A rapid look around the world demonstrates that few rentier countries can be classified as democratic states, especially those in the MENA region; therefore, scholars have suggested that oil wealth blocks democratization process. Other scholars linked the lack of democracy in rentier countries immediately to their dependence on oil rent. Furthermore, researchers clarified that rentier states have common characteristics like, weak civil society and low middle-class formation, no taxations on citizens and higher scales of suppression as participating to the dictatorial of rentier states. The aim of this article is to highlight the relation between rentierism and democracy.
Rentier effect Less taxation weak civil society
Algeria is very dependent on oil and gas, which accounts for 95 per cent of export earnings and one third of the national GDP. Oil economists claimed that any fall in oil prices could affect the Algerian economy, social and political stability; Algeria has a significant role in the international oil and gas market. It is the third largest natural gas producer in the Arab world after Qatar and Saudi Arabia, the leading gas exporter in Africa and an energy supplier to France, Spain, Italy, Turkey, US and China. The Algerian dependence on oil created structural political, economic and social problems, one of them is authoritarianism, which has different manifestations, and the study dismantles this phenomenon in Algeria through three main aspects: political, economic and social through two levels domestic and international.
It is important and critical to understand how rent affects the nature of a rentier state, why oil-exporting countries are considered less democratic. One of rentier state scholars Beblawi argues that rent provides a source of income to oil-exporting countries that grant them to have very low and weak domestic taxation structures. Other scholars like Luciani present similar argument, who claim that high rents liberate the state from the need to increase income domestically. Moreover when citizens, do not pay for taxes, they are much less Demanding of the government, also government expensing on public goods preserves the indispensable support and acquiescence for standing authority, also since the state does not demand a financial contribution from the citizens, they resort to be satisfied with the expense of the state, even when benefits and interest are not equally distributed.
Another important factor which explains the rise of authoritarianism in rentier countries which is the social groups, In addition to minimal taxation in these countries, there are higher amounts of patronage spending, which helps to the government’s staying power. The government also utilizes oil revenues to prevent and stop the formation of certain social groups that would rise the demands and requests on the government for more democracy and less authoritarianism.
The taxation is not only an economic matter but also a political one, taxes means representation, rights and duties..etc. .The ‘neo-classical’ theory of the state developed by Douglass North clarified that taxes are connected with representation and democracy, therefore, less taxation means less democracy. In addition, Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi, claim that in rentier states, limited taxation decreases the people’s influence to keep the rulers responsible, because the rentier state allocates jobs, services, money to them. This manner of guarantying political obeisance and loyalty produces patron‐client relations, rather than democratic exchanges, between the governor and people.
In addition, the rentier state’s welfare policies create a huge bureaucracy, which prohibits the emergence of independent civil society. In addition, the revenues can badly affect individuals too, because it transforms to a serious barrier to the morals of work. Furthermore income is no longer a recompense of serious work but it is related to special coincidence and circumstances like chance, hazard.., etc., another important aspect is that rents help authoritarian regimes with the monetary ability to enlarge their tyrannical security system and to use state‐owned means of communication like media and other propaganda mechanisms to attack the opposition.
In Algeria, non-oil tax revenues constitute 10.2 %of the country’s GDP this figure is under the average index in developing countries and under the rate in the neighboring oil importing like Morocco and Tunisia. The IMF model 2014 argues that, Algeria has not attained its tax potential and should look into reducing costly tax exemptions. Moreover, according to Algerian statistics, 46 %of wage earners were unregistered workers .Some types of taxes are even non-existent in Algeria like property taxes. In addition,it argues that oil wealth supports authoritarianism through patronage. It faced with expended disturbance, as the very first countermeasure, Algeria agreed to repeat the subsidies for foodstuff, therefore, the import of food products rose by 60 %in comparison to 2010 and the invoice of imports reached 46 billion dollars as a result. Algeria also raised pays of civil workers by 46%. At the same time, the regime was determined to relieve the policies controlling the street vending in order to keep unpaid youth far from the protestation.
In Algeria the informal economy is predestined at 6 billion USD, which means 13 %of GDP outside the oil and Gas sector and provides jobs to nearly 2 million people22 %of the active force, any attempts to stop this business without inserting a real development and job creation had proved to be costly and risky. In addition, the government assigned fundamental amounts of money for interest-free loans for young people. Only in 2011, more than 50.000 small enterprises giving jobs to 70.000 young people were created with the financial help of the government; according to IMF, the Algerian government gaveto its citizens more than 23 billion dollars in public grants and retroactive salary and benefit increases. Algerian spending increased by 50% in 2011. The abundance of its financial reserves, standing at 182 billion dollars as of December 2011, which makes the Algerian regime able to expand and develop its patronage policy and facilely buy off popular opposition .
Therefore, the oil rents accrue directly to the state, which has discretionary power over how the revenues are spent. The state can subsequently afford to buy off or repress political opposition. The regime can purchase consent and acquire a form of legitimation through government expenditure on a welfare system. This includes spending on education, health, social security, employment, infrastructure and investment in the private sector.
Repression and the military role
In this concern, Ross argues that there are at least two reasons why resource wealth might lead to larger military forces and elite. The first one is self-interest improving the self-defense and the capacity to respond militarily also get rid of the constant fear of the others and their pressure so this is what an authoritarian government will do so. The second reason is that resources wealth provoke conflict and there is always a need to the military role to keep order
In the geopolitical Mediterranean context, Algeria represents a key country. Because it is the largest and most populous North African state and it has large oil and gas resources, in the mid-1980s under the Chadli presidency, Algeria started to give up the striped economy and became closer to the western model. Also during the social and economic crisis in 1988 the regime was convinced that it is time to adopt political reforms, but the process failed and the military dominated with a western support, France was especially against the rise of the Islamic Front The issues disturbing western countries are: security of investments, the fate of liberal economic reforms, an anti-western regime at the frontiers of Europe, and the access to oil and gas resources.
The Algerian army presented itself as the defender and the protector of democracy and as a credible partner for western interests. The Algerian army is still able to use the saving of energy resources and the readiness to improve the economy and to support from the West, which in turn will guaranty the existence and the survival of the regime. Furthermore, after the coup attempt, France gave $550 million in help to aid Algeria import food and a western consortium provided $1.45 billion in credits this aid could be explained as a payment to the Algerian military for a job well done.
The United States also supported the Algerian military, because of the oil company presence in the Algerian Sahara, the United States encouraged its oil and gas multinationals to invest in Algeria, the army preferred the security of the oil and gas production system. The economy has been liberalized especially in the gas and oil domain, where companies are strongly investing; therefore, new pipelines have been established between Algeria and Europe. The Algerian military took the control of the country. From an economic perspective, persons near to the regime are earning hugely from the economic reformation, the generals themselves became very wealthy. Furthermore the economic reforms aid the regime to narrow the first on society as ‘private monopolies supersede public monopolies and are caught by those with close relations to the powerful generals , from a political perspective , the regime is capable to survive due to the series of feral inhibition and repression, façade democratic steps and outside help .
3/The luck of modernization effect through cultural and social change: it suggests that the oil wealth fails to create the social and cultural changes, which a democratic government demands due to some reasons:
Rentier states have low and weak developed industry capabilities, they lose the information they need to formulate development policies.
Being progressively independent of society, they are unaware, ignorant, of society and indifferent to the preferences and preferences of their populations.
There are ‘allocation’ and not ‘production’ states, therefore the state sector increases in immensity and importance –sometimes it become inactive, entrepreneurship is not promoted, and ‘rent-seeking,’ is in coalition with the state, is the important key to social mobility.
Rents are used by the state to encourage obeisance and that way they block the formation of free social network and groups that could make demands and push for democracy.
The centralization of government and the ambiguity of efficient regulatory frameworks feed corruption and patrimonialism that have a negative effect on the law and the transparency of rent distribution.
An autocratic regime seeks to create loyalty through patron–client networks, which rise political stability and guarantee a certain degree of legitimacy. Such networks include the award of personal support in the format of public sector jobs and the distribution of public resources through permits, projects and contract. These activities will increase the level of corruption and decrease transparency and accountability.
In Algeria, the economic development was not connected to the democratization process. Part of the manifestation can be found in Algeria’s social structure. At independence, the class structure was comparatively united and combined, in the last decade; Algeria gave most of the chances for economic development. Within a mixt elite consisting of political parties, bureaucrats, and, much of the population was attached to the state through patronage networks and the economic interests of the private sector. In addition, trade unions were strongly under governmental control. As a result, the social grounds for opposition was very tight. When compression to reform spread, it did not come from the working or middle classes but from students and religious groups.
Therefore, The social structure in the rentier countries generally and Algeria specially is enfeeble, the social force with the powerful interest in the economic liberalization have to improve political pluralization, specifically the bourgeoisie, however combining those most menaced by it specifically workers, peasants and civil servants. Therefore, rentier states aimed to prevent the formation of a democratic coalition because they extremely menace the bourgeoisie, its ability leading force, and in combining the working class and peasants made them unavailable as shock troops of democratic revolution. Moreover, rent clientelist mentality and networks aimed to individualize political activity as actors look for personal wining through privileged relationship to power, therefore frittering the potential class action necessary for democratization process.
The article concludes that the plenty of the oil prevents democratic transition and supports the strength and immovability of an authoritarian system, through providing for dictator monetary capability to repel any democratic efforts, The case study on Algerian authoritarian regime demonstrated how an tyrannical system whose economy is largely dependent on oil and gas rents acted in the political crises, therefore the Algerian example shows well how oil wealth have played a significant role in blocking the social opposition to increase through repression and patronage, therefore rent is a structural variable in explaining authoritarianism.
Elections in Syria: Forgetting Old Resentments?
In the presidential elections on May 26, Bashar al-Assad won more than 95% of the votes. According to the current constitution, this term will be the last for the president. But in the next seven years of Bashar al-Assad’s rule, the constitution may change, and it is far from certain that this will happen as a result of the work of the Syrian Constitutional Committee, with UN mediation. The victory of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad was accompanied by congratulations from allies and a lack of recognition of the election results by Western countries. In any event, what is the attitude towards this war-torn country and its ruling elites in the Arab world? Will Bashar al-Assad be able to rebuild the country and deliver it from chaos?
Forgetting old resentments. From balance of power to balance of interests
Through regional recognition lies the path to global recognition. It is necessary in some form for the reconstruction of Syria, the cost of which is estimated at more than $250 billion. Syria’s allies do not have such funds, and the West links the provision of funds for the country’s reconstruction with conditions for a political settlement of the conflict, which the current authorities will not agree to. In the absence of economic reconstruction, however, there is a threat of the re-activation of the defeated terrorists. In this context, the role of the rich oil monarchies of the Persian Gulf—the most promising source of money—becomes especially significant.
Syria is traditionally called the “heart” of the Arab world. This, nevertheless, did not prevent other Arab countries from responding to the unfolding violence in Syria by freezing its membership in an important regional structure, the Arab League, in 2011. Speaking about the return of Syria to the Arab League, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said: “Arab diplomacy is very, very famous for its effectiveness, so it seems to me that here we can expect that the issue will be resolved, and, I hope, quite quickly.” However, there are a number of factors that can support this process, and constraints that can hinder it.
The conversation about the return of Syria to the Arab League has been going on for several years—since it became clear that Bashar al-Assad will be able to keep power in his hands. This became obvious to regional and global players with the defeat of terrorists and opposition, with the active support of the Syrian leadership from Iran and Russia. In addition, compared to 2011, the situation has changed in the Arab League itself. In Egypt, the largest country in the Arab world, the secular regime of Abdel Fattah al-Sisi (who has roots in the military), is now in power, and not the anti-Assad-minded Islamists from the Muslim Brotherhood (banned in the Russian Federation). A number of Arab League member states like Algeria, Iraq and Lebanon have never been against Syria, and now actively advocate its return to the organisation. The Gulf monarchies have gone through a decade of reassessing challenges and threats.
Conflicts in Iraq, Syria and Yemen have led to the strengthening of the regional rivals of the Arab states of the Gulf—Turkey and Iran. The expansion of these major regional powers is forcing the UAE, Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries to seek new approaches. In the context of Syria, this means the Arab rejection of the Turkish occupation of Syrian (and, therefore, Arab) land in northern Syria. At the same time, the rulers of the Arabian Peninsula are thinking about whether it is worth it to push Syria into the hands of Iran, if they can try to return it to the “Arab homeland” and balance the Iranian influence on Damascus. The UAE, Bahrain and Oman have already reopened their embassies in Damascus, but so far Saudi Arabia and Qatar, the two key countries that oppose Syria in the Arab League, are in no hurry to do the same. In any event, the Saudis are increasingly inclined towards a partial return of relations. It is clear from some of their actions. For example, we are talking about the restoration of ties between Bahrain and Damascus, since the policy of Bahrain is a litmus test of Riyadh’s aspirations. In early May, there were reports about the visit of the head of the general intelligence service of Saudi Arabia, Khalid bin Ali al-Humaidan, to Damascus. In late May, for the first time in 10 years, a Syrian delegation led by Minister of Tourism Mohammad Rami Martini made an official visit to Riyadh to participate in the work of the World Tourism Organisation Committee for the Middle East.
The results of the presidential elections in Syria once again remind the Arab states that they will have to work with Bashar al-Assad and his government.
Obviously, Damascus is ready to forget old grievances. Among other things, Arab nationalist rhetoric is extremely important for the ruling Baath Party. On the eve of the elections, Assad’s adviser Busseina Shaaban said: “Efforts are being made to improve relations between Damascus and Riyadh, and in the coming days we can witness results in this matter.” If Riyadh changes its position on the return of Syria to the Arab League, there will be only one Arab country opposing this—Qatar. Qatar’s non-Arab ally in the recently weakened regional confrontation is Turkey, which will also hinder this and continues to declare the need of a political settlement of the Syrian conflict. True, this is less and less possible, although the opinion of Turkey, which has more than 3.5 million registered Syrian refugees, is something to be reckoned with.
Veni, vidi, vici?
At the global level, Russia and the United States have different positions. Russia’s foreign policy advocates sovereignty, the return of Syria to the Arab League and its early restoration. But even if Syria returns to the League, it will not solve the economic problems of the country, where corruption is rampant, the currency continues to depreciate, there is barely enough electricity and fuel for the population to survive, and 80% of citizens remain below the poverty line. In addition, the Syrian economy will not receive serious injections, even from the Gulf countries, due to the policies and sanctions of the United States, which remains the hegemon in the region. However, it is precisely the regional recognition of Damascus that is extremely useful and can be considered as a step towards further stabilisation.
Even before the elections in Syria, the Americans, together with Britain, France, Germany and Italy, issued a joint statement about their illegitimacy. The sanctions adopted by the US Congress against Syria under the name “Caesar Act” are “secondary” in nature, which means that any third country doing business with the Syrian government is included in the US sanctions list. Companies from the UAE have already faced this problem, and potentially sanctions deprive Syria of any major projects with the Gulf States in the future. This issue is unsolvable at the regional level. Much depends on how the Americans are committed to the implementation of the sanctions regime.
An excessive US appetite for sanctions may hurt the interests of its regional allies, which will displease the latter (and not always tacitly).
At the moment, however, to quote the journalists of Asharq Al-Awsat newspaper, we observe “the absence of American leadership”: the United States is not engaged in promoting any active campaign to counter the normalisation of relations between Syria and other members of the international community. The previous pattern with regard to Syria remains—with the illegal presence of the American military in the east of the country, support for Kurdish groups, and the illegal use of Syrian resources.
The administration of US President Joe Biden has not yet formed a new course towards Syria, since this issue is not a priority for it. In these conditions, regional and interested global players have the opportunity to correct their positions, build up links with previously inaccessible actors, and make attempts to go beyond the existing restrictions.
Bashar al-Assad sent a message to the whole world that he is ready for a new stage. The world is no longer what it was a decade ago. At the regional level, the Arabs are thinking about accepting the existing reality, but at the global level, the Syria issue is not a priority. In his victory speech, al-Assad noted that the Syrian people “returned to the true meaning of the revolution” after it was “blotted by mercenaries”. It is obvious that Damascus persistently and patiently stands on its ground. Arabs say that patience is the key to joy. The only question is whose joy it is.
From our partner RIAC
The syndrome of neglect: After years of hyperactivity, Erdogan is completely isolated
At the NATO Summit held in Brussels on June 14, strategically important issues were discussed, such as the relations of the Alliance’s Member States with China and their attitude towards President Putin’s Russia. The Member States’ positions on these issues did not appear unambiguous and diplomats had to struggle to find the right wording to draft the final communiqué. What was evident, however, was an only apparently marginal fact: the total “physical” as well as political isolation of Turkish President Recep Tayip Erdogan.
After being defined by Prime Minister Draghi as a “dictator and autocrat”, the Turkish President also had to endure the harsh reprimands of the US State Department which, at the end of the “eleven-day war” between Israel and Hamas, did not hesitate to condemn – in unusually harsh language – some of his public statements made in the first days of the war when, in order to underline his thoughts towards the Israeli leadership, he called Benjamin Netanyahu “the Jewish Prime Minister”.
The derogatory use of the word “Jewish’ instead of “Israeli” triggered a reaction from President Biden’s Administration. The State Department spokesman, Ned Price, was instructed to express “the strong and unequivocal condemnation of the Turkish President’s anti-Semitic comments’, and called on him to refrain from “incendiary remarks, which could incite further violence … not least because anti-Semitism is reprehensible and should have no place on the world stage”.
After struggling for years to become a true regional power, President Erdogan’s Turkey is now on the sidelines of the political scene and the Turkish leader’s bewildered expression emerging from the photographs of the NATO Summit of June 14 – which show him physically isolated from the other Heads of State and government – appears as an iconic testimony to the irrelevance to which Turkey has been condemned, owing to the adventurism of its President, after a decade of reckless and counterproductive political and military moves.
As early as in the spring of 2010, in view of showing he was at the forefront in supporting the Palestinian cause, President Erdogan authorised the establishment of the “Freedom Flotilla”, a naval convoy capable of challenging – under the Turkish flag – the Israeli naval blockade of the Gaza Strip.
On May 31, 2020, Israeli commandos intercepted the Mavi Marmara ship carrying not only humanitarian aid, but also Hamas militants attempting to enter again the Gaza Strip illegally.
As soon as Israeli soldiers stepped onto the deck of the Turkish ship, they were confronted by Palestinians and crew members armed with axes, knives and iron bars. Ten Palestinians and Turkish sailors died in the ensuing clashes, but the most severe wound was inflicted on Turkish-Israeli relations.
Turkey broke off diplomatic relations with Israel – long-standing relations dating back to 1949 when Turkey was the first, and for many years the only, Muslim country to recognise the State of Israel, thus also interrupting important economic and military relations that represented for the entire Middle East the example of how it was possible to follow paths of integration and pacification between Muslims and Jews.
Since 2011, with the outbreak of the so-called “Arab Springs”, President Erdogan has tried in every way to take a leading role in a flow of events which – rather than exporting liberal democracies in the region – aimed to underline and validate the victory of the “Muslim Brotherhood” and of the most backward and fundamentalist Islam.
While thinking he could easily solve his competition with Assad’ Syria and at the same time dismiss the problem of Turkish and Syrian Kurdish irredentism, President Erdogan intervened heavily in the Syrian civil war by providing military aid and logistical support not only to the militias of the “Syria Liberation Army”, but also to the Salafist formations of Jabhat Al Nusra and even ISIS.
We all know what has happened: after a decade of civil war, Syria is in ruins but Bashar al-Assad is still in power; the rebels are now closed in small pockets of resistance and Russia, which intervened siding with Damascus, thus overturning the outcome of the conflict, is firmly established in the country while Turkey is not only excluded from the promising business of Syria’s reconstruction, but finds itself managing a massive refugee emergency.
In President Erdogan’ sometimes ill-considered quest to make his country take on the role of the leading regional power, his activism led him to intervene in the Nagorno-Karabakh crisis in support of the Azerbaijani Turkmen against the Christian Armenians, with the result that, after the last crisis in the autumn of 2020, Turkey had to step aside to leave Russia the role of interposition and peacekeeping force.
In Libya, too – after sending arms and mercenaries to support al-Sarraj’s Government of National Accord (GNA) – after its resignation last January, the Turkish role became less influential than the Turkish leader’s aspirations.
In 2017, in a vain attempt to send a signal to NATO and US allies, President Erdogan bought S-400 surface-to-air missile systems from Russia, worth 2.5 million dollars.
The move did not please the then US President, Donald Trump, who immediately imposed economic and military sanctions on Turkey, thus contributing to the decline of its economy and to its progressive international isolation.
It has recently been reported that, in an attempt to bring Turkey closer to the new Biden Administration, President Erdogan has decided to send back home the Russian technicians who were in charge of S-400 maintenance at the Incirlick base – which is also a NATO base – with the result of infuriating Vladimir Putin who obviously does not like the idea of seeing highly sophisticated equipment in the hands of the Americans.
The end result of all these unhinged moves is that the US sanctions remain in place while the Russians can only regret having trusted an unreliable leader.
On the domestic front, too, despite the repression that followed the failed coup d’état of 2016, things are not going well.
The deep economic crisis, resulting from excessive military spending, poor administrative capacity and rampant corruption, as well as the repercussions of the Covid-19 pandemic, makes the situation even more difficult for the Turkish President and his party, the AKP (Justice and Development Party), which have ruled the country continuously since 2002.
The recent local elections, in which the AKP was defeated, and the election polls indicate that, despite the tactical alliance between President Erdogan’s party and the ultra-nationalist National Movement, a success for the President and his party in the 2023 general and Presidential elections seems far from certain.
What makes President Erdogan’s sleep even more restless is certainly the ‘Peker scandal’ that has been hitting the headlines of all Turkish newspapers and social media over the last few days.
Sedat Peker, a businessman formerly affiliated with the extreme right-wing organisation of the “Grey Wolves” (the same one to which Ali Agca, known for the attempted assassination of Pope John Paul II, belonged) has long been a supporter of Tayyp Recep Erdogan and is known to have been one of the main suppliers of weapons to jihadist groups involved in the Syrian civil war.
Last April, after being accused of corruption and criminal conspiracy, he went into self-exile, first in Montenegro and then in the United Arab Emirates, from where he has been conducting a relentless campaign against President Erdogan and his party on charges of corruption and other crimes and offences.
Under the interested supervision of Mohamed Dalhan, the former Head of the Palestinian intelligence service in the Gaza strip, exiled to the Emirates after the break with Hamas, Sedat Peker daily floods social media with accusations against the Turkish President’s “magic circle”, starting with Interior Minister Suleyman Soylu and his ally Mehemet Agar, former Police Chief, who in Peker’s opinion are responsible not only for corruption, but also for extortion, drug trafficking and murder.
Despite government-imposed censorship, these sensational accusations dominate the political debate in Turkey.
Mohammed Dalhan, the Palestinian secret agent, helps Sedat Peker both out of a spirit of revenge against Hamas and, hence, against its Turkish supporter, and because the Abu Dhabi government, for which he now works, has not favourably viewed Turkey’s attempts to sabotage the “Abraham Accords” between Israel and moderate Arab countries and the explicit support offered by President Erdogan to Hamas during the recent “eleven-day war”. Moreover, the latter ended thanks to Egypt’s mediation – a diplomatic success for the moderate Arab front that pushes Turkey and its leader ever further to the sidelines, as they – observant Sunnis – are now forced to move closer to the heretical Shiites of Iran, the only ones who now seem to give credit to President Erdogan, who is now like a bad student relegated to a corner of the classroom, from which he will find it difficult to escape without a clear change of course towards a more moderate approach in domestic policy and a rapprochement to the West in foreign policy.
Iranian Election Portends Increased Human Rights Abuses, Demands Western Response
When the Iranian regime holds its presidential election this Friday, it is likely to experience the lowest level of voter turnout in its 42-year history. This has been acknowledged by certain Iranian officials and state media outlets. There are a number of reasons for this, which include the lingering effects of three anti-regime uprisings, public resentment over authorities’ crackdowns on those uprisings, a lack of serious competition among the candidates, and the brutal legacy of the clear frontrunner.
All but the last of these factors were already apparent in February of last year, when Iranian regime held elections for various governors and members of parliament. Those elections are the ones to beat if the country is to set a new record for low turnout this week. Moreover, if persistently anti-democratic conditions aren’t enough to yield that outcome on their own, public antipathy toward Ebrahim Raisi might just be the thing that pushes the electoral boycott over the top.
For months now, Raisi has been recognized as a person favored by the regime’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei as the next President. But that preference specifically stems from Raisi’s unwavering loyalty to the supreme leader and his willingness to flout the security and wellbeing of ordinary Iranians in order to safeguard the future of the theocratic dictatorship. In 2019, Raisi was appointed to head the nation’s judiciary, and his penchant for political violence was put to the test by the outbreak of a nationwide uprising in November 2019 – a follow-up to similar protests in January 2018.
The regime’s response to the latter uprising constituted one of the worst singular crackdowns on dissent since the early years of the Iranian regime. As head of the judiciary, Raisi played a leading role in that crackdown, particularly the systematic torture of political prisoners that was detailed in a September 2020 report by Amnesty International. That report was closely accompanied by the emergence of new evidence supporting the tally of protest-related killings provided by the People’s Mojahedin Organisation of Iran (PMOI/MEK).
The MEK, which has long been recognized as the leading voice for Iranian democracy, quickly determined that security forces and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps had killed 1,500 people in mass shooting incidents over just several days coinciding with the November 2019 uprising. Over time, the MEK has also released the names of more than half of the victims, naturally starting with those who were members of the organisation or were otherwise closely connected to it.
Details of the crackdown serve to underscore the notion that it was largely an attack on the MEK, which Khamenei had acknowledged as a driving force behind the initial uprising in early 2018. The supreme leader referenced months of planning by dissidents in order to explain the popular embrace of slogans calling for “death to the dictator” and condemning both the “hardline” and “reformist” factions of mainstream politics inside the regime. This messaging was tantamount to a call for regime change – the expressed platform of the MEK and its parent coalition, the National Council of Resistance of Iran.
In recent weeks, MEK-affiliated activist collectives known as “Resistance Units” have been using precisely this platform to promote the concept of an all-encompassing electoral boycott. In April alone, those activists erected posters, painted graffiti, and held demonstrations in more than 250 localities across the Islamic Republic, urging citizens to “vote for regime change” by avoiding the polls and denying any semblance of legitimacy to the ruling system. Since then, the call to action has been echoed by various other groups, including pensioners and blue-collar workers whose frustration with the regime has greatly intensified in the midst of an economic crisis exacerbated by self-serving government policies and blatant corruption.
Protests by these and other demographics have lately come to feature slogans like, “We have seen no justice; we will not vote anymore.” The implication is that Iranians from all walks of life are not only rejecting the current election but also the entire underlying system, in favour of a platform akin to that which is being promoted by the MEK and the NCRI. The details of that platform are clarified for an international audience each year at a rally of Iranian expatriates and political supporters which invariably features eager endorsement of the “10-point plan” for a democratic Iranian republic that was authored roughly 15 years ago by NCRI President-elect Mrs. Maryam Rajavi.
The plan calls for free and fair elections as well as secular pluralism, and it expresses a commitment to international laws and principles of human rights. By contrast, the existing regime has repeatedly rejected those laws and principles through such recurring actions as its execution of juvenile offenders, its routine usage of torture and forced confessions, and its explicit insistence upon exception from human rights standards that are deemed to conflict with the regime’s fundamentalist interpretation of Shiite Islam.
Despite all of these, Tehran’s contempt for human rights has arguably never been more blatant than is now, in the run-up to Raisi’s appointment as the regime’s next president. His role in the crackdowns following the November 2019 are certainly one reason for this, but the main source of Raisi’s infamy remains his participation in the 1988 massacre of political prisoners. Those killings arguably constitute the late 20th century’s single worst crime against humanity, and as one of four figures in Tehran’s “death commission” at the time, Raisi bears as much responsibility as anybody for the roughly 30,000 hangings that were carried out over just several months.
In commenting on the election, the NCRI has made it clear that Raisi was chosen to run a more-or-less uncontested campaign precisely because of this legacy. Specifically, the NCRI argues that Khamenei witnessed the Resistance movement gaining momentum and resolved to consolidate power in the hands of those most comfortable with political violence. But in so doing, the supreme leader gave Iranians even more incentive to protest the political process than they had had in February 2020. Thus, when Raisi takes office, he will immediately be faced with the challenge of compensating for an electoral boycott that effectively deprive the regime of any claim to political legitimacy.
The consequences of that challenge will surely depend, in part, on the role that the international community chooses to take on in the midst of forthcoming conflicts between the Iranian regime and a population that is showing ever-greater support for an organised resistance. If major world powers elect to stand on the sidelines, it could give the Raisi administration license to assume office and then immediately initiate human rights abuses rivaling those of November 2019, or possibly approaching those of summer 1988. However, if those powers recognize this danger and instead elect to intervene on the Iranian people’s behalf, then they may find they have ample opportunities to do so.
Relevant strategies will be presented by NCRI officials and the political supporters, including European and American lawmakers and academics with diverse party affiliations, when they take part in the coalition’s World Summit on a Free Iran between July 10 and 12.
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Middle East3 days ago
The syndrome of neglect: After years of hyperactivity, Erdogan is completely isolated
Middle East3 days ago
Iranian Election Portends Increased Human Rights Abuses, Demands Western Response
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