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Iran’s economic crisis and the impact on its strategy

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Let us analyze Iran’s current demographics, which – as happens everywhere – is at the basis of the labor force complexion and of the public investment volume, as well as productivity and private spending.

During the first years of Islamic revolution, soon after the advent of the regime, there was a 2.5 million increase in births. In the 2000s, the annual increase of newborns was only one million approximately, while currently there is a phase of further reduction in births.

There is also migration – another decisive factor in demographics – which, as already noted, is always at the basis of every country’s economic structure.

According to the 2016 population survey, the latest effective one carried out by the ayatollah regime, as many as 1.8 million Iranians -i.e. 2.2% of the current 82.407 million people – are of foreign origin.

Hence the presence of a wide share of young or very young people.

As can be easily inferred, this leads to a high rate of unemployment and youth unemployment, in particular.

As often happened in the past, there is also the regimes’ tendency to push the excess of working age population out of the country, also by means of war.

Considering the official data of September-October 2018, in the Shiite Islamic Republic of Iran the average unemployment rate is 12.2%.

According to the latest data, however, women’s unemployment rate is already equal to 19.8%, while the unofficial statistics of real unemployment among young people alone was 28.40% in the first quarter of 2018, with regional peaks of 35% and even 38% in some peripheral areas.

Another secondary, but inevitable effect of youth unemployment is the brain drain, as a result of which every year 150,000-180,000 graduates leave Iran.

A hidden tax that deprives Iran of 50 billion tax revenue, in addition to the loss of public (and family) costs for higher education.

Nevertheless, after 2015 – the year of the JCPOA with P5 + 1, i.e.  China, France, the Russian Federation, Great Britain and the United States, as well as Germany’s participation – there was a significant economic growth that, however, did not facilitate Iran’s access to Iranian capital and assets which had been frozen due to sanctions.

Iran’s total frozen assets are still between 100 and 124 billion US dollars, with approximately 50 billion dollars which have recently been refrozen in the United States alone.

Hence the sanction phase has been characterized by a real collapse of the Iranian economy.

From a GDP growing by a yearly 6% in 2010, in 2015 – exactly the year in which the JCPOA was signed – Iran certified a mere 1.5% GDP increase.

In 2016, as a result of the lifting of some sanctions against it, the GDP grew by 12.5% and by over 4% in 2017.

Hence a record growth in 2016 – due to the JCPOA -but later considerable growth rates were still recorded, certainly higher than the miserable growth rates of the European GDP in those same years.

Before the US unilateral withdrawal from the nuclear deal with Iran, international banks had also predicted a 4.8% increase of Iranian GDP in 2018.

The current rate is instead 1.8%.

Sanctions, especially those regarding currency, always reach the target.

Currently, however, the US unilateral sanctions do not excessively affect Iran’s military system, which is mainly based on domestic technologies and patents and does not fear to be significantly damaged by the embargo and sanctions against it.

Nevertheless, since the announcement of the US withdrawal from the nuclear deal last July, the value of the Iranian currency has halved. So far the riyal has even lost 80% of its value as against the dollar.

Moreover, due to some natural disasters, Iran is currently forced to import much food from abroad, just now that its currency is worth ever less.

Moreover, as always happens, the great devaluation has led to high inflation: currently the Iranian inflation rate is realistically about 24%, while the Iranian government reports a 10.2% rate.

Iran has still approximately 90 billion US dollars of reserves, with the extraction of 3.79 million barrels / day (data of June 2018), but production will certainly decrease, considering the new partial sanctions imposed by the USA.

To the delight of Saudi Arabia, above all, whose crude oil production has a direct inverse correlation with Iran’s.

At strategic and military levels, if Iran wants to organize a war action, its first step will be the Strait of Hormuz.

Over 30% of the maritime oil traffic transits through this waterway (i.e. 18.5 million barrels / day),considering that it is the most used route by all the Arab exporting countries.

Nevertheless, the Strait of Hormuz which, at its narrowest, has a width of 33 miles, is also the waterway used for most Iranian oil exports. This significantly limits the possibility of a generalized block of the Strait of Hormuz, not to mention the fact that the headquarters of the US Firth Fleet is at short distance from Manama, the capital of Bahrain.

Obviously the only relatively credible threat of blocking the Strait of Hormuz is enough to make the oil barrel price rise significantly – and therefore this is what really matters.

Hence there is a direct link between the pursuit of the Iranian  natural strategic goals and the increasingly difficult situation in Iran, subject to new and certainly not negligible unilateral US sanctions.

The more Iran wants, the more it will be punished on the markets and in the international geopolitical system.

Both the current US sanctions of last November and those imposed before the JCPOA, regard precious metals, the acquisition of US banknotes, or of technologies directly or indirectly linked to oil extraction or weapon manufacturing, as well as to the operations of oil transport and storage.

Obviously all payments to Iranian institutions or individuals cannot be made through US banks.

Hence, while a direct confrontation between Iran and the United States is currently unlikely, tension between the two countries is still conceivable – an escalation that also implies, at certain stages, war or semi-war operations.

A further variable of this scenario is Iran’s use of indirect or “hybrid war” strategies in the areas near Hormuz, or in any Middle East region where Shiites or the Iranian Armed Forces – above all, the Pasdaran – can start a war of attrition with the typical methods of hybrid war, guerrilla warfare, proxy war or strategic friction.

In particular, the ships of the Arab countries which are Iran’s “enemies” will be attacked by Iran in various ways, even without the possibility of identifying the attackers.

It is a highly likely scenario, but only if the Shiite republic feels to be encircled or under attack by Israel, the USA or the  Middle East Sunni powers.

In fact, the Yemeni Houthi rebels have already attacked  Saudi Aramco ships, during their crossing of Bab el-Mandeb Strait. If Saudi Arabia responded in the same way, this would give rise to a “small war” in the Strait, which is precisely what Iran wants, without ever directly creating the opportunity.

Approximately 5 million barrels / day transit through Bab el-Mandeb Strait to the Mediterranean, and the other way round.

Hitting these routes, without direct actions by the Guardians of the Revolution or by the less trusted Artesh, could be a possible option  for Iran.

In so doing, however, Iran would antagonize Europe which, indeed, count for nothing strategically and militarily – but this could set a precedent for a US military action, with or without its regional allies.

Hence if we put in place a series of international financial, political and military pressures, we can think that – in the future – the USA can sit back to the negotiating table with Iran.

Currently, it seems that the United States is leaving the Iranian affair to Saudi Arabia and Israel – but probably it will not be enough.

Hence, according to the basic ideas of Iran’s current leadership  in power, the negative reaction to the growth of Iran’s power does not depend on its threatening nature, but on the fear for the growth of a new Middle East actor, namely Iran.

Therefore, again according to the Iranian ruling class, only by pursuing the goals of Iran’s great autonomy and of an evident and significant power projection, will it be possible – in the future – to have an acceptable level of security for Iran and a good level of geoeconomic stability.

The Iranian leaders’ strategic-military theory, however, places  both conventional and unconventional threats on an equal footing.

Nevertheless, according to Iran’s leadership, Iran’s expansion is related to the mere security and stability of the country and has exactly no expansionist aims.

This is what Iran’s leaders maintain. But how can peaceful expansion of commercial networks and routes be pursued if currently Iran has to move between potential or overt enemies?

Hence, as the Iranian leaders maintain, if their economy is further put in crisis, the Iranian government will start bilateral or trilateral negotiations with its neighbouring countries, thus creating  transport, financial and commercial networks, besides the stable exchange of labor force, national currencies, goods and services.

The Iranian leaders think that, in this vast region, their country could arrange its new economic development, outside the framework of relations with the USA and, possibly, with the weak EU.

In other and even much clearer words: railways, roads, trade and IT networks between Iran and the Lebanon, Iraq and Syria.

This is one of the implications of the decisive role played by Iran in the Syrian war.

In terms of national defense, the Iranian Shiite leaders believe that the most important course of action in this sector is the establishment of excellent relations with the United Arab Emirates and Qatar, while a Saudi-Turkish axis is also emerging in the Iranian decision-makers’ minds.

A new Turkish-Iranian axis organized by the Russian Federation, leading to peace between Iran and Turkey – peace that regards  Syria which, however, in the Turkish leaders’ view, could lead to a financial and oil alliance between the two countries, an alliance to which Russia would not be alien.

Furthermore, according to the Iranian leaders, the fight against Daesh-Isis was an operation to make Iran’s borders safe, especially with the Pasdaran’s interventions in Syria and Iraq.

The other strategic project pursued by the Iranian leaders is a stable and strong alliance with the Russian Federation.

From Iran’s viewpoint, all its recent military operations – even using the new scenario created by the “Arab springs” – have exploited the chaos spread by ISIS, for example in Iraq, with a view to creating a stable corridor between the Iranian territory and some Iraqi areas, exactly as it is happening in Syria in the new green line between Iran and Hezbollah’s Lebanon.

A geopolitics of “corridors”, which are at first military and then economic corridors.

Assad is therefore crucial for all Iranian projects, since he can link Iran with the Mediterranean.

With possible threats, especially asymmetric ones, by Iran, which could be launched from the Lebanese coast not only against the “traditional” opponents (Israel and the USA, of course), but also against the whole transit of goods to the Southern coasts of the EU which, obviously, has not yet realized it.

There will be Iranian naval bases on the Lebanese coast in the future.

Hence, within all this conceptual mechanism, we can see Iran’s  current and future choices in the field of military and foreign policy:

1) increase of commercial ties with the countries bordering on the Shiite republic, through agreements including  monetary, export, labour and financial support arrangements to leave the dollar area, as China and Russia do;

2) use of these relations for creating an “external circle” useful for Iran’s defense, with obvious needs to use remote positions for missiles and for anti-aircraft artillery, with the future establishment of a sort of “Shiite NATO”, which could be linked to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO);

3) creation of a balance between the loss of Iranian positions in the US market and the opening up of new opportunities in the European and Middle East markets, with the Iranian economic expansion to Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan;

4) future expansion of proxy wars in Yemen and, possibly, also in Saudi Arabia, possibly with an Iranian “seduction” operation vis-à-vis Manama and other Gulf Emirates, obviously in addition to   further strengthening the link between Iran and Qatar;

5) probable direct threat to Israel, through Hezbollah, so as to verify the Israeli relations with European countries and the USA. The basic question of Iranian leaders is always the same: will Europeans, or even Americans, be willing to “die for Jerusalem”?

6) Planned mounting of tension in Bab el-Mandeb Strait, but with short demonstrative actions, of which Iran itself will be the first to observe their impact on the oil market and on the military structure of the Middle East;

7) Iran’s probable future creation of a sort of “Shiite common market”, but also open to other Sunni countries, which – however – will go along Khomeini’s traditional policy line: to expand the “revolutionary” Iran in the Central Asian axis, by unifying many countries having Shia minorities, such as Uzbekistan, the Hazarasin Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, and the Shia minorities in Pakistan, to which Iran could ensure social peace. A possible future strategy for Iran will be strengthening Shiite minorities so as to later deal with their Sunni governments.

Hence, many signals will be sent to us by Iran in the coming months and years.

Advisory Board Co-chair Honoris Causa Professor Giancarlo Elia Valori is an eminent Italian economist and businessman. He holds prestigious academic distinctions and national orders. Mr. Valori has lectured on international affairs and economics at the world’s leading universities such as Peking University, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Yeshiva University in New York. He currently chairs “International World Group”, he is also the honorary president of Huawei Italy, economic adviser to the Chinese giant HNA Group. In 1992 he was appointed Officier de la Légion d’Honneur de la République Francaise, with this motivation: “A man who can see across borders to understand the world” and in 2002 he received the title “Honorable” of the Académie des Sciences de l’Institut de France. “

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Israelis and Palestinians do what they do best, but for the wrong reasons

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Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu has put Israel’s closest allies and some of his key partners on the spot.

So has a generation of Palestinian youth that has nothing to lose and no longer sees fruitless engagement with and acquiescence of the Jewish state as a means of realizing their national and socio-economic aspirations.

It’s not that young Palestinians have necessarily given up on a compromise resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. On the contrary, however, they believe that armed resistance with the Jenin refugee camp on the West Bank as its focal point will provoke a situation the international community will no longer be able to ignore.

Jenin is home to a black market for pistols, AK-47s, Kalashnikovs, and M16s, and thousands of youths caught in a Catch-22 in which they are ineligible for Israeli work permits because they are on a terrorism list.

So far, the Palestinian youth strategy appears to be working, even if US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken’s visit to the region was aimed at calming tensions rather than solving problems.

Similarly, that was the message that the heads of Egyptian and Jordanian intelligence reportedly gave President Mahmoud Abbas on the same morning that the Palestinian president met with Mr. Blinken.

The intelligence chiefs’ bosses, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi and Jordanian King Abdullah, are in good company as they brace for the fallout of escalating Israeli-Palestinian violence.

So is United Arab Emirates President Mohammed bin Zayed who in recent years spearheaded greater Arab engagement with Israel without a prospect for a resolution of the Palestinian problem, and the kings of Bahrain and Morocco, Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa and Mohammed VI, who followed the UAE leader’s lead.

Returning from a rare visit to Sudan this week, Israeli Foreign Minister Eli Cohen said the two countries would establish formal diplomatic relations by the end of this year.

Unlike Mr. Al-Sisi and the Bahraini and Moroccan monarchs, Mr. Bin Zayed may be less concerned about domestic unrest in response to the Israeli-Palestinian violence but worries that regional security could be compromised by the potential fallout of Israel’s harsh response to Palestinian militancy compounded by a more aggressive Israeli posture towards Iran.

Struggling with an economic crisis, Egypt and Jordan, where Palestinians account for roughly half of the country’s 11 million people, are particularly vulnerable to the Palestinian plight becoming a catalyst for anti-government protest.

This week, Moroccans protested in several cities against their country’s forging two years ago of diplomatic relations with Israel.

The protests were in anticipation of Morocco’s hosting in March in the disputed Western Sahara a meeting of the foreign ministers of Israel, the United States, the UAE, and Bahrain to celebrate the anniversary of diplomatic relations between the Arab and Jewish states.

Last month, Jordanian security forces and protesters, angry about rising fuel prices and poor governance, clashed in the southern city of Maan.

Such demonstrations have a life of their own, and in a moment, they can turn into a protest against the government, poverty, and waste, and we have a direct confrontation whose results can be lethal,” said an Egyptian journalist.

All of this plays into the hands of militant Palestinian youth.

So does Mr. Netanyahu, as he accommodates hardline Jewish nationalist and ultra-conservative religious figures in his Cabinet who are in charge of national security and Palestine-related affairs.

To be sure, Mr. Netanyahu, in response to last Friday’s killing of Jewish worshippers at a synagogue, refrained from striking back with a sledgehammer as Israel typically does. Mr. Blinken’s visit may have been one reason for Mr. Netanyahu’s reticence.

Israeli officials suggest that behind closed doors, Mr. Blinken and other recent US visitors, including National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan and CIA Director Bill Burns, made clear that even if the US and Iran were on one page regarding Iran for the first time in years, their immediate concerns were related to Palestine and the threat to Israeli democracy posed by Mr. Netanyahu’s plans to undermine the independence of his country’s Supreme Court.

“It is a tragedy that we are forced to deal with less important and burning issues at this time. Our mind is on Iran, but our feet are stuck in Silwan,” said a senior Israeli security official, referring to the east Jerusalem neighborhood that is a hotspot of Palestinian-Israeli violence

“The Americans are exerting heavy pressure on the Palestinian issue and equally heavy pressure on the threat to Israeli democracy arising from the Netanyahu government’s legislative blitz. We’re talking to them about Iran and Saudi Arabia, while they want to talk about Jenin and Shireen Abu Akleh and democracy,” a former diplomatic official added.

The former official was referring to last week’s Israeli raid in Jenin, where 10 Palestinians were killed, and the killing last year of Al Jazeera journalist Abu Akleh.

Adopting a more aggressive stance against Iran, Israel is believed to have last month attacked a long-range missile production plant in the Iranian city of Esfahan as well as truck convoys along the Iraq-Syria border convoys carrying ammunition and weapons for Hezbollah, the pro-Iranian Lebanese militia.

Moreover, last week, the US and Israeli militaries staged their most significant and complex exercise to date in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Nevertheless, Mr. Blinken sent mixed messages during his visit, the Israeli assessments of their talks with Mr. Blinken and the two countries’ closer military ties notwithstanding,

For the first time on a visit by a secretary of state, Mr. Blinken met with Israeli civil society organisations focused on LGBTQ rights, integration of ultra-religious Jews and Palestinian Israelis in the Israeli workforce, and Jewish-Palestinian co-existence.

No human rights or other groups working towards an end to the Israeli occupation of the West Bank were invited.

Even so, the militants and the policies enunciated by the Netanyahu government can take credit for the US focus.

The militants’ resorting to arms, Israel’s harsh response, and Israeli policies that ever more flagrantly violate international law and the Geneva conventions make it increasingly difficult for the United States and Europe to look the other way and for Arab states that maintain diplomatic relations with the Jewish states to limit themselves to verbal condemnations.

Israel’s response so far includes trying to push through legislation that many Palestinians say would amount to collective punishment. It would result in the expedited demolition of the homes of family members of Palestinians who’ve carried out attacks and plans to make it easier for Israelis to get guns.

That has not stopped Azerbaijan from dispatching its first ambassador to Israel in three decades of diplomatic relations with the Jewish state amid escalating tensions with Iran, its southern neighbour, or Chad inaugurating the African country’s first embassy in the country during a visit to Israel by President  Mahamat Deby.

Some analysts argue that the militants’ tactics may be a double-edged sword. Their tactics could backfire, and the militants could fall into a trap if the United States and others effectively remain on the sidelines.

“The deepest tragedy is that the Israeli extreme right seems to be counting on Palestinian rage and desperation to provide them with the opportunity to go as far as they can in their twin goals of annexation and expulsion,” cautioned columnist Hussein Ibish.

In a twist or irony, hardliners on both sides of the Israeli-Palestinian divide may find that escalation serves both their interests, even if those interests are diametrically opposite.

Palestinian militants see increased Israeli brutality and violations of international law and the Geneva conventions as making it more difficult for the United States and others to stay on the sidelines or go through the motions of seeking to calm the situation.

So far, the US way to do so does not even amount to a band-aid, let alone a solution. The US is pressuring 86-year-old President Mahmoud’s Palestine Authority to revive security cooperation with Israel and take back control of Jenin and the West Bank city of Nablus.

The US proposition misses a key point: much like West Bank Palestinian militancy in the past, Palestinian youths’ despair is fuelled as much by Israeli policy as it is by the rejection of corrupt and ineffective Palestinian leadership.

“Twenty years ago, we made peace with Israel, but they don’t respect any of it. So, we’re done. We want destruction,” said Ahmad Qassem.

A 24-year-old resident of Jenin. Mr. Qassem has not found work since finishing ninth grade, his last year of school. He was last year released from an Israeli prison after a two-year administrative detention, during which he was never charged or granted a trial.

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Sisi’s visit to Armenia and Azerbaijan to join the Eurasian Union and BRICS

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Photo Credit: Official Facebook Page for the Spokesman of the Egyptian Presidency

President El-Sisi’s visit to India, followed by Armenia and Azerbaijan, came as an affirmation from the Egyptian side and its president, Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, of Egypt’s desire to enter into several giant economic blocs, led by the BRICS with the help of China and India, and then the Eurasian Union with the help of Russia and Armenia mainly.  Rather, let us transfer the experience of the Eurasian Union to Egypt and the countries of the region, which is considered as a project for economic and political integration, based on the customs union of the countries of (Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia), as well as the countries of the United Economic Zone, and announcing later its expansion plan, to include other countries of the economic group.  Eurasian, which is known for short as:

(EurAsEC Group)

  From my point of view and my reading of the general political and economic scene of the Egyptian state, and of President Sisi’s moves towards the east mainly, away from those complex calculations of Washington and the West and the political and economic conditionality of the International Monetary Fund and Western loans, Egypt’s accession to the Eurasian Union, or what is known as the Group of Independent States, will enable Egypt in the coming period to  An alliance worked with those countries, leading to the establishment of a free trade zone between Egypt and the countries of the Eurasian Union, led by Russia and Armenia, leading to the establishment of the customs union between Egypt and the countries of Eurasia, ending with the establishment of the United Economic Zone, and even planning to establish a unified currency for the countries of the Eurasian Union, which facilitates  The process of trade exchange between Egypt and those countries in the future, and of course contributes to the impact on the strength of the US dollar and its collapse and devaluation in the end.

  Also, President El-Sisi’s moves towards India, then Armenia and Azerbaijan in particular, is part of the Egyptian support for the eastern bloc, headed by China, Russia and then India.  This reflects the Egyptian vision to enter into the Eurasian Union, so that the emergence of this Eurasian Union can be seen as part of the announced Russian strategy to restore the importance it had previously on the international political arena during the so-called Cold War during the Soviet Union period, and this is mainly in the interest of Egypt and its President El-Sisi moves towards the Eastern Bloc and his aspiration to join the BRICS membership and then the Eurasian Union, so that this Eurasian Union will in the end serve as a counterweight to the European Union, in addition to the role of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which includes in its membership both Russia and China.

 Also, the Eurasian Union, led by Russia and Armenia, was able to create a single currency like the euro in the European Union, which is to be called the “Altyn currency”.

 It will be a balance to the forces of the European Union in the eastern bloc, led by Russia, China, India, and then Armenia, with an invitation to the rest of Central Asian countries to join the single Eurasian currency later, which serves the Egyptian side and the economic agendas of developing countries in the foreseeable future, and reduces the value of the dollar in the long run.

 Bearing in mind, the United States opposes the Eurasian customs union project for the easy transfer of goods and commodities between countries, and Washington sees it as an attempt to re-establish Russian hegemony in the concept of the Soviet Union among the post-Soviet states.

  This was explicitly announced by the Russian President, “Vladimir Putin”, that his goal is to expand the membership of the Eurasian Customs Union, to include all post-Soviet countries, to include the Baltic countries that are members of the European Union, on top of which are:

(Armenia – Azerbaijan – Georgia – Kyrgyzstan – Moldova – Tajikistan – Turkmenistan – Ukraine – Uzbekistan)

 In addition to allowing the presence of countries that act as observer members, as is the case in most international federations and blocs, which makes it easier for Egypt, in the event of its completion, to open strong and influential economic and investment partnerships with those countries in the eastern bloc, away from the calculations and pressures of the West.

 The Egyptian Ministry of Trade and Industry has already started several rounds and serious and actual negotiations to join the Eurasian Union with Russia, Armenia and the countries forming it, and it was announced in June 2021 the success of the fourth round of free trade agreement negotiations between Egypt and the countries of the Eurasian Economic Union, with the aim of integration in common economic issues.  Among the countries joining it, and this is what Egypt and President El-Sisi aspire to at the present time.

 The fourth round of negotiations between Egypt and the Eurasian Union countries has already ended in the Russian capital, Moscow, with the Egyptian side making tremendous efforts to join the Eurasian Union.  This was mainly welcomed by the Russian side, and then President El-Sisi’s visit to Armenia strengthened the ability of the Egyptian file to join the Eurasian Union. This was reflected in the strong will and desire of all parties to accept the Egyptian side’s request for membership in the Eurasian Customs Union, in the heart of which is Russia and then Armenia.

  President El-Sisi’s visit to Armenia comes as an important occasion, to move forward towards completing the Egyptian side’s membership file, to complete the negotiations and reach a comprehensive and balanced agreement that meets the aspirations of the Egyptian people and all the peoples of the Eurasian Union countries to develop trade exchange, and enhance industrial and investment cooperation between its parties.  In addition to strengthening rapprochement between Egypt and all its parties in all aspects of economic cooperation and opening prospects for future cooperation between all parties.

  Hence, we conclude that President El-Sisi’s moves towards Armenia and Azerbaijan were carefully calculated and planned by the Egyptian side, to join the powerful Eurasian Union bloc, because President El-Sisi realizes that the success of the agreement with the countries of the Eurasian Economic Union will contribute to strengthening trade, industrial and joint investment cooperation between Egypt and the countries.  Eurasian Union.  In addition, that Egyptian membership in the Eurasian Union bloc next to Russia and Armenia, and then the rest of the former Soviet Union countries, will support the system of transferring expertise and advanced industrial technologies to the Egyptian national industry in various productive sectors, in a way that enhances the capacity and strength of the Egyptian market and transfers various and different experiences to it.

 Here we can understand and analyze the reason for President El-Sisi’s moves to that Eurasian region represented in Armenia and Azerbaijan, as well as strengthening Egypt’s relations with the Russian, Chinese and Indian sides, because President El-Sisi and the Egyptian side realize that the agreement with the countries of the Eurasian bloc referred to will support inter-regional trade between Egypt and the countries  Central and North Asia and Europe across and between the countries of the Eurasian Union, and with the markets of the Arab countries and the countries of the African continent through the Egyptian market, through free and preferential trade agreements that link Egypt to those markets, knowing that the volume of trade exchange between Egypt and the countries of the Eurasian Union is with the membership of Russia and Armenia only,  It has reached more than $5 billion, and that percentage is likely to increase if Egypt is officially accepted as a member of the Eurasian bloc and the Eurasian Union, according to plans by President El-Sisi and the Ministry of Industry and Trade in Cairo.

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West sees Iran in a new way

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The Wall Street Journal reported from Tehran that “a lethal crackdown and an ailing economy have quieted anti-government street demonstrations organised protests have largely tapered off.” The paradox is, this interpretation is widely applicable in the contemporary world situation, including many G7 countries. How can one pretend there are no “protestor grievances” in Britain or France today, and, yet, how come they are mute? – asks Indian Ambassador and prominent international observer M.K. Bhadrakumar.

The western narrative never cared to admit that Iran is ruled by elected governments. The big question is, would such street violence have erupted in Iran without the covert support and coordination by foreign intelligence agencies? It is pointless to discuss Iran’s politics while in denial mode about the whole history of foreign interference in that country’s internal affairs.

Meanwhile, Associated Press reported that Iran and Russia are also moving toward linking their banking systems, turning their back on the petrodollar. Read the US Energy Information Administration data o know why the AP report matters. Simply put, almost a quarter of the world’s oil reserves and around 40 percent of the world’s gas reserves may potentially be traded outside the western banking system if Russian and Iranian policies work in tandem, dealing a body blow to the “world currency,” American dollar.

Suffice to say, there is no question that the protests in Iran were a western reaction to the emerging alliance between Iran and Russia. Now that the protests over hijab have “tapered off,” the modus operandi will shift from colour revolution back to the classic mode of sabotage and assassinations (especially after Benjamin Netanyahu’s return to power in Israel.)

The burgeoning military cooperation between Iran and Russia puts Tehran on Washington’s crosshairs. In the context of the Ukraine conflict, the West see Iran in a new way. Indeed, the Russian interest in getting Iran on board the Moscow-brokered process of Turkish-Syrian rapprochement underscores that the Kremlin has jettisoned whatever past reserve it would had about aligning with Iran in geopolitical projects.

Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov stated at a press conference with the visiting Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry in Moscow that “Russia, Iran, and Turkey are members of the ‘Astana troika’, which has been handling the Syrian settlement. Therefore, I consider it absolutely logical that any further communication on bringing relations between Turkey and Syria back to normal will also involve Russia and Iran.”

Turkish President Recep Erdogan’s foreign policy advisor Ibrahim Kalin has said: “We are pleased that Iran is joining this process. Iran is an important side. I think it will be able to contribute to this process. The participation of Iran in the negotiating process, which is held with the mediation of Russia, will make it easier.”

Unsurprisingly, a convergence of interests between the US, Israel and Kurds (and Kiev) to settle scores with Iran is only to be expected. The early signs are already there.

According to Iran’s defence ministry, three drones were involved in the attack at about midnight on a military facility in the city of Isfahan. It said one drone was destroyed by air defence systems and two were caught by “defence traps”, causing minor damage to a building. There were no casualties.

Pentagon spokesperson Brig Gen Patrick Ryder promptly said ‘the US military played no part in the strikes,’ but declined to speculate further.

However, Wall Street Journal quoted unnamed “US officials and people familiar with the operation” as saying Israel had carried out the attack. The New York Times also named Mossad, Israel’s intelligence service, citing “senior (US) intelligence officials”.

Isfahan province is home to a large air base, a major missile production complex and several nuclear sites. Iran’s official Irna news agency said the drones had targeted an ammunition manufacturing plant. The BBC highlighted that “The attack comes amid heightened tensions over Iran’s nuclear programme and its supply of arms to Russia’s war in Ukraine.”

However, a stunning dimension to this sordid affair is that a top aide to the Ukrainian president Zelensky linked the Isfahan attack to the alleged supply of Iranian drones to Russia. An unnamed Iranian official has since reacted that unless Kiev disowned any such linkage, Tehran too may adopt “a new approach that is appropriate to the behaviour of the Kiev government.”

Not much ingenuity is needed to connect the dots in the Isfahan attack — Ukrainian and Israeli intelligence (and the American masterminds in Kiev) operated through the Kurdish groups based in Iraqi Kurdistan, which have long-standing links to both the US and Mossad, and “sleeper cells” within Iran.

The bottomline is that – today almost anything concerning Iran’s security would have a foreign dimension.

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