Connect with us

East Asia

China, Europe and the G-Zero world

Published

on

What does it mean to live in a world without global leadership? Where is the European Union heading? What impact will Trump’s “America first” policy and China’s Belt & Road Initiative have on tomorrow’s world order? Geopolitical reflections on the G-Zero world.

Donald Trump in the White House, China’s mega Belt & Road Initiative (BRI) and, as a symbol of Europe’s identity crisis, Britain’s decision to leave the European Union – those are just three examples of recent radical developments transforming our globalised world.

While the American president continues to pursue his “America first” policy, introducing punitive tariffs on Chinese imports and thus causing a massive trade conflict, China’s authoritarian political structures are growing ever stronger. Xi Jinping’s power has been expanded. He is the “president of all” and, as is again true of Mao Zedong, the centre of a pronounced personality cult. By introducing a Social Credit System (SCS), China wants to rate and classify its citizens in all areas of life. From creditworthiness to political and social behaviour, everything will be monitored. Total surveillance of this type is reminiscent of the methods employed by Big Brother in George Orwell’s novel 1984.

If all that were not enough, the European Union (EU) is stuck in an existential crisis. Geopolitical challenges thus abound and “interesting times” await.

G-2 and a multipolar world

Globalisation – the cross-border exchange and interaction of people, goods, services and communication – was a phenomenon already known in antiquity. A new aspect today is the increasing interdependency of its various actors. Nation-states, globally active companies, international institutions and nongovernment organisations are now closely linked. Since many actors are unaware of this, often their policy responses to globalisation (read: their internationalisation strategies) are neither coordinated nor consistent with each other’s.

The world without global leadership is a world in chaos, one in which each country and region tries to advance its own interests, thus accepting there will be disadvantages for others. Yet since, in the long run, no country or region is capable of playing a leading worldwide role on its own, the question remains of how long the world can remain in chaos and without global leadership. Are we on the road to a G-2 world, one in which everything depends on how relations between the US and China develop? One in which the EU, in particular, must take a subordinate position?

What would be preferable would be a world of cooperation (Banik, 2016, p.22),of peaceful multipolarity, one in which different actors compete with each other but in the spirit of global complementarity. It would be a new cosmopolitan (Nida-Rümeling, 2017, p.178)world order in which international standards are established and safeguarded and military conflicts are avoided – a world in which Europe, above all, has the chance to define itself strategically and realign itself vis-à-vis the US and China.

Following a brief introduction to the current geopolitical situation, this article examines the impact on the EU of the “China first” and “America first” policies. It concludes by highlighting the importance of viewing diversity as an added value and, especially for the EU, cultivating an identité de cœur (identity of the heart) as advanced by Jacques Ancel, a leading representative of French geopolitics.

Everything is geopolitics

Geopolitics is a multidisciplinary approach that analyses the relationship between power and territory. It thus sees all political decision-making and economic strategies as aiming to exert power and influence within a given geographic area. Eurasia currently plays a significant geopolitical role and will continue to do so in the foreseeable future, as can be seen in China’s BRI. Although the interdependence of the various actors urgently demands cooperation and coordination to overcome global challenges, competition is the prevailing principle in today’s world order.

Key global challenges include:

  • Climate change and its consequences
  • Demographic change
  • Increasing urbanisation
  • Competition for the world’s natural resources
  • Equitable food distribution (including access to drinking water)
  • International terrorism (including cyberterrorism)

Because of globalisation and the deterritorialisation that results, various transnational forces have developed, including international organisations, interest groups, lobbying associations and globally active businesses. These transnational players act outside of the context of the constitutional nation-state and independently of it. Borders and the associated controlling mechanisms are disappearing. The political order of internally and externally sovereign nation-states according to the Westphalian model stands in opposition to these transnational forces, and vice versa. Moreover, the general public is becoming increasingly aware of globalisation’s negative consequences, such as non-transparent capital flows, global economic crime, corruption, money laundering, ongoing trade deficits, harsh competition and the exploitation of the world’s natural resources. The globalised world is producing winners and losers. Trust in the political elite is therefore declining among the public in the countries or regions that are losing out, a cohort that includes EU member states. The result is social conflict, political discontent and growing scepticism about the efficiency of today’s democratic systems and institutions. If one looks at China, the question arises of whether authoritarian structures might be the better response to global challenges. An affirmative response would be misguided.

Today’s world order, an aftereffect of the Second World War, is obsolete. Our international institutions are no longer capable of overcoming global challenges. The question of which world order will emerge in the future depends on geopolitical strategies, in particular on those pursued by China, the EU and the US.

China’s meta-strategy

Which ramifications does BRI have for Europe and its companies? This gigantic infrastructure project certainly offers opportunities for the EU, but it is and will remain a Chinese project that exclusively serves Chinese interests. Once constructed, it will be used first and foremost to control and ensure the transport of raw materials, above all from Africa, to China’s production sites. The same purpose will be served by expanding the railway lines, roads and ports included in BRI. And while local economies will benefit from this expansion, the participating countries will find themselves more dependent on China both economically and politically. These infrastructure projects are being financed with Chinese loans; in return, China is securing unimpeded access to crucial raw materials. Moreover, the projects often have no positive impact on employment in the BRI countries since most of the workers at the major building sites are Chinese– thus minimising the jobless rate in China.

Is BRI turning to a white elephant?

From the military perspective, BRI also has myriad implications. The People’s Republic maintains the world’s largest army as measured in the number of its troops. This army can easily monitor the building projects and transport routes (land/sea). Thus, BRI is expanding China’s military influence and driving the modernisation of its armed forces. China’s security strategy has changed. The army is evolving from a land-based military organisation to a naval power. In 2017, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army opened its first foreign base in Djibouti. This was a cause for concern for France, the US and, in particular, India.

BRI has, moreover, a very strong ideological component. National unity and stability are top priorities for the Chinese government. Begun in 1978, China’s economic opening – welcomed and supported by the West’s business community – largely served to avoid social conflict among the country’s population. Private property and entrepreneurship were encouraged, and farmers could retain any surplus production. All these measures were also meant to jolt the often inactive populace from its lethargy. The country’s citizens were used as a factor of production enabling the country to catch up technologically. Foreign investors endorsed this strategy.

With BRI, China is launching a new strategy for strengthening national unity and stability as a way of proactively preventing social unrest and the desire for democratic reforms. BRI is also being called the “path of Xi Jinping” and is meant to reinforce China’s power on the global level. One thing is certain: China is currently the only country in the world with a global strategy.

Analog American president in a digital world

The US president’s “America first” policy illustrates a different approach to globalisation’s challenges. Instead of opening to the world – as China is doing with BRI – “America first” focuses on protectionism. Trump is withdrawing from multilateral trade agreements in favour of bilateral pacts.

Although the US still evinces the qualities of a global leader in many areas, Trump’s unpredictable approach to governing is increasingly a cause for concern for the EU and NATO allies. What is at stake is the reliability of the US when it comes to Europe’s security interests.

Trump seems to be a president from another age. He appears completely unconcerned with globalisation and the interdependencies that have resulted for global actors. He seems to have no interest in acknowledging the world’s complex geopolitical contexts. On the contrary, he apparently still sees the world from the perspective of a real-estate magnate. Borders and walls are being rebuilt. The marketing of the “Trump” brand, moreover, must be visible to everyone.

Although Trump’s methods are very different from those of Xi, both have one thing in common: they are national strategies that strengthen the position of the country in question.

EU: lost dreams

From a global perspective, the European Union is hard to classify. It is neither a nation-state nor the “United States of Europe”. Until now the EU has not succeeded in becoming a political union. It lacks a joint strategy, particularly in terms of foreign, security and economic policies. This lack of a joint strategy is, geopolitically speaking, what prevents the EU from being an equal partner to the US and China. On the contrary, neither China nor the US wants a strong Europe. That is why they support individual member states, depending on which of their interests is at stake.

Europe’s vulnerability is particularly evident in the military arena. Since Trump has taken office, Europe can no longer rely on the US as NATO’s mainstay and main financial contributor. Now that America’s security interests in Europe are no longer a priority for the president, the EU is being forced to step up and take responsibility.

China is taking advantage of Europe’s strategic weakness as well. Chinese investments, especially those relating to BRI, are concentrated in Eastern Europe, and the 16+1 negotiations are further marginalising Brussels.

The world without global leadership is creating major challenges for the EU. Internally, member states are increasingly critical of the diktat from Brussels and are demanding a return to national sovereignty. At the same time, the EU has not been successful in responding to the needs and fears of its citizens – ie, unemployment, especially among young people, and a growing feeling of uncertainty caused by the loss of control in Europe. Borders and the reintroduction of national control mechanisms are again being discussed.

Externally, the EU finds itself facing increasingly dominant nation-states, including China, Russia and the US. The “age of the strongmen” seems to have dawned, strongmen who are unfailingly pursuing their own interests around the globe. If the EU is not successful in defining shared, uniform European interests – above all in the area of security, foreign and economic policy – the Union will sooner or later find itself relegated to geopolitical obscurity.

Cosmopolitan and multipolar

Globalisation does not mean that borders – and thus countries, territories, regions and communities – disappear (Zajec, 2017, p. 238).On the contrary, the more globalised the world is, the greater the sense of belonging people have for their country, region or area. When all is said and done, we want to remain who we are.

Personality cults, like those currently being cultivated in China and Russia, and projects and visions, like BRI and “America first”, not only define national interests, they also provide the strategic and ideological framework required for ensuring national cohesion. This is where the EU continues to come up short. Europe does not have a shared strategic vision, either internally or externally. Diversity is seen as a weakness rather than a strength.

This is where it is worth taking a closer look at the ideas of Jacques Ancel (1879–1943), a thinker who, from a geopolitical perspective, accords a central position to people while also introducing the concept of “identity”.  According to Ancel, there are no natural borders, only those that people recognise based on shared memories, history, culture, language and the express desire to coexist. Thus, in contrast to the German geopolitical nation-state school, he represents a non-rational vision of the “nation of the heart” or an “identity of the heart”.

«C’est le cœur qui vaut et qu’il faut considérer avant tout» (Jacques Ancel)

In this sense, the EU could strategically position itself externally vis-à-vis China and the US as an avant garde actor while also responding internally to the public’s concerns. Nationality, national sovereignty and the shared European identity must be respected as complementary elements and not seen as mutually exclusive. Europe’s diversity must, in turn, be leveraged as a strength and not condemned in a hostile ploy against Brussels.

Geopolitically, this could serve as the EU’s contribution to a new, more equitable, cosmopolitan world order, one characterised by balanced and fair global trade, by a just distribution of the world’s natural and food resources, and by joint efforts to fight terrorism.

In our globalised world, the EU, China and the US are not isolated island paradises. No one is privy to the absolute truth. The challenges stemming from climate change, growing global competition (for natural resources, food, water, etc), the rivalry between national and transnational forces and, above all, international terrorism are forcing us to face reality. The illusions underlying various ideologies must be relinquished. These include the Europe of elites; patriotic Chinese-style capitalism; “America first”; personality cults; and a return to revisionist power structures. Differences must be bridged (Banik, 2016, p. 127). The goal is a cosmopolitan world order in which human values take precedence in keeping with an “identity of the heart”.

Author’s note: this article was previously published in World Scientific, China and the World, Vol. 01, No. 04 (2018).

References (selected works)

  • Ancel, Jacques(1938). La géographie des frontières, Paris, Gallimard.
  • Banik, Katja (2016).Les relations Chine-Europe: à la croisée des chemins, Paris, L’Harmattan.
  • Boniface, Pascal (2017).La Géopolitique, Eyrolles, Paris.
  • Gauchon, Huissoud (2008). Les 100 mots de la géopolitique, puf, Paris.
  • Juncker, Jean-Claude (2017).Discours sur l’état de l’Union 2017, Brussels, European Commission, 13 september 2017.
  • Nida-Rümelin, Julian (2017).Über Grenzen denken, eine Ethik der Migration, edition Körber-Stiftung, Hamburg.
  • Marshall, Tim (2015).  Prisoners of Geography, Elliott and Thompson Ltd., London.
  • The Economist (2018).“All under heaven:China’s belt-and-road plans are tobe welcomed – and worried about,”print edition, Leaders section.
  • The Wall Street Journal (2018).“The global world order will outlast U.S. leadership” (James Dobbins), 24 July 2018.
  • Zajec, Olivier (2016).Introduction à l’analyse géopolitique. Éditions du Rocher, Monaco.

Dr. Katja Banik, since 2017, has been a speaker/guest lecturer on geopolitical and economic issues related to China, Europe and the USA and on different global governance scenarios. She is Membre Associé à Titre Secondaire at Intégration et Coopération dans l’Espace Européen — Etudes Européennes (ICEE), Université Sorbonne Nouvelle Paris 3, and a Member of GIS Réseau Asie et Pacifique/GIS Études Asiatiques in Paris. Katja Banik is the author of Les Relations Chine-Europe: À la Croisée des Chemins published by L’Harmattan (Paris) in 2016. Further, she is the Editor-in-Chief of PwC’s China Compass. Katja Banik has senior management expertise in the logistics (Shanghai and Hong Kong) and she is the founding member of ilkmade.com. http://www.katjabanik.com/

East Asia

Will US-China Tensions Trigger the Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis?

Published

on

Half a century ago, the then-National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger flew to Beijing in the hope of seeking China’s alliance to contain the Soviets. His visit culminated in the U.S. agreement to recognize Beijing as the only legitimate government of China instead of Taipei, going back on the promise he had made to the president of the Republic of China, Chiang Ching-kuo, merely one year previously that Taiwan would never be abandoned by the US. The realistic American diplomat may have never thought that one day Taiwan, once ruthlessly forsaken by the US, would become the latter’s most important strategic fortress in East Asia to contain a rising China.

In 2018, the passage of the Taiwan Travel Act encouraged more high-ranking American government officials to visit Taiwan and vice versa1. The US Undersecretary of State Keith Krach landed in Taiwan two years later, rendering him the highest-level State Department official to visit the island since 19792. The Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, announced the cancellation of all restrictions on official contacts between the U.S. and Taiwan in January 20213 – an action that was vehemently denounced by the Chinese government as Trump’s “last-ditch madness” that would “push the Taiwan question deeper down the road of no return”4.

Just when the world thought of Joe Biden’s ascension to power as a harbinger of softer attitudes toward Beijing, especially regarding Taiwan issues, the diplomatic muscle flexed by the newly elected US president is as eye-tingling as his aviator shades – first, his Secretary of State, Blinken and Secretary of Defense, Austin made an explicit announcement of the U.S. support for Taiwan; second, he sent former Deputy Secretaries of State Richard Armitage and James Steinberg and former senator Chris Dodd to Taiwan in honor of the 42nd anniversary of the Taiwan Relations Act.

America’s incremental interest in the island is not confined to actions from its executive branches, but it has permeated its legislative system. The introduction of the confrontational “Strategic Competition Act of 2021” in April signals the anti-Soviet-style containment of China which was backed by The Senate Foreign Relations Committee. This bill echoes the “Interim National Security Strategic Guidance” released by the Biden Administration in March, and it emphasizes the urgent need to “achieve United States political objectives in the Indo-Pacific” and back closer ties with Taiwan5. With strong bipartisan support, the bill is expected to be signed into law by President Biden and to serve as a legislative compass to counter China at all levels. In that respect, Taiwan Strait is more likely than ever to become “ground zero” by the U.S. and China.

On the other hand, the crackdown on Hong Kong’s democracy movement under the new National Security Law by Beijing proved to be successful due to the limited backlash received from the West. On top of that, Beijing’s handling of Xinjiang cotton issue seems to have managed to incite nationalism among Chinese people on a short notice to boycott “anti-China forces”6. With a record of 380 incursions into Taiwan’s airspace by Chinese air force during 2020, there is reason to believe that Hong Kong and Xinjiang were “guinea pigs” used by Beijing to test its capability for the fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis, the probability of which has been enhanced by Xi Jinping’s attempt to seek reappointment and Beijing’s need to divert domestic attention away from the escalating social conflicts brought about by the stagnant economy.

So, the pertinent question is: if the fourth Taiwan Crisis does break out, when will it happen? It could be sometime after the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympic Games7 as it is unlikely for China to discard the opportunity to showcase its image and test its comprehensive strength8. This could be déjà vu in light of Russia’s successful Blitzkrieg-style invasion of Ukraine in 2014, which occurred only three days after the end of Sochi Winter Olympics. However, China is not the only one who can learn from history. When the rest of the world anticipates China’s intent with regard to Taiwan, preemptive precautions will be taken. The game-theory-type strategic interaction may hence spur China to launch its attack before the upcoming international sports gala.

Another critical timing could be prior to the 20th National Party Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in October 2022. Xi Jinping’s abolishment of term limits through constitutional amendment may pave the legal foundation for his reappointment, but the “widespread opposition within the party”9 renders the legitimacy of his extended tenure unlikely. That is why some may find it hard to conceive of Xi’s attempt to “start an unnecessary war with Taiwan” before his re-appointment10, but his insatiable desire for a 3rd term may push him over the edge. For the time being, Xi seems to be seduced by his burgeoning self-confidence that China is charging into an epoch of opportunity where “the East is rising and the West is declining,”11 and what time is better than now to consolidate his authority in front of dissidents with a military show-off targeting Taiwan?

As Henry Kissinger12 said, “The historical challenge for leaders is to manage the crisis while building the future. Failure could set the world on fire.” When the leaders of the two greatest powers both see their own countries as the future “Leviathan” of the world, the definition of failure can no longer be merely confined to internal mismanagement, but being surpassed by international competitors. Kissinger may have overestimated some leaders’ senses of honor to bear the responsibility of the “historical challenge”, but he can be right about the catastrophic consequences of their failures. But this time, failure is not an option for either side across the Taiwan Strait nor across the Pacific Ocean

Reference

  1. Chen, Y., & Cohen, J. A. (2019). China-Taiwan Relations Re-Examined: The “1992 Consensus” and Cross-Strait Agreements. University of Pennsylvania Asian Law Review, 14(1).
  2. Mink, M. (2021). The Catalyst for Stronger US-Taiwan Ties. https://keithkrach.com/the-catalyst-for-stronger-us-taiwan-ties/
  3. Hass, R. (2021). After lifting restrictions on US-Taiwan relations, what comes next? Brookings. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2021/01/11/after-lifting-restrictions-on-us-taiwan-relations-what-comes-next/
  4. Global Times. (2021). Pompeo may toll the knell for Taiwan authorities. https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202101/1212378.shtml
  5. Zengerle, P., & Martina, M. (2021). U.S. lawmakers intensify bipartisan efforts to counter China. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/us-lawmakers-look-advance-sweeping-bid-counter-china-2021-04-21/
  6. Cui, J., & Zhao, Y. (2021). Boycott of Xinjiang cotton use opposed. China Daily. https://www.chinadailyhk.com/article/161495
  7. Everington, K. (2021). Former US security advisor says Taiwan in “maximum danger” from PLA. Taiwan News. https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/4189160
  8. China Daily. (2021). Preparing for Winter Olympics promotes quality development – Opinio. China Daily. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202101/22/WS600a131ba31024ad0baa44f1.html
  9. The Guardian. (2020). China’s Xi Jinping facing widespread opposition in his own party, insider claims. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/aug/18/china-xi-jinping-facing-widespread-opposition-in-his-own-party-claims-insider
  10. Roy, D. (2021). Rumors of War in the Taiwan Strait. The Diplomat. https://thediplomat.com/2021/03/rumors-of-war-in-the-taiwan-strait/
  11. Buckley, C. (2021). Xi Maps Out China’s Post-Covid Ascent. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/03/world/asia/xi-china-congress.html?_ga=2.178218534.2000768907.1619749005-1359154941.1599697815
  12. Kissinger, H. A. (2020). The Coronavirus Pandemic Will Forever Alter the World Order. https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-coronavirus-pandemic-will-forever-alter-the-world-order-11585953005

Continue Reading

East Asia

Quad Infrastructure Diplomacy: An Attempt to Resist the Belt and Road Initiative

Published

on

Over the years, the competition between the great powers in the dual space of the Indian and Pacific Oceans has been rapidly increasing. In the face of the aggravation of relations between the PRC and the United States, the defence dimension of the rivalry between the two contenders for global leadership traditionally comes to the forefront. However, in today’s context, the parties will most likely not engage in military action for the strengthening of their dominance in the region, but they will try to achieve the goals by expanding of economic influence. In this context, along with the well-known trade wars, there is an infrastructure rivalry in the region, which is enforced on Beijing by Washington and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad).

The role of Infrastructure in Indian and Pacific Oceans’ countries

The countries of Asia traditionally drawing the attention of the world community due to the high rates of economic, technological, and social development. In less than three decades, their per capita income has increased by 74%, millions of people have been lifted out of poverty, as well as a growing middle class has emerged in the region. All this became possible due to the multilateral cooperation institutionalization and the integration of the economies of the Indo-Pacific. However, the strengthening of trade and economic ties and the future prosperity of Asia largely depends on the infrastructure (ports, highways and railways, airports, pipelines, etc.), which contributes to a more active movement of goods on a regional and global scale. Moreover, back in 2009, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) published a report according to which collective investments in infrastructure in the amount of US$8 trillion will be required to maintain rapid economic growth in Asian countries.

The most prominent infrastructure initiative in recent years is the «Belt and Road Initiative» (BRI), which was launched by China’s leader Xi Jinping in 2013. The BRI helped to fill numerous infrastructure gaps, but the United States and its partners increasingly paid attention to the geostrategic aspect of China’s actions. It’s no secret that the Belt and Road plays an important role in the development and integration of China’s provinces with neighboring countries. However, with the growing number of countries participating in the BRI, as well as the strengthening of China’s influence on a regional and global scale, criticism of the strategic tools for expanding Beijing’s economic influence gradually increased. The Belt and Road has faced a number of critical remarks, including those related to accusations of purposely involving the regional countries in the so-called «debt traps». Regardless of the degree of truthfulness or study of the issue, from year to year, media reports have contributed to the building of a contradictory attitude to China’s BRI among the residents, experts, and political elites all over the world.

Moreover, as soon as Donald Trump became the U.S. President in early 2017, Washington modified the nature of its policy towards China to greater confrontation. This trend has become a direct expression of the intensified great powers’ rivalry and their struggle for hegemony in the Indo-Pacific, as well as a motivation for the revival of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), which includes the United States, Australia, India and Japan. However, the interaction of the Quad has long been built on the basis of defence.

This trend continues nowadays, as evidenced by the frequent exercises and the growing Quad naval presence in the Indo-Pacific but in 2021 the Quad countries expanded their range of issues on a multilateral basis. Now the agenda includes vaccine diplomacy (providing 1 billion COVID-19 vaccines to Indo-Pacific countries, climate change, technological cooperation, maritime security, cybersecurity, and external development assistance. According to Kurt Campbell, Indo-Pacific policy coordinator at the National Security Council, Washington is looking to convene an in-person fall summit of leaders of the Quad countries with a focus on infrastructure in the face of the challenge from China.

Quadrilateral infrastructure diplomacy as the continuing vector of the Trump’s administration

The infrastructure agenda also became an important part of the last summit of the G7 countries’ leaders, during which the parties expressed their willingness to establish a BRI counterpart called Build Back Better World (B3W). In total, there are 22 mentions of infrastructure in the final G7 Summit Communiqué. Even despite the traditionally restrained position of India, which took the time to «study the specifics of the proposal», infrastructure diplomacy of Quad is becoming a new area of geostrategic competition in the Indo-Pacific.

There’s one exception: the activities on the infrastructure track are not a new trend of U.S. President Joe Biden’s administration, but a continuation of the foreign policy vector set during the presidency of Donald Trump. It was he who turned Sino-U.S. rivalry into a geo-economic level. Back in 2017, the Foreign Ministers of the Quad countries stated the need for high-quality infrastructure development in order to ensure freedom and openness of sea routes, as well as improve intra-regional ties. In 2018, MoU was signed between the US Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Australia, aimed at implementing major infrastructure projects in the Indo-Pacific. Moreover, the Quad countries raised the question of the BRI countries’ growing debt during their official meeting in Singapore.

It was clear that the Belt and Road Initiative is perceived by the Quad countries as the main factor in expanding the economic and political influence of the People’s Republic of China, as well as China’s influence of the domestic political processes in the countries of Indo-Pacific. At the same time, the combination of economic and defence rivalry enforced on Beijing by Washington, as well as Quad’s efforts to build a balance of power in the region actually indicates the explicit anti-​China nature of the Quad.

In this case, it’s important to note that each of the Quad countries has its own levers of influence, which they can combine in infrastructure competition with Beijing. For example, in 2015, in response to the implementation of the Belt and Road Initiative and the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) by China, Japan made the Partnership for Quality Infrastructure (PQI). The United States, in turn, announced the infrastructure project Blue Dot Network (BDN), as well as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Australia established a new Partnerships for Infrastructure (P4I). All these initiatives are united by a commitment to inclusive economic growth, «quality infrastructure», climate change, disaster response, and social development. The capitalization of the Japanese, American and Australian initiatives is US $110 billion (US$50 billion from Japan and over US$50 from the Asian Development Bank), US$30-60 million, and US$383 thousand (including access to US$4 billion of foreign aid and $US2 billion from the Australian Infrastructure Financing Facility for the Pacific), respectively. Given the ongoing discussions about debt traps, the emphasis on «high-quality infrastructure» may give special features to the initiatives of the Quad but even the total amount of funding will not be able to compete with the US$770 billion investments already made in 138 countries of the world and announced by China.

Anyway, Quad is stepping up its infrastructure diplomacy in at least three areas, including Southeast Asia, Oceania, and the Indian Ocean. For example, Australia, Germany and Switzerland have already allocated US$13 million to the Mekong River Commission For Sustainable Development (MRC) to assist Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and, Vietnam «to respond to pressing challenges while safeguarding the ecological function of the Mekong River and improving people’s livelihoods».At the same time, Australia signed US$300 million MoU with Papua New Guinea, aimed at the ports reconstruction in the major state of Oceania (the ports of Vanimo, Kimbe, Motukea, Lorengau, Oro Bay, Daru, Lae, etc.). It is important to highlight that the increasing economic and infrastructural presence of China in the countries of Oceania, energize Australia’s policy in the South Pacific, which is a traditional zone of influence of Canberra. At the same time, the expansion of Australia’s aid and investment to the broader Indo-Pacific is due to the commitment of the current Australian government to the U.S. foreign policy.

In turn, the reaction of the Southeast Asian countries to the intensification of Quad infrastructure diplomacy will be more restrained. According to the latest Pew Research Center survey, the most unfavourable view of China is in the United States (76%), Canada (73%), Germany (71%), Japan (88%), Australia (78%), and South Korea (77%), while in Singapore — the only country representing ASEAN in the survey — the percentage of unfavourable views on China is at a low level (34%). Moreover, considering the aspects of infrastructure diplomacy in the region, we should definitely refer to the survey of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) of the political elites of the region «Powers, Norms, and Institutions: The Future of the Indo-Pacific from a Southeast Asia Perspective», published in 2020. Despite the intentional exclusion of Russia from the survey, it approximately reflects the trends in the Indo-Pacific countries at the present stage. Thus, as a result of the survey, American experts revealed that the political elites of Southeast Asia positively assess China’s activities in the field of infrastructure development, which has brought tangible benefits to most Southeast Asian countries.

Beijing’s Response

China is actively reacting to verbal attacks from the United States and Quad. The infrastructure agenda was no exception, but China responded by modernizing its global Belt and Road Initiative. In response to criticism about the involvement of the countries in debt traps, Beijing has developed a new Foreign Policy White Paper «China’s International Development Cooperation in the New Era». The document was published in early 2021. According to the provisions of the new White Paper, China will pay closer attention to the process of implementing projects within the aid framework, take an active part in evaluating projects in order to monitor their quality, maintain an appropriate level of confidence in its projects to China, as well as conduct bilateral consultations to identify difficulties with debt repayment and make sure that partners do not fall into a debt trap. It’s possible that the new vision of the PRC will appear especially quickly in countries where the Quad will primarily try to implement their infrastructure projects.

China is the first country in the region, which pays significant attention to the issues of large-scale infrastructure development. Moreover, Beijing has a number of advantages over its opponent — Quad. First, the Belt and Road initiative is more structured and aimed at intensifying trade, economic, cultural and humanitarian cooperation with neighboring countries, while the emerging Quad infrastructure agenda is «dispersed» among numerous individual initiatives, doesn’t have the same level of stability as the BRI, and even after 3.5 years of building the agenda is considered through the prism of expectations.

Second, China’s initiative is aimed at a single infrastructure connection between the PRC and the rest of the world and acts as a potential basis for the intensification of global trade in the future. At the same time, today’s projects of the Quad are of a “sporadic» nature and can’t contribute to the infrastructure linkage between Europe, Africa, South and Southeast Asia on a global scale.

Third, China can already offer the Belt and Road members not only logistics infrastructure but also the opportunities in the field of green energy. At the end of 2019, China produced about a third of the world’s solar energy and retained a leading position in the number of wind turbines. Within the foreseeable future, the Quad countries, and especially the United States, will have to compete with China even in the field of the climate agenda, which is so close to the new administration of the U.S. President Joe Biden.

Finally, during his recent speech on the occasion of the 100th anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party (​CCP), PRC’s Leader Xi Jinping confidently declared the great revival of the Chinese nation, its contribution to the progress of human civilization, and its readiness to build a new world, which undoubtedly indicates China’s decisiveness to respond to challenges to its address, including from the Quad.

Conclusion

The ongoing transformation of the regional architecture in the Indo-Pacific, both in the defence and economic areas, will be an important aspect in the post-pandemic era. China has repeatedly stated about the «covered» Quad activities to deterrence Chinese policy in the region, but the expansion of the Quad’s agenda by infrastructure diplomacy allows us to speak about the evident vector of the Quad strategy against the PRC.

However, nowadays the Quad countries had been left behind. China already has the world’s most numerous land forces, the largest navy, as well as an ambitious global Belt and Road initiative that includes almost 140 countries and a capitalization approaching US$1 trillion. Of course, Quad is moving towards the institutionalization of its infrastructure cooperation and the potential expansion of the number of participating countries to the Quad Plus format. However, to reach China’s achievements for the period 2013-2021, the new alliance will need at least a decade.

At the same time, the rivalry of the Belt and Road with the Quad’s infrastructure initiative will help the countries of the region to diversify their infrastructure ties but will make their choice even more difficult, since it will primarily be regarded as support for the foreign policy vision of one of the parties, and not a pragmatic estimate of economic benefits. All this makes the regional environment in the Indo-Pacific increasingly complex and forces middle powers and smaller countries to adapt to new geostrategic realities.

From our partner International Affairs

Continue Reading

East Asia

Bushido Spirit Resurrected? Japan publicly bared its swords against China

Published

on

Recently, Japan’s Deputy Prime Minister Taro Aso declared that Japan will join forces with the US to “protect Taiwan.” There has been a lot of turmoil, but even though the US directly announced that it will follow the “One China policy,” Japan has not given up its secret intentions. Japan’s new “Defense White Paper,” which was just approved, not only continued to link the US, but also displayed greater animosity toward China.

The Japanese government just finished the 2021 version of the “Defense White Paper,” according to the Global Times, but both the cover and the substance of the white paper are full of “provocative” meaning. The first is the front cover. According to the image released by Japanese media, the cover of Japan’s new “Defense White Paper” is an ink drawing of a warrior on horseback. According to a spokesperson for Japan’s Ministry of Defense, the horse samurai on the cover represents the Japanese Self-Defense Force’s commitment to defend Japan. However, after seeing it, some Japanese netizens said that it was “extremely powerful in fighting spirit.”

From a content standpoint, the white paper keeps the substance of advocating “China menace,” talking about China’s military might, aircraft carriers, Diaoyu Islands, and so on, and also includes the significance of “Taiwan stability” for the first time. A new chapter on Sino-US ties is also included in the white paper. According to the Associated Press, the United States is expanding its assistance for the Taiwan region, while China is increasing its military actions in the region. This necessitates Japan paying attention to it with a “crisis mindset.”

Japan has recently grown more daring and rampant, thanks to a warlike cover and material that provokes China and is linked to the US. Japan has recently bared its swords against China on several occasions.

Not only did Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga take the lead in referring to the Taiwan region as a “country,” but after meeting US President Biden, he issued a joint statement referring to the Taiwan region, and tried his best to exaggerate maritime issues such as the East China Sea and the South China Sea, and Japanese Deputy Prime Minister Taro Aso, Defense Minister Nobuo Kishi, Deputy Defense Mizuho, and Deputy Defense Mizuho. It has all made inappropriate statements on Taiwan and publicly attacked the “One China Principle.”

After China clearly voiced its disapproval, Japan not only refused to be constrained, but actively increased its antagonism toward China. Do they truly believe China is simple to provoke? The tensions between China and Japan will undoubtedly worsen as a result of Japan’s publishing of this white paper. Although Japan has the bravery to provoke, it lacks the guts to initiate an armed war with China. After all, even the United States, on which they have traditionally counted, would not dare.

It is simple to employ force against China, and if the Japanese Self-Defense Force want to fight the People’s Liberation Army, it is preferable for them to be prepared for any catastrophic outcomes. Furthermore, China has long been Japan’s most important commercial partner. Even with Japan’s sluggish economy, they should be wary of challenging China. If they refuse to examine this, China may let them face the consequences of economics and trade.

Furthermore, the US has declared unequivocally that it will pursue the “One China Policy” and has intimated that it will not “protect Taiwan” with Japan. The stance of the United States demonstrates that, despite Japan’s determination to constrain China on the Taiwan problem and invitation to the United States to join in “safeguarding Taiwan and defending Japan,” the United States is hesitant to offer such refuge to Japan. As a result, Japan should be clear about its own place in the heart of the United States and attach itself to the United States, although it may be beaten by the United States again in the end.

In reaction to this event, the Hong Kong media stated that Japan should focus on making friends and generating money rather than intervening in Taiwan’s affairs, saying that “provoking Beijing is a fool’s errand.” As a result, if Japan continues to challenge China, they will be exposed as a total fool. And how good will a fool do in a game between countries?

Continue Reading

Publications

Latest

Travel & Leisure3 hours ago

Four Seasons Hotel Mexico City Reveals Five of the City’s Hidden Gems

The Concierge team at Four Seasons Hotel Mexico City, members of the Les Clefs d’Or international association, invites you to...

East Asia5 hours ago

Will US-China Tensions Trigger the Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis?

Half a century ago, the then-National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger flew to Beijing in the hope of seeking China’s alliance...

South Asia7 hours ago

The Indo-US bonhomie: A challenge to China in the IOR

The oceans have long been recognized as one of the world’s valuable natural resources, and our well-being is tied to...

Uncategorized9 hours ago

The day France fustigated Big Tech: How Google ended up in the crosshair and what will follow

At the beginning of April 2019, the European Parliament approved the EU’s unified regulation on copyright and related rights. Since...

Middle East11 hours ago

Politics by Other Means: A Case Study of the 1991 Gulf War

War has been around since the dawn of man and is spawned by innate human characteristics. Often, when efforts at...

Economy13 hours ago

The Monetary Policy of Pakistan: SBP Maintains the Policy Rate

The State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) announced its bi-monthly monetary policy yesterday, 27th July 2021. Pakistan’s Central bank retained the...

Intelligence15 hours ago

China and Russia’s infiltration of the American Jewish and Israeli lobbies

 – First: The reasons for the registration of (Communist Lobbyists in the Middle East in the United States of America)...

Trending