Authors: Peter Zeniewski and Tae-Yoon Kim*
Global gas markets, business models and pricing arrangements are all in a state of flux. There is great dynamism, both on demand and supply, but still plenty of questions on what the future might hold and what a new international gas market order might look like. The World Energy Outlook doesn’t have a forecast for what gas markets will look like in 2030 or 2040, but the scenarios and analysis provide some insight into the factors that will shape where things go from here.
The China effect on gas markets
Gas accounts for 7% of China’s energy mix today, well below the global average of 22%. But China is going for gas, and this surge in consumption has largely erased talk of a global gas glut. China’s gas demand expanded by a dramatic 15% in 2017, underpinned by a strong policy push for coal-to-gas switching in industry and buildings as part of the drive to “turn China’s skies blue again” and improve air quality. Liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports grew massively, with China surpassing Korea as the second largest LNG importer in the world. Preliminary data for 2018 suggest similarly strong double-digit growth, putting China well on track to become the world’s largest gas-importing country.
In the IEA’s New Policies Scenario (NPS), the share of gas in China’s energy mix is projected to double to 14% by 2040, and most of the increase is met by imports that reach parity with those to the European Union. Demand for LNG is set to quadruple over the same period, accounting for nearly 30% of global LNG trade flows. China has long driven global trends for oil, coal and, more recently, also for many renewable technologies. The “China effect” on gas markets is now becoming a pivotal element for those working in gas markets; this is a key reason why gas does relatively well in all the WEO scenarios.
There is no such a thing as ‘emerging Asian demand’
While China has been grabbing headlines with its unprecedented growth in demand, other emerging Asian markets – notably India, Southeast Asia and South Asia – are also increasing their presence in the global gas arena. Emerging economies in Asia as a whole account for around half of total global gas demand growth in the NPS: their share of global LNG imports doubles to 60% by 2040.
However, although the region is often dubbed “emerging Asia” as a whole, it is difficult to generalise about its gas prospects. Gas has been a niche fuel in some markets (such as India) while it is well established in some others (parts of Southeast Asia, Pakistan and Bangladesh). While there appears to be plenty of room for further growth in aggregate, with the share of gas in the region’s energy mix at less than 10%, this does not necessarily mean that all emerging Asian markets are poised to follow the path that China is taking. A wide variety of starting points and policy, supply security and infrastructure considerations make each emerging Asian market quite distinct. This requires a much more granular approach to understand the outlook for gas across this region.
Economics and policies need to be aligned for gas to grow
The case for gas can be compelling for countries that have significant resources within relatively easy reach, such as those in the Middle East or in much of North America. In these countries, there is scope for gas to displace or outcompete other fuels purely on economic grounds. However, the commercial case for gas looks weaker in many parts of emerging Asia, a key source of demand growth in our projections to 2040. Gas needs to be imported and transportation costs are significant; competition is formidable from amply available coal and renewables; gas infrastructure is often not yet in place in many cases; and consumers and policy makers are sensitive to questions of affordability.
Gas can be a good match for the developing world’s fast-growing urban areas, generating heat, power and mobility with fewer CO2 and local pollutant emissions than coal or oil. In carbon-intensive systems or sectors, it can play an important role in accelerating energy transitions. But – as China has shown – economic drivers need to be supplemented by a favourable policy environment if gas is to thrive. Without such a strategic choice in favour of gas, the fuel could be pushed to the margins by cheaper alternatives.
The main growth sector is no longer power
For now, power generation is the largest gas-consuming sector. Gas has some important advantages for power generation, notably the relatively low capital costs of new plants and the ability to ramp generation up and down quickly – an important attribute in systems that are increasingly rich in solar and wind power. But this is also the sector in which competition is most formidable; lower-cost renewables and the rise of other technologies for short-term market balancing – including energy storage – diminish the prospects for gas growth in the power sector, particularly in the Sustainable Development Scenario (SDS). A similar dynamic is visible in the use of gas to provide heat in buildings, where prospects are constrained by electrification and energy efficiency.
The largest increase in gas demand in the New Policies Scenario is projected to come from industry. Where gas is available, it is well suited to meeting industrial demand. Competition from renewables is more limited, especially for provision of high-temperature heat. Gas typically beats oil on price, and is preferred to coal for convenience (once the infrastructure is in place) as well on environmental grounds. Gas demand in industry is also projected to be more resilient in the SDS than power generation, where demand is far more sensitive to growth of renewables.
The rise of industrial demand in gas importing countries can provide the sort of reliable, ‘baseload’ demand that can underpin new upstream and infrastructure developments around the world. However, it also means less flexibility to respond to fluctuations in price, as industrial consumers can rarely switch to other fuels if gas prices rise, while power systems typically are more responsive and flexible in modulating their fuel mix.
The risk of market tightening in the 2020s has eased, as competition for new gas supply heats up
There was a distinct lull in new LNG project approvals for three years from 2015, but a pickup in approvals in the second half of 2018, led by a major new project on Canada’s west coast, is easing the risk of an abrupt tightening in gas markets around the mid-2020s.
Qatar is among the frontrunners developing new low-cost export capacity, based on its huge potential to tap into liquids-rich gas and leverage its vast existing infrastructure complex at Ras Laffan. But there is a long list of other potential export projects around the world, from the Russian Arctic to East Africa.
The extraordinary growth of shale output means that, by 2025, one in every four cubic metres of gas produced worldwide is projected to come from the United States. With a large number of proposed LNG export projects, the United States is likely to become a cost benchmark for a diverse set of countries looking to expand or announce their presence in international gas markets. International gas supply in the past has been quite concentrated, dominated by a major pipeline exporter (Russia) and a single giant of LNG (Qatar). Supply in the future looks increasingly diverse and competitive, with LNG taking an increasing share of long-distance trade.
LNG is changing the business of trading gas …
The ramp up of new destination-flexible, hub-priced LNG supplies coming out of the United States is providing a catalyst for change in the global gas market. For decades, international gas trade (both pipeline gas and LNG) was dominated by point-to-point deliveries of gas sold under long-term oil-indexed contracts between integrated gas suppliers and monopoly utility buyers.
This model has been under pressure for some time and is now changing quickly, with a host of new market players positioning themselves between buyers and sellers. Larger portfolio players in particular are growing in importance, contracting capacity at liquefaction and regasification terminals around the world, to service a diverse range of offtake contracts across multiple markets. Smaller independents and trading houses are also emerging, taking open positions in the market, buying and selling single cargoes to take advantage of arbitrage opportunities.
European and Asian utilities have meanwhile developed their own trading capabilities, evolving away from their traditional role as passive off-takers. This expanding middle ground between buyers and sellers has helped to underpin the growth of spot LNG sales, allowing for the re-selling, swapping or redirecting of cargoes, utilising a wide variety of short- and long-term contracts.
…but don’t write off traditional long-term contracts
These recent trends do not necessarily imply the end of long-term contracting for new supply: new projects remain huge multi-billion dollar investments that require significant commitments, and there are buyers who stand ready to sign up for guaranteed long-term deliveries: in 2018, Chinese buyers alone signed long-term contracts for around 10 million tonnes per annum. Other established buyers such as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan are likely to continue to source gas via long-term contracts.
For buyers in emerging markets, the relative attractiveness of purchasing LNG on the spot market or via short- or long-term contracts depends to a large extent on the anticipated evolution of gas demand in their domestic market, and the associated appetite to take on supply and price risk. A high level of reliance on the spot market or short-term deals implies greater exposure to price volatility as well as competition with distant markets that may be willing to pay more for gas. Import portfolios in emerging markets are therefore likely to feature a balance of firm, flexible and uncontracted gas in order to match the price and volume sensitivity of a relatively uncertain demand profile.
Not all gas is created equal
Suppliers could do much more to bolster the environmental case for gas by lowering the indirect emissions involved in extracting, processing and transporting it to consumers. In WEO-2018, a first comprehensive analysis of these indirect emissions shows that, on average, they represent around a quarter of the full lifecycle emissions from natural gas. There is also a very large spread between the lowest and the highest-emitting sources. Switching from consuming the most emissions-intensive gas to the least emissions-intensive gas would reduce emissions from gas consumption by nearly 30%, equivalent to upgrading from a traditional to a new condensing gas boiler.
This analysis doesn’t change our conclusion that, in all but the very worst cases, using gas brings environmental benefits compared with coal. But there are ways to improve the picture and, in our view, producers who can demonstrate that they have minimised these indirect emissions are likely to have an advantage.
Eliminating methane leaks – especially via regular leak detection and repair programmes – and cutting back routine flaring are some of the most cost-effective measures. In fact, many methane-reduction measures could actually end up saving money. Operators are also starting to look at electrifying upstream and liquefaction operations using low-carbon electricity. Finally, investment in hydrogen and biomethane could reduce or bypass emissions and make today’s gas infrastructure more compatible with a low-emissions future.
The gas security debate is changing
We are beginning to see the contours of a new, more globalised gas market, in which gas takes on more of the features of a standard commodity. This environment creates a new context for assessing security. While the reliability of cross-border pipeline gas continues to form a crucial part of the energy security equation, the flexibility and responsiveness of global LNG supplies are becoming increasingly important indicators (as highlighted in the IEA’s Global Gas Security Review series).
As LNG supplies lead to more interconnected markets, local supply and demand shocks have greater potential to reverberate globally (as they do in oil markets). The extent to which LNG can adequately respond to such shocks becomes a responsibility that extends beyond governments and monopoly energy suppliers, to portfolio players, traders and shippers. Moreover, the evolving premium among some consumers for greater flexibility, while in some respects positive for security, also contributes to a disconnect between buyer preferences for short-term contracts and seller requirements for long-term commitments to underpin major new infrastructure projects; this could raise questions about the timing and adequacy of investment.
Gas markets are changing: some of today’s hazards might recede but policy-makers and analysts need to be constantly aware of new risks.
*Tae-Yoon Kim, WEO Energy Analyst
Bids open for Somalia’s first-ever oil block licensing round
Somalia has announced that it is opening licensing rounds for seven offshore oil blocks. This comes days after the Federal Government of Somalia approved the board members of the newly established Somali Petroleum Authority (SPA), which will serve to be the regulatory body of Somalia’s oil and gas industry.
Somalia’s Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources Abdirashid M. Ahmed stated that the establishment of a regulator leadership is the first critical step of the implementation of Somalia’s petroleum law which was passed earlier this year and signed by President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed “Farmaajo”.
The Petroleum Law asserts that the regulatory body serves to design a financial and managerial system that fosters international competition and investment into Somalia’s oil and gas industry. While also ensuring the citizens of Somalia, and the Federal Member States see their fair share of oil and gas revenue based on the revenue-sharing agreement.
Somalia has been plagued with civil war, drought and famine for nearly three decades, tapping into Somalia’s vast oil reserves which are estimated to be approximately 30 billion barrels would greatly contribute to the rebuilding and the development of the country’s infrastructure, security, and the economic and social sectors. Exploration for oil in the East African nation started well before the nations collapse in 1991. ExxonMobil and Shell previously had rights to five offshore oil blocks in Somalia and has recently renewed its previous lease agreement with the government of Somalia. Both companies have agreed to pay $1.7 million per month in rent for the leased offshore blocks.
The Office of Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources stated that the 7 blocks which are up for bidding process are among “the most prospective areas for hydrocarbon exploration and production in Somalia”
The licensing round will take place between August 4th, 2020, and March 12th, 2021.
Armenia’s attack against Tovuz is also an attack against Europe’s energy security
The recent escalation of tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan, this time along the international border in the direction of the Tovuz district of Azerbaijan in the aftermath of an armed attack launched by Armenia on July12–14, 2020,had been brewing for some time before finally boiling over into full-fledged military clashes, the worst in recent years, that caused causalities and destruction on both sides. Azerbaijan lost more than 10 servicemen, including one general and a 76-year-old civilian. There are many reasons why this attack happened in this particular border area (and not along the Line of Contact, as usual) and at this particular time, but in this piece I want specifically to focus on one of them and, in concurrence with other internationally recognized scholars in this field, assert that this attack against Azerbaijan should be considered as an attack against Europe’s energy security and well-being.
To begin, a brief review of the history of recent developments in conflict resolution testifies that, although the year 2019 was relatively incident free along the Line of Contact between the Armed Forces of Armenia and Azerbaijan, and for the first time in many years mutual visits of journalists took pace, the year was also identified as the “lost year for the conflict settlement” owing to the lack of progress in the negotiations. This absence of progress was accompanied by incendiary rhetoric employed by Armenia’s Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan who, having ascended to power on the back of the many alluring promises of the so-called “Velvet Revolution,” found himself grappling to deliver on those ambitious reform pledges. The harbingers of heightening hostility were seen in Pashinyan’s infamous declaration during the pan-Armenian games held in Khankendi on August 5,2019, when he said that “Nagorno-Karabakh is Armenia, and that is all;” as well as his continuous insistence on changing the negotiation format –already established by the relevant decisions of the OSCE –to include representatives of the puppet regime in the occupied Nagorno-Karabakh region as an independent party to the peace negotiations.
The year 2020 started off with the January meeting of the Foreign Ministers in Geneva, and in April and June two virtual meetings were held because of COVID-19 lockdowns; however, hopes for any positive progress quickly subsided in the wake of other negative developments. The so-called “parliamentary and presidential elections” that were held by Armenia in the occupied Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan on March31, 2020, were condemned by the international community. These mock elections later culminated in the Shusha provocation,in which the “newly elected president” of the puppet regime in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan was “inaugurated” in Shusha – a city that carries great moral significance for Azerbaijan. The last straw in a hostile build-up was the denial by Pashinyan of Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s comments about a staged, step-by-step solution to the conflict; Pashinyan denied that this was ever the subject of negotiations. The very recent threats by the Armenian Ministry of Defense, which publicly threatened “to occupy new advantageous positions” in Azerbaijan, further testified to the increasingly militaristic mood among Armenia’s upper echelons.
This litany of discouraging events relating to the peace process over the last year and a half in some ways heralded what we witnessed on July12–14, 2020.This attack against Azerbaijan along the international border between Armenia and Azerbaijan reflects the deep frustration of the Pashinyan regime in its inability to bring about the promised changes. Economic problems were heightened by the COVID-19-induced challenge and decreasing foreign assistance, and this was all happening against the backdrop of Azerbaijan’s increasing successes domestically, economically and internationally. Azerbaijan has long been established as an important provider of energy security and sustainable development for Europe through the energy projects that it is implementing together with its international partners. The Baku–Tbilisi–Supsa Western Export (1998) and Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (2005) oil pipelines and Baku–Tbilisi–Erzurum (2006) gas pipeline have enhanced Azerbaijan’s role as an energy producing and exporting country, and the Southern Gas Corridor (SGC) is already becoming a reality. This 3500-km-long Corridor comprises four segments – the Shah Deniz-II project, Southern Caucasus Pipeline Extension (SCPX), Trans Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP) and its final portion, the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP). The Corridor passes through seven countries – Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey, Bulgaria, Greece, Albania and Italy – with Italy being the final destination receiving Caspian gas. Turkey is already receiving gas via TANAP and is contracted to accept up to 6 billion cubic meters of gas via this pipeline. Europe is expected to receive 10 billion cubic meters of Azerbaijani gas per year, and the first gas has already arrived on Albanian territory. The SGC is scheduled to be fully operational by fall 2020 and TAP is almost complete. Things are progressing uninhibitedly and even the COVID-19 pandemic has been unable topreventthe success of the SGC. This Corridor stands as one of the guarantors of Europe’s energy security by providing diversification of energy sources and routes, even despite Europe’s Green Deal, which also acknowledges the continent’s long-term demand for gas.
Such critical infrastructure, vital for Europe’s energy security, passes close to the border area that includes the Tovuz district attacked by the Armed Forces of the Republic of Armenia on July12–14. Armenia is the only country in the South Caucasus that is isolated from these regional energy projects owing to its policy of expansion and occupation. It is thus the only country that does not have anything to losefrom creating chaos and destruction around this critical energy infrastructure. Jealousy and the feeling of self-imposed isolation from all regional cooperation initiatives have no doubt increased Armenia’s hostility toward these energy projects. Further vivid evidence of Armenia’s belligerence against Azerbaijan’s energy infrastructure was provided by its threat to attack the Mingachevir Dam, a civilian infrastructure project that is also a vital component of Azerbaijan’s largest hydroelectric power plant. Hydroelectric power comprises the largest component in Azerbaijan’s renewable energy potential, today standing at around 17–18%ofthe overall energy balance of the country. It is not difficult to imagine the magnitude of civilian causalities in case such a destruction materializes.
By conducting this act of aggression against Azerbaijan along the international border in the direction of Tovuz, Armenia wanted firstly, to divert attention from its own internal problems. Secondly, the regime desired to disguise its failures on the international front, especially recently when Azerbaijan initiated the summoning of a special session of the United Nations General Assembly related to COVID-19,convened on July 10, that was supported by more than 130 members of the UN. Thirdly, Armenia wanted to drag in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) against Azerbaijan by invoking Article 4, which states: “… if one of the States Parties is subjected to aggression by any state or group of states, then this will be considered as aggression against all States Parties to this Treaty…”.Fourthly, and the central thesis of this article, Armenia intended to target critical energy infrastructure implemented by Azerbaijan and its international partners, thereby jeopardizing the energy security of not only the neighboring region, but also of the greater European continent. The aforementioned existing oil and gas infrastructure aside, the SGC is set to be fully operational by fall 2020, and this multibillion-dollar megaproject offers economic, social and many other benefits to all participating countries involved in the construction and implementation of this project. Any damage to this critical infrastructure would deal a heavy blow to the current and future sustainable development of Europe.
Europe must therefore be vigilant regarding such provocations. International actors, including the European Union,OSCE Minsk Group, United Nations, United States, and the Russian Federation, called for an immediate cessation of hostilities between Armenia and Azerbaijan. However, given what is at stake,including this time the crucial energy infrastructure, had Armenia’sattack not been proportionately parried by the Azerbaijani Armed Forces, the statement made by the European Union about this recent military attack could have contained stronger language beyond just “…urging both sides to stop the armed confrontation, refrain from action and rhetoric that provoke tension, and undertake immediate measures to prevent further escalation… .” Naming and shaming the aggressor appropriately is indispensable in this situation. As Mr. Hikmat Hajiyev, Head of Foreign Policy Department of the Presidential Administration and Adviser to the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan on Foreign Affairs, also noted: “the EU should distinguish between the aggressor and the subject of aggression.”
In the 21st century, the international community should not tolerate such flagrant violations of international law; disrespect of UN Security Council resolutions (822, 853, 874, and 884) and other relevant international documents calling for an end to the occupation of Azerbaijani territories; and the feeling of impunity in instigating an attack against a sovereign state, a neighbor, and a crucial player in the realization of critical energy infrastructure projects key to Europe’s own energy security. Azerbaijan has long put up with such aggression and the occupation of its internationally recognized territories in Nagorno-Karabakh region and seven adjacent districts, and has opted for negotiations toward a peaceful solution of the conflict. Yet the aggressor cannot be allowed to continue its attacks against other parts of Azerbaijan– this time Tovuz –thereby jeopardizing not only the latter, but also energy security and sustainable development of the greater European continent just because such provocations seem to offer an escape from the regime’s domestic and external problems. Such practices should be condemned in the strongest possible terms. This should be done not only for the sake of Azerbaijan and regional security in the South Caucasus, but in the name of Europe’s own energy security and well-being.
Palestine Plays Regional Power Politics with Proposed Energy Deal
When Faed Mustafa, Palestine’s ambassador in Ankara, expressed interest in June in negotiating with Turkey an agreement on the delineation of maritime boundaries in the eastern Mediterranean and cooperating on the exploitation of natural resources, he was repositioning Palestine in the larger struggle for regional dominance and the future of his state.
“We also have rights in the Mediterranean. Palestine has shares in oil and gas located in the eastern Mediterranean. We are ready to cooperate in these areas and sign a deal,” Mr. Mustafa said.
Mr. Mustafa did not spell it out, but Palestine would bring the Gaza Marine gas deposit, 36 kilometers off the Gazan coast, to the table. Discovered in 1999, the field, believed to have reserves of 31 billion cubic meters, remains unexplored as a result of multiple armed Israeli-Palestinian clashes, Israeli obstruction, and repeated changes in the consortium that would have ultimately exploited the field.
Palestine’s efforts to hook up with Turkey, at a time when relations with Israel have all but broken down, coincide with stepped up Israeli attempts to stymie Turkish inroads in Palestine paved by support for activists in Jerusalem and funding of historic and cultural facilities, in the wake of US President Donald J. Trump’s 2018 recognition of the city as Israel’s capital.
The Palestinian move also is a ploy to counter several steps taken by the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia to confront Turkey in Jerusalem and the eastern Mediterranean, facilitate a US plan to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict that endorses annexation, and influence the succession of ailing 84-year old Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas.
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan vowed last week in a speech celebrating the change of status of Istanbul’s Hagia Sofia – originally built as a Greek Orthodox church in 537 AD, then renovated into a mosque before becoming a museum by the founder of the Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, in 1935 – to a mosque once again this month, that it would be “the harbinger of the liberation of the Al-Aqsa mosque.”
Al-Aqsa on the Harm-e-Sharif or Temple Mount in Jerusalem is Islam’s third holiest shrine. Backed by Israel, Saudi Arabia has sought to muscle its way into the Jordanian-controlled endowment that administers the Harm-e-Sharif.
A Palestine hook-up with Turkey could complicate Palestinian membership of the East Mediterranean Gas Forum, dubbed the OPEC of Mediterranean gas, that also includes Egypt, Cyprus, Greece, Israel, Italy, and Jordan. France has applied for membership in the Cairo-based grouping while the United States is seeking observer status.
Founded in January and backed by the UAE, the Forum is virulently opposed to Turkish attempts to redraw the maritime boundaries in the region on the back of an agreement with Libya. Turkey refused to join the Forum.
While it is unlikely that the Gaza field will be operational any time soon, production would reduce Palestinian dependence on Israel. Palestinian officials said early this year that they were discussing with Israel an extension of Israeli pipelines to send gas from Israeli gas fields to Palestine but that the talks, contrary to Israeli assertions, did not include development of the Gaza field.
In a twist of irony, Qatar, the UAE’s nemesis, would support a pipeline agreement by guaranteeing Palestinian payments for the gas. The Israeli pipeline along a 40-kilometer route adjacent to the Gaza border with three pumping stations would enable Gaza to operate a 400 MW power plant in a region that has, at the best of times, an energy supply of 15 hours a day.
The status of the talks remains unclear given an apparent delay of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s annexation plans amid international condemnation and US insistence that the Israeli leader postpone his move that had been scheduled for July 1.
Qatar reportedly threatened to cut off millions of dollars in aid to Gaza, provided in coordination with the Israeli government, if the Jewish state pressed ahead with annexation.
In June, Israel approved the transfer of US$50 million from Qatar to Gaza in a bid to dial back mounting tension with militants in the Strip that could spark renewed military confrontation as both Israel and Palestine struggle to get a grip on the coronavirus.
Some Palestinian analysts see the pipeline deal as an attempt by the Palestine Authority (PA) to enhance its influence in Gaza and undermine Hamas – its Islamist rival that controls the Strip – by a significant contribution to a surge in the power supply and a dramatic reduction of the cost of electricity. The risk, these analysts say, is that the pipeline would increase Palestinian dependence on Israel.
Economist Nasr Abdel Karim argued that Israel would only allow enhanced flows of gas, including from the Gaza field, if it leads to an even deeper split between the territory and the West Bank.
“Israel will not allow the Palestinians to benefit from the gas field for economic and political reasons. Israel might allow this in one case — if this plan is part of a bigger project to develop Gaza’s economy so that it splits from the PA and the West Bank,” Mr. Abdel Karim said.
Author’s note: An initial version of this story was first published in Inside Arabia
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