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Israeli-Iranian Nuclear Standoff: So Far Only Verbal

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A few days ago Israel and Iran traded accusations of harboring nuclear ambitions. Speaking at the 73rd session of UN General Assembly, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu spoke about nuclear materials and equipment allegedly stored somewhere in Tehran.

The Iranian response did not take long coming with an enraged Foreign Minister Mohammed Javad Zarif blaming Israel for covert production of nuclear weapons.

According to Zarif, Israel is the only country in the region with a “secret” and “undeclared” nuclear arms program, which allegedly includes “a real nuclear arsenal.”

That the two countries have been engaged in a long-running cold war is no secret. Long before the 1979 Islamic revolution, the founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ayatollah Khomeini, pursued a clearly anti-Israeli line in his speeches and sermons.

“I consider Israel’s independence and its recognition as a catastrophe for Muslims undermining the activities of Islamic governments,” he said over and over again.

“The Zionist regime must be wiped off the face of the earth, and with the help of Divine power, the world will soon live without the United States and Israel,” he added.

Tehran’s anti-Israel rhetoric hasn’t changed much since Khomeini’s death.

Today, Iran is the only country that does not recognize Israel’s very right to exist.

In its 70-year history, the State of Israel has fought seven major wars with the Arabs and endless armed clashes with Palestinians and the pro-Iranian Lebanese Hezbollah movement.

Jerusalem’s relations with many Arab states have generally returned to normal and when it comes to the confrontation with Iran, some of them have even allied with the Jewish state. Meanwhile, Iran is now seen by Israel as a major threat.

Israel’s nuclear program was initiated by its founder, Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion. After the end of the Arab-Israeli war of 1948, in which Israel was confronted by the Egyptian and Jordanian armies, Ben-Gurion realized that an atomic bomb was the only way for Israel to survive in the face of the Arab forces that outnumbered the Israelis many times over.

The history of the creation and possession of Israel’s nuclear weapons is interesting per se and reads like a detective story. What is really important, however, is Israel’s ability to obtain nuclear capability in a short time and virtually without conducting any nuclear tests [1]. These days, the expertise gained over decades and the high performance of modern supercomputers make it possible to create realistic mathematical models of nuclear and thermonuclear warheads, which, in turn, makes it possible to avoid detonating a nuclear charge at a test site.

All this being said, however, Israel strictly adhered to the policy of “positive disguise” refusing to recognize the existence of its nuclear arsenal, hiding direct evidence of its existence and making veiled hints about its existence as a warning to enemies. Former Israeli prime ministers have made such hints more than once. In July 1998, Shimon Peres publicly admitted (without elaborating) that Israel possessed nuclear weapons. Ehud Olmert also indirectly confirmed that the Jewish state had an atomic bomb.

“Iran wants to possess nuclear weapons, following the example of Israel,” Ehud Olmert said in a 2006 interview with SAT1.

Leading politicians, like former US President Jimmy Carter and ex-IAEA Director Mohammed ElBaradei, have mentioned the presence of nuclear weapons in Israel. In 2013, Britain’s Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists asserted that Israel had about 80 nuclear warheads and possessed enough fissile materials to produce between 115 and 190 nuclear warheads. However, the production of nuclear warheads in Israel was “frozen” in 2004.

However, this “freeze” can quickly “thaw out,” and the entire Israeli nuclear complex, consisting of several major nuclear infrastructure facilities, will get back to work.

These facilities include:

Sorek Scientific Nuclear Research Center was set up n the 1950s in Nagal Sorek settlement outside Tel Aviv. Israel’s first 5 MW light-water nuclear reactor, brought in from the US as part of President Dwight Eisenhower’s Atoms for Peace program, was installed there.

This low-power reactor could not produce weapons-grade plutonium, and was mainly used for training specialists and devising methods of handling radioactive materials, which later came in handy in more comprehensive  research. However, despite Israel’s persistent requests, the Americans refused to provide nuclear fuel and equipment that could be used in a nuclear weapons program, so in the late-1950s, France became the main source of materials and nuclear technologies for Israel. The Sorek Center is monitored by the IAEA.

Nuclear Research Center at Dimona. A natural uranium heavy-water reactor, built and later modernized by French specialists, has been operating there since 1964. The 28 MW reactor has a capacity 40-60 kg of weapons-grade plutonium. Until 2003, Israel had produced  about 650 kg of plutonium – enough to build over 100 nuclear charges. (It takes between 3 and 8 kilograms of plutonium to produce a single nuclear warhead, depending on technology used). The Dimon Center of the IAEA is monitored by the IAEA.

Yodefat is a settlement in Galilee, where Israeli specialists reportedly assemble and dismantle nuclear weapons at the Raphael’s enterprise, called “Division 20”.

Kfar Zakharia – a missile base in the Judean Hills where strategic nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles are stored in warehouses.

Eylaban – a nuclear weapons site.

Israel’s Jericho missiles are made in Beer-Yaakov, and their tests are carried out mainly at the army base in Palmachim. A considerable number of Israel’s nuclear-capable aircraft are stationed at the nearby Tel Nof base. Israeli military commentator Joab Limor wrote about this in his article titled “Israeli Weapons of Mass Destruction” as early as in 2011, citing the British magazine Jane’s Intelligence Review.

Israel’s strategic nuclear forces are built around a classic nuclear triad, consisting of land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, bomber-carried cruise missiles and cruise missiles on submarines. As a means of ground-based delivery, foreign experts consider the three-stage Jericho-3 missile (possibly 16 missiles), whose range is estimated at around 6,500 km with a payload of 350 kg payload (one nuclear warhead), and with a range of 4,800 km with a 1-ton nuclear warhead.

Two air squadrons of 18 F-15I Ra’am (Thunder) fighter-bombers each carrying a pair of Israeli-made Gabriel cruise missiles. This is the aerial component of the Israeli nuclear triad.

The naval component consists of five German-made Dolphin diesel electric submarines capable of carrying nuclear-tipped Gabriel cruise missiles.

In summation, it can be stated that Israel now has a wide range of non-strategic means of nuclear weapons delivery and an impressive nuclear arsenal by regional standards. The main emphasis is on the highly survivable maritime component of nuclear forces. This is deemed extremely important for Israel, which, being a small country, is very vulnerable to attacks weapons of mass destruction.

No so Iran, which has also been engaged in nuclear research since the 1950s. Over the years, the country has built up an impressive nuclear infrastructure.

However, no nuclear weapon has been created there, even though after the 1979 Islamic Revolution a secret directive on nuclear weapons development was adopted to ensure the survival of the Islamic regime, and a pertinent plan, dubbed “Ahmad” was drawn up with an eye to creating a nuclear warhead for a ballistic missile. By the way, it was the IAEA which, at the end of 2011, blew the whistle about the “Ahmad” project with a detailed twelve-page document titled “Possible military Dimensions to Iran’s Nuclear Program.”

According to the IAEA, the Amad project was abruptly scrapped at the end of 2003, as ordered by high-ranking officials in Tehran. Simultaneously, the personnel employed in various “Ahmad”-related jobs are believed to have initially remained at their workplaces in order to register and report on the results achieved by that moment. After that – from the end of 2003 to the start of 2004 – both the equipment and the workplaces of those engaged in the project were destroyed to leave as little evidence as possible that might point to the “delicate” nature of the work done there.

All this meaning that since 2004, Iran has not been engaged in any military nuclear activity. By amazing coincidence, Jerusalem froze its production of nuclear warheads in that very same year of 2004.

Israel insists that the military aspect of the Iranian nuclear program is still there. Even though the IAEA’s latest reports point to the contrary, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu claims that Iran is developing nuclear weapons at two secret sites in Tehran. Speaking at the UN, Netanyahu also recalled that in April he had produced tons of documents, which, according to him, had been obtained by Israeli intelligence in Iran.

“Since we raided [their] atomic archive, [the Iranians] have been busy cleaning out the atomic warehouse. Just last month, they removed 15 kilograms of radioactive material. You know what they did with it? They had 15 kilograms of radioactive material, they had to get it out of the site, so they took it out and they spread it around Tehran in an effort to hide the evidence,” the Israeli prime minister told the UN General Assembly in September.

Benjamin Netanyahu also showed several photos from a map application pointing to an address in Tehran, where he claimed nuclear materials were stored.

“What Iran hides, Israel will find,” Netanyahu and added, referring, to what he described as “the tyrants of Tehran”: “Israel knows what you are doing and Israel knows where you are doing it.”

“Israel will never let a regime that calls for our destruction develop nuclear weapons – not now, not in 10 years, not ever… We will continue to act against you in Syria. We will act against you in Lebanon. We will act against you in Iraq. We will act against you whenever and wherever we must act to defend our state and defend our people,” Netanyahu warned.

Israel has always been an ardent opponent of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) for Iran, adopted by international mediators in 2015, arguing that this will not stop Iran from developing nuclear weapons.

Netanyahu still pointed to a positive consequence of the agreement

“By empowering Iran, it brought Israel and many Arab states closer together,” he said during his address to the UN General Assembly.

The recent mutual accusations of nuclear ambitions regularly leveled at each other by Tehran and Jerusalem are part of the war of words, elements of the Iran-Israeli Cold War, which has been going on for many years. The military-political tensions around Iran have been shooting up and the propaganda war between the two countries is heating up.

Undoubtedly, the Israeli politicians’ anti-Iranian nuclear rhetoric is aimed at the complete destruction of the 2015 nuclear deal.

The JCPOA is in a state of limbo now that the US has walked out of it and the other signatories are making every effort to salvage it in one way or another. If the deal collapses then Iran is sure to resume its military nuclear program which, in turn, will reflect very badly on the situation in the Middle East and around the world as no international organization, including the IAEA, will be able to control Tehran’s actions.

It looks like this is exactly what Jerusalem wants so that it can prove Tehran’s nuclear militancy and the correctness of its anti-Iranian policy.

[1] Nothing is definitely known about Israel’s nuclear tests. However, on September 22, 1979, a series of light bursts characteristic of a nuclear explosion of a 2–3 kiloton charge were recorded by the US satellite “Vela” 6911 near the Prince Edward Islands in the South Atlantic. It is widely believed that this was an Israeli nuclear test, possibly conducted jointly with South Africa.

First published in our partner International Affairs

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Nasr Missile and Deterrence Stability of South Asia

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Pakistan has conducted successful test of short range surface to surface ballistic missile ‘Nasr’ on January 24th, 28th and 31st respectively, as part of the Army Strategic Forces Command training exercise, which included quad salvo on 24 January and single shots on 28 & 31 January, 2019. Quad salvo means that the four missiles were fired together from AR1A/A100-E Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) to enhance the operational efficiency of Army Strategic force Command. While single shots means one missile was fired from the vehicle. The aimed of letter tests were for testing in flight maneuverability, including the end flight maneuverability. Nasr has shoot and scoot attributes which mean that the system has a capability of firing and moving away quickly to avoid counter targeting which would be contributing to the weapon’s survivability.The speed and low apogee of the Hatf-IX missile would make it difficult to intercept by all the Indian existing Ballistic Missile Defence system and could defeat S-400 air defence system which is in process.

As South Asia region is consider unstable because of ongoing hostility between India and Pakistan. Though hostility between both states is unending but nuclear weapons have brought stability to a great extent. As India decided to take the nuclear weapons route, Pakistan followed because through nuclear weapons Pakistan successfully neutralized Indian conventional superiority.

In South Asia, security competition between India and Pakistan has been characterised by an action-reaction spiral. Pakistan took the path of nuclear weapons development in order to create balance against militarily superior India. In 2004, India adopted aggressive military doctrine, Pakistan rationally responded by developing Short Range Ballistic Missile Nasr which further strengthen the existing deterrence equation of the region. As Pakistan is not able economically to compete India conventionally, so it always took necessitating reactionary steps to maintain deterrence stability of South Asia.

The purpose of the development of Nasr is defensive because Pakistan would use it to secure its border from Indian conventional aggression. Pakistan Short Range Ballistic Missile Nasr has been criticized by international community that it would increase arms race in South Asia.  But Pakistan developed Nasr to overcome the growing threats from the Indian offensive military doctrine. Cold Start Doctrine forces Pakistan to increase its dependence on nuclear arsenals. General Bipin acknowledged CSD in 2017, was followed by Pakistan’s Nasr test by improving its range from 60 to 70 km which puts cold water on Cold Start. Before official acknowledgement of CSD, Pakistan did not conduct any training tests of Nasr. Pakistan inducted the Nasr missile in its strategic arsenal in 2017and its first training launch was held in July 2017 after the official acknowledgment of CSD from Indian side,  shows that Pakistan developed Nasr only to deter India from initiating a conventional assault against Pakistan. Pakistan does not want to indulge in an arms race rather react to those Indian developments which are threatening its sovereignty. This weapon system has augmented Full Spectrum Deterrence in line with Credible Minimum Deterrence, which means that Pakistan would deter conventional forces (India) by employing nuclear deterrence. Pakistan adopted assertive command and control system on Nasr which means it is centrally controlled which minimize the chances of accidental or unauthorized use.

The latest series of Nasr training tests were response to General Bipin10th January 2019, statement, that the military is launching war games next month to test ‘structures geared towards sudden and swift offensives into enemy territory by Integrated Battle Groups (IBGs). These new structures will be “validated” in military exercises on the ground in May, 2019. As IBGs are the center of Indian offensive military doctrine, which involves initiating rapid military offence from multiple fronts by exploiting the element of surprise and leaving Pakistan with neither the time to respond nor the defensive resources to stop those multiple attacks. Nasr tests are in response to this Indian military announcement as Pakistan solely developed Short Range Ballistic Missile Nasr to deter India from initiating conventional conflict. The recent Nasr tests have frightened Indian commanders because of its capability to defeat all Indian existing Ballistic Missile Defence systems and S-400 air defence system. Hence, deterrence is often in the minds of adversary. As long as Indian leaders continue to be deterred by Nasr, it will continue to be effective.

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Successful Test of Nasr Pours Cold Water on India’s Cold Start Doctrine

Sonia Naz

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Pakistan army announced on 24 January a successful training of its short-range ballistic missile, “Nasr”, which is believed to have a range of just 60 kilometres. The 60-kilometre range Nasr missile as “a high precision, shoot and scoot Weapon System with the ability of in-flight maneuverability. The missile is able to defeat the ballistic missile defence being developed by India. The missile can carry both conventional and nuclear warheads, but it is known more for its capability to carry nuclear warheads of suitable yield. Nasr is launched from a multi-tube launcher, capable of launching four successive missiles. It is considered as the high-precision weapon system that can be prepared for launch in a short time.

Nasr was introduced in April 2011, developed in response to India’s Cold Start doctrine, the existence of which was officially confirmed by Indian Army Chief Gen Bipin Rawat. The tactical nuclear weapon system, it is said, is meant to deny space to India for conventional conflict below the nuclear threshold.

In fact, the NASR has been developed as the Pakistan army of last resort against Indian Cold Start Doctrine. According to the former head of the Strategic Plan Division (SPD) Retd Lt General Kidwai, the nuclear weapons would be only used “if the very existence of Pakistan as a state is at stake.” The sole aim of the nuclear weapons is to deter Indian aggression. He also stated that Indian CSD is an offensive limited war strategy designed to seize Pakistan’s territory swiftly, hence, the developments of TNWs have sufficiently blocked the avenues for serious military operation from the Indian military side. The Nasr can carry a small-yield “sub-kilotonne” nuclear weapon not to designed widespread damage. It has been designed to protect the Pakistan’s national interest and to provoke international intervention to stop India from designing hawkish policies.

Pakistan’s use of tactical nuclear weapon would aim to minimize the destruction and to avoid the provoking a massive Indian retaliation which New Dehli nuclear doctrine mandates. According to many Analysts Pakistan is unlikely to use the Nasr on Indian territory, but, it would used against the Indian forces deep inside Pakistan territory.

Pakistan does not believe in the arms race, the development of short range missile is part of Pakistan’s security policy because India has supremacy in conventional force and it spends more money than Pakistan on its military force modernization. For instance, India tested a long-range nuclear-capable missile on 14 January from an island in the Bay of Bengal. According to the Indian defence ministry the Agni-5 intercontinental ballistic missile, was made from a mobile launcher, and “further strengthens indian credible deterrence”. While, the increase in the military capability of India always intensifies the security dilemma of Pakistan thus, it opposed India’s cruise and ballistic missiles’ development because, its short and long range weapons undermine Pakistan’s security. India has been developing outstanding military strike capabilities to showcase itself as a regional hegemon in South Asia and great power in the world. Nonetheless, it has not changed the strategic relationship between Pakistan and India (according to the prominent nuclear expert Dr. Jaspal ) but, it amplified the arms race in the region.

Dr. Jaspal states that the NASR is a cost-effective way (due to Pakistan’s resource constraints), to alleviate the rapidly growing conventional asymmetries between India and Pakistan and to counter the threat of limited war. In a nutshell, Nasr has poured cold water on India’s Cold Start Doctrine and this weapon system has augmented full spectrum deterrence posture while, remaining within the precincts of the policy of credible minimum deterrence, against prevailing and evolving threat spectrum more effectively including India’s ballistic missile defense and other air defense systems.

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The Collapse of the INF Treaty as a Motivation?

Dmitry Stefanovich

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Despite the attempts of Russian and U.S. sides to find common ground on the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, it appears that the agreement will cease to exist this year. So what next?

Fighting for Opinions

Russia has been demonstrating a rather high degree of flexibility of late, including publicly, by stating its readiness to reveal its “controversial” 9M729 land-based cruise missile and then holding a presentation on it (even though the scale of the event was, apparently, smaller than the one that was originally proposed to the U.S. partners).

Despite the fairly simple diagrams of the 9M729 and 9M728 missiles displayed on their transport-and-launch containers and the launcher’s similarity to that of the “Club-M system that was first demonstrated back in 2007 as part of the setup for the land-based variant of the Kalibr missile (even though it was a shorter-range version intended for export), this information appears to be quite interesting. Furthermore, the data supplied by Russian sources largely confirms the assumption that the warhead is the main feature of this new cruise missile for the Iskander-M tactical missile system. At the same time, it is possible that the “new but not-so-new” launcher had been planned all along, but did not emerge until now due to concerns about possible breaches of the INF Treaty, and that it was only greenlighted once an appropriate, militarily significant cruise missile had emerged that met the INF requirements and required a new launcher type (other than the “classic” 9P78-1 one). It may very well be that the new launcher is not suitable for 9M723-series quasi-ballistic missiles, and there are questions about its compatibility with the accompanying transporter-loader vehicle; however, the missile’s increased accuracy and power (and possibly its enhanced capability to overcome enemy missile defences) was clearly considered to be very valuable.

Unfortunately, the key NATO and EU member nations ignored the presentation, and not necessarily of their own volition [2]. The United States, for its part, continues to express concerns about the 9M729 cruise missile breaching the INF Treaty, demanding the destruction of both the missile and the associated launchers under Washington’s supervision.

On February 2, the United States will start the process of “suspending” its obligations regarding the INF Treaty. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation has already described the decision as being “legally void.” Washington, however, sees this as a way to develop missiles that would be otherwise prohibited by the Treaty. It should be noted that the United States started planning research and development in this field several years back, and the first test launches may be expected in the near future. It could start with test-launching land-based versions of its air- or sea-launched cruise missiles, for example. Another possible pioneer might be a new tactical missile being developed as part of the Precision Strike Missile programme (formerly known as Long Range Precision Fires), which is to replace the good old ATACMS programme. Raytheon is a participant in the project with its DeepStrike project, whose advertised maximum range stands at the marvellously precise figure of 499 kilometres.

What Next after INF Treaty?

If the United States notifies Russia (and the other post-Soviet states) on February 2 about its withdrawal from the Treaty, how will the situation unfold over the next six months? [3]

The worst-case scenario would involve the rapid development and deployment by Russia and the United States of conventional and nuclear medium- and short-range missiles on both sides of the NATO–Russia border: in Russia’s Western Military District (including Kaliningrad exclave) and throughout Central and Eastern Europe. It would take at least a year for the respective missile units to become fully operational, but even announced planse on their deployment would ruin whatever is left of the European security architecture, including the Russia-NATO Founding Act. Western Europe is unlikely to support such processes; however, Eastern European countries may be willing to host U.S. offensive systems within the framework of bilateral agreements. This may indeed trigger a crisis in the West, including within NATO and the EU, but Russia is sure to suffer much more from such a return to the Missile Scares of the 80s. Moscow is much closer to NATO borders today than it was back then due to geography and political developments, and the the military threat emanating from the Alliance is playing a serious role in the way Moscow’ perceives this threat policy-wise. Russia will certainly need to take into account the drastic reduction in decision-making times should hostilities break out, which could result in pre-delegation of the authority to use nuclear weapons to lower levels of the command chain, or even in fully automating this process, given the heightened interest in the topic on the part of the country’s top political and military leadership. It is partially because of these risks that it would be a bad idea to rush to deploy new missile systems, thus poring fuel to the simmering conflicts.

It is much more likely that all the actors involved will exercise some degree of self-restraint. The interested parties could state their intentions to refrain from unprovoked deployments of missile systems. This would prevent any restrictions on R&D efforts, while at the same time facilitating a relatively stable strategic military architecture. Other possibilities include agreements that would restrict the geography of possible deployments – for example, Europe could be declared an area free from intermediate and shorter range missiles. However, such a decision would have a negative impact on the theoretical possibility of developing a global regime (not even a prohibitive regime, but just a restrictive or more transparent one) that would involve China, India, Pakistan, Iran, Israel and other actors.

In addition, if all the parties involved were prepared to withdraw from the INF Treaty, they could coordinate joint decisions on payloads for non-strategic missiles to be deployed. The Treaty does not distinguish between nuclear and conventional warheads, which is something worth revisiting in any eventuality [4]. Such a discussion would help the parties to return to the broader topic of control over tactical nuclear weapons, especially given the fairly interesting proposals that have emerged recently.

The possibility of some arrangements between European countries and Russia deserves special attention. Here, the key objective is to change the perception both in Moscow and in the European capitals: it is not about splitting the transatlantic unity or driving a wedge between Western and Eastern Europe. On the contrary, the emergence of a purely European arms control regime should help the disintegrating U.S.–Russia system of treaties remain in place. This, however, would require both parties to act fairly boldly.

The Future of New START and Arms Control

It should be stressed here that, unless the United States resorts to overly provocative activities in terms of deploying new intermediate and shorter range missile systems aimed directly at the Russian strategic nuclear forces (SNF), then Russia will continue with the current pace and targets for the modernization of its SNF as permitted by the New START Treaty.

In early 2019, the U.S. media ran a Russian letter to the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. The document explained Russia’s position with regard to the allegations of the United States that Moscow had failed to observe the INF Treaty [5]. Without going into much detail as to the essence of the mutual accusations, it should be noted that Washington’s failure to embrace a constructive approach presents the key threat to prolonging New START beyond 2021. Most importantly, Russia is presumably prepared to agree to a system of so-called “cabinet-level written political commitments”. Those are possible with regard to the cap on the total number of ballistic missile launch tubes on U.S. Ohio-class submarines (with the exception of those intended to make up for the missile potential of any lost launchers). A similar principle could be applied to upgraded Tupolev Tu-22M3M long-range bombers, which can theoretically be retrofitted with in-flight refuelling capabilities (thus boosting their range beyond 8000 kilometres) and the ability to release air-launched cruise missiles with a range of over 600 kilometres. This would turn such aircraft into heavy bombers under New START. The aforementioned letter states that Russia has no such intentions with regard to this bombers, but a relevant formal written commitment might prove to be a useful instrument of trust and security. This aspect of arms control may yet come to the fore should Russia-U.S. relations deteriorate further, including under the influence of domestic political processes in the United States.

Russia and the United States managed, in previous decades, to reach a very high level in terms of sharing reliable information on their strategic nuclear forces, and it would be a real pity to see this potential go to waste. However, it is becoming increasingly obvious that these relations are very much unique. It is quite possible that we will return to a time when there were no legally binding restrictions on Russian and U.S. nuclear forces. This might be the point at which a new polycentric nuclear order will begin to form. To begin with, it would be advisable to develop a system of measures aimed at building confidence and transparency, as the existing asymmetry in the arsenals of the nuclear powers dooms any potential attempts to introduce universal or proportional constraints to failure. It is possible that the principle of “commitments” and other such solutions currently being discussed by Russia and the United States with regard to the controversial issues of New START could contribute to the foundation of such a “post-bipolar” regime. China, for one, might prove more willing to embrace a regime like that than a full-blown international treaty complete with stringent restrictions and mandatory inspections.

To conclude, let us revisit the founding principles: Why do countries need arms controls at all? Without getting bogged down in theoretical considerations, such controls resolve two problems: they mitigate risks by increasing the transparency and understandability of the doctrines and structure of the potential adversary’s armed forces, while optimizing one’s own military structure thanks to streamlining the range of defence programmes and curtailing the number of weapons and equipment in active service. It would appear that, today, the INF Treaty is failing to meet these goals, at least in the eyes of the U.S. administration. Whether or not this is because of Russia’s alleged breach of the Treaty or a perceived threat from third countries is of secondary importance.

  1. 1. It is noteworthy that, according to Kommersant, “following the [Russian] Foreign Ministry’s news conference on January 18, the U.S. Embassy in Moscow held a briefing on the topic. However, instead of foreign ambassadors, only political advisors to the representatives of EU member states were invited. One of the people who attended the meeting later revealed to Kommersant that the audience had been informed that the Foreign Ministry event had presented nothing but ‘propaganda,’ and that Russia was ‘in severe breach of the INF Treaty.’”
  2. 2. It is noteworthy that, according to Kommersant, “following the [Russian] Foreign Ministry’s news conference on January 18, the U.S. Embassy in Moscow held a briefing on the topic. However, instead of foreign ambassadors, only political advisors to the representatives of EU member states were invited. One of the people who attended the meeting later revealed to Kommersant that the audience had been informed that the Foreign Ministry event had presented nothing but ‘propaganda,’ and that Russia was ‘in severe breach of the INF Treaty.’”
  3. 3. Procedurally, withdrawing from the Treaty in and of itself is an interesting case in terms of the theory and practice of international law. One of the best articles on this topic was published on the LAWFARE website in the autumn of 2018.
  4. 4. Nuclear warheads are normally weigh slightly less and somewhat less precision-critical than conventional munitions, meaning that a nuclear-tipped missile of the same class may have a longer range.
  5. 5. Unfortunately, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation has not yet published an official Russian translation of the document.

First published in our partner RIAC

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