The EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement will boost trade in goods and services as well as create opportunities for investment.
The agreement will further improve the position of EU exporters and investors on Japan’s large market, while including strong guarantees for the protection of EU standards and values. It will help cement Europe’s leadership in setting global trade rules and send a powerful signal that cooperation, not protectionism, is the way to tackle global challenges.
This Agreement, as other agreements concluded recently by the EU, goes beyond trade issues only. It represents a significant strengthening of our partnership with Japan, as reflected in the name of the agreement.
What is the Economic Partnership Agreement about?
Elimination of customs duties – more than 90% of the EU’s exports to Japan will be duty free at entry into force of the agreement. Once the agreement is fully implemented, Japan will have scrapped customs duties on 97% of goods imported from the EU (in tariff lines), with the remaining tariff lines being subject to partial liberalisation through tariff rate quotas or tariff reductions. This, in turn, will save EU exporters around €1 billion in customs duties per year.
Agriculture and food products – Japan is a highly valuable export market for European farmers and food producers. With annual exports worth over €5.7 billion, Japan is already the EU’s fourth biggest market for agricultural exports. Over time around 85% of EU agri- food products (in tariff lines) will be allowed to enter Japan entirely duty-free. This corresponds to 87% of current agri-food exports by value.
The agreement will eliminate or sharply reduce duties on agricultural products in which the EU has a major export interest, such as pork, the EU’s main agricultural export to Japan, ensuring duty-free trade with processed pork meat and almost duty-free trade for fresh pork meat exports. Tariffs on beef will be cut from 38.5% to 9% over 15 years for a significant volume of beef products.
EU wine exports to Japan are already worth around €1 billion and represent the EU’s second biggest agricultural export to Japan by value. The 15% tariff on wine will be scrapped from day one, as will tariffs for other alcoholic drinks.
As regards cheese exports, where the EU is already the main player on the Japanese market, high duties on many hard cheeses such as Gouda and Cheddar (which currently are at 29.8%) will be eliminated, and a duty-free quota will be established for fresh cheeses such as Mozzarella. The EU-Japan agreement will also scrap today’s customs duties (with a transitional period) for processed agricultural products such as pasta, chocolates, cocoa powder, candies, confectionary, biscuits, starch derivatives, prepared tomatoes and tomato sauce. There will also be significant quotas for EU exports (duty-free or with reduced duty) of malt, potato starch, skimmed milk powder, butter and whey.
Geographical Indications – the EU-Japan agreement recognises the special status and offers protection on the Japanese market to more than 200 European agricultural products from a specific European geographical origin, known as Geographical Indications (GIs) – for instance Roquefort, Aceto Balsamico di Modena, Prosecco, Jambon d’Ardenne, Tiroler Speck, Polska Wódka, Queso Manchego, Lübecker Marzipan and Irish Whiskey. These products will be given the same level of protection in Japan as they experience in the EU today.
Industrial products – tariffs on industrial products will be fully abolished, for instance in sectors where the EU is very competitive, such as chemicals, plastics, cosmetics as well as textiles and clothing. For leather and shoes, the existing quota system that has been significantly hampering EU exports will be abolished at the agreement’s entry into force. Tariffs on shoes will go down from 30% to 21% at entry into force, with the rest of the duties being eliminated over 10 years. Tariffs on EU exports of leather products, such as handbags, will go down to zero over 10 years, as will be those on products that are traditionally highly protected by Japan, such as sports shoes and ski boots.
Fisheries – import quotas will no longer be applied and all tariffs will be eliminated on both sides, meaning better prices for EU consumers and big export opportunities for EU industry.
Forestry – tariffs on all wood products will be fully eliminated, with seven years staging for the most important priorities. Most tariffs on wood products will be dropped immediately, with some less important tariff lines being scrapped after 10 years.
Non-tariff barriers – The EU-Japan negotiations addressed many non-tariff measures that had constituted a concern for EU companies, as some Japanese technical requirements and certification procedures often make it difficult to export safe European products to Japan. The agreement will make it easier for EU companies to access the highly regulated Japanese market. Examples of such barriers addressed include:
Motor vehicles – the agreement ensures that both Japan and the EU will fully align themselves to the same international standards on product safety and the protection of the environment, meaning that European cars will be subject to the same requirements in the EU and Japan, and will not need to be tested and certified again when exported to Japan. With Japan now committing itself to international car standards, EU exports of cars to Japan will become significantly simpler. This also paves the way for even stronger cooperation between the EU and Japan in international standard setting fora. It includes an accelerated dispute settlement between the two sides specifically for motor vehicles, similar to the one agreed under the EU-South Korea trade agreement. It also includes a safeguard and a clause allowing the EU to reintroduce tariffs in the event that Japan would (re)introduce non-tariff barriers to EU exports of vehicles. The agreement will also mean that hydrogen-fuelled cars that approved in the EU can be exported to Japan without further alterations.
Medical devices – In November 2014, Japan adopted the international standard on quality management systems (QMS), on which the EU QMS system for medical devices is based. This reduces the costs of certification of European products exported to Japan considerably.
Textiles labelling – In March 2015, Japan adopted the international textiles labelling system similar to the one used in the EU. Textiles labels therefore do no longer need to be changed on every single garment exported to Japan, as was the case before.
“Quasi drugs”, medical devices and cosmetics – a complicated and duplicative notification system that hampered the marketing of many European pharmaceuticals, medical devices and cosmetics in Japan was finally abolished on 1 January 2016.
Beer – From 2018 onwards, European beers can be exported as beers and not as “alcoholic soft drinks”. This will also lead to similar taxation, thus doing away with differences between different beers.
In addition, the Economic Partnership Agreement also contains general rules on certain types of non-tariff barriers, which will help level the playing field for European products exported to Japan, and increase transparency and predictability:
Technical barriers to trade – the agreement puts the focus on Japan and the EU’s mutual commitment to ensure that their standards and technical regulations are based on international standards to the greatest possible extent. Combined with the provisions on non-tariff measures, this is good news for European exporters of electronics, pharmaceuticals, textiles and chemicals. For instance, reliance on international standards will be helpful for easier and less costly compliance of food products with Japanese labelling rules.
Sanitary and phytosanitary measures – the agreement creates a more predictable regulatory environment for EU products exported to Japan. The EU and Japan have agreed to simplify approval and clearance processes and that import procedures are completed without undue delays, making sure that undue bureaucracy does not put a spanner in the works for exporters. The agreement will not lower safety standards or require parties to change their domestic policy choices on matters such as the use of hormones or genetically modified organisms (GMOs).
Trade in services
The EU exports some €28 billion of services to Japan each year. The agreement will make it easier for EU firms to provide services on the highly lucrative Japanese market. The agreement contains a number of provisions that apply horizontally to all trade in services, such as a provision to reaffirm the Parties’ right to regulate. It maintains the right of EU Member States’ authorities to keep public services public and it will not force governments to privatise or deregulate any public service at national or local level. Likewise, Member States’ authorities retain the right to bring back to the public sector any privately provided services. Europeans will continue to decide for themselves how they want, for example, their healthcare, education and water delivered.
Postal and courier services – the agreement includes provisions on universal service obligations, border procedures, licences and the independence of the regulators. The agreement will also ensure a level-playing field between EU suppliers of postal and courier services and their Japanese competitors, such as Japan Post.
Telecommunications – the agreement includes provisions focused on establishing a level playing field for telecommunications services providers and on issues such as universal service obligations, number portability, mobile roaming and confidentiality of communications.
International maritime transport services – the agreement contains obligations to maintain open and non-discriminatory access to international maritime services (transport and related services) as well as access to ports and port services.
Financial services – the agreement contains specific definitions, exceptions and disciplines on new financial services, self-regulating organisations, payment and clearing systems and transparency, and rules on insurance services provided by postal entities. Many of these are based on rules developed under the World Trade Organisation, while addressing specificities of the financial services sector.
Temporary movement of company personnel – the agreement includes the most advanced provisions on movement of people for business purposes (otherwise known as “mode 4”) that the EU has negotiated so far. They cover all traditional categories such as intra-corporate transferees, business visitors for investment purposes, contractual service suppliers, and independent professionals, as well as newer categories such as short-term business visitors and investors. The EU and Japan have also agreed to allow spouses and children to accompany those who are either service suppliers or who work for a service supplier (covered by “mode 4” provisions). This will, in turn, support investment in both directions.
State owned enterprises – state-owned enterprises will not be allowed to treat EU companies, services or products differently to their Japanese counterparts when buying and selling on commercial markets.
Public procurement – EU companies will be able to participate on an equal footing with Japanese companies in bids for procurement tenders in the 54 so-called ‘core cities’ of Japan (i.e. cities with around 300.000 to 500.00 inhabitants or more). The agreement also removes existing obstacles to procurement in the railway sector.
Investment – The agreement aims to promote investment between the EU and Japan. At the same time, the text explicitly reaffirms the right of each party to regulate to pursue legitimate policy objectives, highlighted in a non- exhaustive list. The agreement does not cover the protection of investment, on which negotiations are ongoing between the two sides for a potential agreement on the protection of investments. The EU has also tabled to Japan its reformed proposal on the Investment Court System. For the EU, it is clear that there can be no return to the old-style Investor to State Dispute Settlement System (ISDS).
Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) – the agreement builds on and reinforces the commitments that both sides have taken in the World Trade Organization (WTO), in line with the EU’s own rules. The agreement sets out provisions on protection of trade secrets, trademarks, copyright protection, patents, minimum common rules for regulatory test data protection for pharmaceuticals, and civil enforcement provisions.
Data protection – Data protection is a fundamental right in the European Union and is not up for negotiation. Privacy is not a commodity to be traded. Since January 2017, the European Union and Japan engaged in a dialogue to facilitate the transfers of personal data for commercial exchanges, while ensuring the highest level of data protection. With the EU General Data Protection Regulation that entered into force last year and the new Japanese privacy law that entered into force in May, the EU and Japan have modernised and strengthened their respective data protection regimes. In July 2018, the Commission and the Japanese government reached a satisfactory conclusion on the robustness each other’s data protection rules, and hence they intend to move forward with the adoption of a so-called “mutual adequacy” arrangement, which will create the world’s largest area of safe transfers of data based on a high level of protection for personal data.
Sustainable development – the agreement includes all the key elements of the EU approach on sustainable development and is in line with other recent EU trade agreements. The EU and Japan commit themselves to implementing the core labour standards of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and international environmental agreements, including the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, as well as the Paris climate agreement. The EU and Japan commit not to lower domestic labour and environmental laws to attract trade and investment. The parties also commit to the conservation and sustainable management of natural resources, and to addressing biodiversity, forestry, and fisheries issues. The parties agree to promote Corporate Social Responsibility and other trade and investment practices supporting sustainable development. The agreement sets up mechanisms for giving civil society oversight over commitments taken in the field of Trade and Sustainable Development. The agreement will have a dedicated, binding mechanism for resolving disputes in this area, which includes governmental consultations and recourse to an independent panel of experts.
Whaling and illegal logging – The EU has banned all imports of whale products for more than 35 years, and this will not change with the Economic Partnership Agreement. The EU and its Member States are committed to the conservation and protection of whales and have consistently expressed strong reservations about whaling for scientific purposes. Whales receive special protection under EU law and the EU strictly enforces the ban on trade under the Convention on Trade in Endangered Species (CITES). The EU addresses whaling by all third countries, including Japan, both in bilateral relations and in the international fora that are best suited to deal with this issue – for example, at the International Whaling Commission, where we work with like-minded partners to address whaling with Japan. The sustainable development chapter of the EU-Japan economic partnership agreement will provide an additional platform to foster dialogue and joint work between the EU and Japan on environmental issues of relevance in a trade context.
The EU and Japan share a common commitment to combat illegal logging and related trade. Trade in illegal timber is not an issue between the EU and Japan. The EU has a very clear legislation on illegal logging, just like Japan, which applies to imports from any country of origin. Both partners have surveillance and certification systems in place to prevent the import of illegal timber. The two partners also work closely with third countries to support them in setting up efficient mechanisms to address the problem. The agreement includes a legal provision committing both partners to the prevention of illegal logging and related trade.
Corporate governance – for the first time in an EU trade agreement, there will be a specific chapter on corporate governance. It is based on the G20/OECD’s Principles on Corporate Governance and reflects the EU’s and Japan’s best practices and rules in this area. The EU and Japan commit themselves to adhere to key principles and objectives, such as transparency and disclosure of information on publicly listed companies; accountability of the management towards shareholders; responsible decision-making based on an objective and independent standpoint; effective and fair exercise of shareholders’ rights; and transparency and fairness in takeover transactions.
Competition – the agreement contains important principles that ensure that both sides commit themselves to maintaining comprehensive competition rules and implementing these rules in a transparent and non-discriminatory manner.
State-to-State dispute settlement mechanism – the agreement ensures that rights and obligations under the agreement are fully observed. It provides an effective, efficient and transparent mechanism with a pre-established list of qualified and experienced panellists for avoiding and solving disputes between the EU and Japan.
Anti-Fraud – The EU and Japan will include an anti-fraud clause in the economic partnership agreement. The anti-fraud clause is a condition for the EU to grant tariff preferences to any third country. It makes it possible for the EU to withdraw tariff preferences in cases of fraud and refusal to co-operate, while ensuring that legitimate traders are not adversely affected. The aim is to prevent abuse of preferential tariff treatment.
At the same time, negotiations with Japan continue on investment protection standards and investment protection dispute resolution.
How Bangladesh became Standout Star in South Asia Amidst Covid-19
Bangladesh, the shining model of development in South Asia, becomes everyone’s economic darling amidst Covid-19. The per capita income of Bangladesh in the fiscal year 2020-21 is higher than that of many neighbouring countries including India and Pakistan. Recently, Bangladesh has agreed to lend $200 million to debt-ridden Sri Lanka to bail out through currency swap. Bangladesh, once one of the most vulnerable economies, has now substantiated itself as the most successful economy of South Asia. How Bangladesh successfully managed Covid-19 and became top performing economy of South Asia?
In March 1971, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman declared their independence from richer and more powerful Pakistan. The country was born through war and famine. Shortly after the independence of Bangladesh, Henry Kissinger, then the U.S. national security advisor, derisively referred to the country as a “Basket Case of Misery.” But after fifty years, recently, Bangladesh’s Cabinet Secretary reported that per capita income has risen to $2,227. Pakistan’s per capita income, meanwhile, is $1,543. In 1971, Pakistan was 70% richer than Bangladesh; today, Bangladesh is 45% richer than Pakistan. Pakistani economist Abid Hasan, former World Bank Adviser, stated that “If Pakistan continues its dismal performance, it is in the realm of possibility that we could be seeking aid from Bangladesh in 2030,”. On the other hand, India, the economic superpower of South Asia, is also lagging behind Bangladesh in terms of per capita income worth of $1,947. This also elucidates that the economic decisions of Bangladesh are better than that of any other South Asian countries.
Bangladesh’s economic growth leans-on three pillars: exports competitiveness, social progress and fiscal prudence. Between 2011 and 2019, Bangladesh’s exports grew at 8.6% every year, compared to the world average of 0.4%. This godsend is substantially due to the country’s hard-hearted focus on products, such as apparel, in which it possesses a comparative advantage.
The variegated investment plans pursued by the Bangladesh government contributes to the escalation of the country’s per capita income. The government has attracted investments in education, health, connectivity and infrastructure both from home and abroad. As a long-term implication, investing in these sectors helped Bangladesh to facilitate space for businesses and created skilled manpower to run them swiftly. Meanwhile, the share of Bangladeshi women in the labor force has consistently grown, unlike in India and Pakistan, where it has decreased. And Bangladesh has maintained a public debt-to-GDP ratio between 30% and 40%. India and Pakistan will both emerge from the pandemic with public debt close to 90% of GDP.
Bangladesh’s economy and industry management strategy during Covid-19 is also worth mentioning here since the country till now has successfully protected its economy from impact of pandemic. At the outset of pandemic, lockdowns and restrictions hampered the country’s overall productivity for a while. To tackle the pandemic effect, Bangladesh introduced improvised monetary policy and fiscal stimuli to bring them under the safety net which lifted the situation from worsening. Government introduced stimulus package which is equivalent to 4.3 percent of total GDP and covers all necessary sectors such as industry, SMEs and agriculture. These packages are not only a one-time deal, new packages are also being announced in course of time. For instance, in January 2021, government announced two new packages for small and medium entrepreneurs and grass roots populations. Apart from economic interventions, the government also chose the path of targeted interventions. The government, after first wave, abandoned widespread lockdown and adopted the policy of targeted intervention which is found to be effective as it allows socio-economic activities to carry on under certain protocols and helps the industries to fight back against the pandemic effect.
Another pivotal key to success was the management of migrant labor force and keeping the domestic production active amidst the pandemic. According to KNOMAD report, amidst the Covid-19, Bangladesh’s remittance grew by 18.4 percent crossing 21 billion per annum inflow where many remittance dependent countries experienced negative growth rate. Because of the massive inflow of remittance, the Forex reserve of Bangladesh reached at 45.1 billion US dollar.
Bangladesh’s success in managing COVID19 and its economy has been reflected in a recent report “Bangladesh Development Update- Moving Forward: Connectivity and Logistics to strengthen Competitiveness,” published by World Bank. Bangladesh’s economy is showing nascent signs of recovery backed by a rebound in exports, strong remittance inflows, and the ongoing vaccination program. Through financial assistance to Sri Lanka and Covid relief aid to India, Bangladesh is showcasing its rise as an emerging superpower in South Asia. That is why Mihir Sharma, Director of Centre for Economy and Growth Programme at the Observer Research Foundation, wrote in an article at Bloomberg that, “Today, the country’s 160 million-plus people, packed into a fertile delta that’s more densely populated than the Vatican City, seem destined to be South Asia’s standout success”. Back in 2017, PwC (PricewaterhouseCoopers) report also predicted the same that Bangladesh will become the largest economy by 2030 and an economic powerhouse in South Asia. And this is how Bangladesh, a development paragon, offers lessons for the other struggling countries of world after 50 years of its independence.
Build Back Better World: An Alternative to the Belt and Road Initiative?
The G7 Summit is all the hype on the global diplomatic canvas. While the Biden-Putin talk is another awaited juncture of the Summit, the announcement of an initiative has wowed just as many whilst irked a few. The Group of Seven (G7) partners: the US, France, the UK, Canada, Italy, Japan, and Germany, launched a global infrastructure initiative to meet the colossal infrastructural needs of the low and middle-income countries. The Project – Build Back Better World (B3W) – is aimed to be a partnership between the most developed economies, namely the G7 members, to help narrow the estimated $40 trillion worth of infrastructure needed in the developing world. However, the project seems to be directed as a rival to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Amidst sharp criticism posed against the People’s Republic during the Summit, the B3W initiative appears to be an alternative multi-lateral funding program to the BRI. Yet, the developing world is the least of the concerns for the optimistic model challenging the Asian giant.
While the B3W claims to be a highly cohesive initiative, the BRI has expanded beyond comprehension and would be extremely difficult to dethrone, even when some of the most lucrative economies of the world are joining heads to compete over the largely untapped potential of the region. Now let’s be fair and contest that neither the G7 nor China intends the welfare of the region over profiteering. However, China enjoys a headstart. The BRI was unveiled back in 2013 by president Xi Jinping. The initiative was projected as a transcontinental long-term policy and investment program aimed to consolidate infrastructural development and gear economic integration of the developing countries falling along the route of the historic Silk Road.
The highly sophisticated project is a long-envisioned dream of China’s Communist Party; operating on the premise of dominating the networks between the continents to establish unarguable sovereignty over the regional economic and policy decision-making. Referring to the official outline of the BRI issued by China’s National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), the BRI drives to: “Promote the connectivity of Asian, European, and African continents and their adjacent seas, establish and strengthen partnerships among the countries along the Belt and Road [Silk Road], set up all-dimensional, multi-tiered and composite connectivity networks and realize diversified, independent, balanced, and sustainable development in these countries”. The excerpt clearly amplifies the thought process and the main agenda of the BRI. On the other hand, the B3W simply stands as a superfluous rival to an already outgrowing program.
Initially known as One Belt One Road (OBOR), the BRI has since expanded in the infrastructural niche of the region, primarily including emerging markets like Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka. The standout feature of the BRI has been the mutually inclusive nature of the projects, that is, the BRI has been commandeering projects in many of the rival countries in the region yet the initiative manages to keep the projects running in parallel without any interference or impediment. With a loose hold on the governance whilst giving a free hand to the political and social realities of each specific country, the BRI program presents a perfect opportunity to jump the bandwagon and obtain funding for development projects without undergoing scrutiny and complications. With such attractive nature of the BRI, the program has significantly grown over the past decade, now hosting 71 countries as partners in the initiative. The BRI currently represents a third of the world’s GDP and approximately two-thirds of the world’s entire population.
Similar to BRI, the B3W aims to congregate cross-national and regional cooperation between the countries involved whilst facilitating the implementation of large-scale projects in the developing world. However, unlike China, the G7 has an array of problems that seem to override the overly optimistic assumption of B3W being the alternate stream to the BRI.
One major contention in the B3W model is the facile assumption that all 7 democracies have an identical policy with respect to China and would therefore react similarly to China’s policies and actions. While the perspective matches the objective of BRI to promote intergovernmental cooperation, the G7 economies are much more polar than the democracies partnered with China. It is rather simplistic to assume that the US and Japan would have a similar stance towards China’s policies, especially when the US has been in a tense trade war with China recently while Japan enjoyed a healthy economic relation with Xi’s regime. It would be a bold statement to conclude that the US and the UK would be more cohesively adjoined towards the B3W relative to the China-Pakistan cooperation towards the BRI. Even when we disregard the years-long partnership between the Asian duo, the newfound initiative would demand more out of the US than the rest of the countries since each country is aware of the tense relations and the underlying desperation that resulted in the B3W program to shape its way in the Summit.
Moreover, the B3W is timed in an era when Europe has seen its history being botched over the past year. Post-Brexit, Europe is exactly the polar opposite of the unified policy-making glorified in the B3W initiate. The European Union (EU), despite US reservations, recently signed an investment deal with China. A symbolic gesture against the role played by former US President Donald J. Trump to bolster the UK’s exit from the Union. As London tumbles into peril, it would rather join hands with China as opposed to the democrat-regime of the US to prevent isolation in the region. Despite US opposition, Germany – Europe’s largest economy – continues to place China as a key market for its Automobile industry. Such a divided partnership holds no threat to the BRI, especially when the partners are highly dependent on China’s market and couldn’t afford an affront to China’s long envisaged initiative.
Even if we assume a unified plan of action shared between the G7 countries, the B3W would fall short in attracting the key developing countries of the region. The main targets of the initiative would naturally be the most promising economies of Asia, namely India, Pakistan, or Bangladesh. However, the BRI has already encapsulated these countries: China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor (BCIMEC) being two of the core 6 developmental corridors of BRI.
While both the participatory as well as the targeted democracies would be highly cautious in supporting the B3W over BRI, the newfound initiate lacks the basic tenets of a lasting project let alone standing rival to the likes of BRI. The B3W is aimed to be domestically funded through USAID, EXIM, and other similar programs. However, a project of such complex nature involves investments from diverse funding channels. The BRI, for example, tallies a total volume of roughly USD 4 to 8 trillion. However, the BRI is state-funded and therefore enjoys a variety of funding routes including BRI bond flotation. The B3W, however, simply falls short as up until recently, the large domestic firms and banks in the US have been pushed against by the Biden regime. An accurate example is the recent adjustment of the global corporate tax rate to a minimum of 15% to undercut the power of giants like Google and Amazon. Such strategies would make it impossible for the United States and its G7 counterparts to gain multiple channels of funding compared to the highly leveraged state-backed companies in China.
Furthermore, the B3W’s competitiveness dampens when conditionalities are brought into the picture. On paper, the B3W presents humane conditions including Human Rights preservation, Climate Change, Rule of Law, and Corruption prevention. In reality, however, the targeted countries are riddled with problems in all 4 categories. A straightforward question would be that why would the developing countries, already hard-pressed on funds, invest to improve on the 4 conditions posed by the B3W when they could easily continue to seek benefits from a no-strings-attached funding through BRI?
The B3W, despite being a highly lucrative and prosperous model, is idealistic if presented as a competition to the BRI. Simply because the G7, majorly the United States, elides the ground realities and averts its gaze from the labyrinth of complex relations shared with China. The only good that could be achieved is if the B3W manages to find its own unique identity in the region, separate from BRI in nature and not rivaling the scale of operation. While Biden has remained vocal to assuage the concerns regarding the B3W’s aim to target the trajectory of the BRI, the leaders have remained silent over the detailed operations of the model in the near future. For now, the B3W would await bipartisan approval in the United States as the remaining partners would develop their plan of action. Safe to say, for now, that the B3W won’t hold a candle to the BRI in the long-run but could create problems for the G7 members if it manages to irk China in the Short-run.
COVID-19: New Dynamics to the World’s Politico-Economic Structure
How ironic it is that a virus invisible from a naked human eye can manage to topple down the world and its dynamics. Breaking out of CoronaVirus, its spread across the globe and the diversity of consequences faced by the individual states all make it evident how the dynamics of the world could be reversed in months. Starting from the blame games regarding coronavirus to its geostrategic implications and the entire enigma between COVID-19 and politics, COVID-19 and economies have shaken the world. Whether it is the acclaimed super power, struggling powers or third world states or even individuals, the pandemic has unveiled the capability and credibility of all, especially in political and economic domains. Wearing masks in public, avoiding hand shake and maintaining distance from one another have emerged as ‘new normal’ in the social world of interaction.
Since the pandemic has locked its eyes upon the globe, world politics has taken an unfortunate drift. From the opportunities for leaders to abuse power during state of emergency (which is imposed in different states to limit the spread of novel Coronavirus) to the likelihood of rise of far-right nationalists to the emergence of ‘travel bubbles’ between states (such as New Zealand and Australia) and the increased chances of regionalism in post-pandemic world to the new terrorist strategies to gain support and many others, all are result of the pandemic’s impact on the political world, one way or the other. Since the end of WWII, the United States has taken the role of global leadership and after the Cold War, it became more prominent as it was the sole superpower of the world. Talking ideally, pandemics are perceived to bring up global cooperation but in the COVID-19 scenario it has started a whole new set of debates, sparkled nativism versus globalization and the sharp divide in global politics has drifted the focus from overcoming the global pandemic through global response to inward looking policies of leaders.
Covid-19 has impacted every sphere of life, be it social, political, health or economic. The pandemic itself being the result of a globalized world has affected globalization badly. It is the best illustration of the interrelation of politics and economics and how the steps in one sector impact the other in this interdependent, globalized world. Political actions such as restricting travel had drastic economic impacts especially to the countries whose economy is largely dependent on tourism, foreign investment etc. Similarly, economic actions such as limiting foreign products’ access had political implications in the form of sudden unemployment and downturn in living standards of people.
For the first time in history, oil prices became negative when its demand suddenly dropped when industries were shut down almost everywhere. Russia and Saudi Arabia’s oil clash which led to increased oil production by Saudi Arabia further complicated the situation. This unprecedented drop in oil demand and consequently its price would only help in the economic recovery of countries. Covid-19 has impacted three sectors badly. First of all, it affected production as global manufacturing has declined due to decrease in demand. Secondly, it has created supply chain and market disruption. Finally, lockdowns affected local businesses everywhere. Bad impact aside, pandemic has led to the change in demand of products. Instead of investment and foreign trade, states having strong medical and textiles industries have got the opportunity of increasing exports. This is because there are requirements of face masks everywhere to avoid contagion. Need for medical instruments have also increased such as ventilators in developing countries specially.
The only positive impact of Coronavirus is that it fostered environmental cleanliness. It is said that it can avert a climate emergency but the fact is that, as soon as the lockdown will be eased and businesses will begin returning into functioning, economic growth and prosperity will be prioritized over sustainability and we might even witness, more than ever, carbon emissions into the atmosphere.
Novel coronavirus has brought new dynamics to the world’s politico-economic structure. While the world has the opportunity to come close for cooperation and consensus to fight it, we might witness increased regionalism in the post-pandemic world as a cautious measure and alternative where crisis management would be more cooperative and quick. There is a likelihood of the emergence of an international treaty or regime to ban bio-weapons. While the prevalence of political optimism is not assured in the post-pandemic world, we are likely to see the interdependent economic world, as before, to overcome the economic slump and revive the global economy.
What position would Russia take in case of an armed conflict between China and US?
China and Russia have seen increasing interactions and closer bonds as they face amid US pressure. The trilateral relations of...
“African Lion 2021”: More than military Show between the US and Morocco
On June 7th, 2021, Morocco, the US, and NATO began joint African Lion maritime drills in the Atlantic Ocean south...
American diplomacy’s comeback and Bulgaria’s institutional trench war
Even though many mainstream media outlets have not noticed it, US diplomacy has staged a gran comeback in the Balkans....
How Bangladesh became Standout Star in South Asia Amidst Covid-19
Bangladesh, the shining model of development in South Asia, becomes everyone’s economic darling amidst Covid-19. The per capita income of...
Elections in Syria: Forgetting Old Resentments?
In the presidential elections on May 26, Bashar al-Assad won more than 95% of the votes. According to the current...
Biden: No More “Favourite Dictators”
Former US President Donald Trump shared a strong personal rapport with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Saudi Crown Prince, Mohammed...
World Bank Supports Recovery and Resilience of Rwanda’s COVID-19-Affected Businesses
The World Bank Group today approved $150 million from the International Development Association (IDA)* to help the Government of Rwanda...
Middle East2 days ago
The syndrome of neglect: After years of hyperactivity, Erdogan is completely isolated
East Asia3 days ago
Xinjiang? A Minority Haven Or Hell
Americas3 days ago
The liberal international order has not crumbled yet
Middle East2 days ago
Iranian Election Portends Increased Human Rights Abuses, Demands Western Response
Middle East2 days ago
Israel-Palestine Conflict: A Way Forward
Defense2 days ago
Hot air messaging: Iran floats reports of imminent Shanghai Cooperation Organization membership
New Social Compact3 days ago
Natural Indications and solutions of weakened immunity within rampancy of Covid
Central Asia2 days ago
China and Russia Build a Central Asian Exclusion Zone