Authors: George Kamiya and Jacob Teter*
Automated driving and shared mobility could dramatically reshape road transport over the coming decades, with major implications for vehicle electrification and the broader electricity system. But can we assume that shared and/or autonomous vehicles of the future will be electric?
While electric vehicles (EVs) tend to be more expensive to purchase, they have lower fuel and maintenance costs than conventional vehicles. As shared and/or autonomous fleets would typically have heavier use patterns than with privately owned vehicles, the lower running costs could make EVs cheaper overall. But whether EVs could fulfil all the operational and technical requirements of shared and/or autonomous vehicles is less certain.
Building upon our look at emerging mobility technologies and services, we discuss the opportunities and challenges of electrifying shared mobility car fleets today and examine prospects for electrifying autonomous vehicles in the future. We explore how we might need to begin to re-think EV-related policies and investments to capitalise on synergies between the three revolutions – sharing, automation and electrification.
Shared and electric?
Car sharing services, which emerged in major cities in the early 2000s, allow members to borrow cars on a short-term basis. As car sharing fleets tend to have shorter trip distance profiles and higher utilisation rates compared to privately owned vehicles, EVs might be a good fit. In fact, several car sharing programs already operate all-electric fleets, including Moov’in.Paris, BlueSG (Singapore), Carma (San Francisco), car2go (Stuttgart, Amsterdam, Madrid, Paris), and DriveNow (Copenhagen).
Most car sharing services operate in one of two ways: free-floating systems where cars can be parked anywhere, or hub/depot services where cars must be left in designated parking spots. In recent years, smartphones and mobile connectivity have made free-floating systems (and by extension one-way journeys) easier to access and pay for.
But free-floating systems using EVs face operational challenges as they rely on a limited number of public fast chargers. These challenges could be overcome through larger batteries, a better-designed charging network (e.g. faster chargers, more stations), or user incentives. In comparison, hub/depot car sharing systems can schedule slower and cheaper charging on their own chargers during vehicle downtimes.
Just as smartphones have changed the way car sharing services operate, they have fostered the rapid expansion of app-based ride-sourcing services provided by so-called transportation network companies (TNCs) such as Uber, Lyft, Didi Chuxing and GrabTaxi. The adoption of EVs in TNC fleets has been slow, despite the significant fuel and maintenance savings potential of EVs for full-time drivers working with TNCs. EV shares on the major ride-sourcing platforms remain below 1% with the exception of Didi at 1.3%, which already has over 400 000 EVs on its network. In California, EVs represented about 1% of vehicle share and trip miles in 2017.
There are also several barriers to EV adoption in taxis and ride-sourcing fleets. First, EVs are generally more expensive to purchase, and few EV models available today meet all the operational requirements of taxis and ride-sourcing services – notably long electric range, seat capacity and large trunk space.
Second, the combination of limited driving range, long charge times, and/or limited access to fast charging can pose challenges – searching for available chargers and long charging times could mean foregone revenues for drivers. Some taxi fleets are demonstrating the use of fuel cell electric vehicles (FCEVs) which could address some of these operational challenges.
Third, TNCs have limited ability to influence purchase decisions of their drivers, including in most jurisdictions where they cannot specify the use of particular vehicle models. But several TNCs are initiating programs to encourage usage of EVs on their platforms. Uber’s Clean Air Program in London provides financial incentives to drivers to switch to or drive more in EVs while Lyft ExpressDrive’s short-term lease options allow drivers to try EVs with little risk. Maven, GM’s car-sharing spin-off, offers a service of short-term rentals of the Chevrolet Bolt BEV to drivers working for TNCs and other shared platforms.
Shifting to EVs for car sharing and TNCs could lead to much larger per-vehicle reductions in GHG and local pollutant emissions compared to privately owned EVs. High utilisation and faster fleet turnover could also help to accelerate battery innovation cycles and more rapid adoption of increasingly efficient vehicles. In addition, given the importance of EV awareness and experience in influencing purchase decisions, the potential exposure of the benefits of electric drive to millions of potential car buyers could indirectly help to increase adoption of privately owned EVs.
Autonomous and electric?
Meanwhile, rapid advances in sensing technologies, connectivity, and AI are bringing highly automated vehicles – autonomous vehicles (AVs) – closer to market. Waymo recently launched their self-driving car service, Waymo One, while major automakers have announced plans to introduce AVs as early as 2020.
Just as with shared mobility and electrification, there are synergies between automation and electrification. With high utilisation rates, commercial fleet applications (where early adoption of AVs seems likely) tend to favour powertrains with lower operations and maintenance costs, including EVs. Well-coordinated fleets of electric AVs may be able to manage challenges around range, access to charging infrastructure, and charging time management. Automated driving technologies may also be easier to implement in EVs due to the greater number of drive-by-wire components.
However, higher utilisation rates of commercial AVs will also mean greater travel distances per day, requiring larger and more expensive battery packs or more frequent recharging (and downtime). AVs may also require significant power consumption to power on-board electronics, though the efficiency of these chips is improving rapidly, from 3‑5 kW in the first generation to less than 1 kW today.
While there is considerable debate regarding how quickly (and if ever) AVs will enter the mainstream, there are specific use cases where the feasibility and economics favour early adoption. For example, commercial applications where labour costs are high or where automation could enable higher vehicle utilisation (e.g. trucks, buses, taxis and ride-sourcing) have the largest potential for cost-cutting through automation.
Pilots and trials are underway for these applications in over 80 cities around the world, and nearly all are using some form of electrified vehicle. Notable examples include robotaxis from Waymo and nuTonomy/Lyft, autonomous electric shuttles across cities in Europe and North America, and autonomous electric buses in Asia. In California, EVs now account for around 70% of automated vehicle trial miles (mostly plug-in hybrids).
A growing number of trials of autonomous electric urban delivery vehicles are also being undertaken in a number of cities in China and the United States. While testing of autonomous freight trucks has been limited to date, early models and concepts from Einride, Ford, and Volvo suggest a push towards all-electric. Tesla’s all-electric Semi is equipped with Enhanced Autopilot (equating to SAE Level 2 automation), which allows for automatic lane-keeping, forward collision warning, and automatic emergency braking.
Shared, autonomous and electric vehicles… and the grid
Governments, utilities, and other companies are actively working to build out charging infrastructure to support the growing number of EVs. Recent research (here, here, and here) shows how public charging infrastructure in particular will be critical in catalysing further market uptake of personally owned electric cars.
For fleets, their intensive and distinct use patterns imply greater (and different) needs for charging compared to private EVs. The availability and coverage of public and fast chargers could be a critical factor in how quickly these fleets become electric, and how business models evolve around shared and/or automated mobility.
EVs currently make up only about 1% of all passenger cars globally, but clustering effects in EV adoption at the local level, combined with uncoordinated charging, could cause problems for the distribution grid, and eventually require greater investments in power generation and transmission.
A combination of pricing incentives and digital technologies (including, eventually, coordinated discharging of EV batteries) could better coordinate fleet and private charging of EVs, minimising negative grid impacts, reducing CO2 emissions, and providing ancillary services. A transition to shared, automated, and electric vehicle (SAEV) fleets could also yield significant system-wide benefits for the grid, assuming the necessary digital technologies and incentive structures are in place.
Researchers are already looking at how different fleet compositions of SAEVs and charger availability could impact costs, operations, and grid impacts. For instance, fleet simulations in Austin, Texas (2016, 2018); Zurich, Switzerland (2016); Columbus, Ohio (2018); and Tokyo, Japan (2019) have investigated how varying fleet size, electric range, charger speed, and pooling could impact vehicle travel patterns and wait times. As the electric fleets modelled in these simulations begin to roll out in the real world, empirical data will lead to a far more robust and deep understanding of the opportunities and trade-offs of SAEVs.
In the near-term, appropriate data sharing between policy makers, utilities, and fleet operators could help anticipate needs for charging infrastructure as mobility service fleets electrify. Over the long-term, shifts towards SAEV fleets could improve the economics of charging infrastructure by increasing utilisation, promoting faster returns on investments and reducing reliance on subsidies and indirect revenue streams through grid services. Utilities could also explore rate structures that maximise grid benefits. Volumetric energy rates based on hourly wholesale pricing, for instance, may be a promising means of reducing peak loading and promoting charging at times when variable renewables are at their peak.
Policies and strategies to electrify a shared and/or automated future
National, regional, and municipal governments around the world are implementing a range of policies to encourage EV adoption and use. Country (and city)-specific objectives, constraints, and contexts will continue to shape the design of appropriate policy mixes for each jurisdiction.
Purchase incentives have generally been effective in encouraging the purchase of EVs, in turn helping to stimulate investment and bring down costs of battery and EV production. Mandates that car manufacturers produce minimum volumes of EVs (i.e. ZEV mandates) have complemented these by providing supply-side certainty.
But with growing adoption of shared (and potentially autonomous) mobility, the importance of policies designed to more directly incentivise the use of EVs over conventional vehicle travel will grow. These policies could include fuel taxes, zero-emission zones, road pricing, HOV and transit lane access, incentives for electric mobility services, or even restrictions on the use of conventional vehicles. Supporting the build-out of charging infrastructure will continue to be crucial to further EV adoption and use, including fast-charging infrastructure in densely populated metropolises and a robust charging network to support a transition to all-electric fleets. Cities where taxi and bus fleets are already making the transition to electric drive may be able to leverage fast-charging stations built for these fleets to spur a transition to electric shared mobility.
Researchers and policymakers are exploring alternative policy frameworks that could be effective in promoting electrification of shared and, eventually, autonomous fleets. California’s SB-1014 “California Clean Miles Standard and Incentive Program: zero-emission vehicles” approved in September 2018 aims to establish annual emission reduction targets for TNCs per passenger-mile. London’s Ultra Low Emissions Zone encourages for all road users, including fleets, to switch to EVs.
Given the uncertainty in how emerging trends could reshape mobility, policymakers might look to more flexible and forward-looking policies and strategies to get ready for different futures.
There may already be useful lessons learned on EV policy and infrastructure planning from cities with high rates of electrified taxis and buses such as Shenzhen, Amsterdam and Santiago. Electric bus depots or other centralised charging hubs could also serve mobility service fleets of the future, supplementing or even servicing the majority of charging needs. Such hubs could be located outside of cities, where property values (not to mention constraints on high voltage installations) are lower. But there may be systems-level repercussions to relying on such a strategy: it could lead to more traffic congestion and lower operational service efficiency from increased “deadheading”.
Dynamics are likely to differ between cities and geographies, driven by differences in power generation mixes and in mobility patterns. Simulations and case studies can begin to illustrate the levers behind such differences, and to anticipate the potential transformations that might occur if, and when, cars and buses become fully autonomous.
To help inform the design of flexible and forward-looking policies, research needs to continue to improve our understanding of a few key questions:
How do the charging needs of fleets differ from those of privately owned cars and in different geographic contexts? How can public charging infrastructure work to support the electrification of fleets and promote driving on electricity?
How might automated fleets change investment decisions around charging infrastructure, including the economics of wireless charging or battery swapping? What business models, data sharing, or policy is needed to balance charging infrastructure needs to support mobility service fleet operations and grid operations?
What are the energy and emissions implications of various market and regulatory designs of power markets? How can they facilitate the transition to renewable and low-carbon energy generation?
Electrifying vehicles can reduce some of the environmental impacts of mobility, notably local air pollution and greenhouse gas emissions. But other adverse effects on society could be exacerbated by emerging mobility technologies and trends, including congestion, inequality, and mobility access issues. Policy makers will need to implement comprehensive policy packages that guard against these challenges. We will explore these and other critical issues in upcoming commentaries.
*Jacob Teter, Transport Analyst
160 million degrees Celsius reached in China: The artificial Sun
Another important step has been taken by Chinese researchers in developing the ultimate energy source for nuclear fusion.
On May 28, the Experimental Advanced Superconducting Tokamak (EAST), known as the “artificial sun”, operating at the Institute of Materials Science in Hefei (Chinese Academy of Sciences), achieved the new limit of the planet reaching the highest temperature ever recorded.
It reached one hundred and twenty million degrees Celsius, for one minute and 51 seconds. EAST also managed to maintain a temperature of 160 million degrees Celsius for 20 seconds. This is a higher peak than that of the sun’s core, which can reach a limit of 15 million degrees Celsius.
A tokamak (Russian: toroidal’naja kamera s magnitnymi katushkami: Russian acronym for “toroidal chamber with magnetic coils”) is a device which uses a powerful magnetic field to confine plasma in the shape of a torus. Torus is a ring-shaped device in which a hot, rarefied gas (usually hydrogen, in the plasma state) is kept cohesive and away from inner walls by a magnetic field created by electromagnets outside the chamber. It was originally conceptualized and invented in the 1950s by Soviet professor Sadyk Azimovič Azimov (1914-88) and others at the Kurčatov Institute in Moscow.
China’s experimental nuclear fusion device was created in 1998 and was called HT-7U at the time. With a view to making it easier to pronounce and remember, as well as having a precise scientific meaning for national and foreign experts, HT-7U was officially renamed EAST in October 2003.
In 2006, the EAST project was completed in a definitive and higher quality manner. In September-October 2006 and in January-February 2007, the EAST device performed two discharge debugs and successfully achieved stable, repetitive and controllable high-temperature plasmas with various magnetic configurations.
EAST has a nuclear fusion reaction mechanism similar to that of the sun. Its operating principle is to add a small amount of the hydrogen isotope deuterium or tritium to the device’s vacuum chamber and generate plasma through a transformer-like principle, then increase its density and temperature to cause a fusion reaction – a process that generates enormous energy.
Over the ten years since its construction, EAST has continually made progress in the search for controllable nuclear fusion.
In 2009, the first round of EAST tests was successful, thus putting China at the forefront of nuclear fusion research. In February 2016, EAST’s physics tests made another major breakthrough, achieving the longest temperature duration reaching 50 million degrees. In 2018, EAST reached a number of important milestones including 100 million degrees.
This means that mankind has made another major advance in its efforts to turn nuclear fusion into new, clean and inexhaustible energy.
Energy is the fundamental driving force behind the functioning of every aspect of life. The energy used today has many shortcomings and cannot fully meet human needs, while nuclear fusion energy is considered the ideal energy par excellence.
According to calculations, the deuterium contained in one litre of seawater can produce the equivalent of the energy of 300 litres of petrol, released after the nuclear fusion reaction, besides the fact that the product is not harmful. Although it is not a “perpetual motion machine”, nuclear fusion can provide energy for a long time. Not only can Marvel’s hero Iron Man rely on the small reactor in his chest, but also raw materials can be obtained from seawater at an extremely low cost.
The first condition for nuclear fusion is to keep fuel in the fourth state of matter, after solid, liquid and gas – i.e. the plasma state.
When the plasma temperature reaches tens of millions of degrees Celsius or even hundreds of millions of degrees, the atomic nucleus can overcome the repulsive force to carry out the polymerisation reaction. Coupled with sufficient density and a sufficiently long thermal energy confinement time, the nuclear fusion reaction is able to continue steadily.
Nevertheless, it is particularly difficult to achieve both the temperature of hundreds of millions of degrees Celsius and the long-term confinement control of plasma stability.
While recognising that nuclear fusion is the ultimate goal for solving the problem of mankind’s future energy, there is both cooperation and competition in international research.
A sign of cooperation is that on July 28, 2020, a ceremony was held in France to launch the major project to install the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER). The ITER project is jointly implemented by China, the Republic of Korea (South Korea), Japan, India, Russia, the European Union and the United States.
On December 28, 2020, Seoul’s Korea Superconducting Tokamak Advanced Research (KSTAR) set a new world limit at the time and its ionomer maintained a temperature of over 100 million degrees for 20 seconds.
In early 2018, the Plasma Science and Fusion Center at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology had begun designing and building a Soonest/Smallest Private-Funded Affordable Robust Compact fusion reactor more advanced than ITER, with a volume tens of times smaller and significantly reduced in cost. But it remains to be seen whether this goal can be achieved.
Chinese researchers have now achieved significant progress in this field and taken another important step towards obtaining energy from nuclear fusion.
In the future, if the production capacity and energy supply of the “artificial sun” is achieved, it will be another technological revolution that can promote social progress even more than the industrial revolution which, in fact, meant the beginning of pollution for the planet and exploitation by capital.
Although there is still a long way to go before the construction of the naval port on Jupiter described by the Chinese writer, Liu Cixin, in his novel The Three-Body Problem (San Ti), mankind is indeed advancing on the road to controllable nuclear fusion.
Nuclear fusion energy has exceptional advantages in producing rich resources, as well as no carbon emissions, so it is clean and safe. It is one of the ideal energy sources for mankind in the future, and can contribute significantly to achieve the goal of eliminating said carbon.
The two greatest difficulties in generating energy from nuclear fusion lie in regularly reaching hundreds of millions of degrees, and in stable ignition and control of long-term confinement.
For the time being, multiple extreme conditions are highly integrated and organically combined at the same time, but this is very difficult and challenging.
In hitting the record, it is the first time that the EAST device has adopted key technologies such as the first water-cooled all-metal active wall, as well as the high-performance tungsten deflector and high-power wave heating states.
At present, there are over 200 core technologies and nearly 2,000 patents on EAST, bringing together cutting-edge technologies such as ‘ultra-high temperature’, ‘ultra-low temperature’, ‘ultra-high vacuum’, ‘ultra-strong magnetic field’ and ‘ultra-high current’.
The total power is 34 megawatts, which is equivalent to about 68,000 domestic microwave ovens heating up together. For 100 million degrees Celsius and -269 °C to coexist, it is necessary to use “ultra-high vacuum” with an intensity of about one hundredth of a billionth of the surface atmospheric pressure suitable for insulation. With a view to supporting this complex extreme system, almost a million parts and components work together on EAST.
The new EAST record further demonstrates the feasibility of nuclear fusion energy and also lays the physical and engineering foundations for marketing.
Energy on earth, stored in the form of fossil fuels, wind, water or animals and plants, originally comes from the sun. For example, fossil fuels evolved from animals and plants millions of years ago, and their energy ultimately comes from solar energy stored by the photosynthesis of plants at the base of the food chain. Therefore, regardless of the type of energy used by humans, they ultimately use the sun energy that comes from nuclear fusion.
If mankind could master the method for releasing the nuclear fusion energy in an orderly manner, it would be equivalent to controlling the sun energy source. Therefore, this is the reason why the controllable nuclear fusion reactor is called the “artificial sun”.
Personal Privacy and Sovereignty in Social Networks
Discussions about privacy and personal sovereignty in social networks should start with general questions. What is privacy in the context of the human presence in cyberspace? What constitutes personal sovereignty in the digital world? Could a social network have something like sovereignty? Who will defeat whom – a whale or an elephant – if a whale is a network, and an elephant is a state?
We know that the inviolability of private life is a fairly traditional, “analogue” human right, which is guaranteed by the constitutions of many countries throughout the world, including Russia. But in the digital world, in particular in social networks, the “analogue” right to privacy is being transformed into a “digital” individual right, which in reality depends on its recognition by the state, the operator of the social network and the person himself. In turn, both the social network and the person have some signs of sovereignty in cyberspace, and in this regard, they become like the state, almost on the same level, which leads to the emergence of inevitable interactions between them. Much depends on how such “digital” human rights and interactions are regulated in reality, rather than just on paper. Here I mean the inviolability of the digital personality, the right to be forgotten, the right to access information technology, etc.
All these rights are included in a certain commonality, which can be conditionally called the sovereignty of an individual. What constitutes the sovereignty of an individual? First, the recognition of one’s inherent dignity, which, as stated in the preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, is related to “all members of the human family”. Second, as the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation points out, Chapter 2 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation imposes on the state not only the passive duty of abstaining from interfering with the freedom of the individual, but also an active (positive) duty to provide assistance in the practical implementation by an individual of his rights and freedoms. The list of these rights is extensive. However, keeping in mind the topic of our discussion, we will highlight those that are most important for a person in the environment of social networks and Big Data: the right to access the Internet, the right to personal data, the right to be forgotten, the right to access Internet technologies, the right to refuse Internet technologies, the right to mental inviolability, digital privacy, the right to a name, to an image, etc.
In cyberspace, a sovereign person collides with other sovereign entities, and, above all, with the state under whose jurisdiction he resides. State sovereignty, according to the classical doctrine, consists of the supremacy, independence and completeness of state power on its territory. According to the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, the territorial supremacy of state power is expressed in the fact that no other power is allowed within the territory of the Russian Federation, which could exist along with it or outside its control. In this regard, it is quite logical to include in this scheme the so-called sovereign Internet, which, like a certain lagoon, can only be separated from the ocean not by a sand spit, but by the insurmountable barrier of the state border.
A sovereign person also collides with network sovereignty. Does it really exist? There may be different opinions on this issue, but in any case, social networks have certain features of sovereignty. Within the network, the power of its administrator (operator, owner) is characterised by completeness, supremacy, and independence. It has its place in cyberspace, which is like a territory. It also has its own population – users. All of them have accepted user agreements, thereby, entered into the “citizenship of the social network” and pledged to obey these agreements.
At the same time, the social network has properties that the state does not have: a transboundary nature, anonymity, public accessibility, and technological unity. Each of these characteristics deserves a separate analysis.
The transboundary nature of the Internet and, consequently, social networks creates a situation where they exist, so to speak, in parallel with the state, since there is no state territory in cyberspace. However, the people, as noted by the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, form the physical substrate of the state and are identified with the concept of “citizens”; they, in turn, may be users of a social network. Inevitably there must be certain interactions between the social network and the state.
In a sense, the state and the social network compete in extending their sovereignty over the individual. But if the state, according to the Constitution, is obliged to recognise, observe and protect human and civil rights, then the network does not have such an obligation. It imposes responsibilities through the user agreement. Here, too, it resembles a state, which, with the help of laws, self-obliges itself to respect the rights of the individual.
The range of possible options for interactions between the state and the social network is extremely wide: from disregard, which was typical at the time when social networks began to appear, to prohibition and blocking; from soft, compromising regulations to harsh ones. However, the resolution of the conflict with the help of national legislation bumps into the cross-border activity of social networks. In particular, what is an offense in some countries may not be considered an offense in other countries, which means that the imposed restrictions and sanctions against users may turn out to be just, legal and justified in some countries, and illegal, unreasonable, and infringing on the rights and legal interests of users in other countries.
Let’s consider two options for the legal regulation of social networks, implemented in the European Union and the United States. The EU Regulation on Combating the Dissemination of Terrorist Content Online of March 16, 2021, obliges hosting providers to remove illegal content or restrict access to it within an hour after receiving an order from the competent national authorities. In other words, firstly, the obligated subject is not the owner (operator, administrator) of a social network, but a hosting provider that provides services on the territory of a particular EU member state. Secondly, the duty is not to monitor user accounts, but to comply with the requirements of the supervisory authority of the relative state.
In contrast, the US 1996 Communication Decency Act, Section 230 (c) does not impose any obligation on the hosting provider, owner, operator, or administrator of a social network. According to this regulatory legal act, any provider, and therefore the owner (operator, administrator) of a social network is released from responsibility for blocking and deleting materials that the provider considers obscene, depraved, rude, too cruel, harassing or otherwise. So it follows, that the provider has the right, but not the obligation to monitor user accounts. At the same time, he is released from responsibility both for removing or blocking content that he himself considers illegal, and for not removing or blocking content that the state considers illegal. In other words, the provider, on the one hand, is endowed with the rights of the editor-in-chief of the media in relation to user accounts (the right to remove any content), and on the other hand, he is discharged from liability for the content in the user accounts, since he is not an “editor-in-chief” or “publisher of the entire social network, but only “the owner of the fence on which the ads are posted”.
The models are different: in one case, the provider is obliged to comply, in the other – he has the right to take measures to restrict the dissemination of information. The goals are also different: in the first case, we talk about the idea of terrorist content, in the second case – about the free discretion of a bona fide provider, whom the American law compares to the “good Samaritan”. By the way, recently the Communication Decency Act rules were discussed in one of the US Congress committees, where they caused a deep split between Democrats, who demanded more censorship of dangerous and fake content, and Republicans, who opposed internal censorship in the networks.
Comparing the Russian domestic legislative innovations of December 30, 2020, one cannot fail to notice the bifurcation in the will of the legislator. The new version of the federal law “On information, information technologies and information protection” obliges the owner of the social network to monitor and block accounts, that is, to simultaneously act as the editor-in-chief of the media and Roskomnadzor. On the contrary, the new version of the federal law “On measures to influence persons involved in violations of fundamental human rights and freedoms, rights and freedoms of citizens of the Russian Federation” prohibits network owners from blocking user accounts under the threat of reprisals against the network as a whole.
The formulations used in the laws create a paradoxical picture. For example, a user writes on Twitter that someone is a bastard because he lives in Chertanovo district and works at the Zhilishchnik state budgetary institution. If the owner of Twitter does not restrict access to such an account, he will break the information law, and if he does, he will violate the law on measures to influence.
At the same time, the question of the limits of national jurisdiction on the Internet is quite interesting. The EU regulation states that it should apply to all providers that meet two criteria: first, the provider allows individuals or legal entities in one or more EU member states to use its services and, second, the provider has a significant connection with these countries. In turn, a significant connection is confirmed by the fact that the provider is established in the EU, provides services in the EU and its activities are aimed at the EU countries. The latter circumstance can be confirmed, in particular, by such signs as the use of language or currency, the possibility to order goods and services from the EU, presence in the national app stores, and the provision of local advertising.
The Russian domestic legislator also uses some of the listed criteria for the national localisation of an information resource, but inconsistently and haphazardly. Thus, in the law on information the language and advertising are used in relation to social networks and news aggregators, and in relation to search engines and audiovisual services – only the orientation of advertising. At the same time, nowhere can find by what indicators it is possible to determine the orientation of advertising.
So, let’s summarise. First, the choice of a person between the sovereignty of the state and the sovereignty of the network is illusory, because a person is always within the limits of state sovereignty – either by virtue of being in the territory, or by virtue of citizenship. Second, the network presumes the legal capacity and relevance of its users and keeps aloof, within the limits determined by itself, from restricting freedom of thought and speech, the right to information, freedom of conscience, freedom of creativity, etc. Third, guarantees of rights recognised by the state for a person can become a reality on the network only if the network has self-commitments, which can be the result of either a global conventional solution or legislative consolidation at the national level of adequate rules for the regulation of social networks. I would like to note that back in 2010, the relevant committee of the State Duma discussed a bill that was proposed by our UNESCO Chair. It was designed to conceptually solve these problems, but the legislator went along the path of creating the so-called “Law on bloggers”, which, as you know, ended in a fiasco.
From our partner RIAC
Russia and India: Natural Partners in Building a Digital World
Much as for today’s Russia, digital transformation has been one of the priorities for India’s government, its entrepreneurs and the civil society. Despite the turmoil caused by the pandemic, the changes on the path of digitization taking place in Russia and India open up new opportunities for cooperation between the two countries and pose new problems.
Given that forecasts of India’s economic growth are again—as it happened a year ago—downgraded, and the footage of today’s tragic situation in the country dominates TV screens, it is difficult to believe that a significant part of the positive transformations of recent years in India has to be attributed to the technological progress of the Fourth Industrial Revolution, the expansion of knowledge economy and a rapid digitization. However, this remains the case, and a study published recently by the SKOLKOVO Institute for Emerging Markets Studies in cooperation with the Indian School of Business focuses on the digitization aspect of the profound transformation that extends to the Indian economy and society as a whole.
The research report “India Goes Digital. From a local phenomenon to a global influencer” examines the main distinctive features that, as the authors argue, make India’s digitisation profile unique. They include both fairly well-known aspects, such as the system of biometric identification of citizens operational in India, as well as less familiar features, including a close partnership between the state and private businesses in designing and implementing digitization programmes, their impact on the increasing financial inclusion as well as the boom of entrepreneurship, which is also largely associated with the rapid proliferation of digital technologies in India.
The study also examines the impact of digitization on the education sector, critical to India’s development. It explores the great potential that India’s educational companies have; after all, as of today, they are the fastest growing in their segment on a global scale, seeking international expansion, which makes quality education more accessible and effective for both developing and developed countries.
The study provides insights into the companies, institutions and entrepreneurs that make up the emerging digital India. In the segment of the study concerning Russian-Indian cooperation, the authors analyze the experience of Russian businesses in India and argue that it is necessary to strengthen the technological segment within the strategic partnership between Russia and India, which is not only dictated by the present-day requirements but also has a very significant potential.
The Russian-Indian partnership in the era of digital transformation
In 2020, Russia and India celebrated 20 years since the Declaration on Strategic Partnership was signed in New Delhi by Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee and President Vladimir Putin in October 2000. In December 2010, the India-Russia partnership was upgraded to the level of a special and privileged strategic partnership. In April 2019, President Putin signed an executive order, awarding Prime Minister N. Modi the Order of St. Andrew the Apostle the First-Called for his distinguished contribution to the privileged strategic partnership between Russia and India and fostering friendly ties between the Russian and Indian peoples. The strategic status of relations is not exclusive for both countries; however, a profound mutual understanding on most of the issues on the contemporary and historical agendas is a unique feature of the Russian-Indian relations. The annual meeting of the leaders of the two countries did not take place in 2020; however, the next face-to-face summit is reportedly planned for 2021. The views of Moscow and New Delhi on the geopolitical situation in the two most important macroregions—Eurasia and the Asia-Pacific—where both Russia and India play an important role and where the two countries seek to smooth out the emerging divergence in approaches to their future deserve a separate analysis.
In April 2021, it was announced that a “two + two” dialogue with the participation of foreign and defense ministers would be established between Russia and India. India is already working with the United States, Japan and Australia in the same format.
In addition to the strong political ties, traditional cooperation in the energy sector, as well as military-technical partnership, is particularly prominent and important for both India and Russia. In September 2019, Prime Minister Narendra Modi was the chief guest at the 5th Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok. The Russian Far East, a vast territory designed to become Russia’s new gateway to Asia, is open for Indian business, striving to become one of the new engines for the development of the Russian-Indian ties.
The planned Vladivostok-Chennai maritime corridor will become an important new transport link connecting the Russian Arctic and the Far East with India. In this regard, the energy bridge between the two countries, which implies trade and investment in oil and gas, LNG, nuclear energy, coal mining and processing, will certainly expand, given the natural complementarity of the economies of the two countries. Cooperation in the field of renewable energy, on which India puts a clear premium, and in the hydrogen economy, are also under discussion. The co-production of COVID-19 vaccines is an important recent addition to the list of priority areas for bilateral collaboration.
Besides, Moscow and Delhi intend to expand military-technical cooperation using the advantages of localization within the framework of the “Make in India” and AtmaNirbhar Bharat (“Self-Reliant India”) programmes that are actively promoted by the Indian government and personally by PM N. Modi.
However, for various reasons, as is well-known, economic cooperation between Russia and India lags behind the level of their expanded political partnership. In 2019, Russian-Indian trade turnover amounted to $11.16 billion (while Russian exports to India amounted to $7.24 billion, India’s exports to Russia amounted to $3.92 billion). Before the pandemic, the governments of the two countries set a goal to triple their trade turnover to $30 billion and to increase bilateral investments from $30 to $50 billion by 2025. N. Modi and V. Putin identified the intensification of trade and economic relations as a priority area of bilateral cooperation. The establishment of a free trade zone between India and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) is being considered.
Governments of India and Russia were tasked with identifying and removing the bottlenecks and obstacles to expanding economic ties. Russia’s Ministry of Economic Development and India’s Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion have launched fast-track, single-window mechanisms to facilitate smooth investments by Russian and Indian companies. “Invest India,” an investment promotion and facilitation agency, established a special Russia desk to provide Russian businesses with a convenient platform for support and advice on investment issues. The Far East Investment and Export Agency, the Russian Export Center, Delovaya Rossiya, as well as the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII), the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) and other organizations promote direct contacts between Indian and Russian business communities. Two rounds of strategic economic dialogue took place between India and Russia: in St. Petersburg in 2018 and in New Delhi in 2019.
2020 was the year of Russia’s BRICS chairmanship, and despite the fact that the BRICS summit, like all other work, had to be held remotely, Russia tried to make the content of this work most up-to-date and relevant to today’s requirements. Thus, the topic of cooperation between the BRICS nations in digitalization-related areas was reflected in the 12th BRICS Summit Moscow Declaration adopted at the meeting. In the new Strategy for BRICS Economic Partnership 2025, one of the three main directions identified was—for the first time—cooperation in digital economy. 2021 is the year of India’s chairmanship in BRICS, meaning that the topic of digitalization, which is very close to India, will undoubtedly find further reflection in the work of the grouping. In recent years, India has made tangible progress in promoting Internet penetration, digital literacy, e-government, financial technology, e-commerce and so on.
Digitalization as Russia’s top priority
Digital transformation is now one of the top priorities for Russia as well. This was reflected in the appointment of Mikhail Mishustin as Prime Minister of the country in January 2020. Speaking at the State Duma in 2020, M. Mishustin noted: “Digital is the oil, gold and platinum of the 21st century. If we do not get digital, digital will get us.” Prior to his appointment as Prime Minister, M. Mishustin headed the Federal Tax Service of Russia, where he managed to overhaul the work of this department on a completely new digital foundation and in a rather short time span. Russia has developed the National Technological Initiative (NTI), a long-term programme aimed at ensuring the leadership of Russian companies on new high-tech markets that will emerge in the global economy during the next 15-20 years.
Like India, Russia is now preparing to test and deploy 5G networks. The national “Digital Economy” programme (planned up to the year 2030) is currently under implementation. NTI and Russia’s other efforts in the technological field can be coordinated with the strategic plans of India in similar areas.
Complementarity and new cooperation avenues
So far, India’s experience with digitalization is not well-known in Russia. With some exceptions, Russian businesses are largely unfamiliar with the changes taking place in India. Although Russian and Indian IT-industries have evolved differently, new complementarities and new opportunities for collaboration between them are emerging. It is noteworthy that the Russian Association of Software Development Companies RUSSOFT, founded in 1999, was created following the example of the Indian National Association of Software and Service Companies (NASSCOM). Today, companies, such as MaximaTelecom (solutions for digital cities and businesses), Lighting Technologies (lighting systems for smart cities), Technonicol (advanced building materials), Zyfra (artificial intelligence and industrial solutions based on the Internet of Things), Tactise Group (advanced solutions in the field of labour protection and industrial safety), as well as state giants such as Rosatom (India’s key partner in the nuclear industry), are actively involved in India’s innovative development path.
However, there exists great potential for expanding this list. Despite severe competition with both Indian and international players, solutions from Russia are in demand, Indian businesses and the national government are willing to work with Russian companies in their own interests, regardless of possible pressure from the outside. Several investment funds are also working with India, building bridges and striving to blend Russian, Indian and international experience. These include Sistema Asia Capital, RTP Global, DST Global. These are experienced tech-savvy investors, representing “smart money”, equipped with the knowledge of working with complex markets, such as India.
The two countries have the potential for cooperation in deep technologies, such as artificial intelligence, big data and analytics, machine learning, smart energy infrastructure, smart logistics, photonics and new materials, microelectronics and semiconductors, as well as blockchain and financial technologies. An important element of support from the governments on both sides could be the establishment of so-called regulatory sandboxes—so that experimental legal regimes could facilitate cross-pollination and testing of ideas between technology companies and start-ups from India and Russia.
Amid today’s realities, India cannot be solely viewed as a potential sales market. It is necessary to work with India as a valuable partner. India welcomes foreign businesses that help address its challenges without aggravating the country’s problems (in particular, unemployment and environmental degradation). India offers incentives to localize production and has unique experience in scaling low-margin products and services. Importantly, Indian businesses are going global very actively and can serve as a springboard for Russian solutions to enter international markets.
Another potentially important area of cooperation between India and Russia is cybersecurity. In the rapidly unfolding digital world, the environment where people and businesses operate is becoming increasingly permeable, while the space that needs protection is more and more difficult to delineate with a security perimeter. Securing critical infrastructure will require new approaches and principles that may be based on quantum technologies and quantum cryptography. Currently, a national cybersecurity strategy is under development in India, and the country is facing regular cyber-attacks on its infrastructure, which Indian regulators, knowing the complexity and ambiguity of this topic, rightly avoid attributing to any specific groups of cybercriminals or naming their origins. At the same time, India’s Western partners rush to attribute these attacks to China or North Korea.
Against the backdrop of the global pandemic crisis, the dangers associated with high technology seem to have receded into the background. However, there is no doubt that the pandemic has significantly accelerated digitalization; and in the new digital world, national independence and sovereignty of countries are becoming more dependent on technology than ever before.
Over the years, Russia has consistently advocated for a broad international consensus under the auspices of the UN to work out the principles of international law to govern cyberspace. Meanwhile, in response to growing digital threats and in the absence of comprehensive international regulation, cyberspace is becoming increasingly regional. In a newly evolving international environment, there are likely to be several technology clusters, each with their own security principles. It is in the interests of both Russia and India to agree on these principles at an early stage, so as not to find themselves on different technological continents in the near future.
Given the constant and consistent striving of both countries for sovereignty and adherence to international law and the principles of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, Russia and India are natural partners in the formation of a new digital world, and if their efforts are intensified, this will stand to benefit not only the two countries but also the international community as a whole.
In line with global trends and reflecting the accelerating technological transformation within India, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs announced in 2020 the creation of the New and Emerging Strategic Technologies (NEST) department that will deal with technology diplomacy, foreign policy and international legal aspects of the new technologies. This is expected to enable India to become more involved in the global debate on technology governance and to better advocate for the country’s national interests in this context.
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