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Israel’s cybersecurity: Principles and techniques

Giancarlo Elia Valori

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In 2018, the sums allocated for funding the whole cybersecurity industry in Israel amounted to 1.03 billion US dollars, with a 22% increase compared to the previous public-private funds budgeted.

 Again in 2018, 66 new companies in the cybersecurity sector were set up, with a 10% increase as against to 2017. In 2016, however, they were 88.

 The higher the rate of technological innovation, the greater the mortality rate of companies.

 A fast and significant increase in turnover and investment in the Israeli cybersecurity, which, however, has been going on for five years.

 Currently the area in which the Israeli start-ups specialized in cybersecurity is particularly focused is the IoT security, i.e. the security concerning the Internet of Things, which is basically a web system in which the real or even symbolic “objects” communicate one another data about themselves and can also have access to information about other objects, autonomously and independently.

 The “things” we are talking about can be equipment, plants, systems, devices, material objects, goods and machines.

 The IoT stems from the idea that the Web can and sometimes must leave a recognizable trace in the real world. This means that the web technology can and often must indicate the end of the separation between the material “thing” and the formal symbol, in the Web as in calculations.

 Just think for a moment about what this will mean for the future production and distribution technologies.

 But also for the design of the “objects”, with “things” that will change autonomously, in their various phases, between automated production, exchange and consumption.

 The technologies that allow the creation of this new form of Spinozan coincidentia rei et intellectus are, in particular, radio-frequency identification (RFDI), with the recent addition of the new protocols by the IEEE.802.15.4 standard, a model using short-range wireless networks integrated between them, precisely according to the technical standards provided by IEEE.802.15.4.

 Low-frequency radio networks and short-range wireless networks, all integrated into a new technology that allows “things” to communicate one another.

 According to many estimates made by market analysts for the sector, in 2020 there will already be 29 billion objects connected at global level.

 Control tools, real objects, materials for medical, statistical and intelligence analyses, as well as technologies for the just-in-time adaptation of companies’ products, not to mention obviously the defence sector.

 For us laymen it is hard even to imagine the ​​application areas of these new web technologies.

 Another primary application of the new cybersecurity of Israeli start-ups in 2018 was that of security for blockchains.

 This means taking care of the security of a network, namely the blockchain, which is a predetermined and closed set of computers, which always talk to one another, but do not know one another and, however, use all the data at their disposal, even vis-à-vis the other elements of the “chain”.

 A game in which all the players know the cards of the others, but do not know the players and, above all, they are always steadily controlled by a constant exchange of information between them.

 Just think, here, of the malware-probably of Chinese origin- which, over two years, has infected the production of virtual coins to the tune of over 2 million US dollars.

 The virtual currency is always and in any case produced in blockchains and succeeding in entering a malware into a complex block network is certainly not a very easy operation.

  As can be easily imagined, the malware we are talking about was the result of a blockchain hacking.

  Every decentralized system, such as blockchains, is always structurally weak.

 Hence, we can infer that Israel wants to use the blockchain technology in many areas, certainly including defence, strategic intelligence and security.

 With specific reference to Security BC, an increasing number of attacks occurred on the boundary between the network and its market.

In fact, in December 2017, NiceHash- the largest virtual exchange market for virtual currency – was hacked, with a loss of 60 million US dollars.

 However, many other attacks could be mentioned.

 There is also the “51 attack”.

  This entails that once any blockchain transaction has been completed, there may be a subject on the Web who, at that moment, has a higher computing power (51%) than the other “blocks”.

  Hence, this enables the subject to change transactions and even multiply them, often excluding the other participants in the “blockchain” from communication.

 Again in this regard, in 2014 there was the case of Gash, which for a long time had 51% of mining power, which is information technology – or rather energy and calculation power – capable of knocking out the competitors of both the other blockchains and of those in which Gash participated directly.

 Recently the new start-ups of Israeli cybersecurity have recently much dealt with cloud-native security.

 In other words, cloud-native security are technologies that regard, for example, containers or networks without autonomous central control.

 This means the intelligence security of everything that currently – due to the size of the networks or of the market – already goes directly to cloud computing.

 Just think here about the large logistics networks, or also the networks of the new division of international labour, or tourist networks and oil, material and raw materials trade networks.

 Finally, for long time Israel’s new cybersecurity companies have much been operating in the Software Defined Perimeter (SDP).

 SDP is also called “black cloud”, a cyber-system that evolved from the studies conducted at the Defense Information Systems Agency, namely the Defense Communication Agency, established in 1960 and producer of countless communication-command-control systems for the US Armed Forces.

 The black cloud – probably developed in 2007 – is, in principle, a criterion for monitoring network security.

 At the beginning of operations, there is an alphanumeric paradigm in which the position and identity of what enters the SDP is checked, but this network is “black” precisely because it can never be traced from outside, or by unauthorized web third parties. Everything happens without ever externalizing an Internet Protocol (IP) or other information.

 In Israel’s current cybersecurity market, recently the most important sector in terms of investment has been the Internet of Things (IoT), which  last year totalled as many as 229.5 million US dollars.

 The Israeli government and private investors are very interested in the IoT, because it is versatile, but above all because it allows many industrial applications, for example in the drone network, in scientific research, in remote control and in medical therapies.

 There will also be IoT technological and application innovations both for management and for storage and distribution networks, but also for the wireless networks of administrative offices and for small specialized production.

 In 2018 one third of total investment went precisely to this sector, to the companies that deal with new network security-enhancement technologies.

 Again in 2018, 60% of the new entrepreneurs or founders of Israeli cyber start-ups already had over ten years of experience in the sector, both as executives and as analysts.

 Obviously, much of what is done in Israel stems from the excellent training that these technicians receive within the Armed Forces, in particular.

 What is the secret of this highly successful formula? First and foremost, the full synergy between the Armed Forces and Universities.

 Also this alone currently seems to be unattainable for our country.

 All this happens, in Italy, both due to the lack of regulatory flexibility and also to the absolute scarcity of funds, as well as to some short-sightedness of investors, who aim at the “product” and not at the new “system”, not to mention some general cultural backwardness.

  Also university backwardness especially in relation to the issues that entail a direct commitment of scientific research in the company and, which is even more severe, in the defence sector.

There is now a “Fund for supporting venture capital” available, included in the Government’s financial and budget package for 2019 – which, however, is technically a “reserve” of the Ministry for Economic Development (MISE), with 90 million euros to be allocated between 2019 and 2021.

 The government is supposed to finance this Fund with a 15% share of the dividends made by State-owned subsidiaries.

 All this seems to work slowly and as late as possible.

 However, the traditional standard of investment in the innovative start-up sector – 100 million euros a year – has remained stable in Italy for several years.

 It must be made clear, however, that this applies to all types of market technological innovation, not just cybersecurity.

 This pales into insignificance compared to the sums invested in Israel, only in the essential field of cybersecurity.

 The bilateral cyber working group between the United States and Israel is already operational, but only for the two countries.

 It was established upon the proposal put forward by Thomas Bossert, former US Homeland Security Advisor, at the 2017 Cyber ​​Week in Tel Aviv. Hence the idea of a bi-national network between the two countries (easier said than done) to counter cyberattacks.

  In his Tel Aviv speech, Bossert mentioned the Iranian attacks on the Sands Casino and Saudi Aramco, as well as the operations of North Korea, which had already attacked Sony. As Bossert underlined, those countries had certainly not the technological and operational refinement of Russia and China.

 Hence, for President Trump’s former consultant, as well as for Israel, the core of everything lies in cyberdefence, which in both countries is the backbone of cybersecurity.

 Another factor to consider when analysing the network of cybersecurity companies in Israel is the very high quality provided by the universities that, in some cases, have specialized in this sector, but always with a close and updated relationship with the Israeli Armed Forces.

 The working cycle of a manager in an Israeli start-up is traditionally military training, then specialization at university level and later creation of the various start-ups, whose products largely returnto the defence sector.

 The new companies are also excellent for generating private profits, but are even more useful in stabilizing the ongoing innovation that characterizes the whole sector.

 Much of the research that private individuals conduct, however, is not subject to disclosure.

 Here much of what comes from Israel is web intelligence, which is the type of research using Artificial Intelligence and Information Technology to build products, systems and procedures that can be reused on the Web.

 Therefore, this sector deals with a sum of data mining (which is the use of technologies that can discover semantic models in vast data collections) and information retrieval, i.e. the technology that discovers information in documents to search for both data and metadata, namely data on data.

 In this sector, however, a relevant role is played by predictive analysis, which uses many of the already mentioned techniques, albeit in a different way, to predict facts or behaviours, as can be easily imagined.

 Web intelligence and web monitoring, however, are used by the Israeli public or private analysts, with a view to checking on the Internet what each intelligence service does – perhaps using less refined methods: the probability of illegal leakage of sensitive data; the emergence of subjective and structural risks; the analysis on the Web of subjects of greater  positive or negative interest for the intelligence services; the possible unlawful disclosure of data by intelligence agents and operators or by people of interest; as well as what we currently tend to call Adversary Simulation.

  It is a technology based, first and foremost, on the actual exfiltration of the enemy’s data.

 Furthermore, adversary simulation operates through a “compromise clause” based on the fact that the enemy is skilful, capable and, in any case, already part of the Web.

 The technology we are talking about creates real-world indicators within one’s own and the attacker’s network. At this juncture, however, for many public and private users who buy it, this technology becomes the highest level for threat assessment and structured response to any threat.

An enhanced and innovative technique of strategic games, which obviously apply both to business and to defence.

 What currently changes in the Israeli cybersecurity technology is the possibility of adapting – for various levels of customers (and security) – the functions of the system and hence the potentials used by the Web.

 Therefore the solutions are always distributed, above all, in Software as a Service mode (SaaS).

 In the social media sector, which is extraordinarily important for its intelligence relevance and the possibility of data mining, the Israeli cybersecurity is willing to produce many avatars and online profiles to be later launched in the virtual world.

 On these structures, it is usually preferred to apply technical solutions that affect both the ordinary and the dark web.

 It should be recalled that the latter is the network composed of websites that do not appear in search engines.

 A network for security, certainly, but above all a Web aimed at the exploration of information, with a constant focus on dual-use technology and an evident primacy of the military sector over the civilian one, for obvious reasons.

Advisory Board Co-chair Honoris Causa Professor Giancarlo Elia Valori is an eminent Italian economist and businessman. He holds prestigious academic distinctions and national orders. Mr. Valori has lectured on international affairs and economics at the world’s leading universities such as Peking University, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Yeshiva University in New York. He currently chairs “International World Group”, he is also the honorary president of Huawei Italy, economic adviser to the Chinese giant HNA Group. In 1992 he was appointed Officier de la Légion d’Honneur de la République Francaise, with this motivation: “A man who can see across borders to understand the world” and in 2002 he received the title “Honorable” of the Académie des Sciences de l’Institut de France. “

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Should Turkey and Azerbaijan Be Worried About Killed Syrian Mercenaries?

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Just a few weeks ago many analysts and observers were sceptical about reports of Turkey’s transferring units of its Syrian National Army (SNA) proxies to Nagorno Karabakh, even more so because Turkish officials denied any such claims. However, as evidence of massive casualties among the Syrian mercenaries continues to mount, there is little space left for doubt: SNA fighters have become cannon fodder in the Turkish operation in support of Azerbaijan.

The first batch of bodies of those Syrians who perished in Nagorno Karabakh counted over 50 people, according to messages and videos that went viral on opposition WhatsApp and Telegram channels. Among the dead who were delivered to Syria over Hiwar Kilis border crossing and were given a hasted burial were men from Aleppo, Idlib, Homs and other regions of Syria. Many of their relatives, like families of Muhammad Shaalan from Atareb and Kinan Ferzat from Maarat al-Nuuman, were shocked to learn about their death.

Just like the majority of the Syrians who travelled to Nagorno Karabakh,  Muhammad and Firzat were primarily motivated by lucrative rewards of up to 2,000 dollars promised by Turkey. “I came here to make money and have a better life back in Syria where the living conditions are miserable. I consider this a job, nothing else,” a member of Liwa Sultan Murad, one of the first SNA factions to deploy its fighters to the contested region, told Guardian.

The reason behind heavy casualties of the Syrian mercenaries is that they are thrown into action where the clashes are the most violent, including Jabrayil, Terter, Fizulin and Talysh. This move allows Azerbaijan to keep its military, who mainly provide air support including operating Turkey-made Bayraktar TB2 UAVs and coordinate artillery and missile strikes of the Armenian positions, out of direct contact with the enemy.

The estimates of the numbers of the Syrian mercenaries present in Nagorno Karabakh are wildly different. While initial reports put their number at 500 men, it is currently believed that the actual number may be in thousands. This data indicates that at least 10 percent of the fighters were killed during the very first days of the escalation – a serious alarm for the mercenaries as well as their Turkish backers.

These developments must ring a bell for Azerbaijan as well. The longer the conflict protracts, the higher the risk of casualties among the Azeri servicemen becomes, who have already suffered losses in Armenian retaliation strikes. Baku has managed to avoid discontent among the military as well as the civilian populace – not least thanks to the Syrian mercenaries crushed as cannon fodder – but this can not continue for long.

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Emerging Multipolarity and its consequences

Abdul Rasool Syed

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“Make America great again” a slogan that formed the nucleus of trump’s electoral campaign vividly suggests that America is no more a great country. It is, in fact, an implicit admission that U.S is gradually losing its clout in international politics and hence, its image as a sole superpower of the world has virtually tarnished. Let me rephrase this connotation; it means that the era of unipolar world is over and the world has now transitioned to a multipolarirty.

Currently, new power centers are emerging in transnational political landscape. China, Russia, India and Turkey are excessively engaged to carve a niche for them in evolving international order. Most importantly, with China and Russia’s mushrooming proximity, balance of power is now shifting from west to east. Former United States (US) Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton at her state visit to New Zealand was one of the first to observe “a shifting balance of power to a more multi-polar world as opposed to the Cold War model of a bipolar world”. This conspicuous change in multi-national political setup was also realized by Ban ki Moon, the then secretary- General of United Nations who stated at Stanford University in 2013 that we have begun to “move increasingly and irreversibly to a multi-polar world”. Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, also declared at the Russia-China Conference 2016 that “international relations have entered into a conceptually new historical stage that consists in the emergence of a multi-polar world order and reflects the strengthening of new centers of economic development and power”.

These manifestations of political spin doctors have since then revealed a general acceptance of the idea of multi-polar world as a concept that is inescapable political reality in the contemporary international dynamics.   However, when it comes to the transitions and inevitability of power structures, there is a little agreement among the international states.

A much stronger resistance to forego unipolarity remains embedded in the Trump administration vision to “make America great again”. Political pundits such  as Robert Kaplan continue to question, whether there is an overlap of unipolar and multi-polar world realities; where US continues to retain the supremacy in military realm of affairs and is anticipated to remain so for a considerable future time, whereby China leads in the economic realm. Additionally nations in the former Third World are acquiring status as rising powers, notably India who have over the years with smart diplomacy have acquired global outreach to shape international agenda.

Chronologically, After World War II, the U.S. became the undisputed and unchallenged global superpower. It was the only country, equipped with nuclear warheads and was one of the few countries involved in the war that came away from it relatively unscathed at home. The U.S. underwent a meager loss of approximately 400,000 soldiers and a fractional amount of civilians in the war. The Soviet Union, meanwhile, incurred a gigantic loss of around 11 million soldiers and some 7 million to 10 million civilians. While Soviet and European cities were undergoing the process of rehabilitation, American cities flourished. It seemed clear to all that the future belonged to the United States.

But it didn’t take long for the luster of unrivaled power to tarnish. The U.S. military machine relaxed as quickly as it had mobilized, and wartime unity gave way to peacetime political debates over government spending and entitlement programs. Within five years, a bipolar world emerged: The Soviets attained an atomic bomb, and the U.S. was caught flat-footed in a war on the Korean Peninsula that ended in a stalemate. Soon thereafter, the U.S. was withdrawing from Vietnam and rioting at home. In 1971, then-President Richard Nixon predicted a world that he said would soon emerge in which the U.S. was “no longer in the position of complete pre-eminence.” Within 26 years of the end of World War II, Nixon’s prediction saw the light of the day and the U.S. had to resign to its fate.

Theoretically, multipolarity refers to a distribution of power in which more than two states have nearly equal amounts of military, cultural, financial and economic influence.

If we look at the contemporary world, we find that with the rise of like China, India, Russia, Indonesia, Turkey and Brazil, global power will spread across a wider range of countries, hence, a new world order with multipolar outlook is likely to emerge .

Realistically speaking, several revisionist powers are and will shaking up their regions. For instance, Russia invaded Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014 – annexing Crimea, over which it has fought several wars throughout history (mainly with Turkey). In turn, Turkey is asserting its sovereignty over the eastern Mediterranean to the frustration of countries like Greece, Egypt, Cyprus and Israel. Meanwhile, India has upped its aggression in its border dispute with Pakistan as Modi began a process to revoke the autonomous status of the disputed territories of Jammu and Kashmir.

Notably, after the age of city-states and nation-states, we are now entering the age of continental politics. The most powerful countries of the 21st century (the U.S., China, Russia India, Indonesia, and Brazil) are the size of continents. They have broad economic bases and their digital economies potentially have hundreds of millions of users. Internationally, their scale requires them to seek broad spheres of influence in order to protect their security.

Here the question arises what will be the impact of growing multipolarity in the world? First of all, revisionist powers will increasingly ignite tensions. The growing assertiveness of countries like Russia, Turkey and India is the new normal. As they grow more powerful, these countries will seek to revise arrangements in order to reflect the new realities of power. Because these (continental) states seek broad spheres of influence, many places are at risk of destabilization.

Second, one of the biggest risks is the growing paranoia of the hegemon (the U.S.). The current trade war has shown how destabilizing the policy of the (financial) hegemon becomes as it feels threatened by the rise of a rival. Historically, this has been the most important source of violent conflicts. Indeed, the biggest source of uncertainty in the coming years is how the U.S. will react to the rise of China.

Third, the world order will become more ambiguous. Two developments deserve our attention. First, the growing use of shadow power will make conflict more unpredictable. With digital tools, states (and non-state actors) are manipulating each other in subtle ways. For example, Russian hackers  posed as Iranians to hit dozens of countries and Americans blamed Russia for tampering with American elections. Second, alliances will also become more ambiguous. With ever changing dynamics of world economy, new alliances, motivated by the concept of triangulation (to keep balance in relation with the US and China, the trade warriors) will form and such alliances, as predicted by spin doctors; will be less stable than the blocs, formed in 20th century.

To sum it up, before we reach a multipolar world order, we will see a period of growing uncertainty based on the rise of revisionist powers, the paranoia of the U.S. and growing ambiguity of conflict and cooperation. Moreover, the political pundits are divided in opinion that whether multi-polarity is unstable than unipolarity or bipolarity. Kenneth Waltz strongly was in favor of “bipolar order as stable”. On the other side, Karl Deutsch and David Singer saw multi-polarity as guaranteeing a greater degree of stability in an article published in 1964, “Multipolar Systems and International Stability”. Simon Reich and Richard Ned Lebow in “Goodbye Hegemony” (2014), question the belief whether a global system without a hegemon would be unstable and more war prone. However, whatever the system the world is likely to witness in the days to come, let’s hope that this should be in the best interest of humanity and it should make the lives of the inhabitants of this planet peaceful and prosperous.

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The future of strategic intelligence

Giancarlo Elia Valori

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There are currently three types of intelligence transformations, namely conceptual, technological and operational.

 In the first case, we are dealing with a new and original intelligence paradigm.

 From a mechanism based on the identification of the need for information-research-processing and analysis-dissemination-feedback, we are shifting to what some people already call “position intelligence”.

 In other words, we are coming to an information mechanism that continuously perceives data and processes it, and then spreads it permanently and continuously to those who have to use it.

While the old intelligence model was “positivist”, i.e it concerned single objective and empirical data to be included in a decision-making process that is not determined by intelligence, currently it is instead a matter of building acontinuous follow-up not of data, but of political behaviours, perceptions of reality by the enemy-opponent, as well as complex phenomena that constantly reach the intelligence matrix from different parts and areas.

While in the past intelligence was rhapsodic and temporary, à la carte of politicians, and sometimes even unsolicited and not requested, it currently becomes the stable core of political, strategic, economic and industrial decisions.

This obviously results in a new relationship between politicians and Intelligence Services.

While, in an era we have already defined as “positivist”, facts, news and the unknown novelties of the enemy-opponent counted, what currently matters is the ever more evident integration between the intelligence system and politicians.

 There is obviously a danger not to be overlooked, i.e. the danger that – without even realizing it – the Intelligence Services take on responsibilities which must be typical of elective bodies only.

 But certainly intelligence currently plays a much greater role than in the past.

Another key element of the conceptual transformation of intelligence is the use not only of highly advanced and powerful information technologies, but also of scientific paradigms which were unknown to us only a few years ago.

Just think about Artificial Intelligence, but also cloud computing, algorithm theory and Markov chains – and here we confine ourselves to the mathematics that sustains current IT and computing.

 But there is also human ethology, an extraordinary evolution of Konrad Lorenz’s animal ethology, as well as social psychology, sociological analysis and scientific depth psychology.

 A whole universe of theories that, in Kant’s words, have recently shifted from metaphysics to science.

It must certainly be used to analyse, for example, mass behaviours that seem unpredictable, as well as the psychological reactions of both the ruling classes and the crowds, and the interactions between the various group behaviours of a country.

Nothing to do with the old Habsburg Evidenzbureau, which informed the General Staff of enemy troops’ movements or of the various generals’ lovers.

We here witness a substantial union between intelligence and political decision-making or, rather, between the thought produced by intelligence and the foundations of political decision-making.

 CIA has often tried to poison Fidel Castro’s beard.

 Today, apart from the doubtful rationality of that operation, it would be a matter of using – for example – advertising, TV series, Hollywood movies, the sugar, tourist or tobacco market cycles, not to poison late Fidel’s beard, but to put the Cuban economy and decision-making system into structural crisis.

 The typical idea of Anglo-Saxon political culture –whereby, once the “tyrant” is eliminated, everything can be fine and back in place – has been largely denied by facts.

 All this obviously without being noticed, as far as the operations for disrupting a country are concerned.

 Another factor of the conceptual transformation of intelligence is speed: currently the IT networks are such as to allow data collection in real time with respect to facts and hence favour wide-ranging decisions.

 As far as technology is concerned, it is well known that both the AI networks, the new calculation structures, and the networks for listening and manipulating the enemy-opponent data are such as to allow operations which were previously not even imaginable.

At this juncture, however, there are two problems: everybody has all the same tools available and hence the danger of not “successfully completing” the operation is great, unlike when the Intelligence Services’ operations were based on the skills, role and dissimulation abilities of some operatives – or on confidential and restricted technologies.

 The other problem is intelligence manipulation: a country that thinks to be a target can spread – in ad hoc networks – manipulated news, malware, data and information which are completely false, but plausible, and can modify the whole information system of the country under attack.

 Another problem of current intelligence technologies is their distance from the “traditional” political decision-making centres.

 A politician, a Minister, a Premier must know what comes out of the intelligence system. Nevertheless, it is so specialised and sectorial that the distance between technical data processing and the “natural language” of politics is likely to make data ambiguous or unclear and of little use.

 Moreover, there is a purely conceptual factor to be noted: if we put together the analysis of financial cycles, of technology change, of public finance and of political and military systems, we must connect systems that operate relatively autonomously from each other.

 In other words, there is no “science of the whole” that can significantly connect such different sectors.

 Therefore, there is the danger of projecting the effects of one sector onto another that is only slightly influenced by it, or of believing that, possibly, if the economy goes well, also the public debt – for example -will go well.

 The room for political decision-making is therefore much wider than modern intelligence analysts believe.

Political decision-making is still made up of history, political-cultural traditions and of perceptions of reality which are shaped by many years of psychological and conceptual training.

With specific reference to operativity, once again we are dealing with radical changes.

 Years ago, there was the single “operative” who had to decide alone – or with very little support from the “Centre” – what to do on the spot and with whom to deal.

 Today, obviously, there is still the individual operative, but he/she is connected to the “Centre” in a different way and, in any case, imagines his/her role differently.

 On the level of political decision-making, intelligence is always operative, because reality is so complex and technically subtle that it no longer enables even the most experienced statesman to “follow their nose”.

The primary paradox of the issue, however, is that intelligence cannot take on political roles that imply a choice between equivalent options.

 This is inevitably the sphere of politics.

 Another factor of the operational transformation is the inevitable presence of intelligence operatives in finance, in the scientific world, in high-level business consulting, in advertising, communication and media.

 Intelligence has therefore progressively demilitarised itself and is increasingly operating in sectors that we would have previously thought to be completely alien to Intelligence Services. Instead, they are currently the central ones.

 Moreover, we are currently witnessing a particular mix of strategic intelligence, geopolitics and financial analysis.

 Why finance? Because it is the most mobile and widespread economic function.

 We are witnessing the birth of a new profession, namely currency geopolitics.

 Hence we are also witnessing the evolution of two new types of intelligence, namely market intelligence (MARKINT) and financial intelligence (FININT).

 An old and new problem is secrecy. The greater the extent to which old and new intelligence is used, the less it can keep secrecy, which is essential now as it was in the past.

 What has always been the aim of strategic intelligence? To predict phenomena starting from a given context.

Contexts, however, change quickly and the interaction between sectors is such as to change the effect of forecasts.

 The formalised techniques for analysis-decision making are manifold: intelligence data mining, “grid technologies”, knowledge creation and sharing, semantic analysis, key intelligence needs (KINS) and many others.

 All operations which are often necessary, but currently we need to highlight two factors typical of the North American intelligence culture which, unfortunately, also negatively affects the models used by U.S. allies.

 The first aspect is that, strangely enough, the same formal models are proposed for both companies and States.

 A State does not have to maximize profits, while a corporation does, at least on a level playing field with its competitors.

 A State is not a “competitor” of the others and ultimately a State has no specific “comparative advantage” but, on the contrary, some of its companies have, if this happens.

 Therefore, the overlap between business intelligence, which is currently necessary, and States’ intelligence is a conceptual bias, typical of those who believe that a State is, as Von Mises said, “the joint stock company of those who pay taxes to it”.

 For companies, it is obvious that all specific and original intelligence operations must be known to the State apparata, which may coordinate them or not, considering that they inevitably have additional data.

On the other hand, some business operations can become very useful for intelligence.

Hence a structure would be needed to put the two “lines” of operations together, and above all, a new intelligence concept is needed.

In the past, the Intelligence Services’ operations were largely defensive: to know something just before it happened, to avoid the adverse operations of a State hitting its own resources, but all with often minimal time limits.

 Now we need expressly offensive intelligence which can hit the opponents’ (commercial, economic and strategic) networks before they move and in good time.

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