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Are Pakistan’s Nukes Secure?

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Since Pakistan acquired the nuclear capability in May 1998 by denoting six nuclear devices in response to India’s five nuclear tests, Western media has been the most ardent critics of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal due to domestic instability in Pakistan. Also, Abdul Qadir Khan’s illicit nuclear proliferation episode has added fuel to the fire because of which Western media and authors started doubting Pakistani scientists and engineers. The two retired Pakistani scientists meeting with Osama Bin Laden in Kandahar is the best evidence provided by the Western authors in this regard. The most controversial discourses by Western scholars often described Pakistan’s nuclear weapon as the ‘Islamic Bomb’ as a threat to Middle East. For instance, Al. J Venters’ Allah’s Bomb: The Islamic Quest for Nuclear Weapons, Steve Weissman and Herbert Krosney’s Pakistan’s Islamic Bomb: Nuclear Threat to Israel and the Middle East, aBBC documentary on the same title was telecasted in 1980, and the biography titled Dr. A. Q. Khan and the Islamic Bomb of Dr. A. Q. Khan, written by Pakistani journalist Zahid Malik.

The impetus to accuse Pakistan’s nuclear weapon as the Islamic bomb to Western media was provided by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s historic speech on the Islamic bomb. Later, Zia ul Haq also claimed that Pakistan would be the first Muslim nuclear state. Israel was the first state which was worried about the Islamic bomb as it was assumed that Pakistan might provide a nuclear security to Muslim states. There is no strong evidence to prove this hypothesis. However, Pakistani Jamaat-e-Islami senator Khurshid Ahmad is in favour of providing extended deterrence to Muslim states.

Another interesting episode in the history of Pakistan’s nuclear development was the threat posed by extremists or terrorists that might seize the nuclear assets in Pakistan. Terrorists attacked the nuclear weapons facilities including a nuclear missile storage facility in Sargodha, a nuclear air base at Kamra, and a Taliban suicide attack on entry point to one of the armament factories at the Wah Cantonment in Pakistan.

Nuclear expert, Shaun Gregory’s study entitled ‘Terrorists Tactics in Pakistan Threaten Nuclear Weapons Safety’ cannot be ignored in this regard. He argued that Pakistan nuclear sites are located near the borders where Taliban and Al-Qaida are dominated. The security personals with access to the nuclear weapons cycle might be willing to collude with terrorists. Also, the terrorists might get hold of fissile material and nukes in Pakistan. Surprisingly, Gregory argued that the ISI exists with strong anti-West sentiments and there is possibility of connection between security forces and Islamists in Pakistan. Additionally, Philip Bobbit’s study Terror and Consent states that Pakistan army might decide to transfer nukes to terrorists.

The western and few Pakistani analysts’ observation on Pakistan’s nuclear weapons safety and security resulted into the debates within Pakistan, the main mission was how to secure the nuclear warheads from terrorists. Also, Seymour Hersh’s puzzling report increased the anxieties to Pakistan. Hersh argued that at least two occasions the US Special Forces have prepared plans to take control of Pakistani nuclear assets in case they fall into the wrong hands. Pakistani military has already in their minds the pre-emptive strike threat to Pakistan’s nuclear facilities from India and Israel, the Hersh’s report has alerted Pakistan about the possible US attack.

Hersh’s report has not seriously taken by Pakistan, however, safety of nukes is now the paramount responsibility of Nuclear Command Authority (NCA)and Strategic Plans Division (SPD)of Pakistan. The new discourses on Pakistan nuclear programme, for instance, Feroz Hussan Khan’s Eating Grass and Naeem Salik’s Learning to Live with the Bomb provided detailed study of Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine, command and control structure. In Hans Born, Bates Gill, and Heiner Hanggi’s edited book Governing the Bomb, Zafar Iqbal Cheema argued that due to the Export Control Act of 2004, there is no possibility of any illegal nuclear exports from Pakistan. Also, with the help of United States, best practices related to protecting fixed installations, convoys transportation, sensitive nuclear materials, material production control &accounting, export and border controls, and personal reliability programme has been shared with Pakistan by the US. The US is confident about the safety of nuclear assets in Pakistan. The former US President Barack Obama to the US military officials have vehemently supported the nuclear control and command structure of Pakistan. Similarly, former British politician David Miliband and French military official Erard Corbin de Mangoux have praised Pakistan’s nuclear control and command structure. Also, some Indian nuclear strategists have openly acknowledged Pakistan’s NCA, SPD, and nuclear control and command system, for instance, Bharat Karnad and M. K. Narayanan.

However, some experts like Scott Sagan is still worried due to operational control of nuclear arsenals in the hands of military in Pakistan.Hassan Abbas’s book Pakistan’s Nuclear Bombclearly displayed that Abdul Qadir Khan’s illicit nuclear episode was supported by politicians and military in Pakistan. Also, Hussain Haqqani in his piece Reimaging Pakistan argued that there is a nexus between the politicians, Islamists and army in Pakistan. The followers of Maududi’s version of Islam (Jamaat-e-Islamia) which talks about the political revolution are within the military, scientists, judiciary, academic, and media in Pakistan. Also, Haqqani argued that although Pakistan possesses nuclear weapons, it is still scared of India.

There is a possibility that that radical Islamist type personals might join the security forces particularly who are trained for security of nuclear installations in Pakistan. Also, there might be sympathisers of Islamists within the nuclear establishments. One employee dealing with nuclear installations was caught for distributing the religious pamphlets among his colleagues in Pakistan. Naeem Salik argues that Pakistan has developed a mechanism to identify an extremist person. However, it is difficult to figure out who is extremist and who is not. The facial expressions can hardly help Pakistani officials dealing with nuclear control and command system to identify an extremist person. The great source of alarm is that there is possibility that the officials dealing with recruiting the persons for security installations might be themselves the followers of extremism. Also, the sympathiser of terrorists can easily join the security forces for nuclear installations in Pakistan.

Undoubtedly, Pakistan managed to satisfy some Western nuclear strategists and politicians regarding the nuke security with the help of its NCA, SPD and control and command structure. Also, Pakistan had actively participated in many nuclear summits (Washington DC in 2010 and Seoul in 2012) to gain experience and knowledge to secure its nuclear assets from falling into wrong hands. Additionally, Pakistan has supported the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. Interesting, according to the Nuclear Threat Initiative’s Nuclear Materials Security Index of 2014, Pakistan has won the seat in updating nuclear security regulations, to implement best practices and has overtaken India. However, Scott Sagan, Shaun Gregory, Philip Bobbit, Bruce Riedel, David Sanger, Joby Warrick, and Seymour Hersh are worried about the nuke security in Pakistan.

I am also worried due to the domestic instability and the religious-political-army nexus in Pakistan. The Islamists might prefer religion (violent Jihad) than army security during the crisis situations in Pakistan. For some Muslims, violent Jihad is part of their faith to fight against the enemies of Islam. Since Pakistan military has killed terrorists in Pakistan, in response, terrorists started attacking the military units and schools in Pakistan. Also, Ahmadiyya Muslims were forcibly declared non-Muslims in 1974, since then, the persecuted minority community have been seen as anti-Pakistan and anti-Islam. Ahmadi scientists and engineers who were busy in helping the nuclear development of Pakistan were forcibly removed during the Zia rule on the baseless charge of threat to Pakistan’s security. Astonishingly, Pakistan did not acknowledge the Nobel laureate, Dr. Abdul Salam’s role in nuclear development of Pakistan. Also, Islamists forced Pakistani government to remove the renowned economist, Dr. Atif Mian’s name in the Economic Advisory Council due to his Ahmadiyya faith. The minority community is also struggling to save their lives and property in Pakistan because for some Muslims it is part of Jihad/Islam to kill the blasphemers.

Recently, Pakistan’s supreme court has acquitted Asia Bibi (a Christian) after accepting her 2015 appeal against her sentence. She was arrested on the blasphemy charges. The supreme court’s verdict regarding Asia Bibi has resulted into protests supported by Islamists in Pakistan. The Dawn newspaper reported that ‘the Tehreek-i-Labbaik Pakistan called for ‘mutiny’ against the army’s top brass and the assassination of the top court’s justices.’ In response, Director General of Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR), Major General Ghafoor advised the religious-political parties to refrain from dragging army into the matter and legal actions would be taken in case of any violation. Also, prime minister of Pakistan, Imran Khan warned the protestors to refrain from clashing with the state. As expected, the weak Pakistani government was forced to accept the demand of agitators to put Asia Bibi on exit control list. Also, Asia Bibi’s lawyer Saiful Mulook left Pakistan due to threats to his life by Islamists. The killings in Pakistan is not difficult as in other states. Politician Salmaan Taseer was killed in 2011 by his body guard due to Taseer’s personal views on blasphemy laws in Pakistan.

The Islamists are powerful and there is a strong evidence that they enjoy a popular support from the public as well as a minor support from the civil and military officials in Pakistan. Former military official, Feroz Hassan Khan has admitted the power of Islamists and their threat to Pakistan’s nukes. Pakistani government can secure nukes from extremists as long as there is a peace between military and Jihadi organizations. Hussain Haqqani’s book Reimagining Pakistan have narrated about the new Jihad so-called ‘Ghazwa-e-Hind’ (Battle of India) that inspired the Jihadi groups in Pakistan to lunch the terrorist attacks across the border. The Jihadists also want the implementation of Sharia in Pakistan and to retaliate the deaths of famous Jihadists at the hands of Pakistani military. Haqqani states that there is possibility of future tussle between the Jihadists in Pakistan due to different interpretations of the Ghazwa-e-Hind. Thus, not only nukes but Pakistan as a whole is in great danger because some Jihadists have claimed Pakistan as part of the Ghazwa-e-Hind, too. Naeem Salik, however, is not confident about the total breakdown of the state structure as well as the complete meltdown of military in Pakistan that might led to an imminent takeover of power in Pakistan by religious extremists. Also, moderate mainstream religious political parties have never won more than five to seven percent of the votes in any national election.

Nevertheless, the historical experience is a valid evidence that Pakistan might fall into the hands of extremists. The extremist ideology is not confined to religious people only, people involved in media, military, judiciary, bureaucracy, and academics are also influenced by radicalism in Pakistan, Haqqani stated. The former president of Pakistan Zia ul Haq was the follower of Jamaat-e-Islamia. Zia implemented the blasphemy laws that resulted into persecution of minorities in Pakistan. The minority communities especially the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community were isolated in their own country. The Jihad policy was also introduced during Zia’s rule. Thus, this is not a distant dream when extremists might rule Pakistan and hopefully, Islamists would prefer to provide extended nuclear deterrence to Muslim states as senator of Jamaat-e-Islamia Khurshid Ahmad have stated. Khuram Iqbal in his piece The Making of Pakistani Human Bomb argued that suicide bombers (young, rural, and semi-literate) are the deadliest in the world and suicide terrorism is caused by religious fundamentalism. In case terrorists got access of some nukes in future in Pakistan, there is a possibility they might prefer suicide nuke bombings, too.

Rameez Raja is pursuing Ph. D at Department of Political Science, Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi. He specializes in India’s nuclear policy. His writings have previously appeared in Rising Kashmir, Café Dissensus Everyday, Kafila, South Asia Journal, Foreign Policy News, Modern Diplomacy, Pakistan Observer, Kashmir Observer, and Kashmir Monitor. Email ID: rameezrajaa23[at]gmail.com

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Revitalising the Quad

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With a high-level informal meeting of the Foreign Ministers of US, India, Japan and Australia on the side lines of the last month UN General Assembly meeting, the much needed impetus has gained to the quadrilateral security dialogue (quad) concerning the security of the Indo-Pacific. The genesis of the quad grouping can be traced back to the 2007 Malabar naval exercise, but proclaimed it as an idea for security of the Indo-Pacific by Japanese Prime Minster Shinzo Abe in 2013 with his ‘Security Diamond’ concept and revived it in 2017 with a new security dialogue mechanism. Since then the four member countries have had official level meetings largely on the sidelines of the East Asia Summit. Indeed, quad is a grouping of regional heavyweights in their backyard, Japan in the western Pacific, India in the Indian Ocean and Australia in the southern Pacific along with the most powerful military in the world, the US.  However, China perceived it as a mechanism to counter its rise.  Undoubtedly, the looming China “threat” is the rallying point of the quad formation. 

China views quad as a grouping as well as individual countries differently. Beijing sees quad is a potential military alliance under US leadership against China. At the same time it doesn’t see individual regional countries as a threat and presumably view with varied perspectives: it opposes Japan  being a ‘normal’ military power but is satisfied with an ally of the US; it objects to a strong India-US defence cooperation because US technical support would help India become a regional hegemon in the Indian Ocean theatre; while remain neutral to Australia.

In a similar fashion the member countries also view China “threat” separately- for US, it’s a peer competitor in spite of the economic interdependence  andonly US can afford the magnitude of current trade war, while India and Japan are its neighboring countries and major trade partners so ill-afford to face security challenges or economic misery, and China is Australia’s largest trade partner but no qualms over security. And, India is more reticent in strengthening the quad because of its fear of “ally-entrapment”. Conversely, China continues its expansionism in the maritime domain, now reached upto India’s backyard.  However, no single country can independently challenge China’s might and that China wants this situation continues in future.  

Asia requires a regional balancing mechanism

As realism explains, peace and stability across the regions is ensured through balance of power. If one country emerged as a regional hegemon then it would seek to exploit others and start exercising its will over lesser states. Eminent realist Kenneth Waltzargued “unbalanced power, whoever wields it, is a potential danger to others.” So far, the old cold war centric balancing and US preponderance have been the main pillars of stability in Asia. But with the rise of China that balance is diminishing and Asia seems to be moving in the direction of unipolarity. However, a unipolar Asia with China at the centre would harm the interest of other heavyweights so structure demands a balancing mechanism to contain one-country dominance. The quad formation can be seen as a structurally driven balancing of secondary powers to prevent the region from unipolarity

At the same time, quad faces perspective and structural problems.  No country in the region is willing to formally join in anycounter-mechanism that is being touted as ant-China. And China is vehemently opposing any sort of coming together of these four countries. For instance, when 2007 edition of bilateral India- US Malabar  naval exercise was converted into a quadrilateral, China sent demarche to the participants asking the rationale behind such grouping and since then the four countries  havenever joined together for a naval exercise.

Another perspective problem is how the quad is acceptable for other regional countries. Southeast Asian states fear that the regional politics will be dominated by great power game and Southeast Asia would be a theatre for jostling by these powers. So it upholds its time-tested inclusive approach in all regional formations, and nothing short of inclusivity.

On the contrary, quad must be seen as another regional organisations along with APEC, ARF, EAS and ADMM plus. All these organisations have different objectives, some of it are security oriented, and deliberations are in a consensus manner. However, none of it is able to address hard security issues that if a military clash took place between China and others then it is hardly to manage under such organizations. Though quad is not a region-wide organization but has the potential military capability to contain the threat both individually and collectively, if it is necessary.   At some level the region requires a power balancing mechanism to maintain peace and stability.

Structurally, it is not a formal alliance so does no clear agenda and an action plan, except the idea of the need for preserving rule-based order in the Indo-Pacific. Japan and Australia are close allies of the US while India wants to keep its ‘strategic autonomy’ and doesn’t want to give any commitment to larger regional issues unless it directly confronts New Delhi. As a result, there has been no coherent agenda as to how this mechanism can be brought up. Threat perceptions and the counter mechanisms are varied for the quad members. 

Under these circumstances, Quad needs to be kept under the soft balancing tactics as of now. A hard balancing by forming a military alliance would bring a cold war structure  that will destabilize the region. The soft balancing can be converted into a hard balancing according to circumstances that if China ever sought to become a revisionist state.  At the same time, instead of as a leader US should be a facilitator of the quad and the regional countries of India Japan and Australia should be allowed to drive the quad. Today trilateral mechanism blossoms within the quad: US- India-Japan and US-Japan- Australia, but there is no India-Japan- Australia trilateral mechanism.   An India-Japan- Australia regional mechanism under the umbrella of quad can bring more energy to the quad. Also, it necessarily requires an action plan which could convince other regional countries of the importance of the quad in Asian security scenario.

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The Game-changing Fallibility of BMD Systems: Lessons from the Middle East and South Asia

M Waqas Jan

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As the Middle East’s major powers recalculate their defence and foreign policies following last month’s missile strikes on Saudi oilfields, there have emerged some telling lessons with regard to the changing nature of modern warfare. While these lessons are perhaps painfully obvious to the likes of Saudi Arabia who have directly been on the receiving end of these attacks, they are also evident in the near deafening introspection being undertaken by the region’s other power brokers, the United States and Israel as well. This has been made clear by the fact that even after a month since the attacks took place, there remains a definite and near ironic aspect of shock and awe to what was otherwise a quick, covert and precision strike on a highly valuable target.

What’s more, the fact that the strike took place despite the presence of one of the world’s most sophisticated missile defense systems, presents a telling example of how the technological balance in cruise missile development has shifted more in favor of offensive strikes at the expense of a once reliable defensive capability. As such, the ease and precision with which one of the world’s most closely guarded facilities were struck, shows that based on the widespread availability of current technologies, it is perhaps more reliable to count on a missile system’s offensive strike capabilities. Consequently, the opportunity cost of investing in and developing expensive missile defense shields based on this scenario becomes tremendously higher.

These lessons provide valuable strategic import to another nearby region which is also brimming with tensions amongst two extremely well equipped and militarily capable states. This refers to the South Asian region, where both India and Pakistan also seem headed towards a dangerous escalation of hostilities. As a result, both countries would do well to consider the lessons emanating from the above-mentioned Saudi experience. For instance, like Saudi Arabia, India has also been on a military spending spree over the last decade, importing some of the world’s most advanced weapons systems from across the world. Its massive economic growth has given it license to pursue a robust military modernization program that is keenly focused on enhancing its power projection capabilities. However, again like Saudi Arabia, India’s military also remains untested and risks being termed another ‘glitter force’ that is more concerned with procuring arms as a matter of prestige as opposed to operational efficacy. This for instance was clear during India’s aerial engagement with Pakistani Air Force jets in March, during which a sophisticated Israeli origin missile fired by India’s air defenses downed one of India’s own Russian made Mi-17 helicopters. Such lack of operational readiness and blind faith in untested systems is evident in both the Saudi and Indian experience highlighted above.

Specifically, regarding the US made Patriot batteries used by the Saudis and the Israeli made Spyder missiles used by India, the above incidents have shown that the efficacy and reliability of these systems in the real-time conflicts of today is quite patchy at best. If anything, any form of over-reliance on these systems runs the risk of a grave miscalculation which in effect is multiplied by the regional complexities of both their respective security environments. These miscalculations are already on display in the increasingly volatile Middle East, as the Western backed and Saudi led military alliance is just realizing. With the vulnerability of such missile defense systems now increasingly evident, there has also arguably been an element of deterrence that has been further reinforced. Consequently, the path to de-escalation appears a lot more rational than one which may escalate towards all-out war. The case of South Asia too was similar where the aerial engagement between nuclear weapons capable India and Pakistan, also ultimately reinforced the latter’s conventional deterrent while exposing gaps in the former’s much touted aerial defenses.

Yet, considering that the case of South Asia remains infinitely more precarious due to the presence of two adversarial nuclear weapons states, the above described developments pose additional yet considerably more important implications when applied to the region’s nuclear deterrence framework. In effect, they erode the belief that ballistic missile defense systems can serve as the backbone to what many a state would consider a winnable nuclear war. These primarily comprise of Nuclear Weapons States such as the US and India which in the recent past have increasingly relied on concepts such as counterforce, pre-emption and precision as key themes within their official military thinking. All under the premise that Missile defense shields offer a reliable and credible defense against an adversary’s pre-emptive or secondary nuclear strikes as part of their strategic calculus. India’s much vaunted purchase of the Russian made S-400 system presents a clear example of such a strategy.

In contrast however, the fallibility and faltering reliability of such air defence systems shows the immense dangers of adopting such an approach within scenarios that have the potential of irreversibly altering life on earth as we know it. Considering how peace and stability in the South Asian region is precariously balanced between Pakistan and India’s nuclear deterrence framework, the unreliability and increasing fallibility of missile defense systems thus warrant a serious re-evaluation of the strategic calculus of both nuclear weapons capable India and Pakistan.  

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Protracted Asymmetric Geopolitical Conflict

Dayan Jayatilleka

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Each of us has his own definition of “geo-history”, and mine is the interface of the “geopolitical” and the “world-historical.”

We are marked by two anniversaries, that of the start of WW II in 1939 and its end in 1945. Fascism was a unique regime of terror, with a strategy of unbridled ‘exterminism’ and therefore constituted a unique political evil in world history. However, outside of its type of regime, strategy and tactics, was its ‘grand strategic’ goal also unique or was it not? Is there a resemblance or homology between, on the one hand, the doctrine of Ein Reich, the telos of world domination, a Thousand Year Reich, and the military moves of Germany and its Axis partners in the run-up to WWII, and on the other, that of a unipolar world order and global military expansionism; of open-ended unipolar global leadership? Is there a continuity or homology between on the one hand, the wartime US Grand Area planning for the postwar world (the documents of which were unearthed by Noam Chomsky), and the present Indo-Pacific strategy and on the other hand, the notorious earlier search for Lebensraum? Is the Indo-Pacific strategy an insistence on “maritime Lebensraum”?

If the answer is yes, and the two paradigms can be superimposed upon each other, then history provides only one answer: the united front and its extension, a global grand alliance. But a united front and grand alliance with whom, to what end?

Politics is combat. International politics is international combat. By the “suicide” of the Soviet Union (that post-mortem verdict was Fidel Castro’s), the Empire was unbound and it is now threatening world peace and the future of humanity itself. Every single arms control agreement (bar one) has been unilaterally renounced, but before that came the rollback of the Yalta and Potsdam agreements with the destruction of former Yugoslavia and the expansion of NATO. Now the empire seeks to dominate the entire global theatre in all possible spheres. This should not come as a shock or surprise. It is almost a law of physics (perhaps it should be called ‘geophysics’) that once unwisely unbound, the Empire would uncoil, spread, expand, and seek to dominate—in short, that the Empire would seek to behave as an empire.

The geohistorical question facing humanity today is how to constrain the Empire, but not return to the old delusions of how to do so. The Empire must be initially counterbalanced and then constrained– bound– permanently, until, as in the case of the Roman Empire, there is a benign change of beliefs (in this case, political) from within its own society, its own citizenry and not as before, a change in its external posture which proves in the long geo-historical term, to have been merely ephemeral, conjunctural, even tactical.

The Empire’s strategy as concerns Russia is quite simple to understand. It is a re-run of the strategy that enabled them to prevail in the Cold War. It is to provoke Russia into an arms race and exceed prudent spending limits, cause economic hardship and generate enough discontent that the citizenry, especially the young, will agitate, thereby causing psychological exhaustion and catalyzing peaceful democratic “regime change”, bringing into office a capitulationist/collaborationist administration sooner or later, in the wake of the end of President Putin’s term. Meanwhile, what is being played out in Hong Kong foreshadows the geohistorical endgame envisaged by the Empire for China and Eurasia as a whole.

By its global offensive, imperialism has potentially overstretched itself morally, ethically and politically. Not since Vietnam has imperialism had a potential target profile which is so large and so exposed. The targeting of Iran when that country has not violated the JCPOA can be turned into a massive indictment on the twin grounds of reason and logic as well as of natural justice. Similarly, the targeting of Venezuela can be exposed for the absurdity that someone who did not even run for Presidential office should be recognized as the legitimate President of a country. So also, the unilateral withdrawal from arms control agreements can be exposed for the danger this poses to humanity.

One of the most important principles of asymmetric political resistance is the identification of the most important strategic real estate as the moral high ground. The moral or moral-ethical high ground is the seizure and occupation of that terrain of argument which is recognized and recognizable as more rational, reasonable and of broader benefit to humanity, assuring “the greatest good of the greatest number” according to universal values and norms and not merely national or regional values and norms.

The main axial routes and themes of the political struggle should be Peace and Sovereignty. Firstly, these are themes that have a universal or near-universal resonance. Secondly, they allow the critic to fight for and occupy the moral high ground because the West has only a toehold on the moral high ground in all these cases. Thirdly, they are also the main achievements of humanity that are threatened by the Western offensive. Fourthly, they are themes that are likely to have resonance among peoples the world over, albeit with greater or lesser emphasis in different areas of the globe.

This great struggle cannot be waged with the guiding ideology solely of or governed solely by “State Interest” or “National Interest.” It can only be waged by the recovery of the spirit of “internationalism” that was present in the entire Soviet period. It is little appreciated that Stalin, the father of ‘Socialism in One Country,’ and political leader of the Great Patriotic War waged an international campaign against fascism. Even in periods of isolation and siege, Stalin’s perspectival approach was never one of a cultural or civilizational preoccupation. The struggle for Peace and Sovereignty, Against Interventionism and Global War, requires the building of global opinion and a global movement.

A contemporary Realist would immediately grasp the opportunity which has opened up in post-Cold War history, namely of compensating at least partially for the loss of those territories and Russia’s Western buffer, the rollback of Yalta and Potsdam and the USSR’s wartime gains and the advance of the NATO borders up to Russia, by the geostrategic gains on the Eastern front through the renewal of partnership with China. Obviously, this has been recognized and acted upon but it has yet to be optimized by the kind of diverse yet solid strategic relationships that the USA has through NATO in the West, and Japan and many other states in other parts of the world. A Realist would recommend a re-visiting, retrieval and revision of Article 1 of the 30 Treaty signed by Stalin and Mao, which recognizes that the security of Russia and China are indivisible and that any aggression against one will be regarded as aggression against the other and responded to accordingly.

There is a contradiction between the Western project of the encirclement of Russia and the intellectual response to that encirclement. One of the reasons for that contradiction is the fact that academies and think tanks have been shaped and formed by and sometimes in the decades of ‘peaceful coexistence’ and later ‘détente’ with the West and are almost structurally unprepared for the change in the global geopolitical-geostrategic ‘ecology’ as it were. These institutions were formed or reshaped by party edict as adjuncts of the tasks of negotiation with the West and the competition (which became enmity for a period) with China. They are structurally oriented towards the West; their institutional faces are turned westwards. Their entire spirit and ethos are those of partnership with the West and suspicion of China stemming from the 1960s and 1970s.

Institutions need to reflect the tasks of the new times, those of facing the West as an adversary in a protracted Cold War encompassing a global hybrid war; facing encirclement by the West and the global offensive of the West. Perhaps new joint analytical and academic institutions should evolve as intellectual-scientific superstructures of the SCO, BRICS, the Astana process and most importantly the partnership with China. A Russo-Sino joint think-tank or ensemble of think-tanks of Advanced Studies, as an intellectual microcosm or advanced prototype of a strategic alliance (not merely a strategic partnership) seems an imperative need.

The threat to Russia is nothing less than deeply, profoundly existential. If Iran is disaggregated by military action two things will result simultaneously. In a small scale equivalent of the collapse of the USSR and the dawning of the unipolar moment after the Cold War ended, there will be a dramatic shift of the balance of forces within the global Islamic community or ummah, to the Wahhabi/Salafists, just as in return to pre-1979, Western power is projected right back into an arena dangerously proximate to Russia’s ‘soft underbelly’ as the western analysts have always seen it. The intermediate ‘buffer state’ may not always remain so. Any deep damaging of Iran will also have global grand strategic implications of tightening the encirclement of Eurasia and weakening China.

Iran’s capacity for deterrence and if deterrence fails, its capacity for prolonged resistance and the same of Venezuela, will decide the level of resistance far away from Russia’s frontlines. If Afghanistan ended the USSR by bleeding it white, then the most effective Western policy in that theatre was to equip the so-called mujahidin with shoulder fired anti-aircraft missiles to neutralize Soviet air power. If the USSR had not been so enmeshed in détente as to hold back the SAM-6s from and provide only a minimum supply of SAM-7s to the Vietnamese, then the damage inflicted on the US may have been such that it could not have gone on the offensive in Afghanistan a mere three years after the withdrawal from Saigon. While the US had no compunction in providing shoulder-fired to the Afghan mujahidin, with whom they had nothing in common ideologically, knowing full well that they would cause Soviet casualties especially among pilots, the USSR did have compunctions in providing SAM-6 batteries and a far more generous quantity of SAM-7s to the Vietnamese who were ideological comrades. The Vietnamese used to wryly remark to those of us in the Vietnam solidarity movement in Asia, that had the USSR provided them with the quantity and quality of air defense missiles that it gave the Arab states in the same period, the early 1970s, the Vietnamese would certainly have used them more effectively and with less losses than did the Arab armies.

That is perhaps the best single piece of explanatory evidence as to why the US recovered so fast from the Vietnam defeat while the USSR unilaterally withdrew from the Cold War and collapsed. It was a matter of will, and the consistent clarity of the US that the USSR was the enemy, and the determination to prevail over it. Later, the successor state of the USSR, the Russian state, with the Russian armed forces as its core, was seen as the enemy—even when the Russian administration and leadership may have been seen as a useful quasi-ally, partner and even ‘friend.’ Thus, on the questions of Iran and Venezuela, a contemporary Russian ‘dialectical and historical Realist’ analysis would consider a ‘reverse Brzezinski.’

China appears caught in a contradiction within an irony. The contradiction is that having entered the world capitalist order dominated by the West and become a major player within it, it now finds itself vulnerable to both economic and military threats simply because it proved to be strong enough to be an economic competitor but not strong enough to prevent, deter or prevail over a military build-up triggered by the inherently hierarchical and hegemonistic character of the system it had bought into. The irony is that China had found itself caught in a contradiction because it had forgotten Mao’s theory of contradictions which draws a fundamental distinction between antagonistic and non-antagonistic contradictions. China regarded the competition between itself and the West as a purely economic and therefore non-antagonistic contradiction, but the world system being not only an economic system but one of power, China’s peaceful rise was perceived by the West not as a ‘friendly’ or non-antagonistic contradiction but precisely as an antagonistic one, to be responded to not merely by economic means but also by military means, namely the biggest build-up of an armada in recent history through the Indo-Pacific strategy.

The irony is a dual one, because it was China that first cautioned the USSR about the idealistic and utopian nature of the project of “peaceful economic competition” with the West, but later pursued it with greater zeal and success than the USSR ever did or could. In the 1960s and 1970s, China had established a methodology of identifying the contradictions in the world at any given period and went on to hierarchize those contradictions. The listing would naturally shift over time and became irrationally anti-Soviet at one point; an irrationality that lasted a long period. However, the methodology of discerning, identifying and ranking contradictions was a realistic one, because it alerted China or anyone who used the dialectical framework, to the reality of antagonism, of hostility, in the world arena.

If the world’s foremost military power which disposes of the greatest destructive force known by history, regards one or more countries as adversaries, indeed as The Other(s), and backs up this policy perspective with the actual offensive disposition and concentration of men and material over time, then basic survival instinct should dictate that the states designated and treated as adversaries should seek to combine their military and non-military strengths to countervail and deter such a power which regards them with hostility and as threats. There are several such countries but only two such great powers, and these are Russia and China, in whichever order. Those who opine that Russia can slip out of this siege by living down a perception of a special relationship with China and associating as closely or even more closely with other great or big powers, seem to forget that Western moves against Russia’s interests preceded its renewed hostility to China.

The bottom line is that in any objective, dialectical and historical Realist analysis of Russia’s core interests, no relationship with Europe can be a substitute or even on par with a partnership with China. Not all vectors are equal, and some are certainly more equal than others.

Since neither Russia nor China can countervail the US-led Western alliance on its own, a closer equation is needed between the two than between either Russia or China and any other big power or powers. No other big power, however friendly, is the target of unremitting and adversarial Western action, and therefore will not take the same risks for either Russia or China as each of them should logically do for each other, since they both stand threatened and targeted. A Concert of Big Powers cannot be a substitute for a defensive United Front or coalition of states, of which the Russia-China relationship will be the main alliance, consisting of those sovereign states actively threatened in a military-economic sense by the West.

These are the strictly personal views of the author.

From our partner RIAC

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