Economy

Restructuring Libya’s finance and economy

Published

5 years ago

October 22, 2018

Last August the Libyan Investment Authority (LIA) moved its Tripoli’s offices to the now famous Tripoli Tower.

The traditional financial institution of Gaddafi’s regime currently manages approximately 67 billion US dollars, most of which are frozen due to the UN sanctions.

Said sanctions shall be gradually removed and replaced with a system of market controls, as the Libyan economy finds its way.

Right now that, after intimidation and serious and often armed threats, LIA has moved to the safer Tripoli Tower.

However, how was LIA established and, above all, what is it today? The Fund, which has some characteristics typical of the oil countries’ sovereign funds, was created in 2006, just as the EU and US economic and trade sanctions against Gaddafi’s regime were slowly being lifted.

The idea underlying the operation was simple and rational, just like the one that had long pushed Norway to create the Government Pension Fund Global, i.e. using the oil profits to avoid the post-energy crisis in Libya and preserve the living standards of the good times.

Hence investing in its post-oil future using the huge surplus generated by the crude oil sales.

From the beginning, LIA had to manage a portfolio of over 65 billion US dollars, but with three policy lines: firstly, 30 billion dollars to be invested in bonds and hedge funds; secondly, business finance and thirdly, the temporary liquidity secured in the Central Bank of Libya and in the Libyan Foreign Bank.

The funds of those two banks soon acquired a value equal to 60% of all LIA assets.

All the companies having relations with foreign markets, from Libya, fell within the scope of the Libyan Investment Fund.

Currently LIA has over 552 subsidiaries.

Nevertheless, there are no documents proving it with certainty. To date there are not even archives that credibly corroborate the LIA budgets and statistics.

Since 2012 it has not even undergone any auditing activity.

There were and there are no strategies for allocating investments nor a plan. The only criterion followed by the Fund managers – now as in the past – is to invest the maximum sums of money in the shortest lapse of time.

The first serious audit was finally carried out by KPMG in June 2011, in the heat of the battle for the survival of Gaddafi’s regime.

At the time, high-risk derivatives transactions were worth as much as 35% of LIA’s total investments – which was incredible for the other global funds.

According to the most secret but reliable sources, however, in 2009 the losses of the Libyan Fund exceeded 2.4 billion US dollars.

What happened, however, in 2011, after the collapse of Gaddafi’s regime? How did LIA and the Libyan African Investment Portfolio (LAIP) act?

In fact, neither company could carry out any operations.

In 2014 alone, LIA’s losses were at least 721 million US dollars.

Moreover, LAIP still holds in its portfolio the Libyan Arab African Investment Company (LAICO), which manages investments – particularly in the real estate sector – in 19 African countries, with specific related companies in Guinea Bissau, Chad and Liberia.

Furthermore, Oil-Libya still operates as a network manager and extractor in at least 18 African countries.

On top of it, the Libyan Fund still owns Rascom Star, a satellite and telephone network connecting much of rural Africa.

Within LAIP there is also FM Capital Partners LTD, another real estate Fund.

Nevertheless, as early as the collapse of Gaddafi’s regime, the internal policy lines of LIA and of the other companies separated: 50% of managers wanted to continue the activity according to the classic rules of the Company’s Management, while the others thought they should mainly follow the new political equilibria within Libya.

The last audit carried out by Deloitte also demonstrated that the over 550 subsidiaries were the real problem of the Fund.

Deloitte also assessed that at least 40% of those companies were completely uneconomic and had to be sold quickly.

In this bunch of lame ducks there were, for example, the eight refineries – one of which managed by Oil invest in Switzerland – which also paid penalties to the Swiss government for obvious environmental reasons.

Allegedly the refinery in Switzerland stopped its activities in 2017.

The traditional investment line of the Libyan Arab Foreign Investment Company (LAFICO) has always been linked to LIA, which currently has over 160 billion US dollars avaialble, including oil, personal income and old foreign investment of Colonel Gaddafi, once again only partially reported to international authorities.

Moreover, according to the LIA managers of the time, the various companies within the Fund did not communicate one another and hence their strategies overlapped.

And the same held true for the interests of their different political offspring.

Moreover, in 2011 an old independent audit showed that the losses before the sanctions that preceded the uprisings amounted to approximately 3.1 billion US dollars.

Gaddafi’s regime started to collapse – a regime which, according to the international narrative, had allegedly accumulated all the money taken by LIA and its subsidiaries.

Obviously this is not true – exactly as it is not true that the “deficit” in Italy’s public finances before the “Bribesville” scandal was caused only by the greed and voracity of the ruling class.

In the countries where there is a destructive psywar and an offensive economic war, these are now the usual models.

It is not by chance that on December 16, 2011 the UN Security Council lifted the specific sanctions against the Central Bank of Libya and the Libyan Foreign Bank (which is not LAFICO) because they had supported the uprisings against Colonel Gaddafi.

In 2014 LIA initiated legal proceedings against Goldman Sachs, which cost it 1.2 billion US dollars, with a bonus for the intermediary bank of 350 million dollars.

The proceedings ended in 2016 and the British judges decided in favour of Goldman Sachs that was entitled to a compensation amounting to one million US dollars.

There was also another legal action brought against Société Générale, which had started in 2014 and later ended with LIA’s partial defeat.

As to the 2018 national budget, for example, the Central Bank of Libya has envisaged the amount of 42,511 billion dinars, broken down as follows: 24.5 for salaries and wages; 6.5 billion dollars for petrol subsidies and 6.7 billion dollars for “other expenses”.

On average the dinar exchange rate is 1.3 as against the dollar, but it is much lower on the black market.

And public spending is all for subsidies and salaries. Very little is spent for welfare – that was Colonel Gaddafi’s asset for gaining consensus. Social wellbeing can be achieved with good stability of oil prices and revenues, which is certainly not the case now.

Moreover, General Haftar militarily conquered the oil sites of the Libyan “oil crescent” on June 14, 2018, after having held back the attacks of the Petroleum Defence Guards of Ibrahim Jadhran, the commander of the force protecting the oil wells and facilities.

According to General Haftar, the condition for reopening wells, as well as storage and transport sites, was the replacement of the Governor of the Central Bank of Libya, Siddiq al-Kabir, with his candidate, namely Mohammad al-Shukri.

Siddiq al-Kabir stated that the Central Bank of Libya has lost 48 billion dinars over the last 4 years and rejected the appointment – formally made by the Tobruk-based Parliament – of his successor, al-Shukri.

Moreover, Siddiq al-Kabirhas also been accused of having pocketed a series of Libyan public funds abroad.

Later General Haftar attacked the Central Bank of Libya in Benghazi to collect funds for the salaries of his soldiers.

Hence the current Libyan financial tension lies in the link between banks and oil revenues – two highly problematic situations, both in al-Serraj’s and in the Benghazi governments, as well as in General Khalifa Haftar’s ranks.

It is certainly no coincidence that the Presidential Council decided to impose a 183% tax on currency transactions with banks.

In addition, taxation was introduced on the goods imported by companies before the current tax reform, which is linked to the reform of the allocation of basic commodities to the Libyan population.

The idea is to stabilize prices and hence make the exchange rate between the dinar and the dollar acceptable, which is another root cause of the economic crisis.

The Libyan citizens often demonstrate in front of bank branches, which are constantly undergoing a liquidity crisis. Prices are out of control and the instability of exchange rates harms also oil transactions, as can be easily imagined.

Nevertheless, even the area controlled by the Tobruk-based Parliament and General Haftar’s Forces is not in a better situation.

In fact, Eastern Libya’s banking authorities have already put their banknotes and coins into circulation, which are already partly used and were printed and minted in Russia.

Pursuant to al-Serraj’s decision of May 2016, said banknotes are accepted in the Tripoli area.

Four billion dinars, with the face of Colonel Gaddafi portrayed on them, and of the same dark colour as copper.

According to the most reliable sources, the reserves of the Central Bank of Libya in Bayda – the city hosting the Central Bank of Eastern Libya – are still substantial: 800 million dinars, 60 million euros and 80 million dollars.

Not bad for an area destroyed by war.

Obviously the simple division into two of the Central Bank – of which only the Tripoli branch is internationally recognized – is the root cause of the terrible Weimar-style devaluation of the Libyan dinar, which, as always happens, they try to patch up with the artificial scarcity of the money in circulation.

As Schumpeter taught us, this does not solve the problem, but shifts it to real goods and services, thus increasing their artificial scarcity and hence their cost.

Meanwhile, the economic situation shows some signs of improvement, considering that the 2017 data and statistics point to total revenues (again only for Tripoli’s government) equal to 22.23 billion dinars, of which 19.2 billion dinars of oil exports; 845 million dinars of taxes; 164 million dinars of customs duties, above all on oil, and 2.1 billion dinars of remaining revenue.

At geopolitical level, however, the tendency to Libya’s partition – which would be a disaster also for oil consumers and, above all, for the Libyan economy, considering that the oil crescent is halfway between the two opposing States – is de facto the prevailing one.

Egypt openly supports General Khalifa Haftar and the tribes helping him.

The Gharyan tribe and many other major ones, totalling 140, now support the Benghazi Government, since at the beginning of clashes, they had often been affiliated to Tripoli and its Government of National Accord.

Tunisia has always tried to reach a very difficult neutral position.

Algeria strongly fears the intrusion of the Emirates’ and Qatar’s Turkish intelligence services into the Libyan economic, oil and political context, but it endeavours above all to limit the Egyptian pressure to the East.

The European powers support General Haftar- with France that, as early as the first inter-Libyan fights, sent him the Brigade Action of its intelligence services. Conversely, Italy is rebuilding its special relationship with al-Serraj’s government – like the one it had with Gaddafi – but with recent openings to General Haftar.

If we want to reach absolute equivalence between the parties, we must avoid doing foreign policy.

Great Britain and the United States tend to quickly withdraw from the Libyan region, thus avoiding to make choices and not tackling the economic and social crisis that could trigger again a war, with the jihad still playing the lion’s share and precisely in the oil crescent.

The United States should not believe that its great oil autonomy, which also pushes it to sell its natural gas abroad, can exempt it from developing a policy putting an end to the unfortunate phase of the “Arab Springs” it had started – of which Gaddafi’s fall is an essential part.

Currently the Libyan production share is around 1% of the total OPEC production.

Everyone is preparing for the significant increase of the oil barrel price, which is expected to reach almost 100 US dollars in the coming months.

If this happened – and it will certainly happen – the Libyan economy could be even safe, but certainly corruption and the overlapping of two financial administrations and two central banks, as well as political insecurity, could still stop Libya’s economic growth.

Hence, for the next international conference scheduled in Palermo for November 12-13, we would need a common economic and financial policy line of all non-Libyan participants to be submitted to both local governments.

Probably General Haftar will not participate – as stated by a member of the Tobruk-based Parliament – but certainly Putin will not participate.

The presence of Mike Pompeo is taken for granted, but probably also the Russian Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, will participate.

Certainly the Italian diplomacy focused only on “Europe” has lost much of the sheen that has characterized it in Africa and the Middle East.

Meanwhile, we could start with a working proposal on the Libyan economy.

For example, a) a European audit for all Libyan state-run companies of both sides.

Later b) the definition of a New Dinar, of which the margin of fluctuation with the dollar, the Euro and the other major international currencies should be established.

Some observers should also be involved, such as China.

Furthermore, an independent authority should be created, which should be accountable to the Libyan governments, but also to the EU, on the public finances of the two Libyan governments.

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Giancarlo Elia Valori

Advisory Board Co-chair Honoris Causa Professor Giancarlo Elia Valori is an eminent Italian economist and businessman. He holds prestigious academic distinctions and national orders. Mr. Valori has lectured on international affairs and economics at the world’s leading universities such as Peking University, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Yeshiva University in New York. He currently chairs “International World Group”, he is also the honorary president of Huawei Italy, economic adviser to the Chinese giant HNA Group. In 1992 he was appointed Officier de la Légion d’Honneur de la République Francaise, with this motivation: “A man who can see across borders to understand the world” and in 2002 he received the title “Honorable” of the Académie des Sciences de l’Institut de France. “

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Economy

How getting dollars from IMF, World Bank would make the borrower country’s situation worse off

Published

3 hours ago

June 10, 2023

Zakria Khan

As globalisation and international trade continue to increase, countries are becoming increasingly dependent on one another for economic support. While the idea of receiving financial assistance from other countries may seem beneficial, it is essential to consider the long-term consequences of relying on foreign funding. In this article, we will explore the reasons why obtaining dollars from other countries may not improve a nation’s situation.

One of the major issues with relying on foreign aid is the potential for a cycle of dependency. When a country becomes reliant on external aid, it can lead to a situation where it is unable to sustain its own economy without outside support. This is a dangerous situation because it can create a vicious cycle where the country continually needs more and more aid just to stay afloat.

For example, if a country receives aid in the form of a loan, it will need to repay the loan with interest. This can be difficult if the country is not generating enough revenue to meet its existing financial obligations, like the case with Pakistan where IMF has given $6.52bn as per 2019 according to al Jazeera news.

accepting foreign aid can result in a loss of autonomy for the recipient country. When a country accepts financial aid, it must adhere to the stipulations of the donor country or organization. These stipulations can range from structural adjustments to changes in the recipient country’s policies or systems. These changes may not necessarily align with the values or beliefs of the recipient country and can have unintended consequences.

For instance, a country that accepts aid from another nation may be required to implement specific economic policies to align with the donor’s interests. While the donor may have good intentions, these policies may not be suitable for the recipient country’s unique economic conditions. This loss of autonomy can have significant long-term consequences for a nation’s economic and political stability.

Furthermore, foreign aid can also create an incentive for the recipient country to focus on producing goods that are exportable to the donor country. This focus can lead to the neglect of domestic industries that could potentially contribute to the country’s long-term economic growth.

when a country relies on foreign aid and loans, it can create a cycle of dependency that is hard to break. Instead of developing its own economy, a country that is dependent on foreign aid becomes trapped in a cycle of always needing more aid to survive. This can lead to a lack of innovation and productivity, as well as a lack of incentives for the government to implement necessary economic reforms.

For example, many African countries have been receiving foreign aid for decades, but their economies remain stagnant, and their people continue to live in poverty. The reason for this is that the aid has created a culture of dependency that has prevented these countries from developing their own economies and becoming self-sufficient. As a result, they continue to rely on foreign aid, and the cycle of dependency continues.

Secondly, foreign aid and loans can also lead to the creation of a debt trap. When a country borrows money from other countries or international institutions like the World Bank or IMF, it is required to pay back that money with interest. If the country is unable to pay back the debt, it can become trapped in a debt cycle that can be difficult to break.

For example, many developing countries have borrowed large sums of money from China to fund infrastructure projects like roads and ports. While these projects have helped to improve the country’s infrastructure, they have also left the country with a large debt burden. In some cases, the debt has become so large that the country is unable to pay it back, and it becomes trapped in a debt cycle that can be difficult to break.

As a nation, it is natural to seek foreign investment and aid to support its economic growth and development. However, it is essential to realize that getting dollars from other countries may not always be the best solution to address a country’s economic challenges. In fact, it can lead to plenty of problems that may exacerbate the current situation.

Foreign aid can create a dependency culture, where a country becomes reliant on the help of others to sustain its economy. This often leads to the abandonment of initiatives that would have driven growth in the economy, as it is more comfortable to rely on handouts rather than working towards self-sufficiency. A dependency culture also makes a nation vulnerable to the whims of other countries, who may withdraw their support without warning, leaving the country with a sudden and severe economic downturn.

Another challenge with getting dollars from other countries is the exchange rate risk. When a country borrows money in a foreign currency, it becomes susceptible to fluctuations in the exchange rate. For instance, if a country borrows money in US dollars, and the US dollar appreciates against the local currency, the debt burden becomes more significant, and it becomes harder to pay back. This can create a vicious cycle of borrowing to pay back previous loans, leading to an unsustainable debt situation.

foreign aid and investment can create a situation where the recipient country becomes a dumping ground for substandard goods and services from the donor countries. For example, in Africa, there have been reports of donated clothes from western countries causing local textile industries to collapse, as people prefer the cheap second-hand clothes from the west. This creates a vicious cycle of dependency on foreign goods, leading to the closure of local industries, job losses, and an erosion of local culture.

Another challenge with getting dollars from other countries is that it may lead to the exploitation of natural resources. For instance, foreign investors may demand favorable policies that allow them to extract resources from the host country at minimal cost, leaving the country with minimal benefits. This creates a situation where the host country is merely an exporter of raw materials, and the foreign investors reap the benefits.

Critics argue that the loans provided by the IMF and other entities often comes with strict conditions attached. Such as imposing austerity measures or liberalizing markets.

whether IMF and World Bank lending helps poor countries or not depends on a variety of factors, including the specific terms and conditions of the loans, how the funds are used, and the broader economic and political context in which the lending takes place.

Economy

The Complex Relationship Between Populism and the Economy: A Delicate Balancing Act

Published

9 hours ago

June 10, 2023

Syeda Nida Fatima

Populism on both the right and left has spread like wildfire over the world. The drive reached its apex in the United States with Trump’s election, but it has been a force in Europe since the Great Recession threw the European economy into a lengthy tailspin. Populism is a political philosophy that demonizes economic and political elites while lionizing ‘the people.’ Populists of all shades argue that the people must recapture power from the unaccountable elites who made them impotent.

Populism has emerged as a powerful force in contemporary politics, challenging long-held political norms and institutions. The appeal to economic concerns and complaints is a crucial feature of populist movements. The link between populism and the economy, on the other hand, is intricate and diverse. During periods of economic instability or stagnation, populism frequently arises, tapping on the frustrations and worries of marginalized people. the economic instability refers to an economy that lacks certainty or equilibrium, such as high unemployment rates, poor economic development, or unpredictable financial markets. Populist leaders and groups are skilled at exploiting economic complaints and presenting them as the consequence of an inefficient or corrupt elite. They present themselves as defenders of the “common people” or marginalized groups who have been left behind by the current political and economic elite. They provide simplified solutions to complicated economic problems, vowing to protect people’s interests against perceived dangers presented by global entities such as globalization, immigration, or multinational businesses.

It is crucial to remember that economic insecurity or stagnation does not always result in the emergence of populism. Other variables, such as cultural fears, identity politics, and a lack of faith in institutions, all contribute to the creation of a climate favorable to populist movements. The economic factor, on the other hand, is frequently a substantial motivator since it directly affects people’s livelihoods and ambitions.

Populist policies and language can have serious consequences for economic stability, development, and long-term viability. To understand its implications for society and policymaking, this delicate balancing act between populism and the economy must be carefully examined.

Economic Dissatisfaction and the Rise of Populism

Populist groups frequently garner support by focusing on economic dissatisfaction in society. These complaints may be the result of a variety of issues, including wage stagnation, job insecurity, economic inequality, and the belief that conventional political elites have not effectively addressed these issues. Populist leaders are skilled at capitalizing on these resentments by pledging quick and dramatic fixes that appeal to disenchanted people.

Populist economic policies

Populist economic policies are frequently put in place once populist politicians are in charge in order to solve the issues that brought them to power. These regulations might be very varied from one country to another, reflecting the diversity of populist movements worldwide. Protectionism, trade restrictions, and more government involvement in the economy are some characteristics of populist economic policy. These actions are frequently justified as defending the rights of the “common people” in the face of multinational companies and powerful global elites.

Long-Term Economic Effects and Short-Term Populist Gains:

Populist measures may improve the short term and placate disenchanted people, but they can harm the economy in the long run. For instance, protectionist policies may shelter domestic sectors from competition in the near term, but they eventually stifle effectiveness, innovation, and competitiveness. Increased government involvement may result in corruption, inefficiency, and a suppression of the expansion of the private sector.

The Effects on Investor Confidence and Market Stability

Populist discourse and actions may also significantly affect investor confidence and market stability. Populist politicians frequently take on established financial and economic institutions like central banks, which can increase volatility and uncertainty. When political factors appear to be driving policy decisions rather than strong economic realities, investors may be reluctant to commit capital.

Inclusive growth vs. Protectionism

If it is feasible to achieve inclusive economic development while assuaging populist attitudes, that would be a key question in the populist-economic nexus. Opponents contend that populist policies frequently priorities instant gratification and protectionism, which may eventually impede broad-based prosperity and deepen inequality. For nations battling populism, striking the correct balance between addressing valid economic concerns and pursuing long-term, sustainable economic policy is a vital task.

The Importance of Education and Economic Literacy

A diversified strategy is needed to address the complicated link between populism and the economy. Increasing economic literacy and spreading education on the advantages of free trade, open markets, and globalization might help dispel the oversimplified myths sometimes spread by populist groups. Societies may promote a more educated and nuanced public dialogue by providing people with the means to comprehend and critically analyses economic concerns.

Conclusion

The complex interrelationship between populism and the economy emphasizes the need of having a thorough grasp of the motivations and outcomes of populist movements. Because it plays on the frustrations and worries of marginalized groups who feel left behind by the current political and economic system, populism frequently gains support during periods of economic instability. Populist leaders can appeal to disillusioned people by capitalizing on economic concerns and promising quick, radical answers.

Economic stability, growth, and societal well-being may be significantly impacted in the long run by populist economic policies and rhetoric. While populist initiatives may temporarily alleviate problems and placate irate people, they frequently overlook factors like long-term sustainability, effectiveness, and competitiveness. Economic development, investment, and innovation can be hampered by protectionist trade policies, increasing government interference, and a contempt for economic competence.

In conclusion, it is important to carefully evaluate and take a balanced approach to the topic of populism and the economy. While economic resentments might contribute to the growth of populism, the economic effects of populist measures must be considered over the long run.

Suggestions

A broad strategy that tackles both the underlying economic complaints and supports sustainable economic policies is necessary to handle the complex problems surrounding populism and the economy. Here are some tips for overcoming these obstacles

Addressing Economic Inequality

Governments should implement policies that promote inclusive economic growth and reduce income inequality.

Strengthening Institutions

Upholding the integrity and independence of democratic institutions is crucial in countering populist tendencies. Strong institutions can help rebuild trust and confidence in the political and economic system, mitigating the appeal of populism.

Promoting Dialogue and Engagement

To address the concerns of marginalized groups, it is essential to engage in open and constructive dialogue.

Strengthening Economic Literacy

Enhancing economic literacy among the general population is critical.

Promoting International Cooperation

Global challenges such as climate change, pandemics, and economic interdependence require collaborative solutions. Governments should prioritize international cooperation and engage in constructive dialogue to address these challenges collectively. By demonstrating the benefits of global engagement and cooperation, societies can counter the isolationist and protectionist tendencies often associated with populism.

Societies may overcome the problems presented by populism while supporting sustainable economic development and social cohesion by resolving economic complaints, advocating inclusive policies, and creating a feeling of economic security and opportunity.

Economy

From Bullets to Development: Rethinking Military Expenditure in Favour of Official Development Assistance

Published

3 days ago

June 7, 2023

Rameen Siddiqui

International assistance has achieved remarkable accomplishments in reducing global poverty, supporting girls’ education, addressing hunger, ensuring safe childbirth, nearly eradicating polio, combating female genital mutilation (FGM), providing food rations for Syrian refugees, constructing schools and sanitation facilities in Kenya, and delivering crucial relief supplies to Afghan villagers affected by an earthquake.

However, despite the current combination of global crises, some of the wealthiest nations in the world are planning to significantly reduce their life-saving aid budgets in 2022-23. These decisions are made by political elites who are sheltered within the safety of their privileged positions, yet the consequences of these choices are acutely felt by the most vulnerable individuals across the globe.

Official Development Assistance (ODA) plays a vital role in supporting the development and welfare efforts of low- and middle-income nations. The United Nations has set a target for countries to allocate 0.7% of their Gross National Income (GNI) towards ODA. However, recent estimates indicate that a significant portion of foreign aid is being directed towards Ukraine, accounting for 7.8% of all ODA in 2022. Meanwhile, aid provided to least-developed countries and countries in sub-Saharan Africa has actually decreased. Donors continue to fall short of their targets to contribute at least 0.7% of their GNI to ODA. When considering a long-term perspective, it is evident that aid may still be experiencing a downward trend in comparison to what countries can reasonably afford.

.Despite its importance, the global levels of Official Development Assistance (ODA) have experienced minimal growth in the last ten years. This lack of progress in fulfilling the commitment to increase ODA to 0.7 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) places a burden on low- and middle-income countries. As a result, these nations are compelled to devise alternative development strategies that are less reliant on external aid. This situation presents them with difficult choices regarding the allocation of their scarce domestic resources undermining development in social sectors.

On the contrary, Military expenditure reached record level in the second year of the pandemic and world military spending continued to grow in 2021, reaching an all-time high of $2.1 trillion. This was the seventh consecutive year that spending increased, research published by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).

In light of the Monterrey Consensus on Financing for Development adopted in March 2002 and the 2015 Addis Ababa Action Agenda (AAAA), which outlines spending priorities, states are encouraged to set appropriate targets for essential public services like healthcare, education, electricity provision, and sanitation. However that might not be the case. The latest figures from the OECD will provide further support to the argument. Although there was substantial funding for Ukraine in 2022, Official Development Assistance (ODA) to some of the world’s poorest countries experienced a decline.

The data reveals a decrease of approximately 0.7% in bilateral flows to the group of nations categorized as the least developed countries, comprising 46 countries ranging from Afghanistan to Zambia. The total amount of aid provided to these countries amounted to $32 billion. In simpler terms, the data demonstrates that development aid to numerous developing countries actually contracted.

This leads to an abrupt reordering of budget priorities, where military expenditures, and humanitarian aid take precedence, while other critical needs like education and social services are likely to be deprioritized. Meanwhile, the convergence of droughts and conflicts causes immense human suffering and widespread hunger in several nations, and despite the urgent nature of these crises, UN humanitarian appeals for assistance consistently suffer from inadequate funding.

Assistance allocated to Ukraine, as well as any future major crises that require global attention, should be supplementary to the existing humanitarian and development budgets rather than compromising one for the sake of the other.

As we already knew, in 2021 the ODA budget was reduced to 0.5%, a drop of £3bn compared to 2020 to £11.4bn. The starkest impact of these cuts is on “least developed countries” (LDCs). The amount of bilateral ODA going to LDCs dropped by £961m in 2021, a cut of 40% taking it to a total of £1.4bn.

Yoke Ling, the Executive Director of Third World Network, commented that the increasing military expenditure will undoubtedly have a direct influence on various types of spending that developed countries have committed to providing for developing nations. This includes Official Development Assistance (ODA) and climate finance, which are legal obligations under climate treaties.

Furthermore, Yoke Ling highlighted that even prior to the Russian-Ukraine conflict, developed nations had already been reducing their financial support for development. Therefore, it is anticipated that this decline in development financing will further deteriorate in the future.

Given the climate-change-triggered floods in Nigeria and Pakistan, the severe food insecurity affecting millions in Nigeria, Ethiopia, South Sudan, Yemen, Afghanistan, and Somalia, the unfolding humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan resulting in widespread starvation and desperate measures such as selling body parts to provide for families, the ongoing refugee crisis in Syria where millions remain in displacement camps even a decade after the conflict started, and the devastating famine gripping Tigray, advocates concur that there is an urgent need to uphold and potentially enhance international aid more than ever before.

According to a UN report titled “2022 Financing for Sustainable Development Report: Bridging the Finance Divide,” the Official Development Assistance (ODA) experienced a remarkable growth, reaching its highest-ever level of $161.2 billion in 2020. However, despite this record growth, the report highlights that 13 countries reduced their ODA contributions, and the overall amount remains insufficient to meet the significant needs of developing countries.

The UN expresses concern that the crisis in Ukraine, coupled with increased spending on refugees in Europe, may result in reductions in aid provided to the poorest nations. The majority of developing countries require urgent and proactive support to get back on track towards achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

According to the report’s estimates, a 20 percent increase in spending will be necessary in key sectors within the poorest countries.

If certain developed nations allocate generous resources to military expenditures while simultaneously reducing funding for other aid programs, are they implying that security interests take precedence over long-term public needs? Without question, the rights and necessities of people in Ukraine, Asia, and the rest of the Global South should be prioritized over military spending. Moreover, apart from the conflict in Ukraine, developed countries have already failed to fulfil their commitment of providing $100 billion of climate finance by the year 2020.

By compromising development aid budgets and climate finance, the consequences of poverty, inequalities, adverse climate impacts, and exclusion in the global South will be exacerbated. Such a lack of ambition risks reinforcing the economic and political grievances that lie at the core of armed conflicts in various regions, including Asia.

In order to uphold solidarity and justice, there is a pressing need for synergized political will and ambition.

We should challenge developed countries to honour their existing aid commitments, which include allocating a minimum of 0.7% of their Gross National Income (GNI) as Official Development Assistance (ODA). Additionally, we also call upon them to provide new funding to address the needs of the people in Ukraine. It is imperative to identify new avenues for grants-based climate finance to compensate those most affected by climate change, including communities experiencing losses and damages.

The UN report on Financing for Sustainable Development also highlights the stark contrast between rich countries, which were able to support their pandemic recovery through substantial borrowing at very low interest rates, and the poorest nations that had to allocate billions of dollars to service their debts, hindering their ability to invest in sustainable development.

As we approach the midpoint of funding the Global Sustainable Development Goals, the discoveries are deeply concerning. We cannot afford to be inactive during this critical moment of shared responsibility, where our aim is to uplift hundreds of millions of individuals out of hunger and poverty. It is indispensable that we prioritize investments in equitable access to decent and environmentally friendly employment, social protection, healthcare, and education, leaving no one behind.