East Asia
Project of the century: How the Belt and Road initiative will impact the Eurasian region
In 2013, China announced the creation of the Silk Road Economic Belt and the Maritime Silk Road of the 21st century – this initiative of “The Belt and Road” was designed to turn Asia and Europe into a single economic region. It focuses on the industries that are important for the internal growth in China and, at the same time, involves over 70 countries with a total population of 4.4 billion. Today, the initiative has already changed the economy of Eurasian countries significantly. Over the last seven years, the region got approximately $98 billion in investments in order to implement 168 projects.
What’s in it for China?
In recent years, China’s economic growth has slowed from double-digits to 6.4% in 2017. The wide-reaching economic model formerly in use (based on cheap labour, gross investment, and exports) has faced a number of serious challenges.
The country has to overcome industrial overproduction – steel making in China is a great example of this challenge. According to official data, China’s production capacity amounts to 1.1 billion tons per year, while internal demand is approximately 700 million tons, and China’s export partners cannot consume the remaining 400 million tons. The country needs to be provided with an access to new markets and to launch new resource-intensive projects.
In addition, Chinese authorities have been facing the problem of a sharp increase in labour cost. We live in a world where the average labour cost in China ($758) is higher than in Russia ($615). And it causes many multinational corporations to move their manufacturing facilities to other South-East Asian countries, such as Vietnam. China is losing its historical competitive edge – cheap labour, and analysts are increasingly talking about the risk of “stalling” in the trap of average income.
Furthermore, China needs to reduce its debt burden. The country is one of the world leaders in joint debt rating. In 2016, the total debt load in China amounted to $27 trillion, which equals 254% of the country’s GDP. Simultaneously, the amount of “bad” debt in the banking system is growing.
Social inequality and poor ecology exacerbate the situation further. For example, 1% of the wealthiest Chinese control roughly 33% of total national wealth, while 25% of the poorest Chinese possess just a mere 1%. Beijing sees as little as 124 clean days every year, while total environmental destruction amounts to 3.5-5% of China’s total GDP. In addition to a number of internal reforms adopted to create an economic model focused on domestic consumption, the Chairman of the People’s Republic of China, Xi Jinping, proposed the “Belt and Road” initiative. Among other things, it is designed to stimulate domestic economic growth through external forces – ensuring access to Chinese products in new sales markets, natural resources, integration into complex production chains, exchange of advanced technologies, and the establishment of new high-tech manufacturing facilities in China. To do this, Chinese authorities are attempting to create a large-scale platform that will enable the expansion of trade and investment relationships, as well as technological cooperation between China and Central Asia, Europe, and Africa. This is believed to be a way for China to gain an access to the tools needed to overcome the economic development challenges described above.
China helped create powerful financial institutions in order to finance projects within the framework of the Belt and Road initiative, such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank with $100 billion in capital, and the Silk Road Foundation ($40 billion in capital). The New Development Bank (or BRICS Bank) is also seen as an important element of the Belt and Road projects’ financial infrastructure, which will also involve the participation of the largest Chinese state-owned banks and development institutions. The total budget for projects under the Belt and Road initiative is estimated at an astronomical $1.3 trillion. The bulk of these investments is expected to be sent to the countries of the Eurasian Economic Union, including Russia, Kazakhstan, Armenia, Belarus and Kyrgyzstan, which are key to the implementation of The Belt and Road initiative.
How will this Chinese initiative affect other countries?
The Belt and Road initiative will stimulate major infrastructure changes not only in China, but also in other countries through which the New Silk Road passes. There are expectations for the construction of new roads and railways, power plants, ports and fuel pipelines. The Chinese investments are expected to accelerate the growth of the economies of the countries participating in the Belt and Road initiative.This is precisely what is meant by mutually beneficial cooperation, or the “win-win” model, which Chinese officials often reference. Many believe in the efficacy of such a model. A total of 69 countries and international organizations have entered into agreements with China to cooperatively implement the framework of The Belt and Road initiative. In practice, cooperation is developing in several key areas.
Trade
In the long run, the Chinese government is striving to create a single integrated economic space, with the ultimate goal of establishing a free trade zone. Already, by the end of 2017, China’s trade turnover with the countries that signed cooperation agreements within the framework of the Belt and Road initiative exceeded $800 billion. To further integrate the economies of Asia and Europe, the creation of six economic corridors has been proposed. The main routes of the Silk Road Economic Belt will connect China with Mongolia and Russia, Indo-China, Pakistan, the Republic of Bangladesh, India and Myanmar, as well as Central and Western Asian countries. Today, goods from China are most commonly delivered by sea, taking approximately 45 days. The construction of modern highways and high-speed railways will shorten this delivery period to 10-15 days.
The most important project in this respect is the largest Central Asian land port – Khorgos. This facility is strategically located in Kazakhstan in the Free Economic Zone called “Khorgos – Eastern Gate”, which also includes logistics and industrial zones. China has invested over $3 million in this project, which saw the first trains come to port in 2015. It is expected that the majority of cargo trains traveling between China and Europe will pass through it in the future.
The formation of a modern transport and logistics infrastructure in the countries of Central Asia, the Caucasus and, even, Europe is a key component for the development of these national economies. Such projects enable China to unload their excess production capacity and deliver domestic goods to foreign markets. Not only large state-owned companies, but small and medium-sized businesses stand to gain as they provide services for complex projects implemented under the framework of the Belt and Road initiative. For example, since 2011 Chinese and European cargo trains have traveled through 28 cities in 11 European countries. Currently, there are more than 4,000 trips per year, and this number is expected to increase to 5,000 by 2020.
Energy
The Belt and Road initiative also takes into account the need to create new energy capacities – construction of interstate power lines, pipelines and gas pipeline systems, and the development of new energy-deposit fields.
One of the most promising projects in this area is Yamal LNG, the Russian liquified natural gas plant that was commissioned at the end of last year. The project’s budget is estimated at $27 billion with approximately $20 billion provided by Chinese banks, led by the Silk Road Foundation as the primary investor.
Additionally, the Power of Siberia gas pipeline is expected to be complete by the end of 2019 – it will enable Russia to supply China with 38 billion cubic meters of gas per year for 30 years. The pipeline, traversing the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia), Irkutsk and Amur regions, will become the largest gas transportation system in Eastern Russia, thanks to over $70 billion in investment by Russia and China.
Tourism
According to online companies Ctrip and Alibaba, Chinese citizens took 129 million tourism trips abroad last year, spending a total of $118.4 billion. Implementation of the “One Belt, One Road” strategy will contribute to the influx of Chinese tourists to countries in the Eurasian Economic Union. Indicators of that influx are already growing. For example, last year a record number of Chinese tourists visited Russia – 1.5 million. However, it is important to note that the bulk of revenue generated as a result of serving Chinese tourists goes to Chinese businesses, not Russian ones, as Chinese travelers tend to buy tour packages and order guide services from home, paying either in cash or through national Chinese payment systems.
Education
The Silk Road Economic Belt also fosters business cooperation between China and other Eurasian countries in the field of education. Today, 25% of all international students in Russia come from China. This indicates an especially high rate of international education collaboration with China as Russia’s share is a mere 2% of all Chinese students studying abroad (most still prefer European and American universities). China and the EEU countries are trying to solve the problem of a personnel shortage in the fields of economics, law and business, increasingly developing joint educational programs. For example, the Moscow School of Management SKOLKOVO runs specialized “Understanding Russia” programmes for Chinese entrepreneurs on how to effectively conduct business in Russia. Over 300 business leaders from China have been trained in this programme. In addition, in November, 2018 the Moscow School of Management SKOLKOVO and the business school of the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology will launch “EMBA for Eurasia”, a cooperative programme designed for business leaders in Eurasia.
Innovations
The most widely-accepted theories of economic growth see technological development as the main driver of modern economic growth. Within the Belt and Road initiative, a special role is played by the sharing of technologies and technological innovations. As of today, 75 industrial parks are under construction as a part of the initiative.
In 2015, a Chinese holding bought 65% of YotaPhone, the Russian smartphone manufacturer. China also actively collaborates with other Eurasian countries on innovative projects in the fields of biotechnology, photonics, biomedicine, LED, food and consumer goods. In essence, it means that “One Belt, One Road” propels the industries of the Eurasian region to a new technological level. For example, several organizations from Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia are developing an innovative project to cool heavy-duty machinery – the so-called “double phase-shift cooling system” is being developed on a super-computer technology platform.
Work is being done in other areas as well, as seven belts are planned to be put in place, including financial and agricultural ones. In total, roughly one thousand different projects are expected to be implemented across different countries in the long term.
What are the barriers for implementing the strategy?
The Belt and Road is an initiative, not a project, meaning it has no defined goals or deadlines. China first mentioned its intention to establish the Silk Road Economic Belt and the Maritime Silk Road of the 21st century back in 2013, yet today, five years later, there is still no official information about the total number of projects or participating countries that should be involved, rendering the strategy somewhat amorphous. Unless the Belt and Road initiative is “institutionalized,” business can not use standard project and investment approaches, which makes it difficult to implement the overarching plan.
Furthermore, China is reducing investment in the Eurasian region. In 2013, the country allocated as much as $18 billion toward the project, but cut this amount down to $10 billion in 2016. If China had not invested in Iran’s nuclear program that year, this amount would have dropped to $5 billion. Such an approach makes predicting future investments challenging. The internal economic and political dynamics of China contribute to the challenge of forecasting the trajectory of the initiative – public and private investment banking institutions have begun to scrutinize these investment projects, as too much money was spent inefficiently or lost, drawing the attention of Chinese regulatory bodies.
Another important roadblock is the fact that some of the announced projects have not been a success. For example, the construction of a high-speed railway between Moscow and Kazan, which was originally designated as one of the priority projects for the Belt and Road, stalled. The construction of this Russian segment was supposed to be the first stage in building a railway between Moscow and Beijing, which was to be followed by an even more ambitious “Eurasia” railway project, connecting Beijing, Moscow and Berlin. Unfortunately, under current financial conditions, these projects are not economically viable, which halted their development at the feasibility study stage. This is a clear example of collaboration in which strategic ambitions outpace, or fail to take into account, the economic and investment feasibility of the Belt and Road projects.
Nevertheless, the initiative has emerged at the right time. At a time when protectionism is gaining momentum in international trade, China is driving an expansion of free market values, simplified customs and visa procedures, and the creation of transportation and logistics infrastructure that will ensure the quick and easy delivery of goods to new markets. This approach enables multilateral development at the domestic level and eliminates barriers to business that already seem archaic in the global world of the 21st century.
East Asia
The Mongolian Candidate
On March 8, 2023, a young boy was presented as the 10th Khalkha Jetsun Dhampa Rinpoche or the 10th Jebtsundamba Khutuktu of Gelug lineage of Khalka Mongols, one of the highest-ranking leaders in Tibetan Buddhism. Media reports indicate the eight-year-old child is one of a set of twins named Aguidai and Achiltai Altannar. He was born in the United States in 2015 and comes from a family that is well-established in the political and business realms, having been introduced by none other than the 14th Dalai Lama himself in a ceremony attended by approximately 600 people in Dharamsala, India.
The boy will act as the leader of Tibetan Buddhism in Mongolia, the country’s majority religion. And in the case that the current Dalai Lama would pass away suddenly, he would then become an even more important figure. After all, the legitimacy of the second-highest religious authority after the Dalai Lama, the Panchen Lama, is denied by Tibetans since China’s abduction and replacement of his eleventh incarnation with its own hand-picked candidate in 1995.
This shift in Mongolia’s Buddhist leadership holds the potential to profoundly determine the direction of the country’s relationship with China. The move also reverberates more widely in terms of the future of Tibetan Buddhism at large, especially when it comes to the selection of the next Dalai Lama. It is yet another reminder to Beijing that the Tibetan resistance movement is alive and well—and it now has a fresh new figurehead who holds meaningful religious authority. As one political analyst predicted in a 2022 article, “Since…2012, Mongolia has walked a geopolitical tightrope with China on one side and Dharamsala on the other. When and how the Jebtsundamba Khutuktu reincarnates will give one side much more power over the future of Tibetan Buddhism, with significant geopolitical consequences.”
The lama link
Mongolia holds critical importance when it comes to Tibetan Buddhism, both today and historically. In fact, the word “dalai” is a Mongolic world meaning “ocean,” “vast,” or “great.” In 1913, Mongolia and Tibet signed a treaty declaring friendship, independence from China, and mutual recognition, with both parties pledging to “work by joint consideration for the well-being of the Buddhist faith.” More recently, in a BBC interview, the Dalai Lama again emphasized the nation’s significance in this domain, stating that his future will be determined by “the Himalayan Buddhists of Tibet and Mongolia.”
The Mongolian government itself has not yet commented on this latest announcement, perhaps to avoid upsetting China, as Beijing has repeatedly punished Mongolia for previously hosting the Dalai Lama throughout the past decades. Following a visit the spiritual leader made to the country in 2002, China closed a border crossing with its neighbor, and after a 2006 visit, flights were suspended to Mongolia from the Chinese capital. The most recent and dramatic retribution China doled out to Mongolia regarding a visit made by the Dalai Lama occurred in 2016. That year, it is said that the Dalai Lama identified the 10th Khalka Jetsun Dhampa Rinpoche’s reincarnation, but stated it was too soon to formally introduce him to the world due to his young age.
China reacted with rage. It demanded that the Mongolian government release an apology and forced the nation to promise it would never again host the Dalai Lama, threatening diplomatic consequences if he were to return. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi told the Mongolian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Tsend Munkh-Orgil, “The Dalai Lama’s furtive visit to Mongolia brought a negative impact to China-Mongolia relations.” In a statement, Wang Yi added, “We hope that Mongolia has taken this lesson to heart.”
Beijing did not merely hit Mongolia with a scolding and stern words, but real, practical consequences as well. One week after the Dalai Lama’s visit, China imposed fees on Mongolian commodity imports and extra transit costs on products crossing into Inner Mongolia. Moreover, Beijing closed a key border crossing with Mongolia, leading to congestion and serious traffic jams and leaving truck drivers stuck in freezing temperatures for days on end. China also halted negotiations with Mongolia for a loan worth 4.2 billion USD. Such obstacles do not come lightly for Mongolia, who relies heavily on China economically, with Beijing being responsible for 60 percent of its imports, over 80 percent of its total exports, and over 40 percent of its GDP.
In response to the 2016 fiasco, the Mongolian government stated, “Mongolia firmly supports the one China policy, consistently holds that Tibet is an inseparable part of China, that the Tibet issue is China’s internal affair.” Mongolia also claimed that the Dalai Lama’s trip was the result of an invitation from Mongolian Buddhists, not the Mongolian government. This reaction, along with Mongolia’s serious financial dependence on China, underscores the considerable degree of influence that Beijing has over the country.
Chinese interference
Beijing does not only leverage the economic power it has over Mongolia, but also actively meddles in the country’s religious affairs. As a way to consolidate its control, China facilitates exchanges with Mongolian Buddhist clergy; more specifically, it does so by targeting and supporting sects that are hostile towards the Dalai Lama, and there are claims that China has financially backed Mongolian abbots that hold this view. After a controversy within the Gelug school of Tibetan Buddhism that began in the 1970s, it is rumored that the CCP started to invest in Mongolia’s anti-Dalai Lama Shugden sect. Interestingly, an NGO called the International Shugden Community, known for staging protests during the Dalai Lama’s international visits, disbanded in 2016 following a Reuters investigation that revealed CCP links to the organization. The accusations of being too close to Beijing can sometimes create problems of legitimacy for Mongolian clergy members hostile to the Dalai Lama, especially as the majority of the country’s Tibetan Buddhists do support him—but China can wield its financial power over these individuals to ensure they do not become too close to Dharamsala.
Today, China is making concerted efforts to integrate Tibetan Buddhism within the framework of its Belt and Road Initiative as part of what’s been called Buddhist diplomacy. Party secretary at the High-level Tibetan Academy of Buddhism, Wang Changyu, has said as much. He explained that the institute’s training of Tibetan Buddhist monks “help[s] countries and territories along the ‘Belt and Road’ satisfy their demand for religious specialists and scriptures,” adding that these exchanges can promote “the results of our Party and country’s ethnic and religious policies, displaying the healthy heritage and development of Tibetan Buddhism [in China, while minimizing] the Dalai clique’s space of activity, upholding national sovereignty.”
This topic is so pivotal to China-Mongolia relations that if one accesses the website of the Chinese embassy in Mongolia, a section dedicated entirely to Tibet is immediately visible on the homepage. The page, entitled “China’s Tibet in the eyes of Mongols” contains reports compiled by Mongolian researchers who traveled on organized visits to Tibet, after which they were instructed to produce material showcasing a positive image of Tibet’s “development and progress” under the PRC. This state-sponsored method—subsidizing trips in exchange for propaganda dissemination—has been used to recruit from other countries as well, such as Nepal.
Another factor to consider is China’s concerns surrounding the ethnic factor in Mongolia. In fact, there are actually more Mongols inside China than in Mongolia, presenting Beijing with another layer of tension to manage. The CCP’s response to this perceived problem has been to crack down on Mongol culture in Inner Mongolia, for instance, by passing a law in 2020 prohibiting teachers from using the Mongolian language—a policy reminiscent of the one instituted in the so-called night-stay schools in Tibet— as part of an effort to make Han Chinese and Mongol culture indistinguishable. This move led to protests in Inner Mongolia that garnered support from across the border, which the government swiftly suppressed before installing new leadership in the region a year later.
Finding the fifteenth
The Dalai Lama’s presentation of the 10th Khalka Jetsun Dhampa Rinpoche has undoubtedly upset China, who wants to control and approve all reincarnations in Tibetan Buddhism. By hosting this ceremony in Dharamsala himself, the Dalai Lama has sent a strong message to the CCP that directly challenges its claim to authority over the reincarnation process. The CCP argues that the correct technique for handling Tibetan Buddhism’s reincarnation process is known as the Golden Urn, and insists that this responsibility falls within its purview and is historically grounded.
The method, performed under the Qing Dynasty, involves filling a golden urn with several options and then drawing lots to identify the reincarnation. In February 2023, the state media outlet The Global Times released an article explaining the Golden Urn process and why the “Recognition of [the] new Dalai Lama must be conducted in China.” The article asserted that this method “has been supervised by the Chinese Central Government and conducted within Chinese territory since the late 13th century.” Beijing claims that this is how Gyaincain Norbu was chosen as the CCP-endorsed Panchen Lama, though there are assertions that the procedure was rigged in his favor. In 2007, the PRC enshrined the Golden Urn convention into law, allowing them to restrict reincarnations to come only from their own pool of pre-determined candidates. This is how the CCP will select the next Dalai Lama. The 14th Dalai Lama rejects this system entirely, saying it was “only used to ‘humor’ the Qing emperors.”
The manners in which the Mongolian government and Buddhist clergy decide to respond to the Dalai Lama’s introduction of the 10th Khalkha Jetsun Dhampa Rinpoche will be important to watch. Thus far, they have remained quiet, as has China. If Mongolia’s response to this reincarnation announcement does not satisfy China, then the CCP may be further incentivized to expand its presence in Mongolia for the sake of getting a hold on Tibetan Buddhism, a force it considers one of its greatest assets—and foremost threats.
East Asia
Will Eastern Order Surface?
In 1945, the post-war period transitioned into a new form of war and competition. The world experienced the bipolarity of the international system. From 1945 to 1990, the American Order captured hegemony through the soft power and excellence of values that characterized the Washington-based order. After the disintegration of the USSR, the world entered a new phase of American hegemony. With the advent of authoritarian capitalism, China emerged as a potent power to counter American hegemony and cultural capital in the 21st century. There is not an iota of doubt about the potentiality of the Chinese order in the last few years, but the persistent norms and appeal of society are still based on the American order. This century is the war of the Cultural Revolution rather than the economic system because China has already accepted the capitalist form of economic growth in the international order.
Quoting from Foreign Affairs the American order is like the layers of an onion. The US-led international order has multiple layers. ’ On the outside are its liberal internationalist notions and tasks, through which the US has delivered the globe a “third way” between the anarchy of nations furiously contending with each other toe to toe and the arrogant ranking of imperial systems—an arrangement that has provided more profits for more populace than any preliminary option. On the exterior, the US has profited from its landscape and its extraordinary trajectory of political expansion. It is located in such a position where oceans are separated from the other incredible powers, its landmass encompasses both Asia and Europe, and it accrues leverage by playing an extraordinary position as a global power balancer. Considering this, the United States had critical opportunities in the twentieth century to form blocs of like-minded states that contour and embed global statutes and organizations. As the contemporary emergency in Ukraine exhibits, this capacity to muster unions of democracies stays one of the United States’ important assets. Under the kingdom of administration and diplomacy, the US domestic civil set up—enhanced by its multiracial and multicultural settler base—integrates the nation to the globe in webs of influence elusive to China, Russia, and other countries. Ultimately, at the nucleus, one of the United States’ incredible resilience is its capability to flunk; as a liberal society, it can recognize its openness and mistakes and pursue ways to enhance them, giving it a specific advantage over its illiberal opponents in engaging emergencies and lapses. No other nation on the face of the earth has appreciated such an extensive set of benefits from bargaining with other nations. This is the explanation why the United States has had such staying power for such an extended period, despite occasional losses and dissatisfactions.
The effort between the United States and its adversaries, China and Russia, is a contest between two opposite logics of world order. The United States protects a multinational edict it has directed for three-quarters of a century—one that is open, multilateral, and anchored in security agreements and cooperation with another liberal democratic country. China and Russia pursue an international declaration that dethrones Western liberal norms—one that is more gracious to regional unions, globes of influence, and dictatorships. The United States maintains a transnational order that defends and increases the attraction of liberal democracy. China and Russia, each in its own way, wish to create an international order that safeguards autocratic rule from the ominous leverages of liberal modernity.
This wrangle between liberal and illiberal WO is an echo of the incredible competition of the twentieth century. In key premature moments—after the decisions of the two world wars and the Cold War—the United States progressed toward a developed schedule for world order. Its conquest rested fairly on the candid validity of American power and the country’s unrivaled financial, technical, and military abilities. The United States will hang around at the depths of the world system in part because of these worldly capacities and its position as a pivot in the international equilibrium of power. The military, technological and soft power of United States allocate an upper-hand in the 21st century.
East Asia
Who hates China’s rise the most: from the “yellow peril” to the “biggest challenger”
From Deng Xiaoping’s economic policy that lifted more than 800 million people out of poverty to China’s current domination in the field of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and its establishment of the Belt and Road initiative, the progress that China has made is impressive in terms of the economic balance sheet. The vast majority of western audience has felt highly uncomfortable about China’s unfamiliar cultural and political landscape. Notably, the hostile awe has been received mainly from the AUKUS countries. The passionate rhetorical protests against China are commonplace among the Anglo leaders. The racial underpinnings of China’s rise centre around the Anglo-Saxon’s despise on China. Kiron Skinner, a former Director of Policy Planning at the United States Department of State stated in 2019 that China’s rise consisted of a narrative that it was “the first time that we will have a great power competitor that is not Caucasian.” In 2022, the British Member of Parliament (MP) Mark Spencer also referred to Chinese spies as “some little China men” in a televised interview when defending Liz Truss’ China policy.
One of the first official Sino-British encounters suggests that the long legacy of the Anglo hostilities towards China can be traced back to the late 18th century. The infamous Macartney’s British Embassy to China failed his initial mission to open trade with China due to the refusal to perform the Chinese Imperial protocol. Macartney’s comptroller, John Barrow, later described China as weak, the state as despotic and corruptible, and the people as hypocritical and dirty. He noted that nothing in China would ever change without European colonisation. In contrast, prior to his description, Europeans had more often admired the Chinese culture and fantasized orientalism. French and other continental artisans and aristocrats had been more appreciative of the Chinoiserie and the profoundness of Chinese philosophy.
In the early 20th century, Sinophobia became a fashion in the Anglo-Saxon world. In support of the idea of “Yellow Peril”, the English novelist Sax Rohmer crafted a Chinese character, Fu Manzhou, as a caricature of a ruthless Chinaman with cruelty, extreme intelligence and a hunger for power. Roughly around the same time, on the other side of the Atlantic, the Chinese Exclusion Act was placed to limit and constrain the Chinese immigrants and their rights within the American society. The anti-miscegenation legislature also enforced restrictions on the interpersonal relationships between different races. Particularly, white women who were married to Chinese men had to leave the country. In Australia, another Anglo country, the draft of Chinese Immigration Act 1855 also placed in Victoria to limit the Chinese immigrants by imposing poll tax, and the term “Coolie” became the racial slur for Asian men throughout that period in the Anglo-Saxon world.
The question to be asked is why did the Anglo-Saxon despise the Chinese so much? There are mainly two reasons behind the sentiment. First of all, even though the Anglo-Saxon perceived themselves as carrying on the “manifested destiny” and the “Whiteman’s burden”, they in fact still viewed themselves as the racial subordinate of the “Nordic race”. Fuelled by earlier biological theories of Madison Grant on race, the Anglo-Americans subjugated themselves as an off-shoot branch, second class of the pure Nordic blood. In Australia, even in later 20th century, an official publication of the Australian Good Neighbour Council described Scandinavians as superior compared to many British migrants. In social psychology, it is proposed that inferior complexity could lead to abusive behaviour, often towards others that are perceived by the perpetrators as worse off. On the cultural level, the British Isles always belonged to the periphery of Europe, where the continental civilization could hardly be shone upon. The roots of the Anglo-Saxon culture were thus built upon the imagery of continental Europe, even as it never truly seemed to be a part of that. When coming in contact with other civilizations, such as China, its own cultural identity became even more hollow in comparison with the 5000 years of history and the richness of artefacts that China had. The destruction of the Chinese imperial winter palace, Yuanmingyuan, by the British was in essence a proof of such cultural identity reflexes.
Anglo-Saxon’s complicated sentiment towards China is thus motivated by a non-material aspect. Unlike the mainstream argument on political systems and values, the ultimate resentment in fact came from the cultural and racial self-reflection. The Anglo-Saxons might have invented the modern capitalism, democracy and technology, but China’s cultural legacy, history and distinctive ethnic identity are the unattainable notions that Anglo-Saxons are envious of.
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