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Will the Malthouse compromise work?

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On January 15, the British MPs cast their ballots on the Agreement on the British Withdrawal from the EU, which Theresa May had reached with Brussels – “Plan A”. The government lost the vote. On January 29 they voted on the government ‘s “plan B”. In fact, the Cabinet did not suggest anything new, having added a number of concessions for EU citizens in Britain, and abolishing the registration fee for them. In turn, the MPs proposed more than a dozen amendments, of which the Speaker of the House of Commons, J. Berkow, selected but a few. If we are to  understand the intricate mechanism of British politics, as well as the events to come, we must analyze some. Britain’s exit from the EU, according to the law, is scheduled for March 29, 2019.

Significantly, the deputies are divided not only by party affiliation – they create interparty alliances of Brexiteers and Bremainers. Quite frequently they call into question the “party’s general line”, thereby breaking the party discipline. Hence the amendments which reflect acute disagreements in the leading parties whose leaders maneuver between warring factions in their parties.

The opposition leader in parliament, J. Corbin, has proposed excluding a “catastrophic” exit of Britain from the EU without an agreement. His plan is to consider an alternative scenario – a permanent Customs Union with the EU and the option of participation in the EU Common Market, as well as to adopt a law on a referendum in which people will vote on a deal or a proposal that will gain the majority in parliament.

The main point of the amendment proposed by Conservative D. Greve, the former attorney general, was to put the alternatives to T. May’s plan to vote on March 26: the Labors’ plan, a second referendum, an exit “without a deal”, and the “Norwegian version” of relations with the EU. The amendment was supported by some Labor backbenchers and a number of deputies from other opposition parties (Liberal Democrats, the Green Party, Plaid Cymru).

The amendment by Caroline Spelman (Conservative) and J. Dromy (Labor) opposed Britain’s withdrawal from the EU “without the Exit Agreement and the Political Declaration” (but gave no details or specify how to achieve that).

The amendment by Labor I. Cooper and Conservative N. Bols suggested postponing Britain’s exit from the EU till December 31, 2019 (that is, to extend Article 50), if the deputies failed to approve the “deal” of the Prime Minister until the end of February. Such a measure would require the consent of Brussels. This amendment was supported by some Tory backbenchers and several deputies from other opposition parties. The Labor leadership also supported the Cooper Amendment, obliging its deputies to vote in its favor, but wished to cut the term of the extension of Article 50.

Labor MPs from constituencies who voted for Brexit were very dissatisfied about the amendment but it enjoyed the support of those in favor of the second referendum and opponents to exit without a deal (from both parties). However, critics from among the Conservatives argued that the amendment would only postpone the decision indefinitely. In fact, the amendment led to the empowerment of parliament to control the Brexit if the transaction did not take place. Journalists described it as a “legislative torpedo”, which deprives the government of the most important power – to formulate the agenda of parliament. As stated in the House of Commons by T. May, the Greve and Cooper amendments represent a “mechanism for usurping the proper role of the executive branch”, which will lead to “far-reaching long-term consequences for the government of the United Kingdom”. She has a good point here.

The opposite point was suggested by the amendment of G. Brady, the head of the 1922 Committee (which brings together Tory backbenchers). As is known, the stumbling block towards the approval of the Agreement with Brussels became so-called “additional guarantees” (backstop) – the provision that the entire territory of the UK will remain in the EU Customs Union until the issue of border regime between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland is settled. It is a kind of “safety valve” against the violation of the 1998 Belfast Agreement on the settlement of the conflict in Ulster between Unionists (Protestants) and Irish Republicans (Catholics). The border should be open, while the exit of Britain from the EU implies its closure (Ireland is a member of the EU, Northern Ireland is part of the United Kingdom). The problem is akin to the quadrature of the circle, so  Brexiteers fear that Britain, under the Agreement with the EU, may remain in the EU Customs Union indefinitely long without the right to unilateral exit or the right to conclude trade agreements with third countries. The latter is one of the most important goals of Brexit.

The Brady Amendment proposed replacing “additional guarantees” with the phrase “alternative arrangements to avoid border closure” as an extra clause to the Agreement. Conservative Brexiteers saw the wording as too vague, doing nothing to lift their concerns about the Agreement. Brexiters from the European Studies Group (led by J. Rees-Mogg) opposed the amendment. However, Brexiteer B. Johnson and others were ready to support the Brady Amendment if T. May would be willing to force the EU to “cut open” the Agreement in order to make legally binding changes, which was significant. However, he withdrew his objections.

The Prime Minister advised the faction to vote in favor of this amendment, which would empower it to negotiate with the EU on this issue. Consequently, T. May got off the ground and supported the amendment, which crossed out her agreements with the EU. The party believes that she should have warned Brussels  long ago that “additional guarantees” had no chance to sail through parliament.

Political maneuvering amidst the Conservatives in relation to the Brady Amendment suggested that, by supporting it, the Brexiteers would gain a few weeks, and will then fail the agreement with the EU again – in February.

The Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) deputies, whose support is crucial for the minority government of T. May, were ready to vote for the Brady Amendment: according to their logic, refusing to exit without a deal (under the Cooper Amendment) means bringing the exit closer.

Thus, the Conservatives are divided on the issue of the degree of intensity of ties with the EU in case of exit, whereas the Labor are split on whether to withdraw from the EU at all. None of the amendments, if successful, obliged the government to anything but would impose political obligations on the Prime Minister. The exception is the amendment of I. Cooper – if approved and followed by the adoption of the relevant law, the government would be obliged to obey the law.

VOTING RESULTS: J. Corbin’s amendment rejected (327: 296), Greve’s amendment rejected (321: 301), Cooper’s amendment not adopted (321: 298), since several Labor voted against their party’s policy and the pound sterling rate dropped, the Spelman-Dromy Amendment accepted (318: 310), the Brady Amendment adopted (317: 301).

Since T. May opted for siding with the Brexiteers and supported the Brady Amendment, she formally won, but her success was a Pyrrhic victory. The majority in parliament opposed exit without a deal (the Spelman-Dromy Amendment), which weakens London’s negotiating positions with Brussels (not only because of the results of the 2016 referendum, but also because, as it became clear recently, T. May does not want to rule out exit without a deal).

Thus, the chaos in parliament has manifested itself: the deputies voted for two mutually exclusive amendments – against exit without a deal and for adjusting the Agreement (which the EU refuses to do), thereby paving the way for exiting without a deal (exit without a deal is impossible, but the deal is impossible to accept while changing it is not what Brussels is willing to do). The European Commission Chairman stated: “The agreement is not subject to revision. It seems that some expect the remaining 27 member states to give up on the “additional guarantees” and on Ireland, but this is not a game, but the core of EU membership. The border of Ireland is the border of Europe – that is the priority of our union ”.

The recent voting does not close the chapter on Brexit. According to media reports, the warring factions of Brexiteers and Bremainers in the Tory parliamentary faction have reached an agreement – the so-called “Malthouse compromise” (after the name of a deputy). J. Ries-Mogg and S. Baker of the European Studies Group (the Brexiteer stronghold), together with Deputy Minister of Housing K. Malthouse, agreed with the Bremainers that T. May would first go to Brussels to seek a new wording for “additional guarantees”(on the basis of non-existing  barrier-free checks at the border). If the attempt fails, May will request the EU to extend the transition period until December 31, 2021. In exchange, Britain will fulfill its financial obligations and undertakes to respect the rights of EU citizens in the UK. Such an arrangement will enable both sides to prepare for the withdrawal of Britain from the EU on WTO rules in late 2021.

However, this “Plan B” (which served the interests of a fragile peace in the Conservative camp) has already been described by Brussels as a trick.

It appears that J. Blackford, the leader of the Scottish nationalists in the House of Commons, has expressed the hidden desire of the Brexiteers: readiness to sacrifice Northern Ireland. The Conservatives “tore to shreds” the Belfast Agreement, rejecting an open border with Ireland.

According to the Guardian: “A fairly dubious type of a compromise plan that does not offer a compromise … The new Malthouse Doctrine actually has the same misconceptions of hardline Brexteers, but in disguise. The Prime Minister proposes that the backbenchers vote against their agreements with Brussels so that she could return to Brussels to ask what she knows she will be denied.

May, having voted for the Brady Amendment, has de facto spoken out against her own brainchild in order to stay balancing on the edge of confrontation between the two factions in her party and not hold early elections. The Conservatives do not want to allow for even a fraction of a chance for a victory of Labor, led by ultra-leftist J. Corbin, although the leading opposition party in the country is also split.

Against the backdrop of political battles, businesses have expressed extreme frustration over the continuing uncertainty. Voters are furious over the work of the deputies: according to a survey, the percentage of voters who have voiced their outcry in connection with the situation exceeds 70%, regardless of what they think about Brexit, or their place of residence (city, village).

The political crisis continues.

First published in our partner International Affairs

Head of the Center for British Studies at the Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences (IE RAS), International Affairs observer

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Europe

Europe tells Biden “no way” to Cold War with China

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Amidst the first big transatlantic tensions for the Biden Administration, a new poll shows that the majority of Europeans see a new Cold War happening between the United States and China, but they don’t see themselves as a part of it.

Overwhelmingly, 62% of Europeans believe that the US is engaged in a new Cold War against China, a new poll just released by the European Council on Foreign Relations found. Just yesterday US President Joe Biden claimed before the UN General Assembly that there is no such thing and the US is not engaging in a new Cold War. So, Europeans see Biden’s bluff and call him on it.

The study was released on Wednesday by Mark Leonard and Ivan Krastev at the European Council on Foreign Relations and found that Europeans don’t see themselves as direct participants in the US-China Cold War. This viewpoint is most pronounced in Bulgaria, Hungary, Austria, Portugal and Italy, according to the study. The prevailing view, in each of the 12 surveyed EU member states, is one of irrelevance – with respondents in Hungary (91%), Bulgaria (80%), Portugal (79%), and Austria (78%) saying that their country is not in a conflict with Beijing.

Only 15% of Europeans believe that the EU is engaged in a Cold War against China. The percentage is so low that one wonders if there should even be such a question. It is not only not a priority, it is not even a question on the agenda for Europeans. Even at the highest point of EU “hawkishness”, only 33% of Swedes hold the view that their country is currently in a Cold War with China.  Leonard and Krastev warn that if Washington and Brussels are preparing for an all-in generational struggle against China, this runs against the grain of opinion in Europe, and leaders in Washington and Brussels will quickly discover that they “do not have a societal consensus behind them”.

“The European public thinks there is a new cold war – but they don’t want to have anything to do with it. Our polling reveals that a “cold war” framing risks alienating European voters”, Mark Leonard said.

The EU doesn’t have the backing of its citizens to follow the US in its new Cold War pursuit. But unlike the views of the authors of the study, my view is that this is not a transatlantic rift that we actually have to be trying to fix. Biden’s China policy won’t be Europe’s China policy, and that’s that, despite US efforts to persuade Europe to follow, as I’ve argued months ago for the Brussels Report and in Modern Diplomacy.

In March this year, Gallup released a poll that showed that 45% of Americans see China as the greatest US enemy. The poll did not frame the question as Cold War but it can be argued that Joe Biden has some mandate derived from the opinion of American people. That is not the case for Europe at all, to the extent that most of us don’t see “China as an enemy” even as a relevant question.

The US’s China pursuit is already giving horrible for the US results in Europe, as French President Macron withdrew the French Ambassador to the US. The US made a deal already in June, as a part of the trilateral partnership with the UK and Australia, and stabbed France in the back months ago to Macron’s last-minute surprise last week. Max Boot at the Council on Foreign Relations argues that it is Macron that is actually arrogant to expect that commitments and deals should mean something: “Back in February, Macron rejected the idea of a U.S.-E.U. common front against China. Now he complains when America pursues its own strategy against China. What’s French for chutzpah?” What Boot does get right is that indeed, there won’t be a joint US-EU front on China, and European citizens also don’t want this, as the recent poll has made clear.

The US saying Europe should follow the US into a Cold War with China over human rights is the same thing as China saying that Europe should start a Cold War with the US over the bad US human rights record. It’s not going to happen. You have to understand that this is how ridiculous the proposition sounds to us, Europeans. Leonard and Krastev urge the EU leadership to “make the case for more assertive policies” towards China around European and national interests rather than a Cold War logic, so that they can sell a strong, united, and compelling case for the future of the Atlantic alliance to European citizens.

I am not sure that I agree, as “more assertive policies” and “cold war” is probably the same thing in the mind of most Europeans and I don’t think that the nuance helps here or matters at all. Leaders like Biden argue anyway that the US is not really pursuing a Cold War. The authors caution EU leaders against adopting a “cold war” framing. You say “framing”, I say “spin”. Should we be in engaging in spins at all to sell unnecessary conflict to EU citizens only to please the US?

Unlike during the first cold war, [Europeans] do not see an immediate, existential threat”, Leonard clarified. European politicians can no longer rely on tensions with China to convince the electorate of the value of transatlantic relations. “Instead, they need to make the case from European interests, showing how a rebalanced alliance can empower and restore sovereignty to European citizens in a dangerous world”, Mark Leonard added. The study shows that there is a growing “disconnect” between the policy ambitions of those in Brussels and how Europeans think. EU citizens should stick to their sentiments and not be convinced to look for conflict where it doesn’t exist, or change what they see and hear with their own eyes and ears in favor of elusive things like the transatlantic partnership, which the US itself doesn’t believe in anyways. And the last thing that should be done is to scare Europeans by convincing them they live in a “dangerous world” and China is the biggest threat or concern.

What the study makes clear is that a Cold War framing against China is likely to repel more EU voters than it attracts, and if there is one thing that politicians know it is that you have to listen to the polls in what your people are telling you instead of engaging in spins. Those that don’t listen in advance get the signs eventually. At the end of the day it’s not important what Biden wants.

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Germany and its Neo-imperial quest

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In January 2021, eight months ago, when rumours about the possibility of appointment of Christian Schmidt as the High Representative in Bosnia occurred for the first time, I published the text under the title ‘Has Germany Lost Its NATO Compass?’. In this text I announced that Schmidt was appointed to help Dragan Čović, the leader of the Croatian HDZ party, to disrupt the constitutional structure of Bosnia-Herzegovina and create precoditions for secession of the Serb- and Croatian-held territories in Bosnia and the country’s final dissolution. I can hardly add anything new to it, except for the fact that Schmidt’s recent statements at the conference of Deutsche Atlantische Gesellschaft have fully confirmed my claims that his role in Bosnia is to act as Čović’s ally in the latter’s attempts to carve up the Bosnian Constitution.

Schmidt is a person with a heavy burden, the burden of a man who has continuously been promoting Croatian interests, for which the Croatian state decorated him with the medal of “Ante Starčević”, which, in his own words, he “proudly wears” and shares with several Croatian convicted war criminals who participated in the 1992-1995 aggression on Bosnia, whom Schmidt obviously perceives as his ideological brethren. The question is, then, why Germany appointed him as the High Representative in Bosnia? 

Germany’s policy towards Bosnia, exercised mostly through the institutions of the European Union, has continuously been based on the concept of Bosnia’s ethnic partition. The phrases that we can occassionaly hear from the EU, on inviolability of state boundaries in the Balkans, is just a rhetoric adapted to the demands by the United States to keep these boundaries intact. So far, these boundaries have remained intact mainly due to the US efforts to preserve them. However, from the notorious Lisbon Conference in February 1992 to the present day, the European Union has always officially stood behind the idea that Bosnia-Herzegovina should be partitioned along ethnic lines. At the Lisbon Conference, Lord Carrington and Jose Cutileiro, the official representatives of the then European Community, which has in the meantime been rebranded as the European Union, drew the maps with lines of ethnic partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina, along which the ethnic cleansing was committed, with 100.000 killed and 1,000.000 expelled, so as to make its territory compatible with their maps. Neither Germany nor the European Union have ever distanced themselves from the idea they promoted and imposed at the Lisbon Conference as ‘the only possible solution’ for Bosnia, despite the grave consequences that followed. Nor has this idea ever stopped being a must within their foreign policy circles, as it has recently been demonstrated by the so-called Janša Non-Paper, launched a couple of months ago, which also advocates the final partition and dissolution of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Such a plan is probably a product of the powerful right-wing circles in the European institutions, such as Schmidt’s CSU, rather than a homework of Janez Janša, the current Prime Minister of Slovenia, whose party is a part of these circles, albeit a minor one. To be sure, Germany is not the original author of the idea of Bosnia’s partition, this author is Great Britain, which launched it directly through Lord Carrington at the Lisbon Conference. Yet, Germany has never shown a will to distance itself from this idea, nor has it done the European Union. Moreover, the appointment of Schmidt, as a member of those political circles which promote ethnic partition as the only solution for multiethnic countries, testifies to the fact that Germany has decided to fully apply this idea and act as its chief promoter.

In this process, the neighbouring countries, Serbia and Croatia, with their extreme nationalist policies, can only act as the EU’s proxies, in charge for the physical implemenation of Bosnia’s pre-meditated disappearance. All the crimes that Serbia and Croatia committed on the Bosnian soil – from the military aggression, over war crimes, ethnic cleansing and genocide, up to the 30 year-long efforts to undermine Bosnia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity – have always had a direct approval and absolute support of the leading EU countries. During the war and in its aftermath, Great Britain and France were the leaders of the initiatives to impose ethnic partition on the citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and now Germany has taken up their role. In such a context, the increasing aggressiveness of Serbia and Croatia can only be interpreted as a consequence of the EU’s intention to finish with Bosnia for good, and Schmidt has arrived to Bosnia to facilitate that process. Therefore, it is high time for the citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina to abandon any ilussions about the true intentions of the European Union and reject its Trojan Horse in the form of the current High Representative.  

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Should there be an age limit to be President?

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The presidential elections in Bulgaria are nearing in November 2021 and I would like to run for President of Bulgaria, but the issue is the age limit.

To run for President in Bulgaria a candidate needs to be at least 40 years old and I am 37. I am not the first to raise the question: should there be an age limit to run for President, and generally for office, and isn’t an age limit actually age discrimination?

Under the international human rights law standard, putting an age limit is allowed in the context of political participation under the right to vote and the right to run to be elected. Human Rights Committee General Comment No.25 interpreting the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states that an age limit has to be based on objective and reasonable criteria, adding that it is reasonable to have a higher age requirement for certain offices. As it stands, the law says that having an age limit for president is not age discrimination, but is 40 actually a reasonable cut-off? National legislations can change. We need to lower the age limit and rethink what’s a reasonable age for President, and not do away with all age limits.

We have seen strong leaders emerge as heads of state and government who are below 40 years of age. Sanna Marin, Prime Minister of Finland, became Prime Minister at 34. Sebastrian Kurz, the Prime Minister of Austria, was elected at 31. Jacinda Ardern, Prime Minister of New Zealand, assumed her position at 37. So perhaps it is time to rethink age limits for the highest offices.

The US has plenty of examples where elected Senators and Congressmen actually beat the age limit and made it despite the convention. The age limit for Senator in the US is 30 years old. Rush Holt was elected to the US Senate at 29. In South Carolina, two State Senators were elected at 24 years old and they were seated anyways. The age limit for US president is 35 years old.

In Argentina, the age cut-off is 30. In India, it is 35. In Pakistan, it is 45 years old. In Turkey, it is 40 years old. Iceland says 35 years old. In France, it is 18.

Generally, democracies set lower age limits. More conservative countries set the age limit higher in line with stereotypes rather than any real world evidence that a 45 year-old or 55 year-old person would be more effective and better suited to the job. Liberal countries tend to set lower age limits.

40 years old to be a President of Bulgaria seems to be an arbitrary line drawn. And while it is legal to have some age limits, 40 years old seems to be last century. Changing the age limit for president of Bulgaria could be a task for the next Bulgarian Parliament for which Bulgarians will also vote on the same date as they vote for President.

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