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New U.S. Cybersecurity Strategies

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The United States was one of the first countries to treat cybersecurity as a matter of strategic importance. The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, as well as the growing threat to the economy, which was becoming increasingly dependent on ICT, forced the George W. Bush administration to reassess the task of securing critical infrastructure facilities. The required an integrated approach, which duly emerged with the publication of the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace.

President Barack Obama announced cybersecurity as one of the most important tasks facing the U.S. government. Another task was to develop the new opportunities afforded by cyberspace and harness them for the purposes of serving national interests. The Cyber Space Policy Review was developed and presented in 2009. It contains an analysis of the existing cybersecurity system, as well as a plan for its transformation with a view to providing better cyber defence of the United States. In 2011, the United States published its International Strategy for Cyberspace, the goal of which is to create a unified platform for international cooperation in cyberspace on the basis of U.S. approaches to cybersecurity. The position of Senior Coordinator for Cyber Issues was created at the U.S. Department of State to promote the country’s cybersecurity policy. An interesting feature of the International Strategy for Cyberspace was the emphasis on so-called “capacity-building,” specifically on rendering assistance to developing countries through the provision of the necessary resources, knowledge and experts, including with a view to these countries developing their own national cybersecurity strategies.

In contrast to the George W. Bush era, U.S. representatives played an active role in preparing the report of the United Nations Groups of Governmental Experts in 2010. In 2011–2013, a number of summit-level bilateral negotiations on cybersecurity issues were held, primarily between Russia and China, during which there was an attempt to develop the “rules of the game” for leading powers in this new sphere of international relations. The high point in U.S.–Russia relations was the singing of the Joint Statement by the Presidents of the United States of America and the Russian Federation on a New Field of Cooperation in Confidence Building in 2013. The document also outlined cooperation measures in the protection of critical information systems and mechanisms for reducing cyberthreats. Unfortunately, all agreements were frozen following the outbreak of the Ukrainian crisis. And they cannot be considered tenable under current conditions, as all attempts to bring them back to life have failed.

Donald Trump: America First

The new Strategy is a logical continuation of the policy of recent years and is now enshrined at the doctrinal level. As we have already mentioned, it resembles the policy of George W. Bush more than that of Barack Obama, although it does borrow from and refine some points of the latter’s strategy to meet current needs. The first thing that catches the eye about the new Cyber Strategy is that is forms an image of an external threat to freedom and democracy and focuses on ensuring peace through strength. The Strategy repeatedly mentions the main opponents – Russia, China, Iran, North Korea and international terrorism.

The policy outlined in the document is based on four pillars: protecting the American people, the homeland and the American way of life; promoting American prosperity; preserving peace through strength; and advancing American influence. In some areas, you can find specific examples of recent events that formed the basis of a new policy that could affect both U.S. policy and international relations in ICT security in general.

The main objective of the first pillar of the new Strategy is to manage cybersecurity risks in order to improve the reliability and sustainability of information systems, including critical facilities. One of the new elements of domestic policy is the development of a risk management system in the Federal supply chain that would include, among other things, determining clear authority to exclude (in individual cases) supposedly risky vendors, products and services. These actions will be combined with efforts to manage risks in supply chains connected with the country’s infrastructure. The level of risk associated with using a specific vendor’s product should be determined on a case-by-case basis. At the same time, examples of similar policies allow us to state with confidence that, as far as the United States is concerned, the main unreliable vendors are located in Russia and China. Given the growing trade and economic standoff between the United States and China, the next logical step could be a ban on the use of Chinese components in government agency servers, just like what happened with Kaspersky Lab. This may very well be followed by an embargo of Chinese components by major companies and at critical infrastructure facilities. At the same time, the United States will promote the development of the internet and an open, compatible, reliable and secure communications infrastructure that will increase the competitiveness of American companies and help them counter the economic interference of other countries in areas of strategic competition.

The new Strategy focuses on improving cybersecurity in the transport and maritime infrastructure, as well as in space. The modernization of these sectors makes them more vulnerable to cyberattacks. The safety of maritime transport is particular concern, as transport delays or cancellations could disrupt the economy at strategic and lower dependent levels. The NotPetya malware attack that cost the logistics company Maersk a total of $300 million in 2017 as a result of a violation of its operating activities drew attention to the problems in this area. In response, the United States plans to establish the necessary roles and areas of responsibility, promote improved mechanisms of international cooperation and information exchange and help create a next-generation maritime infrastructure that is resistant to cyberthreats. It is possible that the maritime infrastructure of other states that participate in international maritime trade may, under the pretext of noncompliance with American standards, be deemed “unsafe” (for example, liquified natural gas terminals or ports along the Northern Sea Route).

Another important element of the policy outlined in the new Strategy is the modernization of legislation in electronic surveillance and computer crime. The United States is expected to update its legislation in these areas in order to expand the power of law enforcement agencies to legally collect evidence relating criminal activity and carry out further operational, investigative and judicial activities. Evidence may be collected outside the United States. In the past, these activities were carried out under so-called mutual legal assistance treaties, including the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime. However, the CLOUD Act adopted this year gives law enforcement agencies considerable powers to obtain information stored in the servers of U.S. companies operating outside the country. As a result, countries are no longer required to enter into mutual legal assistance treaties and inform other states that they are carrying out investigative activities in their territory. Interestingly, while the new Cyber Strategy contains statements about rejecting censorship on the internet and adhering to a free and open cyberspace, it also instructs law enforcement agencies to work with the private sector to overcome technological barriers, for example anonymization and encryption technologies, that are used to ensure this much-touted “freedom of the internet.”

The Strategy places considerable emphasis on actions aimed at expanding U.S. influence around the world. One of these areas is developing the capacities of partner countries to counter cybercrime. When U.S. law enforcement agencies issue a request for assistance, the country in question has to possess the appropriate technical capacity. Despite the fundamental problems of the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime (the lack of development and the threat of state sovereignty being violated), the U.S. Administration will work to increase the international consensus with regard to it. The UN draft resolution “On Cooperation in the Field of Countering Information Crime” put forward by Russia has not even been critically evaluated.

Peace through Strength

The United States is prepared to use all available tools of national power, including military force, to deter opponents from malicious acts in cyberspace that threaten its national interests, allies and partners.

The mechanism for determining the degree of “malicious intent” of actors in cyberspace will be based on the American interpretation of the provisions of international law and the voluntary non-binding norms of the responsible behaviour of states in cyberspace. These norms were developed by a UN Group of Governmental Experts in 2015 and were intended to define the limits of acceptable behaviour of all states and contribute to greater predictability and stability in cyberspace. The United States will encourage other countries to publicly adopt these principles and rules, which will form the basis for joint opposition to states that do not conform to them. In order to identify these states, the Executive Branch of the United States and the country’s key partners plan to share objective and relevant data obtained by their respective intelligence agencies. Obviously, in the context of the widespread use of public attribution, the unsubstantiated statements of a powerful state on the involvement of a given country in a cyber incident cannot lead to an escalation of tensions. There is no indication in any of the documents of the international legal mechanisms that may be created for the legitimate investigation and judicial examination of cyber incidents, including those that, in the opinion of the United States, may be considered an armed attack.

At the same time, work is under way on the establishment of possible consequences of irresponsible behaviour that causes damage to the United States and its partners. The United States expects to build strategic partner relations that will be crucial in terms of exerting influence on the “bad” actors in cyberspace. The Cyber Deterrence Initiative should be a key component of this: coordinating the general response of a broad coalition of likeminded states to serious malicious incidents in cyberspace, including through intelligence sharing, attribution, public statements of support and other joint actions. The United States Department of Defense will carry out similar work to consolidate and strengthen joint initiatives. In accordance with the Law on Budgetary Appropriations for National Defense, in 2018, the Department of Defense carried out a comprehensive review of military strategy in cyberspace and the possibilities for its implementation. The result was the publication of a new Department of Defense Cyber Strategy, many elements of which overlap with the National Cyber Strategy. In accordance with the provisions contained in the Department of Defense Cyber Strategy, the development of cyber capabilities intended for both military purposes and combatting malicious actors in cyberspace will be accelerated. The United States will be able to promote its interests through operations in cyberspace across the entire spectrum of conflict intensity, from daily operations to wartime, while cyber capabilities will be used proactively. This cannot but cause concern, especially considering the fact that Donald Trump has lifted many of the barriers to carrying out cyber operations and the Cyber Command has been given greater independence, becoming the Department of Defense’s 10th Unified Combatant Command

On the whole, the new cyber strategies are aimed at strengthening the power, increasing the influence and promoting the interests in the United States on the international stage. At the same time, Donald Trump’s pre-election campaign slogan of “America First” is being implemented on completely different levels – the promotion of American know-how and technologies and the rallying of allies and partners. Meanwhile, U.S. markets are closing themselves off under the pretext of national security to goods and services provided by companies from “unreliable” states. Similar steps by other states – for example, the requirement that personal information be stored on servers inside the country – are declared to be undermining the competitiveness of American companies.

As for the norms of behaviour in cyberspace developed by the UN Group of Governmental Experts, the United States will promote them and use them to its advantage. This will probably be done through public attribution without any serious evidence, which seems to be par for the course these days. This mechanism of marginalization will not lead to an increase in stability and security, given that it involves a coordinated response from the United States, not only by means of attribution, but also through (proactive) military action.

The Strategy does not outline plans for the creation of international legal mechanisms that could independently, objectively and with due competence carry out a legitimate investigation and make a court decision with regard to malicious acts in ICT. This means that the suspects are already known and there is no doubt as to their identity – Russia, China, Iran, North Korea and international terrorism. At the same time, the Strategy does not say anything about how we might overcome the current crisis situation. Instead, there is a clear signal that no mutually beneficial or mutually essential official contacts on information and cyber security have been planned for the near future. This means that the schism between the American and Russian–Chinese visions of the future ICT environment is only growing, which could lead to the eventual fragmentation of the ICT environment and the internet. Having said that, Russia and China do not want the situation to unfold in this way. This much is clear from the resolution submitted for consideration by the UN General Assembly entitled “Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security.” Traditionally, these resolutions serve to highlight current events in international information security and do not contain any significant declarations. However, this particular resolution calls on all states to follow the norms, rules and principles developed in 2015 and convene a meeting of the Group of Governmental Experts to address the issue of how to implement these norms.

Active work at the unofficial level (namely, track one and a half diplomacy) at various international forums and other platforms could also help overcome the current crisis. Restoring relations should start with steps to re-establish mutual trust, perhaps through participation in projects involving a number of international players. Moreover, given the political will, the sides could focus on solving problems in a manner that is in the interests of both states.

First published in our partner RIAC

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Gulf Sands Shift as Anchors of Regional Security Loosen

Dr. James M. Dorsey

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China and the Gulf states are in the same boat as they grapple with uncertainty about regional security against the backdrop of doubts about the United States’ commitment to the region.

Like the Gulf states, China has long relied on the US defense umbrella to ensure the security of the flow of energy and other goods through waters surrounding the Gulf in what the United States has termed free-riding.

In anticipation of the day when China can no longer depend on security provided by the United States free of charge, China has gradually adjusted its defense strategy and built its first foreign military facility in Djibouti facing the Gulf from the Horn of Africa.

With the People’s Liberation Army Navy tasked with protecting China’s sea lines of communication and safeguarding its overseas interests, strategic planners have signaled that Djibouti is a first step in the likely establishment of further bases that would allow it to project long-range capability and shorten the time needed to resupply.

But Chinese strategic planners and their Gulf counterparts may part ways when it comes to what would be acceptable geopolitical parameters for a rejuvenated regional security architecture.

A rejiggered architecture would likely embed rather than exclude the US defense umbrella primarily designed to protect conservative energy-rich monarchies against Iran and counter militancy.

In contrast to China and Russia, Gulf states, as a matter of principle, favor identifying Iran as the enemy and have cold shouldered proposals for a non-aggression agreement. But for that they need the United States to be a reliable partner that would unconditionally come to their defense at whatever cost.

For its part, China goes to great lengths to avoid being sucked into the Middle East’s myriad conflicts. Adopting a different approach, Russia has put forward a plan for a multilateral security structure based on a non-aggression understanding that would include Iran.

No doubt, China, unlike Russia, wants to postpone the moment in which it has no choice but to become involved in Gulf security. However, China could find itself under pressure sooner rather than later depending on how Gulf perceptions of risk in the continued reliance on the United States evolve.

One factor that could propel things would be a change of guard in the White House as a result of the US election in November.

Democratic presumptive candidate Joe Biden, as president, may strike a more internationalist tone than Donald J. Trump, though a Biden administration’s relations with Saudi Arabia could prove to be more strained. Similarly, Mr. Biden’s focus, like that of Mr. Trump, is likely to be China rather than the Middle East.

By the same token, China’s appraisal of its ability to rely on the US in the Gulf could change depending on how mounting tensions with the US and potential decoupling of the world’s two largest economies unfolds.

China’s increased security engagement in Central Asia may well be an indication of how it hopes to proceed in the Gulf and the broader Middle East. China has stepped up joint military exercises with various Central Asian nations while its share of the Central Asian arms market has increased from 1.5 percent in 2014 to 18 percent today.

Founded in 2001 as a Central Asian security grouping, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) has expanded its relationships in South Asia and the Caucasus, and admitted Iran as an observer.

Referring to China’s infrastructure, telecommunications, and energy-driven Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) that seeks to link the Eurasian landmass to the People’s Republic, China and Central Asia scholar Raffaello Pantucci explained that: “China is expanding its security role in Central Asia to protect its interests in the region and is increasingly unwilling to abrogate security entirely to either local security forces or Russia.”

“By doing so, Beijing is demonstrating an approach that could be read as a blueprint for how China might advance its security relations in other BRI countries,”  Mr. Pantucci wrote.

Central Asia may find it easier than the Gulf to accommodate the Chinese approach.

The problem for most of the Gulf states is that taking Chinese and Russian concerns into account in any new security arrangement would have to entail paradigm shifts in their attitudes toward Iran.

Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates – which has recently made overtures to Iran, insist that any real détente has to involve a halt to Iranian support for proxies in various Middle Eastern countries as well as a return to a renegotiated agreement that would curb not only the Islamic Republic’s nuclear program but also its development of ballistic missiles.

Caught between the rock of perceived US unreliability and the hard place of Chinese and Russian geopolitical imperatives, smaller Gulf states, including the UAE, in contrast to Saudi Arabia, are hedging their bets by cautiously reaching out to Iran in different ways.

They hope that the overtures will take them out of the firing line should either Iran or the United States, by accident or deliberately, heighten tensions and/or spark a wider military confrontation.

To be sure, various Gulf states have different calculations. Saudi Arabia and Bahrain have adopted the most hardline position toward Iran. Oman and Qatar have long maintained normal relations, while the UAE and Kuwait have made limited overtures.

In the short run, Gulf states’ realization of China and Russia’s parameters could persuade them to maintain their levels of expenditure on weapons acquisitions. And, in the case of Saudi Arabia and the UAE, to pursue the development of a domestic defense industry, despite the economic fallout of the pandemic, the drop of oil and gas prices, and the shrinking of energy markets.

Probably, so will recent Iranian military advances. Iran last week publicly displayed what is believed to be an unmanned underwater vehicle that would allow the Revolutionary Guards’ navy to project greater power – because of its long-range, better integrated weapons systems – and more efficiently lay underwater mines.

The vehicle put Iran in an even more elite club than the one it joined in April when it successfully launched a military satellite, a capability only a dozen countries have. When it comes to unmanned underwater vehicles, Iran rubs shoulder with only three countries: the United States, Britain, and China.

Iran’s advances serve two purposes: they highlight the failure of the United States’ two-year-old sanctions-driven maximum pressure campaign to force Iran’s economy on its knees, and, together with massive US arms sales to Gulf countries, they fuel a regional arms race.

To be sure, Russia and China benefit from the race to a limited degree too.

In the ultimate analysis, however, the race could contribute to heightened tensions that risk putting one more nail in the coffin of a US-dominated regional architecture. That in turn could force external powers like China to engage whether they want to or not.

“China is quickly learning that you can’t trade and invest in an unstable place like the Middle East if you don’t have the means to protect your interests,” said Israeli journalist David Rosenberg. “Where business executives come, warships and commando units follow, and they will follow big.”

Author’s note: This story was first published in Inside Arabia

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The Difficulties of Balancing Military Confrontations in Europe

Muratcan Isildak

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Tensions between the West and Russia since 2014 have created a tense military balance focused on Europe. There is an increasing armed activity that climbs up in the Baltic and Black Sea regions. These activities take forms such as deployment of troops, large-scale exercises, and close contact at common sea areas and borders. Although direct attack is not seen as a realistic scenario for both parties, current trends increase the risks of misunderstandings, dangerous accidents and uncontrolled escalation of tension. Although the existing communication channels have reduced the likelihood of undesirable results to date, the level of interaction between the parties is low.

Traditionally, the dispatch and management of tension-boosting threats is handled through trust-and security-building measures, as well as through weapons control tools. These are created to provide some degree of predictability to confrontations, to provide greater stability between intense political tensions. However, in the last two decades, a serious resolution of arms control mechanisms has been observed at the regional and global level.

This model even prevented the Ukraine conflict, which has its roots in the abolition of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Agreement of America and NATO’s reluctance to approve the Conventional Forces (CFE) Agreement in Europe and the Adaptation Agreement of this agreement. Due to the perceived blocking policy of the West, Russia gradually withdrew from the second document after 2007 and also changed its previous positive attitude towards military security.

The process of building a stack of weapons since 2014 has been accompanied by discussions about the renewal of the Vienna document, which systematized confidence building measures, difficulties in the implementation of the Open Skies Treaty and a general sense of hopelessness within the arms control community.

The Treaty of Russian-American Mid-Range Nuclear Forces (INF), which ended on August 2, 2019, was the last element of the old set of institutions that fell from value. The future of the New Strategic Weapons Reduction Treaty, which remains the last solid document on the limitation of nuclear forces, is still pending.

In the midst of these developments, several high-level politicians encouraged the re-stability in Europe through the revitalization of treaty-based restrictions in the military field. For example, in 2016, German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier called for “Restarting arms control as a tried and tested tool for risk reduction, transparency and confidence in Europe”.

Subsequently, his successor Sigmar Gabriel called for “preventing the damage of proven agreements”. He then suggested: “We must do everything we can to protect and develop these contracts and, if necessary, show the courage to return to a new path, for example, the traditional weapon control system”.

Calls for greater predictability in the face of deep divisions in Europe are definitely commendable. Thanks to these calls, arms control has re-entered the international agenda (primarily through the OSCE Structural Dialogue). However, it is not enough to try to protect the mechanisms and even the principles negotiated in the past for the success of the military restrictions.

It is important to reflect on major changes that make the straightforward application of old records less promising and require the redesign of the very basic principles of gun control dogmas.

Russia did not receive enough security guarantees from the West in the 1990s and 2000s. As a result, the level of mobility of the Russian military force and even the degree of unpredictability in the deployment became a compensation for the gap between NATO and conventional forces.

At the same time, it was a logical way to triangulate the combination of a large region, a relatively small population and a reduction in military spending. The drastic structural reforms implemented after 2008 and the large-scale instant exercises carried out by Moscow since 2013 have led to the establishment of new principles that have turned Russia into a more effective military force.

The desire to achieve more mobility also paved the way for NATO to decide to revive two powers related to logistics and transatlantic communication. These developments raised mutual concerns about the unpredictability of the other party in potential crises in Russia and the West.

These criteria may not be fully applied to new doctrinal priorities. Today’s armies associate threats over time rather than geography, quality rather than quantity, and integrated networks, not specific weapon types. The size of the armies decreased, but the percentage of units with high readiness increased.

Therefore, applying advanced military systems carries the risk of miscalculations and misperceptions. It is not the real potential of technologically superior skills that have the greatest destabilizing effect, but the uncertainties about untested tools and applications.

For example, the strategic trilogy concept that featured during the Cold War (including intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine missiles and heavy bombers) opposed the traditional split between the Land, Navy and Air Force. Today, it is important to think equally creatively about reducing complexity while maintaining the validity of any potential limitation in the military field on the one hand.

This does not necessarily mean that they will avoid any commitment. However, the current political transformations undermine European actors in an effort to organize military positions, making possible arrangements more fragile.

However, there is a qualitative difference between the current situations. At that time, concerns about Asia led to changes in regime design, these are very important for the fate of Asia today. Given the ongoing trends in power transition, Europe’s prospect of isolation from external influences can be expected to decrease further. In terms of strategic stability, efforts to reinstate weapon constraints will be defined by the transition from a two-factor balance between Russia and the United States to a multilateral equation where China, as well as India and some other states, have a greater role.

This assessment shows that many of the premises developed for arms control in the second half of the 20th century were no longer valid. It is very important to adapt to the features that define modern agile forces to promote meaningful institutions that provide greater predictability and increased control. This requires the ability to regulate dynamic positions, qualitative criteria rather than quantitative criteria, and integration tools rather than only vehicles with striking capacity.

The need to reconsider the basic categories that define the various levels and aspects of military balance is not unimportant. In particular, strategic stability becomes an increasingly reduced concept, with the emergence of new skills that can affect it. Also, there are new ways to harass, force, and overthrow opponents outside of the war, which can disrupt stability. Since the ability to regulate depends on the ability to define regulatory objects, serious conceptual work should be done before possible negotiations on future weapon control.

Finally, global power transitions mean that successful arms control in Europe requires greater sensitivity to developments elsewhere. Regional actors must either find ways to minimize the wider reflections of local regulations in an increasingly interconnected world; either try to turn certain mechanisms into global norms; or design regimes to strengthen them, rather than putting pressure on other major areas of operation.

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Nuclearization Of South Asia: Where Do We Stand Now?

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Pakistan-India relations have continued to deteriorate since the nuclear test of May 1998. Both the states have faced numerous crisis during which the nuclear weapons have played a very important role. Nuclear weapons have been an effective deterrent force and kept the conflicts from blowing into all-out war. All the recent events suggests that there is a dire need to take transitional measures to reduce the nuclear risks. Nuclear weapons are confusing pieces of technology as their efficiency of destruction is best established when they are not deployed and yet in the same breath, they are to be used when required. This dilemma is further demented when one state is enemy with the other on almost everything. Escalation is both inevitable and perhaps one of the most devastating missteps in nuclear deterrence; one that requires an impressive level of trust. To achieve such a barrier, conventional rivalries need to be revisited, caution needs to be reinstituted and communication needs to be uninterrupted.

From Massive Retaliation of John Foster Dulles to McNamara’s Assured Destruction, nuclear bipolarity changed faces and paved ways for agreements and treaties to replace escalation and deployments. From direct engagements to proxies, from installation of hotlines to breaking ice and bilateralism, even when there was hope the world still endured in fear of an all-out devastation. Still, after all this, what lessons were learnt? How was ‘responsible nuclear weapons state’ defined? More importantly, what was the yardstick beyond which no state possessing such technology dare not tread? States possessing nuclear weapons technology decided not to escalate beyond a certain point and declared that no matter the trust deficit, they were supposed to always adhere to bilaterally settle their disputes. Even after two decades of nuclearization Pakistan and India, admirers of nuclear learning and experts of nuclear deterrence, perhaps were and might still are devoid of such bilateral convictions.

Looking at all the crisis situations in past most importantly the 1999 Kargil conflict, where the things escalated too quickly under nuclear overhang the question arises whether South Asia learnt anything on how close the Kargil was to a showdown of unimaginable proportion?  Talking about more recent event ‘Pulwama’, Whatever happened after Pulwama in 2019 cannot be merely set aside as an emotional rhetoric, it was an actual sub-conventional engagement which had the potential to escalate. Like Kargil Pulwama was a chance to reexamine exactly what went wrong for things to go this far. Instead, India initiated overhauling of its force posture and Pakistan played along. South Asia went from Cold Start to Tactical Nuclear Weapons, from asymmetric confrontations to trans-border infiltrations and from hostilities at Line of Control to Abhinandan’s failed leap for glory. Instantly, everyone started crying war with no one to vouch for peace. What we see now is Indian prompted continued escalatory trajectories, distorted sense of stability, a desperate call for third-party mediation and a complete lack of bilateralism.

Nuclear deterrence, in its generic understanding, requires engaging parties to manifest caution while communicating their strategic posture. Confidence Building Mechanisms in that regard are important but as standalone systems are usually inefficient in dealing with their desired results. Soviet Union’s iron curtain is what caused Cuban Missile Crisis but even a man like Khrushchev realized what could have happened and resorted to engaging with Kennedy. For Narendra Modi and his cabinet, the idealized fog of war cast by an iron curtain of fear/ compellence is much more desirable than a chance at cooperation/dialogue. Bilateralism via Track-II might be fruitful but considering how much we distrust one another, it’s highly likely that all such actions would eventually be put to unnecessary speculation of possessing vested interest. Pakistan and India might not resort to an all-out confrontation but their trust deficit is enough to keep low-yield kinetic engagements alive. Pakistan fears for a false flag terrorist activity from India while India is wary of Pakistan trying to internationalize what it considers to be a bilateral issue.

In the past we have seen that issues between India-Pakistan are never resolved instead the hostility has increased so much that mitigation of the conflict looks like a  farfetched idea. Both states need third party to get running the wheel of diplomatic engagement. Nuclear strategy is not a circular motion rather it is a spiraling affair with each turn graduating it to a new occasion whilst remaining hinged to a singular immovable point of connection. If nuclear deterrence keeps rotating without graduating, it tends to wear out its capacity to deter. What happens next is either another Kargil or something even worse. Pulwama, like Pathankot was a chance for both states to engage positively whilst maintaining their adversarial relationship and even now things are, in a way, plausible for this to occur. Threat, in this context, is how the current trajectory is moving from trust deficit to zero tolerance which can lead to incalculable repercussions.

If both India-Pakistan do not learn any lesson from the past then the future might not be very welcoming. . Nuclear deterrence is as important as it is frightening and Mutually Assured Destruction is almost certainly a final outcome if bilateralism is sacrificed at the altars of diplomatic inflexibility. An arms race without restraint is as dangerous as an uncontrolled escalation of sensitive flashpoints and both strategies are corrosive if taken without mutual consent.

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