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The Saga of Kosovo

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After Serbia has successfully lobbied on the general assembly of Interpol that self-proclaimed Republic of Kosovo does not become member in this organization, the Western Balkans is again heated up. Kosovo Prime Minister Ramush Haradinaj responded by increasing tariffs for 100% on goods from Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Despite the fact that Kosovo(UNMIK) is a signatory of Central European Free Trade Agreement, Haradinaj’s latest move caused a lukewarm reaction of the West. However, stability in the Balkans is mostly shaken by the decision to transform the Kosovo Security Forces into the Kosovo Army. This latest move by the Kosovo’s Government is yet another gross violation of UN Resolution 1244. The skepticism towards the formation of the military was also expressed by Russia, stressing that such a move undermines stability in the Balkans and that it is in contradiction with UN Security Council Resolution 1244, according to which on Kosovo only permitted international military force is KFOR.

The recent formation of the Kosovo Army has once again demonstrated the extent to which the Balkans is unstable. NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg has stated that the decision for the transition of the Kosovo Security Forces to Kosovo Armed Forces were made despite concerns expressed by the Alliance and that he “regrets that decision“.

“While the transition of the KSF is in principle a matter for Kosovo to decide, we have made clear that this move is ill-timed. NATO supports the development of the KSF under its current mandate. With the change of mandate, the North Atlantic Council will now have to re-examine the level of NATO`s egagement with the KSF – under the current mandate. With the change of mandate, the North Atlantic Council will have to re-examine the level of NATO`s engagement with the KSF“, Stoltenberg said.

By transforming the army, Kosovo will increase the number of soldiers to 5,000 and will have 3,000 reservists. Kosovo will have free hands for the purchase of military weapons, from heavy-machine guns, through combat armored vehicles and various types of missile systems. Certainly, a helicopter component can be expected, with a small amount of armor and heavy artillery. Kosovo will most likely get modern antitank missile systems and man-portable air-defense systems, which is a treat to low-flying aircrafts, especially helicopters.

For the Kosovo Serbs, Kosovo Army is primarily a source of fear because of the 2004 pogrom, which essentially was an act of ethnic cleasing, according to Admiral Gregory G. Johnson, then commander of NATO forces in southern Europe. From 17 to 19 March 2004, a large number of Serbs and other non-Albanian population was expelled, their houses burned and Serb cultural and historical monuments were desecrated. It is estimated that more than 4,000 people were expelled from their homes across Kosovo, 28 people were killed, more than 900 people were beaten and severely injured, 19 monuments of the first category and 16 Orthodox churches were destroyed. Also, Albanians destroyed about 10,000 valuable frescoes, icons, and many other church relics, as well as data on births, marriages and deaths, which testify to the centuries-long duration of the Serbs in Kosovo. Serbs were ethnically cleansed from six towns and nine villages. The pogrom also showed that NATO did not want to protect Serbs in Kosovo.

Today, the main problem for the Serbian Government is that Kosovo Army will occupy north of Kosovo. Because of frequent tensions in Kosovo, Serbian Army is equipped with modern weapons and trained rapid reaction forces, known as project 1500. Also Serbian Army purchased 4 assault Mi-35M helicopters, 6 light transport and attack helicopters H145M and 3 transport Mi-17 helicopters. The aim is to protect the Serbs in northern Kosovo. With this equipment, Serbia will be able to quickly deploy smaller, light land forces to critical points of unrest. Basically, the Kosovo army today or in the future will not be able to confront with the Serbian army, which is the strongest armed forces in the Western Balkans. Army of Kosovo was made for blitzkrieg. The goal is to quickly invade the north of Kosovo, occupied it and then with the help of NATO not allow the Serbian Army to respond.

Regarding Kosovo everyone is dissatisfied. Kosovo Albanians were promised everything, and they got little. There is no membership in the United Nations or in the European Union. Unemployment, corruption and crime are high, which is one of reasons why there is no visa liberalization. Also, on Kosovo there is no significant investments. On the other hand, sponsors of an independent Kosovo are also dissatisfied. In Kosovo, for almost 20 years, Albanians have failed to create a law-governed state. The West has invested heavily in building Kosovo institutions, but the results are poor. Approximately 190 Kosovo Albanians are still in Syria and Iraq and are part of terrorist organizations, or have been arrested there, while a total of about 315 Kosovo Albanians fought for the Islamic state in Middle East. In the State Department report from 2017, it was noted growing threat of Islamic terrorism in Kosovo, and warned that Kosovo is one of neuralgic points in Europe on the issue of Islamic radicalism. Even the Western media started to speak openly about this problem.

Vucic’s policy towards Kosovo

The reaction of Serbian authorities to the recent decisions of Kosovo, apart from verbal condemnations, were lukewarm. The request for an urgent session of the Security Council came first from Russia and then from Serbia. In spite of the fact that Serbia had a wide range of responses to the formation of the Kosovo Army, everything remained at the verbal level. In his speech at the Security Council session, Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic did not mention the Kumanovo agreement which involves the return of 1000 Serbian soldiers and police officers at Kosovo. In his two statements at the session, he had not even asked the Security Council to revoke the decision on the establishment of Kosovo Army. He asked the Security Council to abolish the tax rate of 100% on goods from Serbia, but not the abolition of Kosovo Army. In his speech, Aleksandar Vucic also said that in Kosovo lives 1,700,000 Albanians, and if today is clear that this number is multiplied. According to the official data of the Central Election Commission of the self-proclaimed Republic of Kosovo, on the last elections in Kosovo voted only 470,000 citizens and of that, 50,000 Serbs. It should be added that in Kosovo because of widespread corruption, there is a strong discipline over the election, so that the majority of the population go to the polls. In addition to the fact that he has increased the number of Albanians significantly, Vucic reduced the number of Serbs. Serbian president stated that 100,000 Serbs lives in Kosovo in spite of the fact that KFOR claims that 120,000 Serbs lives in Kosovo. In addition, the Serbian List, which is under the control of the official Belgrade, do not leave neither Kosovo Parliament nor the Government of Kosovo.

What characterizes the reign of Alexandar Vucic is defeatism, especially regarding the issue of Kosovo. As a result, the emigration of Serbs from Kosovo, especially to the south of the Ibar, has increased. The reason for such a policy is Vucic’s view that Kosovo should be divided. For this plan he has the support from Hashim Thaci, president of self-proclaimed Republic of Kosovo. Today, on Kosovo, regarding the negotiations with Serbia, there are two blocs. The first, led by Hashim Thaci, is in favor of the exchange of territories (division), likely Northern Kosovo for Serbia’s Presevo Valley. On the other side, Kosovo Prime Minister Ramush Haradinaj is strongly against this plan, responding that such an action would only destabilize the region and lead to war. The main reason why Ramush Haradinaj strongly opposes the division is because of the assessment that Albanians can occupy northern Kosovo. Bearing in mind that the special police of Kosovo so far repeatedly invaded the north of Kosovo, it is realistic to expect that the same in future will be done by Kosovo Army. The only dilemma for Haradinaj is whether the Serbian Army will react. On the other hand, Tachi wants to solve the north Kosovo issue through dialogue with Aleksandar Vucic. This agreement would be catastrophic for Serbia, because Serbia would renounce part of its territory. Consequently, it would encourage other national minorities to take that path. The remaining Serbs in Kosovo would experience an exodus.

First published in our partner International Affairs

Slavisha Batko Milacic is a historian and independent analyst. He has been doing analytics for years, writing in Serbian and English about the situation in the Balkans and Europe. Slavisha Batko Milacic can be contacted at email: varjag5[at]outlook.com

Europe

Iceland’s Historic(al) Elections

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The morning of September, 26 was a good one for Lenya Run Karim of the Pirate Party. Once the preliminary results were announced, things were clear: the 21-year-old law student of the University of Iceland, originating from a Kurdish immigrant family, had become the youngest MP in the country’s history.

In historical significance, however, this event was second to another. Iceland, the world champion in terms of gender equality, became the first country in Europe to have more women MPs than men, 33 versus 30. The news immediately made world headlines: only five countries in the world have achieved such impressive results. Remarkably, all are non-European: Rwanda, Nicaragua and Cuba have a majority of women in parliament, while Mexico and the UAE have an equal number of male and female MPs.

Nine hours later, news agencies around the world had to edit their headlines. The recount in the Northwest constituency affected the outcome across the country to delay the ‘triumph for women’ for another four years.

Small numbers, big changes

The Icelandic electoral system is designed so that 54 out of the 63 seats in the Althingi, the national parliament, are primary or constituency seats, while another nine are equalization seats. Only parties passing the 5 per cent threshold are allowed to distribute equalisation seats that go to the candidates who failed to win constituency mandates and received the most votes in their constituency. However, the number of equalisation mandates in each of the 6 constituencies is legislated. In theory, this could lead to a situation in which the leading party candidate in one constituency may simply lack an equalisation mandate, so the leading candidate of the same party—but in another constituency—receives it.

This is what happened this year. Because of a difference of only ten votes between the Reform Party and the Pirate Party, both vying for the only equalisation mandate in the Northwest, the constituency’s electoral commission announced a recount on its own initiative. There were also questions concerning the counting procedure as such: the ballots were not sealed but simply locked in a Borgarnes hotel room. The updated results hardly affected the distribution of seats between the parties, bringing in five new MPs, none of whom were women, with the 21-year-old Lenya Run Karim replaced by her 52-year-old party colleague.

In the afternoon of September, 27, at the request of the Left-Green Movement, supported by the Independence Party, the Pirates and the Reform Party, the commission in the South announced a recount of their own—the difference between the Left-Greens and the Centrists was only seven votes. There was no ‘domino effect’, as in the case of the Northwest, as the five-hour recount showed the same result. Recounts in other districts are unlikely, nor is it likely that Althingi—vested with the power to declare the elections valid—would invalidate the results in the Northwest. Nevertheless, the ‘replaced’ candidates have already announced their intention to appeal against the results, citing violations of ballot storage procedures. Under the Icelandic law, this is quite enough to invalidate the results and call a re-election in the Northwest, as the Supreme Court of Iceland invalidated the Constitutional Council elections due to a breach of procedure 10 years ago. Be that as it may, the current score remains 33:30, in favor of men.

Progressives’ progress and threshold for socialists

On the whole, there were no surprises: the provisional allocation of mandates resembles, if with minor changes, the opinion polls on the eve of the election.

The ruling three-party coalition has rejuvenated its position, winning 37 out of the 63 Althingi seats. The centrist Progressive Party saw a real electoral triumph, improving its 2017 result by five seats. Prime-minister Katrín Jakobsdóttir’s Left-Green Movement, albeit with a slight loss, won eight seats, surpassing all pre-election expectations. Although the centre-right Independence Party outperformed everyone again to win almost a quarter of all votes, 16 seats are one of the worst results of the Icelandic ‘Grand Old Party’ ever.

The results of the Social-Democrats, almost 10% versus 12.1% in 2017, and of the Pirates, 8.6% versus 9.2%, have deteriorated. Support for the Centre Party of Sigmundur Gunnlaugsson, former prime-minister and victim of the Panama Papers, has halved from 10.9% to 5.4%. The centrists have seen a steady decline in recent years, largely due to a sexist scandal involving party MPs. The populist People’s Party and the pro-European Reform Party have seen gains of 8.8% and 8.3%, as compared to 6.9% and 6.7% in the previous elections.

Of the leading Icelandic parties, only the Socialist Party failed to pass the 5 per cent threshold: despite a rating above 7% in August, the Socialists received only 4.1% of the vote.

Coronavirus, climate & economy

Healthcare and the fight against COVID-19 was, expectedly, on top of the agenda of the elections: 72% of voters ranked it as the defining issue, according to a Fréttablaðið poll. Thanks to swift and stringent measures, the Icelandic government brought the coronavirus under control from day one, and the country has enjoyed one of the lowest infection rates in the world for most of the time. At the same time, the pandemic exposed a number of problems in the national healthcare system: staff shortages, low salaries and long waiting lists for emergency surgery.

Climate change, which Icelanders are already experiencing, was an equally important topic. This summer, the temperature has not dropped below 20°C for 59 days, an anomaly for a North-Atlantic island. However, Icelanders’ concerns never converted into increased support for the four left-leaning parties advocating greater reductions in CO2 emission than the country has committed to under the Paris Agreement: their combined result fell by 0.5%.

The economy and employment were also among the main issues in this election. The pandemic has severely damaged the island nation’s economy, which is heavily tourism-reliant—perhaps, unsurprisingly, many Icelanders are in favor of reviving the tourism sector as well as diversifying the economy further.

The EU membership, by far a ‘traditional’ issue in Icelandic politics, is unlikely to be featured on the agenda of the newly-elected parliament as the combined result of the Eurosceptics, despite a loss of 4%, still exceeds half of the overall votes. The new Althingi will probably face the issue of constitutional reform once again, which is only becoming more topical in the light of the pandemic and the equalization mandates story.

New (old) government?

The parties are to negotiate coalition formation. The most likely scenario now is that the ruling coalition of the Independence Party, the Left-Greens and the Progressives continues. It has been the most ideologically diverse and the first three-party coalition in Iceland’s history to last a full term. A successful fight against the pandemic has only strengthened its positions and helped it secure additional votes. Independence Party leader and finance minister Bjarni Benediktsson has earlier said he would be prepared to keep the ruling coalition if it holds the majority. President Guðni Jóhannesson announced immediately after the elections that he would confirm the mandate of the ruling coalition to form a new government if the three parties could strike a deal.

Other developments are possible but unlikely. Should the Left-Greens decide to leave the coalition, they could be replaced by the Reform Party or the People’s Party, while any coalition without the Independence Party can only be a four-party or larger coalition.

Who will become the new prime-minister still remains to be seen—but if the ruling coalition remains in place, the current prime-minister and leader of the Left-Greens, Katrín Jakobsdóttir, stands a good chance of keeping her post: she is still the most popular politician in Iceland with a 40 per cent approval rate.

The 2021 Althingi election, with one of the lowest turnouts in history at 80.1%, has not produced a clear winner. The election results reflect a Europe-wide trend in which traditional “major” parties are losing support. The electorate is fragmenting and their votes are pulled by smaller new parties. The coronavirus pandemic has only reinforced this trend.

The 2021 campaign did not foreshadow a sensation. Although Iceland has not become the first European country with a women’s majority in parliament, these elections will certainly go down in history as a test of Icelanders’ trust to their own democracy.

From our partner RIAC

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EU-Balkan Summit: No Set Timeframe for Western Balkans Accession

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From left to right: Janez JANŠA (Prime Minister, Slovenia), Charles MICHEL (President of the European Council), Ursula VON DER LEYEN (President of the European Commission) Copyright: European Union

On October 6, Slovenia hosted a summit between the EU and the Western Balkans states. The EU-27 met with their counterparts (Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Kosovo) in the sumptuous Renaissance setting of Brdo Castle, 30 kilometers north of the capital, Ljubljana. Despite calls from a minority of heads of state and government, there were no sign of a breakthrough on the sensitive issue of enlargement. The accession of these countries to the European Union is still not unanimous among the 27 EU member states.

During her final tour of the Balkans three weeks ago, German Chancellor Angela Merkel stated that the peninsula’s integration was of “geostrategic” importance. On the eve of the summit, Austrian Chancellor Sebastian Kurz backed Slovenia’s goal of integrating this zone’s countries into the EU by 2030.

However, the unanimity required to begin the hard negotiations is still a long way off, even for the most advanced countries in the accession process, Albania and North Macedonia. Bulgaria, which is already a member of the EU, is opposing North Macedonia’s admission due to linguistic and cultural differences. Since Yugoslavia’s demise, Sofia has rejected the concept of Macedonian language, insisting that it is a Bulgarian dialect, and has condemned the artificial construction of a distinct national identity.

Other countries’ reluctance to join quickly is of a different nature. France and the Netherlands believe that previous enlargements (Bulgaria and Romania in 2007) have resulted in changes that must first be digested before the next round of enlargement. The EU-27 also demand that all necessary prior guarantees be provided regarding the independence of the judiciary and the fight against corruption in these countries. Despite the fact that press freedom is a requirement for membership, the NGO Reporters Without Borders (RSF) urged the EU to make “support for investigative and professional journalism” a key issue at the summit.”

While the EU-27 have not met since June, the topic of Western Balkans integration is competing with other top priorities in the run-up to France’s presidency of the EU in the first half of 2022. On the eve of the summit, a working dinner will be held, the President of the European Council, Charles Michel, called for “a strategic discussion on the role of the Union on the international scene” in his letter of invitation to the EU-Balkans Summit, citing “recent developments in Afghanistan,” the announcement of the AUKUS pact between the United States, Australia, and the United Kingdom, which has enraged Paris.

The Western Balkans remain the focal point of an international game of influence in which the Europeans seek to maintain their dominance. As a result, the importance of reaffirming a “European perspective” at the summit was not an overstatement. Faced with the more frequent incursion of China, Russia, and Turkey in that European region, the EU has pledged a 30 billion euro Economic and Investment Plan for 2021-2027, as well as increased cooperation, particularly to deal with the aftermath of the Covid-19 pandemic.

Opening the borders, however, is out of the question. In the absence of progress on this issue, Albania, North Macedonia, and Serbia have decided to establish their own zone of free movement (The Balkans are Open”) beginning January 1, 2023. “We are starting today to do in the region what we will do tomorrow in the EU,” said Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama when the agreement was signed last July.

This initiative, launched in 2019 under the name “Mini-Schengen” and based on a 1990s idea, does not have the support of the entire peninsular region, which remains deeply divided over this project. While Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro are not refusing to be a part of it and are open to discussions, the Prime Minister of Kosovo, Albin Kurti, who took office in 2020, for his part accuses Serbia of relying on this project to recreate “a fourth Yugoslavia”

Tensions between Balkan countries continue to be an impediment to European integration. The issue of movement between Kosovo and Serbia has been a source of concern since the end of September. Two weeks of escalation followed Kosovo’s decision to prohibit cars with Serbian license plates from entering its territory, in response to Serbia’s long-standing prohibition on allowing vehicles to pass in the opposite direction.

In response to the mobilization of Kosovar police to block the road, Serbs in Kosovo blocked roads to their towns and villages, and Serbia deployed tanks and the air force near the border. On Sunday, October 3, the conflict seemed to be over, and the roads were reopened. However, the tone had been set three days before the EU-Balkans summit.

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Europe

German Election: Ramifications for the US Foreign Policy

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Image source: twitter @OlafScholz

In the recent German election, foreign policy was scarcely an issue. But Germany is an important element in the US foreign policy. There is a number of cases where Germany and the US can cooperate, but all of these dynamics are going to change very soon.

The Germans’ strategic culture makes it hard to be aligned perfectly with the US and disagreements can easily damage the relations. After the tension between the two countries over the Iraq war, in 2003, Henry Kissinger said that he could not imagine the relations between Germany and the US could be aggravated so quickly, so easily, which might end up being the “permanent temptation of German politics”. For a long time, the US used to provide security for Germany during the Cold War and beyond, so, several generations are used to take peace for granted. But recently, there is a growing demand on them to carry more burden, not just for their own security, but for international peace and stability. This demand was not well-received in Berlin.

Then, the environment around Germany changed and new threats loomed up in front of them. The great powers’ competition became the main theme in international relations. Still, Germany was not and is not ready for shouldering more responsibility. Politicians know this very well. Ursula von der Leyen, who was German defense minister, asked terms like “nuclear weapons” and “deterrence” be removed from her speeches.

Although on paper, all major parties appreciate the importance of Germany’s relations with the US, the Greens and SPD ask for a reset in the relations. The Greens insist on the European way in transatlantic relations and SPD seeks more multilateralism. Therefore, alignment may be harder to maintain in the future. However, If the tensions between the US and China heat up to melting degrees, then external pressure can overrule the internal pressure and Germany may accede to its transatlantic partners, just like when Helmut Schmid let NATO install medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe after the Soviet Union attacked Afghanistan and the Cold War heated up.

According to the election results, now three coalitions are possible: grand coalition with CDU/CSU and SPD, traffic lights coalition with SPD, FDP, and Greens, Jamaica coalition with CDU/CSU, FDP, and Greens. Jamaica coalition will more likely form the most favorable government for the US because it has both CDU and FDP, and traffic lights will be the least favorite as it has SPD. The grand coalition can maintain the status quo at best, because contrary to the current government, SPD will dominate CDU.

To understand nuances, we need to go over security issues to see how these coalitions will react to them. As far as Russia is concerned, none of them will recognize the annexation of Crimea and they all support related sanctions. However, if tensions heat up, any coalition government with SPD will be less likely assertive. On the other hand, as the Greens stress the importance of European values like democracy and human rights, they tend to be more assertive if the US formulates its foreign policy by these common values and describe US-China rivalry as a clash between democracy and authoritarianism. Moreover, the Greens disapprove of the Nordstream project, of course not for its geopolitics. FDP has also sided against it for a different reason. So, the US must follow closely the negotiations which have already started between anti-Russian smaller parties versus major parties.

For relations with China, pro-business FDP is less assertive. They are seeking for developing EU-China relations and deepening economic ties and civil society relations. While CDU/CSU and Greens see China as a competitor, partner, and systemic rival, SPD and FDP have still hopes that they can bring change through the exchange. Thus, the US might have bigger problems with the traffic lights coalition than the Jamaica coalition in this regard.

As for NATO and its 2 percent of GDP, the division is wider. CDU/CSU and FDP are the only parties who support it. So, in the next government, it might be harder to persuade them to pay more. Finally, for nuclear participation, the situation is the same. CDU/CSU is the only party that argues for it. This makes it an alarming situation because the next government has to decide on replacing Germany’s tornados until 2024, otherwise Germany will drop out of the NATO nuclear participation.

The below table gives a brief review of these three coalitions. 1 indicates the lowest level of favoritism and 3 indicates the highest level of favoritism. As it shows, the most anti-Russia coalition is Jamaica, while the most anti-China coalition is Trafic light. Meanwhile, Grand Coalition is the most pro-NATO coalition. If the US adopts a more normative foreign policy against China and Russia, then the Greens and FDP will be more assertive in their anti-Russian and anti-Chinese policies and Germany will align more firmly with the US if traffic light or Jamaica coalition rise to power.

Issues CoalitionsTrafic LightGrand CoalitionJamaica
Russia213 
China312 
NATO132 

1 indicates the lowest level of favoritism. 3 indicates the highest level of favoritism.

In conclusion, this election should not make Americans any happier. The US has already been frustrated with the current government led by Angela Merkel who gave Germany’s trade with China the first priority, and now that the left-wing will have more say in any imaginable coalition in the future, the Americans should become less pleased. But, still, there are hopes that Germany can be a partner for the US in great power competition if the US could articulate its foreign policy with common values, like democracy and human rights. More normative foreign policy can make a reliable partner out of Germany. Foreign policy rarely became a topic in this election, but observers should expect many ramifications for it.

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