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Iran’s and Hezbollah’s missiles against Israel

Giancarlo Elia Valori

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The “precision project” of Iranian missiles, especially the Zelzal model (where the word “zelzal” means earthquake in Farsi), currently operating in the Lebanon, has reached a severe critical point.

 The “Party of God” is currently the most important non-State military actor in the world, which is certainly even more powerful than the Lebanese army itself, with at least 30,000 full-time fighters and additional 25,000 reservists.

 All very well trained by the Iranian Pasdaran, who in 1982 founded the Party with a personal decision of Imam Khomeini.

 The Zelzal missiles (and those currently available to Hezbollah are above all the Zelzal 3) are solid propellant surface-to-surface missiles, a model officially created in 2007, with a stable range of over 250 kilometres.

 According to the Iranian and Lebanese governments, these missiles have a range between 180 and 250 kilometres; a length of 9,600 millimetres; a diameter of616 millimetres; a maximum weight of the armed warhead equal to 900 kilograms and an average margin of error at arrival lower than five metres. The propellant is the HTBP, an oligomer of butadiene having the following formula.

They have a maximum weight of 1,980 kilos and operate in a maximum of 20 seconds. Their maximum service cycle is seven years.

 For the time being, the Iranian project in the Lebanon – and only for Hezbollah-entails the turning of over 14,000 Zelzal2 and 3 into high-precision missiles.

 The missile infrastructure project can convert Zelzal-2 into high-precision missiles with a unit cost – over a few hours – of approximately 5,000-10,000 US dollars. An operation that Iran has been doing for some time, also for the Houthi guerrilla warfare in Yemen.

 Obviously, this fast rapid reconversion immediately endangers Israel’s commercial, intelligence and military networks in the Red Sea, but also directly all US bases in the Greater Middle East.

 Initially Iran tried to send these missiles to the Lebanon directly via Syria, along the Iraqi-Lebanese Shiite “corridor”. Israel, however, has long been carrying out many precise air raids, capable of making the old “corridor” from Iraq to the Lebanon – the real target of Iran’s war in Syria – completely unsafe and above all making also the production of Zelzal 2 and 3missiles in Syria ineffective.

 In response, Iran launched its own technical and intelligence operation, with a view to enabling the Zelzal 2 and 3 missiles already present in the Lebanon (which are currently estimated at approximately 14,000 units) to have an autonomous and advanced GPS (and also Russian GLONASS) guidance system.

 The most important parts of these missiles are still transported, obviously disassembled, from Iran and Iraq to the Lebanon, in Hezbollah’s covert factories, both by land – in the parallel network of the Iraqi-Lebanese “corridor” – and by air from Syria, using the private commercial lines owned by the Pasdaran.

 When the missiles arrive in the Lebanese factories in the hands of Hezbollah (and the Iranian Pasdaran) – often located underground – the Zelzal 2 and 3missiles are upgraded in their intermediate control and command sector. A system is installed for GPS guidance or for the Russian satellite system, a new integrated command and control system. All this basically regards the turning of a Zelzal 2 into a new Fateh 110 missile.

 The Fateh 110 is precisely a short-range Iranian missile, usable on land-based mobile launchers, always with solid propellant.

 Probably it also incorporates Chinese-made guidance systems and has, however, a length of 8.86 metres; a diameter of 0.61 metres; a weight at launch of 3,450 kilos and a maximum charge of 500 kilos, as well as a maximum operating range of 300 kilometres.

 It is not yet completely clear how many Zelzal 2missiles turned into Fateh 110 are now available to Hezbollah, but it is thought that the “Party of God” currently has approximately 150 high-precision missiles.

 However, the Lebanese Zelzal 2missiles not yet upgraded are supposed to be 14,000.

 It should be recalled that Hezbollah has already attacked with missiles the refinery in Haifa – fortunately without repeating the 1947 massacre – some Israeli air bases, the areas near the nuclear reactor of Dimona, and the Kirya military base of the Israeli Armed Forces, as well as the IDF headquarters in Tel Aviv.

 Hence, this is the problem: while it is certainly true that Israel has the maximum coverage at missile level, it is equally true that absolute protection is no longer possible.

 It is therefore tragically probable that, in the future, the Israeli Defence may be forced to choose between the protection of critical infrastructure and the protection of the most populated centres.

 The best strategic solution for Israel can be a direct preventive attack into the Lebanon, which would lead to a full outbreak with the Lebanon, but also with Syria, with the Sunni groups operating there, with Iran and with a share of Shiite militants from Iraq already stationing on the Bekaa-Golan border.

One of the current Israeli strategies, however, is to maintain a focus of international attention and intelligence on Hezbollah’s missiles and to disclose, at the same time, much accurate intelligence data, capable of assessing and checking the danger of this new composition of forces on the Israeli borders.

 Incidentally, however, are we really sure that Iran wants to start destroying the Jewish State – just for mere silly anti-Semitic madness – thus setting the region on fire to finally do a favour probably only to its Sunni enemies?

 As well as eventually favour a complete clash with the Iranian interests in the Lebanon and Syria of the Western forces, which would easily enter from a destabilized Israel into Iran?

  If only the Europeans were less foolish, they could also put credible pressure on Hezbollah, thus letting Hariri’s new government – that still appears friendly to Westerners -know that all this is a clear and very severe violation of the UN Resolution n. 1701.

 A pressure capable of forcing also the Russian Federation and China to become milder and more reasonable.

 Certainly, the situation is increasingly complex.

  As already said, Hezbollah owns approximately 140,000 Iranian-made missiles, hidden in private houses on the Lebanese border with Israel. According to the statistics of the last conflict between the “Party of God” and Israel in 2006, at least 14,000 of them, which are certainly Zelzal 2 and 3 missiles, can be launched at a rate between 180 and 1,200 per day.

 Obviously, the saturation of launches from the Lebanon is capable of causing damage against resources or forces, which could jeopardize Israel’s military response and its internal social stability.

 As already said, currently Hezbollah’s “precision project” is organized directly by the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards.

 Considering Israel’s internal structure, it is enough to hit some critical infrastructure (airports, including the civilian ones, factories, inhabited centres) and the more accurate missiles are, the fewer they are needed to achieve seriously destructive effects.

 It should be recalled, however, that Hezbollah has also SCUD 2 missiles available, always deployed in the Lebanon, which are supposed to have an operating range between 200 and 400 kilometres.

 The “Party of God” also bought from Bashar al-Assad’s Syria some M-600 Tishreen missiles, the Syrian version of the already mentioned Fateh 110,with different guidance and control systems.

 The GPS accuracy of missiles, however, is critical for their strategic effects.

 Precision missiles are such especially because they have a low Circular Error Probability (CEP).

 CEPis the radius of the circle that should enclose 50% of the points of arrival of the missiles launched.

 Hence the lower the CEP, the fewer missiles are needed to destroy a target.

 The missiles with GPS and GLONASS systems reach their target through inertial mechanisms.

 The main coordinates of the target are entered into the missile, at the time of launch, via laptop.

 GPS and GLONASS systems use accelerometers and gyroscopes that move wings and external supports on the missile surface. With immediate feedback on the route and the amount of inertia-fuel that is evaluated immediately and automatically by the missile itself.

 The solid propellant engine, however, lasts about 30 seconds and then the missile is driven by inertia.

 Corrections to the route are possible until the time of impact.

 All these Iranian missiles available to Hezbollah, however, are mobile by road.

 The non-negligible size of the missile makes it liable, for a short period, to be hit before the launch, but it is certainly a particularly difficult operation.

 The Zelzal 2 and Fateh 110missiles are similar and hence their refitting with GPS or GLONASS systems is relatively simple and entails small additional parts which are easy to transfer.

 It should be noted once again that Iran uses both the Western GPS and the Russian Glonass as satellite sensor.

 Just 2-3 hours per missile are enough to turn an old Zelzal into a precision missile, i.e. the time needed to replace the guidance system, the new surface fins and the inertial control system.

 Some hundreds of Lebanese militants for the Hezbollah missile system are trained in a special section of the Imam Husseyn University in Tehran, the official university of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, but only to upgrade the missiles, and many of the “Party of God” have already returned to the Lebanon.

 Spare parts and materials are sent to Syria and the Lebanon by land or by air, with the formally civilian airlines owned by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

 The new parts are stored and checked especially in the warehouses of Damascus airport, but the Syrian factories of missile parts have all been placed under the Pasdaran direct control since December 2016.

 Hence the Hezbollah logic is probably that the more missiles – even low-precision ones – are available, less possible will be for Israel to choose a preventive strategy of destruction of the arsenals before they are used.

 How much damage can such a missile -upgraded by Iran for the Lebanese Shiites – do?

 The Fateh 110missile has a 100-metre CEP and can hence destroy a standard target with a 75% probability rate.

 For urban targets in highly populated areas the Fateh 110 CEP decreases further.

 Israel is small and densely populated, with a very high distribution of critical targets between resident population and urban systems.

 Particularly important centres are located very close to each other, in an area that, on average, is about 20 kilometres wide and 100 metres deep.

 Israel has 20 energy production areas, three commercial ports and a large international airport.

 It has also the military bases of Palmahim, Tel Nof, Nevatimand Hatzor, as well as Dimona, the Haifa refinery, and the  IDF headquarters in the centre of Tel Aviv.

 The operational coverage of Hezbollah’s missile factories in the Lebanon is also varied: under a football field, just north of the Beirut airport, near the Uza’i canal and in many private houses, often of individuals not reported as Shiite militants.

 There are also Lebanese missile depots in Latakia – right near the Russian positions and, probably, in such a way as to make them also the target of an Israeli counter-operation –as well as in Safita, Hisya and, as already mentioned, in Damascus.

 It should be recalled, however, that all Israeli air raids against the launch sites, factories and areas for upgrading Hezbollah’s Iranian missiles – starting from the one of November 2017 in Hisya to the one on Jamaraya, in February 2018, until the operation on Latakia of September 2018- were carried out by Israel in full agreement with the Russian Federation.

  Nevertheless, unlike what happened in Syria, Israel has still no intention of carrying out stable preventive actions on the Lebanese territory, in a region that could quickly trigger off a major conflict with Syria, Iran, the Sunni groups and many others.

 In terms of protection and missile response, Israel can still count on the Iron Dome, a network of sensors and early warning missile batteries, with additional advanced mortar batteries – operational since 2012 – but above all operating against the old Qassam or Soviet Katiusce rockets.

 It works optimally for targets around 70-100 kilometres.

 Since 2017 Israel has also been operating David’s Sling, a medium range and medium-high charge missile network, operating up to 300 kilometres, which is useful precisely against the Fateh 110, the Zelzal 2 and 3missiles, as well as against the Syrian M-600 missiles, including those upgraded with the Iranian GPS-GLONASS. Israel also owns the Arrow 2 network, with ballistic missiles having a long range of over 200 kilometres, which has been operating since 2000. Finally, since 2017 Israel has also been operating Arrow 3, a network of sensors and missiles with a range over 200 kilometres and spatial guidance in their final trajectory phase.

 However, there is still a problem.

 The anti-missile networks, even the most specialized and modern such as the Israeli ones, can be quickly saturated by a very high rate of almost simultaneous launches and by missile decoding actions in flight, which can blind or otherwise limit the full anti-missile response.

 While it is true that Israel has no difficulty in selecting missiles targeted to critical areas of its territory, or those targeted to irrelevant areas, it is equally true that the interceptors are extremely expensive to be placed on site, infinitely more expensive than the missiles they have to intercept, especially if they are short-range missiles.

 Hence, in a tragic future, the Jewish State might be forced to choose to defend only the critical infrastructure, thus leaving some populated centres overexposed.

 A politically suicidal choice for any government.

 Obviously,an unavoidable option for Israel will also be to bring the war – probably not just the air one – into the Lebanon, with evident cascading effects for all the forces present in the region.

Therefore it is fully rational that the Israeli government has made the choice of creating a new IDF “missile Corps” to  specifically face this new type of threat, which will come  from the North, but also from the South, from the Gaza Strip and, possibly, from the jihadist networks now controlling the Sinai region.

 Iran’s technology in the field of missile precision guidance, however, comes from the US Paveway IV (CEP 15 metres, 70,000 US dollars per missile), which is a missile incorporating a dual communication system, carrying out anti-jamming activity on the GPS network (but not on GLONASS), and a semi-active laser guidance.

 Currently Great Britain uses the Brimstone, with a CEP lower than one metre and a particularly advanced laser guidance system.

 Great Britain has also the Exactor 2 available, a multirole missile with a 30-kilometre range.

 A system that is almost completely automated.

 All technologies also available to Iran.

 The fast reverse engineering of the allied and Western materials found in Syria worked miracles for Iran.

 According to Israeli sources, the cost of the new Iranian project on precision missiles in the Lebanon should total 17 billion US dollars, all invested in Hezbollah’s networks only.

 Currently the final unit cost per missile is expected to be 10,000 US dollars.

 As disclosed by various intelligence sources, however, the Lebanese program still has only 250 missiles already operational, as demonstrated by the documentary film produced by the Lebanese Shiite group, which shows an IDF border patrol, the 401th armoured brigade, hit in an accident occurred four years ago.

 It is strange: the Israeli patrol had an M4 Windbreaker tank available, which has a significant passive and active anti-missile defence. Hence Hezbollah, however, has correctly inferred that Israel has currently the ability to send units by land to the Lebanese territory to bring the confrontation to  the Lebanese Shiite region.

 Which is exactly what Hezbollah does not want at all.

 Both the Israeli military services and the Israeli Armed Forces, however, have explicitly stated that Hezbollah “has not yet the industrial capacity to turn the missiles supplied by Iran into precision missiles”.

 For the time being, however, the “Party of God” is supposed to have 90-250 missiles available, already prepared for high-precision actions.

 It is not what Iran and Hezbollah need to carry out the missile saturation operation they have in mind.

 It should also be considered that the “Party of God” normally fails at least 10% of launches, while currently the international standard is 4% for small and medium-sized missiles.

 Hence with 50% of the missiles stopped at departure or in flight by Israeli forces – as always happens – finally only 50 of the 250 missiles upgraded by Iran could be currently launched and become really dangerous for Israel.

 The political and strategic effect would remain anyway, considering the population density and the complexity of the Israeli defence and infrastructure system.

 Therefore the problem is not solved anyway by waiting.

 Hence both Iran and Hezbollah have recently decided to confine the upgrade program only to the 14,000 Zelzal 2 missiles already present and operational, without updates, in the Lebanese Shiite group’s arsenal.

 Here again, however, there are many problems.

 New factories are needed, with a piece-by-piece process that turns a Zelzal 2 or 3 into a Fateh 110missile, which has a 300-kilometre range.

  Which is exactly what the Iranian and Lebanese Shiites need in the first missile salvo.

 Nevertheless, while Iran has already produced4,000 new high-precision missiles in the above mentioned university research centres in Tehran, so far only 1,000 have safely reached the Lebanon.

 Another problem for Hezbollah and the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is the inevitably significant areas needed to upgrade the missiles both in Syria and in the Lebanon.

 All areas already hit by Israeli attacks that, however, are still limited and well-known.

The few factories that have recently been operational in Syria and the Lebanon have already been hit by Israeli air strikes.

 Hence, for the time being, Hezbollah has solved the problem by distributing the missiles to be upgraded to small and widespread factories, located throughout Southern Lebanon, and the few ones still existing in Syria.

 This means that the process for upgrading the missiles becomes slower, more difficult and hence less qualitatively significant.

 Therefore, the previously mentioned costs increase proportionately to the difficulties of technical upgrading. Hence, if the upgraded missiles cost at least 11,000 US dollars each, the total technological upgrade of Hezbollah’s missiles will be worth at least 145 million US dollars.

 Therefore, everything is resolved in the standard time needed for the Iranian upgrade and for Israeli response and certainly for a new possible indirect agreement between Israeli and Syria, not mediated – today, as in the 1990s – by the United States.

 A tacit agreement that is worth, today, in a framework of agreements between Syria itself, which got its grip on the Lebanon and currently cannot hold it any longer, and Israel itself, which could accept – after a credible threat on Hezbollah- a Russian or even US mediation on the current equilibria in the Lebanon.

Advisory Board Co-chair Honoris Causa Professor Giancarlo Elia Valori is an eminent Italian economist and businessman. He holds prestigious academic distinctions and national orders. Mr. Valori has lectured on international affairs and economics at the world’s leading universities such as Peking University, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Yeshiva University in New York. He currently chairs “International World Group”, he is also the honorary president of Huawei Italy, economic adviser to the Chinese giant HNA Group. In 1992 he was appointed Officier de la Légion d’Honneur de la République Francaise, with this motivation: “A man who can see across borders to understand the world” and in 2002 he received the title “Honorable” of the Académie des Sciences de l’Institut de France. “

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Balochistan `insurgency ‘and its impact on CPEC

Amjed Jaaved

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A dispute arose between Baloch leader Akber Bugti and then government led by Parvez Musharraf. Bugti was killed. How he was killed remains a mystery. But, his death triggered a lingering `insurgency’, with ebbs and flow in foreign support.

However, there is no let-up in global anti-Pakistan propaganda from Dr. Naila Baloch’s `free Balochistan’ office, working in New Delhi since June 23, 2018. When this office was opened many Bharatya Janata Party parliamentarians and India’s Research and Analysis Wing’s officers attended it.

The office was opened in line with Doval Doctrine that aims at fomenting insurgency in Pakistan’s provinces, including Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. `Free Balochistan’ sponsored offensive posters on taxi cabs and buses in Switzerland and Britain. USA has recently outlawed Balochistan Liberation Army. However, earlier, in 2012, a handful of Republican had moved a pro-separatist bill in US Congress. It demanded `the right to self-determination’ and ` opportunity to choose their own status’ for people of Balochistan.

Pakistan caught a serving Indian Navy officer Kalbushan Jhadav (pseudonym Mubarik Ali) to foment insurgency in Balochistan. Indian investigative journalists Karan Thapar and Praveen Swami suggested that he was a serving officer. India’s security czar,

Along with Baloch insurgents, Pushtun Tahafuzz Movement is being backed up by India. In their over-ebullient speeches, PTM’s leaders openly scold Pakistan’s National Security institutions. Pakistan’s Inter-Services Public Relations had to warn them `not to cross the red line. Yet, sponsored by Pakistan’s enemies they continued their tirade.  While addressing a rally at Orakzai (April 20, 2019), Pakistan’s prime minister expressed sympathy with Pashtun Tahafuzz Movement demands. But he expressed ennui at anti-army slogans shouted by them. Earlier, Pakistan’s senate’s special committee had patiently heard their demands. PTM voices concerns that are exterior to Pashtoon welfare. For instance, Manzoor Pashteen, in his interview (Herald, May 2018, p.48), berates Pak army operations and extols drone strikes. He says, ‘The army did not eliminate even a single Taliban leader.  All the 87 Taliban commanders killed in the last 18 years were eliminated in drone strikes’. At a PTM meeting in Britain, even Malala Yusafzai’s father (Ziauddin), like His Master’s Voice, echoed anti-army sentiments. He said, “Pakistan army and intelligence agencies knew that Fazalullah was a terrorist who continued to operate radio station in Swat’.

For one thing drone strikes amount to aggression. In an article, David Swanson pointed out that any use of military force, be it a drone attack, amounts to a war. The Kellogg-Briand Pact made war a crime in 1928 and various atrocities became criminal acts at Nuremberg and Tokyo.

Genesis of insurgency: Balochistan has been experiencing an armed insurgency since 2005, when veteran Baloch leader Nawab Akbar Bugti became embroiled in a dispute with then-President of Pakistan General Pervez Musharraf. The differences initially centered on royalties from natural gas mined in the resource-rich town of Dera Bugti, in northeast Balochistan. Subsequently, the building of military cantonments in Balochistan, and the development of Gwadar port by China, also became reasons for conflict (The Quint, August 26 2017). On August 26, 2006, Nawab Akbar Bugti was killed in a mountainous region of Balochistan; although the Pakistani government denied killing Bugti, Baloch groups blamed the government for his assassination, and thus the armed insurgency was further intensified (Dawn, August 27 2006).

Baloch insurgents allege that the China is a “partner in crime” with Pakistan’s government in looting the natural resources of Balochistan (The Balochistan Post, November 25 2018). In December 2018, Pakistan officials foiled a plan to attack Chinese workers on the East Bay Expressway in Gwadar, seizing weapons and ammunition that Baloch insurgents had stockpiled for that purpose (Samaa Digital, December 6 2018).

The most active separatist groups in Balochistan are Baloch Liberation Army, Balochistan Liberation Front, Baloch Republican Army, and United Baloch Army.

Balochistan separatist groups are divided into two distinct groups. The first group consists of BLF, UBA and BRA, whereas the second group includes Balochistan Liberation Army and Balochistan National Liberation Front

Emergence of BRAS: In the early hours of April 18, a group of militants in southwestern Pakistan blocked the coastal highway that connects the port of Gwadar, near the Iranian border, to Karachi farther east. The militants stopped six buses near a mountain pass and checked the identity cards of all the passengers. They singled out 14 members of Pakistan’s armed forces, and then executed them all. Hours later, a coalition of three Baloch separatist groups, known as Baloch Raaji Aajoi Sangar, or BRAS, claimed responsibility. The same group had previously owned attack on the Chinese Consulate in Karachi and a bus of Chinese engineers in the town of Dalbandin, north of Gwadar.

Iran’s woes: Iran worries that Pakistan is allowing Saudi Arabia to use Gwadar as a launching pad to destabilize it. Just as Pakistan accuses Iran of harboring Baloch separatists like BRAS, Iran blames Pakistan for giving sanctuary to militant Sunni Baloch groups such as Jaish al-Adl that have attacked Iranian security forces in Iran’s Sistan and Balochistan province.

Active insurgent groups in Balochistan: Balochistan separatist groups are divided into two distinct groups. One sunni funded by Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for attacks in Iran. And the other shia funded by Iran. The main groups are: Baloch Raaji Aajoi Sangar  (involved in attack on Chinese Consulate in Karachi), Baloch Liberation Army, Baloch Liberation Front, , United Baloch Army, Baloch Liberation Tigers, Baloch Nationalists, Baloch Young Tigers, Balochistan Liberation United Front , Balochistan National Army, Lashkar-e-Balochistan, Baloch Republican Party, Baloch Mussalah Diffah Tanzim (Baloch Militant Defense Army), Baloch National Liberation Front, Free Balochistan Army, Baloch Student Organisation, and Baloch Republican Army (BRP). BRP is the political wing of the armed Balochistan Republican Army. However, its central spokesman Sher Mohamad Bugti denies any relation with the BRA.

Strengths and weaknesses: The insurgency draws its sustenance from the popular misconception that China-Pakistan Economic Corridor is detrimental to Baloch interests. When completed, it would follow influx of foreigners. They would grab their land, plunder their resources and change their demography.

Infighting is the main weakness of the insurgency. Unable to harm armed forces, the insurgents began “killing fellow Baloch and non-Baloch settlers, and launching attacks against Sindhi and Pashtun citizens.” Infighting became obvious when the Baloch Liberation Army “killed on of its commanders, Ali Sher, and detained four of its freedom fighters” in 2015,

Solution

Seminars need to be held inside the country, instead of in China, to create awareness in gullible masses. Issues relating to royalty should be settled. Economic deprivation of the people should be reduced.

Sardari (chieftain) system is the bane of economic deprivation: Even when the British government had consented to creation of India and Pakistan as independent states, one thing continually badgered Churchill`s mind. It was concern about downtrodden masses who would groan under tyranny of the nawab, wadera and chaudhri, after the Englishman`s exit from the Sub-Continent. Churchill believed that the Englishman`s legacy to the Sub-Continent was a modicum of justice and rule of law.

No-one better knew the psyche of the feudal lords better than the Englishman himself. Loyalty to the British crown was sine qua non of being a protégé of the British raj. After all, the wadera icons were the Englishman`s own creation. Of all the lords, the conduct of late Akber Bugti baffles one`s wits. His father, Mehrab Khan, was given title of `Sir` by the English rulers and allotted land not only in the Punjab but also in the Sindh province. Akber Bugti, former governor of Balochistan (1972), owned houses in Quetta, Sibi, Jacobabad, Kendkot, Sanghar, besides his native house in Dera Bugti along with about 12,000 acres of land.

The wadera in the yesteryears used to be tyrannical only to the inhabitants of their own constituency, not to the whole country. The situation appears to have changed now. Is it justified to aid or abet blowing up of gas pipelines, shooting at army helicopters, dragging the innocent Punjabi from the Punjab-bound buses and shooting them point-blank, looting buses going to the other provinces.

Will killing innocent passengers lead to forced payment of money by the gas companies, in addition to agreed royalty? By no stretch of logic, such a step could be justified. The matter needs a closer pry by the government into the psyche of our Baluch lords. Why Pak army can`t build cantonments on Pak soil?

The grievance appears to stem from the perception that lion`s share of windfall gains from the multi-billion dollar Gwador port and city project will go to affluent and influential non-Baluchi civilians and non-civilians. Well, that issue could be sorted out at talks.

In terms of area, Balochistan is the largest province of Pakistan. It covers 43.6 per cent of the country`s total area with only 5 per cent of the total population. It is rich in natural resources. Pakistan`s industrial infrastructure mainly depends on the gas and coal of this province. The gas from Dera Bugti meets 60 per cent of Pakistan`s, mainly Punjab`s, domestic and industrial needs. The province has 200 coal mines, which again meet the industrial requirements of Punjab. The province is rich in marble and mineral wealth which is being explored by foreigners under contracts from the Government of Pakistan. Balochistan benefits from the resources of the other provinces just as the other provinces benefit from the resources of Balochistan. The Nawabs received crores of rupees as royalty for the gas transmitted. They are to be blamed for the backwardness of the province. Why don`t they spend a pittance out of the received money on economic development of the province?

Not long ago, gas pipelines in Dera Bugti, the source of the Sui Gas, were frequently attacked by missiles. The government said the attackers were from  Bugti tribe. The Pakistan government had to detail about 50,000 para-military troops to protect sensitive installations in Dera Bugti.

In the Sui-gas-fields area, Akbar Bugti initially owned no land. In collusion with revenue officials he got 7,000 acres transferred in his name. He has been receiving royalty from two gas companies at the rate of Rs. 14,000/- per acre, to the tune of ten crore rupees annually. But this land was the property of the Kalpar tribe.

In 1992 armed Bugti tribesmen forcefully evicted six thousand Kalpars and Masuri Bugtis and occupied their lands, gardens and houses. These people are wandering hither and thither in different districts.

Conclusion

The PTM’s criticism of Pakistan’s armed forces is not fair. They wrogly defend drone attacks. The UN charter maintained war as a crime, but limited it to an ‘aggressive’ war, and gave immunity to any wars launched with the UN approval. If that is indeed the case, did the UN allow drone attacks on Pakistan? Drone attacks on Pakistan’s territory are a clear violation of the country’s sovereignty as an independent state.  Doubtless `patriotism is the last refuge of a scoundrel’. Lest the PTM is dubbed unpatriotic, it should stick on course. And confine itself to its demands.

The root cause of the problem is the medieval sardari system in Balochistan. This system is responsible for suppression of the common man. This system should be abolished. If the Sardars of today had not been constantly loyal to the Englishman, he would have dis-knighted them.

Not all the nawabs are so malevolent, as our Baluch scions of nawabs.

Nawab of Kalabagh tried to abolish the Sardari system by setting up about 40 police stations in Balochistan. However, General Moosa was averse to the policy. The government should seriously consider such steps as would effectively extend its writ in every nook and corner of Balochistan. The Sardari system must be abolished. Meanwhile, a study should be undertaken to evaluate loyalty and political nuisance of the nawab, sardar, waderas, and their ilk. If the Sardars are not loyal to the national interests, what is the fun of propping them up with government`s patronage? Why not take corrective action to cut them to size?

India should stop stoking up insurgencies in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Both India and Pakistan are nuclear armed. There is no reason why they should be toujours at daggers drawn.  Entente may flare up into a nuclear Armageddon. India need to shun jingoism, stop its evil machinations in Pakistan, and solve differences through talks.

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Strategy of Cyber Defense Structure in Political Theories

Sajad Abedi

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Since the principle of defense addresses a wide range of threats, it applies both in the field of justice and in the field of military and strategic affairs. But implementing cyber-defense is only recommended if the risks that can be identified have a direct impact on the security and even survival of a state, so each government is obliged to address any challenges that may arise. To eliminate it. Challenges of identifying the author or authors of an attack, estimating the likely impacts and reconstructions of the attack and setting targets, within the context of public networks and actors, distinguish cyberspace from other spaces in which defense is formed. Defense in cyberspace, while feasible, may not only be limited to existing actions, but unique concepts must be developed and presented.

In fact, some of the challenges in cyber defense are similar to those in other forms of defense. For example, the problem of identifying cyberattacks is reminiscent of the challenge of defending nuclear terrorism. Identifying the effects of a cyber-attack is very similar to identifying the effects of biological weapons. Also, the invisibility of computer weapons is, in many cases, very similar to the challenge posed by biological weapons.

Defensive methodological approaches can therefore be used to define some elements of cyber defense: against the threats of terrorism the concepts of “defense through denial” and “indirect defense” can be conceptualized against biological threats. Applied “symmetrical defense”.

In practice, however, we find that, although governments appear to be heavily dependent on computer systems for their deployment, they are not the same as those charged with using malicious equipment against computer systems. . For this reason, the impact of using cyber defense equipment against them is questionable. In fact, hacker groups that sell or lease knowledge or networks of infected machines to others, often to attack, plan malware or spyware or even to detect security flaws in systems, often the only things they need are a few (powerful) computers and an internet connection. So the question arises whether they can be prevented from doing so only by threatening to respond exclusively to cyber.

The need to establish a balance between action and response and the necessity of influencing the answer itself presents another challenge that must be met with the ability to ensure that the response is repeated and repeated as needed. Some experts believe that cyber defense can disrupt or temporarily disrupt a competitor’s activities, or temporarily disrupt the competitor’s activities, despite the physical (physical) measures that more or less neutralize the competitor; but none of the cyber solutions. It cannot lead to definitive neutralization of the threat.

In such a situation, the impact of the Aztemeric countermeasures point-by-point action cannot be ignored. Therefore, better enforcement of cyber defense against criminal groups – whose realization of financial interests is their top priority – can be resorted to by law enforcement (including actions aimed at the financial interests of the actors). Military responses can also be used if confronted with actors with little reliance on information technology.

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Achieving safety and security in an age of disruption and distrust

MD Staff

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The ability of citizens and businesses to go about their daily lives with a sense of safety and security is vital to prosperity, but citizens in many countries feel unsafe. Whether it’s because of inadequate responses to natural disasters, terrorist attacks, massive data breaches or the spread of disinformation, trust in governments’ ability to protect society is declining.

To address this requires a new, systemic approach to security that broadens its definition beyond defence and policing. Governments, local authorities and the private sector need to work closely together across all areas that contribute to security. PwC identifies four overlapping domains – physical, economic, digital and social — underpinned by trust, that form the foundation of a secure and prosperous society.

That’s the conclusion of PwC’s new report, Achieving safety and security in an age of disruption and distrust.Itchallenges the traditionally narrow view of physical safety and security, expanding the concept of what security means to include citizens’ basic needs; including food, water and utilities; and the organisations that deliver them.

The report draws on academic research* and case studies to show the necessity and benefits of a collaborative approach to security. It identifies the different elements that cause citizens and businesses to feel unsafe and the players, from private sector communications firms and infrastructure companies to security forces and non-governmental organisations, who need to work together to deliver security in all the domains.

Tony Peake, PwC Global Leader, Government and Public Services, says:“Unless you create a safe and secure environment in which people can go about their daily lives without fear, they won’t be able to work and sustain their families or carve out a decent standard of living.

The breadth of the challenge of delivering security has never been greater, requiring agility in response and innovation in prevention. And while security is a core task of governments, it can’t be achieved in isolation. It needs to be viewed holistically, with governments taking the lead in facilitating collaboration across organisations, sectors and territorial divides to deliver the security that is vital to a functioning society.”

The building blocks of security: physical, digital, social and economic

The report explains how these domains overlap and impact each other, adding to the complexity of delivering security. For example, economic security is closely tied to cyber security and thwarting data theft. Critical infrastructure services like telecommunications, power and transportation systems that rely on technology to operate must be secured both physically and digitally. Border control systems such as passport readers and iris scanning machines rely on digital interfaces that require cyber security.

Peter van Uhm, former Chief of Defence of the Armed Forces of the Netherlands, summarises in his foreword to the report:“It has become increasingly clear that delivering the safety and security that citizens and businesses need to prosper requires ever closer collaborations across borders, sectors and institutions. I learned that (re)building a failed state means realising that everything in a nation is interlinked and that it is all about the hearts and minds of the people. If you want the people to have trust in their society and faith in their future, safety and security in the broadest terms are the prerequisite.”

How governments can safeguard and protect citizens

PwC has identified six key actions that government leaders can take to develop a collaborative, systemic approach to delivering safety and security to their citizens:

1)    Take stock: look at the interplay of the different physical, digital, economic and social domains and spot any weak links across sectors.

2)    Identify and engage the right stakeholders and collaborate to develop a joint agenda and a national and/or local safety and security policy.

3)    Identify what each stakeholder needs to provide in the process and assess their level of interconnectedness to deliver safety and security, e.g. back-up systems for telecommunications failures.

4)    Work with leadership in the different overlapping domains and empower people in the right places to make decisions.

5)    Invest in leaders so that they are skilled in engaging the public and instilling a sense of trust.

6)    Manage carefully the trade-off of security with safeguarding personal data and citizens’ rights.

The recommendations for private sector firms and non-profit organisations include these steps:

1)    Work more closely with trusted governments to improve engagement and collaboration.

2)    Align organisational purpose with the broader societal safety and security agenda.

3)    Develop the capacity and capability to improve safety and security for stakeholders.

Examples of how this works in practice

Crisis readiness and response to a terrorist attack in Sweden

The 2017 Stockholm terrorist attack illustrates the need for collaboration between governments and non-profit partners. This attack was perpetrated by one individual who drove at high speed down a pedestrian street, killing five people and injuring 10 more. A scenario planning exercise between government and security agencies had been carried out several months before the attack and is credited with limiting the number of casualties and the swift arrest of the attacker.

Government authorities and the private sector collaborate to thwart cyber threat

A major cyber attack in Australia, dubbed Cloud Hopper, was identified and mitigated through close collaboration between cyber security experts in both the public and private sectors.

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