Since last February 22, Algeria has been shaken by street demonstrations that occur almost simultaneously in all the 48 provinces of the country.
Working on the assumption that the people’s anger is entirely spontaneous, its immediate origin is the announcement by President Abdelaziz Bouteflika he wants to run for his fifth term, which should start following the elections scheduled for next April.
President Bouteflika, who is over 80 years of age, is in very poor health. In fact, as far as we know, he is currently hospitalized in Geneva for treatment, probably as a result of the two strokes he suffered in 2013.
Bouteflika, however, made his spokesman, Abdelghani Zaalane, state that the upcoming election will be held on a date to be set by the National Assembly.
In any case, Bouteflika does not intend to serve until the end of his next presidential term, but will confine himself to setting, as President, the date of the new election.
Moreover, the elderly and sick leader has promised the adoption by referendum of a new Constitution, partly already drafted, and a reform of the electoral law.
The Presidency, however, is currently run by the Head of the intelligence Services and by the Chief of the Armed Forces, who really pull the strings of Algeria’ s political and economic transition.
However, who is really ruling in Algeria while, in the electoral campaign, Bouteflika keeps on showing his photos of twenty years ago and is never heard on the radio or on TV?
The power of the traditional leader of the FLN, who has been President for twenty years, is now divided into three groups: the presidential and political power; the military and intelligence one, and finally – albeit certainly not to be neglected – the branch of family and State affairs, as well as internal and international influence.
The Armed Forces, however, still play a primary role and seem to have great autonomy.
Over the last few years, President Bouteflika has tried to reduce their autonomy in favour of his business clan, to which not even the senior officers of the intelligence Services and of the Armed Forces are alien.
The military take orders only from the President himself, where possible, but above all from his brother Said.
In the Algerian political circles’ imagination, the latter still epitomizes the true eminence grise of the regime.
It should be recalled that Abdelaziz Bouteflika was Foreign Minister several times from 1960 to 1970. In 1979 he voluntarily relinquished power after the death of Houari Boumedienne, of whom he had been private secretary. He finally settled abroad, at first in the United Arab Emirates (which, in fact, have played a significant role in Algeria’s current “transformation”) and later in Switzerland and France.
Shortly after Boumedienne’s death, he was accused of embezzlement of State funds.
In 1999, only upon the military’s request, he returned to Algeria to rule it, following the resignation of General Liamine Zeroual.
The old FLN President, however, has always done everything to move the military leaders away from the real centre of power, namely business and intelligence.
Moreover, Bouteflika amended the Constitution twice to increase his powers and, above all, he has brought to power a new class of businessmen, who depend only on him.
As happens also in Western Europe, the political parties are now only the pale shadow of what they were in the past.
Political aggregation is achieved with the traditional advertising-style systems commonly used also in the West, but there is a sort of fear and prestige of the Leader, namely Bouteflika, that still lingers within the crowds.
Here the political parties include the traditional group of the National Liberation Front (FLN) and its traditional ally – the former Soviet-style single party, known as Rassemblement National Democratique- as well as the Islamists (we do not know yet whether “moderate” or not) of the Rassemblement de l’Espoir de l’Algerie, and various other small parties. There is also the old single union, namely UGTA.
As already mentioned, one of Abdelaziz Bouteflika’s first supporters is his brother Said, who is the official advisor to the Head of State.
He is aged 61, but nobody knows his true role and personal power which, however, is presumably very strong.
Opponents say he is the only one who chooses Ministers, but also decides policies and carefully coordinates news on the media. He never granted interviews.
Former Professor at the University of Algiers and trade unionist, Said has a wide network of very solid friendships, both in Algeria and abroad, including Italy.
The other man at the core of Algerian power is Ahmed Gaid Salah.
He is aged 79 and is both Armed Forces Chief of Staff and Deputy-Minister of Defense, considering that the role of Minister is officially played by the President of the Republic.
He is considered Bouteflika’s lieutenant.
He has certainly obtained personal advantages thanks to his current role, especially when, in September 2015, the elderly President marginalized Mohamed Mediene, known as Toufik, the traditional Head of the Algerian intelligence Services he had led for 25 years in a row.
Bouteflika had openly accused Toufik of incompetence but, in the logic of the elderly President, the sense of his removal is to fully and safely control all the Algerian military apparatus and subject it to his wishes, which are above all those of the lively Algerian business community.
At the core of the Algerian FLN power elite, there is also Athmane Tartag.
He is the new Head of the intelligence Services. In the 1970s he trained for a long time at the KGB and in the 1990s he was a protagonist of Algeria’s very tough fight against jihadist terrorism.
He is very close to Said Bouteflika.
Nevertheless, the demonstrations throughout the country have now been reduced significantly by the current Prime Minister, Ahmed Ouhaya, who has spoken of “unknown sources” that allegedly fuel the street riots. Probably he is not entirely wrong.
The fear of a new civil war, not necessarily linked to a new uprising of the “sword jihad”, troubles not only the ruling classes, but also the crowds in action. The latter do not absolutely want to go back to the 1990s and that was the spectre which, alone, stopped the possibility of an “Arab spring” in Algeria.
It should be recalled that, at the beginning of the 1990s, the Algerian civil war – which was also the first mass evolution of jihad-exacted a toll of at least 200,000 deaths.
For the Algerian crowds, in 2011 the only memory of those years avoided the “contagion” of the “Arab Springs” among the Muslim Brotherhood and the clumsy Western agents.
The population and economic data, however, are currently similar to those found in the “democratic” propaganda machine of 2011: very strong corruption of the public apparata; widespread unemployment; a very high rate of youth unemployment and people’s poor aptitude for work.
In fact, as early as the mass demonstrations of last February, the protesters’ demands have focused on stopping price increases – and in this case the government has decided not to cut subsidies -and on protecting and increasing the now miserable salaries of the public sector (hence with a quasi-automatic recourse to the corruptive bakshish), as well as on finally finding a solution to the very severe housing emergency.
The government, however, has no money.
It still depends on oil remittances (to the tune of 65%), which obviously fall in time of low oil prices and OPEC restrictions. The government must also come to terms with an old Soviet-style bureaucracy. It still has a very extensive power on business and companies – a real longa manus – but is in fact isolated from the new strategic and military equilibria of the Maghreb region, to which it reacts without being able to change them.
Furthermore, the relative increase in oil prices – made possible almost exclusively by a decrease in the production of OPEC, of which Algeria is also a member – has certainly provided a small new channel of fresh liquidity to the Algerian government, but has also broken fiscal discipline and further increased public spending.
Hence higher taxes on imported goods – as first economic measure implemented by the government -and relinquishment of the subsidy cuts introduced in 2017, as well as increases for investment and social spending.
According to the Algerian General Accounting Office, however, rebus sic stantibus, the deficit should be redressed in 2023.
Furthermore, many customs duties have been levied on imports, which lead to an increase in prices. We should also consider the very poor success of the plans for economic diversification and for reducing “oil dependence”. Indeed, if anything, the Algerian authorities are trying to maximize profits from oil and natural gas and currently the GDP is growing thanks to the increase in public spending generated only by the increase in the oil price.
However, what would be the real political alternatives to Bouteflika? Probably for want of anyone better, the FLN has already crowned him, but it could not do otherwise. Prime Minister Ouyahia does not know where else to turn, although he is also the leader of the Rassemblement National Democratique.In particular, there is such a level of tension between the various powers within the clan and political affairs of Bouteflika and the Armed Forces that no true new national leader can emerge.
Among the protesters in the streets, there is growing consensus for JilJedid, the “new generation” political party, but the possible candidates also include Chabib Khelil, former Energy Minister and OPEC President, who has also the Moroccan citizenship, and is currently a powerful international consultant.
Chabib Khelil has strong ties with the United States and a Palestinian wife with a US passport.
This makeshis candidacy impossible, due to Algeria’s rules and regulations.
Not to mention the judicial problems due to his old relations with SAIPEM.
Another “new” candidate could also be Mouloud Hamrouche, a former “moderate” Prime Minister.
Within the establishment’s natural strategy designed to fully support Bouteflika’s candidacy, we must also consider the recent ousting of the Police Chief, Abdelghani Hamel – who, at the time, was considered one of the most natural successors to Bouteflika – as a result of a drug trafficking case involving the powerful Algerian Police, that can rely on 200,000 men but – after the above mentioned reforms-is deprived of a reliable and stable Security Service.
What doAlgeria’s current decision-makers fear? Obviously the “sword jihad”.
We Europeans – and Italians, in particular – could add that the irrational disruption of Algeria relating to the “Arab springs” leads to a porous and uncontrollable Algerian coast, just as the danger of migration flows from Libya is slowly fading away and the migration flows from Tunisia have stabilized.
Algeria is also deeply concerned about the tribal, jihadist and military instability that emerged in Mali during the elections held there between last July and August.
The Algerian decision-makers are also worried about the great instability in Libya – currently a major problem for its military decision-makers – and obviously in Tunisia.
With specific reference to Libya, Algeria is a clear, open and very helpful supporter of Al-Sarraj’s GNA, while its intelligence Services, which know the sub-Saharan deserts very well, are endeavouring for peace between the militias and the non-jihadist tribes of Fezzan, so as to later achieve the goal of a unified Libya.
Shortly before the arrival of Haftar, who currently holds about 80% of the Libyan territory from the South.
Nevertheless, apart from the recent amnesty for the local jihadists, which led to the surrender of about 88 militants of the “holy war”, all the Algerian military operations in Sahel are of scarce political relevance – and this is a very severe matter.
Currently the Algerian Armed Forces can rely on 147,000 people – all well trained even in the desert -and on a total number of 460,000 reservists.
It should also be recalled that, despite the economic crisis, Algeria spends 10 billion US dollars a year on weapons and, between 2012 and 2016, its military spending increased by 277%, almost all (80%) used to purchase Russian weapons.
Algeria is still the fifth largest importer of weapons in the world and the third largest buyer of Russian weapons.
It is also worth recalling that, although currently Algeria is not a place for migrant transit to Europe, there are still very active old routes from sub-Saharan Africa up to Tamanrasset and then leading to Morocco, Libya and Tunisia.
Currently the only chance for avoiding the rehabilitation of the Algerian coasts for the transit of migrants heading to the EU and, above all, to Italy, is solely the Algerian authorities’ very firm will to repress these flows.
If this is no longer the case, we will soon have a powerful and effective alternative for the new transit of illegal migration flows from the Maghreb region to Italy and to the other European and Mediterranean ports.
Algeria, in fact, has long been gathering its many irregular migrants and directing them, manu militari, towards Mali and Niger.
There are some agreements between Algeria and the Sahel countries, but there have also been tensions, since Algeria has often imposed its pace and its weapons on sub-Saharan Africa, even with some clashes with Mali’s and Niger’s forces.
Hence there is great fear that insecurity – now endemic in the Maghreb region – spreads also to the wide Algerian territory, the greatest true strategic driver of Bouteflika’s current management.
The Algerian regime is certainly not wrong in assessing the facts in this way.
The Kingdom of Morocco has denounced the fact that some months ago Algeria had the Iranian support in its old fight against the Polisario Front, with the subsequent closure of the Tehran diplomatic representative office last May.
Even before the Algerian independence, the Polisario Front has been one of the souls of the FLN foreign policy.
This is a sign that now the Algerian (and Moroccan) issue is at the core of the link between the jihad and the overt operations in all the internal areas of the two countries – and hence of their connection with the Sahel region.
Nevertheless, there is still another issue on the table that is much more important than it may appear at first sight, i.e. the joint candidacy of Morocco and Algeria to host the 2030 FIFA World Cup.
Another very great bet on the internal security of Bouteflika’s regime – and of Mohammed VI, who is very focused on this event to make his Alawite Kingdom rise to world fame.
In all likelihood, however, the great global forces that disrupted Tunisia, at first, and then Egypt and Libya – thus making those old, but basically stable regimes an unbalanced system, largely porous from the South – are caring precisely about Algeria, which has all the characteristics to interest the global propaganda for world democracy: an old and sick leader – almost an absolute leader – an old protectionist and oil-based system, to be possibly made available to other OPEC countries; an internal demographic bomb and a major crisis preventing the young people and the new elites from finding opportunities in the Northern developed countries.
A political-propaganda paradigm that is now very well tested, although ever more dangerous.
The perfect scenario for an “old vs. young people” fight – as already seen in the US and French propaganda – or even a possible platform for internal liberalization, probably with the usual “moderate Islamists” who enter the political game, also because – just to use again the old-fashioned standards of Western propaganda -the blame for the sole presence of the sword jihad in the Maghreb region is to be laid on the “reactionary” governments’ “repression”.
As already noted, with a view to facing the economic crisis and the lack of investment, the current Algerian regime has implemented a short-term expansionary fiscal policy, which has led to high inflation and only enables the government to buy for time, without being able to solve the central issues of State economy and the relationship between bureaucracy, political power, oil revenues and industrial transformation.
For Algeria oil and natural gas still account for 97% of total exports, two thirds of State revenues and one third of GDP.
These figures date back to 2014, but today data is only slightly different.
The quantity of oil and gas reserves, however, does not bode well.
Oil experts talk about twenty years of reserves still possible for oil and fifty for natural gas.
It should be noted, however, that Algeria’s foreign debt still accounts for a mere 2% of GDP.
Hence probably Bouteflika and his successors want to keep things as they are and, in the future, start modernization by resorting to debt and foreign investment, with two additional years of debt fiscal spending and then a massive sale of Algeria’s public debt securities, which could finance again both the currency status quo, held artificially too high, and public spending in subsidies and bureaucratic jobs for young people.
However, the demographic bomb – the trigger of the “Arab Spring” old crises – is one of the first aspects to study.
Also from the anthropological and cultural viewpoints. The young people, also in the West, aredéracinés, without the memory of what happened to the FLN to make it reach that point.
Currently five sevenths of the Algerian population is below 21 years of age.
In 2019,for the Algerian young protesters, “democracy” is not the fight against France and the pied noirs, possibly helped by ENI and the USSR, but only a decent job and food every day.
Hence crowds easy to manipulate, who probably Elias Canetti, in his extraordinary book Crowds and Power, would have defined “incited crowds”.
Currently, the Muslim Brotherhood that has always been at the origin of “Arab springs” – also for induction and interferences from abroad – is particularly active in Algeria.
Hence the classic paradigm of the quasi-spontaneous people’s rebellion is ready, but probably Bouteflika will agree-albeit only after his fifth reelection (probable because his regime is seen as a factor of stable economic and civil growth) – on a new name, although always representing the old elites. A new leader that will build new and good relations with China (which has reduced its oil and gas purchases), but above all with Japan and the EU, which could really change the whole production formula of future Algeria, by changing and expanding the terms of economic trade between Algeria and the European Union.
Provided said leader will have the necessary skills and strength, attitudes about which I am doubtful.
Here Are the 10 Young Africans Pushing Boundaries and Changing the World in 2019
Ten African women and men are part of a cohort of 127 of the world’s most promising social activists, business leaders, public servants, artists and technologists. They are all under the age of 40 and have been invited to join the World Economic Forum’s community of Young Global Leaders (YGLs). They are pushing boundaries and breaking traditional rules to improve the world.
Current members lead governments and Fortune 500 companies, hold Nobel Prizes and Academy Awards, and have become UN Goodwill Ambassadors and Social Entrepreneurs. The community aims to bring together individuals with different skills sets from a range of fields to shape an inclusive and sustainable future for the world.
By working as a community, YGLs have supported the entrepreneurial skills of young refugees in the Kenyan camp of Kakuma, are pushing governments to set up a “New Deal for Nature” that will protect lands and oceans, and are tackling hunger and malnutrition using social gastronomy. Notable alumni include Iyinoluwa Aboyeji, Chief Executive Officer, Flutterwave, Nigeria; Lewis Pugh, Founder, Lewis Pugh Foundation, South Africa; Jacinda Ardern, Prime Minister of New Zealand; Fatoumata Ba, Founder and Chief Executive Officer, Janngo, France; Amal Clooney, Barrister, Doughty Street Chambers, United Kingdom; Emmanuel Macron, President of France; Larry Page, Co-Founder and Chief Executive Officer, Google, USA; and Zhou Xun, Actor, People’s Republic of China.
This year, many of the YGL nominees are from emerging economies, including eight women and two men from Africa; and more than one-half of the new members are women. They have been selected for representing the best of their generation, for their ability to enhance understanding and promote action, and for their innovative activity in the fields of art, business, civil society, energy, government and health.
Members of the new class will take part in a five-year programme that will help them identify ways in which their ground-breaking work can advance new models of innovation and make a difference in their communities.
“We look to these leaders to take forward the challenge of improving the state of the world. In offering opportunities and experiences to transform their understanding of the possibilities presented by the Fourth Industrial Revolution, we are investing in them to drive a future where we all can flourish,” said Mariah Levin, Head of the Forum of Young Global Leaders at the World Economic Forum.
African YGLs have the chance to benefit from the Dangote Fellowship, which is made possible by the generosity of the Aliko Dangote Foundation. The aim of the fellowship is to increase the quality and quantity of young African leaders across the continent by supporting the engagement of African YGLs in the community, such as those from small enterprises or the non-business sector. The fellowship helps YGLs from Africa participate in YGL and Forum events.
Joining the Class of 2019 from Africa are:
Anta Ngom Bathily, Managing Director, Groupe SEDIMA, Senegal. She has significantly developed Francophone Africa’s largest agriculture business.
Kamissa Camara, Minister of Foreign Affairs, African Integration and International Communication of Mali. She is the country’s youngest and first female minister of foreign affairs, working for peace, security and development across the Sahel.
Kirsty Coventry, Minister of Youth, Sport, Arts and Recreation of Zimbabwe. She has won more Olympic medals than any other female swimmer in history and is the most decorated African Olympian.
Wanuri Kahiu, Film Director, AFROBUBBLEGUM, Kenya. Her collective supports African art and, as an award-winning director, producer and author, she is part of the new generation of African storytellers.
Aminata Kane Ndiaye, Chief Executive Officer, Orange, Sierra Leone. She is a leading executive driving the operations of the telecommunications giant with more than 1.8 million local subscribers.
Bogolo Joy Kenewendo, Minister of Investment, Trade and Industry of Botswana. At 31, she is one of her country’s youngest cabinet members.
Umra Omar, Founder, Safari Doctors, Kenya. She is saving thousands of lives a year by providing free basic health services, including malaria treatment, in rural Kenya.
Tolu Oni, Associate Professor, School of Public Health and Family Medicine, University of Cape Town, South Africa. As a leading female African scholar, she explores the intersections of health and urbanism.
David Moinina Sengeh, Chief Innovation Officer and Head, Directorate of Science, Technology and Innovation (DSTI) of Sierra Leone. As his country’s first chief innovation officer, he is transforming critical thinking for youth across Africa.
Adebola Williams, Chief Executive Officer, Red Media Africa, Nigeria. His civic participation group engages millions of African youth and his work has helped elect three African presidents.
Unrest in Algeria: A blow against Russia?
The political situation in Algeria has been aggravating as the number of the participants in protest rallies has amounted to one million and these are now being joined by representatives of the Algerian community in other countries – first of all, in France. Thousands of Algerians opposing the regime of incumbent President Abdelasziz Bouteflika have mounted rallies in a number of French cities while the most numerous demonstrations have been reported in Paris and Marseille.
About 200 protesters and the same number of policemen have been injured amid promises by rally activists to paralyze the country’s economic and political life by means of a nationwide strike. For Algeria, a country which has been the stronghold of stability in North Africa for nearly two decades, such a course of events could turn out to be a severe trial. However, what is happening is due to a whole range of internal and external reasons.
Among the internal reasons that have been fuelling tensions in Algeria is the refusal by many Algerians to acknowledge the decision by 82-year-old Abdelaziz Bouteflika, who has been in power since 1999, to run for the fifth term in the presidential elections on April 18th. What has caused a pubic outcry is not the president’s credentials (he played a significant role in the country’s struggle for independence and takes credit for securing an end to the bloody civil war in 2002), but the condition of his health. After surviving a stroke in 2013, Abdelaziz Bouteflika has been moving around in a wheel-chair and has been experiencing severe speech problems. He has been rarely seen in public over the past few years and had to send his representative to the Central Electoral Commission to register him as candidate to presidency from his ruling National Liberation Front. According to reports, at the time of registration the president was under treatment in Geneva and his condition has worsened of late. For this reason, many protesters announced that they had no intention of voting for an “empty place” alleging that the candidate in question barely understood what elections he would be taking part in. «We don’t even know whether our president is still alive, or whether he is dead. We don’t know who is acting on his behalf», – the French Le Monde quotes one of the protesters as saying.
Nevertheless, shortly after the protests erupted the Algerian news media published the written version of the address to the nation by President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, in which the president made it clear that he had opted in favor of nominating his candidacy following «requests from the civil society and the political class». «Millions of Algerians have expressed their willingness to back my candidacy by collecting signatures and making their own personal contributions», – the president wrote. He praised the «feeling of civil duty», which, in his words, drove the participants in street protests: «I want to make it clear that I will not allow anyone to gain control of my country’s riches or its future in the interests of some underground influence groups».
Should he win in the elections, Abdelaziz Bouteflika has promised to organize a nationwide dialogue so that citizens and political groups alike could discuss how to reform the system of government in Algeria and prepare the draft of a new Constitution which will be then put to vote at the nationwide referendum. On top of that, the incumbent president signaled readiness to step up struggle against corruption and assured the country’s citizens that the fifth term in office would in any case become the last for him.
In turn, Algerian Prime Minister Ahmed Ouyahia has called for peace and quiet having warned the street protesters about the destabilizing consequences of their actions: «People were offering roses to the policemen, which is good. But I would like to remind you that the turmoil in Syria started with roses too». «They say some are calling for nationwide strikes but I remember the strikes in 1991», – the prime minister said recalling the tragic events of Algeria’s recent history, – when the Islamists took advantage of the protest rallies and political instability in the country to launch their armed struggle for power.
However, political processes at home are not the only factor underlying the current protests in Algeria. Unlike its Maghreb neighbors, Algeria survived the turmoil of the 2011 “Arab Spring” in good condition and with minimum pain. The Algerians received an injection against mass protests when the disturbances of the late 1980s spilled into a decade of civil war, – says Karima Diresh, an expert on North Africa at the Paris-based National Scientific Research Center. In her words, this cost Algeria about 200, 000 killed, and dozens of thousands still unaccounted for.
That’s why what causes the greatest concern in the current situation is not purely internal processes, but the striving of external forces to take advantage of the protests and instill them with a particular urgency. According to reports, standing behind the protest movement are not only activists of the Algerian diaspora abroad but also certain groups within the leadership of the European Union and some in the United States, which are extremely annoyed with the Algerian leadership for faltering in two vital sectors –the military-political and the energy.
In terms of military-technical cooperation, Algeria is one of Russia’s key partners – not only in Africa, but worldwide. According to a report by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), in a period from 2013 to 2017 Russia supplied Algeria with weapons for a total value of 2.4 billion dollars, which accounted for 59% of the Algerian arms imports. According to 2016 reports, Algeria came third in the list of buyers of Russian weapons ($ 923.6 million), running ahead of Vietnam and coming close to China ($ 958.8 million).
This is largely due to two major factors – firstly, the historical traditions of cooperation which go back to the days when independent Algeria was brought into being with the support of the USSR, and secondly – the country’s strained relations with neighboring Morocco over the Western Sahara. This conflict forces the Algerians to tirelessly strengthen their combat capability.
On the whole, trade and economic cooperation between Russia and Algeria has been developing progressively. According to the results of 2017, Algeria ranked second among African countries in imports from Russia, amounting to 4.6 billion dollars, after Egypt (6.2 billion dollars). In 2016, the Russian-Algerian trade did not exceed $ 4 billion.
Significantly, all other African countries in 2017 accounted for a total of $ 3.9 billion worth of imports from Russia. According to preliminary data for 2018, the Russian-Algerian trade turnover increased to 5.4 billion dollars (of which only 10 million dollars accounted for Russian imports from Algeria).
In the course of his visit to Algeria in October 2017, Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev discussed in detail with the country’s leadership the prospects for the supply of Russian technologies and knowhow in order to create a national atomic industry. “A trustworthy regulatory and legal framework has been set for cooperation in the nuclear power industry,” the head of the Russian government said back then adding that Russia is already preparing nuclear industry specialists for Algeria. “At the same time, we are ready to consider projects for the generation of “clean” power at wind and solar stations,”- Dmitry Medvedev said.
While cooperation between Algeria and Russia is rather a long-running source of headaches for the EU, NATO and the United States, the intention of the current Algerian leadership to re-consider gas supplies to the European market took Brussels by surprise and, according to reports, prompted an agenda that raised the issue of removing the incumbent leadership from power at an early date. A statement on gas supplies was voiced at the end of December 2018 by the Algerian Minister of Energy Mustafa Gitoni, who said that in the next five years his country will cut export gas supplies due to increased domestic consumption. In 2017, Algeria delivered 49.6 billion cubic meters of gas to Europe through pipelines and in the form of liquefied natural gas (LNG). However, according to the minister, gas consumption at home is growing at an ever faster pace, and therefore, the leadership will have to re-consider gas exports in 2022: “We have enough gas for our domestic needs only,” predicts Mustafa Gitoni. Algeria is currently producing 130 billion cubic meters of gas, half of which goes for domestic consumption. As for gas consumption in Europe, in 2017 gas supplies amounted to 560.5 billion cubic meters. Of these, 260.4 billion cubic meters of gas were provide by European suppliers (including non-EU member Norway). The Russian Gazprom shipped 194.4 billion cubic meters to Europe in 2017, while another 105.7 billion cubic meters came from other countries.
Among them, Algeria (with 49.6 billion cubic meters of pipe gas and LNG) was a top supplier, significantly ahead of Qatar (24 billion cubic meters) and Nigeria (12.5 billion cubic meters). The United States accounted for 2.61 billion cubic meters.
Plans by the Algerian government to reorient gas supplies to domestic consumption caused an immediate negative reaction both from the European Union leadership and in the United States. Given the reduction of gas production in the Netherlands and Norway, it is uninterrupted supplies from Algeria that should largely ensure the energy security of Europe and thus allow it to reduce its dependence on Russian gas.
Another option is LNG supplies to Europe from the United States, but their volumes largely depend on the price and demand in European and Asian markets – primarily in China, where the situation has been following an unwelcome course, from the point of view of Europeans.
According to reports by the General Administration of Customs of China for 2018, the growth of China’s gas imports compared to 2017 amounted to 31.8%. By 2025, China’s additional demand for LNG will hit some 78 billion cubic meters, – analysts at Vygon Consulting say: “In fact, this means gas imports will double, even without Taiwan, by the middle of the next decade.” “China will likely continue to absorb the growth of supply on the LNG market as new terminals are commissioned, primarily in the US,”- says Fitch Corporation Director Dmitry Marinchenko. According to the company’s reports, if the above trend persists, by 2024 the absolute volumes of the Chinese gas market will grow almost fourfold.
In the current situation, we should expect more intervention from the United States and the European Union in order to provide Algeria with a ruling politician who would act in line with Western interests. So far, this politician is believed to be the richest man in the country, the billionaire industrialist Issad Rebrab, who makes no secret of his orientation towards France. However, he is already 74 years old, which makes him a transition figure. “The nationalist government formed on the basis of the National Liberation Front deliberately restrained Algerian-French ties, although from the geographic point of view, France, or Italy, are the two most suitable trading partners for Algeria. The younger generation is different. There are a lot of pro-French and pro-American representatives among the opposition who know little about the role the USSR played in the liberation of their country,”- testifies Sergey Balmasov, an expert of the Russian Council on International Affairs.
In addition, the current situation plays into the hands of Islamists who will undoubtedly try to replay the scenario of the civil war of the 1990s with more gains for themselves. And this is fraught with a new escalation of tension in North Africa, the Mediterranean and the Middle East.
First published in our partner International Affairs
Candide Leguede: Shining a New Light on Women’s Entrepreneurship in Togo
Candide Leguede runs Société ARCANDIA, a company she started nearly twenty years ago which promotes “Made in Togo” artisanal and artistic products. As an entrepreneur with years of experience, Leguede wanted to help women and young entrepreneurs by sharing her expertise. That is why she established and is CEO of INNOV’UP, the Entrepreneurial Center for Businesswomen in Togo with an incubator for women-led start-ups — the first of its kind in West Africa.
“Women’s contribution to the economy is no longer in question,” attests Leguede. “The Togolese economy is supported by the informal sector where 48% of women operate. There are more and more women-led SMEs, yet women continue to face unique difficulties that men don’t when creating their businesses.” Financed by UNDP, Leguede established INNOV’UP to promote women’s entrepreneurship but also to facilitate the transition of women-led businesses from the informal to the formal sector.
Leguede sees entrepreneurship’s strong potential for both wealth creation and employment and urges that it should be supported from the bottom up to promote inclusive development. Emphasizing the prevalence of the informal sector in the Togolese economy, she advises finding the necessary synergies between the different players in the ecosystem so that it benefits everyone. “Supporting infrastructure is essential. The state should consider financial support to entrepreneurship initiatives with yearly grants and allowances or establishing an investment fund that responds to the real needs of women entrepreneurs. In other words, a specially-dedicated fund to women’s entrepreneurship.”
Leguede acknowledges education as another key factor holding women back, as well as traditional attitudes about their role in society. “This compounds the problem in accessing finance. Moreover, it instills in women a fear of risk-taking and low self-esteem, both of which constitute major obstacles to promoting competitive female entrepreneurship.”
The need for a more empowering narrative for women entrepreneurs with supporting policies behind it is undeniable. Highlighting the importance of confidence, Leguede notes that women in Togo are slow to assert themselves as economic actors: “even though they’re key actors in the economy and have so much potential, they’re still timid.” Leguede therefore wanted to establish an incubator that targeted women and their specific constraints precisely because she understood the status quo could only go so far for women.
“As part of our goal to foster a change in women’s mentality,” she adds, “INNOV’UP now offers mentoring and awareness-raising programs to women — young and old — free of charge.”
Speaking personally, Leguede insists that her gender and age have been an advantage in her career precisely because of these skills. “Women’s emotional intelligence and social understanding is a major asset when building your own business. Look at the fact that women-led businesses are far less likely to fail than those run by men: 21% vs. 48%.”
Ultimately, what drives Leguede is her belief in the women of Togo. “The number of women entrepreneurs is growing, and more and more women are at the heart of new business activities in Togo. No matter the real obstacles they face, women are excellent managers.”
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