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New U.S. Cybersecurity Strategies

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The United States was one of the first countries to treat cybersecurity as a matter of strategic importance. The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, as well as the growing threat to the economy, which was becoming increasingly dependent on ICT, forced the George W. Bush administration to reassess the task of securing critical infrastructure facilities. The required an integrated approach, which duly emerged with the publication of the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace.

President Barack Obama announced cybersecurity as one of the most important tasks facing the U.S. government. Another task was to develop the new opportunities afforded by cyberspace and harness them for the purposes of serving national interests. The Cyber Space Policy Review was developed and presented in 2009. It contains an analysis of the existing cybersecurity system, as well as a plan for its transformation with a view to providing better cyber defence of the United States. In 2011, the United States published its International Strategy for Cyberspace, the goal of which is to create a unified platform for international cooperation in cyberspace on the basis of U.S. approaches to cybersecurity. The position of Senior Coordinator for Cyber Issues was created at the U.S. Department of State to promote the country’s cybersecurity policy. An interesting feature of the International Strategy for Cyberspace was the emphasis on so-called “capacity-building,” specifically on rendering assistance to developing countries through the provision of the necessary resources, knowledge and experts, including with a view to these countries developing their own national cybersecurity strategies.

In contrast to the George W. Bush era, U.S. representatives played an active role in preparing the report of the United Nations Groups of Governmental Experts in 2010. In 2011–2013, a number of summit-level bilateral negotiations on cybersecurity issues were held, primarily between Russia and China, during which there was an attempt to develop the “rules of the game” for leading powers in this new sphere of international relations. The high point in U.S.–Russia relations was the singing of the Joint Statement by the Presidents of the United States of America and the Russian Federation on a New Field of Cooperation in Confidence Building in 2013. The document also outlined cooperation measures in the protection of critical information systems and mechanisms for reducing cyberthreats. Unfortunately, all agreements were frozen following the outbreak of the Ukrainian crisis. And they cannot be considered tenable under current conditions, as all attempts to bring them back to life have failed.

Donald Trump: America First

The new Strategy is a logical continuation of the policy of recent years and is now enshrined at the doctrinal level. As we have already mentioned, it resembles the policy of George W. Bush more than that of Barack Obama, although it does borrow from and refine some points of the latter’s strategy to meet current needs. The first thing that catches the eye about the new Cyber Strategy is that is forms an image of an external threat to freedom and democracy and focuses on ensuring peace through strength. The Strategy repeatedly mentions the main opponents – Russia, China, Iran, North Korea and international terrorism.

The policy outlined in the document is based on four pillars: protecting the American people, the homeland and the American way of life; promoting American prosperity; preserving peace through strength; and advancing American influence. In some areas, you can find specific examples of recent events that formed the basis of a new policy that could affect both U.S. policy and international relations in ICT security in general.

The main objective of the first pillar of the new Strategy is to manage cybersecurity risks in order to improve the reliability and sustainability of information systems, including critical facilities. One of the new elements of domestic policy is the development of a risk management system in the Federal supply chain that would include, among other things, determining clear authority to exclude (in individual cases) supposedly risky vendors, products and services. These actions will be combined with efforts to manage risks in supply chains connected with the country’s infrastructure. The level of risk associated with using a specific vendor’s product should be determined on a case-by-case basis. At the same time, examples of similar policies allow us to state with confidence that, as far as the United States is concerned, the main unreliable vendors are located in Russia and China. Given the growing trade and economic standoff between the United States and China, the next logical step could be a ban on the use of Chinese components in government agency servers, just like what happened with Kaspersky Lab. This may very well be followed by an embargo of Chinese components by major companies and at critical infrastructure facilities. At the same time, the United States will promote the development of the internet and an open, compatible, reliable and secure communications infrastructure that will increase the competitiveness of American companies and help them counter the economic interference of other countries in areas of strategic competition.

The new Strategy focuses on improving cybersecurity in the transport and maritime infrastructure, as well as in space. The modernization of these sectors makes them more vulnerable to cyberattacks. The safety of maritime transport is particular concern, as transport delays or cancellations could disrupt the economy at strategic and lower dependent levels. The NotPetya malware attack that cost the logistics company Maersk a total of $300 million in 2017 as a result of a violation of its operating activities drew attention to the problems in this area. In response, the United States plans to establish the necessary roles and areas of responsibility, promote improved mechanisms of international cooperation and information exchange and help create a next-generation maritime infrastructure that is resistant to cyberthreats. It is possible that the maritime infrastructure of other states that participate in international maritime trade may, under the pretext of noncompliance with American standards, be deemed “unsafe” (for example, liquified natural gas terminals or ports along the Northern Sea Route).

Another important element of the policy outlined in the new Strategy is the modernization of legislation in electronic surveillance and computer crime. The United States is expected to update its legislation in these areas in order to expand the power of law enforcement agencies to legally collect evidence relating criminal activity and carry out further operational, investigative and judicial activities. Evidence may be collected outside the United States. In the past, these activities were carried out under so-called mutual legal assistance treaties, including the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime. However, the CLOUD Act adopted this year gives law enforcement agencies considerable powers to obtain information stored in the servers of U.S. companies operating outside the country. As a result, countries are no longer required to enter into mutual legal assistance treaties and inform other states that they are carrying out investigative activities in their territory. Interestingly, while the new Cyber Strategy contains statements about rejecting censorship on the internet and adhering to a free and open cyberspace, it also instructs law enforcement agencies to work with the private sector to overcome technological barriers, for example anonymization and encryption technologies, that are used to ensure this much-touted “freedom of the internet.”

The Strategy places considerable emphasis on actions aimed at expanding U.S. influence around the world. One of these areas is developing the capacities of partner countries to counter cybercrime. When U.S. law enforcement agencies issue a request for assistance, the country in question has to possess the appropriate technical capacity. Despite the fundamental problems of the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime (the lack of development and the threat of state sovereignty being violated), the U.S. Administration will work to increase the international consensus with regard to it. The UN draft resolution “On Cooperation in the Field of Countering Information Crime” put forward by Russia has not even been critically evaluated.

Peace through Strength

The United States is prepared to use all available tools of national power, including military force, to deter opponents from malicious acts in cyberspace that threaten its national interests, allies and partners.

The mechanism for determining the degree of “malicious intent” of actors in cyberspace will be based on the American interpretation of the provisions of international law and the voluntary non-binding norms of the responsible behaviour of states in cyberspace. These norms were developed by a UN Group of Governmental Experts in 2015 and were intended to define the limits of acceptable behaviour of all states and contribute to greater predictability and stability in cyberspace. The United States will encourage other countries to publicly adopt these principles and rules, which will form the basis for joint opposition to states that do not conform to them. In order to identify these states, the Executive Branch of the United States and the country’s key partners plan to share objective and relevant data obtained by their respective intelligence agencies. Obviously, in the context of the widespread use of public attribution, the unsubstantiated statements of a powerful state on the involvement of a given country in a cyber incident cannot lead to an escalation of tensions. There is no indication in any of the documents of the international legal mechanisms that may be created for the legitimate investigation and judicial examination of cyber incidents, including those that, in the opinion of the United States, may be considered an armed attack.

At the same time, work is under way on the establishment of possible consequences of irresponsible behaviour that causes damage to the United States and its partners. The United States expects to build strategic partner relations that will be crucial in terms of exerting influence on the “bad” actors in cyberspace. The Cyber Deterrence Initiative should be a key component of this: coordinating the general response of a broad coalition of likeminded states to serious malicious incidents in cyberspace, including through intelligence sharing, attribution, public statements of support and other joint actions. The United States Department of Defense will carry out similar work to consolidate and strengthen joint initiatives. In accordance with the Law on Budgetary Appropriations for National Defense, in 2018, the Department of Defense carried out a comprehensive review of military strategy in cyberspace and the possibilities for its implementation. The result was the publication of a new Department of Defense Cyber Strategy, many elements of which overlap with the National Cyber Strategy. In accordance with the provisions contained in the Department of Defense Cyber Strategy, the development of cyber capabilities intended for both military purposes and combatting malicious actors in cyberspace will be accelerated. The United States will be able to promote its interests through operations in cyberspace across the entire spectrum of conflict intensity, from daily operations to wartime, while cyber capabilities will be used proactively. This cannot but cause concern, especially considering the fact that Donald Trump has lifted many of the barriers to carrying out cyber operations and the Cyber Command has been given greater independence, becoming the Department of Defense’s 10th Unified Combatant Command

On the whole, the new cyber strategies are aimed at strengthening the power, increasing the influence and promoting the interests in the United States on the international stage. At the same time, Donald Trump’s pre-election campaign slogan of “America First” is being implemented on completely different levels – the promotion of American know-how and technologies and the rallying of allies and partners. Meanwhile, U.S. markets are closing themselves off under the pretext of national security to goods and services provided by companies from “unreliable” states. Similar steps by other states – for example, the requirement that personal information be stored on servers inside the country – are declared to be undermining the competitiveness of American companies.

As for the norms of behaviour in cyberspace developed by the UN Group of Governmental Experts, the United States will promote them and use them to its advantage. This will probably be done through public attribution without any serious evidence, which seems to be par for the course these days. This mechanism of marginalization will not lead to an increase in stability and security, given that it involves a coordinated response from the United States, not only by means of attribution, but also through (proactive) military action.

The Strategy does not outline plans for the creation of international legal mechanisms that could independently, objectively and with due competence carry out a legitimate investigation and make a court decision with regard to malicious acts in ICT. This means that the suspects are already known and there is no doubt as to their identity – Russia, China, Iran, North Korea and international terrorism. At the same time, the Strategy does not say anything about how we might overcome the current crisis situation. Instead, there is a clear signal that no mutually beneficial or mutually essential official contacts on information and cyber security have been planned for the near future. This means that the schism between the American and Russian–Chinese visions of the future ICT environment is only growing, which could lead to the eventual fragmentation of the ICT environment and the internet. Having said that, Russia and China do not want the situation to unfold in this way. This much is clear from the resolution submitted for consideration by the UN General Assembly entitled “Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security.” Traditionally, these resolutions serve to highlight current events in international information security and do not contain any significant declarations. However, this particular resolution calls on all states to follow the norms, rules and principles developed in 2015 and convene a meeting of the Group of Governmental Experts to address the issue of how to implement these norms.

Active work at the unofficial level (namely, track one and a half diplomacy) at various international forums and other platforms could also help overcome the current crisis. Restoring relations should start with steps to re-establish mutual trust, perhaps through participation in projects involving a number of international players. Moreover, given the political will, the sides could focus on solving problems in a manner that is in the interests of both states.

First published in our partner RIAC

Defense

Nuclear Weapons: How Safe Are We?

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Some sixty years ago, American psychologist Abraham Maslow formulated a five tier hierarchy of needs.  First, food and shelter followed by safety and so on, not that each need had to be satisfied fully to move to the next.   

It might explain why thousands marched in the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament in the 1950s when bellicose threats by leaders were not uncommon.  Among the more notorious was Khruschev’s, ‘We’ll bury you,’ in 1956 during the Suez adventure by Britain, France and Israel.  They seized the Canal after the Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser had nationalized the controlling Suez Canal Company.  Receiving no support from President Eisenhower, they somewhat shamefacedly retreated.  

If one presumes all of those tensions were over with detente, then political and economic rivalries compounded by spheres of influence and their expansion have been overlooked.  Thus to Ukraine with President Vladimir Putin unable to retreat further when NATO attempted to plant a dagger in the heart of Russia.

Well, some of the tensions have returned, and while an all-out nuclear war is still unthinkable, it can happen by miscalculation.  For example, when one side deploys tactical weapons that a commander in an asymmetric war is unable to resist using against a large grouping of elusive combatants.

If fewer nuclear weapons are more desirable, the question remains, how few?  Hence the START treaty signed by George Bush (Senior) and Mikhail Gorbachev although proposed originally by Ronald Reagan.  It removed 80 percent of their nuclear weapons.  So how many nuclear weapons are there in the world thirty years later, and how safe are we?

According to the latest count, Russia possesses 6,257 nuclear weapons of which 4587 are operational.  In numerous ICBM silos and 11 nuclear submarines that can patrol close to U.S. shores, it is a formidable arsenal.

Of course the world has changed and Russia has removed all of its nuclear weapons from Ukraine.  At the same time, it is developing new weapons and new delivery methods.  This includes the very serious threat of a nuclear-propelled cruise missile with unlimited range.  A very serious threat because cruise missiles can fly close to the ground under the radar.  There is also Sarmat, a new ballistic missile capable of carrying up to 15 nuclear warheads, each with its own target.  Thus a single missile could destroy just about all US major cities.

So what has the US been up to?  It has 5600 nuclear weapons of which 3700 are operational.  ICBMs based both in the US and the territory of its NATO allies place some of these next door to Russia.  The very limited warning time requires a hair trigger response and should give us pause.  Let’s hope Putin is not enjoying a sauna at the time and some general frightened with a use-it or lose-it scenario decides to let loose and save his motherland. 

Then there are the other countries:  UK (200 nuclear weapons), France (300), China (350), India (160), Pakistan (165), Israel (90), and last but now least North Korea (45).  With all of this, how safe does one feel?  An exchange between any of them — India and Pakistan come to mind — would cause a nuclear winter and mass starvation. 

The real problem is that a small country with a large more powerful neighbor — again Pakistan and India — achieves a measure of equality or perhaps a stalemate through nuclear weapons, and thus security.  It would be very difficult to persuade Pakistan (or for that matter Israel) to relinquish its nuclear arsenal.  Perhaps the best safety lies in an inclusive non-threatening world. 

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CSTO anniversary summit: New challenges and threats

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The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) has marked its 30th year, at anniversary summit hosted by Moscow, with renewed multilateral documents strictly tasking its members forge a united security bloc to fight for territorial sovereignty and integrity, and against the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). At least, one of the landmarked achievements is, if anything at all, its establishment and existence in the political history of member states.

After the collapse of the Soviet era that consequently witnessed all the 16 Soviet republics attaining their political independence, only six of them by agreement became what is referred to as the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). It is a dreamed replica of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). 

During the meeting held on May 16, at the suggestion of Russian President Vladimir Putin, the CIS will receive observer status at the CSTO, according to various official reports. It implies that CSTO will undergo steadily, of not urgent expansion in numerical strength. Despite the sharp political differences, vast levels of economic development and all kinds of social difficulties, the CSTO currently is made of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan. 

Reports say the Collective Security Treaty Organization stands for solving international problems by political and diplomatic means, a statement by the CSTO Collective Security Council on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the Collective Security Treaty and the 20th anniversary of the organization said.

“With the appropriate capacity to ensure the security and stability of member states, the organization firmly believes that there is no alternative to the solution of existing international problems by political and diplomatic means and gives priority to the development of coordinated approaches to the problems of improving the international situation, countering threats and challenges faced by Member States of the CSTO,” the statement published on the Kremlin’s website reads.

The statement notes that the peacekeeping operation in Kazakhstan in January “has confirmed the readiness of the collective forces (of the CSTO) to effectively solve the problems of ensuring the security of its member states,” and demonstrated to the international community the ability to quickly deploy and conduct missions, “thereby demonstrating the high status of the CSTO in the system of international and regional organizations.”

At the same time, according to the statement, during the period since the signing of the Collective Security Treaty, international relations in conditions of fragmentation of the world community “are increasingly characterized by the aggravation of tension.”

According to the materials prepared by the Kremlin, the member states aim at deeper military cooperation and more efficient interaction on an entire range of current and new challenges and threats, including those emanating from Afghanistan. The focus is also on the problem of biosecurity, as well as on enhancing their collective security system, peacekeeping potential, and mechanisms of rapid response to crises, heeding the experience the organization gained during its peacekeeping operation in Kazakhstan.

Besides the group summit, Putin held separate bilateral interaction in a working breakfast format which was reportedly focused on forging ways toward deeping and strengthening military cooperation, and further on the situation in Ukraine. The Collective Security Council is the supreme body of the CSTO. It includes the heads of the states that are members of the organization.

It follows therefore that Vladimir Putin held these separate bilateral meetings with Prime Minister of Armenia Nikol Pashinyan, President of Belarus Alexander Lukashenko, President of Kazakhstan Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, President of Kyrgyzstan Sadyr Japarov and President of Tajikistan Emomali Rahmon.

Putin at the bilateral meeting with Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, noted that Moscow and Yerevan saw a good growth in bilateral trade in 2021, and both agreemed to maintain regular contact “on all issues on the bilateral agenda and on regional problems.” Russia and Armenia plan to continue their joint efforts to settle the Karabakh problem in the trilateral format, together with the partners from Azerbaijan.

Putin at the bilateral meeting with President of Kyrgyzstan Sadyr Japarov praised relations between the two countries, noting there are issues requiring further detailed discussion. “Now there is an opportunity to talk about our bilateral relations,” Putin said. “There are many questions, but I would like to note right away that, on the whole, our relations are developing positively.”

The president highlighted a “rather serious” increase in trade between the two countries last year, which climbed by more than 30%. “Russia confidently occupies the first position in trade by Kyrgyzstan. There are, of course, issues that require a separate discussion,” he said. “I am very glad that on the sidelines of our international event today we can talk about these issues.”

Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko strongly suggested, at the opening of the summit, the CSTO members step up political cooperation to resist foreign pressures and further warned that “opponents and foes” were systematically shaking loose the basis and relations of alliance. “In this respect we play into the hands of the West in a sense. I am certain that if we presented a common front, there would have never been what they call ‘sanctions from hell’,” he stressed.

“Stronger political cooperation and coordination by the CSTO member-states. The effectiveness of the mechanism of foreign policy and security consultations must be increased. We should speak out on behalf of the CSTO on international platforms more often to make the organization’s voice and stance well-heard and seen. There must be a common voice and a common stance, the way they are in the West,” he said.

Lukashenko noted that the West has been waging a full-fledged hybrid war against Belarus and Russia. “The unipolar world order is becoming a thing of the past, yet the collective West is waging an aggressive war to defend its positions. It is using all means, including in our organization’s zone of responsibility – from threatening the use of NATO weapons along our western borders to waging a full-fledged hybrid war, primarily against Russia and Belarus.”

He described NATO as “aggressively building up its muscles” with the aim of seeking to include neutral countries and acting under the you-are-either-with-us-or-against-us principle and “is hypocritically continuing to declare its defensive nature. The Collective Security Treaty Organization’s really defensive and peaceful position stands in contrast against this backdrop. It is evident that not a single country is a threat to the North Atlantic bloc.”

On the Russia-Belarus Union, he noted that Belarus’ participation ion the Union with Russia and in the CSTO has sobered up its potential opponents in the West. “Otherwise, I am afraid a hot war might have been unleashed in Belarus. By the way, they tried to do it back in 2020,” he added.

According to a joint statement by the leaders that was adopted, it noted to ensure the security of its borders amid an alarming situation in Afghanistan and elsewhere in the region. “The situation in Afghanistan and on other external frontiers of the CSTO member-states is alarming,” the statement said. “In connection with this, we express readiness to maintain security at the borders within the CSTO’s zone of responsibility.”

Nezavisimaya Gazeta, local Russian newspaper, reported that the attendees noted the significant role of the CSTO and peacekeeping forces in quashing the January insurrection in Kazakhstan, and also assessed the global situation and the topic of NATO’s expansion. President Alexander Lukashenko of Belarus noted that the members of the organization do not have unity. Some of them support the West’s actions against Moscow. He stated that “Russia should not fight alone against the expansion of NATO.”

Director of the East-West Strategy analytical center Dmitry Orlov told Nezavisimaya Gazeta that the CSTO is still not active enough. “In general, the CSTO still justified itself, but with some nuance. Not all members of the organization quickly and unconditionally decided to participate in peacekeeping missions. In particular, Kyrgyzstan argued for a long time whether to send their military to quell the protests that erupted over economic problems. The CSTO showed that the only guarantor of the security of the Central Asian region is Russia, because it had the largest contingent,” the expert said, adding that the post-Soviet security bloc did not become a serious alternative to NATO.

However, the organization may have a future, Belarusian Defense Minister Viktor Khrenin predicted the expansion of the association. According to him, the number of participants will increase to dozens of countries.

Chairman of the CSTO Parliamentary Assembly, Speaker of the State Duma (lower house of legislators) Vyacheslav Volodin congratulated the speakers of the parliaments of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan on the 30th anniversary of the signing of the Collective Security Treaty.

“The CSTO has proven its effectiveness as a guarantor of regional stability, protection of the independence and sovereignty of the member states. Today, the organization serves as a dependable deterrent to the challenges and threats posed by international terrorism and extremism. The CSTO contributes significantly to the battle against drug trafficking and weapons, organized transnational crime, illegal migration,” Volodin was quoted on the website of the State Duma.

Volodin stated that the CSTO peacekeepers’ efficiency in supporting Kazakhstan in stabilizing the situation in January of this year indicates the organization’s maturity.

The CSTO is an international security organization, which currently includes six member-states: Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan. On May 15, 1992, in Tashkent, the leaders of Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan (which is no longer a member of the CSTO since 2012) signed the treaty establishing the organization. In 1993, Azerbaijan, Georgia (both countries left the CSTO in 1999) and Belarus joined the organization.

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Lithuanian MOD admits Armed Forces capability deficit

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According to the last public opinion poll, the trust of Lithuanian residents of the National Armed Forces is continuously growing, and NATO membership is viewed in a highly positive light. The more so, it states that 88% of respondents support allied presence on the territory of Lithuania.

It should be said, that the last report published on kam.lt, the official site of Lithuanian Defence Ministry, was conducted on 16–29 December 2021 when the increasing military expenditures did not influence the national economy as much as they impact it today.

Despite positive reports, even last year the Defence Ministry admitted that the military’s requirement for modern armaments, vehicles, equipment and supplies remains high, given the former lack of funding, increased Lithuanian Armed Forces structure, obsolescence of armaments, equipment and vehicles, and modern technology introduction costs.

The rapid increase in the number of the Lithuanian Armed Forces personnel, the increased volumes of military training and the provision of support by the host country have highlighted the shortcomings of new armaments, equipment and machinery in the units and the existing infrastructure of the Lithuanian Armed Forces. The challenges currently facing armament and infrastructure development are due not only to the need for significant financial investment, but also to the legal and technical constraints that need to be addressed.

The Ministry of National Defence admits in its report that there are critical goals that should be achieved to meet national and Allied needs in a timely and high-quality manner:

the critical task is the smooth development of three new military towns (in Šilalė, Šiauliai and Vilnius),

the military training infrastructure must be further expanded by continuing the development of the main landfills of the Lithuanian Armed Forces and making decisions on the establishment of a new landfill;

therefore the focus must be on the development of viable infrastructure, gradually moving to complex development of military towns and abandoning non-viable infrastructure. Systemic solutions are needed for the rapid, high-quality and market-based development of National Defence infrastructure, such as better regulation, in order to accelerate the implementation of projects necessary for national security.

Another big problem for the National Armed Forces is lack of their attractiveness for the youth and the motivation of the soldiers.

Lithuanian military leadership admits either that the National Armed Forces lack sufficient capabilities as a host nation. Thus, Defence Minister Arvydas Anušauskas said capability deficit is a major obstacle for NATO battalion-brigade shift. He stated that the lack of capabilities may become an obstacle to turning battalions deployed in NATO’s eastern countries into brigades.

Lithuania, as well as the contributing countries that send troops to NATO’s forward battalions does not have sufficient capabilities itself. He made a conclusion that Lithuania needs to build them up and assured the allies in the willing to contribute to that as well.

“As if we have a brigade, we can also contribute our share of capabilities to that brigade, which is what the Estonians, for example, are doing”, the minister said.

Lithuania and NATO’s other eastern members are pushing for a decision at the Alliance’s upcoming Madrid summit in June to increase the size of the NATO multinational battalions deployed in the Baltic states and Poland to brigade-sized units. The battalions were deployed here in 2017, and increasing troops in this region is on the table amid regional security concerns.

Thus, the unsatisfactory provision of the Armed Forces and capabilities deficit prevent Lithuanian leadership from achieving its political goals and leaves nothing but ask for additional NATO help. The time is near when the Alliance gets tired of constant demands and will stop funding annoying countries. NATO’s authorities have repeatedly stressed that each country should make the most of its own resources and not rely only on collective defense capabilities.

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