On 21st February 2019, International Court of Justice finished it hearing the arguments of India and Pakistan on Jadhav Case and cases is reserved for deliberation. In 2017 India had instituted proceedings against Pakistan claiming for consular access to Mr.Jadhav (alleged to be Indian Spy by Pakistan) who is convicted for espionage. The case arises out of an Application filed by India under Article 40, paragraph 1, of the Statute of the Court and Article 38 of the Rules read along with Article 1 of the Optional Protocol concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes (Optional Protocol) done at Vienna on 24 April 1963.Pakistan has however in its reply statement argued that State of Pakistan was willing to permit consular access upon an undertaking from the State of India that it will co-operate with Pakistan in a mutual investigation about the crimes allegedly perpetrated by Jadhav in the territory of Pakistan and his possession of Indian Passport with wrong credentials. State of Pakistan states its view is legally correct as per paragraph (vi) of the Indo-Pak 2008 Bilateral Agreement on Consular Access.
The interpretation of 2008 Bilateral Agreement is thus important in order to resolve the issue. However, while the State of India considers the 2008 Agreement to be irrelevant and Pakistan relies on a flawed interpretation of the same in order assert the correctness of their action. Getting the interpretation of 2008 Bilateral Agreement right could have saved States from arguing on the uncharted areas of espionage, and the status of military tribunals, indirectly compromising the interests of national security on various notes.
Indian counsels began the arguments by identifying two broad issues arising in the case. The first one relates to the violation of Article 36 of Vienna Convention of Consular Relations (VCCR)1963 and the second is a little extended argument about the relief to be awarded in the said case upon an affirmative decision of the violation of Article 36. Indian Counsels stressed on the importance on the special relief of release pleaded by India, unlike Avena or La Grand Case, where ICJ had ordered reconsideration. They had been confident enough throughout the hearing that the first issue is established on a very simple prima facie observation. However there appears to be a missing point in the Indian take on the case. It fails to address the India-Pakistan2008 Bilateral Agreement on Consular Access interpretatively. It simply relies on a theory that the 2008 Agreement doesn’t modify the obligations of the State of Pakistan under the Vienna Convention of Consular Relations. Perhaps, the State of Pakistan was successfully managing to fix the context of the dispute to an alleged espionage case and led the arguments away from the text of treaties.
There are several ambiguities in the explanation given on 2008 Bilateral Agreement. Not using the full title of the 2008 agreement even once, State of India argued that “(2008 Agreement) is… irrelevant to the assertion of rights to consular access under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention (Para 107 of Verbatim Record 2019/1)”. It is highly unsustainable claim State of India can make, after signing an international agreement titled “Agreement on Consular Access” intending to provide “reciprocal” consular facilities. Such a claim is not consistent with good faith by which States enter into treaty relationships. You may argue Human Rights, but the implementation of the same requires inevitably a system of governance build upon the principle of trust.
By applying Article 41 of VCLTand Article 73 of VCCR India contends that the provisions of 2008 Agreement have no applicability in the instance case. It also relies on the Human Right’s dimension of the Article 36 of VCCR (pages 35-47 of Verbatim Record 2019/1) to establish an erga omnes nature of consular access as a due process of law. It deals casually with the words “supplementary and amplification the provisions thereof” in the text of Article 73. This in my view is a serious lacuna. The word “supplementary” can mean something which is “completing and supporting” the provisions as well. If it solely meant to be augmenting the provisions then there is no need for separate enunciation of the words “confirming”, “supplementing”, “extending” or “amplifying” in the article.
First of all, Article 73 of VCCR is speaking about the provisions of VCCR as such, and not directly addressing the rights contained therein. It means that the absolute notion of the rights mentioned in VCCR is imaginary and highly expansive of the textual meaning of Article 73.Article 36 of VCCR also is primarily not a human rights provision, although the dimensions of Human rights are easily attributable to it. It deals with procedural aspect of “exercising consular functions” and intents “to facilitate” a smooth exercise of the same. Viewed from such a context the 2008 Agreement is meaningful and relevant. It is decidedly descriptive of the procedure to be adopted by governments of India and Pakistan in cases involving Article 36 of the VCCR.
The Article 36 of the VCCR, paragraph 1 clause (a) speaks about the freedom of consular agents to communicate with nationals of sending state and vice-versa, clause (b) deals with actions to be taken up by the receiving state, without delay, if the nationals under custody request to meet their consuls, and clause (c) right of the consular officer to meet nationals and arrange for legal assistance. But clause (c) also requires consuls to refrain from such actions if the nationals expressly requests so. Paragraph 2 further mandates that the rights referred in paragraph 1 shall be exercised according to the laws and regulations of the receiving state with only subjection that “the purposes” for which the rights are provided must be fulfilled.
The2008 Bilateral Agreement paragraphs (i-iv) are improving upon these provisions of Article 36. They are not irrelevant as such. The paragraph (ii) makes it obligatory that receiving state immediately inform the sending state the arrest of its nationals, whether the national requests so or not. This is an amplification of right mentioned in paragraph (b) of the Article 36 of VCCR. Paragraph (iv) improves upon the position of paragraph (b) of Article 36 by qualifying the words “without delay” in Article 36(b) with “a maximum limit of 3 months” within which the consular access “must be provided”. Paragraph (iii) once again improves upon the provisions of the VCCR by making it obligatory again for the receiving state to inform expeditiously about the sentencing of the nationals of sending state. State of India at ICJ could have ideally relied upon these provisions in order to further establish instances of violations of its rights by the State of Pakistan. Although the State of Pakistan has almost violated almost each one of these provisions in the instant case, India’s claim solely relies upon the Vienna Convention (Application Instituting Proceedings, Para 46).The motivations behind State of India in avoiding such a straight legal strategy and choosing the language of Human Rights is something interesting to be investigated. Probably it’s because of the intention to seek remedies beyond “review” or “reconsideration” of case back in the courts of Pakistan.
On the other hand, State of Pakistan claims the paragraph (vi) of 2008 Bilateral Agreement enables them to make the provision for consular access conditional, which is both jurisprudential and interpretatively unsustainable. Jurisprudentially, such an argument abridges the guarantee of the right of consular access, a ‘due process principle ‘codified under Article 36 of VCCR. Interpretatively, paragraph (vi) not cannot be argued successfully as a provision dealing with consular access. Although the paragraph (vi) states thus “in case of arrest, detention or sentence made on political or security grounds, each side may examine the case on its merits”, it is not clear as to whether this could mean limiting the right to consular access.
Both the paragraphs (v) and (vii), i.e. to say antecedent and subsequent to para (vi), deals with the repatriation of the individuals arrested, detained or convicted inside the territory of receiving state upon the fulfilment of certain conditions by the sending state. Just because the Agreement is titled after Consular Access, it is highly imaginative to load paragraph (vi) with explanation on consular access when both the paragraphs (v) and (vii) are dealing predominantly with repatriation after detention or conviction. Right to Consular Access is a right coming into the effect at the very first moment of the arrest or sometimes even when a decision to make an arrest is made by the receiving state.
However arguing on the false premise presented by State of Pakistan, India Counsels had to the extent the breadth of its own arguments, finally ending up with claims like interests of national security cannot be self-certified by nations concerned. This is in direct contravention to Indian position in various human rights forum that it cannot allow for politicised international organisations or international tribunals to decide upon the issues of national security. Further these arguments, if addressed seriously by the International Court, are going to change the composure of the jurisprudence of international law. Although such an evolution of jurisprudence is desirable from the angle of human rights, it has the danger of exposing diplomatically the weaker State’s sovereignty to a politicized International arena. This could have been possibly be avoided by solely relying upon positive legal materials such as Vienna Convention 1963 and 2008 Bilateral Agreement. The outcome of judgement could be no different, but would also have saved the principle of State sovereignty. The lack of international law expertise of developing nations was quite visible throughout the hearing.