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It Is Time to Revise Russia–Turkey Relations for a More Stable Future

Timur Akhmetov

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With ongoing debates on Russian-made S-400 deliveries to Turkey, fate of continuing cooperation of Russia, Turkey and Iran in Syria and future of Ankara’s relations with the European Union and NATO, it is high time to make an honest review of Russian-Turkish relations, define weaknesses of bilateral cooperation and try to sketch a framework for a better future. Inspection of historical legacy and nature of current ties may be of big value for those who want to grasp contours of common future. Analysis of existing political constellations in both countries, study of actors who shape or strive to shape bilateral relations and investigation of today’s cases of regional cooperation between Turkey and Russia may further contribute to explaining trajectory of bilateral relations.

Historical background

During the first years of the Russia–Turkey relations after the collapse of the Soviet Union were defined by views of leaderships that were formed during the Cold war era. In the aftermath of the Independence War, Kemalist regime viewed its ties with the Soviet Union as a political alternative for Ankara’s relations with the European countries. The balanced approach in cooperation with the Soviets was gradually complicated by Moscow’s insistence upon Ataturk to redesign Turkey’s political regime according to the socialist principles. Left-leaning members of the Kemalist establishment came to support this idea.

Relations with Moscow were further marred after 1945 with the USSR threatening to reconsider the Straits regime and change Turkey’s eastern borders. Later, Soviet officials in later did confirm that Stalin’s insistence was a primary reason for Turkey’s decision to ally itself with Western powers. The Soviet Union interpreted Turkish participation in the Marshall plan, membership in the NATO under the Eisenhower Doctrine were as a further step to get security guarantees in face of the Soviet threats. On the other hand, it also prompted Moscow to consider Turkey’s foreign policy as being to a large extent defined by the NATO strategic plans rather than national interests.

The crisis in Turkey’s relations with its traditional allies over the Cyprus issue in 1964 and later in 1974 showed the Soviets that Turkey was increasingly diverging from the western line. The Soviets saw this situation as an opportunity to relaunch contacts with Ankara. From the mid 1970-s, the relations between the USSR and Turkey started gaining their own logic and that was largely expressed in trade, gas, and technology exchange cooperation. Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and Moscow’s support for the Workers’ Party of Kurdistan, on the other hand, didn’t allow these improvements to gain larger potency.

Gradual transformation from competition to cooperation

It is against this background that bilateral relations were developing in the 1990s. Political elites in both countries were still thinking in terms of bipolar confrontation and felt a lot of distrust towards each other. On the other hand, both countries were experiencing profound difficulty in finding their places in a new world defined by instability around their borders and lack of acceptable set of rules of global political engagement.

Areas that Russian elites viewed as Russia’s traditional sphere of influence were witnessing increased involvement of Western and global players. Growing instability in the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Balkans did not allow both countries to reshape their perception of each other and find a common ground. Relations were further complicated by the fact that Russia perceived Turkey as a tool in the hands of Western powers to minimize Russian presence.

With regard to the Caucasus and Central Asia, Turkey had very good potential to become a driver of positive political and economic changes. With the fall of the Soviet Union and collapse of bipolar competition Turkey lost its strategic importance in the Western eyes and this fact made Turkish elites look for areas where Turkey could be again an important ally.

By the 1990s it was evident that the countries’ elites were gradually moving from confrontation and competition, concentrating on areas that were mutually benefiting. Two points should be stressed here: this decision was a result of political will and had non-partisan character meaning that this approach enjoyed legitimacy among broader groups of political elites. Secondly, problematic areas in bilateral relations were not resolved or given increased attention but rather mitigated and pushed from the agenda.

Since the later years of the Cold war, certain areas have been pushing both countries to more cooperation and trust. These areas became relevant in the Russia–Turkey relations as well. Trade agreements on gas were a primary area where both countries had a chance to prove themselves as reliable partners. For Turkey, it was important to get stable contracts on gas deliveries for its growing economy during 1990s. For Russia, it was important to have Turkey as a reliable transit partner for its gas supplies to the European markets.

Economic cooperation and increasing mutual interdependence stimulated contacts in other areas, including construction. Turkish companies became especially famous in Russia for their road building technologies, and Russian companies were welcomed in Turkey due to their know-hows in building of large infrastructure objects like factories, dams, channels, or nuclear plants. Further areas included production and manufacture facilities in Russia, especially in culturally affiliated republics like Tatarstan.

Political leadership

It is important to note that since 2000s cooperation in these areas didn’t lead to increasing influence or effectiveness of lobbying among economic groups. Many experts point to the considerable control of formal politics over the business in both countries: with exemption big economic projects like Akkuyu NPP or TurkStream gas pipeline, economic and business ties don’t define political agenda between Turkey and Russia, commercial activity heavily dependent on political decisions and rapport. Although, this is less relevant for Turkish case since in Turkish export to Russia dominate goods and products produced by a large number of smaller local producers.

Predominance of political leadership in channelling of the bilateral relations is another dimension. Heads of state in Turkey and Russia are viewed as key actors who define bilateral relations. This also suggests that relations lack deeper institutionalization despite rich scope of agreements signed in the last 15 years: Moscow and Ankara are struggling to bring bilateral relations onto more stable and rigid foundation, which makes relations susceptible to situational politics. The establishment of the High-Level Cooperation Council in 2010, i.e. 20 years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, shows how slow the progress in this direction really is.

The lack of stable institutional base is coupled with the lack of unity in ideological views on a series of issues dealing with global and regional agendas. Turkey’s foreign policy is defined by personal interests of the country’s leadership, who has been trying to consolidate power within close circle of people loyal to Erdogan. Foreign policy decision-making process in both countries is very personalized: even though bilateral relations are not driven by common values and norms, as in the Turkey–NATO relations in their best years, both Moscow and Ankara may pursue personal political gains.

Nevertheless, it is important to underline that principle shift towards more cooperation may have deeper roots than solely the will of political leadership: rapprochement between Turkey and Russia started in 1997–1998, i.e. before Putin and Erdogan came to power. This observation is further confirmed by the fact that during these years both Ankara and Moscow decided to give up on using Chechen and Kurdish issues to pressure each other in other political questions.

Eurasianism and other groups of influence in Russia–Turkey ties

One of the ideological premises that many observers attribute to bilateral cooperation is the idea of Eurasianism. The concept is widely used in discussions on current state and the future of bilateral relations. The analysis of how elites understand Eurasianism in both countries reveals that there are both commonalities and differences. Russian and Turkish elites tend to view Eurasianism as a suitable ideological semantic tool to express their common desire to put their relations on ideational base. Further commonality includes the idea that Eurasian powers are destined to unite in order to challenge the West or at least to resist the pressure from the Western liberal democracies.

At the same time, there are considerable differences in what the elites understand under Eurasianism. In Russian case, Eurasianism was an ideological tool to protect Russian traditional sphere of influence by bringing local societies together under Russia’s guidance. For Turkish elites, primarily among left-leaning anti-imperialist politicians, Eurasianism is a way to challenge Turkey’s overly serious dependence from the West and to seek support from non-Western powers in resolving existing problems. Eurasianism is also popular among some of pan-Turanists and pan-Turkists, who channel their attention to the geographical regions covered by Eurasian ideology.

It can be said that Eurasianism is supported by small part of political elites in Turkey: after the 1990s, Turkey realized that it has a very limited scope of influence in the core of Eurasia, Central Asia and Russia, meaning that Turkey can be a part of Eurasia, but not its leading power.

Another aspect that defines bilateral relations is the attitudes to power and ability to influence regional politics is also. Both Turkey and Russia can be considered as rising powers who want to redefine rules of game of global and regional politics, established after the Cold war largely without much involvement and contribution of the latter two. These rising power demand recognition as rightful players in global politics. With consolidation of political regimes in Turkey and Russia, elites in both countries are becoming increasingly allergic to Western pressure and criticism and, therefore, tend to counter-balance these challenges by improving their own international stance and by developing closer ties with other rising powers.

Still, it is important to emphasize several crucial points. Eurasianists include very different political groups with different understanding of this ideology itself. In Turkey, the label Eurasianist may unite anti-Western and pro-Russian groups. However, this does not imply that being anti-Western automatically refers to being pro-Russian. On the other hand, the group is attractive for left-leaning activists, even though there are aspects of right ideology of pan-Turanism and pan-Turkism in it.

Another important point is a scope of real influence of the Eurasianists. For decades, the group around Perinçek has managed to consolidate around its political platform many influential former military officers and wage successful media campaigns, their influence and, most importantly, access to the decision-making process remains, however, very limited. The fact that this group failed to prevent escalation between Turkey and Russian right after the jet crisis in November 2015 despite all its mediation efforts and alleged contacts with Russian side may indicate their limited influence on politics in Turkey. The influence of this political group may depend on current reforms of the Armed Forces where Turkish government is trying to establish new rules of the game making it harder for the officers to exert their political influence.

Thirdly, it is important to understand why Perinçek group in Turkey is popular today and enjoys benevolence of the ruling party despite its criticism of the current Turkish foreign policy and domestic policies of the AKP. One way to answer this question is to consider assumption that AKP doesn’t attach to ties with Russia strategic importance, using it merely as an instrument, implying that today’s rapprochement is driven by current international conditions where Turkey is experiencing lack of dialogue with its Western partners and, thus, feels increasingly isolated. On the other hand, it is fair to say as well, that Erdogan may be allowing the Perinçek group as much freedom mainly to communicate to the Russians red lines of cooperation that Turkey may have in many areas of mutual interests like Kurdish issue in Syria.

It is important to mention the role that other groups are playing in formation of bilateral official dialogue, be it negative or positive. Business circles represent the most potent forces that can in theory exert a level of influence. A number of Turkish construction companies like Ant Yapi, Renaissance Construstion, Enka, Limak, Costa Group are working and successfully expand its presence in the Russian market: in 1972–2016 Turkish companies participated in 8755 projects around the world with total value of USD 325 billion among them 1939 projects worth $64.8 billion in the Russian Federation. Naturally, Turkish companies operating in Russia have gained experience in handling with local political establishment and bureaucracy, sometimes engaging in non-transparent business schemes. This laid a foundation for further ties and connections with politicians on federal level.

But still, even if Turkish companies have limited influence in Russia, they are unlikely to have a say in strategic decision-making process, especially on security related issues. This could be seen from their participation in construction of very profitable objects. Russian business circles, with exception of energy and automobile giants like Gazprom, Rosatom, Gaz, is very poorly represented in Turkey and has very limited experience in dealing with Turkish clients with their own cultural specifics.

Another group that can influence bilateral relations are ethnic minorities. Historically, Turkey hosted refugees and emigrants from Russian Empire, Soviet Union and later Russian Federation. Today, groups like Crimean Tatars, Circassians, North Caucasian diasporas influence public opinion on Russia in Turkey, though their activity is limited due do strict Turkish nationalism and firm grip of current ruling party on media and public demonstrations. These groups may find themselves in the center of new frictions between Russia and Turkey, especially considering the ongoing migration of foreign fighters from Syria back to Turkey and Western Ukraine. Religious groups like South Caucasian Salafist networks still can pose a danger to Russian national security from Turkey thought its presence in Georgia and western Ukraine. Existence of sympathizers to the groups’ cause among Turkish bureaucracy may further complicate Russian-Turkish rapprochement and attempts to strengthen anti-terrorism cooperation.

The role of the West and third countries in dynamics of bilateral relations

Russia and Turkey perceive bilateral cooperation over gas supplies and Akkuyu nuclear plant as almost an ideal platform to improve their negotiating positions vis-à-vis the European Union. For Turkey, better terms for gas deliveries from Russia and Russian assistance in building of the nuclear facilities have direct implications for the long-term economic development plans, as Turkish government is expecting a rise in energy demands. On the other hand, Russia gets stable revenues from its exports to Turkey, a good asset for its budget stability in times of Western sanctions and pressures on domestic economic plans. All of this indicates that economic cooperation contributes to advancement of their negotiating positions via-a-vis Europe and the US.

By the same token, Russia has been using Turkey’s support on multiple issues as a very effective asset in its own competition against the NATO. For Russian elites, Turkey’s independence from the Western alliance is very important. A number of Turkish experts emphasized the fact that Turkey didn’t join Western sanctions imposed on Russia in 2014.

While both leading actors want to gain more influence in the global politics, this transformation, however, will not come without problems for bilateral relations. Turkish elites seem to have accepted the fact that without considerable Western backing Turkey has very limited room for action in the Central Asia. This approach is further nuanced by claims that Turkey is aware that its relations with Russia are uneven, especially in military and diplomatic terms, therefore, when and where possible, Ankara would like to counteract Russian dominance through soft-balancing, expanding discussions of NATO–Turkey cooperation, for example, in Georgia or Azerbaijan. Russian military build-up in the Black Sea is also causing concerns in Turkey. This claim can be related to the ongoing efforts of the Turkish government to increase navy capacities in territorial waters.

Another interesting point in terms of influence of the third parties in the bilateral relations is the role of the Central Asian leaders in this process. These leaders are forced to mediate between the two because of their political reliance on Russia and cultural affinity to Turkey. There are, however, tendencies in Russian policies to minimize Turkic solidarity with Turkey among Russian Turkic communities.

Informal dimension of bilateral relations

Despite political elites’ vocal support for and visible official efforts to strengthen non-official bilateral ties, connections between private parties, NGOs, and academia exert limited influence on official relations between Russia and Turkey. Primary reason behind this lies in systemic position of civil society in decision-making process in each country. According to experts, scholars, who make research on bilateral relations, often lack necessary linguistic skills. There is still ideological bias in many academic circles, both in Russia and Turkey as well. For example, sometimes, scholars, who write on bilateral relations, do it in a form to confirm their personal, professional, political loyalty to institutions or movements, meaning that the scope and tone of analysis may eventually change according to the agenda. That is why many Turkish or Russian speaking scholar prefer engaging in history and culture studies rather than doing research on current political affairs. There are problems of insufficient funding and institutionalization between academia in Turkey and Russia as well.

Civil war in Syria

Nowadays, Russia seems to be rediscovering itself as a global power again. Russian elites are eagerly engaged in the Middle East, and state-supported energy and military companies increase their impact in the regional political landscape. On the other hand, Middle East became by the matter of choice an area of foreign policy activism of Turkish elites.The AKP government has been increasing gaining self-confidence in dealing with regional issues, possibly, hoping that cultural and geographical proximity to local population may be translated into real life political and economic gains for Turkey.

Syria was possibly the prime example of recent regional activism of Turkey, but civil war changed this approach with rising instability threatening Turkish security and coming of many new global and regional players in the conflict. The problem for the Russian-Turkish relations is that Syria turned out to be an area where Russian and Turkish interests clashed. But eventually increasing number of challenges transformed foreign policy dynamics in Turkey, and securitization of the process led to re-evalutation of priorities, where closer contacts with Russia became to be seen as one of the channels to enhance security situation on Turkish borders. Moscow positively reacted to Turkish concerns over the PKK/Kurdish issues, seeing them as a legitimate topic of discussions with Turkey.

As far as we can see today, Turkish elites are trying to adapt to new realities by getting used to Russian presence. Watching NATO allies increasingly abandon Ankara, Turkish elites are trying to become more active in broadening areas of cooperation with Russia and Iran. Judging by the lessons from the past, Turkey and Russia are able to find a common solution and acknowledge their corresponding legitimate interests and concerns. Turkey’s cooperation with Russia is a tactical phenomenon that was caused by Western partners’ inability to show solidarity on many occasions and to act against Russia.

Differences over political issues like the fate of Assad’s regime or scope of rights for Kurds may be pushed from the agenda in the mid-term, allowing bilateral cooperation on Syria to be focused on economic matters like reconstruction, trade, energy projects. These are the areas that are important for Russian plans to rebuild Syria and that Turkey can be interested in as well. Still, Turkey would like to keep supporting opposition, because, otherwise it would have to deal with Assad through Russian mediation therefore falling into more dependence on Moscow.

Conclusion

Even though one may witness rapid development of political ties between Turkey and Russia in recent years, relations are not immune to unforeseeable shocks. Heavy accent on political dialogue, political connections and consultations between the governments may be of great importance in general, but at times reveal that it is insufficient for development of full-fledged relations. Today’s cooperation between Moscow and Ankara in Syria serves as a good platform for both to test their political trust and to learn to listen to each other’s concerns, which so far have been largely ignored or pushed out of the agenda. Despite current existing moods in Europe and the United States on Turkey planning to leave the NATO, analysis of historical legacy and present situation in the world suggest that Turkey neither would prefer nor would afford to leave the Western security and political structures. On the other hand, Turkey’s rapprochement with the West would not be necessarily against interests of Russia. Interconnectedness of Turkey with Europe and USA may be of good utility for Russian global foreign policy. Current positive dialogue, however, should be used to include non-state non-official players and give them space to direct and shape bilateral relations. Their presence and contribution would be a best guarantee against political fluctuations which we will definitely witness in the future.

First published in our partner RIAC

Timur Akhmetov is a Turkey-based Russian researcher and freelance journalist specializing in Turkish-Russian relations. He is a Turkey expert at the Russian International Affairs Council and has previously interned at the Russian Institute for Strategic Studies, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the International Strategic Research Organization in Ankara.

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Russia–Africa Economic Forum and Summit Organizing Committee Holds Meeting in Moscow

Kester Kenn Klomegah

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The Organizing Committee in charge of preparing for and holding the Russia-Africa Economic Forum and Summit in the Russian Federation in 2019 has held a meeting in Moscow. The meeting was chaired by Russian Presidential Aide Yury Ushakov and attended by Advisor to the Russian President Anton Kobyakov, Roscongress Foundation CEO Alexander Stuglev, Russian Deputy Minister of Finance Sergey Storchak, and Special Representative of the Russian President for the Middle East and Africa and Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Mikhail Bogdanov. The meeting was also attended by representatives of ministries and departments that are involved in preparing for the events.

The meeting participants discussed organizational issues concerning preparations for business and protocol events as well as their specific details. Ushakov reiterated just how monumental and important the upcoming events in the Russia-Africa format are. “The organization of the Forum is a serious first step towards our economic and political return to Africa. To date, 50 African heads of state have already confirmed they will be attending the Forum, which is a great success,” he said.

“Preparations for the most important events in the history of Russian-African relations have reached the finish line. A quarter of the world’s heads of state will come to Russia to discuss initiatives and strengthen Russian-African relations. I am certain that the participants in the Russia-Africa Economic Forum and the Summit will demonstrate a readiness to cooperate and develop joint projects in the Eurasian and African spaces, as evidenced not only by their active cooperation during the preparatory stage, but also by the number of them who have confirmed,” said Kobyakov, who serves as the Executive Secretary of the Organizing Committee.

“It is essential that Russia-Africa Summit and Forum produce an economic effect, among other things. We have carried out a lot of work to provide the African side with information. We have prepared a large package of Russian expertise and products in 12 areas. Presentations will be given for heads of state and delegates by the leaders of such companies as Rosatom, Russian Railways, Rosgeo, VTB, and others. They will present the opportunities that can be offered to African countries and so having such a large number of leaders take part in the events is a unique opportunity us to realize economic potential,” Russian Minister of Economic Development Maxim Oreshkin said.

The main event of the Russia-Africa Forum will be the plenary session ‘Russia– Africa: Uncovering the Potential for Cooperation’ during which the presidents of Russia and Egypt are expected to speak. A final declaration of the Summit titled ‘For Peace, Security, and Development’ has been drafted and includes items on the global and regional agendas that are important to Russia as well as proposals on ways to develop the full scope of Russian-African relations.

“At least 23 intergovernmental and interagency agreements and other agreements between African and Russian companies are expected to be signed on the sidelines of the Forum. The Forum will be held under the slogan ‘For Peace, Security, and Development’, which can serve as the foundation of the Summit’s final declaration and was drawn up in cooperation with the participating countries,” Bogdanov said.

The Roscongress Foundation is the organizer of the events, and the Russian Export Center and Afreximbank are the co-organizers.

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Weimar 2.0 and Russia

Alexander Kramarenko

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Power is always a sophisticated and ambiguous exercise in its own disappearance.-Les Strategies Fatales, Jean Baudrillard

For a number of years already in the West, and in Europe in particular, they talk of Weimar or Weimar syndrome alluding to the rise of the protest “populism”, collapse of political centre and the outcomes of direct democracy (meaning not only the referendum in Britain on Brexit, but the Trump phenomenon as well, i.e. his doing away with all intermediaries, be it party machine, traditional media or donors, in communicating with his electorate). That refers us to the collapse of the Weimar Republic and the Nazis coming to power in Germany. In our case it is already about the fruits, by which they judge the tree. This Weimar tree is neoliberal economics, represented by reaganomics/thatcherism and the Lisbon Agenda of the EU, which has been destroying Western societies for the past 30 years. So, one ought to have started talking of Weimar at least in 2008 when struck the Global Financial Crisis being doused since then with printing money (so-called “quantitative easying”). They realized that there was a problem only when the crisis made itself felt in politics which became averaged, alternative-free and, thus, lost any sense or relevance for the electorate. People lost their trust in traditional media, and social nets restored to the “silent majority” their say in public affairs and provided them with a means of self-organization beyond the elites’ control.

Liberal capitalism which reproduces and aggravates inequality brought about the Great Depression and led to WWII. But prior to that the contradictions within a society eradicating illiteracy fast, and the globalization, at the time imperialist, resulted in WWI. In our time all things tend to accelerate and, thus, we witness two parallel and intertwined processes, i.e. those of neoliberal economics and globalization both driven by the interests of the investment classes. While marching back to the future, should we be surprised by the outcomes? Now that war has run its course as a form of collective consumption, it has been replaced with the social state, which, however, has largely come under suspicion at the suggestion of the Anglo-Saxon nations. That turned the crisis into a protracted and irresolvable (French sans issu is closer to the Russian original) affair, all the more so that the elites espousing neoliberalism wouldn’t admit to its contemporary Weimar origins.

The US and Britain bet on further tightening neo-liberal screws, which includes cutting taxes and taxes on business among others. This is how Brexit makes sense as a mobilization project of the elites. After all, liberal capitalism is their creature, as well as, by the way, globalization which is being closed down for being obsolete and for its “mixed results”, particularly the rise of China and the rest. Given the size of their government budgets in relation to the GDP, the EU cannot afford those cuts: if it ever engages in competition on those terms, the social state would crumble and peace in Europe gone with it. Thus, the past bipolarity resurfaces in the Western community, with the poles exchanging the values they stood for if compared to the two world wars. The EU/Germany are now on the side of democracy and social justice, and the Anglo-Americans willing to throw themselves and all the rest into the dark Hobbesian world of the period between two wars with respective consequences not only for society but also for international relations.

Unlike in the past century, there is no need to invent a bicycle and pay with blood for the experience. We’ve got, simply, to find ways to preserve the social state under the new circumstances, while reaching the same goal of making market economy compatible with representative democracy of universal suffrage. The talk of fascist threat is not groundless though not all the “populists” come under the definition. Their further evolution is difficult to predict, but the lessons of history remain valid – neither culture nor civilization couldn’t prevent our continent’s descent into barbarism in the past. All the more so that after the Cold War end the universal meaning of George Orwell’s dystopias dawned upon us.

No doubt, the US and Britain, historically attached to hard socio-economic policies, will continue along that path. Brexit is inevitable due both to the democratic mandate of the referendum and the special nature of the British constitutional system with the executive power fully vested in the government, while traditions are also on the side of Prime Minister Boris Johnson. But the departure of the British might serve a powerful mobilizing push for European elites, stuck in their obsession with the status quo. It would wake them up to the reality and the need to take measures to save the integration project, its future depending to a great extent on the Germans. The Germans will have to pay for preservation of the Euro-zone for its collapse and return of the Mark would bring about economic disaster of Germany making her defenseless in the face of the Anglo-Saxon onslaught. The fact that they succeeded in “stopping” M.Salvini, having avoided holding general elections in Italy, is a poor consolation and cannot be a sound substitute for further systemic strengthening of the European integration which plainly cannot remain stuck in the present limbo for long.

How should Russia position herself in this context? We need Europe in peace with itself. We are in a position to shape such a Europe, which we have been doing over the past three centuries, including at critical moments of its history. There were errors as well, for example, when the Comintern underestimated the danger of Nazism and drew lessons from that at its VII Congress, which was late for all. We cannot afford to make that error again, even if we will have to wait for the European political mainstream to understand that one has to change for things to stay as they are. Conventional wars are out of date in the West, being replaced by trade and currency wars. And here Russia must be on the side of the united Europe providing the EU with a strategic depth by way of intensified trade, economic and investment cooperation, as well as a Eurasian entry to East Asia and South-East Asia. It is in our national interest to have an alternative to the dollar in the global monetary and financial system: here, like in other matters, complexity/diversity amounts to freedom (according to Dmitry Bykov).

Together with us, it will be easier for Europe to stand her ground in the face of Washington’s demands that it supports American Military-Industrial Complex with her taxpayers’ money. Thus, the ghost of war would finally be driven out of European politics. The cause of peace is hugely helped by the fact that, judging by recent events, the American weapons developed in the absence of competitive environment in the area of hard force politics, say F-35s and Patriots, in reality turn out to be badly wanting, sort of Baudrillard’s signs of weapons, not real ones fit for real war.

Fortunately, we have been spared the fate of living under direct oligarchic rule (Berezovsky, Khodorkovsky, etc), which makes it so easy to administer Ukraine from outside. Like early in the XXth Century, the Russian authorities preserve their freedom of Bonapartist maneuver, i.e. the ability to stay above the propertied interests. Russia did march towards fascism on the eve of the 1917 Revolution, which made of our country the chief tool of victory over those countries where fascism prevailed in the final count. Ways of History are unfathomable! The Russian proto-fascist figures who emigrated abroad took part in the Nazi project of the West. We have got to remember that and treat with caution the ideological legacy of our emigration (the People’s Labour Union, used by both the Germans and the Americans has not disappeared), as well as the efforts of those trying to pass fascism for a “Russian idea.” History has shown that fascism is not “our cup of tea.” All the progressive ideas of our time, be it existentialism, communicative action or postmodernism in its various shades, are rooted in Dostoevsky’s philosophy and fiction. What other ideas do we want?

After 1989 and 1991, we dived into the wrong type of capitalism, not socialism/capitalism with a human face (Swedish, German, etc) that we had dreamed of. Some liked it, but far from everybody. That is why we have many problems in common with Europe, those that generate states of inequality and despair, other forms of alienation. They are easier to solve together. We can draw lessons from each other’s mistakes. If we take the pensions reform in France, something could be prompted by the experience of the similar reform in Russia. It has led to a substantial rise in the over-all uncertainty in the country, which might continue well into the 2024 elections, unless a broad maneuver is undertaken at the level of socio-economic policies to improve standards of living and, accordingly, increase the stagnating consumer demand.

These are the reasons why the normalization of the political relationship with the EU is, unreservedly, an imperative for both sides, especially so against the background of the normalization underway between Washington and Minsk. The road lies through settlement of the Ukrainian crisis, which the Presidents of Russia and France are closely working for. Liberalism is no obstacle if it is an idea amongst others, not a dogma. Quite obviously, the words “liberal” and “order” are utterly at odds. No government in Europe is interested in a situation where it equals itself, contrary to Baudrillard’s warning. We had it between two wars in Europe, what other Weimar do we need to get us understand that?

From our partner RIAC

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Russia and China: New Silent War against US deception

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In the doctrine of world politics, US scholars and Political leaders are truly believe, after the entire world, especially Western society, would experience the devastations of world wars, nuclear weapons, and the “balance of terror” during the Cold War; deal with some international issues, or at least push the other powers to make concessions diplomatically and cooperatively . Economic and cultural conflicts have emerged, and soft power has become one of the most sophisticated weapons of many post-Soviet states.

Over past decade or so, new types of warfare and strategies include the “Silent War”, which takes place in the interfaces between peace and war, and in a geo-strategically arena between hidden defensive action and offensive force. It is a war on multiple zone strategies than one and specific tactical arena at the same time. Their speed and effective power are often terrifying.

Yet, As Jim Sciutto, A national security expert and CNN’s chief correspondent, pointed out on his new entitled book “The Shadow War: Inside the Secret Russian and Chinese Operations to Defeat America.” It shows the measures of the secret war to undermined US foreign policy and lessening America’s status and credibility led by Russia and China against the United States, which ended up in very significant outcomes.

Cryptic vision

Those who tend to believe in “Silent War” doesn’t exist or recognized among big power politics, this cryptically war reveals that the United States is in a state of virtual war waged by Russia without recognition, taking aggressive move against Washington and its allies, from cyberspace to outer space, and around the world. US military policymakers, national security officials and political analysts convincingly understand Moscow as a clear adversary of their homeland security.

However, opinion takes a census to indicate that the American public does not fully understand what’s going on behind this scene, especially since President “Donald Trump” did not act in front of the Americans according to that fact, and did not acknowledge that Russia’s actions pose a threat to the US soil.

To certain extent, The international relations scholars acknowledge that this skepticism is an essential move of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s plan, as the American confusion is the outcome and the main goal of a new kind of silent war by Moscow, a campaign systematically targeting American politics and society which is  divided American political ideologies and interrupt American Democratic Community. Therefore, its economy, media environment, and voting systems depend on weak electronic state propagandas technologies.

Additionally, that the goal of this campaign is to attack American interests and undermine US’s foreign policy at the international stage, which means that in the current situation Washington does not prompt to make a military response, and then over time Russia is working to extend this silent strategy even further. As Valery Gerasimov (Chief of Staff of the Russian Armed Forces) clarified the aim of the “Silent War” which is to build up a “permanent front across the territory of the enemy state”.

The Silent War Strategies of the Russian perspective

This is quite superficial with regards to the paper published in 2013 entitled “The value of science in reading the future,” by Gerasimov highlighted that Russian government today is applying new strategies and highly effective mechanism in reversing US public opinion, especially through the social media. During the Cold War, Moscow had inadequate tools to manipulate American public opinion or interfere in American political campaigns. But the emergence of high tech and media platform created vast opportunities for them, and unsafe email systems became also benefit for hackers to take apart with governments in campaigns.

Due to this, some overseas political analysts mentioned that during January 2017, Russia fully intervened in the 2016 US presidential election in order “to discredit and disqualify Hillary Clinton, with a clear preference for President-elect Donald Trump.” The analysts add that Russia tried hard to interfere in the November 2018 congressional elections, and all the evidence suggests that Russia eagerly will do the same in the upcoming 2020 presidential election.

At the same time, Russian military preparations continue, with Moscow deploying in outer space weapons designed to destroy American satellites, which have become the foundations of American military and economic supremacy globally. Below the oceans, two new categories of attack submarines and ballistic missiles have been deployed. It is, therefore, better able to expand the nuclear threat to US shores.

On land, Russia invaded and occupied territory in sovereign states, including Ukraine and Georgia, and attempted a coup in Montenegro, threatening treaties and the rule of law that helped maintain peace in Europe for decades.

As noted, the Russian have annexed Crimea in 2014 in clear violation of its peace agreement with Ukraine, the United States, and Europe. Months later, it occupied and seized large lands of eastern Ukraine. In both cases, Moscow sent special forces, pretending not to be regular soldiers in the Russian army, and appeared in non-uniform, and their argument was just to help citizens of Russian origin there who fear for their safety and sustain their protections.

Actually, in last year (2018) an article published by author Gerasimov was severely describing the precise and effectiveness of strategies and tactics that Russian would soon use, pointing out that: “The open use of forces to sustain peace is often under the hands of UN Peacekeeping mission and crisis management are used only at a certain stage, as a final stage in achieving success in any armed conflict or unstable circumstances. “

Chinese rise strategy

With a new strategy concept turned in world order, “It is no coincidence that China is pursuing a strategy that is almost identical to that of Russia, with similar objectives, from expanding in world trade and government bilateral cooperations to the United States to seizing areas of the disputed South China Sea to its sovereignty, and even to its militarization, to the deployment of high effective missiles.

Surely enough, according to the author, American big companies, even though they are fully aware of Chinese trade abduction and marketing diversion, sometimes those large trading firms are refuse to seek US government for help, or identify Internet violations, for fear of isolating their Chinese partners or losing full access to the Chinese market altogether. therefore “China’s rise strategy propagates and plans to enlarge sows of fear on US deception towards her,” Jim Sciutto points out.

In return for Chinese efforts, the Barack Obama administration did not respond appropriately to Beijing, nor did it properly handle Chinese militarization efforts in the South China Sea. The former US president merely took personal promises from Chinese President Xi Jinping.

Ways of contest

So far, The United States is adjusting its political strategy and foreign policy measures abroad to address these new threats and intimidations especial from big powers. Jim Sciutto confirms that he met several Americans aboard submarines and surveillance aircraft, in NSA operations centers, and in various air overseas bases, all of whom acknowledge silent war is going to take place in this era and also they are becoming aware of the dimensions of Russian-Chinese hostility, and their war against Washington. American people, military leaders, and legislators all agree that an effective and urgent response requires to come from US leadership.

Despite the failures of some of the overseas policies and decision-making plans of the administrations of “Barack Obama” and “George W. Bush”; a many of decision-makers argue that they faced at least Russia directly during its most serious acts of aggression. Condoleezza Rice, the former secretary of state, noted in the Washington Post on August 2018, on the tenth anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Georgia, that the Bush administration had returned Georgian troops from Iraq to help protect Tbilisi. It said it had personally warned Russian Foreign Minister “Sergei Lavrov” of the removal of “Mikheil Saakashvili,” Georgia’s democratically elected president.

Additionally, Some high ranking officials say that “Obama” has advised “Putin” personally twice from interfering in the American elections; the first was in a face-to-face conversation at the G20 summit in China on September 2016, and the second one was eight days before the presidential election in a phone call talks in order to help to prevent world nuclear confrontations.

In contrary, President Trump has shown much fewer concerns to confront Russian and has frequently wondered whether Russia is really an enemy. According to some sayings from within his current administration, his unwillingness to encounter the Russian threat is partly motivated by the perception that recognition of Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election will discredit his nomination of being the new president.

Despite the ignorance and inexperience of “Trump” of the encounter of collusion with big powers particularly Russia, but his continued unwillingness to identify and face the Russian threat greatly hurt US overseas interests, and makes American foreign policy unable to handle its homeland security silent war of the Russian side.

To the end, Jim Sciutto comes up with suggestions on how to deal with Russian and Chinese intimidations more effectively. The author as political analysts does not argue that win Silent war will be easy at all but needs new investments and developments in next-generation weapons systems, such as supersonic weapons. He added that investing in conventional weapons, like warships and aircraft carriers, is not enough to maintain US standing and domination of the international system.

Let’s see how the Trump leadership in this Silent War reacts to the threat of their big power and to what extent American foreign policymakers could absorb American public opinion towards Trump’s failed overseas policies.

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