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International Law

Legal framework of the Caspian Sea and the interests of Iran

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Authors: Javad Heirannia and Omid Shokri Kalehsar*

In international law, the concept of power is inevitably alongside with the principles of the law.

In other words, since there is no judiciary reference in the international judiciary conflicts, the law is affected by the concept of power in international system. There are different opinions about the relationship between power and law.

Different legal schools of thought differ in their views towards the relativity of power and rights.

Realists believe that power is the main core of international law and takes the main role in the basic norms and principles of international law and relations. So; law should be in compliant with national interests and accordingly it takes prominence. Contrary to realists, scholars from the Yale University Law School do not accept power as the core of international law and emphasize global social commonalities instead of the traditional notion of power. But in general, we cannot ignore the role of power in creating international rules among governments.

Therefore, due to the importance of power in politics, when we want to determine Caspian Sea legal status, at the same time that we pay attention to previous legal contracts, including the treaties of 1921 and 1940 between Iran, Russia and the former Soviet Union, we have to also consider the political conditions. According to the text of an agreement between the presidents of Iran, Russia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, signed on August 5 in Aktau, Kazakhstan, the five countries agreed on issues such as military, security, shipping and economic matters, but delineating seabed and sub-seabed postponed to bilateral agreements between countries. However, the announcement of the signing of an agreement between the government of Iran and the other four countries after nearly three decades of the collapse of the Soviet Union Led to the critical reactions of many Iranians, especially those saying that Iran had enjoyed 50% share of Caspian Sea during the former Soviet Union.

Russo-Persian Treaty of Friendship (1921), Treaty of Commerce and Navigation (1940)

The 1921 treaty is one of the agreements between Iran and Russia on the Caspian Sea. According to the treaty, the Caspian Sea is a common sea between Iran and Russia, both enjoying equal rights of free navigation. According to Article 40 of the treaty, 10 miles were considered as an exclusive fishing zone and the rest was shared between Iran and Russia. Of course, in this treaty, Iran was requested to surrender fishing privilege to Russia to help Russian livelihoods, and the privilege was awarded to them in 1925 for 25 years. But Iran’s Prime Minister, Mohammad Mosaddeq, did not extend the second period of 25 years, although the Soviets continued fishing in all areas and waters of the Caspian, but Iran was usually fishing only in the coastal zone. This continued, and although the fishing privilege for the Russians was not renewed, Russia and Iran both operated at the sea.

Before signing 1921 contract, only the Russians could have military naval forces in the Caspian on the basis of Treaty of Turkmenchay and Treaty of Gulistan, the privilege of which was awarded to Russians by two above-mentioned treaties. In fact, after the oppressive and one-sided Treaty of Turkmenchay and Gulistan between Iran and Tsardom in the first quarter of the nineteenth century, 1921 contract between Iran and the Russian government was the first formal agreement with almost equal status in the Caspian Sea. But the 1940 contract was a little different from the 1921 in which the Russians set to be in a higher position in the contract clinched during Stalin and Iran, the difference of which is totally clear by contrasting them. Parts of the 1940 treaty were on commercial and customs rights between the two countries and other clauses were about the shipping rights of the two sides over the Caspian Sea. The position of Iran in this contract was slightly better than the one in what were signed during the Tsardom of the Russian era.

Dividing the seabed and sub-seabed; ignoring Iran’s viewpoints

After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the founding of the Russian Federation, three other new countries around the Caspian Sea were created from the Soviet heritage, including Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan. Although Iran and Russia at this stage were set for the Caspian Sea to treat a shared one, the Russians took a dual stance in this case. In this regard, Russia from one side stroke a bilateral deal with Kazakhstan in 1988 dividing the northern seabed and its resources and from the other side clinched similar contract with the Republic of Azerbaijan. It led to Iran’s protest maintaining that because both countries enjoy the joint ownership of the Caspian Sea, then any decisions have to be taken jointly in this regard.

According to the joint ownership principle, resources are considered jointly and therefore would have to be divided equally based on an agreement signed by all the Caspian coastal countries. Hence, what the Russians did in dividing Caspian seabed and its resources bilaterally ran contrary to joint ownership principle. In fact, when we consider the Caspian Sea as a common sea, all the resources of this sea are divided equally among all members. Therefore, the Russians’ attempts to conclude bilateral agreements and the division of the continental shelf is contrary to the being common sea of the Caspian.

Under Mohammad Khatami, the then president of Iran, it was proposed that the Caspian Sea be divided equally having 20% share by each coastal country, but four others did not accept the offer, after which Iran declared that it will not allow any interference by other countries in 20% of its adjacent waters So, the Russian vessel left waters of Iran. Since that time, Iran has emphasized its 20% share, but Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan were dissatisfied with this situation, especially in the Alborz field with oil resources, making it a dispute and the disagreement has prolonged so far.

After Kazakhstan’s Aktau agreement on the Caspian Sea, Iran declared to continue governing its 20% share of waters as long as its share with Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan is not determined well.

After the meeting, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani stated: “There are still issues in the southern part of the sea between Turkmenistan, Iran and Azerbaijan. We had good agreements with Azerbaijan that are in operation, but some of these issues have not been resolved yet. At the recent Caspian Summit, some serious issues concerning Iran and many other countries were resolved the most important of which was security in the Caspian Sea.

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The talks between Iran and Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan on the Caspian Sea have been Unsuccessful. Recently, Russia has announced a new plan with coastal states accepting it with the exception ofIran. According to the Russian plan, 15 miles would be considered as the territorial sea and 10 more miles as the exclusive fishing zone. The surface water would be for shared shipping, but seabed and sub-seabed resources are divided according to the 1998 contract.

In Kazakhstan’s Aktau agreement, Caspian Sea navigation was calculated according to the Convention on the Law of the Sea(1982). According to the Convention, 15 miles considered as coastal waters and 10 miles as the exclusive fishing zone putting the rest as a common area. This means that the sovereign right of Iran in the Caspian will be less than 13%.

Because the Caspian Sea doesn’t have any link to open waters, it is in fact considered as a great lake the rules of which are regulated on the basis of the coastal states multilateral agreements.

Based on Kazakhstan’s Aktau agreement, the baseline of the Caspian Sea has been identified; therefore, it is impossible for Iran to determine its share of the seabed and sub-seabed resources in upcoming negotiations. Also, since the deeper part of the Caspian Sea is located in the southern part, the Iranian side, Iran’s share of internal waters will be much less. In the other words, Iran’s baseline in Caspian Sea will not be so distant from the coast, something that can bring about security consequences for the country.

Sharing seabed and sub-seabed in accordance with bilateral agreements among other countries expect for Iranis detrimental to Tehran. However, when the rule over a sea is deemed as joint ownership, its mineral resources, oil and gas are to be taken into consideration fully and then the achieved interests are divided among 5 countries. According to the Convention on the legal status of the Caspian Sea, the areas beyond the territorial waters and exclusive fishing zone of each country are to be known as a common or joint zone. In this case, the use of seabed resources in the Caspian Sea remains unclear.

This is especially true in the southern part of the Caspian Sea, because the fate of the resources in the northern part of the Caspian Sea is determined in the bi-and-trilateral agreements of Russia, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. So, the existing disputes are only among Iran with two countries including Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan. As a result, declaring the area beyond the territorial waters and the exclusive fishing zone as a joint ownership means destroying the sovereignty of Iran over the energy field of the Alborz in the Caspian Sea. Based on bilateral agreements signed between Russians with Kazakhstan and then with Azerbaijan and also between Kazakhstan with Turkmenistan in 1998, seabed and sub-seabed resources were divided between themselves, making the share of Iran negligible.

Russia, in fact, by signing the above bilateral contracts violated the joint ownership agreed upon with Iran and the case ended in Tehran’s detriment. Since the presidency of Khatami, Iran has emphasized that it has 20% share in Caspian Sea and announced not to allow others to do any kind of activity in its territorial waters. That’s why the Azerbaijani oil operation in the joint oil field with Iran was stopped. While before Kazakhstan’s Aktau agreement, Iran rejected the joint exploitation with Azerbaijan, Tehran approved 50-50 division of the oil field of Alborz with the country in this convention.

One of the criticisms leveled against Aktau convention is that the determination of the share of each Caspian coastal state in the seabed and sub- seabed and put to future bilateral negotiations.

In other words, the convention only discusses surface water and since the convention has determined the baseline, Iran cannot determine its share in seabed and sub-seabed.

Of course, the Kazakhstan’s Aktau agreement calls for a revision of the previous bilateral agreements between 4other Caspian Sea states, which can be in Iran’s favor. The review not to be based on the length of the beaches, since the contracts of 1921 and 1940 were not based on the length of the coasts, but all the sea was reckoned as common. Therefore, Iran’s share in Seabed and sub- Seabed resources should be more than what is now mentioned in the Aktau convention. Accordingly, if there is a review in the agreement, it can make a revision in Iran’s right and share in the Caspian Sea. While, due to the ordinary practice that making any decision is based on bi-and-multilateral negotiations, bilateral agreements clinched between some coastal countries have led to the violation of Iran’s rights in the Caspian Sea.

“Taking dual role, unfriendly and sensitive-inducing of Russia in the issue as well as sharing method of seabed based on bilateral agreements with new adjacent neighbors is one of the most important reasons Iran encounters a crucial problem in the Caspian Sea whereof”, Mohsen Aminzadeh, former deputy for foreign minister of Iran during the presidency of Mohammad Khatami, believes. In reaction to Russia on dividing the resources of the Caspian sub-seabed without any coordination with Tehran, Iran announced that the final acceptance of the Caspian Sea enjoying joint ownership in the legal regime is conditional to determine the Caspian sub-seabed resources. This is while Iran for the first time formally abandoned the condition at the second meeting of the Caspian Sea in Tehran accepting the joint ownership of everything in the Caspian Sea but the sub-seabed tacitly.

Iran also accepted the crossing of the pipeline and energy transmission through the Caspian Sea in the Aktau agreement. This is while the crossing from Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan could have been done through Iran instead. Consequently, from one hand, Iran lost this opportunity and on the other hand, accepting the crossing of the pipeline through the Caspian Sea will have environmental risks. Regarding security issues, The Kazakhstan’s Aktau agreement says that the Caspian Sea is not a military one, resolving Iran and Russia’s concerns over the presence of NATO in the sea. Of course, the very issue was in the previous treaties, but it was discussed more extensively in the Kazakhstan Convention. So, foreign powers cannot run for any military and naval bases on the Caspian shore and making any threats against other coastal states.

Prior to the Aktau agreement, When Iran had any disagreement over the Caspian Sea, it relied on both historical background and the 1921 treaties with Russia and 1940 treaties with the Soviet Union. Iran has always put emphasis on this historical background making its status one of two historical claimants of the Caspian Sea. Iran ignored these two historical contracts in Aktau convention by giving them up in its text.

Earlier, during the formal declaration of Tehran Summit, being the first joint document of the five leaders, no reference was made to the above-mentioned historical background and contracts.

The President of Kazakhstan formally stated in his speech that the previous treaties over the Caspian Sea have become null and void making it deemed accepted indirectly by Iran’s silence.

The newly independent coastal states are not interested in the historical background of the Caspian Sea, so they are trying to forgo the historical claimants of the two countries -Iran and the Soviet Union. They are more willing to Institutionalize the trends of the five countries instead of the historical background, but this doesn’t justify Iran’s withdrawal from its substantiated claims on the Caspian Sea.

“Iran could at least register its own stance alone concerning the historical background of its claims on the Caspian Sea in Tehran Summit putting emphasis on it. Therefore, it is really unclear why such a negligence was made in spite of the great importance of these backgrounds over Iran’s endless legal disputes over the Caspian Sea.” Mohsen Aminzadeh, former deputy for foreign minister of Iran during the presidency of Mohammad Khatami, believes.

*Omid Shokri Kalehsar, Senior Energy Security Analyst

Ph.D Student of International relations in Islamic Azad niversity،Science and Research Branch (Iran) Visiting Fellow of the Persian Gulf Department in the Center for Middle East Studies

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International Law

Why International Institutions Survive: An Afterword to the G20 Summit

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Media Center G20 Indonesia/Prastyo Utomo/wsj/hd/22.

We, of course, are extremely critical of the very idea of global institutions and the prospects for their survival amid the emergence of a qualitatively new international order. Basic ideas about how such organisations appear and why they work, as well as the practical experience of the past decades, constantly demonstrate how unprepared such forms of interaction between states turn out to be to solve their most important hypothetical task — limiting selfish manifestations in the behaviour of their own creators. However, the institutions persist and, moreover, their number is increasing due to the formation of new specific regional platforms and global gatherings of powers, which is happening both formally and informally.

Just a few days ago, another G20 summit took place in Indonesia — a meeting of the 20 supposedly most developed powers. These economies first convened 13 years ago to discuss the fight against the global consequences of the financial crisis in Western countries. This association is not a formal international organisation, unlike the UN or the World Trade Organization, and does not have its own secretariat or specialised agencies. However, in its composition, the G20 has turned out to be one of the most promising institutional undertakings of the entire post-Cold War period.

The reason is that the G20, first, is quite objective in terms of participation criteria and, second, is completely non-democratic in terms of the formation of its membership. In the simplest terms, it was created by the leading powers of the West — the G7 countries — at a historical moment when they felt the need to make their decisions more legitimate, to gain a new way to influence growing economies, and, finally, share some of their own economic difficulties with the rest of the world not only in fact, but also organisationally.

Other countries of the world included in the G20 list compiled by the USA and Britain were glad to accept this invitation. First of all, because they saw an opportunity to limit the West’s monopoly on making the most important decisions, or, at least, to get new chances to reflect some of their interests there. Thus, both groups of participants made a very pragmatic choice amid circumstances where the West was still strong enough that no one could expect to survive without its consent.

The G20, as we can see, was created for special purposes in special circumstances, which, by the way, also applies to any international institution set up during the second half of the 20th and early 21st century. Even the United Nations (UN) was an intellectual creation of the United States and Britain, aimed to preserve and strengthen their influence on international affairs after the World War II. Another thing is that the UN still tried to live its own life, and now the presence of Russia and China in its “Areopagus”, i.e. among the permanent members of the Security Council, creates the appearance that the hypothetical pinnacle of world governance relatively adequately reflects the distribution of aggregate power capabilities. However, during the Cold War, as now, we see that all really important issues regarding war and peace are decided by the great powers among themselves.

As for the impact on the main processes in the world that emerged after the end of the Cold War, here it was the G20 that was considered a suitable palliative solution juxtaposed between the omnipotence of the West and the desire of the rest to get at least a part of the “pie” of the global distribution of goods. Moreover, 14 years ago, when the G20 began to meet, none of the major countries of the modern World Majority imagined a direct confrontation with the West and all sought to integrate into the globalisation led by it, even without a special revision of the rules and norms that existed there before. This fully applies to Russia, which quite sensibly assessed its strength. There were still five years left before the ambitious Xi Jingping came to power in China, when most observers considered the strengthening of Beijing’s economic and political proximity to be the most plausible scenario for Sino-American relations.

However, it was the financial crisis of 2008-2013 that turned out to be a turning point, from which everyone seemed to have realised that it is not necessary to count on the existing model of globalisation to solve the basic problems of development and economic growth. The cyclicality of economic development and the accumulated imbalances in trade, global finance and everything else made it clear that a return to sustainable growth in the US and Europe was unrealistic, and saving what had already been created would require a much tougher policy in relation to the distribution of benefits on a global scale. The emerging economies, of which China quickly took the lead, could expect a more sustainable position, but also doubted the West’s ability to act as a benevolent engine of the global economy. In other words, it was at the very moment when the G20 emerged as an institution that the leading states realised that it was no longer possible to save globalisation in its previous form, and economic shocks would very likely lead to violent geopolitical clashes.

Therefore, the extremely informal and, at the same time, representative G20 arose precisely as a mechanism for a “civilised divorce” of countries actively involved in globalisation on the eve of its inevitable crisis.

In this respect, it was indeed the pinnacle of the institutional approach to problem-solving that marked the entire 20th century. What follows should be either the formation of a new balance of power and the adaptation of institutions to it, or their complete disintegration with an unclear prospect for states going beyond bilateral agreements or relatively narrow regional associations and forums.

We see that the most successful multilateral projects of our time are either a continuation of those that have already taken place, like ASEAN or NATO, or completely new regional groupings with uncertain prospects and internal structures. The promising Shanghai Cooperation Organisation should be included among the latter. The latest SCO summit in Uzbekistan revealed that its participants were highly able to single out from the whole set of international problems of Eurasia and their own development issues those that make sense to discuss at the multilateral level. In addition, Sino-Russian leadership in the SCO leaves hope that other participating countries will be able to build their interests into the priorities and integrity limits of the two Eurasian giants. India only adds pluralism, allowing alternatives to the increasingly solidarity positions of Moscow and Beijing to be put forward.

However, the fact that the G20 is, in reality, a tool for the civilised dismantling of the existing order rather than their renewal does not mean its immediate death. After all, we already know examples where organisations created to “divorce” participants retain their vitality beyond solving the most important problems associated with this unpleasant process. The latest G20 summit was overshadowed by the desire of the Western countries, which, together with their satraps from the European Union institutions, make up the majority, to turn the political part of the meeting into a fight against Russia. However, at the same time, we saw that the Indonesian presidency used such intentions to increase its independence in world affairs and rejected all Western claims regarding Russian participation. In addition, an important personal meeting between the leaders of the United States and China took place on the sidelines of the summit, which allowed them to temporarily dispel the expectation of an inevitable clash, which seemed likely only three months ago.

Of course, we are far from thinking that China, India or other developing countries, not to mention Russia, see the G20 as a way to take global leadership away from the West. In Moscow, Beijing, New Delhi and other capitals, they know that those institutions that do not fully meet American interests are easily sacrificed to the current circumstances. However, first, such a radical US approach still has a chance to change under increasing pressure from outside and inside. Second, the G20 is still a platform that can survive as at least a club filled with contradictions, precisely amid the complete decline of formal global international institutions. And it looks like we won’t have to wait very long.

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Cooperation in a Changing World: A Discussion on New Regionalism and Globalisation

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The two main trends that have shaped the World Economic Order are 1) multilateralism, which sets global rules for international trade without favouritism, and 2) new regionalism, which sets up several zones of regional free trade and cooperation that can apply development and economic growth more quickly and flexibly but have a limited geographic scope.

Hettne (1995) says that “new regionalism” is not a single policy but a set of policies that focus on economics or other factors. “Regionalism” refers to a complex change process involving state and non-state actors at the global, regional, and national levels. Since actors and processes interact at many different levels and their relative importance changes over time and space, it is impossible to say which level is the most important (Soderbaun, 2001).

This article highlights the discussions between the experts on regional cooperation and integration and the supporters of multilateralism and globalisation. The objective is not to extend arguments that can be endless due to rich literature, however, it is to show the major points of contention that can lead to more research and discussions.

Gilson (2002) and other scholars argue that regionalism divides the international system into different and separated competitive blocks, despite arguments to the contrary from authors and analysts like Hettne (1998, 2005), Beeson (2009), and Dent (2004). Regionalism, especially forms of closed regionalism, acts as an obstacle on the path to globalisation (Dent, 2008).

Authors in the first category argue that globalisation and regionalism are not mutually exclusive concepts. Their reasoning rests on the GATT-WTO conception of regionalism and regionalisation as integral to and predating globalisation. As of 2022, the WTO had informed about 356 Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) in force (and its predecessor, the GATT), while several others are thought to be in effect but have yet to be reported (see: WTO, 2022 database).

 Regional trade liberalisation and cooperation arrangements have been considered important intermediate measures, enabling nations to cope with the risks and opportunities of the global market and embrace new multilateral regulations (Katzenstein, 1997). The developing tensions between economic regionalism and economic multilateralism directly result from the mutually reinforcing nature of regionalism and globalisation. As seen with the end of the Uruguay Round, when integration into the EU prompted some member states to adopt the GATT deal, and with NAFTA’s significant impact on the liberalisation of investments, regional cooperation can be a good stepping stone to an accessible international economy. According to Summers (1991), regionalism affects the multilateral international trade system and will increasingly serve as a driving factor towards liberalisation. Summers contends that regional liberalisation is the best approach towards liberalisation and globalisation.

In contrast, the second category of experts’ places greater emphasis on the notion that discriminatory regional and sub-regional accords are a response to globalisation. As an example, Bhagwati (1993) argues that protectionism, mercantilism and other regionalism delay global liberalisation and threaten the multilateral trading system. Bergsten (1997) says that the European Monetary Union (EMU) shows how it sets priorities that differ from those of the world. Furthermore, regional blocs can contribute to geo-economics conflicts, which may have political implications.

Three key issues are raised by those who want complete dependence on the multilateral approach (Bhagwati and Panagariya, 1996):

  1. Trade is diverted by regional cooperation.
  2. The distraction of attention.
  3. The geopolitical consequences of regionalism.

 First, they point out that trade is diverted by regional cooperation that provides members favourable treatment over non-members. Members may also profit from favourable policies and regulations for restricted content in addition to differential tariffs. According to opponents, the disadvantage of regional liberalisation can be more than overcome by the impact of preferences, resulting in a diversion of the trade balance.

Also, they are worried that transferring tariff revenues under a preferential arrangement could hurt the way one member’s income is split. The distraction of attention is the second point raised by critics. They say that if countries get involved in regional projects, they might lose interest in the multilateral system, which could stop its growth and possibly make it less effective.

The United States’ rapid change in trade policy since the early 1980s has drawn particular attention. The international system had previously received top attention from the United States. It declined to take part in regional economic integration. The main reasons the U.S. agreed to the creation and growth of European integration were political and security issues. The U.S. wanted to keep Europe safe and out of war.

The geopolitical consequences of regionalism are the third issue. Regional trade agreements (and economic groupings more generally) may have caused political and even military conflicts between governments in former times. While modern regionalist critics do not expect such severe results, analysts are concerned that close and intense regional links may cause aggravations and even conflicts that extend beyond economics to more generalised domains of global affairs.

Regionalism proponents hold opposing viewpoints on each of these topics (Bergsten, 1996). First, they contend that regional agreements advance free trade and multilateralism in at least two ways: first, that trade expansion has typically surpassed trade contraction, and second, that regional agreements support both domestic and global dynamics that increase rather than diminish the likelihood of global liberalisation. For developing nations, the internal dynamic is particularly crucial since regional agreements, which can be negotiated considerably more quickly than global accords, lock in domestic reforms against the possibility that succeeding governments will attempt to reverse them. Internationally, regional agreements frequently set the stage for liberalisation concepts that can then be broadly applied in the multilateral system.

Second, regionalism critics pointed out that it frequently has considerable, verifiable impacts. Regional integration will likely lead to further multilateral initiatives when officials, governments, and nations adapt to the liberalisation process.

Third, proponents of regionalism argue that it has had more positive than negative political consequences. Because of trade and closer economic cooperation, a new war between Germany and France was almost unthinkable in the European Union. Argentina and Brazil have used it to end their long-running rivalry, which has recently taken on nuclear implications.

APEC’s primary objectives include establishing the United States as a stabilising power in Asia and creating institutional ties between nations that were once adversaries, like Japan, China, and the rest of East Asia. Therefore, the potential of carrying up peace through cooperation is greater than the likelihood of generating conflicts.

Defenders of regionalism point out that regional agreements are permitted explicitly by Article 24 of the GATT and, more recently, the WTO, recognising their consistency with the global trading system. Three requirements must be met for these agreements to be effective:

  1. They must substantially encompass all trade between member nations;
  2. They must not erect new barriers for outsiders;
  3. They must accomplish free trade among members by a specific date (usually to be at most ten years from the starting date).

Although it is generally acknowledged that the most significant regional agreements (the EU and NAFTA) have fully or largely met these criteria, the GATT and WTO have been largely ineffective in certifying and overseeing their implementation. Because of this, the important regions have had many reasons to say that they work well with the multilateral system.

In conclusion, regionalism and globalism are linked, but only if the major countries involved in the process manage it well. History shows they can succeed if they try to improve things for both sides. The outcome in former eras shows that this is also reasonably achievable if they desire to pursue one at the expense of the other. The process’s inherent dynamics are sufficiently balanced for the participants’ policy choices to be decisive.

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International Law

Institution’s evolution

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As the human civilization is evolving, the institutions that were once very relevant and inevitable have been becoming archaic and irrelevant and alarmingly becoming deleterious if remain enacted and rigid. Standing mass armies is one of such institutions, which is losing its relevance that it once earned through conscription of human resource and extraction natural resources. With the emergence of democracy coupled with the dilution of borders by globalization, the armies have lost their stage and much eulogized roles as the defender, protector and invaders. The yardstick to measure the strength of any nation was their military’s might which has now been replaced with other well established indicators.

To shed light upon how and why the role of armies has been dwindled, we have to dive into the modern historical account of the events and reasons that once made the army inevitable and much desirable. As the raison d’etat for establishing the armies and galvanizing their influence   was to acquire the large swaths of land and the quantifiable amount of people to propel the engine of their state machine. Resultantly, the expanded territories were in dire need to be regulated and protected with the iron fist rule, which could not be done without strengthening armies.

Now the hitherto said aspirations have become obsolete and less desirable due to changing dimensions of a society as a whole thereby the military too. To give credence to these assertions it is adequate to allude towards the decline in the tendency of ragging the territorial acquisition wars specifically in the post peace era. Now there is no incentive to acquire the large latifundia or the large amount of people to be slave them as farm workers or to conscript them into armies.

As per the report of the freedom house, there were scant sixty-nine electoral democracies in 1990; today there are more than one hundred and fifteen electrical democracies, which are more than sixty percent. In recently emerged democracies, resultantly, the transition from the centrally planned economies to the economic liberalization spawned the era of entrepreneurship and innovation. Now these budding democracies have recently embarked on the journey towards more opportunities and rising incomes that remained chimera twenty years ago. To bolster this claim, the human security report is enough as it claims that state-based arm conflict has ebbed by 40 percent and which is waning the propensity of countries to wage a full-scale war.

Furthermore, well-established democratic peace theory hits the last nail in the coffin of the aspirations to reinvigorate the military might. The increasing number of democracies are less likely to wage a war with another democratic country, which in result declines the chances of war.

As initially claimed, the ab initio reasons of having standing armies have squarely been replaced; it comes naturally in mind what have replaced them. In a complex and entangled world woven with the fabric of trade, ideas, and innovations, the war-philic countries are the least fit for survival in the Darwinian sense. The countries who are doing wonders in the spheres of economy ideas, innovations inter alia services are less prone to war and aggression.

Many but naming few as the innovation, ideas, trade, and entrepreneurial tendencies have substituted the reasons, which once made the armies relevant and inevitable. Sweden, Norway, UK at the top of global innovation index 2021 and the countries deprived of bloated, mighty, and behemoth militaries, which are also circumscribed in the limited territories, are at the peak of ideas, prosperity, and innovation as compared to those who are bestowed upon with unassailable armies.

Ostensibly, after taking into account the recent shift in the reason of having large standing armies, it is now necessary to discuss about the nature of the future warfare which poses the threats, but here too while dealing with them make everyone wary of the institution of armies and militaries which are too rigid to abreast with the current dynamic nature of warfare, resultantly, they have to bear the brunt of their rigidity everywhere.

Therefore, the Character of the future warfare is dramatically changing which incorporates the novel means to materialize the desired and often mischievous aspirations. In this regard, hybrid warfare is one emerging character, which includes a diverse variety of activities and instruments to destabilize the society, which surely would be desirable for its user. These instruments are like interfering in the electoral processes in which the adversaries can influence the outcome of the electoral processes in the direction, which benefit the adversaries’ political aspirations – Putin’s interference in Trump’s election campaign and Cambridge analytica.

Other instruments are disinformation and false news, Cyber-attacks, and financial influence. Which all of them have already been employing in different dimensions and scales. In this domain, Russia is employing all of these instruments with great dexterity. To better deal with such recent emerging means and tools, it has become a need of hour to introduce the more integrated and sophisticated ways to deal with hybrid warfare and to replace the rigid, archaic and obsolete militarily solutions. In doing so, fostering democracy, inclusion of civil society investment in media literacy are few but viable solutions.

Succinctly, the justifications for raising the large armies, which were to expand the territories, to slave the people or to protect the volatile boundaries, have recently been replaced or become obsolete and irrelevant. Therefore, this institution should be abreast its pace with the dynamic and changing character of the threats posing the great dangers. Moreover, the gauge to quantify the power of any country has resultantly been changed from the strength of armies to the innovation, ideas, entrepreneurial spirit, trade, and socio economic and socio political stability. Contemporarily, it has become futile to strengthen and increase the sizes of armies, which have already lost their relevance, conversely, the changing Character of warfare or better known as hybrid warfare, demands more.

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The challenges lie ahead Ankara’s decision to normalize relations with Cairo and Damascus

Although Egypt and Syria are at the bottom of the list of states with which Turkey intends to reconcile, the...

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Terrorism2 hours ago

Terrorist Upsurge in Taliban’s Afghanistan: Regimes, Attacks and the Concerns of Neighbors

The U.S. undersecretary of defence for policy, Dr. Colin Kahl had wisely predicted in October 2021, that a possible resurgence...

South Asia4 hours ago

The Dragon’s Perception Creation and Passivity: A Never-ending Bottleneck

Vijay Gokhale, The Long Game: How The Chinese Negotiate With India ( Penguin Vintage , 2021) Multiple divergences have shaped...

Economy6 hours ago

Explainer: African Leaders Should Accelerate Industrialization Without Short-Haircut Processes

At the end of their four-day deliberations, African leaders and participants have issued a joint statement relating to the future...

East Asia7 hours ago

A review of popular unrest in China in light of the ongoing anti-lockdown protests

Late 1970s saw the Chinese people standing up to exercise their right to dissent for the first time since the...

Defense12 hours ago

Internet of Military Things (IoMT) and the Future of Warfare

The Internet of Military Things (IoMT) is a class of heterogeneously connected devices employed for future warfare. It has wide...

Americas16 hours ago

The Silicon Valley’s ‘Code Peasants’ and ‘Code Overlords’

The most numerous tech workers in Silicon Valley would be programmers. Their stereotypical image was keeping their heads down, busy...

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