It is not so obvious we can define -sic et simpliciter – the recent Summit held in Hanoi between the leader of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Kim Jong-Un, and the US President, Donald J. Trump, as a mere and insignificant “failure”.
Or – according to the most simplistic international press comments-even as a failure of Trump’s techniques as a deal maker.
It is not an issue of popular psychology. Here the issue is of a geoeconomic and strategic nature.
Also the North Korean leader, Kim Jong-Un, is a very talented mediator and broker but, as is currently obvious, here the issue is much broader than what it could appear at first glance.
It was the North Korean Foreign Minister, Ri-Yung-Ho, however, who announced that negotiations had ended without an official agreement.
The initial idea of the North Korean leaders was to immediately lift some of the remaining economic sanctions on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and later proceed to the total dismantling of the great Yongbyon reactor.
After this first break of negotiations, President Trump said that Kim Jong-Un had also agreed to immediately dismantle the Yongbyon reactor, but with an explicit US statement of lifting all the various remaining trade sanctions in their entirety.
Finally, the North Korean side promptly replied to the United States that, also in this second and already negative phase, its request concerned only and in any case the lifting of a part of sanctions.
Here we need to refer to an example of the past: the progressive normalization of trade relations between the United States and the People’s Republic of China.
From the beginning of political negotiations between the United States and China, there were “contact groups” that did not immediately resolve all the outstanding commercial and military issues, but set their progressive harmonization in the oscillation between the two national interests.
Still today there are “contact groups” between North Korea and the United States.
George Bush – appointed by President Gerald Ford -was the first Head of the US Diplomatic Office in Beijing, which was not yet a real embassy.
It is by no mere coincidence that George Bush, the future 41stPresident of the United States, was appointed Head of C.I.A.
It should be recalled that, at the time, the United States simultaneously recognized both Taiwan and Beijing, but the commercial relations – carefully studied by both Parties – officially began only in 1979, with the subsequent and decisive entry of the People’s Republic of China into the WTO in 2001.
As early as 2005, however, the United States recorded a trade imbalance with China of as many as 202 billion US dollars. Hence the United States was too dependent on Chinese imports and, again, the trade imbalance the United States had vis-à-vis China was clearly shown by the significant loss of US jobs.
Therefore what was done with China -although in a reasonably shorter lapse of time – will be done also with North Korea and in the same way.
Hence this is the core of the issue: contacts have already been established – halfway between the personal and the official level – but only in a bilateral context, and with direct reference to both Trump and Kim Jong-un, for the resolution of economic disputes, current sanctions and the future bilateral economic and financial relations between the United States and North Korea.
It will take long time, however, because the tripartite relationship is between North Korea, Russia and China.
If the United States thinks that Kim Jong-Un plays this game alone, or that North Korea is content with being a small, but isolated rich country, like Vietnam or Laos, it is completely wrong.
The US sanctions against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea – such as those typical of the First World War, namely the Trading with the Enemy Act- were imposed on North Korea as early as 1950.
It should also be recalled, however, that part of these trade restrictions had already been removed, as part of the1995 Agreed Framework and, again within the framework of the Six Party Talks, a bilateral agreement- a temporary, but important one – was reached between the United States and North Korea, precisely on the long-range missile tests. Hence there was a further economic relief as early as June 2000.
Hence, basically, we are dealing with a still forbidden sale of potential dual-use goods or services, which can fall within the traditional Wassenaar Arrangement, of which both the USA and South Korea are members, while currently the US importers of all products coming from North Korea must still ask for an authorization from the US Treasury Office of Foreign Assets, which requests certification regarding the fact that these products have not been processed by North Korean entities and companies related to nuclear proliferation.
According to North American experts, the requests for trading are very few every year and, as far as we know, there are more material and productive obstacles than legal impediments that really prevent trade between the United States and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea from growing.
This is precisely what is being studied in confidential and solely bilateral contexts.
Clearly, the eminently political dimension of the situation is such that, if we went back to the missile or nuclear tension between North Korea and the United States, all trade negotiations would be blocked and then immediately cancelled.
Trade, however, is still scarce. North Korea is one of the very few nations that have not the US legal and commercial status of Normal Trade Relations (NTR) and, in any case, North Korea’s exports still fall within “column 2” of the trade tariffs, those defined by the Smooth-Hawley Tariff Act as far back as 1930.
Those tariffs dating back to 1930 are heavy tariffs on the most labour-intensive and low-specialization goods, such as clothes and fabrics, precisely the sector in which North Korea will give us a hard time in the future.
It should be noted, however, that China itself – which has the permanent NTR status – obtained it only through the WTO and not through direct negotiations with the United States.
Nevertheless, so far North Korea has never shown any interest in the WTO.
Here the United States does not certainly agree.
It believes that, for both the old Multi Fibre Textile Arrangement – which ended in 2005 and later led to the great Chinese textile boom – and for all the rest, North Korea’s entry into the WTO would be ideal for bilateral trade between the United States and North Korea.
North Korea, however, does not “fill” its textile quotas even in the EU, where there are no sanctions.
Therefore, the problem does not only lie in the US trade sanctions on North Korea, but also in the great global refinancing of the non-dual use productive system of the whole Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.
As already noted, a large global investment bank will soon be needed between the United States, some European countries, Russia and China, with a view to modernizing North Korea’s economic system.
Obviously, if we assess the Summit failure in purely strategic terms, it will be clear that the underlying issue is China, not North Korea.
In fact, if we think that – as any indicator seems to confirm – China is about to settle the issue of its trade tariffs with the United States, we can obviously infer that China wants, at first, to settle its business with the United States, and later possibly give the green light to a new international economic system centred around North Korea.
A system which, however, will depend on China, not on the United States.
A system that could also overlap or contrast with China’s current interests.
Therefore President Trump failed in his attempt to divide North Korea and the People’s Republic of China.
President Trump was far from playing the role of deal maker since the operations in Hanoi were probably led more by China than by the United States.
Hence this is the sense of the final reaction of Kim Jong-Un, who clearly said that nothing will be dismantled in the Yongbyon complex, if the sanctions that still weigh on the US-North Korean bilateral trade are not lifted in their entirety.
Hence this is the core of the issue: China has made it clear that no trade agreements can be reached in Asia, without a prior global negotiation with China.
It is by no mere coincidence that the Summit was held in Hanoi, in the once very unfriendly Vietnam for the United States, where the latter has, in fact, triggered off the new current economic growth.
The signal was clear: if you do like your old Vietnamese comrades, your economy will grow and many of the North Korean structural problems would quickly disappear.
Moreover, probably with the only exception of the US intelligence services, we all know that North Korea is continuing to maintain its nuclear and missile sites rebus sic stantibus.
This is exactly what both the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China want in this phase, unless they are the new brokers of the new North Korean economic development, which shall never be controlled by US interests, but by those of the two large Asian and Eurasian countries.
Furthermore, in China the population structure – and hence the production ways – are changing.
Soon only 50% of the Chinese population will be working-age. Therefore China has only two options ahead to increase the potential growth rate: to stimulate its people’s participation in the labour market and / or increase the total productivity of the factors of production.
Moreover, given their current indebtedness and lack of liquidity available, the Chinese companies cannot yet fully invest in increasing the total productivity of their factors of production.
Hence the need for China, but also for North Korea, to proceed divided, but hit together: the People’s Republic of China could never abandon North Korea, especially from an economic viewpoint, but North Korea would be crazy if, accepting the North American trade sirens, it thought it could do without the strategic, financial and trade continuity with China.
Russia and the end of North Korea’s Tong-mi bong-nam strategy
North Korea’s decades old strategy of ‘Tong-mi bong-nam’ (Engage the United States, Block South Korea) and its rare variant ( ‘Tong-nam bong-mi’ or Engage South Korea, Block the US) of breaking the Washington-Seoul axis by alternatively cooperating with one in order to isolate the other so as to manoeuvre its way through it has seen a shift recently as Pyongyang moves closer to Russia.
Tensions have been high on the Korean Peninsula since the election of the conservative President Yoon Seok-youl, who has adopted a “Kill Chain” strategy to preemptively target the Kim regime in the face of an imminent nuclear threat. Cooperation has been restricted to calls for reunion of families across the border along with disarmament linked “audacious” economic aid in order to denuclearise Pyongyang, which stands at the cusp of its worst economic crisis post the pandemic. However, surprisingly, North Korea has not only rejected the offer but has declared itself a nuclear state by adopting a law which rules out the possibility of denuclearisation by allowing Pyongyang to conduct preemptive strikes to protect itself. With a possible nuclear test on the cards, the Russian hand behind such bold moves cannot be overlooked.
Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine has emboldened North Korea in more ways than one: it has not only challenged the invincibility of the Western powers whom Pyongyang defines as “hostile” but has also created demands for North Korean weaponry for a sanction pressed Russia to continue the war, promising to fill Pyongyang’s coffers with much needed foreign reserves. While North Korea has denied these claims, its increased proximity with Moscow is too conspicuous to gloss over. The most significant consequence however has been a change in North Korea’s policy towards Seoul and Washington.
Efficiently using it to challenge Seoul’s participation in any peace negotiations since the Korean Armistice Agreement of 1953, the strategy of Tong-mi bong-nam was employed again in 1994 when faced with recurrent famines and massive food shortages, Pyongyang agreed to denuclearise under the Agreed Framework and eventually normalise its relationship with the US. The idea was to extract economic aid while isolating Seoul after tensions soared over the latter not sending official condolences on Kim il-Sung’s death.
The strategy was reversed in South’s favour when relations with Washington soured after it imposed a fresh series of sanctions against Pyongyang’s nuclear proliferation programme in April 1998 and North Korea positively responded to Kim Dae-Jung’s Sunshine Policy which resulted in the historic June 15 summit of 2000, where the the leaders of the two Koreas met for the first time post the division in 1945. President Bush’s “Axis of Evil” comment further worsened US-North Korean ties which led Pyongyang to not only break off contacts with both the US and South Korea but also withdraw from the NPT in January 2003. Although South Korean efforts and North Korea’s mounting economic crisis succeeded in bringing Pyongyang to the Six Party Talks where Seoul argued that North’s security concerns be taken into account before pushing for denuclearisation, Washington’s rigid stance that North Korea denuclearises first resulted in a stalemate. Pyongyang conducted its first nuclear test in 2006 inviting more stringent sanctions and eventually withdrew from the Six Party talks in 2009. After successive conservative governments which favoured a hard stance towards North Korea virtually stalled negotiations, President Moon Jae-in’s friendly approach resulted in a major breakthrough in Inter-Korean relations in the form of the 2018 Panmunjom Declaration which called for phased disarmament, at a time when Pyongyang’s economy was at its lowest in the past two decades and tensions with the Trump administration soared high. The breakdown of the 2019 Hanoi Summit between North Korea and the US finally ended cooperation.
The above cases illustrate how efficiently North Korea has used Tong-mi bong-nam as a manoeuvring tool where negotiations were undertaken only during times of economic crisis while nuclear proliferation continued to remain a priority to achieve reunification of the peninsula in a way favourable to Pyongyang. Moreover, Kim Jong-un has learnt from the case of Gadaffi’s Libya that engaging the West in denuclearisation would only provide limited respite while possession of nuclear weapons not only creates a strong deterrence against attacks by much powerful adversaries but also fuels nuclear nationalism thus reproducing regime legitimacy even at its weakest moments. Hence, he has nipped all chances of achieving complete denuclearisation in the bud. While China has so far played a major role in moderating Pyongyang’s aggression by prioritising regional stability considering its own geopolitical and economic interests over countering the US; Russia’s bold violation of UNSC sanctions by not only trading with Pyongyang but also demonstrating active interest in employing North Korean workers and labelling the bilateral relationship as being of “mutual interest” speaks volumes about the greater latitude it is willing to provide its anti-American ally in pressing forward with its agenda.
Though Tong-mi bong-nam has served North Korea’s interests by aiding it in extracting economic benefits while dodging commitments over complete denuclearisation, it has simultaneously acted as the only window for Seoul and Washington to negotiate with Pyongyang. As its raison d’être, namely North’s economic and diplomatic isolation, wanes with Moscow’s support; the hope for denuclearisation might be lost forever specifically as the US and South Korea continue to seek “overwhelming” military response to resolve the crisis which might lead to unimaginably dangerous consequences. The need of the hour is to multilaterally engage with both Russia and North Korea on disarmament and lift sanctions in a phased manner while ensuring that the two abide by their commitments.
The SCO seeks for a new role in the post-Ukrainian crisis world
During the Samarkand summit which was held during September 15-16, the Council of Heads of State of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) signed the landmark Samarkand Declaration, advanced Iran’s accession, start the process for Belarus to become a full member, while approving Bahrain, Maldives, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates and Myanmar as dialogue partners. Additionally, the SCO issued groundbreaking statements and documents, marking the first time that member states have jointly spoken out on emerging issues, such as climate change, supply chain security and international energy security. All of these progresses verify that the SCO has come of the age over the past two decades. There is no question that the SCO is now the largest regional cooperation organization in the world. Over half of the world’s population lives in its member states, accounting for about 25% of the global GDP—and those states have a powerful intellectual and technological potential and a considerable part of the global natural resources.
As one of the two leading drivers of the SCO, Russia has played the tremendous role in its development and solidarity of all member states in principle and in reality as well. This year, despite the Ukrainian war drags on for over 200 days, Russia still acted influentially to promote Iran’s “earliest possible accession” to the SCO legally and Belarus’s beginning the accession process. As President Putin said during the summit, “There are many more countries that seek membership in or association with the SCO. All are welcomed because the SCO is a “non-bloc association and rather working with the whole world.” It is also true that in a very complicated international situation, the SCO is not “marking time,” but rather continuing to develop and build its role in addressing international and regional issues—maintaining peace and stability “throughout the vast Eurasian space.”
Echoing the coming changes in global politics and the economy which are about to undergo fundamental and irreversible changes, it is obvious that there are new “centers of power” emerging, and the interaction among them is inclusively based on universally recognized principles of the rule of international law and the UN Charter, namely, equal and indivisible security and respect for each other’s sovereignty, national values and interests. Given this, this article aims to argue what role the SCO would be able to play in the next twenty years?
The SCO holds tremendous potential for the future of international community and particularly in the fields of ensuring energy security and food security. Accordingly, the latest joint statement proposes to avoid excessive fluctuations in the prices of international bulk commodities in the energy sector, ensure the safety and stability of international food and energy resources’ transportation channels, and to smooth the international production and supply chain. To insure these ends, the statement also underlines adherence to the principle of technology neutrality as it is the key to encourage the research and application of various clean and low-carbon energy technologies. Given this, the Samarkand summit is a milestone both in the development of the SCO and building of a SCO community with shared future. Accordingly, the SCO will adhere to the principle of not targeting third parties as the Final Declaration states that the SCO seeks to ensure peace, security and stability. In reality, SCO members intend to jointly further develop cooperation in politics and security, trade, economy, finance and investments, cultural and humanitarian relations “in order to build a peaceful, safe, prosperous and environmentally friendly planet Earth.”
In the overall terms, China has played the significant role in joint promoting of the SCO as Russia admitted that in unison with the Chinese side, the existence of a unipolar world is impossible. Moscow and Beijing have agreed that it’s an impossible situation when the wealthy West is claiming the right to invent rules in economy, in politics and the right to impose its will on other countries. The foundation of the unipolar system has started to seriously creak and wobble. A new reality is emerging. Now it is more apparent that the obsolete unipolar model is being superseded by a new world order based on the fundamental principles of justice, equality, and the recognition of the right of each nation and state to its sovereign path of development. Put it more precisely, strong political and economic centers acting as a driving force of this irreversible process are being shaped in the Asia Pacific region.
Echoing the consensus among the SCO member states and their partners in the Eurasian domain, President Xi spoke at the summit that the successful experience of the SCO has been based on political trust, win-win cooperation, equality between nations, openness and inclusiveness, and equity and justice. They are not only the source of strength for the development of the SCO but also the fundamental guide that must be followed strictly in the years to come. Given that under the volatile world, the SCO, as an important constructive force in international and regional affairs, should keep itself well-positioned in the face of changing international dynamics, constantly enhance strategic independence, consolidate and deepen solidarity and cooperation, and build a closer SCO community with a shared future.
More specifically, China has not only presented the Global Development Initiative and the Global Security Initiative, but also carried out the initiatives with real actions. In addition, the SCO greets the new round of the largest expansion of the SCO membership has consolidated its status and influence as the most populous regional cooperation organization with the vastest territory in the world. The expansion fully demonstrates that the SCO is not a closed and exclusive “small clique” but an open, inclusive “big family”. As a new type of international organization comprising 26 countries, the SCO is increasingly showing strong vitality and bright prospects for development including that it will inject new impetus into peace and prosperity in Eurasia and beyond and play an exemplary role in building a new type of international relations and a community with a shared future for mankind.
In sum, the SCO has gained greater significance with the outbreak of hostilities in Ukraine, where an economically weaker Russia is turning to East in general and China in particular as Beijing and Moscow vow to be a partner with no limits and leading coordination over the SCO. In addition, the comprehensive strategic partnership of China and Russia covers a bilateral agenda, multilateral trade and economic cooperation and shared security concerns of all concerned. In the face of outrageous Western sanctions, the SCO demonstrates stability, continues to develop progressively, and gains momentum. China is sure to play the constructive role of promoting their business to the global level, including strengthening the basis of economic cooperation among SCO member states, allowing the launch of free economic zones, and implementing large-scale infrastructure projects globally.
Factionalism in the Chinese Communist Party: From Mao to Now
With the crucial 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) set to commence on October 16, here’s a look at the different factions that have historically existed within the Party, otherwise considered a highly centralised and monolithic organisation.
Described by Lenin as “freedom of discussion, unity of action”, Democratic Centralism is a Marxist-Leninist theoretical concept which attempts to strike a balance between inner Party democracy and organisational unity as an assurance that decisions could be efficiently made without stifling ideological struggles within the Party which emerge in the form of dissent. It was first specifically adopted as the organising principle of a Marxist party in the Soviet Union by both Bolshevik and Menshevik factions of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party (RSDLP) at their separate conferences in 1905 and was unanimously adopted at the Party Unity Congress in 1906. Initially seen to be compatible with the existence of factions, a more rigid idea of Democratic Centralism was adopted at the 10th Party Congress in 1921 when all factions were outlawed in the name of Party unity. While the intention was not to wipe out the democratic discourse altogether, ‘monolithic unity’ vertically imposed by the late 1920s supplanted all free debate.
The Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) at its 17th Congress in 1934 defined the four cardinal points of Democratic Centralism as follows:
election of all leading bodies of the Party; their periodic accountability to their respective organisations; strict party discipline & the subordination of the minority to the majority and decisions of higher bodies to be absolutely binding on lower bodies and on party members.
In other words, free debate and discussion would be allowed to exist within the ranks of the Party till a decision is taken by the higher body after which it must be faithfully followed and implemented by all lower ranks in the name of Party discipline without any collective attempts to block the decision. Factionalism thus, came to be seen as a serious offense of sabotaging Party unity. The Third Communist International (1919-43) called for Democratic Centralism to be strictly implemented by all fellow Communist parties across the world which continued even after its dissolution in 1943.
The Chinese Communist Party, through the slogan ‘Centralism based on Democracy and Democracy Under Centralist Guidance’ (《民主基础上的集中，集中知道下的民主》), describes its role as focused on the inclusion of popular opinion which is considered extremely important not just for the successful implementation of its policies but also as the raison d’être of its rule however concurrently, it considers them too vague to be implemented as they exist. The CCP thus sees itself as the central sieve through which mass opinions would be filtered off their vagueness and effective policies could be formulated as it is considered to be in best possession of both the knowledge of Marxism-Leninism and interests of the masses. Party cadres would go to the masses and raise their demands at the Party meetings followed by a debate, also known as the Mass Line approach. Once the decision is taken, there would be no further discussion and the cadres would faithfully implement the policies among the populace with iron discipline.
After a brief period of decentralisation post the 1978 Reform and Opening up, Centralism was reintroduced following the Tiananmen Square Movement of 1989 and more so after the fall of the USSR in 1991 in order to avert a possible legitimacy crisis. Since then streams of Centralism and Democracy have alternatively dominated leadership views. In his speech at the 17th Party Congress, Hu Jintao emphasised on the need to strengthen intra Party democracy as a part of Democratic Centralism. In contrast, Xi Jinping in 2016 emphasised on the need to integrate centralisation on a democratic basis while urging the members to display “pure and utmost” loyalty to the Party.
Though Articles 3(5) and 10 of the CCP Constitution prohibit factionalism within the Party in the name of Democratic Centralism, interest groups nevertheless exist through informal networks based on personal ties called Guanxi (关系). Guanxi has its roots in the Confucian tradition which emphasises on the feeling of belongingness among members of a family or an organisation. Such a nexus functions in a reciprocal way where the followers look for career security and advancement under the protection of a senior leader who ensures their interests are served in the upper rungs in exchange for their support, for instance, Hu Jintao was known to have led a group of his comrades from his Communist Youth League (CYL) days called Tuanpai (团派) in his entourage. While in itself testifying the presence of factionalism, this relationship often results in emergence of factions due to its unstable nature. All chosen successors to the General Secretary in the Party’s history have been purged by their own patrons (Mao and Deng) with the sole exception of Deng Xiaoping’s protégé, Jiang Zemin. Inconsistent leadership decision making, with opinions swinging between “Left adventurism” and “Right opportunism” under Mao and “Emancipation of Mind” and “Socialist Spiritual Civilisation” under Deng too has given rise to interest groups within the Party.
Other features of China’s political system which give rise to factionalism include power entrusted to individual leaders in a hierarchical context; the monopoly of the Communist Party over all legal channels of expression of diverse interests; absence of a formal structure of decision making and interference of the military in politics.
Factions at a glance
The origins of Guanxi networks can be traced back to Shantou (山头）or “mountain top” alliances which date back to the Party’s early days. Facing a hostile Nationalist Party (国民党) and Japanese forces, the CCP was nurtured in independent and isolated rural basecamps which were often located in rugged hilly terrain. Thus, each Shantou became a locus of its leader’s power. The hostile and dangerous conditions necessitated a close bond between leaders and their followers which fragmented member’s loyalty towards the CCP as a Party as the primary allegiance was paid to the leader and not to the organisation.
Though Mao in his On Contradiction (1937) defined intra Party differences and discussions as a symbol of its vitality and liveliness, he was very strict about expression of dissent outside the Party apparatus which was seen as an attempt to break away from the Party and resulted almost always in purges. Even as Mao successfully established his line of thought as the single ideological core of the Party during the Yenan Rectification Campaign of 1942, ground realities built conditions for the existence of factions which continued as external channels of communication among political associates, outlets of their diverse interests and command system of their forces. Informal Factionalism continued to drive the Party’s inner politics even after the victory in the Civil War in 1949. While Mao could establish himself as the Chairman, his sole legitimacy to rule still faced challenges since all his associates had comparable experience and contribution to enlist. As a result, though working under Mao, leaders such as Zhou Enlai and Peng Dehuai continued to remain influential in a system where they were not expected to do so. Cautious of not upsetting Mao,these leaders often collaborated amongst themselves to weather any crisis which Mao read as a threat to his own power and hence, he launched the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) as an anti-organisation movement so as to tie all strands of loyalty to himself and not the Party where other leaders still exercised influence.
Interestingly, a penchant for a similar policy did not always translate into unity among members, the classic example being the fallout between Liu Shaoqi and Mao Zedong who did not just share policy preferences on most issues but had also joined the Party at the same time and worked together. Similarly, both Lin Biao and the Gang of Four (四人帮) were on the same page in the trajectory of the revolution but it was the power struggle amongst them which ultimately led to Lin’s fall. During Deng’s regime, Chen Yun and Peng Zhen’s shared conservativeness did not prevent Chen from blocking Peng’s path to the Politburo Standing Committee. Both Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang were reform minded but Zhao held his silence when Hu was ousted. Similarly, it was on the basis of personal networks that Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yun remained the most powerful leaders throughout their lives without holding any official position.
The economic reforms of the post Mao period further split internal unity into those who continued to stick with the Maoist line, demanding strict obedience to the socialist model of development and those who believed in inching closer to an open, market oriented economy. Economic interests thus play a major role in guiding factionalism, with the emergence of a ‘Petroleum faction’ within the CCP of those associated with the crude oil industry being a noticeable example.
Common political origins have also formed a ground for development of factions. Like Hu’s Tuanpai, Jiang Zemin was known to promote those who had worked for him previously in the Shanghai administration which led to the rise of a “Shanghai Clique” when he ascended the top position. Xi is similarly known to be leading a “Fujian Clique” as his ascension to power was soon followed by the promotion of his former associates Wang Xiaohong and Deng Weiping to senior positions. He has also promoted his protégés from his home province of Shaanxi. Xi is not only known to secure the interests of “Princelings” (太子党 or children of high ranking Communist leaders as himself) but to also further promote a “Tsinghua Faction” of his alma mater which is known to have existed since 2008 when 1 of the 7 members of the Politburo Standing Committee and 3 of the 25 members of the Politburo were alumni of the prestigious Tsinghua University. Xi Jinping has also actively promoted leaders such as Ma Xingrui and Zhang Qingwei from the Defense-Aerospace industry (军工航天系) to top civilian positions. Perhaps the starkest episode of factionalism within the CCP was the fall of Bo Xilai, Xi’s contender to the position of the General Secretary in 2012, which not just revealed the fault lines within the Party but also brought into question the fragmented loyalty of the military as many senior PLA officers closely associated with Bo such as Zhou Yongkang were found to have actively aided him in securing the most coveted position and were later tried and arrested for charges of corruption and abuse of power.
With speculations high that Xi is likely to evade the “seven up, eight down” (七上，八下) rule which restricts reappointments of senior leaders above the age of 68 and the retirement of Li Keqiang as the Premier, groups such as the CYL faction are likely to be further marginalised while the prominence of those close to Xi Jinping is bound to prevail at the upcoming Party Congress which might result in the likely promotion of leaders like Chen Min’er and Ding Xuexiang.
Factionalism within the CCP does not just stand as the testimony of the dynamics in Chinese politics but also provides a window into the otherwise opaque world of its functioning.
Torture is ‘widespread’ and likely underestimated in DR Congo
Torture is “widespread” and underestimated in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and the abuse involves armed groups and...
Understanding Today’s Russian Government: Putin’s Goals
Following are excerpts from (which constitute only 22% of) Russian President Vladimir Putin’s speech and his answers to questions at...
New WHO strategy aims to strengthen rapid response to health emergencies
Amid mounting health emergencies globally – such as the COVID-19 pandemic, climate-related crises, and the war in Ukraine – the...
Bright future for Pakistan-Iran relations
One of the oldest civilizations, the Islamic Republic of Iran, is situated in Western Asia, bordering Iraq and Turkey to...
Five years of violence in northern Mozambique has forced nearly a million to flee
Nearly one million people have fled extreme violence perpetrated by non-State armed groups in northern Mozambique over the past five...
Ten years of Afghan economic growth, reversed in just 12 months
A year on from the Taliban takeover in Kabul, Afghanistan is gripped by “cascading crises”, including a crippled economy that...
Betting on the wrong horse: The battle to define moderate Islam
Proponents of a moderate Islam that embraces tolerance, diversity, and pluralism may be betting on the wrong horse by supporting...
Eastern Europe4 days ago
A New Phase of Escalation in the Russia-Ukraine War
Green Planet4 days ago
Youth Pessimistic Attitude and Their Noteworthy Role as Climate Justice Norm Entrepreneur
Russia4 days ago
Russia-Zimbabwe’s Parliamentary Relations Still at Exploratory Stage
Middle East4 days ago
Saudi crown prince shifts into high gear on multiple fronts
African Renaissance4 days ago
The New World Order
Defense3 days ago
Between the Greater Russia and the MAD
Defense3 days ago
A Matter of Ethics: Should Artificial Intelligence be Deployed in Warfare?
International Law3 days ago
Factors Influencing the World Order’s Structure