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The Collapse of the INF Treaty as a Motivation?

Dmitry Stefanovich

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Despite the attempts of Russian and U.S. sides to find common ground on the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, it appears that the agreement will cease to exist this year. So what next?

Fighting for Opinions

Russia has been demonstrating a rather high degree of flexibility of late, including publicly, by stating its readiness to reveal its “controversial” 9M729 land-based cruise missile and then holding a presentation on it (even though the scale of the event was, apparently, smaller than the one that was originally proposed to the U.S. partners).

Despite the fairly simple diagrams of the 9M729 and 9M728 missiles displayed on their transport-and-launch containers and the launcher’s similarity to that of the “Club-M system that was first demonstrated back in 2007 as part of the setup for the land-based variant of the Kalibr missile (even though it was a shorter-range version intended for export), this information appears to be quite interesting. Furthermore, the data supplied by Russian sources largely confirms the assumption that the warhead is the main feature of this new cruise missile for the Iskander-M tactical missile system. At the same time, it is possible that the “new but not-so-new” launcher had been planned all along, but did not emerge until now due to concerns about possible breaches of the INF Treaty, and that it was only greenlighted once an appropriate, militarily significant cruise missile had emerged that met the INF requirements and required a new launcher type (other than the “classic” 9P78-1 one). It may very well be that the new launcher is not suitable for 9M723-series quasi-ballistic missiles, and there are questions about its compatibility with the accompanying transporter-loader vehicle; however, the missile’s increased accuracy and power (and possibly its enhanced capability to overcome enemy missile defences) was clearly considered to be very valuable.

Unfortunately, the key NATO and EU member nations ignored the presentation, and not necessarily of their own volition [2]. The United States, for its part, continues to express concerns about the 9M729 cruise missile breaching the INF Treaty, demanding the destruction of both the missile and the associated launchers under Washington’s supervision.

On February 2, the United States will start the process of “suspending” its obligations regarding the INF Treaty. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation has already described the decision as being “legally void.” Washington, however, sees this as a way to develop missiles that would be otherwise prohibited by the Treaty. It should be noted that the United States started planning research and development in this field several years back, and the first test launches may be expected in the near future. It could start with test-launching land-based versions of its air- or sea-launched cruise missiles, for example. Another possible pioneer might be a new tactical missile being developed as part of the Precision Strike Missile programme (formerly known as Long Range Precision Fires), which is to replace the good old ATACMS programme. Raytheon is a participant in the project with its DeepStrike project, whose advertised maximum range stands at the marvellously precise figure of 499 kilometres.

What Next after INF Treaty?

If the United States notifies Russia (and the other post-Soviet states) on February 2 about its withdrawal from the Treaty, how will the situation unfold over the next six months? [3]

The worst-case scenario would involve the rapid development and deployment by Russia and the United States of conventional and nuclear medium- and short-range missiles on both sides of the NATO–Russia border: in Russia’s Western Military District (including Kaliningrad exclave) and throughout Central and Eastern Europe. It would take at least a year for the respective missile units to become fully operational, but even announced planse on their deployment would ruin whatever is left of the European security architecture, including the Russia-NATO Founding Act. Western Europe is unlikely to support such processes; however, Eastern European countries may be willing to host U.S. offensive systems within the framework of bilateral agreements. This may indeed trigger a crisis in the West, including within NATO and the EU, but Russia is sure to suffer much more from such a return to the Missile Scares of the 80s. Moscow is much closer to NATO borders today than it was back then due to geography and political developments, and the the military threat emanating from the Alliance is playing a serious role in the way Moscow’ perceives this threat policy-wise. Russia will certainly need to take into account the drastic reduction in decision-making times should hostilities break out, which could result in pre-delegation of the authority to use nuclear weapons to lower levels of the command chain, or even in fully automating this process, given the heightened interest in the topic on the part of the country’s top political and military leadership. It is partially because of these risks that it would be a bad idea to rush to deploy new missile systems, thus poring fuel to the simmering conflicts.

It is much more likely that all the actors involved will exercise some degree of self-restraint. The interested parties could state their intentions to refrain from unprovoked deployments of missile systems. This would prevent any restrictions on R&D efforts, while at the same time facilitating a relatively stable strategic military architecture. Other possibilities include agreements that would restrict the geography of possible deployments – for example, Europe could be declared an area free from intermediate and shorter range missiles. However, such a decision would have a negative impact on the theoretical possibility of developing a global regime (not even a prohibitive regime, but just a restrictive or more transparent one) that would involve China, India, Pakistan, Iran, Israel and other actors.

In addition, if all the parties involved were prepared to withdraw from the INF Treaty, they could coordinate joint decisions on payloads for non-strategic missiles to be deployed. The Treaty does not distinguish between nuclear and conventional warheads, which is something worth revisiting in any eventuality [4]. Such a discussion would help the parties to return to the broader topic of control over tactical nuclear weapons, especially given the fairly interesting proposals that have emerged recently.

The possibility of some arrangements between European countries and Russia deserves special attention. Here, the key objective is to change the perception both in Moscow and in the European capitals: it is not about splitting the transatlantic unity or driving a wedge between Western and Eastern Europe. On the contrary, the emergence of a purely European arms control regime should help the disintegrating U.S.–Russia system of treaties remain in place. This, however, would require both parties to act fairly boldly.

The Future of New START and Arms Control

It should be stressed here that, unless the United States resorts to overly provocative activities in terms of deploying new intermediate and shorter range missile systems aimed directly at the Russian strategic nuclear forces (SNF), then Russia will continue with the current pace and targets for the modernization of its SNF as permitted by the New START Treaty.

In early 2019, the U.S. media ran a Russian letter to the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. The document explained Russia’s position with regard to the allegations of the United States that Moscow had failed to observe the INF Treaty [5]. Without going into much detail as to the essence of the mutual accusations, it should be noted that Washington’s failure to embrace a constructive approach presents the key threat to prolonging New START beyond 2021. Most importantly, Russia is presumably prepared to agree to a system of so-called “cabinet-level written political commitments”. Those are possible with regard to the cap on the total number of ballistic missile launch tubes on U.S. Ohio-class submarines (with the exception of those intended to make up for the missile potential of any lost launchers). A similar principle could be applied to upgraded Tupolev Tu-22M3M long-range bombers, which can theoretically be retrofitted with in-flight refuelling capabilities (thus boosting their range beyond 8000 kilometres) and the ability to release air-launched cruise missiles with a range of over 600 kilometres. This would turn such aircraft into heavy bombers under New START. The aforementioned letter states that Russia has no such intentions with regard to this bombers, but a relevant formal written commitment might prove to be a useful instrument of trust and security. This aspect of arms control may yet come to the fore should Russia-U.S. relations deteriorate further, including under the influence of domestic political processes in the United States.

Russia and the United States managed, in previous decades, to reach a very high level in terms of sharing reliable information on their strategic nuclear forces, and it would be a real pity to see this potential go to waste. However, it is becoming increasingly obvious that these relations are very much unique. It is quite possible that we will return to a time when there were no legally binding restrictions on Russian and U.S. nuclear forces. This might be the point at which a new polycentric nuclear order will begin to form. To begin with, it would be advisable to develop a system of measures aimed at building confidence and transparency, as the existing asymmetry in the arsenals of the nuclear powers dooms any potential attempts to introduce universal or proportional constraints to failure. It is possible that the principle of “commitments” and other such solutions currently being discussed by Russia and the United States with regard to the controversial issues of New START could contribute to the foundation of such a “post-bipolar” regime. China, for one, might prove more willing to embrace a regime like that than a full-blown international treaty complete with stringent restrictions and mandatory inspections.

To conclude, let us revisit the founding principles: Why do countries need arms controls at all? Without getting bogged down in theoretical considerations, such controls resolve two problems: they mitigate risks by increasing the transparency and understandability of the doctrines and structure of the potential adversary’s armed forces, while optimizing one’s own military structure thanks to streamlining the range of defence programmes and curtailing the number of weapons and equipment in active service. It would appear that, today, the INF Treaty is failing to meet these goals, at least in the eyes of the U.S. administration. Whether or not this is because of Russia’s alleged breach of the Treaty or a perceived threat from third countries is of secondary importance.

  1. 1. It is noteworthy that, according to Kommersant, “following the [Russian] Foreign Ministry’s news conference on January 18, the U.S. Embassy in Moscow held a briefing on the topic. However, instead of foreign ambassadors, only political advisors to the representatives of EU member states were invited. One of the people who attended the meeting later revealed to Kommersant that the audience had been informed that the Foreign Ministry event had presented nothing but ‘propaganda,’ and that Russia was ‘in severe breach of the INF Treaty.’”
  2. 2. It is noteworthy that, according to Kommersant, “following the [Russian] Foreign Ministry’s news conference on January 18, the U.S. Embassy in Moscow held a briefing on the topic. However, instead of foreign ambassadors, only political advisors to the representatives of EU member states were invited. One of the people who attended the meeting later revealed to Kommersant that the audience had been informed that the Foreign Ministry event had presented nothing but ‘propaganda,’ and that Russia was ‘in severe breach of the INF Treaty.’”
  3. 3. Procedurally, withdrawing from the Treaty in and of itself is an interesting case in terms of the theory and practice of international law. One of the best articles on this topic was published on the LAWFARE website in the autumn of 2018.
  4. 4. Nuclear warheads are normally weigh slightly less and somewhat less precision-critical than conventional munitions, meaning that a nuclear-tipped missile of the same class may have a longer range.
  5. 5. Unfortunately, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation has not yet published an official Russian translation of the document.

First published in our partner RIAC

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Defense

Pakistan’s Skepticism on India’s NFU Policy Stands Validated

Haris Bilal Malik

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The South Asian region is widely regarded as vulnerable to the threat of nuclear war. This is largely because of the Kashmir issue’s dangerous potential as a ‘nuclear flashpoint’ between India and Pakistan. This is evident in how the use of nuclear weapons is currently being debated at the highest levels of both the Indian and Pakistani leadership against the backdrop of the latest rounds of tensions over the disputed territory. This includes recent statements by Indian Defence Minister Rajnath Singh which have alluded to India rolling back its ‘No-First Use’ (NFU) policy regarding the use of nuclear weapons. In the wake of the ongoing hostility in the region, the likely shift in India’s NFU policy is likely to have long-lasting implications for peace and stability across the region.

Keeping in mind the implications of the above-mentioned statement Pakistan’s response has been articulated at various strategic levels in Pakistan. For instance, Prime Minister Imran Khan in his article for the New York Times condemned this likely shift by terming it as a ‘not-so-veiled’ nuclear threat to Pakistan. Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi condemned India’s assertion of changing its NFU policy by terming it highly unfortunate and reflective of India’s irresponsible and belligerent behavior. At the military level, Pakistan has always doubted India’s NFU policy to have ever existed in the first place. This was reflected in Pakistan military’s official spokesperson Major General Asif Ghafoor’s statement in which he clearly said that India’s ‘no first use’ was its sole prerogative and if it wanted to change its policy then it was its own choice.

Contrary to India’s declared NFU policy, Pakistan has never made such a commitment or statement and has deliberately maintained a policy of ambiguity concerning a nuclear first strike against India. This has been carried out with a view to assuring its security and to preserve its sovereignty by deterring India via both minimum credible deterrence and full-spectrum deterrence capabilities. This posture asserts that since Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are for defensive purposes in principle, they are aimed at deterring India from any and all kinds of aggression. Therefore, even now Pakistan is likely to keep its options open and still leave room for the possibility of carrying out a ‘first strike’ as a viable potential deterrent against India if any of its stated red lines are crossed.

Furthermore, India’s NFU policy is hardly verifiable or justifiable when taken at face value as a credible policy option because of Indian offensive missile advancements and growing nuclear arsenal. This is also evident from India’s enhanced missile developments which include; hypersonic missiles, ballistic missile defence systems, enhanced space capabilities for intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance and the induction of nuclear powered ballistic missile capable submarines. Such recent developments indicate that India’s nuclear weapons modernization is aimed at continuously enhancing its deterrence framework including its second-strike capabilities. As such it is also evident of India’s shift towards employing a counterforce instead of a counter value approach to nuclear warfare. By continuously seeking an edge over Pakistan in terms of more accurate strike and, intelligence gathering capabilities, supported in tandem by enhanced BMD systems, the shifting trends indicate that India might find it more feasible to abandon its NFU policy and flirt with the possibility of a more offensive as opposed to defensive nuclear posture.

However, since Pakistan has long doubted India’s NFU policy anyway, India’s attempt to rethink, reconsider, reinterpret or shift away from its NFU policy would do not really make much difference for Pakistan’s strategic calculus. The first amendment in the NFU policy in 2003 which was based on the Indian Cabinet Committee on Security’s (CCS) review of its nuclear doctrine had already denied the NFU policy. According to this review, if the Indian armed forces or its citizens were attacked with chemical or biological weapons, then India would reserve the right to respond with nuclear weapons. Moreover, India’s preparations for a limited war or a low-intensity conflict against Pakistan under its more recent doctrines such as the 2017 Joint Doctrine of the Indian Armed Forces (JDIAF) and the 2018 Land Warfare Doctrine (LWD) are also based upon more proactive offensive strategies and indirect threats of preemptive strikes which have long since eroded the credibility of its NFU policy.

Hence, based on this context, the likelihood of India shifting its declared position on the No First Use nuclear policy against the backdrop of ongoing tensions over the Kashmir issue presents a highly irresponsible and destabilizing move by the Indian government. Especially during a situation where exercising calm and restraint are of the utmost importance, India has willfully put at stake the delicate strategic balance which exists in the South Asian region. This is likely to pose severe and long-lasting implications for peace and stability across not only the South Asian region but the entire world at large.

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Russia does not exclude nuclear war in Europe

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In these latter days the issue of the risk of nuclear escalation in a non-nuclear conflict and war by mistake is acutely on the agenda.

Obviously, strategic stability is in deep crisis. According to the report which is based on the results of a situational analysis directed by Sergei A. Karaganov and held at the Russian Foreign Ministry, “it would be a mistake to think that the new military-strategic landscape is stable. 

From author’s point of view, the main threat comes from a risk of military conflict between nuclear powers, including an unintended nuclear or non-nuclear conflict, which can subsequently escalate into a global nuclear war, with the probability of such escalation now being higher than before.
According to the report, it is clear that Russia is convinced that the U.S. has been consistently destroying its traditional architecture – the system of nuclear arms control agreements, again considering options to use nuclear weapons in a conventional conflict for winning the war, and refusing to begin serious negotiations to strengthen strategic stability.

The author is sure that this creates a vacuum in the field of nuclear weapons and lowers the threshold for their use at a time when the risk of an armed clash between nuclear powers in the current political and technological situation remains quite high.

As for Europe is concerned, the report states that more serious risks of inadvertent military clash come from the U.S.’s continues efforts to build up its military infrastructure, including missile defences and drones, in Eastern Europe, its plans to increase its low-yield nuclear weapons arsenal and put those weapons on strategic delivery systems in order to neutralize the Russian military threat. Numerous the U.S. proposals to strengthen its military presence and deployment of weapons in the territories of Poland and the Baltic States clearly indicate that the U.S. allows the possibility of a regional military conflict with Russia in Europe and is taking measures to prevent Russia from winning it by using of tactical nuclear weapons or conventionally-armed medium-range missiles.

The author consider that this is a rather dangerous tendency: for Russia, the use of tactical nuclear weapons or conventionally-armed medium-range missiles against it would mean a strategic strike and would inevitably trigger a nuclear second strike against the U.S. or those countries which deployed its nuclear weapons.

Thus, countries which are ready to deploy any kind of weapons suggested by the U.S. will turn themselves to real targets for Russia.
Nuclear war in Europe is no more a ghostly threat, but a very real one.

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Infectious Diseases and National Security: Who will frame National Health Security Policy of Pakistan?

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Health plays an influential role in fostering economic growth and sustainable development. Because of its indirect impact on human development, better health boosts rates of economic growth and contributes to wealth creation. In the past decades, new healthcare challenges and emerging infectious disease outbreaks have drawn global attention particularly in developing countries like Pakistan. Traditionally, health and security occupied separate domains, but in recent years the imperative fusion between health and national security has been recognized by policymakers, security and defence analysts in both developed and developing countries. The last two or three decades have seen sharp rise in non-traditional threats to national security, such as infectious diseases. There are many lines of attack that infectious diseases can intimidate national security i.e. increased rates of morbidity and mortality, massive damage on public health and health infrastructure, political instability, and economic volatility.

Emerging and reemerging infectious diseases, and their pandemic potential, pose a challenge to national security in the 21st century that cannot be overlooked. Though, the historical threat to national security by epidemic diseases is not new; the threat has increased in recent past and is growing rapidly in Pakistan. Correspondingly, reemergence of mosquito-borne infections such as dengue, chikungunya, zika, and more virulent forms of malaria and new more severe forms of viral respiratory infections have evolved. Pakistan is one of several countries, which together bear 95% of the burden of infectious diseases, and the trend is on the rise. According to statistics, Pakistan had not been able to control the burden of communicable diseases like tuberculosis, malaria, dengue fever, typhoid, hepatitis, cholera and other infectious diseases. Malaria, dengue, polio, and tuberculosis, are among the top killers. Pakistan is ranked fifth on the list of high-burden TB countries, and worst of all; Pakistan is one of the three remaining countries where poliomyelitis, also called polio, is still endemic. An average of about one million lives claimed yearly by malaria (estimated 12% of the rural population is believed to carry malaria parasites in their blood) and anticipated mortality rate of 48 thousand deaths per year as a result of TB cases. Similarly, infectious diseases are the biggest killers of children in Pakistan, causing 60% of all child deaths under 5 years of age.

At present, Pakistan is facing multiple challenges in healthcare, which can be broken down into social issues, technical constraints, lack of trained human resources, infrastructure, effective legislation and policymaking, awareness and negligence. The structure and function of the current healthcare system in Pakistan is far below international standards and ranked at 122 out of 190 countries in terms of healthcare standards. Pakistan does not have an organized healthcare system; even health priorities are not properly defined by present government (except Health-card). There is no evidence of strong political will, and inter-ministerial and inter-departmental conflicts, corruption, awful governance, and lack of correspondence are rampant to cope with national health security issues.

Epidemiologically, the behavior of epidemic is usually compared to previous outbreaks. The reemergence of Dengue virus (year-to-date, thousands of dengue cases are reported and hundreds of deaths in last few months) along with the dispersion of infectious diseases geographically throughout Pakistan demonstrate that Ministry of Health (MoH) and Ministry of Defence (MoD) are not incorporated and interconnected to address the national health security issues. Likewise, research and development (R&D) for new tools and technologies to prevent, detect and respond to emerging disease threats and outbreaks have not been considered by authorities with growing need in the country. As seen with the Dengue and Chikungunya outbreaks, there is a shortage of appropriate diagnostic equipments and vaccines to manage the response and lack of regulatory framework for fast-tracking and surveillance technology, tools and techniques when rapid respond is indispensable.

To cut a long story short, health security has become a national priority in many countries, supported by loyal and devoted leadership. They are approaching health security in a holistic manner, including, social, technical, economic, diplomatic, military and intelligence-related aspects. On the contrary, the link between infectious diseases and national security is relatively a new concept in Pakistan. A new paradigm is needed that links infectious diseases to national security and recognize the broad effects of diseases on society. Response to infectious disease threats should be strategic priority of health and security agencies in Pakistan. Ministry of Defence needs to acknowledge its role in ensuring that the state’s population is fit and healthy since there are no signs that the Ministry of Defence is awakening to this responsibility. At a time when our conception of national security is evolving rapidly, we must look hard at uncertain and non-traditional threats, specifically. Today, Pakistan is facing a wide range of threats to national health security, including disease outbreaks and pandemics. As health threats are evolving, protecting Pakistan from 21st century health security threats need a clear strategic direction and teamwork between Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Health. Of course, with uncertainty and ambiguity, a large amount of work is needed to bring analytical clarity to the national health security paradigm.

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