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The Lebanon, natural gas and local political equilibria

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As can be easily foreseen, the huge amount of natural gas that is being discovered throughout the East Mediterranean region is bound to quickly change the whole economic, strategic and military system of the Middle East.

As well as the links between the Greater Middle East and the European Union.

While, before the discoveries of the East Mediterranean region, the primary theme was the network of contacts between the EU West and the Arab-Islamic universe, currently these productive transformations change the internal relations among traditionally producing countries and place  Israel in a new economic context, thus making the EU countries enter this new maritime production system as full members.

Hence it is by no mere coincidence that the first East Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGS) was organized in Cairo last January.

The Forum participants included Egypt, Italy, the European Union, Cyprus, Greece, Jordan and the Palestinian National Authority.

However, it also included Israel and this is certainly a fact not to be overlooked.

The logic of the meeting, however, is to create – in the short term – a politically and productively cohesive group, capable of maximizing the financial and political effects of this great operation and also avoiding competitive policies by other neighbouring gas areas.

First and foremost the Persian Gulf, but also the coastal areas of the Horn of Africa and the possible exploration areas off the Yemeni coast.

The Conference was sponsored by Schlumberger and Deloitte and hosted by World Oil, Gas Processing& LNG, Hydrocarbon Processing, Petroleum Economist, Pipeline & Gas Journal and, finally, by Underground Construction.

As can be easily imagined, also the large European and North American companies of the sector were present.

It should be noted that, this year, the Forum has also been slightly brought forward, for obvious reasons of strong political and productive needs.

Two countries, namely Syria and the Lebanon, did not participate and over the last few years they have started to exploit their offshore deposits in an autonomous way.

Obviously Syria will primarily support the Russian and Iranian networks towards Central Asia and China, while the Lebanon will use its offshore deposits, which are largely independent from neighboring countries, so as to revive its economy.

Zohr, the great Egyptian gas field, was discovered in 2015. In the future, however, Egypt also wants to become the hub for all the natural gas passages in the region, both to the EU and to the rest of the world.

The Israeli Leviathan and Karish gas fields have already started production, despite some tensions between the private technical and financial managers and the State of Israel, which wants a different use of a part of extractions.

If Israel’s gas transits through the Balkan line to Vienna, or through the Greek-Albanian network and Italy, it will anyway be fundamental for the European economy and its strategic equilibria.

In all likelihood, Israel’s gas will be even more decisive in the first operational version of the Southern Corridor – the one we have called “Viennese” – than in the Greek-Italian one.

As already mentioned, the Lebanon will mainly play the game against the Israeli gas, for both political and eminently economic reasons.

So far the Lebanon has indicated two Exploration and Production Agreements (EPAs) to a consortium led by Total, with the participation of ENI and Novatek, while Norway and the Lebanon are still collaborating for technical and legal issues through the oil for development program, which will last until 2020.

The Lebanon, however, has also completed its LNG import network for domestic electricity production, a primary problem for the country.

There are also several contracts expiring or to be renewed in the small, but very important market of Lebanese gas.

Political factionalism and the many overt and covert alliances of the Lebanon do not allow to have a homogeneous market of its natural gas.

With specific reference to Cyprus, ENI has discovered Block 6, with the wide Calypso deposit inside, while Exxon-Mobil still “drills” Block 10.

It should be recalled that Turkey has recently blocked the SAIPEM 12000 drillship just a few days after Block 3 was discovered. Turkey, however, has not behaved in the same way with Exxon-Mobil Block 10, in which it does not currently show any direct interest.

The problem is well known: Turkey believes that every exploration and processing-selling activity of all Cypriot gas should benefit both island’s communities and hence not only the Greek one.

The Cypriot government is dealing with Total for Block 11 and with ENI and Total for Block 6, but its real big problem is Aphrodite, the gas field  that should be connected to Egypt with a pipeline enabling Egypt to liquefy and transport gas to end markets.

Meanwhile Israel has already started production in 70% of its Leviathan fields, while the Karish and Tamimgas fields have been fully financed and are now operational.

Egypt’s Parliament has also voted for the creation of a new national natural gas Authority and already receives the LNG extracted by ENI in Zahr.

Hence currently the interests of the various gas producing countries tend to coincide and the Conference about which we are talking is very similar to the creation of what in the past – when economy still existed – was called “cartel”.

A cartel that depends, however, on the future distribution networks in Europe, as well as on the possible choice of some players to play the very “American-style” game of shale gas, and on the moves of the Russian Federation, which is entering this market in many regions. A cartel that finally also depends on the reactions of the Iran-Qatar axis and, hence, of the Saudi system that organizes the Emirates’ natural gas.

A very interesting fact was the request made by all participants to create an international gas organization in the region.

A new OPEC of natural gas?

Too early to say, but the idea is still in the minds of many Forum participants.

According to many Chinese analysts, this is highly probable.

It is worth recalling that currently the Forum countries already account for 87% of all the East Mediterranean’s natural gas.

Furthermore, the logic of opening to private investment and the “mutual benefit” criterion make this new gas OPEC a powerful attraction for all the new producing countries, which will not fail to join this network in the future.

Apart from geopolitical assessments and considerations which, however, are not currently clear yet.

Neither Israel nor Palestine can export their gas without passing through Egypt. Hence, in the coming years, the reasons for achieving a lasting peace will be much stronger than usual.

Unless, as someone predicts, we are faced with a very technological and utterly ubiquitous terrorism 2.0, which could take the form of the old Palestinian or “global” jihad or, possibly, of a mass anarchic-populist rebellion, but especially in the West.

Not to mention the new relationship between Palestine and Arab or Islamic countries, which would be changed radically by the new financial autonomy of the Palestinian world.

What are the challenges that the Forum countries must face to become stable producers in such an important and geopolitically sensitive market?

A market that tends to saturation, above all because of the structural economic crisis of Western markets.

Firstly, all deposits are in deep water and offshore, which makes extraction much more expensive than usual.

We are not talking about the cost of the North American shale gas, but we are not far off.

In the minds of many Middle East decision-makers, this linkage to the US and Canadian cost cycle can be very dangerous.

This could also force some competitors, outside the East Mediterranean region, to play the geopolitical and military card of the stable price increase, so as to temporarily taking the Eastern marine deposits off the market.

The geopolitical effects are hard to imagine.

Furthermore the infrastructure to put these huge resources on the market is extremely expensive and still very scarcely developed and will probably carry a very high and currently unpredictable geopolitical risk.

In fact, the standard geopolitical risks are well-known: the war in Syria; terrorism, which would certainly find a new area of action; the ambiguity of a vacuous and aimless Europe, which does not yet know what energy it wants to use in the future, undecided between the rhapsodic purchases of US shale gas and the strong tensions between France and Germany on the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline, with the related recent agreement on the European Directive for gas pipelines (which regards Ukraine).

The Aachen agreement, although certainly being the basis of future links between France and Germany, clashes with the short and medium-term interests of two EU countries that have different energy networks, based on different geopolitics.

Moreover France and Germany are anyway thwarting the EU common energy policy, with the very recent stop of the South Transit East Pyrenees (STEP) between France and Spain.

It is well-known that Spain is currently the country with the highest re-gasification potential in Europe and France plans to fully exploit the already existing networks on its own.

The more energy prices are competitive at the EU edges, the fewer incentives exist for a common energy policy.

Moreover, on the basis of practical calculations, it can be inferred – with some degree of accuracy – that the political risk, combined with structurally high and not yet competitive extraction costs, has left 36% of East Mediterranean’s gas potential still unexplored and untapped.

However, the structure of the East Mediterranean Gas Forum, which is already based in Cairo, will be open to everybody including European countries, which could thus escape the grip of a “German-style” energy policy – the last and definitive phase of Southern Europe’s exclusion from the EU centres of power.

For the time being Turkey will not be part of the EMGF.

And it is by no mere coincidence that also the Lebanon will not be a member.

The reason is simple. There are very old tensions between Turkey and Cyprus but, as early as 2003, Turkey has denounced the agreements on maritime borders signed by Cyprus, considering that, according to Turkey, Cyprus – as EU Member State – cannot represent the two local communities, namely the Greek and the Turkish ones, and hence has no full international legal capacity.

Secondly, Turkey believes that Cyprus’ autonomy in defining its Special Economic Zones should be reduced significantly.

Moreover Turkey still thinks that also the current Cypriot Economic Zones are often in areas which are de facto in Turkish waters.

Hence, as early as 2008, Turkey has been rejecting all oil exploration activities in Cyprus and its disputed waters.

Furthermore Turkey intends to promote only its own exploration activities, always in the maritime area attributed to Cyprus.

Turkey’s relations with Greece are certainly not performing better. For years Erdogan has been claiming many Greek islands in the Aegean Sea. Not to mention the air crash, caused by an attack of Turkish fighters, which cost the life of a Greek pilot in April 2018.

As early as his visit to Greece in 2017, Erdogan has been constantly calling for the reform of the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne.

This refers to Turkey’s taking possession of the border areas with Greece that – according to the long-standing Turkish polemic in this regard -were “taken away” by Westerners to be given to Greece.

Erdogan strongly argues against Greece’s right of oil and gas extraction in certain sea areas, again on the border between the two countries, albeit  outside the Cypriot region, that he believes are part of a new finally legitimate border between Turkey and the Greek islands.

Turkey does not even agree on the current relations between Greece and Libya, given that Turkey repeatedly argues with Greece for its direct oil operations on the Libyan continental shelf, which it believes it can claim for a greater share.

However, there is also a further dispute between Turkey and Egypt.

Erdogan, in fact, has never fully accepted the coup of the Egyptian military services that in 2013 – in eleven days only -overthrew Mohammed Morsi and his Muslim Brotherhood’s government in Cairo.

Moreover, at the time, Erdogan -who has still many links with the Ikhwan – even asked the UN Security Council to impose specific sanctions on  Egypt and its internal operations against a government that certainly toppled Morsi’s democratically elected government, which anyway resulted from a great but obscure media, political and strategic operation, namely the Arab springs.

It is worth recalling that a deputy-director of CIA, Michael Morell, wrote in one of his memoirs, that the “Arab springs” were orchestrated and engineered by the Agency to foster popular uprisings “against Al Qaeda”.

The results of this crazy reasoning is before us to be seen. Erdogan, however, does not give up and often demands the release of all political prisoners held in Egyptian jails.

Yet the tension of this true mad card of the East Mediterranean region, namely Turkey, mounts even with Israel, which was once its best ally throughout the Middle East, when Turkey still was the heir of the old “secular” Republic of Atatűrk, with the young Turks who trained to seize power in the many Lodges of the Grand Orient of Italy scattered throughout the Ottoman Empire.

We can also recall the tension between Israel and Turkey during the Operation “Cast Lead” of 2008-2009 or the issue of the Marmara ships in 2010.

The situation between the two countries has never returned to normalcy, despite Israel’s apologies to Turkey, quickly organized by the United States in 2013 and the subsequent normalization of 2016, partly justified by the new energy scenario emerging in the East Mediterranean region.

Then there was the expulsion of the Israeli Ambassador from Ankara in 2018and Erdogan accusing Israel of “genocide”. Finally the choice, which Turkey considers strongly prompted and desired by Israel, to move the US Embassy to Jerusalem.

Hence, on the one hand, the East Mediterranean’s oil and gas extraction requires a very high degree of collaboration between all the parties involved, while, on the other, it is the exactly the new Eastern wealth to create new rifts and fuel old tensions.

In fact the perception of an “aggressive” Turkish behavior is currently extremely widespread among all the participants in the Cairo Forum (but obviously not in Italy).

This tension, however, also affects the Lebanon, where many leaders still believe that the Forum is primarily targeted against their country.

In short, especially with this new and recent government led by Saad Hariri, the Lebanon believes it can manage, on its own, to effectively extract and monetize its maritime gas resources.

In fact, some Ministers of this Hariri-Hezbollah’s government maintain that the Lebanon could be connected to Europe through Northern Turkey (and this is another temptation for Turkey) via the Arab Gas Pipeline, although obviously, the expansion of this network with the pipeline in Syria is to be completed yet.

However, there would also be the line through Egypt, again using the Arab Gas Pipeline.

In short, the Lebanon thinks it has been thrown out, but it will soon realize that there is the possibility – also and especially with a Forum in which there is also Israel – to use at best and, above all, soon the distribution systems put in place by the Forum.

Advisory Board Co-chair Honoris Causa Professor Giancarlo Elia Valori is an eminent Italian economist and businessman. He holds prestigious academic distinctions and national orders. Mr. Valori has lectured on international affairs and economics at the world’s leading universities such as Peking University, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Yeshiva University in New York. He currently chairs “International World Group”, he is also the honorary president of Huawei Italy, economic adviser to the Chinese giant HNA Group. In 1992 he was appointed Officier de la Légion d’Honneur de la République Francaise, with this motivation: “A man who can see across borders to understand the world” and in 2002 he received the title “Honorable” of the Académie des Sciences de l’Institut de France. “

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East Mediterranean Gas Forum and Turkish expansion

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Image source: Greek Environment and Energy Ministry

The East Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF) is a unique regional organization in the eastern Mediterranean region. The establishment of the organization was announced when Turkey was seeking to expand in the Mediterranean region, as well as some eastern Mediterranean countries, such as Libya. Libya’s national security is an integral part of Egypt’s national security. In 2020, President Al-Sisi stated that: “Sirte and al-Jafra are a red line.” It is worth noting that Egypt has played an essential role in achieving a ceasefire in Libya. Egypt does not seek to interfere in Libya’s internal affairs but seeks to preserve its national security. Egypt supports the negotiations under the auspices of the United Nations and calls on all the disputing parties in Libya to negotiate and end the dispute in Libya in order to restore Libya’s stability and security. Turkish expansion in the Mediterranean causes concern to both Cyprus and Greece, as Turkey is drilling for gas near the Greek island of Crete, which has led to an escalation of tension between Turkey, Cyprus, and Greece. That led to the international community’s intervention to support Greece against the Turkish expansion, France pledged military aid to Greece, and Germany called on all parties to calm the conflict over gas in the Mediterranean. Turkey began the exploration process in 2019, and Turkey sees that it has many natural resources in the eastern Mediterranean and seeks to exploit it. However, there is still a problem of demarcating borders between Turkey and some eastern Mediterranean countries, which made the exploration process illegal. The demarcation of the borders between Libya and Turkey has led to the intensity of the conflict between Turkey and Greece. It is possible to say that Turkey did so in response to establishing the East Mediterranean Forum.

The East Mediterranean Forum is a regional organization, which includes six countries: Egypt, Greece, Cyprus, Jordan, Italy, and Israel. Its headquarters are located in Cairo, the capital of Egypt. The East Mediterranean Gas Forum organization was a forum. This forum was co-founded by Egypt, Jordan, Greece, Cyprus, Palestine, and Israel. The international community welcomed the idea of the forum. France requested to join the forum, and the United States of America attended the forum meeting as an international observer. Although Palestine is one of the founders of the East Mediterranean Gas Forum in 2019, it didn’t sign the protocol of the organization. Palestinian News and Information Agency reported that Palestine did not participate in the signing ceremony. And as a co-founding country of the forum, it will not retreat from the membership of any international organization that affirms its national and sovereign rights. The transformation of the Gas Forum into an international organization is an important and historic step in the region. It allows the countries of the region to cooperate in the eastern Mediterranean region. It’s worth mentioning that the eastern Mediterranean region includes nine countries, Egypt, Cyprus, Greece, Lebanon, Palestine, Syria, Libya, Turkey, and Israel. And now only four countries from eastern Mediterranean region joined the organization.

The forum is an economic and political organization, which its primary goal is the economic exploitation of natural gas and the interest in strengthening cooperation and developing dialogue between the states of the organization; in addition to that, the organization works to protect the wealth of its members in the eastern Mediterranean region against Turkish expansion and it also puts an end to Turkey’s illegal drilling activities in the region. As we can see, the organization attempts to reshape the balance of power in the region. Although the clear objectives of the organization, there are many challenges face it, including challenges related to the organization as an institution, such as the mechanisms of the institution, decision-making, conflict resolution, and protection of the region’s gas wealth. In addition to that, border problems between some organization members and other countries, such as the problem of borders between Palestine and Israel and the dispute over the demarcation of the maritime borders between Lebanon and Israel.

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Pakistan’s water-and-energy crisis

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The Indus Water Treaty talks between India and Pakistan had been in limbo since India abrogated special status  (Article 370) of the occupied Kashmir and usurped  hereditary rights(Article 35-A) of its permanent citizens. Following peace on the line of control, the two countries, water commissioners of the two countries held a meeting in March 2021 (though supposed to be held in 2019) to resolve outstanding issues. The main focus was on Pakistan’s objections to design of Indian hydropower projects on the Chenab River. India is building the 1,000 MW Pakal Dul Hydro Electric Project on river Marusudar, a tributary of the Chenab. The project is located in Kishtwar district of Jammu & Kashmir. The second project, Lower Kalnai, is being developed on the Chenab River.

The meeting was delayed because of India’s pugnacious attitude (surgical strikes, cartographic aggression on Kashmir, etc.).

The Indus Waters Treaty is a water-sharing treaty between India and Pakistan, facilitated by the World Bank, to use the water available in the Indus River and its tributaries. The treaty allocated the waters of the western rivers that are the Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab to Pakistan and those of the eastern rivers, namely the Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej, to India. According to provisions of the Indus Waters Treaty, all the waters of the Eastern Rivers (Sutlej, Beas, and Ravi), amounting to around 33 million acre feet (MAF) annually, is allocated to India for unrestricted use and the waters of the Western rivers (Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab) amounting to around 135 MAF annually largely to Pakistan. Under the treaty, India has been given the right to generate hydroelectricity through run-of-the-river projects on the western rivers, subject to specific criteria for design and operation.

The treaty also envisaged funding and building of dams, link canals, barrages, and tube wells like the Tarbela Dam on the Indus River and the Mangla Dam on the Jhelum River.

Since time immemorial, the Indus-river system has been used for irrigation in undivided India. However modern irrigation- engineering work was initiated dating 1850s during the British rule. The treaty was necessitated by partition of India into the dominions of India and Pakistan in 1947.

The fruition of the treaty is attributed to David Lilienthal, former head of both the Tennessee Valley Authority and the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission.

After six years of talks, Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Pakistani President Mohammad Ayub Khan signed the Indus Waters Treaty in September 1960. The Indus-water treaty required the creation of a Permanent Indus Commission, with a commissioner from each country, to resolve e any difference of opinion on architecture, design, and other aspects of the dams that the two countries may build on the allocated rivers. Aside from bellicose statements to scrap the treaty, the Indus treaty remained intact though the two countries fought many wars.

In 2017, India completed the building of the Kishanganga dam in occupied Kashmir and continued work on the Ratle hydroelectric power station on the Chenab River despite Pakistan’s objections.

In post-Ayub era, Pakistan was not able to make progress on making new dams particularly the Kalabagh Dam. The construction of the dam was delayed owing to frivolous objections raised by the three provinces that are Sindh, Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

Instead of trying to evolve consensus on the vital water projects, Pakistan’s politicians remained engrossed in pettifoggery or machinations to pull down whichever government happened to be in power. 

Necessity of the Kalabagh Dam

This project was approved by the Technical Committee on Water Resources during 2003-2005. However, the feasibility report has not been implemented for over 15 years.  Now three of the four provinces (excluding the Punjab) are at daggers drawn over it. The fact however remains that the inter-provincial committee was composed of eight technical experts, two from each province.

The Committee also looked into all aspects including the effect of dilution of seawater with fresh water, seawater intrusion into the groundwater, riverine irrigation, and forests fisheries (Pala fish, shrimp, kharif and rabi cultivation), besides growth of Mangrove forests. The project had already been  approved by the World Bank Indus Special Study Group in its report titled Development of Water and Power Resources of Pakistan: A Sectoral Analysis (1967). The estimated cost, then, was US$6.12 billion, over six years from 1977 to 1982.

After commissioning of Tarbela Dam in 1976, the dam could have been built in six years by 1982. The cost per unit of 12 billion units, the KBD hydel electricity was Rs1.5 as compared to Rs16.5 per unit from thermal sources.

The dam was to serve as a receptacle to store monsoon flows of the upper reaches of the mighty Indus.

Our power shortage then was 4000-5000 MW. The estimated cost of constructing the dam was US$6.12 billion, over six years from 1977 to 1982. After commissioning of Tarbela Dam in 1976, the dam could have been built in six years by 1982. The cost per unit of 12 billion units the hydel electricity was Rs.1.5 as compared to Rs. 16.5 per unit from thermal sources. We are losing Rs. 180 billion per year due to ten time costlier production (12billion xRs.15 billion). Add to it loss of US$ 6.12 billion per annum from due to the superfluous flow of 30 million Acre Feet at of water from Kotri Barrage into the Arabian Sea (one MAF valued at US$1-1.5 billion).

Our water resources reserves have not risen pari passu with growth in population, 32.4 million in 1948 to 154.6 million in 2005, and 207.8 million in 2017. In  kharif season, rivers flow at 84 percent while only 40 percent during the rabi season. The present water storage capacity in Pakistan is hardly 11.77million acres per feet (MAF) that is about only eight percent of the annual flow.

Factors of water crisis

Three provincial assemblies resolved against building the KBD. A politician alleged the dam would convert Sind into a desert. Apprehensions against the dam could be allayed by reviewing Water Apportionment Accord (as directed by Lahore High Court also vide its Order dated November 29, 2012, case no. WP 8777). No justification to kill the goose that lays the golden eggs.

Losses due to delay

The losses due to the delays in the project have soared up to Rs180 billion a year due to its 10-time costlier construction (1990 estimate).  Added to it is the loss of $6.12 billion per annum due to superfluous flow of 30 million acre feet of water from Kotri Barrage into the Arabian Sea. In mangrove season, rivers flow at 84 per cent while only at 40 per cent during Rabi season. The present water storage capacity in Pakistan is hardly 11.77MAF that is only about eight per cent of the annual flow.

Legislative assemblies of three of our provinces, barring the Punjab province, have been bitterly opposing construction of the Kala Bagh Dam. Are they justified? To answer the question we have to look into various aspects of the construction of the dam, particularly feasibility and repercussions of constructing the dam. After enactment of the Eighteenth amendment, building of dams is now a provincial subject. The fact however remains that water security is more a national subject than a provincial one.

Debate about pros and cons

 The construction of Kalabagh dam is predicted to supply over 4 million acre-feet additional water to Sindh. While explaining benefits of Kalabagh Dam, WAPDA engineer Shamsul Mulk stated that China would be generating around 30,000 megawatts of electricity from dams. “Even India has more than 4,000 dams,” he said. “We lose billions due to the non-construction of dams.”

Concluding remarks

The opposition to the Kalabagh Dam is whimsical rooted in political rhetoric. According to the United Nations’ forecast, water scarcity would be Pakistan’s greatest problem in current century.

The country has been in the grip of a severe energy crisis for several years. No one even talks about Kalabagh Dam. Towards the end of the 1980s, Pakistan met 70 percent of its energy needs from hydel (hydroelectric) power and 30 percent from thermal energy. By 2012-13, Pakistan became dependent on thermal energy generated from costly furnace oil and diesel by up to 44 percent, with the remaining 56 percent being generated from other, mainly thermal, sources. This change had a cascading effect on prices and the consumers’ bills skyrocketed.

Hydel energy remains largely neglected, despite its low production cost. Many public sector electricity generation plants have outlived their utility. Without cheaper electricity, circular debt will continue to mount. Circular debt, accumulated in the power sector, is a handy excuse for the energy crisis. This debt piles up when downstream customers fail to pay their bills to upstream suppliers (or producers) in time. Who are the defaulters? They include not only ordinary citizens, but also the provinces, the public sector, influential corporations and powerful individuals (including political tycoons). To continue supplying power, the thermal producer has to borrow (and later pay interest charges and repay the contracted loan) and find alternative financial sources, unless the government makes the bounteous payment. The solution is simple: power distribution companies should promptly pay their dues to the generation companies.

However, circular debt is only the tip of the iceberg. There are many other factors blighting the energy scenario. The government needs to evolve a policy in which the power sector is prioritized.

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Rosatom Empowering Africa

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After the first Russia-Africa summit held in Sochi, authorities have been moving to build on this new chapter of Russia‘s relations with African countries. As set in the joint declaration, the two sides have outlined comprehensive goals and tasks for the further development of Russia-Africa cooperation in significant areas including science and technology.

Business interest in Africa is steadily increasing and Russian companies, among them Rosatom, are ready to work with African partners. It is largely acknowledged that energy (construction and repair of power generation facilities as well as in peaceful nuclear energy and the use of renewable energy sources) is an important area of the economic cooperation between Russia and Africa.

Ryan Collyer is the Regional Vice-President of Rosatom for Sub-Saharan Africa, and his key responsibilities include overseeing, implementing and managing all Russian nuclear projects in Sub-Sahara African region. In this insightful and wide-ranging interview with Kester Kenn Klomegah early April 2021, Ryan Collyer discusses efforts toward providing nuclear power, training of nuclear specialists, the main challenges and the future plans for Africa.

Here are the interview excerpts:

Even before the first Russia-Africa summit held in October 2019, several African countries have shown a keen interest in building nuclear power plants. What is the current situation (overview) moving from mere interest to realizing concrete results in Africa?

It is important to note that nuclear is not new to Africa and Africa is not new to nuclear. South Africa has successfully operated Safari 1 research reactor for over 55 years and Koeberg nuclear power plant for over three decades. At one point, South Africa was the second-largest exporter of the life-saving medical isotope, Molybdenum 99, in the world. There are also currently research reactors in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Nigeria, and Ghana.

Another source is the cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency. Thanks to that, many countries like Benin, Ethiopia, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia, and others benefit from modern nuclear technologies applications in healthcare and agriculture. In Zambia, a cancer disease hospital received much-needed support, and now over 20,000 patients have been diagnosed and treated at the hospital. Benin’s soybean farmers could triple their income using the benefits of nuclear irradiation. In Tanzania, its island of Zanzibar became tsetse-free thanks to the Sterile Insect Technique (SIT).

Many other African countries are already working on joining the atomic club in one form or another, whether it be the construction of a Nuclear Power Plant or a research reactor or the development of nuclear infrastructure or the training of professional personnel. In this undertaking, Russia is a trusted partner for many. We have signed intergovernmental agreements in the peaceful use of atomic energy with Algeria (2014), Ghana (2015), Egypt (2015), Ethiopia (2019), Republic of Congo (2019), Nigeria (2012, 2016), Rwanda (2018), South Africa (2004), Sudan (2017), Tunisia (2016), Uganda (2019) and Zambia (2016). Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) were signed with Kenya in 2016 and Morocco in 2017. 

How would you estimate the potential nuclear energy requirements in Africa? How is that compared to other alternative power sources such as solar and hydro-power?

Today, 600 million people in sub-Saharan Africa (one-out-of-two people) do not have access to electricity. Any significant change is not forthcoming, according to the International Energy Agency (IEA). Estimations show that 530 million people (one-out-of-three people) will remain without electricity in 2030. As GDP growth and urbanization in Africa escalate, the power demand will increase exponentially. Today the electricity demand in Africa is 700 terawatt-hours (TWh), with the North African economies and South Africa accounting for over 70% of the total.

According to the IEA estimate scenarios, by 2040, the electricity demand will more than double in the Stated Policies Scenario to over 1600 TWh. It may reach 2300 TWh in the Africa Case Scenario. It is undeniable that Africa needs vast amounts of sustainable energy to transform societies, grow economies, and reduce the global carbon footprint.

No single source of electricity can provide these amounts and considerably lower greenhouse emissions. A healthy mix of several intermittent and base load options can satisfy these criteria and allow for the economy and society’s prosperity. The top-5 performers in the Energy Trilemma Index by World Energy Council have a combination of both nuclear and renewable resources to balance all three dimensions: equity, security, and environmental sustainability, thus enabling their prosperity and competitiveness. For example, Switzerland has over 30% nuclear, Sweden roughly 40% nuclear, Finland – 18%, and France – over 70% nuclear.

Apart from energy poverty, nuclear can solve other continent problems, from low industrialization to advances in science, healthcare, and agriculture, thus propelling the continent towards the African Union’s Agenda 2063 Master plan, which envisions Africa’s transformation into the global powerhouse of the future. So, we are advocating a diverse energy mix that utilizes all available resources, including renewables and nuclear, to ensure climate resilience and environmental safety, social equity, and supply security.

Can you discuss concretely about the planned nuclear projects in South Africa, Zambia and Egypt? Say why these have still not taken off as planned, the necessary agreements have been signed though?

Our plans for projects in Egypt and Zambia are proceeding at the pace acceptable for both parties. In Egypt, we plan to commission four power units with VVER-1200 type reactors with a capacity of 1200 MW each by 2028. We will also supply nuclear fuel throughout the entire NPP life cycle (60 years), provide training services, and carry out maintenance and repairs within ten years after each unit’s start. With our initial agreement signed in 2015, and necessary infrastructure still being put in place, the El Dabaa project is firmly underway. 

Our project in Zambia, Center for Nuclear Science and Technology, is implemented in several stages, starting with a Multipurpose Irradiation Center. Once the Center is built, a training complex within it will contribute to building capacity in nuclear technology by providing opportunities for training students of different degrees from Bachelor to PhD and carrying out advanced experiments and research that provides a new level of practical competencies. With Zambia being new to nuclear, the installation of infrastructure is the key priority at the moment. 

As for South Africa, we maintain a cordial working relationship with crucial nuclear industry bodies and are monitoring their ambitions to add 2500MW of new nuclear to the grid very closely, but we are not currently engaged in any active nuclear projects. The initial 9600MW nuclear new build program in South Africa was halted in 2017 as a result of internal procedural issues of the country. It is important to note that the 9600MW program did not make it past the Request for Information (RFI) stage, and Rosatom was only one of many vendors interested to bid for the project.  The program was then downsized to 2500MW and restarted in 2020 as the country grapples with power shortages due to an aging coal-fired fleet. 

To what extent, the use of nuclear power safe and secured for Africa? What technical precautions (measures) can you suggest for ensuring nuclear security?

A nuclear power program is a complex undertaking that requires meticulous planning, preparation, and investment in time, institutions, and human resources. The development of such a program does not happen overnight and can take several years to implement. All countries, which embark on the path towards the peaceful use of nuclear technologies, do so by adopting the IAEA Milestone Approach framework. This approach provides newcomer countries with well-structured guidance and a clear to-do list, which gives them a clear understanding of how to safely and effectively implement and manage their civil nuclear program. This approach includes necessary policy and legal framework, human capital development, installation of management and regulatory bodies, implementation of safeguards, and educating the public. 

Since many of our partners are relatively new to the technology, we are able to provide full support to them on their path towards achieving their national nuclear energy programs, this at all of its stages of the project and in full accordance with IAEA regulations. 

Do you also envisage transferring technology by training local specialists and how does this currently look like, how many specialists per year undergoing training in Russia?

The ultimate goal in our projects is to help our partners gain independence in terms of human capital. Still, it will need at least a decade of education and training of many young people and professionals. 

As part of our commitment, we assist our partner countries with training local personnel via a government-sponsored bursary program by the Russian Ministry of Science and Higher Education. Since 2010, hundreds of students from Algeria, Ghana, Egypt, Zambia, Kenya, Nigeria, Tanzania, Uganda, Ethiopia, and South Africa have been receiving nuclear and related education at leading Russian educational institutions. Currently, over 1500 students from Sub-Saharan Africa study in Russia under bachelor, master and post-doc programs, 256 students are on nuclear and related programs. 

Another aspect is short-term training for professionals – managers and specialists in nuclear. The topics of training range from nuclear energy, technology management and technical regulations to safety features of Russian designs in nuclear. 

In your view, why many African countries opting for renewable energy? Is it nuclear power affordable for Africa? With this trend, what is Rosatom’s plan for future cooperation with African countries?

Currently, renewables show the fastest-growing curve in meeting this demand with the solar potential of 10 TW, the hydro of 350 GW, the wind of 110 GW, and the geothermal energy sources of 15 GW. Many are easy to install and demand little in terms of investment. 

However, the critical question regarding these sources is reliability. US Energy Department estimates show that nuclear power plants produce maximum power over 93% of the time during the year. That’s about 1.5 to 2 times more than natural gas and coal units and 2.5 to 3.5 times more reliable than wind and solar plants. To replace a nuclear power plant, one would need two coal or three to four renewable plants of the same size to generate the same amount of electricity onto the grid.

Another critical question is the cost. Most of the funds are needed to during the construction period. Building a large-scale nuclear reactor takes thousands of workers, massive amounts of steel and concrete, thousands of components, and several systems to provide electricity, cooling, ventilation, information, control and communication. However, apart from a reliable source of electricity throughout several decades (from 40 to 60 years minimum), the International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates that the construction of new NPPs is competitive compared to other green energy sources like wind and solar. It is also worth noting such an economic advantage of nuclear power as the electricity cost’s stability and predictability.

Our experience shows substantial dividends for any country that joins the international nuclear community. We are talking about thousands of new jobs, quantum leaps in R&D, and the creation of entirely new sectors of the economy. According to our estimates, US$1 invested in nuclear power plants under the Rosatom project brings in US$ 1.9 to local suppliers, US$4.3 for the country’s GDP, and US$1.4 to the Treasury as tax revenues. 

We have recently calculated even more specific data based on El Dabaa nuclear power station. During the construction period, the NPP project will increase the country’s GDP by over US$4 billion or 1%, bring around US$570 million as tax revenue, and employ over 70% of local personnel. Apart from the NPP itself, Egypt will have a new seaport, several roads, and schools constructed. After the start of operations, over 19% of the population or 20 million people will have access to electricity, and the NPP will prevent over 14 million tons of CO2 emissions annually.

In general, I would like to say that while the capital cost for nuclear energy may be higher, the reliable energy that it produces over its lifespan is very affordable. Beyond this, the inclusion of nuclear energy into the energy mix itself gives a powerful qualitative impetus for the economy, the establishment of high-technology-based industries and, as a result, the growth of export potential and quality of life.

Reference: Rosatom offers integrated clean energy solutions across the nuclear supply chain and beyond. With 70 years’ experience, the company is the world leader in high-performance solutions for all kinds of nuclear power plants. It also works in the segments of wind generation, nuclear medicine, energy storage and others. Products and services of the nuclear industry enterprises are supplied to over 50 countries around the world.

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