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Ayatollah Khomeini: Strategist, practitioner and mastermind of the Islamic revolution in Iran

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The year 2019 marks 40 years to the Islamic Republic of Iran. On February 11, 1979, the Islamic revolution won in Iran. The last shahinshah of the Persian Empire, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, was overthrown. The 2500-year history of the Persian Monarchy came to a close.

Undoubtedly, the Islamic revolution in Iran marked a significant chapter in the history of the 20th century and can in fact be ranked on par with the Bolshevik October Revolution in Russia, which, like the Iranian one, turned the whole country “upside down” and to this day continues to affect political processes in the region and worldwide.

The unquestionable leader of this revolution, who had been planning it for many years in exile, was Ayatollah Seyid Ruholla Mostafavi Mousavi Khomeini. He devoted his whole life to the struggle against the shah regime which repeatedly subjected him to arrest and persecution. In 1964, Ayatollah Khomeini was expelled from Iran and spent the next fifteen years in exile. For almost a year he lived in Turkey, another 13 years in Iraq and almost half a year near Paris.

However, throughout all those years Khomeini never stopped the political struggle, influencing the mentality of Iranians from abroad. In exile, Khomeini stepped up his opposition activities devising the theoretical foundations for a new Islamic state and at the same time preparing the Iranians for the overthrow of the Shah. His associates recorded his sermons and speeches on an audio tape and secretly shipped them to Iran to be distributed in Iranian mosques there.

The population of Iran knew Khomeini fairly well and were aware of his views on the domestic situation in the country and his plans for the country’s further development. His views were pretty radical. In his speeches, Khomeini lashed out at Shah’s leadership, the “comprador bourgeoisie,” the United States, and Israel. The USSR, as a major Communist power, came under fierce criticism as well. In one of his speeches, he said: “America is worse than England, England is worse than the Soviet Union, and the Soviets are worse than both of them !!!”

Whether accepted or not, Khomeini was in his own way a unique religious figure and politician. He was the one who put forward the idea of “velayat faqih”, that is, the principle of a sacred and politicized expression of religious spirituality, aimed at the absolute power of a fair legal theologian who would represent the highest level of spiritual Shiite authority – “marja e taglid”.

It was this principle that Khomeini chose to go into the basis of Khomeinism (or “neo-Shiism”) ideology he had elaborated and the principle of state-building. He combined Islam and politics, his major goal being a complete Islamization of the whole society by forcibly extending the sphere of influence of religion to embrace other sections, which in other societies are occupied by ideology, while simultaneously turning them into an instrument of political struggle. The slogan “Our religion is our ideology, our ideology is our policy” was put by the Ayatollah into practice. Thus, the boundaries between religious, ideological, and political activities in Iran were largely blurred and make up a single whole at present.

Naturally, comparison is always fraught with subjectivism. Nevertheless, Ayatollah Khomeini can be compared with Joseph Stalin. And not only because both were markedly ascetic, both expressed their thoughts simply and dogmatically, so those thoughts were clear to everyone, even the uneducated, both devoted themselves to fierce political struggle and both came to power, bringing an countless number of victims to the altar of victory.

Khomeini’s Islamic revolutionary zeal did not subside after the fall of the Shah. Moreover, he did all he could to clear the way for a new, Islamic dictatorship under the republican slogans. The Shah’s institutes of power were destroyed in a matter of months.

On April 1, 1979, a referendum was held with only one question: “Do you support the creation of the Islamic Republic of Iran?” And the majority said yes. On that day, Iran, which marked the 2500th anniversary of the monarchy only a few years before, became an Islamic republic.

In December the same year, the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran was adopted, which stipulated the supremacy of Islamic principles on the basis of Khomeinism.

The year 1980 marked the beginning of the rapid process of formation and institutionalization of the organs of the new theocratic power in the country. Khomeini was an Islamic innovator who put his idea of “velayat faqih” into practice.

This principle formed the foundation of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Like in any republic, the Constitution of the IRI proclaims the separation of the legislative (parliament), executive (government) and judicial branches of government. However, above all these branches is the supreme leader of the country, selected by a narrow circle of Islamic clerical experts from among the highest-ranking Shiite clergy. He has the control of all kinds of power in Iran – the spiritual, state, political and military. As the country’s spiritual leader, he is called Faqih, the head of the Shiite community; as a nationwide political leader – Rahbar – the head of the country; as a military leader, the Supreme Commander of all Iranian armed forces. Naturally, the title of a supreme leader went to Ayatollah Khomeini.

At first, the supreme leader used revolution sympathizers in his own interests. In a peculiar situation of anti-Shah struggle, Khomeini turned out to be an ingenious politician who was able to successfully play with the left and the right, balancing between them, juggling them, elevating some, and then others. But all this was to come to an end.

Starting from the summer of 1980 and perhaps until 1984, Ayatollah Khomeini removed the “companions of the revolution” that stood in his way. That is, those forces that backed him but were alien to him.

All those who disagreed with the new ideology he had brought in faced the same lot.

Among them were equally authoritative religious figures who did not agree with the idea of

“velayat faqih”, with the unification of Islam and politics. Among them was Ayatollah Mohammad Kazem Shariatmadari. He and his associates were not repressed but deprived of the opportunity to act politically. They were put under house arrest. Some ayatollahs left Iran, some simply fell silent. Gathered in the city of Qum (the center of Shiism) they kept silent, without being engaged in any political activity against Ayatollah Khomeini.

But such a “humane” attitude on the part of the new authorities was not for everyone who disagreed. As any revolution, the Iranian revolution was accompanied by revolutionary terror. The wheel of repression was spinning.

Effectively using the Islamic Revolutionary Committees, the newly formed Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Iranian Hezbollah (Party of Allah), the new Shiite leadership of Iran, led by Khomeini, carried out a series of repressions. The repression campaign was launched on June 14, 1980, when Ayatollah Khomeini issued a decree on the “Islamic cultural revolution” which proclaimed persecution of dissidents or a “witch hunt”. By the end of 1984, the total number of those executed in Iran was estimated at 40,000.

A powerful resistance to the Khomeini regime came from People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI). Founded in the sixties to fight the Shah regime, it occasionally resorted to terrorist methods. From the ideological point of view, the organization based its strategy on Islamism with Marxism.
Members of PMOI did a lot for the Islamic revolution, actively opposing any attempts to restore the monarchy. At first, they were on the side of Khomeini. But Ayatollah Khomeini, having sensed competitors in them, began to exert a strong pressure on them. As a result, the Mojahedin were removed from government,  repressed (more than 3 thousand members were subjected to reprisals),  and went into hiding.

The last force Khomeini struck at was the People’s Party of Iran (PPI), that is, pro-Soviet Communists, who supported Khomeini’s anti-Shah struggle in the first revolutionary years. Thus, in January 1979, PPI General Secretary N. Kiyanuri spoke favorably about Khomeini, stating that “scientific socialism and Islam do not contract one another,” and  that “Communists and Khomeini can go together almost to the end”, “infinitely helping and assisting each other”. However, this did not stop the Ayatollah. More than 5,000 members and supporters of the party were arrested. From TV screens people could see high-profile trials against the left in which PPI leaders admitted that they had been fulfilling orders from the Kremlin and declared themselves agents of Moscow.

Affecting the nature of repressions in those years was the situation on the fronts of the Iran-Iraq war (1980 – 1988). All opposition representatives were viewed as traitors who were allegedly acting in the interests of Saddam Hussein.

The suppression of the opposition, including, above all, Khomeini’s former supporters of the anti-Shah struggle, was accompanied by the Islamization of all spheres of life: political, economic, social, cultural, legal, and military. Naturally, the repressive measures of the Islamic authorities caused massive — legal and illegal — emigration from Iran. More than three million Iranians left their country. By the end of 1983 dissent had been suppressed across the country, so Islamic rule could be considered valid. The Islamic Revolution won. The Islamic Republic of Iran became a political reality.

The internal political struggle in the IRI continued after the defeat of brothers in anti-revolutionary struggle — both in parliament, the Majlis, and among various political groups. Representatives of those groups did not question Khomeini’s course but among themselves they had conflicting views on how best to implement it. Their differences were substantial enough. However, the supreme leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, remained above those frictions and never took sides. When he spoke, it became clear what everyone should do.

Ayatollah Khomeini continued to enjoy immense authority even after his death. In 1989, when the supreme leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ayatollah Khomeini, passed away on June 3, the author of the obituary article was in Iran. Mourning ceremonies that were held throughout the country are difficult to describe or impart in words. All of Tehran was clad in black: men in black shirts, women in black hijabs. Tehran is known for its heat. In an attempt to make it less of an ordeal for the mourners, volunteers and firefighters pour water on them, as they walk in grief in an endless stream that fills all the space in the streets and squares. Nearly all residents of Iran, several million people, came to Tehran to pay their last respects to Rahbar.
Khomeini’s ideas continue to form the basis of the political doctrine of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which determines the external and internal policies of the clerical leadership. An important place in the doctrine is occupied by the principles of Islamic internationalism, developed by Ayatollah Khomeini and his associates; the principles of Muslim unity; ideas about the special mission of the Muslims; about the messiah role of Islam and Iran; the theory about the permanent nature of the Islamic revolution; about the antagonism between “the oppressed (the destitute)” and “the oppressors (the arrogant)”; the theory of the “bipolar world” and the division of the world along the South-North axis. The latter theory was developed by Ayatollah Khomeini and his associates on the basis of the Islamic dogma that divides the world into “areas of faith” and “areas of war” and is designed to meet global changes and serve the strategic goals of the Iranian policy.

The leading role in this Islamic revolutionary process should be assumed by the Islamic Republic of Iran, which is set on forcing its religious and ideological theories on the rest of the world. Here lies the main political core of Khomeinism of the official ideology of Iran  – the “export of the Islamic revolution”. Along with it being part of official ideology, this concept is a legal one, since it is enshrined in the Constitution of Iran.

Ayatollah Khomeini positioned himself no more than a global Islamic leader with radical views. In his speech in March 1980, he said: “We must work to incite revolution all over the world and we must preclude any thoughts of abandoning it. Iran not only refuses to recognize any differences between Muslim countries, it also acts as an intercessor for all oppressed peoples. We must make clear our stance on powers and superpowers and voice our protest to them, despite the difficulties that we experience. Our attitude to the world is dictated by our beliefs».

From time to time, Iranian officials recall about the “global and historic importance” of the Islamic revolution. Thus, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (2005 – 2013), speaking at a ceremony in honor of the Iranian Basij militia in December 2008, said: “You all understand that the Islamic revolution was a movement that cannot be confined to the territory of Iran. This movement was aimed not only at creating a new system, but also at materializing the promises of God. The Islamic revolution was a fundamental and decisive movement for all humanity, following the path of divine prophets ”. And this naturally gives rise to questions from most politicians and countries that do not share these radical views.

Of course, 30 years after the death of Ayatollah Khomeini, the Islamic Republic of Iran has undergone significant changes. The current regime in Iran, which came into being thanks to the Islamic revolution, is constantly evolving and this evolution, proceeding under the motto of the teachings of Ayatollah Khomeini, has been spiraling.

The eight-year Iran-Iraq war (1980 – 1988) undermined the economy of Iran. The “Tawhid economy» model developed by the Khomeini team while still in exile  (the Islamic analogue of the War Communism economy) could not save the country. Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, who became president of the Islamic Republic of Iran after the death of Khomeini (1989-1997), said good-bye to the “Tawhid economy” and made a sharp turn towards the market. He initiated economic market reforms, which made it possible to liberate the Iranian business and overcome the post-war crisis. It dealt a serious blow to the legacy of Ayatollah Khomeini.

The next president, Mohammad Khatami (1997–2005), while pursuing economic reforms, introduced elements of liberalism into domestic and foreign policy, which triggered an outrage from the radicals. And this is understandable: although carried out under the slogans of Khomeini’s teachings, the social and political reforms (whether their architects wanted it or not) inevitably took the country and society further and further away from the general concept of Khomeinism. The conservative-minded Iranian clergy could not let it happen. They wanted restoration of the Khomeinist regime, they needed a change in the policies of the two presidents to maintain their power.

President Ahmadinejad was expected to fulfill the mission of returning to the ideology of Khomeini. This he did with great enthusiasm, bringing the nuclear conflict on the verge of a war with the United States and Israel, and throwing the economy into the abyss of the most severe international sanctions.

President Hassan Rouhani (2013 – present), a liberal-reformist politician, saved the situation. However, the provocative policy of President Trump towards Iran and the US withdrawal from the nuclear deal have given Iranian conservatives and radicals a new chance to return to the ideological principles of the time of Ayatollah Khomeini.

Thus, the Islamic Republic of Iran has gone through various stages of its development: revolutionary terror, war, a thaw, and a cold spell. But it would be quite correct to assert that the evolution of the Islamic Republic of Iran boils down to expanding or narrowing the limits of the permissible across a vast variety of dogmatic political, economic, and social restrictions. At the same time, all evolutionary processes in the Islamic Republic of Iran have proceeded under the portrait of Khomeini, with quotes from his works, to his, in fact, personality cult.

Ayatollah Khomeini created the Islamic Republic of Iran, which has become a kind of laboratory, in which political Islam for the first time in global practices has turned into a means of resolving problems that confront the Islamic civilization in the present-day world.

Khomeinism never restricted itself to Iran. The theory and political practice of Ayatollah Khomeini have in many ways encouraged politicians in a number of Islamic countries to use political Islam for their own purposes. Over time, there appeared special terms that reflect the essence of Khomeini’s policy – the “Khomeini effect”, the “Khomeini model” and even the “Khomeini world plan.” But the practice of pursuing one of the basic principles of Khomeinism – the export of the Islamic revolution on the model of Iran – alarmed many Islamic (and not only Islamic) countries, particularly those in which a significant number of Muslims are Shiites. But what is clear is that Khomeinism never developed to become a global doctrine or a major political practice, neither in the region, nor elsewhere in the world.

First published in our partner International Affairs

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Iran: A major Replacement of Human Resources

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Since 1979, when the mullahs seized power, Iran has topped the list of countries affected by the “brain drain”. What appeared to be local bleeding at the time may now become total bleeding affecting other sectors of the population.

The headline of one of the stories in the official news agency, IRNA, was: “It is not only the elite that migrate.” The daily newspaper, Javan, affiliated with the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, warned that Iran was losing some of its best-educated people, and stated that mass immigration of “elite elements” “costs the nation millions of dollars.” But immigration now attracts Iranians with less skills or devoid of skills.

According to the best semi-official estimates, since 1979 some eight million people, roughly 10 percent of the population, have left Iran, including an estimated 4.2 million highly educated and highly skilled people.

In the past four years, the brain drain has accelerated, with an average of 4,000 doctors leaving each year.

According to IRNA, at present, 30,000 general practitioners and senior nurses are awaiting the “good professional standing” certificates that developed countries require from those wishing to immigrate from so-called “developing countries”, such as Iran.

A study conducted by two researchers from the University of Tehran, Adel Abdullah and Maryam Rezaei, showed that almost all Iranians who immigrate seek to enter the European Union or the so-called “Anglosphere” countries such as Britain, Canada, the United States, New Zealand and Australia.

Only 10 percent of potential immigrants are willing to go “anywhere else” to get out of Iran.

The immigration requests did not include a single request who wanted to go to a Muslim country, and the only exception is Iraq, which attracts thousands of Iranian mullahs and students of theology who go to Najaf and Karbala to escape the government’s domination of religion in Tehran.

Potential immigrants also avoid China, India and Russia, while the only two Asian countries still attracting Iranians are Malaysia and Japan.

For many potential immigrants, the first destination they want to go to is Dubai, then Istanbul, then Cyprus and until recently Yerevan (the capital of Armenia), where visas are being applied for to desired destinations. Some immigrants may have to wait two or three years to obtain visas from the European Union, Canada and the United States.

Who migrates and why?

Some of the answers came from a three-year study conducted by Sharif University (Ariamher) in Tehran. According to the study, a survey of 17,078 people across all 31 provinces of Iran showed that 70 percent of senior managers and highly skilled employees in the public sector wish to immigrate.

In the projects and businessmen sector, 66 percent expressed their desire to emigrate. This figure drops to 60 percent among doctors, nurses and other medical personnel.

The study shows that the majority of potential immigrants are highly educated, unmarried youth from urban areas, i.e. the higher the education of the individual, the greater the desire to leave.

Among those who express “dissatisfaction with the current situation,” 43 percent of them want to leave the country. This figure drops to 40 percent among those who feel “great satisfaction”, which reveals that the desire to leave is deeper than occasional social and political concerns, which is confirmed by other figures in the same study.

Of those who felt “despairing about the future in Iran,” 42 percent want to leave, a figure that drops to 38 percent among those who still have some hope for the country’s future.

The study shows that the desire to flee Iran is not caused by economic hardship as a result of unemployment or inflation. It is not only the poor or the unemployed who wish to flee, but also those with good jobs, or candidates for well-paid jobs and a seat on the mullahs’ train and their security and military partners.

The largest number of immigrants comes from the provinces of Tehran, Isfahan and Qom, where per capita income is 30 percent higher than the average income in the country. Poorer provinces such as Sistan Baluchistan, Boyer Ahmad, Koh Kiluyeh, and South Khorasan are at the bottom of the list in terms of immigrant numbers.

The study does not provide figures, but there is anecdotal evidence that tens of thousands of immigrants, especially to Canada and the United States, are descended from ruling Islamic families.

None of the studies we looked at suggested other reasons as potential attractions for immigrants, such as the great success stories of Iranian immigrants around the world. A study conducted by Nooshin Karami revealed that more than 200 politicians of Iranian origin now occupy senior positions in the political structures of 30 countries, including those of the European Union and the Anglosphere. 1000 Iranians hold senior positions in international companies, while thousands more are active in the media, scientific research and academic circles in the leading industrialized countries. Dozens of Iranian writers, poets, playwrights, and filmmakers have built successful careers for themselves outside of Iran.

At the other end of the spectrum, Iran also attracts immigrants from neighboring Iraq, from the Kurdish and Shiite Arab regions, the Nakhichevan enclave, Afghanistan and Pakistan, while hosting thousands of religious students from Yemen, Syria, Lebanon and Nigeria. Qom.” According to state media, many students remain in Iran after completing their studies and marrying Iranian women.

All in all, Iran hosts more than six million “foreign guests,” including Afghan, Pakistani, and Iraqi refugees. Interestingly, the desire to leave seems to have reached the “guests” as well. Between March 2021 and March 2022, more than half a million Afghan refugees returned to their homes.

To deal with the consequences of this “brain drain,” the Islamic Republic unveiled a program to attract highly educated and skilled people from “anywhere in the world” with the promise of one-year contracts, good salaries, and enjoyment of “all citizenship rights except the right to vote.”

An estimated 300,000 fighters who served under the Iranian command in Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen were promised permanent residence in Iran and access to agricultural land to start a new life.

Critics claim that the Khomeinist regime is pleased that so many potential opponents among the urban middle class are leaving Iran, as Iran can compensate for the loss of population with newcomers from poor Muslim countries who aspire to a better standard of living under what they see as a “true Islamic” regime.

It is worth noting that other authoritarian regimes, notably the former Soviet Union, communist China, North Korea, Vietnam, and Cuba, benefited from the exodus of what they saw as potential enemies from the middle class, allowing them to implement a scheme of “great replacement.”

On this, Iranian Revolutionary Guard General Mohammad Reza Najdi said: “Let those who do not love us leave the country, to make room for those who love us.”

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‘Saudi First’ aid policy marries geopolitics with economics

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When Mohammed al-Jadaan told a gathering of the global political and business elite that Saudi Arabia would, in the future, attach conditions to its foreign aid, the finance minister was announcing the expansion of existing conditionality rather than a wholly new approach.

Coined ‘Saudi First,’ the new conditionality ties aid to responsible economic policies and reforms, not just support for the kingdom’s geopolitics.

For the longest time, Saudi Arabia granted aid with no overt strings. The aid was policed by privately demanding support for the kingdom’s policies, often using as a carrot and stick quotas for the haj, the yearly Muslim pilgrimage to the holy city of Mecca allotted to countries across the globe.

As a result, over the years, Saudi Arabia poured tens of billions of dollars into black holes, countries that used the aid as a band-aid to address an immediate crisis with no structural effort to resolve underlying causes.

For countries like Lebanon, Egypt, and Pakistan, this meant stumbling from one crisis to the next.

“We are changing the way we provide assistance and development assistance. We used to give direct grants and deposits without strings attached, and we are changing that. We are working with multilateral institutions to actually say, we need to see reform,” Mr. Al-Jadaan told this month’s World Economic Forum in the Swiss resort of Davos.

Saudi First serves multiple Saudi purposes.

It ties geopolitical drivers of Saudi aid to economic criteria that are likely to enhance the kingdom’s influence, create opportunities for Saudi investment and business, and enhance the kingdom’s ties to recipient countries.

In doing so, the additional conditionality positions the kingdom as a constructive, forward-looking member of the international community. It aligns Saudi Arabia more closely with multilateral institutions like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), regional development banks, and major donors such as the United States and the European Union.

It also enables Saudi rulers to circumvent the implications of the principle of ‘no taxation without representation’ that traces its roots to the American revolution.

Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s social and economic revamping of the kingdom while tightening the political screws as part of his plan to diversify the kingdom’s economy has involved introducing taxes with no political participation.

“Saudi people see their resources going abroad while they’re being asked to pay taxes, have their benefits cut, and so on. So, I think this Saudi first stance really serves as a way to both court and contain populism,” said Gulf scholar Kristin Smith Diwan.

Saudi circumvention of the American revolutionary principle, irrespective of whether it helps pacify Saudis, has already had unintended consequences.

Earlier this week, the Jordanian parliament fired a deputy, Mohammad Al-Fayez, for asking Mr. Bin Salman to stop aiding Jordan.

“All your aid lands in the pockets of the corrupt. Your donations pay bills that have nothing to do with the Jordanian people. We hear about aid coming in for the state. However, this aid only goes to a corrupt class that is getting richer at the expense of the proud Jordanian people,” Mr. Al-Fayez said in a letter to the crown prince.

The Jordanian parliament’s measure coincided with the Saudi finance minister’s announcement. Mr. Al-Fayez wrote his letter in December at the height of clashes in the southern city of Maan between security forces and protesters angry about rising fuel prices and poor governance.

Countries like Lebanon, Pakistan, and Egypt that are potentially most impacted by the new conditions for Saudi aid illustrate the geopolitical complexities of the change.

For Saudi Arabia, Lebanon is about countering Iran and its Lebanese Shiite proxy, Hezbollah, a powerful militia and political movement with significant influence in government and the country’s power structure.

Saudi Arabia hopes that the new conditionality will force a change in Lebanon’s power dynamics.

“The whole world knows what the kingdom offered Lebanon…until it…was back on its feet. But what can we do if current Lebanese policy chooses to surrender the reins of an ancient Arab nation to Iran’s proxy in that country?” asked Saudi columnist Hammoud Abu Taleb.

To be sure, the Lebanese establishment is responsible for the country teetering on the brink of collapse.

The World Bank has described the crisis fuelled by corruption, waste, and unsustainable financial policies as one of the worst globally since the mid-19th century.

This week’s judicial battle over holding powerful figures accountable for the 2020 Beirut port explosion that has spilled onto the streets of the Lebanese capital reflects the establishment’s determination to shield itself no matter the cost to Lebanon as a whole.

The explosion in a warehouse in the port housing hundreds of tons of ammonium nitrate, a material used in fertilizers, killed 218 people, injured more than 6,000, and damaged large parts of Beirut.

A Saudi contribution to forcing political change, a sine qua non for putting Lebanon on a path toward recovery, would be welcome.

It would also go some way towards the kingdom taking responsibility for its role in fighting a decades-long proxy war with Iran that helped bring the Mediterranean nation to its knees.

That is, if the conditions imposed by Saudi Arabia are tailored in ways that contribute to change while seeking to alleviate the pain the Lebanese endured, with the Lebanese pound losing 95% of its value, prices skyrocketing, and purchasing power demolished.

One way would be making accountability for the Beirut blast a condition for future aid.

Recent Saudi standoffishness towards the regime of Egyptian general-turned-president Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, was evident in the kingdom’s conspicuous absence at a gathering of regional leaders in Abu Dhabi earlier this month. Mr. Al-Sisi was one of the attendees.

The standoffishness reflects the fact that Egypt is a black hole. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and other Gulf states have injected tens of billions of dollars with few tangible results except for keeping in power a regime that emerged from a 2013 military coup supported by the kingdom and the Emirates.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE backed the coup as part of a campaign to roll back the achievements of the 2011 popular Arab revolts that toppled four leaders, including Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak.

The coup also ended the flawed presidency of Mohammed Morsi, Egypt’s first and only democratically elected leader. Because he was a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, Mr. Morsi was like a red cloth to a bull in the two Gulf states.

The UAE recognised early on that it needed to ensure its billions were judiciously deployed. So it based a Cabinet-level official in Cairo to advocate reforms and assist in crafting policies that would help put the economy back on track.

The Emirati effort came to naught, with Egypt continuously needing additional funds from the Gulf and the IMF, and the UAE, allowing Mr. Al-Sisi to turn the military into the country’s foremost economic player.

The impact of the Covid-19 pandemic and the Ukraine war on commodity and energy prices only aggravated Egypt’s economic crisis that is largely the result of Mr. Al-Sisi’s economic mismanagement

Mr. Al-Sisi unsuccessfully tried to manipulate Egypt’s currency, set misguided spending priorities, launched wasteful megaprojects, and expanded disruptive state and military control of the economy.

Time will tell what lessons the Saudis may learn from the Emirati experience. Unlike Lebanon, the question is whether Saudi Arabia will strictly impose its news aid policy conditionality or continue to view Egypt as too big to fail.

The problem for Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states is that popular discontent is simmering just below the surface in Egypt and could explode at any time. What makes things potentially more volatile is the possibility of the plight of the Palestinians, aggravated by the policies of Israel’s new hardline, Jewish nationalist government, becoming the catalyst for anti-government protests.

Such demonstrations have a life of their own, and in a moment, they can turn into a protest against the government, against poverty and waste, and we have a direct confrontation whose results can be lethal,” said an Egyptian journalist.

One factor in Saudi thinking about Egypt may be the perception that the North African country, which refused to get sucked into the kingdom’s war in Yemen, may no longer be the security buffer in Africa it once was together with Sudan, a country in transition following a 2019 popular revolt.

That seemed to be one reason for this month’s signing of a memorandum on defence cooperation between Saudi Arabia and Chad, a nation in a region wracked by ethnic and jihadist insurgencies.

The memorandum signals a potential Saudi interest in playing some security role in West Africa at a time that France is on the retreat while Turkey, Iran, and the Wagner Group, Russian mercenaries with close ties to President Vladimir Putin, are on the march.

Last year, Qatar mediated a peace agreement between the Chadian government and more than 30 rebel and opposition factions. However, nine groups, including the Front for Change and Concord in Chad (FACT), the most powerful insurgent faction, refused to sign the deal.

The likelihood of Saudi Arabia taking on an expanded security role far from its shores may be slim in the immediate future.

Even so, creating building blocks that include tighter relations with recipients of Saudi foreign aid through sensible strings attached is one step towards cementing the kingdom’s geopolitical influence.

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MBS policies: Are a threat to the Washington-led Global Order or not?

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In this photo released by Saudi Press Agency (SPA), Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, right, greets President Joe Biden, with a fist bump after his arrival in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, Friday, July 15, 2022. (Saudi Press Agency via AP)

Amid the Ukraine crisis, Riyadh’s policy towards Washington took a bitter shift. The years-long loyalty of Riyadh towards Washington began to tremble. The Riyadh did not condemn Moscow’s attack on Kyiv, nor it fulfilled the Washington’s expectations by refusing to OPEC Plus’ decision of not increasing the oil production. Whether Moscow’s valiant attempt of opening war against Kyiv, against the will of Washington and NATO, inspired the KSA to take an unpredictable position or Riyadh’s policy shift is owing to its economic and strategic interests, it is quite debatable. This shift not only triggered the minds of researchers worldwide but also caused Biden’s eyebrows to rise. In addition, Riyadh also showed its willingness to join BRICS. In case, Riyadh joins BRICS to ensure its economic and strategic interests; it will challenge the supremacy of petro-dollar, as Saudi Arabia is one of the largest oil exporters. As a whole, it will affect US economy drastically, hence posing serious threats to the Washington-led Global Order.

The wake of the Ukraine war wreaked havoc throughout the globe by destabilizing the global economy. Moreover, this eruption of the conflict increased food and energy insecurity vertically and horizontally. Being a global leader, Washington stepped forward to discourage Moscow and compelled it to withdraw its troops from Kyiv. As a result, Moscow decided to cut off the energy supply to the west. This was just an initiation of the devastation. The clash of interests between Moscow and Washington led to the American use of so-called institutional power, freezing Moscow’s assets. Contrarily, Moscow’s denial to supply energy gave rise to energy insecurity caused by the rising oil and gas prices. Following the primacy doctrine, the global hegemon America took the responsibility to curb this energy insecurity leading to global economic instability. Continuing the long tradition, Washington intended to exercise the influence on the Middle Eastern partners KSA and UAE to supply the energy resources abundantly to fill the energy supply and demand gap.

This time the results were unpredictable, as both of these states defied to enhance their energy production. The unprecedented stance of the Saudi Monarch was to comply with OPEC Plus’ decision to decrease production and increase the prices of energy products. This denial of Riyadh was taken as a serious gesture by Washington. It was perceived that Riyadh’s refusal was a gesture for having goodwill for Russia, consequently creating the situation of “Either you are with us or against us.” In other terms, we may conclude that it was a shift in loyalties.

The whole debate revolves around the question, “Whether Riyadh’s policy has strength to shake the foundations of prevailing Washington led global order or not?” Is the global order a volatile structure to be transformed so easily just by shifting a policy of one state, or does this policy shift have some potential challenges? Before directly coming to the horror impacts of this policy, we should better discuss the worth of energy security and its irrefutable importance for the stable global economic system. If the fuel prices aren’t lowered, it will halt or lower the industrial processes of major industrialized states, including the U.S., consequently drastically affecting the states’ GDP and Per capita income. The vulnerabilities in economic position will surely lead to chaos and internal instability.  

The other facet of this debate, “Whether Riyadh is shifting towards Russia or not? Is Russia capable enough to serve the strategic interests of Riyadh? If not, then what does this policy shift mean?” The ultimate strategic interests of Riyadh always centered on attaining regional hegemony by countering Tehran. At the same time, Moscow is already enjoying better diplomatic ties with Tehran. Moscow will adopt a balanced approach between Riyadh and Tehran. Contrarily, there may be some possibilities of extension of this Riyadh-Moscow cooperation from energy to Economic and military cooperation because Russia is capable of providing the defense technology to Riyadh but unable to provide security in the region. Most importantly, Washington’s institutional hold can be used against Riyadh. These threats still can restrict Riyadh from standing up with Moscow. 

The other important frontier of this debate is KSA’s willingness to join BRICS. As the world’s largest oil exporter, Saudi Arabia has played a central role in the Petrodollar system. The country has used its vast oil reserves to maintain a strong influence on the global economy and has largely adhered to the practice of only selling oil in exchange for U.S. dollars. This has helped to ensure the continued global demand for U.S. dollars and has contributed to the dollar’s status as the dominant global currency. One potential outcome is that Saudi Arabia and other BRICS countries could agree to use a different currency for oil trade, such as the Chinese yuan or a new currency specifically for use by BRICS countries. This could lead to a decrease in global demand for U.S. dollars and potentially negatively affect the U.S. economy.

Saudi Arabia’s recent policy shift towards BRICS and Russia has raised questions about the stability of the current global order, particularly about the stability of Petro-dollars and global energy security. While it is debatable whether the shift is motivated by economic or strategic interests, it is clear that this move is a serious concern for the United States and has the potential to impact the contemporary Washington-led global order significantly. It remains to be seen whether Saudi Arabia will follow through with its potential decision to join the BRICS group and how this will affect its relationships with other countries, particularly Russia and the United States. In a nutshell, major global order changes are expected to occur if Saudi Arabia joins BRICS because it will affect the supremacy of Petro-dollars and consequently lead to the decline in U.S. economic power.

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