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International Law

The normative context in defining ‘refugees’

Janakan Muthukumar

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Photo Credit: © UNHCR/Ivor Prickett

Contextual challenges in recognizing refugees

The Refugee Convention articulates that for any person to be qualified to be a refugee that person must have been outside from the country of his nationality due to the fact of a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, member of a particular social group or for having a particular political opinion. However, the Convention also in its stand approves that any person who has already been considered as a refugee under any treaty arrangements prior to this Convention would also be considered as refugees. The definition provided in the Convention is comprehensive, in a way that considers the cultural changes, and the interpretation includes the fear of persecution not only by the state actors but also by non-state actors.

However, there are also a number of restrictions, such as if a person voluntarily re-availed him or herself of the protection of his/her country of nationality, or has voluntarily reacquired the nationality of their state, the definition of refugees would not be applicable.  Further, if the state ceased to exist under the ‘cessation’ clauses, although according to the UNHCR, such clause required to be invoked sparingly, there is a possibility where the person may not fit within the definition provided by the Convention.  Nonetheless, the provision in the Convention so far has been interpreted broadly, in a way that the refugee status will not be considered to be ceased as long as the situation in the state of origin remains a danger.

Irrespective of these restrictions, the Convention remains as the central pillar, customarily interpreted in reflecting its objective and purpose of it – protecting individuals in need. Although in cases the general instability was found as a factor which is inconsistent to the prevent cessation of status, particularly due to the effect of persecution, it has also been considered as a viable internal alternative, which demonstrates that the customary interpretation of the Convention is limited. In other cases, the general instability was found as a ground for subsidiary protection that said, although the Convention fails to provide the required protection, still the state is obliged to grant such protection. Further, the Convention contemplates that irrespective of the condition of persecution remains a qualification, an individual could still qualify as a refugee given the fact there are compelling reasons arising from the previous persecution, commonly referred as ‘exemption from cessation.’ This exception applies only to the ‘statutory’ refugees, i.e. individuals who are eligible as refugees under the Article 1A (1) of the Convention: who were prior to the Convention were recognized as refugees. Further, the state practice is also contributing in extending the ‘exemption from cessation’ in protecting Convention refugees, irrespective of the fact, that the UNHCR noted clearly that such interpretation is not required by the Convention.

Nonetheless, the extent of the state practice creates now the customary norm, requiring this application, to be a purposive one. However, limitation applies under the exclusion clauses from the protection of non-refoulment to anyone qualify as a refugee under the serious reasons for consideration for have committed a crime against peace, war crime or crime against humanity or poses a compelling threat to national security or public order to the security of the country of refuge, where the individual who has already qualified as a refugee would subsequently lose the status. Note, however the exclusion clauses themselves have exceptions, such as child soldiers, decided in the case of AG v Zaoui by the Supreme Court of New Zealand, reflected on refoulment that goes hand and hand with the jus cogens status on preventing torture, noted that “[t]he prohibition on refoulment to torture has the  status of a peremptory norm or jus cogens with the consequence that article 33.2 [of the Refugee Convention] would now be void to the extent that it allows for [refoulment in such circumstances].” This implication of flexible application of the Convention was not only followed throughout the judicial decisions but also by legislative actions such as by the Council of Europe on the Recommendation 773, which recommended the European Union members to apply the definition of refugee liberally as amended by the Protocol of the Convention.

Evolution of a definition under the customary international law

As discussed above although the Convention has not amended explicitly in revising the definition of refugees, it has been customarily broadly interpreted as to justify the object and purpose. Although there has been an argument that the definition of refugees does not appear under the customary international law, but under treaty law, authors alike Hailbronner believes that the international obligation to grant protection to the victim is a ‘wishful legal thinking’, thus reflection through the state practice is a viable option. The American Society of International Law also produced that the human rights instruments are required to be read as a whole, thus protection prescribed in the Convention could be applicable to persons who enjoy any sort of non-refoulment. Thus, non-refoulment is a general principle, which Bazo also agrees that any individual who has the right to be protected under the international law must be covered by the definition of refugees. However, these arguments would be only valid if there are an extensive state practice and opinio juris to support the argument.

Regarding the state practice in expanding the definition of refugees, the reason for the primary expansion is because of civil wars, ethnic and communal conflicts and natural disasters, and of the acceptance that the international law can expand itself through custom. The Statue of the International Court of Justice prescribes that ‘evidence of a general practice accepted as law is law’ based on two elements: state practice which is described as a widespread and consistent practice of the states and opinio juris, the subjective belief of the state that engages in that practice, believing it as a requirement, not as an option. In this context, the statistics reveal that according to the UNHCR around 9 million individuals who have been identified as refugees, deserve protection, which from the state practice guidance provided in the case of North Sea Continental Shelf and of the history of the states to recognize and receive refugees to their respected nations represent the widespread practice, further be recognized not only through the subjective believe that it is the responsibility to protect refugees under the outgrown opinion juris, but also an international obligation under the treaty provisions such as Conventions Against Torture (CAT), and of the peremptory norm, jus cogens.

Defining Refugee through International Agreements

Although number of international instruments address the refugees in various stands, the Convention of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) on Refugees expands the definition of refugees includes, the people who displace due to the ‘external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order.’ Although there have been arguments that the intention of the drafters of the Convention was reflecting the post-colonial context, the fact that the Convention was signed by a number of largest recipients of refugees including Kenya, Uganda, Sudan, Zambia, Egypt and Tanzania makes the validity of the claim of the Convention in expanding the definition of refugees. In one step further, the states such as South Africa, Tanzania and Uganda adopted the Convention into their municipal laws impacts on the state practice, form a customary international law in expanding the scope of the definition of refugees. As such, the Bangkok Principles on the Asian -African Legal Consultive Organization also claims similar expansion in the definition of refugees, specially accepts the concept of refugees sur place, also claims the definition to cover any individual who was expelled from a state where his or her life or liberty is threatened for the reasons of race, colour, nationality, ethnic origins, etc.

The Cartagena Declaration focused on the forced migrants in Central and South America noted that Article 1(2) of the OAU Convention as the starting point of defining refugees, the declaration was although not legally binding in nature, endorsed by the Organization of American States, the UNHCR Executive Committee, further cited in the Brasilia Declaration on the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons in the Americans. It was signed and ratified by most of the American states, including Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua and Venezuela. The Mercosur Rio de Janeiro Declaration further provided expanded definition includes not only to the individual whose life is threatened for the reasons of race, colour and nationality etc., as provided in the previously discussed declarations, but also the victims of a generalized violation of human rights. The declaration itself expresses the state practice by accepting the geographically diverse practice to support the existence of the customary international law.

The Refugee Convention, its Protocol of 1967, and the Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees 2001 attribute the expanded version of the definition of refugees, also affirms the important of the human rights and regional refugee protection instruments which by doing it expresses the obligation of the states to carry the burden for the stronger existence of opinio juris.

There has been also the subsidiary protection provided in the international agreements based on the context of persecution, often those individuals protected are referred as de facto refugees: the refugees who need are seen as legitimate, however, they would not qualify under the Convention. However, looking at the intention of the drafters of the Convention, it is expressed that the provisions of the Convention can be interpreted in a way to cover these expanded group of persons. However, there has been debate about this status, which was particularly addressed by the European Union in the context when considering the minimum standard of the directive failed to cover subsidiary protection. Although the directive models the Article 1(F) of the Convention, there has been no legal obligation to follow the terms, nor required to be supplemented by humanitarian assistance. Nonetheless, there are a number of international treaties calls for the subsidiary protection, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the CAT in particular, the Article 3 which prohibits refoulment of a person, ‘where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subject to torture.’

The European Convention on Human Rights and the American and African Charters make similar provisions on torture, establishes that the protection must be given to an individual when he is in ‘real risk.’ The EU Minimum Standards Directive 2004 particularly requires the member states to receive asylum application on the basis of the subsidiary protection who cannot go back to the country of origin because of serious harm, which includes death penalty or execution, torture and inhuman treatment or any other form of serious and individual threat to the civilian’s life by indiscriminate violence caused by the international or non- international armed conflict.

The state practice and the opinio juris have also been recognized in the context of refugees by the practice and mandate of the UNHCR that contributes to the formation of customary international law. It is because the organization embodies the state practice through being represented by the state delegates, or where the state cites the mandate of the organization being supervisory expresses opinio juris that the legal standards applied by the organization are accurate and the delegation by the states to the UNHCR could determine the status of refugees. In this context, the practice of the UNHCR cannot be dismissed, a representative opinio juris that is effective.

The Council of Europe through its Recommendation 18 of 2001 and by case laws such as in the case of Elgafaji v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie, Case C-465/07, 2009 E.C.R., argues for the qualification for the subsidiary protection which does not require to be a specifically targeted for harsh treatment, but as far is it fulfill ‘serious and individual treat’ due to the indiscriminate violence. It is to note that the EU did not broaden the definition of refugees, but provides legal standings for subsidiary protection, an expression of the opinio juris for the subsidiary protection.

Normative restrictions on the definition of refugees

Although the above discussion expresses that the definition of refugees has been expanded in a way to cover individuals, not just those facing the risk of persecution, there are also the existence of the negative impact of the customary international law that narrows the definition, particularly when there is a treaty provision which contrasts to the intention of the customary international law in this matter in particular.

One method the states adopted in narrowing the scope of the application of refugee law is by interpreting the territorial application of the Convention, which affects the determination of when an individual is outside his country of nationality. For an example, the US Supreme Court ruled that the Convention is not applicable outside the territory of the United States, whereas Russia interpreted in the same manner, along with interpreting the definition of territory.

The second method is by providing alternative relocation. Courts found when there is a possibility for the individual to relocate within the state of nationality, the application for refugee status can be rejected. However, in this context states found it from two approaches. First is to see whether there is genuine access to the areas of domestic protection, where the state can ensure the protection is meaningful, and the protection is not unpredictable. The second approach is comparing the situation of the area where the individual currently situated and the characteristic of the proposed area of protection, which is the approach the UK finds through the case laws since the first approach does not go along with the EU Council Directive 2004/83/EC.

The third method of the states enforce is applying the third country or safe country of origin tests to refuse the claims for asylum, in the basis that if the individual is coming from a country that has been deemed safe, then there is no requirement to provide asylum.

The fourth method is enforcing prohibitions on applying for recognition of refugee status through regulations under certain circumstances. Although it in first hand appears as it does not narrow the definition of refugees, but the fact the burden of proof is placed on the applicant that he has no disqualifying act or condition such as in the cases of terrorist suspects, such as in the case of Bundesrepublik Deutschland v. B, Case C- 57/09, 1990 E.C.R. and Bundesrepublik Deutschland v. D., Case C-101/09, 2010, severely affects the scope of being defined as a legitimate refugee. Further, broadly interpreting the acceptable criteria that the Convention spells out for refusing the refugee status, have certainly undermined the scope of the Convention, that indirectly impact in the definition and scope of refugees.

The fifth method is providing diplomatic assurances while refusing to accept the refugees, which is still remaining controversial. It was argued against by the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture as an ineffective approach has been used by states. The MOU signed by the UK with Jordan, Libya and Lebanon to provide blanket assurance is a clear example of it, which the Council of European Commissioner for Human Rights argued that “[t]he weakness inherent in the practice of diplomatic assurances lies in the fact that where there is a need for such assurances, there is clearly an acknowledged risk of torture or ill-treatment.”

In these contexts, this essay concludes that although normatively the definition of refugees has extended, the governments have been using different mechanisms in restricting the scope of it by not willfully restrict the definition, or contrast the customary international law, but by going around the definition, that has substantially weakened the entire legal scope of the extension of the definition so far has been built up by the customary international law.

Janakan Muthukumar is a young academic, currently undertakes a research project at the University of Toronto on G7 commitments on International Security. He holds an LLM in International Law from the University of London, UK and a Master in Human Rights and Democratisation at the University of Sydney, Australia. His research focuses on armed conflicts, counterterrorism and counterproliferation.

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International Law

Russia’s Ambivalent Position in International Law: A Civilizational Narrative

Punsara Amarasinghe

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Russia’s unique geographic position and its own diverse culture twisted with Euro-Asian values have placed Russia as a country with a blend of civilizational values.  Perhaps, the obvious question that one can raise is the exact validity of a civilizational perspective on deciding the international image of a country. In such a context the civilizational legacy embedded upon Russia throughout its history should be taken into consideration as the most pivotal fact in carving its global role. In particular, its history stemming from Orthodox roots that appreciated the centrality of the ruler and legitimacy of authority has always been Russia’s guiding points in its history. The values which are predominantly important to Western democracies such as individual liberty, freedom of expression and personal space have always been regarded with a sense of skepticism in Russia. Nevertheless, it was not because Russia does not value the liberty or human freedom, but it is important to understand Russia’s approach human rights, international law and many other global political practices have been born out of Russia’s civilizational uniqueness.

Especially, the Russian approach to international law and its existing anomalies with the Western notion of international legal standards is an interesting topic regardless of complex nature. The twisted geographic position that paved the path to create Russia a civilization thrived between Europe and Asia is a notable factor which kept Russia aloof from the political developments took place in Latin Europe. It is not an exaggeration to say that Russia was not touched by the effects of Westphalia till Peter the Great exposed Russia to Europe and the famous jurist of his court Peter Shafirov codified the first international legal text in Russian empire. However, the international legal scholarship and Russia’s role in European international law making such as Hague conferences 1899 and 1905 were completely uprooted by the events that took place in 1917. The state emerged in the aftermath of Bolshevik revolution was grounded on Marxian Leninist ideology which inherently rejected the faith in international law as an oppressive tool operated by capitalist states. However, the reluctance of admitting the universality of international law and its norms were withered away during the Stalinist period with the emergence of new jurisprudential school that accepted the applicability of international law in world socialist cause. As an example Soviet jurist Grigori Tunkin advocated for the peaceful co-existence of states through international law.

However, Russia and its juristic approach to international law have always taken rather ambivalent position regardless of its time space. Since the imperial Tsarist regime to the Soviet era, Russian had shown their civilizational uniqueness in adhering to international law. Many anticipated with some sanguine hopes Russia would return to Europe after the collapse of their communist empire and this hope was fuelled by sense of optimism shown by Boris Yeltsin when Russia officially joined European Court of Human Rights in 1998. Many pundits described it as an act symbolizing Russia’s yearn to embrace European values as she did under Peter in 18th century. Nevertheless, Russian position of international law in Post-Soviet space did not entirely transform into a lenient one. Especially, the crisis erupted after annexation of Crimea and the constant reports on human rights abuses have raised a big question mark before international legal practice in contemporary Russia. It seems to indicate that Russia’s historical uniqueness of being away from Latin Europe still shapes its legal thinking. For instance, Russia’s denial of admitting individuals as a subject of international law stands as a pivotal feature in post-Soviet confrontation with western international law. The abundant attention upon state sovereignty over any other rights has not been forsaken in post-Soviet era and perhaps in examining Russia’s role in the aftermath of Crimean crisis that one can regard Russia has fervently deviated from European liberal values. President Putin’s remarks at Federal Assembly in 2002 on upholding its state supremacy can be regarded as Russia’s state policy on maintain their vastness as it was preserved under Tsars and Communists unchanged. In addressing the Federal Assembly in 2002, President Putin said “All our historical experience testifies: such a country as Russia many live and develop in the existing borders only if it is a powerful state. Maintenance of the state in a vast space, preservation of the unique community of the people while keeping strong positions of the country in the world-that is not only enormous work”

Above mentioned statement made by Putin in 2002 aptly convinces why Russia is heavily concerned about her territorial sovereignty while keeping low enthusiasm over issues such as individual rights, human rights. The civilizational difference between Russia and the West has become double edged sword as Russia’s real civilizational position in international law appears ambiguous. In fact, we cannot entirely exclude Russia from European civilization and its intellectual influences, but in the same time the space to locate Russia in Asiatic geo political space gives less significant factors. This twisted dilemma has perhaps sharpened Russia as a unique civilization and the sui generis practice Russia upholds in international law can be regarded as an offshoot of this civilizational uniqueness. The argument I illustrated above regarding the reluctance of Russia throughout its history in denying to accept individuals as subjects of international law shows the country’s dogmatic views inevitably clashing with Western values and ironically this position has undergone some less changes in the annals of history since Tsarist regime to present Russian federation.

During the period of Soviet Union that any effort to uplift individual rights or admitting individuals as subjects of international law got nipped in the bud with vehement opposition of Soviet jurists. Soviet opposition pointed out brining individuals as a subject of international law would lead to undermine state sovereignty and propagate western liberal values. However, the stanch state centrism prevails in Russian international law scholarship even after the fall of communism convinces the continuity of Soviet tradition as an inherent part of modern Russian international law.

In seeking the civilizational roots of the Russian approach to international law, we need to further investigate the puzzling debate remains unanswered about Russia’s destined position in civilizational order. Contemporary Russia keeps one foot in European space and its institutional legacies reminding of Peter’s Europeanization, but simultaneously it keeps other foot in its unique civilization as a critique of European liberal values. The old aged antagonism between Orthodox Russia and Latin Europe seems to have resurrected from a different way as Russia still adheres to its Muscovy tradition of orthodoxy while Europe reciprocates it with a sense of scepticism. It is a fact and not even a conjuncture that notion of civilization has solidly made some strong impacts in Russia’s attitude to international law.

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International Law

The Exclusive Maritime Economic Zones in the Mediterranean

Giancarlo Elia Valori

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Nowadays all coastal countries are taking action at maritime level by creating Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) and this happens also in the already crowded Mediterranean, thus redesigning power projections, possible future agreements and future alliances.

 It is Turkey, however, which has currently allied with al-Sarraj’s Tripolitania to avoid the harsh conditions that Cyprus and Greece have long imposed on its EEZ.

In principle, Turkey wants economic equality in Cyprus between the two ethnic groups, namely the Greek and the Turkish ones.

Therefore it forces -often manu militari – the external exploration ships to move away from the Cypriot sea, which is an excellent future extraction area.

 Turkey’s idea – which has so far proved effective – serves to separate the Greek contact and continuity with the neighbouring maritime areas of Cyprus and Egypt, so as to avoid the Greek control of the EastMed gas pipeline and hence break the continuity line between Southern Europe and Africa, which is needed mainly by Italy.

 It is useless to resort to more or less universal lawyers and courts of justice. We need to “carry the sword”, as Our Lord Jesus Christ also advises.

 The new Turkish EEZ stretches from the Kas-Marmaris line, on the edge of the Kastellorizo island to the south of Crete, with a triangle that enters the maritime area between the EEZs of Greece, Cyprus and Egypt.

Clearly the aim is to isolate the Greek EEZ from the Cypriot and East and South Mediterranean ones, which have already been classified as particularly rich in oil and gas.

So far Turkey has not specified the precise geographical and geo-mathematical boundaries of its new EEZ, but Egypt has also dismissed it as “illegal” and Greece has branded it as “absurd”.

 A possible strategic calculation is what makes us think that Turkey still regards al-Sarraj in Tripolitania as a card to play for a possible future victory against Khalifa Haftar. It is likely, however, that President Erdogan simply considers al-Sarraj the safest card to play anyway, thanks to his Westernist affiliations.

 Westerners will not abandon al-Sarraj and his Tripolitania full of jihadists and Muslim Brothers. This is music to Erdogan’s ears, since he does not want to be left alone to hold the bag of a failed State, namely Tripolitania.

 Either you are smart on your own – and Erdogan certainly is, besides being an expert strategist – or you trust other people’s stupidity and, in this case, nothing is better than Westerners’ foreign policy. 

In principle, however, what is an EEZ? According to the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea, which fully entered into force on November 16, 1994, it is the largest sea area – which, however, cannot exceed 200 miles – in which a coastal State exercises its sovereign rights on the body of water for managing natural resources, such as fishing or the extraction of oil, gas or other substances, as well as for the ecological and biological protection of the marine environment. We should not overlook also scientific research into the sea environment, which is currently essential for technological evolution.

Unless otherwise provided for, theEEZ outer limit coincides with that of the continental shelf in which the State under consideration has the right to exploit mineral resources.

 In this case, the EEZ may not even be proclaimed officially , but the coastal State has always exclusive and original rights on the continental shelf.

 Italy – which is now the country of Farinelli and of the ancient tradition of the castratoopera singers – is also very cautious about the issue of the Turkish-Libyan EEZ. However, at the Cairo Summit held on January 8 last, Italy declared null and void the claims of Turkey and Tripolitania to oppose the claims of Greece, Cyprus and France.

 As to Tripoli alone, however, an EEZ has already existed since 2009.

 It unilaterally incorporates the Fisheries Protection Zone, established in 2005, but the Libyan capital of the West, namely Tripoli, has also declared it has held negotiations only with Greece. As Tripoli claims, said negotiations have ended due to the Greek claim to include in its EEZ a small island below Crete, namely Gaudo, which would have changed – to its benefit – the  equidistance line between the Greek EEZ and Tripoli’s Exclusive Economic Zone.

In the discussion on the Mediterranean EEZs, however, Greece demands a rigid geographical equidistance enhancing its many islands while, currently, in maritime law there is a tendency to use a principle of proportionality between sea surfaces and length of coasts.

Hence Turkey has proposed to Tripoli a new border further north than the one accepted by Greece. This greatly enhances the coasts of Cyrenaica and Anatolia, but severely harms the rights of Crete and the Greek Dodecanese.

Greece, in fact, wants to establish its EEZ not in the Aegean Sea – which would be geographically and politically obvious, although it here clashes with a whole range of conflicting interests of Italy, Cyprus, Turkey, Egypt, Lebanon and Israel – but in the East Mediterranean.

For its Exclusive Economic Zone, Greece has long been seeking agreements with Italy and Albania, but Italy considers only the protection of its fisheries to be a priority, while Albania regards the 2009 Treaty as severely unfair to Albanian maritime interests.

After the harsh darkness of German financial operations against its small economy, Greece is now rebuilding its maritime policy and its modest, but intelligent power projection.

 It is by no mere coincidence that Greece immediately wanted to take part in the European Maritime Awareness in the Strait of Hormuz (EMASOH), which would monitor commercial and non-commercial transit in the Strait of Hormuz.

 EMASOH is led by France, which now has a close relationship with Greece against Turkey, and sees the participation of Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Italy, Germany, Holland and Portugal.

For the time being Greece has exploited the Cypriot harshness vis-à-vis Turkey, especially by granting exploration permits in areas delimited and bordered by the EEZs of Israel, Egypt and Cyprus.

Turkey strongly challenges this Greek maritime autonomy, supporting the right of the Turkish Cypriot community to collect their share of royalties and, in any case, considering part of the Greek EEZ – the one in which prospections have been authorized – to absolutely belong to Turkey.

 The East-Med Gas Forum organized by Cyprus has so far stabilized relations between Crete, Israel and Egypt. The solution reached at the Forum, however, is inevitably written in the sand.

 The real problem for Turkey, however, is the route of the new EastMed gas pipeline, which excludes the Turkish territory and part of the European market from the next gas pipeline planned by Turkey together with the Russian Federation.

So far the EU has not shown it accepts the document for the Turkish-Libyan EEZ.

In fact, however, the European Union cannot effectively oppose the Mediterranean countries that want to have a clearly excessive EEZ in relation to their coasts and economic weight.

As mentioned above, Italy has not signed the Memorandum of January 8 last in Cairo.

 There are many reasons explaining this attitude: Italy does not like Turkey’s excessive autonomy, but it is not even happy with the Greek and Cypriot maritime projects, while France well protects its Total and hence also the agreement between Totaland ENI, between Cyprus and the Lebanese and Egyptian coasts.

Italy’s energy policy, which has never viewed the EastMed pipeline favourably, appreciates and enhances instead the Green stream pipeline from the Libyan (and Tunisian) coasts but, on the other hand, does not even effectively protect its own immediate interests in Libya or Tunisia.

 The strategic link between Turkey’s and Tripoli’s policy, however, is based on a proven fact: the strenuous defense by the EU, Great Britain, Israel and the United States of the gas fields identified south and east of Cyprus.

 Therefore Turkey must look elsewhere to certify its hegemony over oil and gas, which is a right of passage and not a right of production.

Also Colonel Gaddafi, however, had a very personal and sometimes imaginative idea of international maritime law.

 In 1973 the Raìs included the entire Gulf of Sirte in the Libyan inland waters. In 2005 there was the proclamation of the Fishing Protection Zone 62 miles from the coasts of Gaddafi’s Jamahiriya. In 2009, however, there was also the new Libyan EEZ which stretched up to “what international law permitted”, as the Colonel of Sirte used to say, but it was a rather subjective interpretation of maritime law.

 Cyprus, the real punctum dolens of Turkish maritime policy, already established its EEZs with Egypt (in 2003), the Lebanon (in 2007) and Israel (in 2010).

It should be recalled that Turkey has not yet its own EEZ, except for the one defined between Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot Republic, and it accepts the proposal of EEZ with al-Sarraj, while it actively opposes all oil operations in the East of Cyprus.

 Greece has always been bound by NATO’s obligation not to exacerbate tensions with Turkey. It has therefore stopped the establishment of its own EEZ, but Turkey’s activism with Tripoli has changed the situation and hence also Greece’s geopolitical choices.

Certainly every State is anyway free to define its own EEZs, but it should ultimately be a right limited by binding international treaties. Currently, however, the legal-practical criteria are clear and sufficiently common: the first principle is geometric equidistance, while the median line is – almost always – the result of a free agreement between the Parties.

Moreover, the classic approach of equidistance was taken for delimiting the Turkish-Libyan EEZ. As mentioned above, a line was drawn from the waters directly behind Kastellorizo up to the Marmaris peninsula just in front of Rhodes, while the Libyan area of this EEZ goes from the geographical border of Cyrenaica with Egypt up to Derna.

 The Greek islands, apart from Kharpatos, have been completely neglected by the Turkish EEZ, but certainly Greece cannot and does not want to deal directly with Cyrenaica or Tripoli.

Hence what can be done? Greece could immediately extend its territorial waters – which are currently still limited to 6 miles – to 12 miles. However, also Italy is involved since, following the 1985 decision of the European Court of Justice, it must set up its EEZ. The Court of Justice ruled that, while establishing their EEZs, both Malta and Libya should stop at meridian 15°10′, which is the one where the zone of interest of third countries begins – hence precisely Italy.

Among these issues there is the extension – wanted by the Algerian government – of its EEZ to the Central-Western Sea of Sardinia, overlapping the Italian Ecological Protection Zone and the Italian-Spanish continental shelf.

 There is long-standing tension between Spain and Algeria, due to the role of the new post-Franco Spain in the Spanish Sahara and its never denied support to the Frente Polisario y del Rio de Oro, as well as to a vast sequence of old and new conflicts.

The political meaning of the Algerian operation is obvious: as from now Algeria wants to consider itself a frontline State compared to France, which, moreover, has extended its territorial waters up to Ventimiglia and Menton, with an agreement signed secretly in 2015 between Italy and France – an agreement which, strangely enough, grants to France the fishy areas of Cimitero, Fuori Sanremo, Ossobuchi, Vapore and Banco.

 “Sanremo’s red prawns are a dream”, as the Genoese Paolo Conte sang in Genova per noi.

 The agreement is not yet operational, but France has already involved the EU for its implementation.

Hence the Italian masochism does not only concern the Libyan coast.

However, there has been a sequence of creations of Mediterranean EEZs. Israel has defined its Exclusive Economic Zone by excluding the sea in front of Gaza, also for obvious security reasons, thus integrating its areas with those of Cyprus and Greece.

 This has immediately led to Turkey’s reaction and it is well-known that Turkey is now the main point of reference for Hamas, the organization of the Muslim Brotherhood, in the Gaza Strip and in Sinai where Hamas also operates as a thorn in the flesh of the harshest enemy of the Muslim Ikhwan, namely Al Sisi’s Egypt.

In February 2018 units of the Turkish Navy blocked – rather harshly – a Saipem ship which was to explore and probably drill an underwater area off Cyprus, where Turkey had unilaterally declared the universal blockade of seabed exploration activities.

 Moreover, in October 2019, Turkey started its oil and gas exploration in Block 7, which – as established by the Cypriot government – falls within the joint competence of Total and ENI.

 Total – a French company re-founded after the Second World War by the former French intelligence agent Guillermet -was given 20% of the Cypriot Blocks 2 and 9 (the same amount previously held by the Cypriot company Kogas), and 30% of Block 3 – with ENI down to 50% – and also 40% of Block 8, previously totally in ENI’s hands.

 On the one hand, in June 2018 ENI discovered the large Egyptian underwater field, namely Noor, which is already the most important one in the Mediterranean and could radically change Egypt’s economy and power projection.

Hence, on the other hand, Turkey is holding tight the whole underwater oil and gas area of the sea around Cyprus- even extending it to the coasts of Cyrenaica – so as to maintain its status as a global oil hub between East and West and counterbalance the oil expansion of Egypt, Israel, the Greek part of Cyprus and the Lebanon.

As already mentioned, the issue of the Algerian EEZ is particularly interesting, if only our governments had any idea of what the national interest.

It should be recalled that Algeria established its new EEZ on March 20, 2018.

As is well known, the border applies also to the seabed: the Algerian area partly overlaps the Hispanic-Italian continental shelf and the Italian Ecological Protection Zone, to the west of Sardinia, with the Algerian EEZ stretching north-westwards, in the Gulf of Oristano, up to reaching the waters of Portovesme, Sant’Antioco, Carloforte (the area where the best Italian tunafish is produced), Oristano, Bosa and Alghero.

 The cusp of the Algerian area (coordinates 40°21’31” N and 06°50’35” E) is about 60 miles from the coast of Sardinia, but 196 miles from the Algerian coast.

 The Algerian EEZ replaces the old Fisheries Protection Zone (FPZ) established in 1994, which had a maximum distance of 40 miles from the Algerian coast of Ras Tenes and, as things stand now, seems a clear imitation of the new Turkish-Libyan EEZ – to Italy’s detriment, of course.

We should also recall the proposals for maritime expansion by some States in the East. The Levantine Sea is very rich in oil, as well as the Ionian Sea, where Greece is supposed to have designs on its oil and gas.

 There is also the sea south of Crete, now seized and requisitioned by Turkey, but also the Adriatic Sea, which is currently exploited for natural gas by Croatia and Montenegro.

The proposal for establishing an Italian EEZ was submitted to the Chamber of Deputies on December 20, 2019, while the proposal for the establishment of a Ministry of the Sea lies idle in the Senate.

 Certainly, Turkey has recently granted to al-Sarraj’s Libya a very “generous” loan of 2.7 billion US dollars, but – as noted above – Turkey wants to become the one and only energy hub of the whole Mediterranean, both for the lines coming from Russia and the Caucasus and for those originating from the Mare Nostrum.

 Blue Stream, South Caucasus Pipeline, Southern Gas Corridor, TANAP and the Turkish Stream are all elements of a future Turkish hegemony in the energy world, which is Erdogan’s top priority.

 Italy cannot be excluded from all these sectors and, regardless of the government in office, it shall anyway not leave ENI alone and finally conceive an Italian geopolitics in the Mediterranean, which is clearly missing today.

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International Law

Financial Action Task Force (FATF)

Asfandiyar Khan

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FATF is an independent and inter-governmental organization, which was established in 1989 by G7 countries (UK, France, United States, Germany, Canada, Italy, and Japan) .It is formed by the governments for the governments. This organization develops and promote policies to protect the global financial system against money laundering and terrorist financing and the financing of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. This organization have total 39 member countries and headquarter is in Paris, France(International Standard/FATF/Combating terrorism, 2012-2019)This organization observing all the countries of the world regarding money laundering, terrorist financing and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction according to its own standards and rules. Whenever a country found involved in one of these type of activities FATF takes very strong steps against that country. FATF have two types of lists, one is “Gray list” and another is “Blacklist”. Whenever a country pushed in one of these list so its economy suffer a lot. Now recently Pakistan is in the Gray list. According to Foreign of Pakistan, “Sha Muhammad Qureshi”, Pakistan losses annually $10 billion due to its existence in the Gray list. Now Iran and North Korea are in the Black list of FATF. In collaboration with other international stakeholders, the FATF also works to identify the national-level vulnerabilities with the aim of protecting the international finance system from misuse.

Background of the FATF

Related threats to the integrity of the international financial system FATF was established in 1989 by the ministers of its member jurisdiction. The only purpose was to keep and control money laundering, terrorist financing and financing for the weapons of mass destruction. In the early stages FATF was only for the black money-those money which was producing from drugs and other illegal activities then the 9/11 attacks changed its priorities and dimensions. FATF jurisdiction extended over other types of activities also, like Terrorist financing, money laundering and financing for weapon of mass destruction. The threat posed to the banking system, G-7 Heads of the states or government and European commission convened the Task Force from the G-7 member states, the European commission and eight other countries (FATF.org.history, 1989-2019).

Recommendation of FATF

In order to combat money laundering, terrorist financing and financing for weapons of mass destruction FATF have set up a comprehensive recommendations and consistent framework of measures which countries should implement. Every country have diverse legal, administrative and operational frameworks and different financial system and so cannot take all identical measures to counter these threats. The FATF Recommendations, therefore, set an international standards, which countries should implement through measures adapted to their particular circumstances. The FATF Recommendations set out the essential measures that countries should have in place to:

-Identify the risks, and develop policies and domestic coordination;

-Pursue the money laundering, terrorist financing and the financing of proliferation;

-Apply preventive measures for the financial sector and other designated sectors;

-Establish powers and responsibilities for the competent authorities ( e.g., investigative, law enforcement and supervisory authorities ) and other institutions measures;

-Enhance the transparency and availability of beneficial ownership information of legal persons and arrangements; and

-Facilitate international cooperation.

Pakistan on FATF Gray List

The international watchdog against money laundering and financing of terrorism, the “Financial Action Task Force” has put Pakistan on a list of “jurisdiction with strategic deficiencies”, also known as the gray-list. The Financial Action Task Force has decided in principle that Pakistan will remain on its gray list till next February and directed Islamabad to take ‘extra measures’ for complete elimination of terror financing and money laundering. The reason is according to “FATF” Pakistan have structural deficiencies in anti-money laundering (AML) and combating financing of terrorism. There are also countries in the FATF’s gray-list: Ethiopia, Serbia, Sir Lanka, Syria, Trinidad, and Tobago, Tunisia and Yemen. This is not the first time Pakistan has found itself on one of FATF’s list- the country was there in 2008 and from 2012 to 2015 and now again in 2018 (Khan, 2019).

It is “highly probable” that Pakistan will be formally black listed by global terror funding and money laundering watchdog FATF if it does not swiftly act against terror funding by February 2020. The Paris based FATF took the decision after its five day plenary, which concluded in the French capital.

“FATF” Implications on Pakistan

Financial Action Task Force (FATF) may put at risk the impending $6 billion IMF bailout- because this organization have very strong coordination with the economic institution like, IMF, World Bank etc. whenever a country don’t comply and don’t take cautious and precious steps regarding terrorist financing, money laundering and financing for weapons of mass destruction according to the FATF recommendations and FATF international standards so that country could involve in economic difficulties. The same case is with Pakistan, Iran, North Korea, Sri Lanka, Ethiopia, Serbia etc (Dhawan, jun 20, 2019).

Pakistan would get loans costlier, with higher interest and with strict conditions. Because “FATF” have very strong coordination with other Economic institutions, they tell them that this country is not safe for loans. May be your loans go in the wrong hands. Whenever a trust-deficit creates between the FATF and a country that’s creates a lot of economic problems to that country. This is the institution that give advises and recommendations to other economic institutions regarding a country economic situation and circumstances. This is very influential inter-governmental organization.

When a country come in “FATF” gray list that country couldn’t take loans easily, the rating and borrowing capacity goes down. The most important thing that investors don’t come to that country which happens in “FATF” gray list. Those countries if want international transactions it takes long time and scrutiny also increase and it does business loss. According to Foreign Minister of Pakistan “Sha Muhammad Qureshi” that due to the existence of Pakistan in gray list of “FATF” Pakistan annually loses $6 billion.

There is also another list with “FATF” that is called “Blacklist”, this very crucial and danger list. If Pakistan were pushed in the Blacklist so the $6 billion “IMF” bailout package would be cancelled and the government of Pakistan would more suffer from economic problems and will get corner on international level. With this inflation would increase, unemployment etc. The proposal was put by the United State of States of America, UK, and France against Pakistan. They claimed that Pakistan should put in the FATF blacklist but so far they didn’t succeed because of Turkey, and Malaysia support in the voting the request was rejected.

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