On October 19, Russia’s President Vladimir Putin visited Uzbekistan. According to media reports, Moscow and Tashkent focused on “prospects for further strategic partnership,” cooperation in military technology, and economic ties between the two countries. Moscow is investing billions of dollars and is planning to open more branches of top Russian universities in Uzbekistan. On the same days, October 17-19, Tashkent played host to the VIII Central Asian Trade Forum, organized by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). As they spoke at the event, the US representatives announced Washington’s interest in providing duty-free access to its domestic market for several thousand products from Central Asian states. This approach reflects the policy of bilateral cooperation which the two parties agreed upon during a visit of the President of Uzbekistan Shavkat Mirziyoyev to the United States in May this year, which resulted in $ 4.8 billion contracts.
Central Asia has been a zone of geopolitical rivalry between the world’s top players for centuries. Even when the main part of this territory was part of the USSR, the USA, China and other countries tried to influence the Soviet “soft underbelly”. After 1991, the region quickly moved to the sidelines of the military-strategic interests of Moscow, Beijing and Washington . At present, the three powers are concerned about the threat of Islamic extremism and an increase in drug trafficking in the region. While sharing the same concerns, the parties interpret the causes of these threats in different ways. In general, regional competition of external powers is moderate, being visible mainly in the economic sphere. For now, two integration projects are developing at fast pace in Central Asia – the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), promoted by the Russian Federation, whose members are Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, and the Chinese Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB), targeted at all Central Asian countries. In the mid-2010s, the United States unveiled its conceptual vision of the future of the region — the New Silk Road Initiative, which, however, has not yet seen any substantial progress.
At present, countries of the region are pursuing the policy of building secular national states. Searches for national identity in the values of Islam or Pan-Turkism is a thing of the past. Meanwhile, for a part of the population, religious principles still prevail over the national and civil ones. Also, there are a number of other challenges to the stability and security of the region. Russian International Affairs Council experts say that political institutions are weak, the economy is poorly diversified, heavily corrupt, hinging largely on “shadow” schemes and smuggling. Social and economic problems, disputes over the distribution of water resources, and inter-religious and inter-ethnic conflicts are acute. On top of all this comes the rapidly aggravating problem of uneven economic development of countries. The main external threats are proximity to Afghanistan and the Middle East with a high degree of border penetrability.
In general, the ruling circles of the states of the region are trying to maintain power and property and evade serious socio-economic upheavals. The financial and economic interests of the elite are largely oriented at the West. However, the current challenges to domestic and regional stability, as well as the nature of the existing regimes, are what scares Western investors the most. As a result, countries of Central Asia are drifting between globalization and regionalization, between economic projects that benefit primarily the elites themselves, and the need to guarantee an increase in the living standards of wide sections of society, “between efforts to preserve a niche in the “old” world economy and secure niches in the “new” one”.
Over the past few years, Russia has been promoting its interests in the region within the framework of the CSTO, the EAEU and the Customs Union. Until recently, the majority of projects with the participation of Russian investors were concentrated in the oil and gas sector. Meanwhile, representatives of local elites and business communities would prefer to see Russian investments in the energy sector, in the creation of cross-border “transit transport routes.” There is a high demand for projects that would develop interstate economic cooperation within the framework of the EEU, and projects whose products would be oriented at markets beyond the post-Soviet space. These areas include the military industry, the mining sector, and the supply of agricultural products. At the same time, experts point out “excessive” “coordination and regulation of economic relations” within Russian regional initiatives.
Nevertheless, Russia maintains a significant potential to secure its economic influence in the region. Most enterprises and agricultural facilities in Central Asia date back to the Soviet days and most of the infrastructure, railways and highways are focused on Russia. The Russian media are popular in the region, supporting the idea of stability and sovereignty. Until early 2010s, the “Soviet legacy” enabled the Russian Federation to remain a major economic partner for all the Central Asian countries. However, in recent years, Moscow has been losing its leading economic position to China, mainly, for lack of investment.
China’s rapidly growing economy requires more and more resources. Given that Central Asia is rich in oil, gas, minerals and cotton, Beijing has been trying to promote economic projects in the region since the early 2000s. At the end of 2017, trade turnover between China and countries of Central Asia reached $ 30 billion, whereas trade between Russia and the region was less than two thirds of this figure. China overtook Russia in trade with all countries in the region, except Kazakhstan. Now, China is pursuing multibillion-dollar projects in transport and pipeline infrastructure as part of the strategy of the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB), and is increasing investment in industrial facilities and joint ventures. There are plans to build three railway corridors: between the Chinese port of Lianyungang and Kazakh Almaty, and two between the south of China and Central Asia. By the end of 2017, the Chinese investments in Central Asia had exceeded $ 100 billion. Investment plans until 2030 are estimated at several hundred billion dollars.
Meanwhile, according to most Western analysts, Russia and China have been pursuing a coordinated and well-balanced policy of extensive cooperation in Central Asia. China has been focusing on economic projects in the region, while Russia, besides the economic sphere, has taken the lead in ensuring military and anti-terrorism security and regional stability. According to Western estimates, Central Asia has been picked by Moscow and Beijing as number one site to practice strategic interaction, which can then be used in other parts of Eurasia. This cooperation hinges on an agreement reached by the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China at top level in 2015 on integration between the EAEU and the SREB. The economic role of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization is also expected to increase after Kyrgyzstan assumes the SCO presidency in 2019. Both countries are fully aware of the strategic mutual benefit from participation in these projects and neither pursues economic or regional security initiatives that could be detrimental to the other party.
In 2011, Washington launched the New Silk Road Strategy (NSR), which initially focused on the economic revival of Afghanistan through its integration into regional development projects. In autumn 2015, as the US Secretary of State, visited all five Central Asian countries in the course of his first tour, the Samarkand Declaration was adopted to promote the New Silk Road, which declared the widest possible range of areas of cooperation between the United States and countries of the region. Gradually, the United States began to shift from the still idealism-ridden policy of supporting the “development of democracy” in Central Asia towards a more pragmatic course, aimed at reducing the influence of the Russian Federation while simultaneously moderating the presence of China.
So far, the extent of the Trump administration’s interest in Central Asia is uncertain. It looks like the United States is ready to encourage local authorities to “soften” domestic policies, including on the expansion of international contacts, by boosting economic assistance and cementing ties between representatives of the business community. In particular, moves of this kind have been reported to come from the USA in the direction of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. USAID enjoys a significant influence on public associations in Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. As for region-wide economic projects under the patronage of the United States, most of them are stalling, because they are made dependent, to this or that extent, on stabilization in Afghanistan.
Another important tool for strengthening the US positions in the region after 2001 is the promotion of a counter-terrorism agenda, a military presence, primarily in Afghanistan, and the development of military and defense ties with the Central Asian states. Preventing the spread of radical movements in Central Asia meets the interests of both Washington and all countries of the region.
In the meantime, the interests of Central Asian countries spread beyond the bounds of financial assistance and economic cooperation as they are unequivocally making it to understand that they are looking for new partners and security guarantors capable of balancing the United States, Russia and China.
This encourages countries of Central Asia to develop contacts with a whole range of external players that have noticeable interests in the region. The influence of the European Union in Central Asia decreased, after the promising projects of the previous decades fell through. EU experts argue that the Union lacks the resources to compete with Russia and China. Therefore, they call for “focusing on specific projects” that would contribute to raising the living standards across a wide section of society. As for China’s SREB initiative, the EU sees it as a significant destabilizer, given the insufficient involvement of local, particularly human, resources, and a dramatic increase in Central Asia’s political and debt dependence on Beijing. Therefore, the EU is seeking to “fit” “into the current situation with a view to influence further developments from within.”
Since 2012, Japan has been stepping up its political efforts in Central Asia. As he visited the region in 2015, Prime Minister Abe signed $ 27 billion agreements, including on cooperation in the fuel and energy sector, in infrastructure projects, and in measures to combat terrorism and extremism. While doing this, Japan reiterates its readiness to maintain extensive ties with other powers, including Russia, China and Turkey. The latter persists in its claims to play a leading role in Central Asia, nurturing ambitions to become the leader of the Turkic world. However, Ankara’s positions have suffered a blow in recent years. President Erdogan has faced a lot of criticism for not providing enough support for the Turkic communities in Russia and in the west of China.
Thus, the leading circles of the Central Asian countries are pursuing a “purely pragmatic” policy. Among the priorities are structural economic reforms, attracting more investments, primarily to the production sector and high-tech industries, and the development of “human capital.” As global players demonstrate renewed interest in the region, Central Asia has an option to pursue an increasingly varying and multi-vector policy. In spring this year, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan made a bid to form a community of five Central Asian states without participation of external powers. At last, the transformation of Central Asia is taking place against the background of the arrival of a relatively new generation of leaders, fewer and fewer of whom see Moscow as a major historical partner. Given these conditions, Russia, if it wants to maintain its positions in Central Asia, ought to devise new approaches to regional policy. In our opinion, a strategy that should take center stage in Central Asia in the near future is one that would provide countries of the region with an economic cooperation agenda that does not require a clear geopolitical choice.
First published in our partner International Affairs
Gender Issues In Kazakhstan: Challenging Journey on The Road to Empowerment
Globally, Gender issue is the prime concern to all over the world and Kazakhstan holds no exception. Gender remains a critically important and largely overlooked in terms to the promote of gender equality and women empowerment. Gender issues deals with all aspects of societal customs related to men and women, the way they interrelate, their differences in access and use of resources, their participation, opportunities and how they react to changes, interventions and policies. It’s been 45 years since United Nations has declared international women’s day on 8th march, marking a new wave of feminist movement. Kazakhstan has grown into an upper-middle income country from a lower-middle one in the last two decades. However, the situation of women has not changed accordingly. The government has formulated important policies on gender equality and certain progress has also been made. However it requires greater effort to realize the completion of the process given the rigid patriarchal social structure of Kazakhstan. In recent times, a new wave of feminist scholars has risen in Kazakhstan. These feminists possess Western education and are aware of all the latest trends in social development in Kazakhstan. They believe that Kazakhstan has quite a complex set of policies and attitudes towards gender equality and women’s empowerment. Empowerment on its own is seen as a process of increasing the capacity of individuals or groups to make choices and to transform those choices into desired actions and outcome.
Political And Economic Sphere
The disintegration of Soviet Union in 1991 resulted into a severe economic decline in Kazakhstan. Sudden economic shocks occurred, as guaranteed markets for products ceased to exist and the restructuring of state owned enterprises and collective production units brought about massive layoffs. These economic changes also led to considerable changes in social relations. The immediate impact in Kazakhstan was a rapid, sharp rise in poverty and deterioration in human development indicators. Unemployment and layoffs was massive. The transition period had adverse impact on Kazakhstani women. Scholars suggest that in the 1990s, unemployment in Kazakhstan clearly had “a female face”; women constituted up to 70 percent of the entire “jobless and poor” population. The status of women and related issues has not much improved since. Issues of gender inequality are prevalent in almost every sphere of social life. There are fewer women in the position of power vis-à-vis men. Presently, there are very few women who are represented in government sectors and political bodies. In the parliament of Kazakhstan, men still have more power than women. Women representation in the parliament in the 1990s was not even one fourth of their share in the population. It was 11.2 percent in 1999 increasing slightly to 15.9 percent in 2006. Some scholars’ records, the proportion of women in parliament remained 12.7 and 13.6 percent in 2007 and 2010 respectively. In 2016, the government committed to give 30 percent of decision making roles to the women at all levels though situation improved only little. Limited women’s participation in politics and access to power at all levels constrain the efficiency of the state and its policies. It is thus very important to give equal access to women in political, economic and educational sphere. “The republic of Kazakhstan” argues that the majority of Kazakhstani women have higher education, yet women are underrepresented among managers and leaders and overrepresented among the unemployed and those living in poverty. Gender equality is a precondition for meeting the challenge of reducing poverty, promoting sustainable development and building good governance. The high degree of gender equality in terms of both opportunities and benefits would help the country to achieve high economic growth and better quality of life. This made a very important observation ‘gender equality is more than a goal in itself.’ The opportunities open to women and girls, especially in their early years, determines not only their individual futures but also that of wider society. Since, rural communities of women are more vulnerable and need more support. Despite successes, further progress is needed. More robust safeguards must be put in place to protect those who are most vulnerable, especially in rural areas. Education remains crucial for eradicating these issues. In 2011, Kazakhstan weekly newspaper highlighted that women are facing a problem of gender inequality in Kazakhstan. Women have fewer rights and opportunities than men in reality. Most of the women have been migrated from paid labour to household work because of the decrease in total employment during 1999-2000.
Gender violence is only one aspect of inequality which is why sexual violence is considered as a gender inequality problem rather than just a criminal offence. It’s been 27 years since UN general assembly adopted the declaration of elimination of violence against women in 1993 but, such violence is still prevalent all over the world. Although, Kazakhstan’s constitution proclaims to maintain gender equality in the country, there are many problems like human trafficking; domestic abuse and rape that impact women’s lives in society. The falling economic status also affects their participation in the public spheres, especially in the decision-making and political processes.
When women are economically empowered, they can be significant contributors to the economic growth of the country, which has the end effect of contributing to the prosperity of every woman, every man, every girl and every boy in country. In 2019, United Nations population fund (UNDP) made an observation that Gender equality and the empowerment of women is integral parts of all aspects of development. Gender equality and the empowerment of women are at the heart of the Agenda for Sustainable Development. This implies the role that many women in Kazakhstan play in areas ranging from politics to sciences and culture as well as to bridge the gender gap in the digital space. Transformative gender roles requires transforming unequal gender relations by investing in women, encouraging and bringing to reality the requisite changes in social norms, cultural values, power structures and eliminating the root causes of gender inequality and discrimination.
Kazakhstan Gender Policy: Government’s Laws and Policy
It is believed that the role of the state and its policies are critical to improve the status of women. United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE, 2011) highlighted that promoting gender equality and women’s economic empowerment has to target lasting and long-term improvements in the policy environment in order to ensure sustainable development for all. It is important to note that successful and constructive policymaking and programme implementation should be executed in a needs-responsive manner. The gaps in this sphere were pointed out in a study done by Asian Development Bank (ADB) in 2013. Which made an observation that women’s economic empowerment is critical for achieving gender equality and combating poverty, and also for harnessing women’s economic potential and contribution to the country’s economic development. The objective of any gender policy is working towards an organization which implements gender point of view as a focal point to frame its internal and external policy. The aim of gender policy can be achieved only when both the sexes have equal access to power, authority and resources which is perceptible in the goals, strategies, structure and culture of the organization. The new Strategic Plan 2018-2021 sets its priority by UN women in consultation with the Kazakh government, NGOs, civil society. This will be basically focused on ending violence against women and women’s economic empowerment for socially vulnerable groups. They are also observing budgeting, national planning in consultation with the government.
UN Women sets its priorities for the region based on its new Strategic Plan 2018-2021 in consultation with the government and civil society individuals. But overarching all of that is the implementation of the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) which Kazakhstan has also signed up to and this is a framework, then, for all of our work in the country. Kazakh government’s long-term strategies focusing on empowering people. United Nations (UN) observes “Gender equality is the most important element of the success of Kazakhstan in the future. If the people of Kazakhstan and the government do not dedicate sufficient resources and sufficient attention to achieving gender equality to providing all opportunities for women and girls to reach parity with men, then Kazakhstan will not achieve its goals of becoming one of the 30 most developed countries in the world.”
Discourses and Reality of New Great Game: Particularly focus on Kazakhstan
The “New Great Game” became a much-debated term of current events in the region. Currently, the analogy of “great powers” transformed into hegemony, powers, regional security. It is basically focused on the importance of the geopolitical security, financial control, global supremacy and energy. This renewed game brought more competition, more rivalry among the players. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, it strengthened the regional security and decreased the tendency for the ruling of only one power over the regions. It is very obvious that “New Great Game” is dynamic in nature. . The renewed geopolitical interest determines the actions, behaviour and the role of the players in this game. It is mainly maintaining the balancing game internationally. Almost for a decade, the major external, as well as Regional players struggled for hegemony, power, global supremacy, natural gas resources, energy, and towards the control of oil resources of the region of Caspian Sea were described as the ‘New Great Game’. The major four combatants are China, Russia, U.S.A and EU.
Lately, in the 19th century, few experts used the term, “The New Great Game” and analyses that “it is an international competition between foreign rivalry and within the Central Asian region”. The term New Great Game has been used both as an opportunity and a constraint for major players in global politics. There is competition for control, power, dominate, own motives and interest. The new sources of hydrocarbon resources, natural gases and extracting oil were probably available for major external actors. The growing use of this analytical value could be described as politico-religious goals, maximization of profit, and promotion of religious security and revival of geopolitical interests. These two ideas have perceived the political, social, economic security. The contemporary use of the geopolitical approach in this region is self-evident, which has increased their roles in the foreign policy of global powers. Some Western observers suggest that the Caspian Sea countries contain the largest amount of energy resources. ‘The Caspian region’ has become a significant source of global energy production as well as a centre of extending geopolitical and economic interest. The aim of the renewed game is more focused on independent sovereignty, attaining control over the oil, energy assets and secure transportation routes to global markets than balancing their neighbours.
The Caspian region possesses the rich amount of energy resources, “which is playing a significant role politically and economically in order to dominate the region over the Caspian region countries and the world”. After Kazakhstan proclaimed its independence in 1991, it found itself landlocked and located between two major powers China and Russia. Kazakhstan has enormous energy resources of oil and natural gas, but Kazakhstan lies far from the world’s energy markets. For Kazakhstan, the route of pipelines exporting oil and gas is a major interest, and both a source of prosperity and potential political dependence. For both the United States (US) and China, Kazakhstan and Central Asia represent an alternative source of stable oil and gas supply and help to limit China’s oil dependence on the Middle East and organisation of petroleum exporting countries (OPEC). Several commentators, authors and scholars have described the competition for energy resources in Central Asia between the world’s major powers as a “New Great Game.” “This policy is based on Kazakhstan’s need to build relations and partnerships in multiple directions”. Kazakhstan’s location in Central Asia with powerful neighbours and a landlocked position, demands Kazakhstan to cooperate with others to secure export routes for its resources and protect its interests more broadly. “The country’s large reserves, growing production and export of oil and gas give Kazakhstan an opportunity to use energy resources as a tool, to promote and achieve foreign policy interests and objectives”. Energy resources can potentially help Kazakhstan to overcome its difficult foreign policy position, and avoid too much dependence on any one state, especially Russia.
Dynamics of New Great Game and Kazakhstan
Kazakhstan is a young sovereign state. The economy of Kazakhstan depends densely on oil sector. After Russia, Kazakhstan places second in terms of mineral production among the CIS countries. It is also a landlocked country and a transit country. In 1911, Kazakhstan became an oil producer. In the decade of 1960s and 1970s, the production became expanded to a relevant level. The rich resources, oil and natural gas, in the region has attracted the international community. Recently, the oil production of Kazakhstan is influenced by two giant onshore fields, namely, Tengiz and Karachaganak. Kazakhstan makes an effort to perform strategy among other countries of the world community that makes it an equivalent partner.
Energy has become the focus of Kazakhstan’s foreign policy after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Since its independence the leadership in Kazakhstan has followed multi-vector and balanced principles in its relationship with all the countries in the international arena. The geography of Central Asia is such that due to its natural resources and its proximity to the Caspian Sea, they attract the focus of the developed and developing countries for their growth. Hydrocarbon reserves have been the greatest boon for Kazakhstan and since independence it has greatly utilized this capacity.
“New Great Game” as the utmost generally used analogy for the geopolitical change of Central Asia. For Kazakhstan, this game approach is mainly for three reasons: territorial integrity, regime legitimacy and universal recognition in regional as well as international affairs. The countries of Central Asia have been the focus of this great game since the disintegration of former Soviet Union: “Central Asia, for good or for ill, is back once more in the thick of the news, and looks like staying there for a long time to come.” This approach reflects awareness among central Asian states. Central Asian states play a central role in interactions between European Union (EU), America, Russia and China. Kazakhstan is an independent state, who have been changed its ideology and focused on both a constraint and an opportunity of game approach. On the one hand, original great game was fought between Britain and Russia for dominance in Central Asia.
In 2013, as Laruelle and Peyrouse says “a realistic interpretation of the interaction between Central Asian countries and external actors is therefore not of a ‘Great Game,’ but rather of many ‘little games’ that are modular, evolving, negotiable, complementary, and not exclusive of one another”. The “great powers” discourse has transformed and now focuses on the importance of the region principally as suppliers of energy resources to the global market; increasing competition has led to increasing conflicts in the region. In the “New Great Game” the fight for control over territory has now been shifted to the control of oil and gas reserves and pipeline routes.
The new players to join this great game are USA, China and the EU. As Cooley (2012) has stated, the game is not the sole preserve of the global players: “the Central Asian states, even the weaker ones, are not passive pawns in the strategic manoeuvrings of the great powers, but important actors in their own right. Thus, the new game is being played at a number of levels. The rules of the game are not dictated solely by the big players. The Central Asian states themselves have drawn up the ‘local rules’ that guide many of these geopolitical interactions, learning to leverage this interest and even fuel perceptions of regional competition to guard their domestic political power and extract economic benefits”.
Kazakhstan is a predominant actor among Central Asian countries. It is a key player in terms of supplying natural resources to the outside world. As Khidirbekughli (2003) puts it, “Kazakhstan has become the focal point of strategic rivalries in twenty-first century”. However, in the power rivalry between Russia and China, Kazakhstan becomes very vulnerable. The key observer of the game for the Kazakhstan government is both internal and external. As a newly independent nation Kazakhstan has a need to establish its legitimacy domestically and internationally. Its multi-ethnic political entities that have emerging from its colonial and imperial past have also contributed to this great game. The President of Kazakhstan has also promoted “economy first” principle and has also associated himself and his government with set targets. These targets give importance to economic development ahead of democratic ambition. In the past decade Kazakhstan has been among the top five fastest developing countries. Territorial integrity and regime survival have been the aim of the elite in Kazakhstan. Moreover, personal wealth and status have also been important. Kazakhstan has asserted its independence by developing diplomatic relations with 139 countries, diplomatic missions in 74 and accredits diplomats from 107 states. Kazakhstan is also an enthusiastic participant in regional and international organisations. These include the WTO, the OSCE, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), and the World Economic Forum in 2013.
Localism in Tajikistan: How would it affect Power Shift?
Localism has been a common characteristic of all post-Soviet Central Asian Republics. However, this trait emerged in different ways; the result has been almost similar. The phenomenon is stemmed in unbalanced developing process and deliberate unequal share of power between regional ethnic groups of Communist leadership.
In Tajikistan, the localism emerged with more complexity and has had more important consequences. In some opinions, a main root of Tajik Civil war of 1990s, had been localism which followed by religious and ethnic gaps. In essence, the war was between privileged and unprivileged areas[i]. Akbar Turjanzoda, prominent cleric and former deputy Prime Minister of Tajikistan, who is also known as an influential figure of peace process, in his book “Between water and Fire” emphasizes on a “balanced localism” and suggests the balance between representatives of different regions is the only solution for a peaceful country[ii]. After the Peace Accord, everyone expected to do so, however the balance never achieved.
In Soviet era, the Khujandis were the most influential group that enjoyed the power and wealth. Moscow-based leadership made this due to dual Uzbek-Tajik identity of the Khujandis, who were under influence of regional focal point, Tashkent. On the other hand, any possibility for anti-Russian integration in North was less than any other region in Tajikistan. Moreover, contemporary history of revolutionary groups, such as Basmachis, shaped basically in other regions. Furthermore, in separation of Tajikistan from Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic in 1920s, the Khujandi elites made the most important role[iii]. These factors made the Khujandto become the prominent region in the Soviet Republic.
If we consider the identity based division of regions as Shavkat Kasymov did in his paper “Regional fragmentation in Tajikistan: The shift of powers between different identity groups[iv]”, we can categorize the Tajik regions into Khujandis, Kulobis, Gharmis and Pamiris. The geographical position of these 4 group is shown in Map-1.
Map-1: Geographical position of identity-based division of localism in Tajikistan[v]
However, after about 3 decades of geopolitical changes, more geographical features should be considered on Tajik localism. As you can see in Map-1, the identity based divisions do not cover all provinces of 1920s in Tajikistan. North, South, East and Center are the 4 contemporary key regions of the country which represent a political clan. Map-2shows the political map of independent Tajikistan.
Migration process is a factor that should be considered in second division, especially about capital, Dushanbe. The city is geographically included in Centre, but the political view is unknown due to migration flow[vi]. It is also true about those who were displaced from Gharm to Qurghonteppa for agricultural purposes during Soviet era.
Map-2: the political map of independent Tajikistan[vii]
The Southerners leading by Emomali Rahmonhave enjoyed the power in post-peace era. In all political arrangements, the localism has been affected roguishly. Danghara, Kulob and Farkhor from Khatlon province are the main power spots in South. The major powerful and influential structures within the state such as President, Defense, Internal and external affairs ministries and State committee for National Security are all occupied by elites from these regions. Interestingly, opposition believes that according to peace accord, the power-based ministries such as defense and internal affairs should have been allocated to opposition, but never done[viii]. Even the potential president of the country, the Chairman of National Assembly is from south. According to the country’s constitution, in case of death, resignation and incapability of the President, his duties prior to the beginning of assignment by the new President, shall be taken over by the Chairman of National Assembly[ix].
Although the Northerners’ share of power has been marginalized dramatically after the Soviet dissolution, they have still a better situation comprising to Center and East. According to the political traditions rooted in contemporary coalition during the civil war, the Prime Minister belongs to North. However, his power has been limited, and the authority shared with 3 deputies from south. The position is personally under the control of the President.
The Eastern Pamirs have even the smallest share of power, due to their different culture, language and especially religion. It seems that the Eastern elites trend to have more control to their homeland as an autonomous region, rather having national power positions. After 2018 conflicts, as a sign of appeasement, Rahmon appointed a figure close to Aga Khan, the religious leader of the Pamiris as provincial chief. But in National share of power, nothing considerable.
Understanding the share of Center is a bit more complicated. Today, the Islamist opposition is mainly from this part of the country. This clan is known to its religious identity. Sayid Abdulloh Nuri, the former leader and founder of Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT) and former United Tajik Opposition (UTO) is a well-known politician of this share. Other prominent political Islamist figures such as former deputy PM, Akbar Turjanzoda, and Muhiddin Kabiri also belong to this clan. While the first circles of IRPT had a Gharmi identity,a senior member of the party believes that they have moved beyond localism and as an example, the party introduced Muhammadalihayit, deputy chairman of the party, who was from South.
On the other hand, there are also small shares within the State. Chairman of the Assembly of Representatives belong to Center. There are also some ministries from cities like Hisor and Vahdat.
Muhammadjon Kabirov, a Tajik expert and senior member of IRPT believes that the current power sharing system in the country is even deceptive. First, there are always parallel state institutions which belong to Southerners such as Energy and electricity institutions. On the other hand, while the head of these structures have been granted to non-Southerners, the deputies and bodies of the ministries are mainly from South. Thirdly, these elites cannot and not let to apply their local identity in their share of power. And eventually, these points are while the state positions are not sold by money or allocated by political affiliations.
|Chairman of National Assembly||Rustam Emomali||Danghara|
|Prosecutor General||Yusuf Rahmon||Vose|
|Min. of Defense||SheraliMirzo||Hamadoni|
|Min. of Internal Affairs||Ramazon Rahimzoda||Kulob|
|Min. of Foreign Affairs||Sirojiddin Muhriddin||Temurmalik|
|Chmn., State Committee for National Security||Saymumin Yatimov||Farkhor|
|Mayor of Capital||RustamEmomali||Danghara|
|Min. of Education & Science||Muhammadyusuf Imamzoda||Temurmalik|
|Min. of Finance||Fayziddin Qahhorzoda||Vose|
|Min. of Industry & New Technologies||Zarobiddin Fayzullozoda||Danghara|
|Min. of Health & Social Protection||Jamoliddin Abdullozoda||Danghara|
|Min. of Agriculture||Amonullo Solimzoda||Danghara|
|Min. of Economic Development & Trade||Zavghi Zavghizoda||Hamadoni|
|North||Prime Minister||Qohir Rasulzoda||Ghafurov|
|Min. of Justice||Rustam Shohmurad||Konibodom|
|Min. of Labor, Migration, & Public Employment||Golru Jabbarzoda||Isfara|
|East||Min. of Culture||Zulfia Davlatzoda||Khorog|
|Min. of Transport||Khudoyor Khudoyorzoda||Rushon|
|Center||Chairman of the Assembly of Representatives||Muhammadtoer Zokirzoda||Rasht|
|Min. of Energy & Water Resources||Usmonali Usmonzoda||Vahdat|
Table1: Distribution of power in Tajikistan based on localism[x]
Localism and Shift in power
At the first shift in power in Tajikistan, the localism played a prominent role. In the post-Soviet era, th power was in hands of Northern pro-communists. At the same time that the central Gharmis and Easters were seeking a share in the country’s politics, the Southerners made a clever coalition with weakened North and simply came into power. At that time, when the opposition groups were mainly in unstable and disconnected regions of the country as well asAfghanistan, the political competition defined between North and South. In 1994, the Northern candidate, Abdumalik Abdullajanov lost the election to the Southern Emomali Rahmon (with 58%)[xi]. Then the war started, the peace achieved and due to the peace accord, 30 percent of the state’s power should have been allocated to opposition. However, step by step it tends to less than 5 percent.
There are evidences that the country is moving toward another shift in power. The amendments applied to the constitution in 2016 and paved the way for Rustam’s (Rahmon’s elder son) presidency. In the meanwhile, Rustam is experiencing different positions and rising up for a hard inter-family competition (maybe with his more experienced sister Ozoda) and a wider confrontation with potential and indeed opposition (Internal power groups and exiled opposition).
There is still a possibility that due to recent security issues and Corona Virus pandemic, Rahmon run for another term and keep the power by himself. Maybe he will learn from Nazarboyev’s experience. After achieving the leadership of country’s National Assembly by Rustam, it is more likely to happen. The situation allows Rahmon to leave the power anytime he wants and does surprise everyone.
Any of the mentioned scenarios happen to the shift in power, the localism’s affect is inevitable. As Rahmon raises his effective/ineffective authoritarianism with less legitimacy, he will try to change the regional balance in power in a kleptocratic space of the country’s politics. The change in Badakhshon and other changes of more politicians from Danghara were the first spark. But still no one guarantee that the unrests won’t happen again. We should also expect consolidating the ties with North by various means.Recent change in the Minstry of Labor, Migration and Public Employment, that a politician from North (GolruJabbarzoda) replaced a Southern Minister (Sumangul Taghoyzoda from Kulob) is a sign. Also Rahmon’s granddaughter married to a Northern family (grandson of the governor of the Sughd region)which was unprecedented in large presidential family[xii].
How the exiled opposition will play their role in a country increasingly closing, is a vague question at the moment. Forming the coalition such as “National Alliance” is unlikely to affect dramatically. However, the restricted figures inside the country, has a potential to fire the spark. That’s the reason that Rahmon will strictly keep control over these two potentials.
[i]For example HoonanPeimani in his book “Regional Security and the Future of Central Asia: The Competition of Iran, Turkey, and Russia” believes that; P. 28.
[ii]АкбарТӯрадчонзода, Миёниобуоташ, Саҳифа 5-6.
[iii]Talking to a Tajik expert, MuhammadaliBurhanov.
[iv]Kasymov, Shavkat, (2012), Regional fragmentation in Tajikistan: The shift of powers between different identity groups, Asian Geographer, 30:1, 1-20.
[v]The map is obtained from “Tajikistan: A Political and Social History” written by Kirill Nourzhanov and Christian Bleuer, published by ANU E Press, P. 93.
[vi] Three Tajik experts suggested that Dushanbe does not represent any political clan.
[vii] The map is obtained from: https://geology.com/world/tajikistan-satellite-image.shtml.
[viii]Interview with MuhammadjonKabirov, Tajik expert and senior IRPT member.
[x] The data in table mainly obtained by official websites and in some cases by talking to Tajik experts.
[xii]Tajikistan: Marriage Folds Northern Elite Into Presidential Family, https://eurasianet.org/tajikistan-marriage-folds-northern-elite-into-presidential-family.
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