Since the emergence of the Islamic State (IS), an estimated 21 per cent of its 30,000 foreign fighters reportedly travelled from Europe to Syria and Iraq to join IS and participate in the conflict. Such phenomenon raises concern over the stability and the security of the nations from which the foreign fighters are recruited as these radicalised fighters may ‘may pose a serious threat to their States of origin … transit…travel, as well as states neighbouring zones of armed conflicts’ according to United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 2178 (2014). The resolution further called upon Member States to co-operate in restricting the movements of foreign fighters.
In response, States enacted laws not only restricting the movement of foreign fighters but also penalising actions that are considered a potential threat to national security and interests. These laws conferred expanded power of surveillance on intelligence and law enforcement agencies; they also restricted immigrant and non-citizen access to the state territory by limiting the right to have a passport and, in more extreme cases, restricted the right to citizenship. However, denationalization not only affects a person’s right to protection, freedom of movement and political participation as he no longer eligible to enjoy the rights and protection provided under the national legal system, but also creates debate that the state is provided an illegitimate enhancement of power ‘at the expense of all citizens and citizenship itself.’ In this context, this essay criticises the scope of counterterrorism laws in the United Kingdom (UK) that enable the deprivation of nationality on security grounds that cannot be justified as an effective counterterrorism mechanism as they would render individuals’ stateless.
Violation of Human Rights
Deprivation of nationality causes a severe erosion of human rights, including the right to life under article 2, and freedom from torture and other inhuman treatment of punishment under article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Although the UK government indicates regularly that it has ‘shown itself to be committed to deport foreign nationals involved in terrorist activities in this country fully respecting our human rights obligations’,such commitments have not been much effective. In some cases the UK government went a step further and required a Memorandum of Understanding to formally assure the receiving state would comply with the human rights’ norms of the deportees. However, this set of assurances is highly questionable in cases where deportees are sent back to countries that have poor human rights records, such as Yemen and Syria. In Abu Qatada, the Strasbourg Court was convinced that a mere Memorandum of Understanding may not prevent the violation of article 3 of the ECHR and not assure the right to fair trial because any confession obtained by torture is admissible in Jordan. Further, in states where the executive overly influences the judiciary, there can be no judicial protection or remedies available to the deportees, which fundamentally undermines the principle of the universal protection of human rights.
International law implications
International law forbids any arbitrary deprivation of nationality. According to the 1961 Convention, no State may deprive ‘any person or group of persons of their nationality on racial, ethnic, religious or political grounds’. However, articles 5–9 of the 1961 Convention prescribe range of principles for withdrawal of nationality, particularly the deprivation of nationality to serve a legitimate purpose. In relation to the deprivation as an external act, the international law impacts the rights and interests of other States. In the context of the UK, such deprivation of citizenship impacts the rights and interests of other States in the context of deportation, refusal and re-admission, prosecution of international crimes and application for protection abroad. This part of the essay focuses on the external act of deprivation and criticizes how in each case the UK’s decision to deprive nationality is problematic under international law.
This must also be seen in connection with the International Law Commission’s (ILC) Draft Articles on the expulsion of aliens, whereby article 9 prescribes for the ‘deprivation of nationality for the sole purpose of expulsion. A State shall not make its national an alien, by deprivation of nationality, for the sole purpose of expelling him or her.’ In the Commentary, the ILC noted that ‘deprivation of nationality, insofar as it has no other justification than the State’s desire to expel the individual, would be abusive, indeed arbitrary within the meaning of article 15, paragraph 2, of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.’ However, it is to be noted that the article does not intervene in the operation of any national legislation for the deprivation of nationality.
This is further affirmed in the General Comment on article 12 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), where the Human Rights Committee noted that the right to enter one’s own country is more than a concept of nationality. General Comment No. 27 on the Freedom of Movement extended this view, noting that even if deprivation is possible, it will not put the individual outside the right to enter and reside in that country, as that is his ‘own country’. In this context, the deprivation of nationality can be seen as an illegitimate act for a permanent deportation. However, in legal discourse, no State has the right to hand-wash its duties to the deportee, as his right to remain in the country would exist even after his nationality is deprived. However, in the real world, this has not been the case, because the border agencies have never allowed citizens whose nationality was deprived to re-enter the country.
In cases where extradition is required under international law, the UK is obligated to extradite the person ‘without exception whatsoever and whether or not the offence was committed in its territory, to submit the case without undue delay to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution…’. Article 5 of the UN Convention Against Torture (CAT), to which the UK is a party, is one example of the international obligation to extradite a suspect. Further, the Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite case is an example of the State’s responsibility. There, Senegal was found liable for State responsibility under articles 6(2) and 7(1) of the CAT against Belgium. As such, the UK depriving nationality and deporting citizens who are potential suspects of international crimes may cause the UK to violate its obligation to extradite and may lead to its the UK’s liability for its ineffective approach to countering terrorism.
Further, the UK is one of eight parties to the 1961 Convention. Under part 14 of the Statement of Changes in Immigration Rules and of the new Rule Nos 401 and 403, while an individual ‘satisfies the requirements of Article 1(1) of the 1954 United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, as a person who is not considered as a national by any State under the operation of its law….’ In the event when the other parties to the 1961 Convention may not receive the individual, whose nationality is deprived by the UK, the UK will be left with an obligation under the 1961 Convention to readmit the individual in order to prevent a condition of stateless to the individual. This may reflect on the reputation of the UK, on the one hand, for prosecuting an ineffective approach that deprives the nationality of the individual and, on the other hand, as a signatory without complying in good faith with the 1961 Convention.
First, the deprivation of nationality is an unprecedented blurring of the framework of security policies, as it can be invoked without any trial or criminal conviction relating to terrorism. It is on the basis of a dominant logic of prevention based on the logic of suspicion. However, it is also an echo of the colonial history of governance by racialized conception of social order, where the citizenship is not a secure status, but a reward for conformity to the bounds of defined ‘acceptable behaviour’. This resort to deprivation constitutes the securitization of citizenship as a policy, where the pre-crime preventive paradigm is encouraged as an option to counter the new definition of ‘radicalization’, which includes political violence, holding views against the government and ‘vocal opposition to (…) British values’. Although the notion of civic citizenship involves a more inclusive national identity compared to the legal definition of citizenship and belonging based on ethnicity, the deprivation of nationality as a counterterrorism measure nevertheless creates normative boundaries of exclusion and a hierarchy between the ‘good and tolerated’ citizenship and the ‘failed’ citizenship.
Second, it is the State that has the fundamental duty to provide security for its citizens. Permitting the deprivation of citizenship simply allows States to disregard the consequences. Being statelessness without diplomatic protection or conveyance by passport renders the deportee in an extremely vulnerable position to abuse. A good example is the 16 British nationals whose passports were revoked when they were abroad: two were killed in a drone attack by the US, one was kidnapped, and one was rendered by US security services. While there has been debate over whether denationalization is an appropriate punishment, the position that lets an individual remain stateless is condemnable.
Third, the deprivation of citizenship creates a situation where instead of citizens having the sovereign power to choose their government, the government chooses who they wish to govern; deprivation is no longer based on ‘conductive to the public good’, for as Lord Slynn notes in Secretary of State for the Home Department v Rehman, ‘there is no definition or limitation of what can be “conducive to the public good” and the matter is plainly in the first instance and primarily one for the discretion of the Secretary of State.’ This phrase therefore provides an ill-defined ground for the UK government to deprive nationality of an individual and at the same time create ‘a dubious and shifting hierarchy of citizenship’.
Depriving the nationality of citizens on mere suspicion for links with terrorist organisations as a counterterrorism mechanism has failed from both legal and rights-based perspectives. This essay concludes there are four main reasons that reflect the deprivation of nationality problem. First, it disrupts the UK’s international commitment to reduce statelessness, and its obligation under the UN Security Council Resolution to bring suspects of terrorism to justice. Second, it undermines the UK’s commitment to uphold human rights and the rule of law as a liberal democratic state while countering threats against its national security and national interest. Third, revoking nationality is an ineffective security strategy against terrorism because of practical implications. In the same vein, the above analysis recognises that mere banishment and deportation could be a measure that may backfire the real intention in countering terrorism because it fails to address the root cause for the radicalisation. Such avoidance in the long term may produce counter activities against the state and keep the national security at constant risk. Fourth, the power of the UK to revoke the citizenship of naturalised citizens who have no second nationality—which causes stateless—thus creates a legal black hole, into which once an individual fall he cannot be pulled out.
Compared with the deprivation of nationality, the measures proposed by sections 1 and 2 of the CTA 2015 such as seizure of passport from personnel suspected of involvement in terrorism, and temporary exclusion orders are more effective because they involve some judicial intervention and temporary suspension of individuals within the UK, which means the state will have the power to retain the suspect whenever required. There are also other counterterrorism measures that, with the adequate intervention of judiciary, have been an effective security strategy against terrorism. Thus, this essay proposes that the UK must revoke its laws concerning the deprivation of nationality as a counterterrorism measure but alternatively introduce laws that would address issuing permits to return to the terrorist suspects on individual basis, set specific obligations to the individuals after return to the UK, set tribunal that could review the decision of temporary exclusion, and strict the terrorism prevention and investigation measures with consideration of enforceability, and upholding international law and obligations in the contemporary counterterrorism context that will make the UK counterterrorism response effective.
A shift in militants’ strategy could shine a more positive light on failed US policy
A paradigm shift in jihadist thinking suggests that the US invasion of Afghanistan may prove to have achieved more than many counterterrorism experts would want policymakers and military strategists to believe.
Similarly, the paradigm shift also hints at the possibility that the presence in a Taliban-governed Afghanistan of various militant Islamist and jihadist groups could turn out to be an advantage in efforts to prevent and contain political violence.
The evolution of tensions and unfolding of differences in the world of Afghan militancy will constitute a litmus test of the shift and how history will ultimately judge the United States’ 20-year forever war in Afghanistan in terms of counterterrorism.
The shift involves a move away from cross-border and transnational acts of violence towards local militancy and the garnering of popular support through good governance based on an ultra-conservative interpretation of Islam. It is a difference in strategy that constitutes one of the ideological and strategic differences between Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State.
“This is not because (the jihadists’) ideology has softened: It is because they have learned that inviting overwhelming reprisals from modern militaries is the fastest way to forfeit their conquests, squander their influence and be forced to start all over again,” said scholar and journalist, Hassan Hassan, in a lengthy piece of rare up-close reporting on jihadist militancy.
“Contrary to how some understand the US withdrawal in Afghanistan, the lesson extremists are taking from the Taliban’s success is not simply that jihad works but that diplomacy and engagement are a necessary part of the process, which includes reassuring the West about external threats emerging from their areas. What can be gained from parlays in Doha is more significant and lasting than any terror attack,” Mr. Hassan went on to say.
The shift amounts to a return to the pattern of Islamic militancy that historically is rooted in local grievances and conflicts. Mr. Hassan also describes the Islamic State’s transnational jihadism that targets the West, long embraced by Al-Qaeda, as an aberration of that history.
Mr. Hassan’s analysis is supported by research published by The Soufan Group, a research organization established by Ali Soufan, a former FBI agent who played an important role in the interrogation of captured Al-Qaeda officials and was involved in related cases in the United States and elsewhere.
Analyst Abdul Sayed noted that Al Qaeda, in an effort to prevent the United States from driving it out of Afghanistan and Pakistan, has “shifted focus from global terrorist attacks and external operations to supporting local jihadist groups throughout South Asia, and fuelling the narratives that underpin their objectives. This shift helped build resilience, allowing Al-Qaeda to survive despite the massive blows inflicted by the United States and its allies.”
The Islamic State’s loss of its proto-state in Syria and Iraq, and the Taliban victory in Afghanistan appear to vindicate this paradigm shift.
CNN correspondent Clarissa Ward said she walked away from an interview in August with Abdu Munir, the name used by a commander of the Islamic State-Khorasan, two days before it attacked Kabul airport, with the impression that “ISIS-Khorasan is very different from ISIS… in Syria and Iraq. Ms. Ward was referring to the Afghan affiliate as well as the Islamic State itself using common Western abbreviations for them.
Ms. Ward said that “the conversation that I had with this commander did not lead me to believe that they had the same level of transnational ambitions… They’re much more focussed on the Taliban, honestly, than they are on trying to blow up a plane…and they’re much more simple, less sophisticated.”
The jihadist strategy shift would be further vindicated if the Taliban victory also reinforces ultraconservative religious trends in neighbouring Pakistan.
Ultraconservatives and jihadists may take heart from recent opposition by Muslim clerics, including Tahir Mehmood Ashrafi, Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan’s special representative for religious harmony, to draft legislation that would ban forced conversions.
As a result, the shift could become one more argument to justify a possible future decision by President Joe Biden to pull US troops out of Iraq and Syria originally dispatched to fight the Islamic State, as part of the emerging contours of a Biden doctrine.
“There is no question that the GWOT has not gone as planned… Yet it would still be wrong – and rash – simply to discard the GWOT as a strategic failure. The fact that consecutive presidents have found it so difficult to extricate the United States from ongoing operations in the greater Middle East reflects the reality of a persistent threat from extremist organisations and their allies… GWOT has been considerably more fruitful than it might first appear,” said analysts Hal Brand and Michael O’Hanlon, referring to President George W. Bush’s global war on terror launched in 2001 in the wake of the 9/11 attacks.
Messrs. Brand and O’Hanlon may be painting an overly optimistic picture. In the best of cases, Taliban-ruled Afghanistan will only partially live up to their criteria of success laid out in a recent journal article. The Taliban’s policing of jihadists may prevent them from targeting the United States and others but will continue to offer them a safe haven, allowing them to recruit.
“Being a safe haven for global jihadists and acting as a launchpad for attacks against the West are not the same thing. Under the Doha Agreement, the Taliban have committed to preventing attacks being launched from Afghanistan, but they have not pledged to cut off relations with foreign jihadist groups altogether, nor to expel them from Afghanistan,” said Afghanistan scholar Antonio Giustozzi.
Even so, on balance that could turn out to be less of a problem provided the Taliban can keep in check the Islamic State, the one jihadist group that refuses to accept its takeover of Afghanistan or make Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the Pakistani Taliban, adopt the shift in strategy. The fata morgana of a Taliban 2.0 could be shattered if large numbers of Taliban fighters defect to the Islamic State in protest against the group’s policing of militants on Afghan soil and/or embracing degrees of social liberalization, particularly regarding women’s rights.
That could prove to be a big if. Question marks about the Taliban’s ability to police those groups that have welcomed its victory and/or pledged allegiance to it have already begun to emerge. Mr. Giustozzi reports that in contrast to Pakistani militants Lashkar-e Taiba and Lashkar-e Jhangvi, and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan; the TTP and Al-Qaeda have refused to negotiate agreements that would tighten Taliban control by moving them to different parts of the country. Lashkar-e Taiba and Lashkar-e Janghvi are groups seen as having close ties to Pakistani intelligence.
The proposed agreements reportedly stroked with demands put forward by China that the Taliban ensure that militants on Afghan soil are prevented from training, raising funds and recruiting.
Suhail Shaheen, a Taliban spokesperson in Qatar, appeared to acknowledge the demands in an interview with the Global Times, a Chinese Communist Party newspaper. “First, we will not allow any training on our territory. Second, we will not allow any fundraising for those who intend to carry out a foreign agenda. Third, we will not allow the establishment of any recruitment centre in Afghanistan. These are the main things,” Mr. Shaheen said.
Zabihullah Mujahid, the Taliban’s chief spokesperson in Kabul, however, last month left the door open on the Taliban’s relationship with the TTP.
“The issue of the TTP is one that Pakistan will have to deal with, not Afghanistan. It is up to Pakistan, and Pakistani Islamic scholars and religious figures, not the Taliban, to decide on the legitimacy or illegitimacy of their war and to formulate a strategy in response,” Mr. Mujahid told a Pakistani television program. The spokesman stopped short of saying whether the Taliban would abide by a decision of the scholars.
The TTP is believed to be responsible for a recent spike in attacks on Pakistani security forces, including a suicide attack in Pakistan that killed three paramilitary soldiers and wounded 20 other people. The stepped-up attacks prompted the New Zealand cricket team to last week abandon its first tour of Pakistan in 18 years and abruptly leave the country while England cancelled its visit that had been scheduled for next month.
Similarly, behind the facades, cracks had already emerged between the Taliban and Al-Qaeda before the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, prompting the group, like the TTP, according to Mr. Giustozzi, to refuse to negotiate a deal with the Afghans and build support among factions of the Taliban that are more sympathetic to the jihadists.
Al-Qaeda was wary of what the Taliban’s agreement with the United States would mean for the group and suspected the Afghans of having a hand in the killing of several of its senior members in recent years. Al-Qaeda worries, moreover, that Taliban understandings with China and Russia could put its freedom of movement and/or existence into further jeopardy.
Apparently anticipating a Taliban failure to control all jihadists on Afghan soil and/or adoption of the paradigm strategy shift by some major jihadist groups, US intelligence officials predicted that Al-Qaeda would be able to reconstitute itself in Afghanistan and be capable of orchestrating attacks inside the U.S. in one to two years.
Their predictions were bolstered by the return to Afghanistan of Anwar ul Haq Mujahid, a leader of Osama bin Laden’s former “Black Guard,” who allegedly helped plan and orchestrate the jihadist leader’s escape in 2001 as the United States bombed his Tora Bora hideout. Mr. Mujahid, no family of the Taliban spokesman, reportedly returned to Jalalabad to command Taliban forces and foreign fighters in eastern Afghanistan. Several of his associates are said to also be back.
However, Mr. Mujahid’s return does not by definition deny the potential shift in Al-Qaeda strategy that is supported by the Taliban. It could be the Taliban’s way of placating the group as well as the more militant within its own ranks.
“Despite the persistence of the relationship…the Taliban have a strong interest in holding Al-Qaeda in check… It is not hard to imagine a scenario in which the Taliban provide space and financial support for Al-Qaeda to operate while also restricting the activities of the group to plot and stage attacks,” said scholar Cole Bunzel.
Islamic State threat moves online, expands across Africa
Two decades after the 11 September terrorist attacks in New York, terror networks Al-Qaida and Islamic State – also known as Da’esh – continue to pose a grave threat to peace and security, adapting to new technologies and moving into some of the world’s most fragile regions, the top UN counter-terrorism official told the Security Council on Thursday.
UN counter-terrorism chief Vladimir Voronkov presented the Secretary-General’s latest report on the threats posed by terrorist groups, saying that Da’esh continues to exploit the disruption, grievances and development setbacks caused by the pandemic to regroup, recruit new followers and intensify its activities – both online and on the ground.
“Today, we face transnational terrorist threats like Da’esh and Al-Qaida that are enduring and able to adapt to new technologies, but also expanding to include individuals and groups that commit terrorist attacks connected to xenophobia, racism and other forms of intolerance”, said Mr. Voronkov.
The UN counter-terrorism architecture, largely set up in the wake of the 9/11 attack, helps Member States implement effective frameworks to prevent, address, investigate and prosecute acts of terrorism.
It is also ramping up efforts to help countries adapt to the rapidly changing nature of the threat, which has become more digital and de-centralized in recent years.
Noting that the world is currently witnessing a rapidly evolving situation in Afghanistan “which could have far-reaching implications” around the globe, he cited Da’esh’s expanded presence in that country and pointed out that several members of the Taliban have been designated as terrorists by the Security Council.
“We will need to ensure that Afghanistan is never again used as launching pad for global terrorism“, stressed the UN official.
He briefed the Council on the eve of the fourth commemoration of the International Day of Remembrance of and Tribute to the Victims of Terrorism, observed annually on 21 August.
Islamic State in Africa
While Da’esh remains focused on reconstituting its capabilities in Iraq and Syria, Mr. Vornkov said the most alarming development in recent months is the group’s relentless spread across the African continent.
The so-called “Islamic State in the Greater Sahara” has killed several hundred civilians since the start of 2021 in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, while the group’s “West Africa Province” will likely gain from the weakening of Boko Haram, with additional spillover of terrorists and foreign fighters from Libya.
Meanwhile, the expansion of Da’esh in Central Africa – and especially in northern Mozambique – could have far-reaching implications for peace and security in the region.
“A global response is urgently needed to support the efforts of African countries and regional organizations to counter terrorism and address its interplay with conflict, organized crime, governance and development gaps”, said Mr. Voronkov.
Repatriating women and children
Alongside Da’esh’s expansion in Africa and its rapid shift online, Mr. Voronkov also cited the continued detention of thousands of individuals with alleged links to terrorist groups as another factor exacerbating the threat.
Deteriorating conditions in detention facilities and displacement camps in northeast Syria, in particular, are serving as a rallying cry for terrorist activities. They have already fuelled instances of terrorist radicalization, fund-raising, arms smuggling, training and incitement to terror.
Against that backdrop, he echoed calls from officials across the UN for Member States to voluntarily repatriate all concerned individuals, with a particular focus on children.
In September, the Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT) and the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) will jointly launch a global framework to support countries requesting assistance with protection, voluntary repatriation, prosecution, rehabilitation and reintegration of individuals with suspected links to designated terrorist groups returning from Iraq and Syria.
The framework has already been deployed in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.
Taliban and Al Qaeda: Putting a fox in charge of the chicken coop?
Abu Omar Khorasani was taken from Kabul’s Pul-i-Charkhi prison and unceremoniously shot.
The first and only person to have been executed since the Taliban gained full control of Afghanistan, Mr. Khorasani was the head of the Islamic State in South Asia until he was arrested by government forces last year.
The precise circumstances of his execution are not known. His killing was, however, at least in part designed to send a message to the international community, and particularly Afghanistan’s neighbours, including China and Iran, as well as Russia, Central Asia’s security overlord.
The message was that the Taliban were cracking down on foreign jihadists and militants in Afghanistan.
Mr. Khorasani was an easy symbol. The Taliban and the Islamic State, whose ranks of foreigners are primarily populated by Pakistanis and a sprinkling of Central Asians, Uighurs, Russians, Turks, Iranians, Indonesians, Indians, and Frenchmen, have long been adversarial. The Islamic State recently accused the Taliban of being more nationalist than pious in their negotiations with the United States.
The Taliban message is a partial truth at best. What is true for the Islamic State is not true for Al–Qaeda and others such as the Uighur Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP) and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan.
The Taliban appear to believe that they can get away with the differentiation because they perceived the United States as more focused in the withdrawal negotiations on ensuring that the Islamic State, Al-Qaeda, and other militants will not be allowed to use Afghanistan as a base for international operations rather than on getting them expelled from the country.
The perceived US focus may have been rooted in a concern that if Taliban’s hands were forced, they would let militants slip out of the country and not hand them over to authorities. That would make it difficult to control their movements or ensure that they are either entered into deradicalization programs or, if warranted, brought to justice.
“It’s a Catch-22. The Taliban ensuring that Al Qaeda sticks to rule risks putting a fox in charge of the chicken coop. How much better that is than having foxes run wild remains to be seen,” said a retired counter-terrorism official.
Officials of the Trump administration that negotiated the agreement suggest that the continued presence of Al-Qaeda and other militants in Afghanistan would violate the accord with the Taliban.
Former Vice President Mike Pence as well as Trump era State Department counterterrorism coordinator Nathan Sales argued that the deal “required the Taliban…to refuse terrorists safe harbour.”
Russia and China, while publicly more measured in their statements, are likely to share western concerns. Russia held military drills earlier this month with Tajik and Uzbek troops in Tajikistan, 20 kilometres from the border with Afghanistan.
Al-Qaeda may have been boosted in recent weeks by multiple prison breaks in which the Taliban freed operatives of Al-Qaeda and other militant groups. It remains unclear however to what degree the breaks will help the group strengthen its presence in Afghanistan.
General Mark Milley, chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, warned this week that al Qaeda and the Islamic State could quickly rebuild their networks in Afghanistan.
The United Nations recently reported that Al-Qaeda “is present in at least 15 Afghan provinces”, and that its affiliate in the Indian subcontinent, “operates under Taliban protection from Kandahar, Helmand and Nimruz provinces.”
“Without information on who exactly escaped, it is difficult to determine whether historically significant figures remain within AQ’s AfPak network, or if it is mainly composed of newer figures these days, whether local or regional foreign fighters,” cautioned political violence scholar Aaron Y. Zelin. Mr. Zelin was referring to Al-Qaeda’s Afghanistan-Pakistan network.
Also unclear is whether Al-Qaeda operatives in Iran will be allowed to relocate to Afghanistan.
The prison breaks further go to concerns about relying on the Taliban to police jihadists and other militants with aspirations beyond Afghanistan’s borders. Of particular concern is the fact that the balance of power has yet to be determined between Taliban leaders who in recent days have been eager to put a more moderate, accommodating foot forward with security guarantees for their opponents, minorities and women and the group’s far-flung less polished rank and file.
The concern about the Taliban’s ability and willingness to control militant activity on Afghan soil is magnified by worry regarding the continued existence of warlords with the power to organise violence, provide jobs and public services, and forge or strengthen ties with militants.
“Warlords will play an active role in the future of Afghanistan. They will remain businessmen and political leaders, connected to global economic processes and networks. They will develop the military power that they need to control territory and wage war. They will, finally, continue to fight for more autonomy and, in some cases, might even manage to partially form their old regional polities once again,” said Romain Malejacq, author of a book on Afghan warlords.
“Afghanistan’s availability as a sanctuary for terrorists is, to say the least, related to its status as a warlord-ridden wasteland,” said journalist and author Graeme Wood.
The Taliban’s refusal to expel militants not only complicates the group’s efforts to garner legitimacy in the international community and particularly its neighbours, even if Al-Qaeda has been significantly weakened since 9/11 and is less focussed on attacking the United States and more on the Muslim world.
It also strengthens those who fear that Afghanistan will again emerge as a launching pad for trans-national political violence. “We are going to go back to a pre-9/11 state—a breeding ground for terrorism,” warned Michael McCaul, the ranking Republican member of the US House Foreign Affairs Committee. “They (the Taliban) will not restrict terrorist groups, just ask them to operate low-key,” added Douglas London, a former head of CIA counterterrorism operations for South and Southwest Asia.
The Taliban proved already 20 years ago that they valued loyalty when they rejected US and Saudi pressure to hand over Osama bin Laden no matter the cost. The Taliban have since come to appreciate Al Qaeda’s fighting skills and contributions to the Afghan militants’ cause.
Taliban fighters this week, in a violation of their pledge to inclusiveness, demonstrated their ideological anti-Shiite affinity with Al-Qaeda by blowing up a statue of Abdul Ali Mazari, a Shiite Hazara militia leader killed by the Taliban when they first took power in 1996.
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