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Will Iran be able to counteract US sanctions?

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American sanctions and how to confront them

The Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) today, as in the past 40 years of its existence, is in the global spotlight as the focus of major political and economic developments.

As you know, on May 8, US President Donald Trump announced the withdrawal of the United States from the nuclear deal – the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) – and the resumption of the sanctions regime against Iran.

On August 7, the United States introduced the first anti-Iranian sanctions package that envisages restrictions on the purchase of Iranian cars, gold and metals. The sanctions also affected Iranian companies specializing in aluminum, graphite, coal, and steel, as well as those manufacturing computer programs for industrial enterprises.

On November 4, the United States will launch a second package that will deal a blow to the Iranian energy sector, in the first place, to the oil and gas industry and related industries, and will affect major transactions, that is, the IRI’s banking system.

Undoubtedly, this is a major attack on the Iranian economy. If we recall the period from 2011 to 2016, back then such international sanctions nearly threw it into an abyss in just a few months. However, today the situation is somewhat different. The anti-Iranian sanctions announced by Trump have lost their international status.

Unlike in those days, when due to Tehran’s “nuclear” persistence the entire world rose against it, today Trump’s anti-Iran initiative is not supported by anyone. The White House administration counts only on the financial and economic pressure on the disobedient and the obstinate who do not want to join the campaign against the IRI.

And these turned out to be quite a few. As they met in Vienna in July, the five participants in the nuclear deal with Iran (Russia, China, Britain, France, Germany) agreed to protect the five countries’companies from the impact of US sanctions. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said that the parties had also agreed to establish methods of maintaining trade relations with Iran which “would not depend on the whims of the United States.”

On August 7, immediately after the introduction of American sanctions against the Islamic Republic of Iran, the European Union adopted the so-called ‘blocking’ regulation which invalidates American sanctions against Iran on its territory, bans European companies from observing them and prohibits the implementation of any foreign court rulings adopted on the basis of these sanctions.

The coming into force of this regulation also allows all European organizations to claim compensation in court for damage inflicted as a result of implementation of these sanctions from persons responsible for this (referring to US authorities).

In late August, the EU began to discuss the possibility of creating an independent payment system, which would protect the European business from US sanctions against Iran. The project may involve central banks of France and Germany.

Moreover, at the end of August, the European Commission (EC) approved financial assistance to Iran to the amount of 50 million euros to solve the “key economic and social problems” of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The first tranche amounted to 18 million euros, which will be channeled “for projects in support of sustainable economic and social development in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” with 8 million euros allocated to Iranian private companies. Measures to support the Iranian private sector include assistance to Iranian small and medium-sized businesses, development of production and marketing chains, and technical assistance to the Iranian Trade Promotion Organization. Though small, the sums are important.

The EU will support Iran as long as the country is committed to “full and effective” compliance with the “nuclear deal”, which stipulates the lifting of sanctions, the executive body of the European Union specifies.

Despite measures to support Iran, the desire to preserve the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and the EU’s protests against anti-Iranian sanctions, large European and transnational companies do not really believe in the European Union being able to counteract the United States. Experts say that judging by the experience of the past, when the European Union put up resistance after unilateral actions by the White House, these not quite effective “threats” are about all the “resistance” Europe can mount, since the Iranian market, despite all its attractiveness, can not be compared with the American one. Robert Einhorn, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution in Washington, former advisor to the US Secretary of State, said: “Foreign companies are already experiencing difficulty doing business with Iran, and if all these difficulties  – non-transparent rules, corruption, poor management, etc. – become aggravated further by the risk of being cut off from the US market and the US financial system, then no reasoning from  European politicians will work.”

Right now, three months before the Americans introduce the main portion of sanctions, many large companies are leaving the IRI. In the oil sector – this is the French oil and gas giant Total. [1]

Fully aware of the situation, the Iranian leadership relies on cooperation with small and medium-sized foreign enterprises which are not so connected with the United States. Goliam Reza Ansari, the Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister for Economic Affairs, said recently: “There are 23 million small and medium-sized businesses in Europe, and they could assist us in bypassing US sanctions.” We must use the potential of European enterprises to meet our economic needs in times of trouble. We are planning to create a working group of experts to promote such enterprises throughout the country. ”

Many countries back Tehran’s anti-sanctions measures. They are prepared to buy oil from Iran, to invest in projects, to provide know-how and technology. First of all, in the oil and gas sector.

The Chinese economic analyst Kingji Su sayvili said that the Iranian economy is able to overcome US sanctions with minimal difficulties, since these measures are not supported by the international community. The Chinese expert emphasized that after the arrival of sanctions many major economies, including European countries, China and Russia, retained or even strengthened economic relations with Iran.

Indeed, the director of the Department of International Cooperation of China Petroleum and Chemical Industry Federation (CPCIF) said that China will continue to import Iranian oil, despite US sanctions. He underscored that the Chinese market and many other Asian markets strongly depend on Iranian oil. According to The Wall Street Journal (WSJ), the number one buyer of Iranian oil – China, which acquires about a quarter of its oil supplies, is unlikely to cut down on its purchases.

In turn, Investment Director of the Iranian National Petrochemical Company (NPC) Hossein Alimorad said that the amount of Chinese investments in the Iranian oil and petrochemical industry had not changed after the US withdrew from the nuclear deal. As Mr. Alimorad announced recently, the NPC has reached an agreement with a consortium of companies from China and the Philippines regarding a $ 7 billion investment in the petrochemical industry in Iran.

Moreover, Mohammad Mostafavi, Director of Investment of the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), said that China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) together with the Iranian Petropars can take over from Total, which has 50.1% of the stake in the joint project for the development of the 11th phase of the South Pars gas field, if the French company leaves Iran.

German company ADL recently signed an agreement on cooperation in the oil refining sector with the Iranian oil company Sepahan (SOC). The goal is to share technical know-how and knowledge to improve the quality of products, including industrial oils and lubricants. ADL will begin to implement this ambitious plan in cooperation with its Swiss and Austrian partners.

South Korea (ROK) said in mid-August that Seoul will provide financial support to companies affected by new sanctions against Iran, and will look into the possibility of doing business in alternative markets so as to minimize losses to the local economy. It is clear that South Korea, having bought 147 million barrels of oil from Iran in 2017, is more than interested in expanding oil business with it.

Undoubtedly, international support for Iran as it tries to battle Trump’s sanctions is of great value. However, perhaps no less important are the internal economic measures that Tehran is taking to repel, or at least soften the blow to the key sector of its economy – the oil and gas extraction and processing industries.

Oil import substitution

Leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran are stepping up measures to ensure import substitution. Thus, the Iranian Oil Ministry has banned the import of 84 types of equipment for the oil industry on the grounds that such equipment can be produced domestically.

Among the equipment and products prohibited for importation are wellhead equipment, desalination facilities, anticorrosive substances, sulfur recovery catalysts, wellhead control panels, and others.

Can the Iranians solve the problem of import substitution in the oil industry, while ensuring the necessary modernization of the entire oil and gas sector?

New sanctions against Iran have created severe challenges for Iran’s oil and gas production and its petrochemical industry.

However, it should be noted that the IRI, which was under American sanctions ever since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, has been developing its own production of oil and gas equipment. This kind of work was particularly intensive the period from 2010 to 2016, when anti-Iranian sanctions were the toughest.

The head of the Iranian oil company in southern regions Hamid Bovard said in 2013 that Iranian enterprises were producing oil and gas equipment and developing prototypes for launching into production of about seven thousand items. Mr. Howard expressed confidence that such oil and gas equipment as gas pumps, turbines, ball valves and compressors will be key to the restoration of Iran’s oil industry. By that time, eight hundred projects had been launched, with investments reaching about $ 15.5 billion. All of them aim to increase the recovery rate of crude oil and oil extraction.

Today, amid the increasing pressure from the Trump administration on Iran, measures to counteract sanctions are intensifying. According to Director of the Petrochemical Company Jam Said Shirdel, the company’s specialists, in cooperation with other Iranian companies, have developed and produced 1,000 types of products and equipment for petrochemicals which were previously purchased abroad. He added that in the next two years the company will produce 20,000 types of petrochemical products.

According to Reza Khayyamyan, head of the Association of Equipment Manufacturers of Iranian Oil Companies, the Iranian producers can provide technical services and produce 80% of advanced oil equipment for the development of oil extraction and processing projects. Mr. Hayamyan said this industry employs more than 50 Iranian companies. New contracts worth more than $ 6 billion will soon be signed with local oil extraction and refining companies.

Mr. Hayamyan made it clear that import substitution of oil and gas equipment is on the list of priorities of the Ministry of Oil, which is planning to roll out 14,000 major parts.

As we see, Iran is set on mobilizing its own resources. For one, Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council Ali Shamkhani said recently that the Iranian private sector plays an important role in counteracting the economic war, which was launched against Iran by the Trump administration.

Mohammad Hosseini, member of the Board of Trustees of the National Development Fund of Iran (NDF), said that Fund will allocate 12% of financial resources to counter US sanctions against Iran.

However, it is too early to talk about a profound modernization of the entire oil and gas complex on the basis of state-of-the-art technologies. As it happens, the most advanced technologies, know-how, innovations in the oil and gas and petrochemical industry, which mark dramatic breakthroughs in this industry and its overall renovation, are concentrated and receive special protection in the laboratories of just a few of the largest oil and gas companies, which, alas, are not ready to share these technologies with Iran.

Economy and politics under sanctions

In general, the economic situation in Iran before Trump announced anti-Iranian sanctions regime was not in its best condition. But in connection with the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action there were hopes and faith in a better future.

Now the situation has become worse because of sanctions. The rial rate has fallen, which provoked a rush for buying dollars. This further accelerated the collapse of the Iranian rial. Compared to January, when one dollar on the black market sold for 43 thousand rials, at the end of August it trade for 107 thousand. The official rate for this period decreased from about 36 thousand to 42 thousand.

In the meantime, the opposition is seizing on every opportunity to put the blame for the current situation on President Hassan Rouhani and his liberal reform Cabinet.

In late July, opposition MPs used their constitutional right to summon the president for making a report on the effectiveness of his activities. They gave President Rouhani a month to prepare the answers to their questions and explain to them why the government had done nothing to put an end of the smuggling of goods that damages production, what caused the fall of the Iranian rial, and what triggered economic recession and rising unemployment.

On August 25  President Rouhani addressed the Majlis. In particular, he said: “We are not afraid of America or economic problems. We will overcome all difficulties <…>. You can talk about unemployment, foreign currency, recession and smuggling. I think that the problem is people’s views on the future <…>. People are not afraid of the US, they are afraid of our differences. If they see that we are united, they will believe that the problems will be solved,” the president said. At the same time, he acknowledged that part of the country’s population “had lost faith in the future of the IRI and doubts its power”.

The president’s report did not satisfy Deputies of the Mejlis, who expressed their discontent with the work of Rouhani and his government. In addition to that, the MPs struck a blow to the government’s makeup by securing the dismissal of the Minister of Economy and Finance Masoud Karbasian, Minister of Labor, Social Welfare and Cooperative Affairs Ali Rabiyyi. Dismissed earlier was the head of the Central Bank, Valiollah Seif. Abdolnasser Hemmati was appointed instead.

Thus, the political situation in Iran is no longer stable being marred by visible signs of a schism within the ruling elite. However, it would be premature to suggest a crisis of the Iranian regime. The American sanctions have jeopardized the positions of only President Rouhani and his team, which was ready for a dialogue with the West. The growing political weakness of President Rouhani and his government has given a chance to his hardline opponents to strengthen their positions and exert a significant influence on the policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran at home and abroad.

For now, removal of Rouhani is not on the agenda. Supreme leader Ayatollah Khamenei, fearing an internal political explosion, is supporting the president. However, given the situation and increasing pressure from the opposition, Rouhani’s policies (both domestic and foreign) may change, though not in the direction of reforms and liberalization.

Whether Tehran will agree to new talks with Washington, to compromises on nuclear missile programs is difficult to predict. For today, it is 100% no. This would mean a ‘political death’ for Rouhani and for the supreme leader Khamenei as well. What will happen next is difficult to say. Much will depend on the ability to retain the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and, most importantly, on the ability of all opponents of Trump’s anti-Iran sanctions to confront them financially and economically.

However, Ayatollah Khamenei is rather pessimistic about this. He said on August 29 that Iran should give up hopes that Europe will save a nuclear deal. In addition, he added two important things. First, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action is not a goal, but a means, and Iran, if it finds that the Plan has ceased to meet Iranian interests, will reject it. And the second: Iran has no intention of negotiating a new agreement with the US at any level because of the “obscenity” of such talks.

Indeed, there are no conditions and no incentives for Iran entering new talks on nuclear missile issues,

Even in case of the worst of scenarios, if the IRI economy faces serious problems, the most radical groups concentrating around the political opponents of Rouhani may come to power in Tehran. These forces will not even consider the issue of negotiations with the US. The Islamic Republic of Iran will yet again become a “besieged fortress”, but this is unlikely to affect foreign policy ambitions, especially in the region. On the contrary, they will grow under the leadership of anti-Western politicians and IRGC, forming a foundation for the military and political instability in the region.

  •  [1] Total is getting ready to leave Iran before November 4. The company is developing the South Pars gas field. Total has already invested in it app. 50 million dollars. The French make it no secret that they do not want to anger Washington. The $ 2 billion project is under threat, but these losses are nothing in comparison with the fines that could be imposed on the violators of sanctions by the US Treasury, and other consequences. The most serious threat is the “cut-off” from the US financial system. For many large companies, this threat is even worse than billions in fines. For example, over 90% of all financial transactions at Total pass through US banks.
  • [2] Wellhead equipment is a set of equipment designed for tying casing strings, sealing the wellhead (annular space, internal tubing cavity, well production diversion) during drilling, well workover and well operation mode regulation.

First published in our partner International Affairs

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Public decency law puts Saudi reforms in perspective

Dr. James M. Dorsey

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A newly adopted Saudi law on public decency helps define Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s vague notion of ‘moderate Islam.’

It also lays bare the pitfalls of his social reforms as well as his preference for hyper-nationalism rather than religion as the legitimizing ideology of his rule and his quest for control of every aspect of Saudi life.

In an indication that Prince Mohammed is walking a fine line, Saudi media reported that the government was still weighing how to implement the law almost two months after it was adopted.

“This (law) is an effort to balance the pressure from conservative elements of society that accuse the (government) of allowing things to go ‘out of control’. Effecting social change is an art form — you want to push as fast as possible without provoking a counter reaction. Not easy!” Ali Shihabi, founder of Arabia Foundation, a Washington-based, pro-Saudi think-tank, told Agence France-Presse.

The law comes on the back of a series of reforms in recent years that were designed to facilitate Prince Mohammed’s plans to streamline and diversify the Saudi economy and project the crown prince as a reformer.

The reforms included the lifting of a ban on women’s driving, relaxation of gender segregation, enhancement of women’s professional opportunities, the introduction of modern forms of entertainment and the curbing of the powers of the kingdom’s feared religious police.

Prince Mohammed also vowed to revert the inward-looking, ultra-conservative kingdom to a form of moderate Islam he claimed existed prior to the 1979 Iranian revolution.

Ultimately, Prince Mohammed’s short-lived reformist image was severely tarnished by the kingdom’s devastating war in Yemen;  the brutal killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi; the mass arrest of clerics, activists, journalists and academics; his failure to lift the kingdom’s male guardianship system; and the mushrooming number of people fleeing the kingdom, including dissidents as well as women seeking to escape repressive and abusive families.

Sparking ridicule on social media, the new law defines limits of Prince Mohammed’s social reforms and creates one more anchor for his repression of any form of dissent.

The law bans men’s shorts except for on beaches and in sports clubs. It also bans garments with questionable prints that like shorts “offend public tastes.” It forbids the taking of pictures or use of phrases that might offend public decency as well as graffiti that could be interpreted as “harmful.”

The bans packages public decency as representing Saudi “values and principles” in a nod towards Prince Mohammed’s promotion of a hyper-nationalist Saudi identity.

Yet, various of its restrictions are more in line with the kingdom’s long-standing austere interpretation of Islam while others reinforce the crown prince’s repression of anything that does not amount to an endorsement of his rule or policies.

The restrictions on clothing and this month’s closure on opening night of the kingdom’s first-ever alcohol-free ‘Halal’ disco constitute an apparent effort to cater to ultra-conservatives who oppose liberalisation of gender segregation and public religious rituals such as the muted lifting of rules that force businesses to close during prayers times.

The reforms, while significant in and of themselves, stop short of dismantling what politics scholar Brandon Ives terms ‘religious institutionalism’ or the intertwining of religion and state through a “plethora of institutions, policies, and legal codes.”

Religious institutionalism complicates Prince Mohammed’s attempt to replace religious legitimization of his rule with hyper-nationalism because of its success in fusing religion with Saudi culture.

“Religion and culture are now so intertwined in what it means to be Saudi that it is hard to separate the two,” said Eman Alhussein, author of a just published European Council of Foreign Relations report on Saudi hyper-nationalism.

As a result, some nationalists have joined religious conservatives in calling for limitations on what is deemed acceptable entertainment and media content.

Ms. Alhussein noted that some online critics were cautioning that the promotion of hyper-nationalism stripped Saudis of their values in a manner that weakens their loyalty to the regime.

“Nationalism in this increasingly strident form could eventually become a Trojan horse that undermines the state,” Ms. Alhussein warned.

Nationalism’s double edge is enhanced, Ms. Alhussein went on to argue, by the undermining of the buffer function of the kingdom’s traditional religious establishment. “The state will now be more accountable for its credibility, and potentially much more exposed,” she said.

Prince Mohammed’s refusal to tackle religious institutionalism impacts not only his attempts at consolidation of his power but also his effort to project the kingdom as an enlightened 21st century state.

The crown prince, in a bid to alter the kingdom’s image and cut expenditure, has significantly reduced spending on a decades-long, US$100 billion campaign to globally promote anti-Shiite, anti-Iranian strands of ultra-conservative Sunni Islam.

Prince Mohammed has at the same time ordered state-controlled vehicles that once promoted religious ultra-conservativism to preach tolerance, mutual respect and inter-faith dialogue instead.

Mr. Ives’ analysis suggests, however, that the kingdom’s U-turn is unlikely to lead to a clean break with support abroad of ultra-conservatism without the dismantling of religious institutionalism.

He argues that the domestic pressure that persuades states such as Saudi Arabia and Iran to support co-religionist rebel groups beyond their borders is generated not by religious affinity but by religious institutionalism that creates a political role for religious forces.

Mr. Ives’ arguments appear to be borne out by continued Saudi support for Islamist militants in Balochistan, the Pakistani province that borders on Iran, as well as Algeria and Libya and propagation of non-violent expressions of an apolitical, quietist, and loyalist interpretation of Islam in countries like Kazakhstan.

Saudi Arabia’s new public decency law in effect highlights the limitations of Prince Mohammed’s reforms.

In a private conversation last year with the Archbishop of Canterbury during a visit to Britain, Prince Mohammed reportedly put some flesh on the skeleton of his vision of moderate Islam.

When urged by the archbishop to allow non-Muslims to open places of worship in the kingdom, Prince Mohammed responded: “I could never allow that. This is the holy site of Islam, and it should stay as such.”

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Why should China fully support Iran in Persian Gulf tensions?

Payman Yazdani

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According to many international thinkers creating tensions in the Persian Gulf region by the U.S. also aims at containing China and limiting Beijing’s access to energy resources of the region which is driving engine of Chinese economy.

China was one of the oil exporter countries in 70s and 80s, but following its economic growth it has turned into an oil importing country since 1993 and due to continuation of its economic growth now the country is heavily dependent on importing of oil from other countries. Nowadays the country is the second energy consuming and third oil importing country in the world. Despite the Beijing’s efforts to provide its energy security by diversifying its energy sources during the past years, the country is still heavily dependent on energy import.

Thanks to its efforts and hardworking people China left its global economic rivals behind and became the second biggest economy of the world after the United States. It seems that due to its plans and initiatives Beijing is also managing to leave behind the U.S. in near future and become the world’s biggest economy. The White House has kept an eye the China’s development and its plans and initiatives. The U.S. has never been negligent in monitoring China’s achievements and ambitions.

By changing its approaches and positive interaction with rest of the world Since 1970s, China has promoted its global position to the second biggest economy of the world while before it the country was among the third world countries. The U.S.’s efforts to contain China has become more serious since the beginning of the 21st century. Since Donald Trump took office the level of conflicts between China and the U.S. has climbed up from economic and trade level and is entering into political and security level. Now, Increase of Chinese power and global influence is a major challenge for the White House. In the first step president Trump waged wagged a trade and economic war against Beijing and in the next stage Trump is going to restrict China’s influence globally particularly among the U.S. allies.

To contain China, the U.S. has resorted to many strategies and tactics such as destabilizing west borders of China in Afghanistan and Pakistan and trying to spread to central Asia aiming at thwarting Chinese ‘One road-One belt’ initiative that many experts believe that success of this project will let China to determine the word trade orders in the future.   

Trying to intensify territorial disputes between China and its neighbors besides its trade war against Beijing are among another U.S. tactics to contain China.  

Statistics from www.worldstopexports.com website indicates that China imports its needed crude oil from the following countries:

1.    Russia: US$37.9 billion (15.8% of China’s total imported crude)
2.    Saudi Arabia: $29.7 billion (12.4%)
3.    Angola: $24.9 billion (10.4%)
4.    Iraq: $22.4 billion (9.4%)
5.    Oman: $17.3 billion (7.2%)
6.    Brazil: $16.2 billion (6.8%)
7.    Iran: $15 billion (6.3%)
8.    Kuwait: $11.9 billion (5%)
9.    Venezuela: $7 billion (2.9%)
10.    United States: $6.8 billion (2.8%)
11.    United Arab Emirates: $6.7 billion (2.8%)
12.    Congo: $6.4 billion (2.7%)
13.    Colombia: $5 billion (2.1%)
14.    Malaysia: $4.8 billion (2%)
15.    Libya: $4.7 billion (2%)

Crude oil import is driving engine of Chinese economy so any threats to energy security of China will inflict a heavy blow to the country’s economic growth and can help U.S. to win trade war against Beijing and contain it.

Above mentioned statistics show that some 43% of the crude oil that China imports goes from Persian Gulf and 4.6% goes from Libya and Venezuela that the U.S. destructive polices has already created a chaotic situation in two countries.

Many experts believe that the U.S. withdrawal from Iran’s nuclear deal known as the JCPOA under false pretexts not only aims at pressurizing Iran but also it is a way to pressurize China to compromise in the trade war that Washington has waged against it. Any conflict and tension in the Persian Gulf region which China’s economy is heavily dependent on means a great blow to the country’s economy, therefore many suspicious incidents and tensions created by Washington and its proxies in Persian Gulf region like attacking oil tankers can be interpreted as the White House’s measures to contain China in order to guarantee the U.S. hegemony and influence for the next decades.  

Commenting on possible relation between recent developments in Persian Gulf and its effects on China’s economy, Dr. Osman Faruk Logoglu a senior member of Tukey’s CHP and former diplomat says,” With its provocative actions and sanctions, Washington not only aims to buttress its support for Israel and its Arab allies by punishing Iran but at the same time also intends to deny Chinese access to Iranian oil.  The fear of and rivalry with China is today one of the primary drivers of American foreign policy.  Interruption of the oil flow in the Gulf is one way to directly hurt Chinese interests.  The Trump administration is, therefore, playing with fire in Iran and a potential conflagration with China.”

A senior Iranian analyst Sadeq Maleki also believes, “The rising tensions between the United States and Iran are mainly caused by Tehran’s independence policy and Washington’s intolerance toward this fact. However, such independence is considered as an exceptional opportunity for the Europeans and other states, especially China, that need to supply their energy from Iran and the Persian Gulf region. A big part of Washington’s policy of fomenting tensions against Tehran and making the Persian Gulf region more volatile comes in line with the White House’s plan to contain China. Iran’s resistance to the U.S.’ pressure is in fact shaping an equation, in which the Islamic Republic indirectly contributes to the interests of China and even Europe. So, China and Europe are highly expected to help Iran in this regard. In a long-term strategic perspective, the U.S.’ long distance from the Middle East, the dangers of insecurity in the Persian Gulf region, and the proximity of Europe and China to the region, heighten the need for greater coordination between Iran, China and Europe in countering the U.S.’ aggressive attitudes.”

Zeynep Oktav, an international relation Professor at Istanbul Medeniyet University also sees a close relation between U.S. created tensions in the Persian Gulf and containment of China. She said, “I believe there’s a close relation as Washington wants to dominate the Middle East with its efforts to exclude China from the region. In this context containing Iran is of crucial importance as China buys Iranian crude oil. China currently seems to change its previous policies of balancing Iran and USA. Beijing applies latest sanctions on Iran, however, it opposes any possibility of American military attack on Iran. In my opinion, USA challenges China by threatening Iran in the Middle East, the issue is not about Iran, it’s about China.”
Even some experts who don’t believe in close relation between the ongoing U.S. created tensions in Persian Gulf and containment of China by the U.S. don’t reject the possibility totally and say the relation is indirect not direct.

Prof. Larry Catá Backer of Pennsylvania State University says, “Relation between Persian Gulf tensions and U.S.-China negotiations may reflect post facto efforts to exploit serendipitous perceive opportunity; it is much less likely to represent the execution of some sort of strategic plan.”

Prof. Nader Entessar, a Professor Emeritus in the Department of Political Science and Criminal Justice at the University of South Alabama believes that if there is any relationship between the tensions in the Persian Gulf and containment of China, it is not direct.

From our partner Tehran Times

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Istanbul, the Mayoral Election Rerun: A Turning Point for Democracy?

Zakir Gul, Ph.D.

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Despite state-sponsored and private efforts to influence the outcome of Turkey’s mayoral elections on March 31 either directly or indirectly, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP) suffered major losses. Of particular note is the mayoral election in Istanbul where AKP member and former Prime Minister Binali Yildirim lost to Republican People’s Party (CHP) candidate Ekrem Imamoglu, someone who was not especially popular or well-known. He resembles the last person, who effectively challenged the AKP in general election: Selahattin Demirtas, the charismatic co-leader of the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) who has been jailed since 2016.

The outcome of the mayoral election in Istanbul reflects poorly on the president’s ability to ensure that a member of his own party remains in power in the city where Erdogan himself was elected as mayor in 1994, although with the lowest percentage(25.19%) in Istanbul election history. Since then, Erdogan has not lost even one election—be it for mayor or some other political position—despite widespread claims of corruption involving Erdogan and the AKP.

Imamoglu prevailed in the election against his AKP opponent because he was seen by many diverse people as the antithesis of Erdogan and the AKP. Istanbul voters apparently saw Imamoglu as a champion of their desire for a peaceful country and someone who could stop the ruling party’s pervasive hateful and divisive discourse and policies, its human rights violations, and its embrace of kleptocracy and kakistocracy, at least in Istanbul. Erdogan, of course, was not happy with Imamoglu’s popularity and acted as if he, too, was running against Imamoglu. Erdogan wanted his close companion, Yildirim, to win the mayoral election and resorted his usual strategy of declaring his critics terrorists. Through state-controlled media, Erdogan implied that anyone voted for his candidate, Yildirim, was voting in support of Turkey and that anyone who voted for Yildirim’s opponent, Imamoglu, supported terrorists and were enemies of state. Yildirim’s (and by extension Erdogan’s) campaign slogan was “the survival of Turkey.”The message was that for Turkey to continue to exist, the residents of Istanbul should support the ruling party, the AKP. In other words, if the ruling party is defeated, Turkey will no longer exist. The campaign slogan and the policies of the AKP received consistent support from the leader of the ultranationalist Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), Devlet Bahceli. The efforts of Erdogan and Bahceli, however, failed miserably. The winner on March 31 was Mr. Imamoglu, leaving Erdogan and Bahceli shocked at the outcome.

The election defeat was not something that Erdogan could swallow, and he made his displeasure known.  The Supreme Election Council (YSK) subsequently ruled that the mayoral election in Istanbul would be repeated on June 23. Erdogan realized that his strategy did not work this time. He also realized the importance of Kurdish voters in Turkey and that these Kurdish citizens would be the ones to determine the winner of the mayoral election in Istanbul.

Armed with these insights, Erdogan changed his campaign strategy to one that was built on gaining the votes of Turkey’s Kurdish citizens. Gone from the playbook was ethnic discrimination and the indiscriminate labeling of opponents of the ruling party as terrorists. The strategy, however, would be an uphill battle. Turkey’s Kurdish citizens have not forgotten the government’s harsh policies in the name of fighting terrorism, such as destroying houses in several Kurdish populated cities in the southeastern region of Turkey. When he developed his new campaign strategy, Erdogan most likely underestimate the power of the Kurdish vote. As the jailed HDP co-leader Demirtas warned, “Those who see Kurds as ‘simpletons who are very easy to deceive’ have always been mistaken, they will continue being mistaken.” He encouraged Kurdish citizens to go to the ballot boxes to say no to fascism and to defend their rights. In other words, Demirtas was implying that the Kurdish population should vote but not to support the AKP, as the AKP is fascist.

Discourse on the issues occurred for the first time. For example, Yildirim used the word Kurdistan during one of his political rallies. Just before the March 31 election, however, Erdogan said, “In my country, there is no region called Kurdistan.” In another example, the leader of the MHP, Bahceli, referred to the leader of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) as Ocalan. Bahceli previously had avoided calling the PKK leader by name, referring to him instead as “the chief of terrorists.”

At the same time, the leader of PKK, Abdullah Ocalan, countered Demirtas’ plea for Kurdish voters to vote in the mayoral election but not for the AKP, making an announcement through state news agency, Anadolu Agency(AA) in which he called on Turkey’s most influential pro-Kurdish party, the HDP, to remain neutral and not support either candidate in the Istanbul election rerun on June 23. Meanwhile, Osman Ocalan, the PKK leader’s brother, appeared on the state-run television network TRT Kurdi for an interview in which he supported his brother’s message and criticized the CHP and its candidate.

The outcome of the election on June 23 most likely will be the same as it was on March 31. The Kurds, whose houses and neighborhoods have been destroyed by the security forces in the name of counterterrorism policies have not forgotten what happened at the hands of the ruling AKP. They also have not forgotten the Kobani incidents, where Kurds were left to die in front of ISIS. Further, some righteous citizens who have observed the victimization of hundreds of thousands of individuals and families, regardless of their ethnicity or color, by government decrees, will also not support Erdogan’s candidate for mayor of Istanbul. They will choose the opposition candidate because they long for an end to the Erdogan regime’s constitutional and human rights violations (Human Rights Watch, 2019; UN Report, 2018) in response to Kurds who dare to disagree with the ruling party.Istanbul’s Kurdish voters will not forget Erdogan’s disdain for the Kurds. The Kurds know that Kurds,too, are human. They will not forget Erdogan’s overly political and pragmatist approach to human beings. Yesterday’s terrorist is today’s human, or vice versa, depending on the vote the ruling party needs.

If the Erdogan-supported candidate is again defeated, it is highly likely that the Istanbul mayoral election rerun will be a turning point for Turkish democracy—a turning back to Turkish democracy.

*Yusuf Gunay, Security Expert & Analyst, Cleveland, Ohio, US

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