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IEA steps up its work on energy innovation as money flows into new energy tech companies

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Investments are leading indicators of the direction of change in the energy sector. This is particularly true for investments in innovation and digitalisation, so-called “intangible assets” that will shape the technologies for supplying and using energy in the decades to come.

Across the economy, investments in long-lasting intangible assets – including software, R&D, data, management efficiency, branding – are growing and will be among the biggest sources of future productivity. In Europe, intangible investments are rising as a share of GDP, while those in more traditional, tangible capital assets are declining. In the United States, intangibles are already in the lead according to some estimates.

The International Energy Agency brings together the best global data on energy investments in its World Energy Investment report and Tracking Clean Energy Progress web platform, including investments in innovation.

Innovative energy technologies will be crucial to tackling environmental problems associated with energy use, as well as reducing consumer costs and increasing prosperity around the world. Both the public and private sectors play central roles in driving energy innovation, with private money flowing to new commercial opportunities, supported by government-backed markets that provide direction to innovative activities and government investment in novel, risky technology areas. To deliver the goals agreed by the 23 country signatories (plus the European Commission) of Mission Innovation, understanding the trends in the spending and the strategies of the private sector will be vital.

Electric mobility is leading an energy venture capital boom

The latest data on investments in start-ups from i3 shows a booming venture capital sector globally for energy technologies. Venture capital investors provide capital to multiple small companies with new ideas about how to deploy energy technologies, often combining technologies in novel ways in the hope of disrupting existing markets and delivering huge returns within five years if one of them is successful. While venture capital generally does not fund the underlying research, it is a good indicator of where people think there is scope for new technologies to meet customers’ unsatisfied needs and unseat the existing energy order.

Venture capital investment in energy technologies is flourishing, with more money flowing in 2018 than in the first two quarters of any previous year. But whereas the previous highpoint in 2008 was led by renewables – notably solar – it is now transportation that is getting all the attention, mostly electric vehicles. To complete the switch from supply-side to demand-side technologies, funding for energy efficiency (especially related to connected-buildings technology) has been higher than for renewables so far in 2018.

As we have previously noted, several factors underpin this trend. First, innovation in clean energy hardware and venture capital are often not well matched. The timeframe needed to establish the viability of energy projects can be too long, the capital requirements for technology demonstration too high and the consumer value too low. Although there is a much more established market for solar panels today, compared to 2008, there is a still a serious need to deliver better renewable technologies to the market. Secondly, while the upswing of investments is striking, the total number of deals was actually falling until this year, when it saw an 18% increase compared to the first half of 2017. What has changed is the willingness of investors – especially in Asia – to place a small number of very large bets on electric vehicle companies, which represent the hottest part of the market today.

Energy is still far from joining the ranks of biotechnology and software as a hundred-billion-dollar venture capital market. However, by combining spillovers from rapid digital technology advances with expectations of revolution in the transport system, it is currently in a growth phase. If consumers respond favourably, some of these digital and mobility ideas could be deployed at scales of millions of units relatively quickly; at such a scale new generations would be developed each year and performance improved dramatically. But is unclear whether the excitement around, for example, batteries for electric mobility could stimulate venture capital investment in electricity storage for the grid or whether venture capital will play a significant role in energy supply technology development. Markets for stored electricity are not poised to deliver such high returns in the near term and venture capital is not usually patient.

Changes and new entrants in corporate energy innovation strategy

Corporate venture capital can take a slightly more long-term view, but still more short-term than traditional corporate R&D programmes. High levels of technological uncertainty in today’s energy sector, coupled with rising competition between firms in different regions and, increasingly, different sectors, support a shift in the patterns of corporate innovation funding.

We estimate that global corporate spending on energy R&D grew 3% in 2017, to USD 88 billion, but is still lower than it was in 2014, before the oil price slumped. Over recent decades, these budgets have become less centralised and more integrated with product development in individual business units. Many major companies devote no more than one-tenth to one-third of their total R&D budgets to new technologies, with the bulk of spending going to incremental improvements of existing technologies. Given the high expectations for fundamental changes in the energy system and uncertainty about the timing and technologies involved, firms are trying to make their research budgets work as hard as possible.

Digitalisation, in particular, enables companies to place more small bets on emerging technologies and to be open to changing direction quickly. New technologies for software and digital-based products have shorter innovation cycles and can be brought to the market quicker. They require less investment and fewer consumables, and they can be prototyped more quickly and tested in a variety of environments simultaneously and do not need costly manufacturing facilities or value chains to be deployed. The result can be a lower unit cost of innovation. But it also opens energy companies up to competition from firms with core competences in information and communication technologies (ICT).

In 2017, total investment in energy technology start-ups by corporations – i.e. companies primarily engaged in making and selling non-financial products – reached USD 6.1 billion. This was a big increase compared to 2016, and was driven largely by investments by ICT companies alongside more traditional energy sector companies, including oil and gas and utilities and automakers. As with energy venture capital in general, the overall trend underpinned by several very large deals, especially in Asia. Notable deals in 2017 included Tencent and Baidu’s investments in Tesla, NIO and WM Motors; Intel’s investment in Volocoptor electric helicopters; Qualcomm’s investment in CargoX truck logistics; and China Mobile’s investment in Ninebot electric scooters.

In some cases, the entry of firms from sectors such as ICT into parts of the energy industry is forcing companies to change their perceptions of who they should consider their competitors to be.

There are several reasons large established companies provide capital to early-stage technology companies. They might see it as a good investment on a purely financial basis, but more commonly it is seen as an investment in learning about a technology, acquiring human capital, and building a relationship with the technology owner that would smooth the path to licensing or buying the technology if it is successful. In general, this approach is used with technologies that are currently outside the core competence of the corporate investor but that could add significant value to existing businesses if the market developed in that direction. Given the value of innovation to many large energy companies, corporate venture capital (CVC) finance and even growth equity (a type of private equity investment) can cost less and involve less risk than developing a technology in-house. It can also shield the developers from the strict evaluations placed on internal R&D projects housed in existing business units. For a start-up company, a CVC investor can provide access to expertise and customers that can give it a better chance of maturing quickly.

Among oil and gas companies, a noticeable recent trend is a shift away from technology areas that complement their existing infrastructure – such as bioenergy, CCUS and fossil fuel supply technologies – and towards technologies that could complement their broader capabilities or let them explore new business areas. Utilities have also increased their funding of energy technology start-ups. Worldwide, they spent a record USD 0.7 billion in 2017, surpassing the previous high of 2013 and the tail end of the clean tech boom. Solar power, electricity storage and, to a lesser extent, smart-grid technologies have been the main focus of utility funding in recent years, but growth in 2017 was driven largely by transport technologies, which took one-half of the total, and wind power technologies, which took one-quarter.

As innovation evolves, the IEA is helping policies to adapt

A growing number of energy companies are separating the teams that are focused on innovation outside their core competences, and that could in some cases undermine their existing businesses, from the governance structures of typical corporate R&D. Rather than having large budgets for research linked to sustaining existing businesses, these teams generally pursue a wider range of innovation management activities, often with lower capital requirements. These activities include VC funding, internal innovation competitions, pilot testing of competing options and more strategic partnerships with firms outside their traditional sectors. To manage risks in highly uncertain and unfamiliar technology areas, collaboration with technology suppliers, customers or across business units tends to play a larger role than in traditional corporate R&D.

Changes to the ways that new energy technologies are developed and commercialised by the private sector can require changes in the ways that governments incentivise and track innovation. Having a strong ecosystem of research institutions and energy entrepreneurs can be more valuable than tax breaks and R&D funding for making a country attractive to a large company as a place to undertake novel projects. Absolute corporate expenditure on R&D may become less closely linked to the pace of corporate innovation in low-carbon technologies. The need to collaborate to rapidly test and scale up ideas can reduce companies’ incentives to create and defend in-house intellectual property. Policy makers may need to ensure that their national or regional policies also support the improvements to capital-intensive hardware solutions needed to tackle climate change. In these areas, patient government capital for higher-risk technologies could become even more vital.

The IEA takes this public policy challenge seriously and is strengthening its work on innovation around the world. For example, on 30 September 2018, we signed a Memorandum of Understanding with India on collaboration on clean energy innovation as part of our Clean Energy Transitions Programme. We are also enhancing collaboration with Brazil and other key partner countries. Through this programme, plus our ongoing close cooperation with Mission Innovation and our leading network of Technology Collaboration Programmes, the IEA aims to support countries to have the best data and analysis on public and private sector energy R&D at their fingertips and apply international best practice in policy making.

The commentary is based on an excerpt from World Energy Investment 2018 and interviews conducted with corporate R&D leaders in late 2017 and early 2018. Source: IEA

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Bids open for Somalia’s first-ever oil block licensing round

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Somalia has announced that it is opening licensing rounds for seven offshore oil blocks. This comes days after the Federal Government of Somalia approved the board members of the newly established Somali Petroleum Authority (SPA), which will serve to be the regulatory body of Somalia’s oil and gas industry.

Somalia’s Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources Abdirashid M. Ahmed stated that the establishment of a regulator leadership is the first critical step of the implementation of Somalia’s petroleum law which was passed earlier this year and signed by President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed “Farmaajo”.

The Petroleum Law asserts that the regulatory body serves to design a financial and managerial system that fosters international competition and investment into Somalia’s oil and gas industry. While also ensuring the citizens of Somalia, and the Federal Member States see their fair share of oil and gas revenue based on the revenue-sharing agreement.

Somalia has been plagued with civil war, drought and famine for nearly three decades, tapping into Somalia’s vast oil reserves which are estimated to be approximately 30 billion barrels would greatly contribute to the rebuilding and the development of the country’s infrastructure, security, and the economic and social sectors. Exploration for oil in the East African nation started well before the nations collapse in 1991. ExxonMobil and Shell previously had rights to five offshore oil blocks in Somalia and has recently renewed its previous lease agreement with the government of Somalia. Both companies have agreed to pay $1.7 million per month in rent for the leased offshore blocks.

The Office of Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources stated that the 7 blocks which are up for bidding process are among “the most prospective areas for hydrocarbon exploration and production in Somalia”

The licensing round will take place between August 4th, 2020, and March 12th, 2021.

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Armenia’s attack against Tovuz is also an attack against Europe’s energy security

Dr. Esmira Jafarova

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The recent escalation of tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan, this time along the international border in the direction of the Tovuz district of Azerbaijan in the aftermath of an armed attack launched by Armenia on July12–14, 2020,had been brewing for some time before finally boiling over into full-fledged military clashes, the worst in recent years, that caused causalities and destruction on both sides. Azerbaijan lost more than 10 servicemen, including one general and a 76-year-old civilian. There are many reasons why this attack happened in this particular border area (and not along the Line of Contact, as usual) and at this particular time, but in this piece I want specifically to focus on one of them and, in concurrence with other internationally recognized scholars in this field, assert that this attack against Azerbaijan should be considered as an attack against Europe’s energy security and well-being.

To begin, a brief review of the history of recent developments in conflict resolution testifies that, although the year 2019 was relatively incident free along the Line of Contact between the Armed Forces of Armenia and Azerbaijan, and for the first time in many years mutual visits of journalists took pace, the year was also identified as the “lost year for the conflict settlement” owing to the lack of progress in the negotiations. This absence of progress was accompanied by incendiary rhetoric employed by Armenia’s Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan who, having ascended to power on the back of the many alluring promises of the so-called “Velvet Revolution,” found himself grappling to deliver on those ambitious reform pledges. The harbingers of heightening hostility were seen in Pashinyan’s infamous declaration during the pan-Armenian games held in Khankendi on August 5,2019, when he said that “Nagorno-Karabakh is Armenia, and that is all;” as well as his continuous insistence on changing the negotiation format –already established by the relevant decisions of the OSCE –to include representatives of the puppet regime in the occupied Nagorno-Karabakh region as an independent party to the peace negotiations.

The year 2020 started off with the January meeting of the Foreign Ministers in Geneva, and in April and June two virtual meetings were held because of COVID-19 lockdowns; however, hopes for any positive progress quickly subsided in the wake of other negative developments. The so-called “parliamentary and presidential elections” that were held by Armenia in the occupied Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan on March31, 2020, were condemned by the international community. These mock elections later culminated in the Shusha provocation,in which the “newly elected president” of the puppet regime in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan was “inaugurated” in Shusha – a city that carries great moral significance for Azerbaijan. The last straw in a hostile build-up was the denial by Pashinyan of Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s comments about a staged, step-by-step solution to the conflict; Pashinyan denied that this was ever the subject of negotiations. The very recent threats by the Armenian Ministry of Defense, which publicly threatened “to occupy new advantageous positions” in Azerbaijan, further testified to the increasingly militaristic mood among Armenia’s upper echelons.

This litany of discouraging events relating to the peace process over the last year and a half in some ways heralded what we witnessed on July12–14, 2020.This attack against Azerbaijan along the international border between Armenia and Azerbaijan reflects the deep frustration of the Pashinyan regime in its inability to bring about the promised changes. Economic problems were heightened by the COVID-19-induced challenge and decreasing foreign assistance, and this was all happening against the backdrop of Azerbaijan’s increasing successes domestically, economically and internationally. Azerbaijan has long been established as an important provider of energy security and sustainable development for Europe through the energy projects that it is implementing together with its international partners. The Baku–Tbilisi–Supsa Western Export (1998) and Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (2005) oil pipelines and Baku–Tbilisi–Erzurum (2006) gas pipeline have enhanced Azerbaijan’s role as an energy producing and exporting country, and the Southern Gas Corridor (SGC) is already becoming a reality. This 3500-km-long Corridor comprises four segments – the Shah Deniz-II project, Southern Caucasus Pipeline Extension (SCPX), Trans Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP) and its final portion, the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP). The Corridor passes through seven countries – Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey, Bulgaria, Greece, Albania and Italy – with Italy being the final destination receiving Caspian gas. Turkey is already receiving gas via TANAP and is contracted to accept up to 6 billion cubic meters of gas via this pipeline. Europe is expected to receive 10 billion cubic meters of Azerbaijani gas per year, and the first gas has already arrived on Albanian territory. The SGC is scheduled to be fully operational by fall 2020 and TAP is almost complete. Things are progressing uninhibitedly and even the COVID-19 pandemic has been unable topreventthe success of the SGC. This Corridor stands as one of the guarantors of Europe’s energy security by providing diversification of energy sources and routes, even despite Europe’s Green Deal, which also acknowledges the continent’s long-term demand for gas.

Such critical infrastructure, vital for Europe’s energy security, passes close to the border area that includes the Tovuz district attacked by the Armed Forces of the Republic of Armenia on July12–14. Armenia is the only country in the South Caucasus that is isolated from these regional energy projects owing to its policy of expansion and occupation. It is thus the only country that does not have anything to losefrom creating chaos and destruction around this critical energy infrastructure. Jealousy and the feeling of self-imposed isolation from all regional cooperation initiatives have no doubt increased Armenia’s hostility toward these energy projects. Further vivid evidence of Armenia’s belligerence against Azerbaijan’s energy infrastructure was provided by its threat to attack the Mingachevir Dam, a civilian infrastructure project that is also a vital component of Azerbaijan’s largest hydroelectric power plant. Hydroelectric power comprises the largest component in Azerbaijan’s renewable energy potential, today standing at around 17–18%ofthe overall energy balance of the country. It is not difficult to imagine the magnitude of civilian causalities in case such a destruction materializes. 

By conducting this act of aggression against Azerbaijan along the international border in the direction of Tovuz, Armenia wanted firstly, to divert attention from its own internal problems. Secondly, the regime desired to disguise its failures on the international front, especially recently when Azerbaijan initiated the summoning of a special session of the United Nations General Assembly related to COVID-19,convened on July 10, that was supported by more than 130 members of the UN. Thirdly, Armenia wanted to drag in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) against Azerbaijan by invoking Article 4, which states: “… if one of the States Parties is subjected to aggression by any state or group of states, then this will be considered as aggression against all States Parties to this Treaty…”.Fourthly, and the central thesis of this article, Armenia intended to target critical energy infrastructure implemented by Azerbaijan and its international partners, thereby jeopardizing the energy security of not only the neighboring region, but also of the greater European continent. The aforementioned existing oil and gas infrastructure aside, the SGC is set to be fully operational by fall 2020, and this multibillion-dollar megaproject offers economic, social and many other benefits to all participating countries involved in the construction and implementation of this project. Any damage to this critical infrastructure would deal a heavy blow to the current and future sustainable development of Europe.

Europe must therefore be vigilant regarding such provocations. International actors, including the European Union,OSCE Minsk Group, United Nations, United States, and the Russian Federation, called for an immediate cessation of hostilities between Armenia and Azerbaijan. However, given what is at stake,including this time the crucial energy infrastructure, had Armenia’sattack not been proportionately parried by the Azerbaijani Armed Forces, the statement made by the European Union about this recent military attack could have contained stronger language beyond just “…urging both sides to stop the armed confrontation, refrain from action and rhetoric that provoke tension, and undertake immediate measures to prevent further escalation… .” Naming and shaming the aggressor appropriately is indispensable in this situation. As Mr. Hikmat Hajiyev, Head of Foreign Policy Department of the Presidential Administration and Adviser to the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan on Foreign Affairs, also noted: “the EU should distinguish between the aggressor and the subject of aggression.”

In the 21st century, the international community should not tolerate such flagrant violations of international law; disrespect of UN Security Council resolutions (822, 853, 874, and 884) and other relevant international documents calling for an end to the occupation of Azerbaijani territories; and the feeling of impunity in instigating an attack against a sovereign state, a neighbor, and a crucial player in the realization of critical energy infrastructure projects key to Europe’s own energy security. Azerbaijan has long put up with such aggression and the occupation of its internationally recognized territories in Nagorno-Karabakh region and seven adjacent districts, and has opted for negotiations toward a peaceful solution of the conflict. Yet the aggressor cannot be allowed to continue its attacks against other parts of Azerbaijan– this time Tovuz –thereby jeopardizing not only the latter, but also energy security and sustainable development of the greater European continent just because such provocations seem to offer an escape from the regime’s domestic and external problems. Such practices should be condemned in the strongest possible terms. This should be done not only for the sake of Azerbaijan and regional security in the South Caucasus, but in the name of Europe’s own energy security and well-being. 

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Palestine Plays Regional Power Politics with Proposed Energy Deal

Dr. James M. Dorsey

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Faed Mustafa, Palestine’s ambassador in Ankara, Turkey

When Faed Mustafa, Palestine’s ambassador in Ankara, expressed interest in June in negotiating with Turkey an agreement on the delineation of maritime boundaries in the eastern Mediterranean and cooperating on the exploitation of natural resources, he was repositioning Palestine in the larger struggle for regional dominance and the future of his state.

“We also have rights in the Mediterranean. Palestine has shares in oil and gas located in the eastern Mediterranean. We are ready to cooperate in these areas and sign a deal,” Mr. Mustafa said.

Mr. Mustafa did not spell it out, but Palestine would bring the Gaza Marine gas deposit, 36 kilometers off the Gazan coast, to the table. Discovered in 1999, the field, believed to have reserves of 31 billion cubic meters, remains unexplored as a result of multiple armed Israeli-Palestinian clashes, Israeli obstruction, and repeated changes in the consortium that would have ultimately exploited the field.

Palestine’s efforts to hook up with Turkey, at a time when relations with Israel have all but broken down, coincide with stepped up Israeli attempts to stymie Turkish inroads in Palestine paved by support for activists in Jerusalem and funding of historic and cultural facilities, in the wake of US President Donald J. Trump’s 2018 recognition of the city as Israel’s capital.

The Palestinian move also is a ploy to counter several steps taken by the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia to confront Turkey in Jerusalem and the eastern Mediterranean, facilitate a US plan to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict that endorses annexation, and influence the succession of ailing 84-year old Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan vowed last week in a speech celebrating the change of status of Istanbul’s Hagia Sofia – originally built as a Greek Orthodox church in 537 AD, then renovated into a mosque before becoming a museum by the founder of the Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, in 1935 – to a mosque once again this month, that it would be “the harbinger of the liberation of the Al-Aqsa mosque.”

Al-Aqsa on the Harm-e-Sharif or Temple Mount in Jerusalem is Islam’s third holiest shrine. Backed by Israel, Saudi Arabia has sought to muscle its way into the Jordanian-controlled endowment that administers the Harm-e-Sharif.

A Palestine hook-up with Turkey could complicate Palestinian membership of the East Mediterranean Gas Forum, dubbed the OPEC of Mediterranean gas, that also includes Egypt, Cyprus, Greece, Israel, Italy, and Jordan. France has applied for membership in the Cairo-based grouping while the United States is seeking observer status.

Founded in January and backed by the UAE, the Forum is virulently opposed to Turkish attempts to redraw the maritime boundaries in the region on the back of an agreement with Libya. Turkey refused to join the Forum.

While it is unlikely that the Gaza field will be operational any time soon, production would reduce Palestinian dependence on Israel. Palestinian officials said early this year that they were discussing with Israel an extension of Israeli pipelines to send gas from Israeli gas fields to Palestine but that the talks, contrary to Israeli assertions, did not include development of the Gaza field.

In a twist of irony, Qatar, the UAE’s nemesis, would support a pipeline agreement by guaranteeing Palestinian payments for the gas. The Israeli pipeline along a 40-kilometer route adjacent to the Gaza border with three pumping stations would enable Gaza to operate a 400 MW power plant in a region that has, at the best of times, an energy supply of 15 hours a day.

The status of the talks remains unclear given an apparent delay of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s annexation plans amid international condemnation and US insistence that the Israeli leader postpone his move that had been scheduled for July 1.

Qatar reportedly threatened to cut off millions of dollars in aid to Gaza, provided in coordination with the Israeli government, if the Jewish state pressed ahead with annexation.

In June, Israel  approved the transfer of US$50 million from Qatar to Gaza in a bid to dial back mounting tension with militants in the Strip that could spark renewed military confrontation as both Israel and Palestine struggle to get a grip on the coronavirus.

Some Palestinian analysts see the pipeline deal as an attempt by the Palestine Authority (PA) to enhance its influence in Gaza and undermine Hamas – its Islamist rival that controls the Strip – by a significant contribution to a surge in the power supply and a dramatic reduction of the cost of electricity. The risk, these analysts say, is that the pipeline would increase Palestinian dependence on Israel.

Economist Nasr Abdel Karim argued that Israel would only allow enhanced flows of gas, including from the Gaza field, if it leads to an even deeper split between the territory and the West Bank.

“Israel will not allow the Palestinians to benefit from the gas field for economic and political reasons. Israel might allow this in one case — if this plan is part of a bigger project to develop Gaza’s economy so that it splits from the PA and the West Bank,” Mr. Abdel Karim said.

Author’s note: An initial version of this story was first published in Inside Arabia

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