The 55th Munich Conference on security issues featured no separate panel on Ukraine. The statement by NATO’s former Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen that “from the strategic point of view, Ukraine plays a very big role” was an attempt to make the pot sweeter.
What did they say about security at the Munich Conference? In 2018, this issue, which was key for Ukraine’s leadership, was supported by the report of the former NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen titled “Will the UN be able to unite Ukraine?” which was prepared by the American Hudson Institute in tandem with the Rasmussen Global Foundation. The focal point of Poroshenko’s speech and Rasmussen’s report was a peacekeeping mission in Donbass.
At Munich-2019, the Minsk Agreements, which is an issue that guarantees European security, as distinct from the so-called “Russian threat” and “Russian intervention”, were left without attention. Instead, the participants focused on the “Russian aggression in the Kerch Strait”, which provided a reason for debate thanks to the Ukrainian provocation in November last year, which is presented as the “Russian aggression”. The Minsk Agreements were brought up to attention by the US State Department Special Representative for Ukraine Kurt Volker, who did it in a Jesuit manner: “We are always in favor of meeting and having a discussion. Russia shows no interest or progress on this issue. In fact, they made it clear they did not want to do anything during the presidential election. The special envoy also acknowledged that the Minsk Agreements are not producing the desired effect. “They (the Minsk Agreements – DB) never worked well, as Russia refused to implement them. There has never been a ceasefire, a withdrawal of heavy weaponry, or cooperation on this issue. ” In other words, that Kiev is doing its utmost to stall and devalue the Minsk Agreements and that the West hasn’t been demonstrating any interest in them lately is Russia’s fault.
Last year Rasmussen reported about a draft peacekeeping mission in Donbass, this year he is talking about the possibility of Russian interference in the elections: “At present, we are all keeping a close eye on the election campaign in Ukraine, because it will be a testing ground, including in terms of Russia’s possible interference in the elections. I have no doubt that Moscow will try to resort to measures and tools that could transform and be used also during the European elections in May this year and even in course of American elections in 2020.”
“There can be no global security or security in Europe without Ukraine,” Poroshenko said in Munich. For Ukraine, European security means repulsing the “Russian threat” through sanctions, rather than working to resolve the conflict in the south-east of the country . As said above, the Minsk Agreements and the Normandy format received no attention in Munich this time. At a bilateral meeting with German Chancellor Angela Merkel Poroshenko concentrated on measures to “coordinate actions to implement the Azov package of sanctions and on how to prevent the Russian interference in the presidential elections in Ukraine.” Poroshenko reported that he had discussed the Azov package with the Vice President of the United States Michael Pence: “We have thoroughly considered coordination of our actions in response to the aggression in the Kerch Strait. We have thoroughly discussed further steps to impose sanctions and coordinate these sanctions with the sanctions of the European Union. We do count on cooperation, including in the defense sector, and in the supply of all types of weapons to Ukraine as we have adopted a law that allows the Ministry of Defense to import weapons directly.” The words of Michael Pence were perceived as a triumph of Poroshenko and Ukrainian diplomacy: “Let me send a very simple message to both you and the Ukrainian people:“ We are with you. ” The recent incident in the Kerch Strait serves as a reminder of the challenges that Ukraine faces because of the Russian aggression. I want to assure you that the United States supports Ukraine. ”
Ukraine had been getting ready for the Munich Conference in earnest, given that it is part of the election campaign of the official candidate to presidency and incumbent President of Ukraine Petr Poroshenko. He had something to present for the attention of his foreign colleagues: the provocation on November 25, 2018 in the Kerch Strait, and amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine, including a clause on joining NATO and the European Union.
Unlike the amendments to the country’s constitution, which is an internal affair of Ukraine, and a course for joining NATO and the EU, which does not depend on Kiev’s readiness but on the decisions of NATO and the European Union as such, the provocation in the Kerch Strait went off well, providing a good reason for sanctions from the US and the EU, and for anti-Russian rhetoric and politics in general.
Judging by the statements by Ukrainian experts, the outcome of the Munich Conference has received both positive and negative response in Ukraine. What upset Ukraine? That the “Nord Stream 2” Project will go ahead. The fact that the United States will not slap sanctions on Europe in connection with the Project. The position of Kiev requires a fine balance. Ukraine does not like Trump, but he is the initiator of sanctions against Europeans in connection with “Nord Stream 2”. While Ukraine is committed to European integration, it openly welcomes sanctions against Europe in connection with “Nord Stream 2” and favors the preservation of the transit of Russian gas through Ukraine, as what they once dubbed as the “a necessary condition for European integration.” A fairly tricky balance, in which the Minsk Agreements and the Normandy format are no longer visible.
How did the Munich Conference please Ukraine? By the coming sanctions, the so-called “Azov package.” What also pleases Kiev is some coordination between the US and Europe in the expected sanctions package, even if it boils down to just a few restrictions, which is not bad either. Europe has come up with the Azov Package, and sanctions based on the provocation in the Kerch Strait are due from the United States as well. Each of the parties initiating the restrictive measures pursues their own goals. The European Union will impose restrictions in the wake of the incident in the Kerch Strait, but, according to the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Federica Mogherini, these sanctions will be exclusively personal ones, targeting 8 individuals. This constitutes the entire policy of the European Union, which is anti-Russian, and in this the EU strikes a chord with the United States. However, to spoil relations with Russia beyond repair is not on the agenda, particularly considering the agenda of the EU’s leading country, Germany. Berlin has a joint energy project with Russia – “Nord Stream 2”. Against this background, the “Azov package” from the EU, or in fact, putting a few people on the black list, is but a political and moral compensation for Washington, amid Berlin’s uncompromising position regarding the Nord Stream.
The Azov Package from the US will contain:
-sanctions against FSB agents who, according to the authors of the bill, are involved in the attack on Ukrainian ships in the Kerch Strait in November 2018;
-sanctions against the Russian shipbuilding sector, if Russia violates the freedom of navigation in the Kerch Strait or anywhere else;
-sanctions for supporting projects to develop oil resources in Russia and sanctions against Russian oil projects abroad. “
European sanctions come as a tribute to the anti-Russian mainstream and are used to distract attention from Nord Stream 2. US sanctions reflect technological, political, and economic competition in shipbuilding and oil production. They create a threat to Nord Stream 2, the Northern Sea Route, and the Russian liquefied gas. Coordination of sanctions is currently visible only in their name and reliance on one provocative incident.
Nobody discussed Ukraine’s security at the Munich Conference, the Ukrainian panel was not even on the program. Perhaps, democratic countries, following democratic principles, thereby wanted to establish a democratic distance pending the presidential elections. What is obvious is that the West is interested in the “Russian aggression” as one of the main components of present-day international politics, while Ukraine provides a good context and a very bright case within the framework of the anti-Russian policies of the West.
First published in our partner International Affairs
Strategic Instability in the Era of Information and Communication Technologies: Crisis or the New Norm?
Strategic stability is once again becoming a primary concern in international relations. The topic has received a great deal of attention of late, mainly because of the steady erosion of the reduction and limitation regime: the United States has now withdrawn from both the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM Treaty) and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty), the New START treaty is set to expire soon, and no further talks on reduction and limitation of nuclear arms are being held. Another reason is the rapid development of information and communication technologies (ICTs), which are playing a growing role in the global military and political arena in the 21st century. With a new technological revolution under way, can we ensure a level of strategic security that is both necessary and sufficient? Or will instability become a new trend in global strategic security as well? It would be hard to argue that this is not a crisis.
Today there are two approaches — or rather a rift between the old understanding of “strategic stability,” which took shape during the bipolar era (when the term itself was coined), and a radically new understanding of the ways of ensuring strategic stability in the modern world and the challenges that this presents.
As is often the case, the truth probably lies somewhere in between. It would be a mistake to discard the experience of maintaining strategic stability that was accumulated throughout the Cold War period and which helped prevent a deep-seated confrontation from boiling over into a large-scale war — even though the political and technological changes that have taken place since then cannot be ignored.
As an example, during the bipolar era, “strategic stability” was defined as a state of relations that would remove incentives for a nuclear first strike.
Since nuclear arms still exist and their destructive capabilities are constantly improving, this understanding of strategic stability is as relevant today as it was during the Cold War, when it was only taking shape. But the situation has grown considerably more complicated over the last three decades, and the methods and mechanisms of preventing nuclear war that were envisaged during the bipolar era are no longer in line with the current geopolitical reality and the level of technological development. With these massive changes in international military and political relations, we need to consider other parameters in addition to the nuclear component, while at the same time preserving the essence of the idea. Furthermore, the bipolar era, when the world was split between two global opposing powers, has given way to a situation where strategic stability is determined by a greater number of players. This is why we need to assess the characteristics and capabilities of the military and political system as a whole.
Strategic stability of the military and political system is a state of the world (the lack of a large-scale war) within which the framework of this system is maintained even under continuous disturbance (destabilizing factors) for a certain (defined) period of time.
Therefore, on a professional level, not only should we be talking about “maintaining” and “strengthening” strategic stability, but we should also acknowledge the need to ensure strategic stability and devise new approaches to assessing its level based on our experience — which means we must develop common qualitative and especially quantitative assessments of this level. For that to be possible, we need to agree on common assessment criteria.
The bilateral discussion of such criteria between the United States and Russia came to a halt in the 1990s, as the U.S. no longer considered it necessary. This has given rise to a global problem, because the reduction of strategic stability to a level that is below what is needed and what is sufficient is dangerous for all states without exception. It is thus in the best interests of all countries to ensure this level, but the extent of their responsibility varies. The nuclear powers are still the most responsible.
What new features of this system, in which ensuring a necessary and sufficient level of stability is so crucial, have emerged over the past few decades?
An increase in the number of local wars and armed conflicts which break out and progress increasingly under the influence of ICTs.
The restructuring of international relations after a period of bipolarity followed by multipolarity dominated by the United States. This new transformation is, first of all, caused by changes in military and strategic relations between Russia and the United States, as well as by the appearance of a new global centre of power, namely China, which is not involved in the nuclear disarmament process.
The gradual erosion of the strategic arms limitation and reduction regime: the United States has now withdrawn both from the ABM Treaty and the INF Treaty, the New START treaty is set to expire soon, and no further talks on reduction and limitation of nuclear arms are being held.
Nuclear missile multipolarity, which consists in a growing number of states possessing nuclear weapons and the increasing probability of their proliferation.
The trend towards doctrinal changes among nuclear powers that are formally aimed at strengthening the deterrence regime but in fact lead to a reduction of the threshold for the use of nuclear arms; in particular, there is a growing possibility of a limited nuclear war.
Creation of a large-scale U.S. missile defence system, which brings about serious changes in the strategic balance of power and increased uncertainty in strategic planning.
The growing role and power of non-nuclear (highly precise and highly intelligent) weapons in strategic planning. These new armaments create the hypothetical threat of a disarming strike against strategic nuclear forces. Developing these kinds of weapons complicates the global strategic landscape and makes crisis decision-making all the more difficult.
Deployment of nuclear and non-nuclear weapons on the same platforms, which may lead to the launch of ballistic or cruise missiles with conventional warheads being perceived as nuclear weapons use.
The appearance of low-yield nuclear weapons, which lowers the threshold for nuclear weapons use and, as a result, increases the probability of an armed conflict escalating to a nuclear war.
Development of ICT-based state-of-the-art anti-satellite weapons that allow countries to interfere with enemy satellites, including parts of the ballistic missile early warning system, and destroy them using ground-based anti-satellite systems. Such weapons can also disrupt the operation of satellites used for network-centric warfare, which is an approach being actively developed by militarily developed states. This is one of the most serious threats to strategic stability at this stage.
The militarization of space. In February 2019, President of the United States Donald Trump signed a Memorandum on the Establishment of the United States Space Force, which lists such purposes as protecting U.S. interests in space, “deterring aggression and defending the Nation,” as well as “projecting military power in, from and to space.”
In addition to technological developments, experts from various countries increasingly point to the role that psychology plays in influencing strategic stability in the modern world. Western society and its political elites no longer fear nuclear war, which may lead to a considerable reduction of the threshold for weapons use, including with regard to nuclear arms. And most alarming of all is not this confidence in the impossibility of nuclear war, but rather the belief that a “small,” local nuclear war can be fought and won. Such views have started to grow and spread partly due to progress in ICTs, which makes it possible to project informational and psychological influence on a huge audience in a relatively short amount of time and at minimal cost.
We can thus distinguish several key factors of the global influence of ICTs on strategic stability. First, ICTs can be used for destructive military and political purposes. Second, the exponential growth of technologies that force countries to acquire strategic advantages can make it tempting to try and win a large-scale war. Third, the boundaries between peace and war, defence and offence in military planning (including in the nuclear sphere) tend to become blurred. Furthermore, the logic of global confrontation is changing: the combined use of non-military tactics and harmful ICTs enables countries to achieve their war goals even without armed conflict. And one last notable factor of influence is the reduced path to the escalation of conflict, caused by the probability of ICT attacks on nuclear missile infrastructure.
When elaborating criteria for assessing the level of strategic stability and developing plans to ensure it, it is wise both to consider those factors that can be found in any historical period and those specific to the current age. The accelerated progress of ICTs falls into the latter category. Analysis shows that all the destabilizing factors in the modern strategic stability system are due to the development of ICTs. According to expert estimates, over 30 states possess so-called offensive cyber weapons; this is why this threat should really be singled out as a destabilizing factor of its own. Moreover, each of the other factors is enhanced by the destructive use of ICTs, the militarization of peaceful information technologies, and the ease of use, unexpectedness and speed of both IT and psychological weapons.
Additional risks are posed by so-called cyber electromagnetic activities, which are being actively developed by the United States. These include cyber operations, electronic warfare, electronic peacetime attacks, electromagnetic spectrum management operations, the suppression of targets by active and passive interference, as well as electromagnetic disinformation.
The potential use of ICTs to undermine the security of military facilities as part of a nation’s critical infrastructure is clearly a global threat. At the same time, estimating the possible damage from such threats and developing countermeasures is significantly complicated by the intangible nature of ICTs, as well as by the wide range of sources of possible malicious technologies: state and non-state actors, and even single hackers. All of this increases the level of uncertainty and instability. ICT threats may be attributed to various elements of military organization and infrastructure. But in the context of strategic stability, special attention should be paid to the security of nuclear missile weapons. All nuclear powers are modernizing their nuclear systems to keep up with the progress in computer technologies. The integration of network operations in military planning programmes began more than 30 years ago, and today we can already speak of an ICT revolution in military affairs. More and more components of the military nuclear infrastructure — from warheads and their delivery vehicles to control and guidance systems and command and control systems of strategic nuclear forces — depend on sophisticated software, which makes them potential targets for ICT attacks.
Special attention needs to be paid to the protection of strategic weapons, the early warning system, air and missile defence systems, and the command and control system for nuclear weapons. Furthermore, in addition to, or instead of, the principle of deterrence by inevitable retaliation, there is now growing interest in deterrence by blocking the use of offensive means (a “left of launch” strategy) through the use of ICTs.
Decreased strategic stability is due to the fact that the development of malicious ICTs increases the probability of a number of adverse events, such as the erroneous authorized launch of ballistic missiles; the decision to use nuclear weapons; the receipt of a false alarm from the early warning system about the launch of ballistic missiles, which is possible on account of the growing sophistication of ICT attacks or the damage or destruction of communication channels; interference in the control system of the armed forces (including nuclear forces); and the decreased confidence of military decisionmakers in the performance of control and command systems. In addition, a critical issue is the impact that the increased probability of nuclear weapons being disabled or destroyed by means of ICTs will have on future nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation processes.
The possibility that decisions about the use of nuclear weapons will be influenced by information and communication technologies is therefore the most serious threat that exists today — not in theory but in fact. There is now a greater probability of an erroneous authorized launch of a ballistic missile as a result of false information or due to a lack of confidence in the proper operation of military systems and some actions being perceived as the first step to mutually assured destruction. This leads to a considerable reduction in strategic stability.
All of the above threats are further exacerbated by the growing use of remote-controlled robotic strike weapons, the development of artificial intelligence technologies for military purposes, machine learning, the autonomous operation capabilities of various systems and subsystems, automated decision-making systems and other elements that may be subject to ICT attacks.
What global steps can be taken today in response to these global threats to strategic stability, based on the experience gained in the bipolar era? First, all the parties involved (Russia, the United States and China) will have to find common ground in terms of what in their opinion constitutes strategic stability; develop and formalize a common understanding of the danger of ICT threats; and, of course, develop common approaches to assessing the probability of intentional and unintentional ICT attacks. Moreover, they will need to have a clear agreement on the probable response in the event that an ICT attack on strategic nuclear forces is detected. These steps may provide building blocks for an ICT deterrence policy, similar to what was done with regard to nuclear weapons in the bipolar era.
At the same time, it would be reasonable to start work on an ICT arms control regime (statements, commitments, agreements and treaties) that could include: a ban on ICT attacks against certain targets, primarily military facilities; the limitation and/or renouncement of offensive ICT capabilities; the introduction of ICT arms control measures; the establishment of international norms regulating the ways and means of preventing and stopping cyber conflicts; and the development of a convention on the prohibition of the harmful use of ICTs in the nuclear weapons sphere.
From our partner RIAC
“Let Russia Be Russia” (US debate on global security system)
The controversial decision by the current US administration to withdraw from the INF treaty, as well as its threat to suspend observance of the Open Skies Treaty and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), has been met with criticism and resistance even in the United States itself. However, opposition to President Trump’s moves is multi-pronged and pursues goals not necessarily aimed at preserving what has remained of the global security system as some of the “champions of peace” also happen to be the very same “liberal interventionists,” who are responsible for many of the armed conflicts happening today. It is imperative for us to distinguish between pragmatics, who really seek to reduce military threats, such as former US Defense Secretary William Perry, ex-US ambassador to the Soviet Union John Matlock, former presidential adviser Thomas Graham and some others, and experts and media personalities, whose criticism of the US withdrawal from these accords is merely an attempt to jump on the bandwagon of the ongoing anti-Trump campaign being waged by liberal “mainstream” media, which is often openly Russophobic too, faulting Trump for his “too polite” way of dealing with his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin.
The Wall Street Journal was among the first to break the news about Donald Trump’s plans to withdraw from the Open Skies Treaty (OST). In an October 27, 2019 article, the newspaper wrote that President Trump had signed a document outlining the US administration’s intention to withdraw from the 1992 accord. The newspaper’s sources specified, however, that the decision was not final and consultations continued.
Earlier, however, in its October 20, 2019 issue, the WSJ reported that former Secretary of State George Schultz, former Defense Secretary William Perry, and former Senator Sam Nunn, all of them critical of the US withdrawal from the OST, had warned about Trump’s decision to exit the treaty. While paying homage to the customary tune about Russia’s “aggressiveness,” these three politicians, known for their participation in past disarmament programs, emphasized the need to keep in place existing defense agreements with Russia, reminding their readers, and above all, Donald Trump, that the great achievement of post-Cold War US diplomacy could soon be erased if some of the Trump administration officials have their say and the United States unilaterally withdraws from the Open Skies Treaty, which even during the current period of tense relations between Moscow and Washington helps to preserve transparency and trust. They argued that such a withdrawal from the treaty would be a big mistake, adding that it would undermine trust between the United States and Russia, and be detrimental to the US allies’ security.
The authors added that the idea of the Open Skies Treaty, initially proposed by President Dwight Eisenhower in 1955, got a new lease on life in 1992, when Moscow agreed to open its territory for overflights to verify Russia’s compliance with the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty). With the CFE Treaty now suspended, Russia is showing clear “defense generosity” by maintaining its “most verified country” status (the authors of the letter admit that Russia is a country most extensively covered by OST overflights).
Apparently trying to fend off standard accusations at home of “working for Moscow,” Schultz, Perry, and Nunn wrap up their letter with a customary admission about Republicans and Democrats having a shared view about “a serious challenge to international security” allegedly posed by Russia.” That being said, they still draw a pragmatic conclusion that instead of pulling out of previously signed international security agreements, Washington should redouble its commitment to the risk-reduction strategies consistently sought by previous US administrations.
This standpoint distinguishes pragmatic supporters of maintaining the security system – the priority, which Schultz, Perry, and Nunn confirmed in their April 10, 2019 article “The Threat of Nuclear War Is Still With Us” – from Trump’s professional debunkers from the Democratic Party.
Trump’s opponents also criticize him for breaking agreements, and not just defense ones, but trade and environmental as well (above all the Paris Agreement on climate change). However, while criticizing Trump, they still arrive at quite opposite conclusions by calling for ramping up pressure on Russia and filling the White House with “hawks” from the Pentagon and the State Department, etc. They also talk about the imaginary “friendship” between Putin and Trump, allegedly stemming from some Russian contribution to Trump’s victory in the 2016 election, and which they believe should be neutralized no matter what, including by initiating new conflicts with Russia.
Jeremy Kuzmarov, who writes for Counterpunch, points to an unprecedentedly high level of Russophobia in the ongoing debate among potential candidates for the 2020 presidential election from the Democratic Party.
Kuzmarov notes that it is impossible to explain this level of Russophobia by the election campaign alone. It is about ideology. Kuzmarov notes that former US President Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton both represent the “globalist project,” which is still alive and views Russia and China as obstacles on the way of human progress (hence Obama’s absurd decision not to include Russia in the Trans-Pacific Partnership project – as if Russia and China were not Pacific powers). At the same time, they see Trump’s victory in 2016 as an unfortunate “stab in the back” from US voters. Therefore, all proponents of this ideology, still dominant in the United States, are up in arms and out to fight Trump, whom they never tire of calling “a Kremlin puppet.” This is exactly the ideological “narrative” that makes the US Democrats incapable of compromise in the field of disarmament.
Therefore, any proposals of compromise made by independent experts are subjected to appropriate “modifications” before they are published in order to avoid accusations of being “helpful” to Moscow, just like in the case of historian Stephen Cohen. This explains the cautious tonality of the proposal made by Thomas Graham – a former assistant George W. Bush and a prominent expert on Russia. In a think piece titled “Let Russia Be Russia,” published in Foreign Affairs journal, he offered a rather strange “quid pro quo” whereby the US and Ukraine accept Russia’s sovereignty over Crimea (as if someone is going to discuss this with them!), and Russia withdraws its support for Donbass. Only then, Graham argues, can we discuss disarmament initiatives, joint efforts by Russia and the United States to prevent Iran from going nuclear, etc. Well, even if this rather unrealistic idea resonates with some in the US expert community, it hardly fits into the ultra-liberal ideology of “reformatting” the world, which is still espoused by US political elites. Therefore, it looks like Graham’s proposal will remain just a vain wish for a possible compromise. Meanwhile, the last pillars of the global security system are crumbling right before our eyes…
From our partner International Affairs
Joint military drills between Russia and Serbia
From 24 to 29 October in Serbia was held joint tactical live-fire exercise with air defence missile units of the Serbian Air Defence units and the Russian Aerospace Forces dubbed “Slavic Shield 2019”. The aim of the exercise was to educate and use the joint group of the Serbian Air Defence and the Russian Aerospace Forces in the air defence of the territory and military forces against reconnaissance and enemy activities from airspace, as well as to training and practicing of commands and units for the preparation and execution of an air defence operation.
Russian-Serbian air defense exercise “Slavic shield 2019“ is held for the first time in September this year in the Astrakhan region, on the basis of the Centre for Combat Training and Combat Use of the Aerospace Forces. The exercise consisted of two stages. The first stage of the Russian – Serian air defense exercise “Slavic shield 2019“ was held in Russia and involved the crews of anti-aircraft missile and radio-technical troops of the Russian Air Force and Air Defence of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Serbia, S-400 anti-aircraft missile systems, Pantsir-S anti-aircraft missile and gun systems, and radar stations. During the exercise, the issues of interaction and joint combat use of air defense units of the Aerospace Forces of the Russian Federation and the air force of the air defense of the Republic of Serbia were being worked out.
The second stage of “Slavic shield 2019” was held from 24 to 29 October 2019 in the territory of the Republic of Serbia. The S-400 division units with anti-aircraft missile systems S-400 and aircraft missile and gun system „Pantsir-S“ were transfered by military transport aircraft of the Russian Air Force to the territory of Serbia to participate in the second stage of the joint Russian-Serbian air defense exercise „Slavic shild – 2019“.
As part of the exercise, the Russian S-400 division and the Pantsir-S battery were deployed on the territory of a Serbian air base and were the most important systems in the joint Russian – Serbian air defense exercise „Slavic shield 2019“.
“Today we had a unique opportunity to see how the S-400 battalion works and to see how Pantsir-S works. As you know, we have purchased, ordered one Pantsir-S system, and we are expecting it in our country soon. This is a fantastic system that targets all flying objects, especially drones and cruise missiles at the distances up to 80 kilometers, tracks everything and it is very difficult to jam their radar, because they have many different codes and many different approaches. Our people are overjoyed, they are training, and I expect that in the next month or two, they will be able to show their lethal effect on an exercise in Serbia also on such cruise missiles and small drones, which are very dangerous for anti-aircraft systems. As for S-400 – if we had two S-400 battalions, no one would ever dare to overfly Serbia – president of the Republic of Serbia Aleksandar Vucic said, accompanied by Serbian Minister of defence Aleksandar Vulin and chief of General Staff of the Serbian Armed Forces, Lieutenant General Milan Mojsilovic. According to him, Serbia is drastically boosting its military capabilities and although is a small country, it`s still not strong enough, but it is many times stronger than earlier.
“With Pantsir coming, these are big things for us. Please look at the Serb soldiers, to see their smiling faces and how happy they are because of everything they saw. And about the S-400 when we got into the cabin – that is where you defend the whole country from. This is incredible power, incredible strength and I congratulate once again our Russian friends for creating such systems and we learn a lot from them, we have learned a lot. I am happy that today we were able to see Brigadier General Tiosav Jankovic, who was there training, who knows a lot and is very important for the establishment of these systems and their operation here on the territory of the Republic of Serbia” – president Vucic said, emphasizing that he had never seen such a thing in his life, even though he was at strategic military airports not far from Moscow.
After that, Serbian President Vucic visited the positions of the Pantsir-S1 air defence missile-gun system and S-400 air defence missile-gun system, where the crews demonstrated the operation of the system in a real situation, as part of a joint live fire tactical exercise of air defence missile units of Serbian Air Defence and Russian Aerospace Forces dubbed “Slavic Shield 2019”, involving the weapons of the Serbian Armed Forces and the mentioned air defence missile systems from the composition of the Russian Aerospace Forces. Deputy commander of the Russian Aerospace Forces, lieutenant general Yuri Nikolayevich Grehov, handed Serbian President Vucic a model of the Pantsir-S1 system at the end of the tour, on the occasion of conducting a joint exercise.
Also, a Russian-Serbian tactical flight exercise “BARS-2019” began on October 30 in Russia. In the Astrakhan region the crews of MiG-29SMT fighter jets destroyed more than ten air targets. During the flights, the joint crews carried out practical launches of air-to-air missiles at targets dropped by the target-setting aircraft. In addition, the flight crew of fighter aircraft participating in the exercise, worked out the launches of unguided missiles and firing from at ground targets, indicating the objects of the mock enemy. A day earlier, in the framework of the exercise “BARS-2019”, the crews of Mi-8AMTSH helicopters fulfilled the tasks of search and rescue support of flights and evacuation of the conditionally injured crew. The crews of MiG-29SMT aircraft practiced offensive and defensive actions, as well as interception of air targets. The exercise involves joint crews of two countries on MiG-29SMT airplanes and Mi-8ATMSh helicopters. The drills involved over 10 aircraft of the Russian Aerospace Forces.
The possibility for the Serbian army to train with the Russian army on such drills is very important, because the Serbian army has gained valuable experience. Also, the arrival of the S-400 system in Serbia is a clear message from Russia, that Russia is interested for the Balkans and to protect its main ally in the region – Serbia.
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