Connect with us

Europe

Balkan powder keg

Published

on

After the NATO aggression against Serbia and Montenegro in 1999, the United States of America, having established full control over the Balkans, shifted its focus after 2000 to the Middle East. The United States continued to be heavily present in the Balkans, but indirectly through its allies, who continued their policy of expanding NATO and the European Union. The separation of Montenegro from the state union with Serbia in 2006 and the proclamation of the independence of Kosovo in 2008 definitely influenced the change in geopolitical relations in the region. Namely, by the territorial “narrowing down and economic weakening” of Serbia, the United States significantly weakened Serbian influence on the neighboring countries, thereby affecting the establishment of a regional balance. Furthermore, the third round of NATO enlargement, with the membership of Croatia and Albania in NATO in 2009, as well as with Montenegro’s entry into NATO in 2017, the United States has in a geostrategic view “rounded up” the area of the Western Balkans, geopolitically extremely important for the control of the Adriatic basin, the eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea region.

For some time it’s clear that the power of the West is weakening in the world, and these changes are also felt in the Balkans. Lately voting at the Interpol assembly showed that the political West no longer has the power it had until recently. Or, as it said Serbian Minister of Foreign Affairs Ivica Dacic, ” it turned out that it was not enough that some great powers send requests and that all fulfill and support all their demands”. For the West neither did help the open pressure towards some countries.

The West has not become military and economically weak, the budget for the military is on the contrary increased, however, in the meantime, two superpowers, Russia and China appeared. It is clear that the world slowly becomes multipolar. What is important to emphasize is that the West is losing soft power in the Balkans. And without soft power, Western policy in the Balkans shows the true face. This was best seen on October 19 in the Macedonian Parliament, when the Macedonian parliament passed constitutional changes that allowed the country to be called Republic of Northern Macedonia. To change the name, voted 80 MPs, thus reaching a two-thirds majority of 120 MPs needed to initiate constitutional changes. On which way this two-thirds majority was reach in the Macedonian Parliament, is best seen by the tweet of the Greek Defense Minister Panos Kamenos: “Who could think that in the European value system and democracy those who do not vote by the orders are arrested and voters who are obedient receive a bonus of two million euros of ‘dirty money’. I am ashamed”. This tweet of the Greek Defense Minister shows how Western diplomats achieve their goals in the Balkans. The result of this vote will be that (Northern) Macedonia will sign the NATO Membership Protocol in January 2019, after which formal negotiations on NATO accession could begin as well as the ratification process in the parliaments of all 29 member states, which could mean that (Northern) Macedonia could become a full member by 2020. And that will mean that the NATO ring around Serbia and Republic of Srpska (Bosnia and Hercegovina)  will be completely closed. Since in Serbia is the lowest support for joining NATO, it will be left as the last state to join NATO.

Pressures in Bosnia and Herzegovina have already begun. Despite the fact that Republic of Srpska voted a resolution on neutrality in October 2017, NATO recently sent Bosnia and Herzegovina an action plan for NATO membership. The realization of the First Annual National Program would increase financial obligations, from the current 1.33% of GDP, Bosnia and Hercegovina would have to allocate for defense from 1.8% to 2.2% of GDP, which would certainly be a new blow to the economy of this impoverished state union.

Today in the Balkans, there are two hot spots: Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. In spite of the fact that many analysts consider Kosovo as the source of possible major disorders, in reality it is Bosnia and Herzegovina. There are strong international forces in Kosovo, and there can only be a minor or limited conflict. This is primarily related to the violent takeover of northern Kosovo by the Kosovo Army. But in Bosnia and Hercegovina, things are completely different. Today’s Bosnia and Hercegovina is the result of the Dayton Agreement. An agreement that ended the war, but did not offer a better future for the citizens of Bosnia and Hercegovina. What’s more, it is the reason for the permanent conflict between the constituent nations of Serbs, Bosniaks and Croats. One of the most basic principles on which the Dayton Agreement was based on is the division of Bosnia and Hercegovina (51% of the territory to the Federation of Bosnia and Hercegovina, 49% to Republic of Srpska). And Republic of Srpska is under strong pressure from the West, because of strong anti-NATO position.

Unrest in the Balkans

Recently, the leader of the Bosniaks Bakir Izetbegovic spoke about arming: “Poor neighbors spend money on expensive weapons. You see these rocket systems and planes in Serbia and Croatia, and we must keep the balance in all of this, because weakness attracts”,Izetbegovic said.

This is also indicated by the arming of Croatian armed forces in recent years. The Pentagon donated Croatia 16 OH-58D Kiowa Warrior helicopters, used for observation, utility and direct fire support. The obligation of Croatia was  to pay all the taxes and the pilot training: the price tag – 30 million dollars. Croatia also has acquired Patria armorued personnel vehicles, the self-propeled PzH Howitzers and signed a contract to buy 12 used F-16 Barak fighter jets from Israel. In the meantime, US has blocked the delivery of Israeli fighter jets because the Israelis have upgraded them. In any case, Croatia has decided to acquire a squadron of fighter jets. Apart from the above, Croatia will get from Unated Stated two tactical transport helicopters UH-60 Black Hawk, also under very favorable conditions. Also the Croatian Army has held comprehensive inter-service joint exercise of all components of the Croatian Armed Forces titled “Velebit 18 – Joint Force” which is the largest military exercise of Croatian army since the end of the war. It was conducted continuously for 72 hours from 13 to 15 October 2018 on multiple locations in the Republic of Croatia. It engaged a total of 5,500 members of the Croatian Armed Forces, including the reserve component. Croatian Army tested the attained level of capabilities pertaining  the defence of the national territory and to test the newly introduced weapons and equipment. However, bearing in mind that in NATO there is the principe of collective defense, which means that if someone threatens the security of Croatia, NATO is obliged to defend it, a logical question arises why Croatia should invest significant money in the purchase of arms as well as in serious military exercises. Especially having in mind that Croatia is at the bottom end of scale when it comes to EU countries economies. People are leaving Croatia, mostly young educated people. The answer is pretty clear, when we see that this process is done with strategic cooperation with United States.

The dramatic armament of Croatia has significantly disturbed the balance of power in the Balkans. So Serbia also began with serious equipping and arming. That could be seen on combined tactical exercise with combat shooting ”The Century of Winners 1918-2018” which was held at the Pester provisional testing range, on which Serbia marked the 100th anniversary of the victory in the First World War but also sent a clear message. It was one of the largest military exercises in the region, which included 8,000 members of the Serbian Armed Forces, with around 645 combat systems. The exercise has simultaneosly taken place in ten locations in Serbia where air force and infantry troops performed planned, training and combat activities with the engagement of 100 tanks, 100 combat vehicles, 100 artillery systems and with the ground and air defence missile systems.

Serbian Defense Minister Aleksandar Vulin stated that in 2018 Serbia has introduced in service nine fighter jets “MIG 29” and that in accordance with the agreement on military-technical cooperation with Belarus, in 2019 another four fighter jets “MIG 29” of the same type will be delivered. Agreements on the purchase of four Mi-35 combat helicopters and three transport Mi-17 B5 from Russia were concluded also. In the middle of the 2019 will be delivered the first H145M medium-sized military multirole helicopter. However, the most important will be the acquisition of the Pantsir-S missile system, a self-propelled, medium range surface-to-air missile system. Should be noted, that Serbia as the only state in the Balkans that proclaimed neutrality, is forced to have a trained and equipped army.

And that the weapons in the Balkans is not acquired just like that, shows the statement of European Union Commision chief Jean-Claude Juncker who warned at the beginning of October 2018 of a possible new war in the Balkans if Bosnia, Albania, Serbia, Macedonia, Montenegro and Kosovo do not feel the EU is serious about offering them future membership.

“If, in Europe’s highly complicated landscape, the impression arises, that we’re not serious about offering the prospect of EU membership to the western Balkans, then we might see later – and probably even sooner – what we saw in Balkans in the 1990s,’’ Juncker said in a speech to the Austrian parliament. In other words, if the West does not control the Balkans, war can become reality. In the coming period, the tensions will only grow in the Balkans, and there is a real chance that if the West can not achieve its goals peacefully, it will do it violently, as they did in Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia in the near past.  Without any doubt, pressure on Serbs will be getting stronger. That is why it requires a stronger presence of Russia in the Balkans, primarily in Serbia and Republic of Srpska.

First published in our partner International Affairs

Slavisha Batko Milacic is a historian and independent analyst. He has been doing analytics for years, writing in Serbian and English about the situation in the Balkans and Europe. Slavisha Batko Milacic can be contacted at email: varjag5[at]outlook.com

Continue Reading
Comments

Europe

NATO’s Cypriot Trick

Published

on

UN Photo/Eskinder Debebe

When the Soviet Union collapsed and the Warsaw Pact died, there was much speculation that NATO would consider itself redundant and either disappear or at least transmogrify into a less aggressive body.

Failing that, Moscow at least felt assured that NATO would not include Germany, let alone expand eastwards. Even the NATO Review, NATO’s PR organ, wrote self-apologetically twenty-five years after the fall of the Berlin wall: “Thus, the debate about the enlargement of NATO evolved solely in the context of German reunification. In these negotiations Bonn and Washington managed to allay Soviet reservations about a reunited Germany remaining in NATO. This was achieved by generous financial aid, and by the ‘2+4 Treaty’ ruling out the stationing of foreign NATO forces on the territory of the former East Germany. However, it was also achieved through countless personal conversations in which Gorbachev and other Soviet leaders were assured that the West would not take advantage of the Soviet Union’s weakness and willingness to withdraw militarily from Central and Eastern Europe.”

Whatever the polemics about Russia’s claim that NATO broke its promises, the facts of what happened following the fall of the Berlin wall and the negotiations about German re-unification strongly demonstrate that Moscow felt cheated and that the NATO business and military machine, driven by a jingoistic Cold War Britain, a selfish U.S. military-industrial-congressional complex and an atavistic Russia-hating Poland, saw an opportunity to become a world policeman.

This helps to explain why, in contrast to Berlin, NATO decided to keep Nicosia as the world’s last divided city. For Cyprus is in fact NATO’s southernmost point, de facto. And to have resolved Cyprus’ problem by heeding UN resolutions and getting rid of all foreign forces and re-unifying the country would have meant that NATO would have ‘lost’ Cyprus: hardly helpful to the idea of making NATO the world policeman. Let us look a little more closely at the history behind this.

Following the Suez debacle in 1956, Britain had already moved its Middle East Headquarters from Aden to Cyprus, while the U.S. was taking over from the UK and France in the Middle East. Although, to some extent under U.S. pressure, Britain was forced to bring Makarios out of exile and begin negotiating with Greece and Turkey to give up its colony, the U.S. opted for a NATO solution. It would not do to have a truly sovereign Cyprus, but only one which accepted the existence of the Sovereign Base Areas (SBAs) as part and parcel of any settlement; and so it has remained, whatever the sophistic semantics about a bizonal settlement and a double-headed government. The set of twisted and oft-contradictory treaties that have bedevilled the island since 1960 are still afflicting the part-occupied island which has been a de facto NATO base since 1949. Let us look at some more history.

When Cyprus obtained its qualified independence in 1960, Greece and Turkey had already signed, on 11 February 1959, a so called ‘Gentlemen’s Agreement’, agreeing that they would support Cyprus’ entry into NATO.1 This was, however, mere posture diplomacy, since Britain—and the U.S. for that matter—did not trust Cyprus, given the strength of the Progressive Party of Working People (AKEL) and the latter’s links to Moscow. The Ministry of Defence (MOD) wrote: ‘Membership of NATO might make it easier for the Republic of Cyprus and possibly for the Greeks and Turks to cause political embarrassment should the United Kingdom wish to use the bases […] for national ends outside Cyprus […] The access of the Cypriot Government to NATO plans and documents would present a serious security risk, particularly in view of the strength of the Cypriot Communist Party. […] The Chiefs of Staff, therefore, feel most strongly that, from the military point of view, it would be a grave disadvantage to admit Cyprus to NATO.’2 In short, Cyprus was considered unreliable.

As is well known, the unworkable constitution (described as such by the Foreign Office and even by David Hannay, the Annan reunification plan’s PR man), resulted in chaos and civil strife: in January 1964, during the chaos caused by the Foreign Office’s help and encouragement to President Makarios to introduce a ‘thirteen point plan’ to solve Cyprus’ problems, British Prime Minister Douglas-Home told the Cabinet: ‘If the Turks invade or if we are seriously prevented from fulfilling our political role, we have made it quite clear that we will retire into base.’3 Put more simply, Britain had never had any intention of upholding the Treaty of Guarantee.

In July of the same year, the Foreign Office wrote: ‘The Americans have made it quite clear that there would be no question of using the 6th Fleet to prevent any possible Turkish invasion […] We have all along made it clear to the United Nations that we could not agree to UNFICYP’s being used for the purpose of repelling external intervention, and the standing orders to our troops outside UNFYCYP are to withdraw to the sovereign base areas immediately any such intervention takes place.’4

It was mainly thanks to Moscow and President Makarios that in 1964 a Turkish invasion and/or the island being divided between Greece and Turkey was prevented. Such a solution would have strengthened NATO, since Cyprus would no longer exist other than as a part of NATO members Greece and Turkey. Moscow had issued the following statement: ‘The Soviet Government hereby states that if there is an armed foreign invasion of Cypriot territory, the Soviet Union will help the Republic of Cyprus to defend its freedom and independence against foreign intervention.’5

Privately, Britain, realising the unworkability of the 1960 treaties, was embarrassed, and wished to relieve itself of the whole problem. The following gives us the backstage truth: ‘The bases and retained sites, and their usefulness to us, depend in large measure on Greek Cypriot co-operation and at least acquiescence. A ‘Guantanamo’6 position is out of the question. Their future therefore must depend on the extent to which we can retain Greek and/or Cypriot goodwill and counter USSR and UAR pressures. There seems little doubt, however, that in the long term, our sovereign rights in the SBA’s will be considered increasingly irksome by the Greek Cypriots and will be regarded as increasingly anachronistic by world public opinion.7

Following the Turkish invasion ten years later, Britain tried to give up its bases: ‘British strategic interests in Cyprus are now minimal. Cyprus has never figured in NATO strategy and our bases there have no direct NATO role. The strategic value of Cyprus to us has declined sharply since our virtual withdrawal from east of Suez. This will remain the case when the Suez Canal has reopened.8

A Cabinet paper concluded: ‘Our policy should continue to be one of complete withdrawal of our military presence on Cyprus as soon as feasible. […] In the circumstances I think that we should make the Americans aware of our growing difficulty in continuing to provide a military presence in Cyprus while sustaining our main contribution to NATO. […]9

Britain kept trying to give up the bases, but the enabler of the Turkish invasion, Henry Kissinger, did not allow Britain to give up its bases and listening posts, since that would have weakened NATO, and since Kissinger needed the bases because of the Arab-Israel dispute.10

Thus, by the end of 1980, in a private about-turn, Britain had completely succumbed to American pressure: ‘The benefits which we derive from the SBAs are of major significance and virtually irreplaceable. They are an essential contribution to the Anglo-American relationship. The Department have regularly considered with those concerned which circumstances in Cyprus are most conducive to our retaining unfettered use of our SBA facilities. On balance, the conclusion is that an early ‘solution’ might not help (since pressures against the SBAs might then build up), just as breakdown and return to strife would not, and that our interests are best served by continuing movement towards a solution – without the early prospect of arrival [author’s italics]11.

And so it is today: Cyprus is a de facto NATO territory. A truly independent, sovereign and united Cyprus is an anathema to the U.S. and Britain, since such a scenario would afford Russia the hypothetical opportunity to increase its influence in the Eastern Mediterranean.

From our partner RIAC

[1] Ministry of Defence paper JP (59) 163, I January 1960, BNA DEFE 13/99/MO/5/1/5, in Mallinson, William, Cyprus, a Modern History, I.B. Tauris (now Bloomsbury), London and New York, 2005, 2009, 2012, p.49.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Memorandum by Prime Minister, 2 January 1964, BNA CAB/129/116, in ibid, Mallinson, William, p.37.

[4] British Embassy, Washington, to Foreign Office, 7 July 1964, telegram 8541, BNA FO 371/174766, file C1205/2/G, in ibid.’, Mallinson, William, p. 37.

[5] Joseph, Joseph S., Cyprus, Ethnic Conflict and International Politics, St Martin’s Press, London and New York, 1997, p. 66.

[6] In 1964, Cuba cut off supplies to the American base at Guantanamo Bay, since the US refused to return it to Cuba, as a result of which the US took measures to make it self-sufficient.

[7] Briefing paper, 18 June 1964, BNA-DO/220/170, file MED 193/105/2, part A. Mallinson,William, Kissinger and the Invasion of Cyprus, p. 127.

[8] ‘British Interests in the Eastern Mediterranean’, draft paper, 11 April 1975, BNA-FCO 46/1248, file DPI/515/1.

[9] Cabinet paper, 29 September 1976, in op. cit. Mallinson, William, Kissinger and the Invasion of Cyprus, p.134.

[10] Mallinson, William, Britain and Cyprus: Key Themes and Documents, I.B. Tauris, London and New York, 2011, and Bloomsbury, London and New York, 2020, pp. 87-121.

[11] Fergusson to Foreign Minister’s Private Secretary, minute, 8 December 1980, BNA-FCO 9/2949, file WSC/023/1, part C.

Continue Reading

Europe

Belarus divorces from the Eastern Partnership: A new challenge for the EU Neighborhood Policy

Published

on

The Eastern Partnership (EaP) is the Eastern dimension of the EU Neighborhood Policy adopted back in 2009 aimed at deepening relations between Brussels and six Eastern European partners – Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. The EaP has been regarded as a strategic initiative based on mutual interests and common values with a goal of strengthening political and economic relations with those countries, helping them enhance their institutional capacity through sustainable reforms. While increasing stability and paving the way for the sustainable development of those societies, the EU’s overall goal has been to secure its Eastern borders.

Since the very beginning the EaP has been suspiciously viewed by Russia as an attempt of expansion of the sphere of influence and as a first step of EU membership of these countries. Russians point to the EU and NATO ambitious expansion eastward as the main reason for complicated relations and in this context the EaP has been regarded with traditional fears and paranoic perceptions. The Russian hard power approach causes serious problems for the EaP which fails to mitigate security concerns of partner countries and to come up with serious initiatives for conflict settlement. Being a laggard in terms of soft power, the Russian ruling elite has continuously used all hard power foreign policy instruments at its disposal trying to undermine the coherence of the initiative. And the very recent démarche of Belarus to withdraw from the EaP should be seen in this context of confrontation.

On 28th of June, the ministry of foreign affairs of Belarus announced a decision to halt its membership in the EaP as a response to the EU sanctions imposed on Minsk accompanied by the recalling ambassadors from both sides. Actually, this isn’t the first case of the EaP walkout blackmailed by Lukashenko. The first escape was attempted in September-October 2011, but the difficulties were soon resolved and Lukashenko revised his decision. This time situation seems very complicated and these far-reaching tensions may have tough consequences for Lukashenko’s regime. This new group of sectoral sanctions which target banking, oil, telecommunication spheres and also ban the export of potash, is a harsh response from the EU against Lukashneko’s scandalous hijacking activity in May to detain a Belarusian opposition journalist and blogger Roman Protasevich.

Lukashenko’s administration not only challenges the EU Neighborhood Policy and shows no retreat, but also goes forward escalating the situation. Minsk takes high risks freezing the Readmission Agreement signed by the EU. This document is a legal basis for bilateral cooperation aimed at struggling against irregular migration flows. It’s not a secret that the territory of Belarus has been used for illegal migration for the groups from the Middle East to penetrate into neighboring EU member states such as Poland, Lithuania and Latvia. Moreover, Belarus territory has served as a transit route for smuggling circles going from East to West and vice versa.  And now closing eyes on all these channels, Minsk hopes to increase the bargaining power vis-à-vis Brussels. However, given the Western reactions, it seems that this time the EU is resolute.

Despite the fact that Charles Michel, the President of the EU Council, described this withdrawal as “another step backwards” and even threatened that “this will escalate tensions having clear negative impacts”, the EU wants to continue working with the Belarusian society  as Josep Borrel stated. The EU’s determination to keep the bridges alive with the Belarusian people, in spite of Lukashneko’s radical stance, is aimed at preventing further isolationism of Minsk which would benefit only Russia.

In contrast to the increasing level of tensions with the EU, the Russian authorities continue to support Lukasheno’s administration, thus trying to deepen the gap and to bring Belarus under their total influence. Russia uses Belarus in its chessboard with the EU and the USA in Eastern Europe. Last year’s fraud elections and brutal crackdown by Lukashenko left him alone with the only source of power stemming from the Kremlin. Thus the withdrawal from the EaP should be understood not only as a convulsion of the Belarusian authorities in response to the sanctions, but also Russia’s employment of the Belarus card to respond to the recent joint statement of the EU-US summit in Brussels, when both parties declared their intention to stand with the people of Belarus, supporting their demands for human rights and democracy simultaneously criticising Lukashenko’s regime and his reckless political behavior and also criticising Russian’s unacceptable behavior.

So, Lukashenko’s step to quit the EaP can be seen as a well-calculated adulatory sign towards Moscow sacrificing the last remnants of sovereignty in order to receive financial and political lifebuoy amid the increasing crisis in the result of sanctions.  And the recent visit of N. Patrushev, the Secretary of the Security Council of Russia, to Minsk right after the withdrawal decision shows Russian inclination to strike while the iron is hot and to abuse the vulnerable situation of Belarus. Patrushev stated that the ultimate goal of foreign powers is to change the power in Belarus and he suggested instead of focusing on internal issues, to bring their forces together against external threats as their influence affects internal developments. For this reason, deeper integration of security and military services of both countries are on the table.

The reaction of opposition leader S. Tikhanovskaya was very rough, stating that this suspension will cut the opportunities of ordinary citizens who benefit from the political and economic outcomes of the EaP. Moreover, she claims that Lukashenko doesn’t have a right to represent Belarus since August 2020 and his decisions don’t have legal consequences for Belarus. This kind of approach is shared by the leadership of Lithuania too, whose president and minister of foreign affairs not only refuse to recognize Lukashenko as a legitimate president, but also highlight the role of the Kremlin in supporting the dictatorial power of Lukashenko in exchange for decreasing sovereignty.

The blackmail of Lukashenko to challenge the EU Eastern Neighborhood Policy  in order to have the sanctions lifted may bring about such kind of precedents with other partnering countries as well. First of all, this concerns Azerbaijan which continues to face serious problems related with human rights, freedom of expression, the problem of Prisoners of War and other traits of authoritarian power. It’s well-known that  human rights issues have been the underwater stones in the EU and Azerbaijan relations and they continue to pose new challenges for Aliyev’s non-democratice regime. Another weak ring of the EaP chain is Armenia. Even though reelected N. Pashinyan is eager to pursue a balanced foreign policy, post-war Armenia still faces serious limitations given its vulnerable dependence on Russia. Besides, Pashinyan’s main rival and the former President R. Kocharyan, whose alliance will be the second largest faction in the newly elected Parliament has recently stated that this new parliament can last up to one and half years and nobody can exclude the possibility of new snap elections. His pro-Russian attitude and anti-Western stance are well-known and in case he becomes a prime-minister, there is no guarantee that he will follow the path of Lukashenko. 

Therefore  the statement of the Austrian MFA, that ”we cannot leave South Caucasus to others” during the  recent official visit of the Austrian, Romanian and Latvian MFA under the mandate of the EU High Representative to the South Caucasus, reminds  about the EU presence in the region and also the fact that the ‘normative power’ can be a source of balance and a status quo changer.

Continue Reading

Europe

Anti-Macron protests underline classism, as corona protesters and gilets jaune join forces

Published

on

photo: Alaattin Doğru - Anadolu Agency

I get it. People in France are fed up with the Covid lockdowns and that’s why they are protesting against the new tightening of the Covid rules. But there is much more to the story.

The new anti-Covid rules by French President Macron came in the middle of the Cannes Film Festival where the rich and famous come out to play for 10 days at the French Reviera. I was there, too, in fact when the new set of rules angered so many ordinary French people. But guess what — the rules didn’t apply to us, those gathered for the Cannes red carpets and parties. Celebrities did not have to wear masks on the red carpet. I did not have to put on a mask at the red carpets. I was not checked even once on the mandatory Covid tests which we took every 2 days anyways. No one at the Cannes red carpets, parties or fashion shows was looking at Covid tests at the entrance, and I attended not one or two things. That’s at the time when the rest of France was boiling. Yes, we were treated differently as the Cannes crowd. That was obvious.

Don’t get me wrong — spending tens of thousands of euros to drink champaigne, walk red carpets and hang out with actors, models, designers and influencers is great. But I couldn’t help but notice that the Cannes elite was being held to a very different standard in comparisson to the ordinary French public. Macron exempted the Cannes crowd from the new rules and that smells of classism and elitism. I can see why the gillets gaune, which I wrote about in my book Trump, European security and Turkey (2020), are angry and want to resume their protests which were put an end to with the Covid lockdowns.

In fact, as soon as you move one or two streets away from the craze and snobbery of the Cannes Festival, you see a very different French picture. Actually, the most pleasant conversations I had in Cannes were with the guy that made my pizza at 2am, a couple of gillets jaune on the street, and the taxi driver who lives in Cannes. These were the pleasant, hard-working French people that represent France so much better than the snotty Cannes Film Festival organizers, the French police or the so-overrated snobbery at the Chopard events. 

From the pizza guy in Mozarella Street I learned that he works two jobs and sleeps 3 hours per night. That’s the reality for many normal French people. Yet, he was the nicest and coolest person I met in Cannes. Somehow I wished that he could trade places with some of the rest I met in Cannes who probably don’t deserve to have an easy life and should be taught a lesson. So I get it. I get the struggle of the gillets gaune and all those that are opposed to Macron’s policies. He is increasingly playing with the far right and that might as well mean that he is looking at his sunset. 

I also get the classism that persists in French society — it’s important to be aware of it even if you’re on the receiving end of a lot of glamor, bemefits and good things. All I can tell you is that next time I am in France, I am joining the gillet jaune protests. Now I really get it. 

Continue Reading

Publications

Latest

Terrorism47 mins ago

A question mark on FATF’s credibility

While addressing a political gathering, India’s external affairs minister  S. Jaishanker made a startling lapsus de langue “We have been...

Human Rights3 hours ago

UNSC calls for ‘immediate reversal’ of Turkish and Turkish Cypriot decision on Varosha

The Security Council said in a statement released on Friday that settling any part of the abandoned Cypriot suburb of Varosha, “by people other than...

Americas5 hours ago

Biden Revises US Sanctions Policy

In the United States, a revision of the sanctions policy is in full swing. Joe Biden’s administration strives to make sanctions instruments more effective in achieving his...

South Asia7 hours ago

Unleashing India’s True Potential

As India strives to unleash its true potential to rise as a global powerhouse, it is tasked with a series...

New Social Compact9 hours ago

Demand for Investigation of COVID-19 gained momentum

Human history is full of natural disasters like Earthquakes, Floods, Fires, Vacanos, Drought, Famine, Pandemic, etc. Some of them were...

Central Asia11 hours ago

Power without Soft Power: China’s Outreach to Central Asia

The People’s Republic of China has become increasingly interested in the Central Asian countries—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan—for both...

Americas13 hours ago

Sea Breeze 2021: U.S. is worryingly heading closer to conflict with Russia in the Black Sea

On July 10th, the 2021 iteration of the joint military exercise, Sea Breeze, concluded in the Black Sea. This exercise,...

Trending