Last August the Libyan Investment Authority (LIA) moved its Tripoli’s offices to the now famous Tripoli Tower.
The traditional financial institution of Gaddafi’s regime currently manages approximately 67 billion US dollars, most of which are frozen due to the UN sanctions.
Said sanctions shall be gradually removed and replaced with a system of market controls, as the Libyan economy finds its way.
Right now that, after intimidation and serious and often armed threats, LIA has moved to the safer Tripoli Tower.
However, how was LIA established and, above all, what is it today? The Fund, which has some characteristics typical of the oil countries’ sovereign funds, was created in 2006, just as the EU and US economic and trade sanctions against Gaddafi’s regime were slowly being lifted.
The idea underlying the operation was simple and rational, just like the one that had long pushed Norway to create the Government Pension Fund Global, i.e. using the oil profits to avoid the post-energy crisis in Libya and preserve the living standards of the good times.
Hence investing in its post-oil future using the huge surplus generated by the crude oil sales.
From the beginning, LIA had to manage a portfolio of over 65 billion US dollars, but with three policy lines: firstly, 30 billion dollars to be invested in bonds and hedge funds; secondly, business finance and thirdly, the temporary liquidity secured in the Central Bank of Libya and in the Libyan Foreign Bank.
The funds of those two banks soon acquired a value equal to 60% of all LIA assets.
All the companies having relations with foreign markets, from Libya, fell within the scope of the Libyan Investment Fund.
Currently LIA has over 552 subsidiaries.
Nevertheless, there are no documents proving it with certainty. To date there are not even archives that credibly corroborate the LIA budgets and statistics.
Since 2012 it has not even undergone any auditing activity.
There were and there are no strategies for allocating investments nor a plan. The only criterion followed by the Fund managers – now as in the past – is to invest the maximum sums of money in the shortest lapse of time.
The first serious audit was finally carried out by KPMG in June 2011, in the heat of the battle for the survival of Gaddafi’s regime.
At the time, high-risk derivatives transactions were worth as much as 35% of LIA’s total investments – which was incredible for the other global funds.
According to the most secret but reliable sources, however, in 2009 the losses of the Libyan Fund exceeded 2.4 billion US dollars.
What happened, however, in 2011, after the collapse of Gaddafi’s regime? How did LIA and the Libyan African Investment Portfolio (LAIP) act?
In fact, neither company could carry out any operations.
In 2014 alone, LIA’s losses were at least 721 million US dollars.
Moreover, LAIP still holds in its portfolio the Libyan Arab African Investment Company (LAICO), which manages investments – particularly in the real estate sector – in 19 African countries, with specific related companies in Guinea Bissau, Chad and Liberia.
Furthermore, Oil-Libya still operates as a network manager and extractor in at least 18 African countries.
On top of it, the Libyan Fund still owns Rascom Star, a satellite and telephone network connecting much of rural Africa.
Within LAIP there is also FM Capital Partners LTD, another real estate Fund.
Nevertheless, as early as the collapse of Gaddafi’s regime, the internal policy lines of LIA and of the other companies separated: 50% of managers wanted to continue the activity according to the classic rules of the Company’s Management, while the others thought they should mainly follow the new political equilibria within Libya.
The last audit carried out by Deloitte also demonstrated that the over 550 subsidiaries were the real problem of the Fund.
Deloitte also assessed that at least 40% of those companies were completely uneconomic and had to be sold quickly.
In this bunch of lame ducks there were, for example, the eight refineries – one of which managed by Oil invest in Switzerland – which also paid penalties to the Swiss government for obvious environmental reasons.
Allegedly the refinery in Switzerland stopped its activities in 2017.
The traditional investment line of the Libyan Arab Foreign Investment Company (LAFICO) has always been linked to LIA, which currently has over 160 billion US dollars avaialble, including oil, personal income and old foreign investment of Colonel Gaddafi, once again only partially reported to international authorities.
Moreover, according to the LIA managers of the time, the various companies within the Fund did not communicate one another and hence their strategies overlapped.
And the same held true for the interests of their different political offspring.
Moreover, in 2011 an old independent audit showed that the losses before the sanctions that preceded the uprisings amounted to approximately 3.1 billion US dollars.
Gaddafi’s regime started to collapse – a regime which, according to the international narrative, had allegedly accumulated all the money taken by LIA and its subsidiaries.
Obviously this is not true – exactly as it is not true that the “deficit” in Italy’s public finances before the “Bribesville” scandal was caused only by the greed and voracity of the ruling class.
In the countries where there is a destructive psywar and an offensive economic war, these are now the usual models.
It is not by chance that on December 16, 2011 the UN Security Council lifted the specific sanctions against the Central Bank of Libya and the Libyan Foreign Bank (which is not LAFICO) because they had supported the uprisings against Colonel Gaddafi.
In 2014 LIA initiated legal proceedings against Goldman Sachs, which cost it 1.2 billion US dollars, with a bonus for the intermediary bank of 350 million dollars.
The proceedings ended in 2016 and the British judges decided in favour of Goldman Sachs that was entitled to a compensation amounting to one million US dollars.
There was also another legal action brought against Société Générale, which had started in 2014 and later ended with LIA’s partial defeat.
As to the 2018 national budget, for example, the Central Bank of Libya has envisaged the amount of 42,511 billion dinars, broken down as follows: 24.5 for salaries and wages; 6.5 billion dollars for petrol subsidies and 6.7 billion dollars for “other expenses”.
On average the dinar exchange rate is 1.3 as against the dollar, but it is much lower on the black market.
And public spending is all for subsidies and salaries. Very little is spent for welfare – that was Colonel Gaddafi’s asset for gaining consensus. Social wellbeing can be achieved with good stability of oil prices and revenues, which is certainly not the case now.
Moreover, General Haftar militarily conquered the oil sites of the Libyan “oil crescent” on June 14, 2018, after having held back the attacks of the Petroleum Defence Guards of Ibrahim Jadhran, the commander of the force protecting the oil wells and facilities.
According to General Haftar, the condition for reopening wells, as well as storage and transport sites, was the replacement of the Governor of the Central Bank of Libya, Siddiq al-Kabir, with his candidate, namely Mohammad al-Shukri.
Siddiq al-Kabir stated that the Central Bank of Libya has lost 48 billion dinars over the last 4 years and rejected the appointment – formally made by the Tobruk-based Parliament – of his successor, al-Shukri.
Moreover, Siddiq al-Kabirhas also been accused of having pocketed a series of Libyan public funds abroad.
Later General Haftar attacked the Central Bank of Libya in Benghazi to collect funds for the salaries of his soldiers.
Hence the current Libyan financial tension lies in the link between banks and oil revenues – two highly problematic situations, both in al-Serraj’s and in the Benghazi governments, as well as in General Khalifa Haftar’s ranks.
It is certainly no coincidence that the Presidential Council decided to impose a 183% tax on currency transactions with banks.
In addition, taxation was introduced on the goods imported by companies before the current tax reform, which is linked to the reform of the allocation of basic commodities to the Libyan population.
The idea is to stabilize prices and hence make the exchange rate between the dinar and the dollar acceptable, which is another root cause of the economic crisis.
The Libyan citizens often demonstrate in front of bank branches, which are constantly undergoing a liquidity crisis. Prices are out of control and the instability of exchange rates harms also oil transactions, as can be easily imagined.
Nevertheless, even the area controlled by the Tobruk-based Parliament and General Haftar’s Forces is not in a better situation.
In fact, Eastern Libya’s banking authorities have already put their banknotes and coins into circulation, which are already partly used and were printed and minted in Russia.
Pursuant to al-Serraj’s decision of May 2016, said banknotes are accepted in the Tripoli area.
Four billion dinars, with the face of Colonel Gaddafi portrayed on them, and of the same dark colour as copper.
According to the most reliable sources, the reserves of the Central Bank of Libya in Bayda – the city hosting the Central Bank of Eastern Libya – are still substantial: 800 million dinars, 60 million euros and 80 million dollars.
Not bad for an area destroyed by war.
Obviously the simple division into two of the Central Bank – of which only the Tripoli branch is internationally recognized – is the root cause of the terrible Weimar-style devaluation of the Libyan dinar, which, as always happens, they try to patch up with the artificial scarcity of the money in circulation.
As Schumpeter taught us, this does not solve the problem, but shifts it to real goods and services, thus increasing their artificial scarcity and hence their cost.
Meanwhile, the economic situation shows some signs of improvement, considering that the 2017 data and statistics point to total revenues (again only for Tripoli’s government) equal to 22.23 billion dinars, of which 19.2 billion dinars of oil exports; 845 million dinars of taxes; 164 million dinars of customs duties, above all on oil, and 2.1 billion dinars of remaining revenue.
At geopolitical level, however, the tendency to Libya’s partition – which would be a disaster also for oil consumers and, above all, for the Libyan economy, considering that the oil crescent is halfway between the two opposing States – is de facto the prevailing one.
Egypt openly supports General Khalifa Haftar and the tribes helping him.
The Gharyan tribe and many other major ones, totalling 140, now support the Benghazi Government, since at the beginning of clashes, they had often been affiliated to Tripoli and its Government of National Accord.
Tunisia has always tried to reach a very difficult neutral position.
Algeria strongly fears the intrusion of the Emirates’ and Qatar’s Turkish intelligence services into the Libyan economic, oil and political context, but it endeavours above all to limit the Egyptian pressure to the East.
The European powers support General Haftar- with France that, as early as the first inter-Libyan fights, sent him the Brigade Action of its intelligence services. Conversely, Italy is rebuilding its special relationship with al-Serraj’s government – like the one it had with Gaddafi – but with recent openings to General Haftar.
If we want to reach absolute equivalence between the parties, we must avoid doing foreign policy.
Great Britain and the United States tend to quickly withdraw from the Libyan region, thus avoiding to make choices and not tackling the economic and social crisis that could trigger again a war, with the jihad still playing the lion’s share and precisely in the oil crescent.
The United States should not believe that its great oil autonomy, which also pushes it to sell its natural gas abroad, can exempt it from developing a policy putting an end to the unfortunate phase of the “Arab Springs” it had started – of which Gaddafi’s fall is an essential part.
Currently the Libyan production share is around 1% of the total OPEC production.
Everyone is preparing for the significant increase of the oil barrel price, which is expected to reach almost 100 US dollars in the coming months.
If this happened – and it will certainly happen – the Libyan economy could be even safe, but certainly corruption and the overlapping of two financial administrations and two central banks, as well as political insecurity, could still stop Libya’s economic growth.
Hence, for the next international conference scheduled in Palermo for November 12-13, we would need a common economic and financial policy line of all non-Libyan participants to be submitted to both local governments.
Probably General Haftar will not participate – as stated by a member of the Tobruk-based Parliament – but certainly Putin will not participate.
The presence of Mike Pompeo is taken for granted, but probably also the Russian Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, will participate.
Certainly the Italian diplomacy focused only on “Europe” has lost much of the sheen that has characterized it in Africa and the Middle East.
Meanwhile, we could start with a working proposal on the Libyan economy.
For example, a) a European audit for all Libyan state-run companies of both sides.
Later b) the definition of a New Dinar, of which the margin of fluctuation with the dollar, the Euro and the other major international currencies should be established.
Some observers should also be involved, such as China.
Furthermore, an independent authority should be created, which should be accountable to the Libyan governments, but also to the EU, on the public finances of the two Libyan governments.
Assessing the trends of Globalization in the Covid Era
Coronavirus largely represents acceleration in existing globalization trends, rather than a full paradigm shift.
Globalization has ebbed and flowed over the years, but the event panelists agreed that the 2007-08 global financial crash marked a turning point and kicked off a trend “slowbalization”. Falling income, increasing unemployment and inequality proved fertile ground for the rise of nationalism and anti-immigration rhetoric. One of the most potential shifts towards domestic production, which is well underway before corona virus, can accelerate, as rising barriers to the free movement of goods, people and capital that underpin globalization. Technology is at the heart of this unilateralism. In the past two decades, we have seen a shift in the global economy, from a reliance on tangible to intangible assets such as software, which does not require complex supply chains. The rise of artificial intelligence could also displace cheap labor and drive restoring in advanced economies. COVID-19 lockdowns have only accelerated such digitization. Another rise in populism could be on the horizon as well, the whitepaper noted, as millions of people around the world are plunged into poverty. And the reputation of international organizations such as the World Health Organization has been weakened, which may further reduce global cooperation.
Compounding this is the deterioration in US-China relations and an escalating trade war. The resulting uncertainty is delaying companies’ investment decisions and curbing the global capital flows which are a key pillar of globalization.
It will categorize the globe in losers and winners. The most successful countries in the near future are likely to be those that can generate social consensus on policies; small economies that are protected by nearby large markets like China or Europe; and countries with strong public finances that can prop up their domestic economy, such as Switzerland. Exporting countries that cannot rely on domestic markets will be the big losers, such as India and many African nations. Oil exporting countries may also run into trouble because of growing sustainability concerns. So-called green policies will become a key differentiator for countries, as will taxation to finance the post-pandemic recovery.
Globalization has proved to be game changer for whole world in terms of mobility of people resources and capital; flow of people and resources has also made the flow of diseases especially viral diseases through global interconnectedness. Since the occurrence of Covid-19 on December 2019 in China, the world has totally changed and it has left strong impacts on global security as states have faced many challenges in health, domestic and economic sector. The Corona virus was reported in China initially and later due to free movement of people across borders and lack of availability of knowledge on its symptoms and causes it spread to almost all over the world and hit the states from highly developed states to least developed states and alarmed the Global Health and Security.
According to World Health Organization, the total number of covid cases registered is 162773940 and 3375573 people died due to Corona. The pandemic has also posed a great impact on health care systems and huge burden on world economy and social set-up and contributed to the shift in Globalization trends.
Although globalization has ensured economic and cultural growth in recent past but as mobility of people across borders become easier, the spread of diseases also became easier as the bubonic plague was transmitted from China to Europe through trade routes and influenza pandemic spread during WW1 due to movement of armies and Asian flu of 1957 was spread via land and sea travel. Hence, the phenomenon of globalization has amplified global transmission of diseases and there is link of how the close integration of people and flow of trade and commerce also causes disease transmission. The year 2019 proved to be fatal for whole world as novel coronavirus (SARS-Cov-2) observed in Wuhan city of China spread so rapidly that in March, 2020 WHO declared COVID-19 as pandemic and by October 2020, over 41 million confirmed cases and 1.13 million deaths have reported worldwide. The lockdown measures adopted by states to counter the spread of virus during the global pandemic in has not only impacted our livelihood but also affected economy in terms of supply and demand as market places were closed most of the time and decelerated the economic growth of affected countries which reduced trade and increased poverty. As with all forms of volatility, there are both losers and winners as discussed above, and the case of COVID-19 is no different. While globalization may be negatively impacted in the form of the trade of goods and certain services such as travel, other sectors may experience heightened demand. More remote forms of work will only spur on the cross-border flow of data and of dispersed but easily exchanged professional services. As such, not only the suppliers of these services but also the enablers such as Zoom and broadband providers will be the beneficiaries.
Moreover, the low and middle income countries like Pakistan have faced a collapse in health care systems. The lockdowns and restricted movement has put pressure on transportation systems resulting in loss of income, disruption of global trading and halt of tourism sector, decrease in production, consumption, employment and supply chain. Globally centralized supply chains in low labor-cost countries are also being challenged by the increased use of robotics and automation, allowing firms to keep production in relatively expensive countries. COVID-19 has highlighted the importance of automation, as the threat to operations posed by “non-essential” business closures is based on the need to keep people at home. As such, operations that leverage robotics will be less affected. Ironically, among those countries that have weathered this pandemic the best are many with high levels of robotics usage such as South Korea.
Moreover, unemployment has become major issue with 14% decline in jobs related to industry. Moreover, globally over 140 million people are estimated to face extreme poverty along with food insecurity. Along with economic system, countries with active corona cases are vulnerable like Ireland, UK, and Italy despite having good health care facilities. In African continent, the countries that are more vulnerable are South Africa and Egypt, In Europe, Germany, Russia and Italy are more vulnerable and in Asia and Oceania, Pakistan, India and Saudi Arabia and Turkey and in America Brazil, Chile, USA, Mexico and Peru. The Covid came in three different waves and posed more challenge for states like India where the whole health system collapsed and people were helpless.
In Addition to Health care system and economy, the education sector has been affected too mostly in developing and under-developing states. For example, initially when the schools, colleges and universities were closed the students as well as teachers couldn’t adapt immediately to online mode and that made it difficult to acquire quality education. Moreover, the states like Pakistan where internet availability is limited and there are many household that lack access to internet especially rural areas, education could not be provided through online mode. Although the studies at University level continued through online mode, but primary and secondary education sector were severely affected. And this is clear , that the learning acquired by attending institutions and learning at home through online mode are very different and the later requires self-regulation that is very less in today’s youth who have various other distractions in terms of electronic gadgets, social media and mobile phones.
COVID became a global issue in past two years and all the states and international organizations were active to cooperate and spread awareness and adopted measures that could halt its spread. It affected all states and posed challenges on economy, health, education and has exposed the urgent need to revisit disaster preparedness and health care systems as health care capacity of powerful nations have been tested during pandemic. The developed states like US have faced difficulties in controlling the spread of epidemic and less developed have been further unable to respond to and control the situation. The Covid has not only posed challenges to economic and health system but the trends of globalization have also shifted. The states adopted counter strategies where institutions were closed, lockdowns were implemented, travel banned and people have to restrict movement.
In short, Covid has been and still is a challenge that states are facing and all states and international organizations have cooperated to fight this evil through research on its causes and effects. The Global community has been successful to produce vaccine that will control the spread of Corona in future and generate immunity for Virus among people. The fight against corona is still there and future hold secrets of this Global Virus that has changed the whole global structure and posed challenge to developed and under developed sates equally as no one was prepared for this deadly outbreak.
We are shifting to a new model of globalization that is more localized, focused on services, less capital and energy intensive. Globalization will survive in the COVID-era, but it will look vastly different.
How has Russia’s economy fared in the pandemic era?
Authors: Apurva Sanghi, Samuel Freije-Rodriguez, Nithin Umapathi
COVID-19 continues to upturn our lives and disrupt economic activity across the world. The World Bank estimates that well over 100 million people would be pushed into extreme poverty by the end of this year alone. Global food insecurity is on the rise, and the pandemic is expected to leave long-term scars, world over. How has Russia’s economy fared in the global “pandemic-onium”? What about jobs, food prices, and poverty?
First, the economy. In our most recent World Bank Russia Economic Report, we examine how Russia’s GDP fell by 3% in 2020 compared to larger contractions of 3.8% in the world economy, 5.4% in advanced economies and 4.8% in most commodity-exporting economies. Several factors helped Russia perform relatively better. Well-known ones are Russia’s sizeable fiscal buffers and supportive monetary policy. This allowed for a substantial countercyclical fiscal response (about 4.5 percent of GDP, on par with benchmark countries). Lesser-known factors, perhaps, are a relatively small services sector and a large public sector that buffered against unemployment.
Russia’s pre-pandemic advances in digitization also paid off and enabled Russian society to operate reasonably effectively during lockdowns. And closer and growing ties to a relatively fast-growing China, stabilization in new COVID-19 cases, loosening of OPEC+ production cuts – all helped. Indeed, the economic recovery is gathering pace — and with all the caveats of uncertainty around the evolution of the pandemic – we now project Russia’s GDP to grow at 3.2% in 2021 and 2022.
Second, when it comes to jobs, although employment remains below pre-pandemic levels, the labor market is improving. The unemployment rate in March 2021 was 5.4%, down from 6.4% in last August. Interestingly, most jobs were created in the informal sector: about 828,000 in the 2nd half of 2020. Job losses have not been the same across economic activities. Total losses of 1.78 million jobs were concentrated in four sectors: manufacturing, construction, retail and hospitality, and health/social services.
Job losses in manufacturing, construction, and retail and hospitality can be explained by the lockdown measures and the difficulty of tele-work in these sectors. However, the fall of employment in health and social services during a pandemic, is more difficult to explain. It could be because of increased mental and physical fatigue of health workers, increased infections in this segment of the workforce, or the fall in employment in social care facilities (including the private ones), which were hit by the pandemic.
Third, turning to food prices, both cyclical and structural factors are behind the rise for items such as sugar and eggs. Higher global demand, global supply disruptions due to bad weather, and lower domestic harvest such as for sugar crops and oilseeds, along with the sizeable ruble depreciation last year, have contributed to this rise. Structural factors stem from the 2014 food embargo, which reduced competition in the domestic market, as domestic production has been unable to respond fully to demand.
At the same time, short-term (cyclical) policy responses to rising food prices have been geared towards export restrictions such as bans, quotas, tariffs, and price caps and subsidies. While politically attractive, and administratively easily implementable, these measures are economically distortive. A recent Higher School of Economics study found that consumer losses amounted to 2000 rubles per Russian citizens, each year, with the beneficiaries being Russian producers and non-sanctioned importers, such as Belarus. Moreover, it is the low-income families and poor who are disproportionately affected by food price increases, as they spend nearly half of their income on food. Therefore, a better approach to help those most affected by food insecurity would be to improve the targeting of Russia’s social safety nets in order to reduce food insecurity and poverty.
Finally, this brings us to poverty.
Russia has admirably contained additional spikes in the COVID-19 induced poverty rate. This success, in large part, is due to various compensatory social policies, such as the increase in unemployment benefits, child allowances, and support to single parent families. With the economic recovery now gathering pace, and assuming effective implementation of announced policies, we forecast Russia’s poverty rate by end-year 2021 to decline to 11.4 from the pre-pandemic poverty rate of 12.3%. However, double-digit poverty remains stubbornly high, and strong growth will play an important role in achieving Russia’s goal of halving it by 2030.
That being said, we believe that growth will not be enough – it will need to be complemented by a social safety net system that is more scalable and inclusive (the current welfare system transfers around only 10% of the total social assistance budget to the poor). Successful implementation of Russia’s strategic directive (Послание Президента Федеральному Собранию) will also require a safety net capable of addressing the complex financial, health, labor market and long-term care needs of the poor and vulnerable.
A concrete example of how a scalable and inclusive safety net could be weaved is through a national program, which aids people who fall below the poverty threshold. They would be provided with an income-gap-filling payment combined with incentives to graduate them out of poverty through labor activation support. With many caveats, such as excellent targeting, we estimate the lower-bound cost of such a program to be around 0.3% of GDP. As Russian policymakers tackle the goal of halving poverty, at least based on our analysis, accomplishing this laudable goal is within reach.
First appeared in the print version of the Kommersant newspaper via World Bank
Is Bangladesh falling into a China’s Debt-Trap Like Sri-Lanka?
Bangladesh is the second highest investment destination for China in South Asia. Referring to the incident of Sri Lanka, lease of Hambantota port by China, critics say that greater dependency of Bangladesh on China will make the country a victim of Chinese debt-trap. Is Bangladesh really going to be a victim of China’s debt-trap?
Bangladesh reached lower-middle-income country status in 2015. Bangladesh has met, for the second time, all the three criteria for graduating from the Least Developed Country (LDC) and if everything goes right, will finally be graduated in 2026.
Sri Lanka became middle income country in 1997. The country is facing economic downturn due to wrong economic policies. Recently, Bangladesh has agreed to lend $200 million to debt-ridden Sri Lanka which is struggling to maintain a moderate foreign exchange reserve. Undoubtedly, it is matter of pride for Bangladesh. At the same time, Bangladesh should take lessons from Sri Lanka for upcoming days to avoid unexpected economic crisis.
Bangladesh and Sri Lanka have similar economic weak point. In both countries, the Tax-GDP ratio is not at expected percentage. The economy of both countries depends on a single product, for example- Bangladesh’s economy is dependent on RMG and Sri Lankan economy is dependent on tourism industry. The good news for Bangladesh is that, though Sri Lanka is struggling with its economy but Bangladesh has enough time to confront the upcoming challenges.
The benefits, such as lowest interest rate; longer grace period, that Bangladesh receives as a LDC from different donor organizations like World Bank (WB), International Monetary Fund (IMF), Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) etc. will be available till 2027. Now donor agencies like WB, IMF etc. lend Bangladesh with 2% interest rate. These loans have very long tenure, 25-40 years, and the grace period is almost 10-12 years. After 2027, Bangladesh will have to pay higher interest rate.
As Sri Lanka is a middle-income country, it has to pay higher interest rate and gets lower grace period for the loan from donor agencies. Besides, Sri Lanka also borrows from international market through bonds with almost 6 percent interest rate. According to the Central Bank of Sri Lanka, the loan borrowed by Sri Lanka through Sovereign bond was almost 50% of its total external debt.
There are sharp differences between the loans from Donor agencies and loans through Sovereign bonds. Donor agencies offer loans with low interest rates and long tenure. They also come with flexible terms and conditions such as grace periods of around 10-12 years. When the grace period matures, the repayment takes place for next 30-40 years. On the other hand, loans through bonds come with high interest rates, short tenure and no grace periods. Generally, these loans have to be paid within 10 years and the interests are also payable from day one.
Bangladesh needs precise plans for its graduation journey from LDC to Developing country. Plans are also crucial for post-graduation phase for proper implementation of development projects. Otherwise, Bangladesh may also have to face economic crisis like Sri Lanka in near future.
There is a common misconception that Bangladesh is burdened with foreign loans. But the reality begs to differ. According to Economic Relations Department’s (ERD) ‘Flow of External Resources into Bangladesh’ report, in 2019-20 fiscal years, total external debt outstanding of Bangladesh was USD 4409.51 Crore which is equal to BDT 3,74,898.35 crore in local currency. According to this figure, the per capita loan is BDT 23,425 considering the total population as 16 crores.
According to IMF and World Bank’s Standard, it is only dangerous for an economy if its external debts exceed 40% of GDP. Currently, Bangladesh’s total external debts is less than 15% of GDP which is far from danger mark. Interestingly, USA has the world’s largest external debt which is almost 102% of its GDP. However, the country’s economy is still vibrant because of the strength of US dollar.
There is propaganda against Bangladesh that, it is burdened with Chinese soft loans and soon the consequences will be like Sri Lanka. External debts are mostly used in Bangladesh to cover the budget shortage. In current fiscal year, Bangladesh has taken 38% from World Bank, 24.5% from Asian Development Bank, 17% from Japan, 3% from China and 1% from India as external debt. Bangladesh has taken 80% of total external debt from WB, ADB and JICA.
In 2016, Bangladesh and China transformed their bilateral relations to ‘Strategic Partnership’. In the recent time, like other parts of Asia, Chinese funding is also rising rapidly in South Asia. This has created a good opportunity for fast growing economies like Bangladesh as Chinese Development Finances (DFIs) are offering alternative sources of loans. Chinese DFIs are also creating a competitive and sustainable alternative funding source for Bangladesh since now other countries like India and Japan are also focusing on providing flexible conditions while financing Bangladesh. Based on the analysis, it can be concluded that the propaganda that Bangladesh is going to fall in the Chinese debt-trap is nothing but a myth.
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