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What will happen as a result of the Turkish Lira crisis?

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As often happens in these cases, the financial structure of the current Turkish crisis was quite simple initially: as is always the case during an electoral period, credit to businesses and families was “pumped” to such a point that, before the outbreak of the crisis, the Turkish inflation rate had already reached 16%.

Again during the campaign for the general election of June 24 last, President RecepTayyp Erdogan promised strong investment in infrastructure.

It is the usual, old theory of Napoleon III, quand le bâtimentva, tout va – but currently investment in infrastructure has a relatively low multiplier (1.9 on average) and is increasingly capital intensive rather than labour intensive.

Furthermore, the return on investment over time and the future average return, if any, become technically unpredictable.

Certainly the modern economic theory tells us that also higher infrastructure costs lead to net increases in sectors which are not directly dependent on infrastructure – such as the classic examples of the ferry cost and the restaurant owner’s profit on an island. Nevertheless the money borrowed for these operations is little or is such as to create short and relevant returns -and this can never happen.

President Erdogan’s electoral promises, however, were inevitable: according to the latest internal polls before June 24, 60% of the people who traditionally voted for AKP (Adaletve Kalkınma Partisi, the Justice and Development Party) were already loyal and stable, above all vis-à-vis the Party’s Leader. However, 30-40% of the old AKP voters were dissatisfied, to the point of calling their vote for President Erdogan into question, and 10-15% were fed up with the AKP and its Leader.

It would be the end if, God forbid, the United States sought President Erdogan’s economic destabilization to punish “the tyrant” – ideological nonsense in which it only believes – or if the European Union thought to destroy the “fascist” Erdogan to free the Turkish people, thus destabilizing a ‘huge and essential area for the European security. The uncontrolled migration would turn into an invasion and the direct contact between the EU strategic nothingness and the Middle East jihad would become lethal, but only for Europe.

During the campaign for the general elections of last June, President Erdogan had also promised public investment (and nowadays the globalized economy is such as not to allow to make promises on private investment, without funding State’s investment). He was faced with an unprecedented united front of the four opposition parties against the AKP, which did not augur well for the founder of the first Party in power.

Hence “international markets” need to become aware of it in time: without promises you can never win elections and without some electoral public spending there is no consensus. This holds true for both the West and the East. The Jordanian uprising of last spring is acase in point: nowadays springs are economic  and destabilize a larger area than the purely political ones of 2011.

“Communication”, manipulative spin, and taking some extra erotic “liberties” are no longer enough to win elections – as still happens, but not for much longer, in some Western countries.

People want and will always want employment, security, infrastructure, wages and pensions, and above all stability.

The problem, which also applies to Italy, is that the current capital is post-national and pays taxes nowhere, while the average incomes have been falling for eleven years and cannot be further attacked by tax authorities.

Hence, since we cannot generate inflation – considering that the “markets” are only interested in it – we do no longer understand where we should find the resources, even limited, to give the masses what they have always asked from politicians since the times of Marcus Agrippa.

Hence there is also the Turkish leader’s electoral reference to the figure of Atatürk – that is strange even within a traditionally neo-Ottoman and Sunni project and narrative like the ones of  President Erdogan’s Party – which would have been impossible years before. During the electoral campaign, President Erdogan also underlined the further Turkish engagement in Syria, another clearly nationalistic and even secular factor that no one would find in President Erdogan’s initial storytelling. Finally he also referred to the Turkish ties with the European Union.

Clearly the European Union currently becomes the natural strategic and economic counterpart, faced with the crisis with the United States, an old tension due to the presence of Fethüllah Gülen in the USA.

Gülen is a Turkish preacher and political scientist, allied with Erdogan until 2013, but since 1999 he has been living in the forests of Pennsylvania.

With his movement, namely Hizmit (“Service”), Fethullah Gülenis supposed to be the figure who traditionally inspired the strong penetration of the Turkish AKP bureaucracies’ into the intelligence services and Armed Forces, in particular, as well as the Turkish coup of July 15, 2016.

Probably, the United States has always looked to the Western political scientist and sapiential preacher it hosts as a sort of threat to Turkey, a sword of Damocles enabling America to prompt an “Arab spring” in Turkey or even a “colour revolution” where needed.

Islamic esoteric sects, sapiential and secret networks, halfway between coup and Revelation, often connected with the most refined Western culture and politics, as well as relations between politics, intelligence and esotericism.

Nil sub sole novi: when Italy still counted for something, even the Grand Orient of Italy was the only cover chosen by the “Young Turks”, who organized their political and military action within the ranks of the Italian Lodges of Alexandria of Egypt, Istanbul and Thessaloniki.

However, let us revert to the economy: in spite of everything, the debt-GDP ratio – the obsession of the poor-quality economists so fashionable today – is very low in Turkey (a mere 28%).

However, Turkey currently records a high trade deficit of current accounts, which amounts to 6%. Hence the private debt has risen to over 50% of GDP, thus obviously putting the currency in difficulties.

In early July, all foreign investors expected a sharp rise in the Turkish Lira interest rates- and it was a “rational expectation”.

But obviously Erdogan, who is above all a politician, a leader who, like everyone else, seeks re-election – as the political scientists of the Rational Choice school of thought maintain  – blocked the interest rates downwards, with a view to avoiding impacts on domestic consumption and on the cost of loans.

Apart from Erdogan’s direct and institutional-family influence on the Turkish Central Bank, the idea is that the interest rate growth is generated by high inflation – as maintained by the neoclassical economic theories currently fashionable everywhere. And if the opposite were true? Here the arrow of time is of great importance.

The impact was predictably negative: inflation rose very rapidly, considering that many goods and services came from abroad. Investors got scared and only at that juncture  President Trump’s new duties materialized, just to top it all off.

Furthermore, Turkish companies have always been asking for money, especially abroad, to be considered reliable, given that – like all the recent dangerous economic success stories – the AKP-led Turkey has configured itself as an almost exclusively export-oriented country.

Einaudi’s economic wisdom would recommend a balance between the internal market and the external market dimension. Today, however, everyone superficially read the fashionable manuals, where equations seem to be written for theoretical cases, not for real economies.

Apart from President Trump’s duties, which kill a dead man– as we will see later on – the critical structure of the Turkish economy is made up of the following issues, which are all still on the table: a) the free fall of the Turkish Lira, the primary index of foreign investors’ sentiment; the Turkish currency that fell for twelve days in a row as against the dollar; the longest “fall” of the Turkish lira since 1999, the year when Gülen took refuge in the United States and the International Monetary Fund had to intervene with a bailout in dollars.

Considering that Turkey lives on many strong currency imports as against an export-regulated economy, which must be based on a weak currency to have the size necessary for reaching equilibrium and break even. Hence always keeping the Turkish currency artificially “weak”, a Weimarian inflation rapidly emerged.

  1. b) The financial burdens which, as always happens in these cases, have risen more than inflation, because investors are asking for a guarantee both to offset inflation and to be hedged against the collapse of the currency.
  2. c) As to the current accounts – another structural problem – it is still obvious that, under these conditions, Turkey must attract capital from abroad with very high rates of return – only to balance the economy and break even.

This triggers an imbalance that is resolved as in the case of a drug addict: much foreign capital marginally ever harder to repay, even only for the interest share.

Later, as in a well-known Dürer’s print, the scourge of the greater incidence of foreign debt materializes, just when buying  “good” currency only with the Turkish Lira has a higher cost. Other scourges materialize such as the growth of non-performing loans and the complete Turkish dependence on foreign oil and gas, which are sold in dollars and, incidentally, are increasing their unit price.

As already seen, apart from the current situation, the structure of the Turkish economy is strictly export-oriented, with domestic imports that depend directly on the oil and natural gas prices.

The steadily increasing prices of oil and natural gas rapidly led to a Turkish trade balance deficit equal to 57 billion US dollars in the period between March 2017 and March 2018.

There is virtually no propensity for domestic savings (whereas the high rate of domestic savings is exactly what is rescuing and will rescue Italy) and therefore the Turkish dependence on foreign loans has become chronic. This dependence feeds on the low value of the Turkish lira, which is however the main problem when debt must be repaid.

The foreign debt incurred in 2018 already amounts to 240 billion US dollars.

Obviously, under these conditions, the Turkish companies operating abroad do not repatriate their profits, which remain in the most profitable markets, while the solvency of Turkish banks is exacerbating.

Finally, however, the Turkish Central Bank reacted according to the too little too late classic rule, when the lira reached 4.9290 as against the dollar, thus restricting – only at that juncture – the monetary base and finally increasing interest rates.

Hence who is bearing the brunt of the crisis in Turkey? All the many people who have taken on debts in dollars or euros, but workers are certainly not better off.

Indirect taxation on employees’ incomes now accounts for 65% of their total salaries. Obviously unemployment (and hence the “cost of the politics”) increases and finally Turkish exports will also be devalued for a period covering at least the difference between the pre-crisis levels and those of the point in which markets will declare that the great Turkish inflation is over – inflation they have triggered off by taking advantage of Turkey’s mistakes.

Inflation resulting from the forced repayment of foreign debt, which was politically excessive. A precisely Weimarian structure.

The so-called Vision 2023, which Erdogan had made public in 2011, the year of the “Arab Springs”, will be probably put to an end.

Is it possible that after the stalemate in the Syrian crisis now won by Assad and Putin, the era of “Arab springs” has come, induced by the economic crisis rather than by the “democratic rebellions”, usually managed by the Muslim Brotherhood or by some fundamentalist group, with the agreement of the major Western democracies?

The Turkish crisis as if it were a sort of Egyptian, but only financial Tahrir Square, is a hypothesis not to be ruled out.

According to Erdogan’ statements, Vision 2023 aimed at a strong growth of average incomes and at an average per capita GDP of at least 25,000 US dollars, thus enabling Turkey to rank 10th in the world economy, to triple exports up to 500 billion dollars and create ten “global” Turkish brands (a good idea, which would apply also to Italy). Finally, the idea was to solve the long-standing issue of EU membership.

The Association Agreement between the EU and Turkey was signed in 1964.

The Final Stage of said agreement concerned a complete customs agreement between Turkey and the European Union. Later, in 1999, the “pre-accession policy” came, which imposed, inter alia, the constitutional change of relations between the Armed Forces and the political system, thus ensuring the rapid Islamization of the country. Was it a blind or silly strategy? We do not know the answer to this question.

In 2004 the EU still urged to open negotiations with Turkey – negotiations which are still underway. In 2016, a few days before the coup of July 15, there was a Declaration which “reaffirmed the commitment to implement the action plan as defined on November 29, 2015”, while the Parties agreed that the accession process should be “revitalized”.

Just lip service, as the opponents of the Soviet regime used to say, when they read the CPSU’s official statements.

Reverting to the economy, even the now unlikely Turkish plan for 2023 becomes possible only if a strong and long growth is recorded, or if we seriously increase – first and foremost – domestic savings. Investment and not consumption induced by strong currency regions must be generated, while the dependence of the Turkish lira on foreign capital must be reduced.

The shift between the dollar and the euro would be possible in Turkey, considering that now 70% of Foreign Direct Investment in the country comes from the EU, which is also a sort of legal, sociological and humanitarian minuet.

This will be possible if the Turkish economy is partially dedollarized and investment comes from areas such as the EU, in particular, as well as from the Russian Federation and its friends of the  Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and hence from China.

However, for the NATO’s second Armed Force, this means a radical change of strategic planning.

For China, Turkey should stop supporting the Turkmen jihadists of Xinjiang – something which, however, it is doing ever less. It should also seriously favour Russian operations in Syria, with the guarantee of the territorial non-continuity of the future Kurdish Rojava between Northern Syria and the Anatolian territory – but currently the Kurds fight together with the Syrians in Idlib. Finally, for the future Turkey, it should buy oil and natural gas in roubles and renminbi from China and Russia, with “branded” investment to enter the Central Asian and Far East markets.

A clear link between economic reconstruction and strategic repositioning, a new vision of the Atlantic Pact to the East, which would find itself bare vis-à-vis the Persian Gulf and deprived of areas enabling it to control the Russian Federation to the South.

A fundamental defeat of NATO, faced with the increase of US duties for Turkish goods. Pure madness.

Currently, however, Erdogan has also other certainties. He knows that we need to rely ever less on the Sunni Arab world (even if Vision 2023 seems to be almost similar to the one – bearing almost the same name – drafted by the Saudi Prince, Mohammad bin Salman), considering that Saudi Arabia has other things to think about and is already welcome in the world of high public debt held by foreign investors.

Erdogan is still convinced that Russia remains an unreliable and – in any case, considering the size of its economy – unable to support Turkey, which is floundering in a crisis. He is also convinced that China has other strategic priorities in the Mediterranean and that Africa, where Erdogan invested significantly, is still a tiny market.

There would also be the EU 18th-century-style minuet, but we do not see a way out between a declaration of intent and the other.

Hence is this game worth the risk of President Trump’s increase in duties?

Let us analyse the situation. Pending the Turkish lira crisis, President Trump stated that the US import duties on the Turkish steel would increase by 50% and those on aluminium by 20%.

There is also the usual issue of Gülen in the tension between the USA and Turkey, as well as the new tension regarding the detention in Ankara of a North American Protestant pastor, Andrew Branson, accused by the Turkish Police and intelligence services of espionage in favour of the Kurds.

Considering the US intelligence services’ long tradition of use of their religious sects, this charge may be plausible.

Besides President Trump’s unpredictable tariff geoeconomics, there is also the FED’s action.

Since the 2008 Lehman crisis, the Federal Reserve has been buying and stabilizing with derivatives the sovereign and major banks’ bonds and securities issued or deposited in a phase on the verge of bankruptcy.

In 2017, however, the FED decided to “normalize” the budgets, thus leaving to the markets the already acquired securities of sovereign or non-sovereign entities, still in danger but stabilized and hence having a higher price. It sells them at a low price, but it earns more.

The FED’s portfolio of such bonds and securities is supposed to decrease by 315 billion US dollars in 2018 and by additional 437 billion US dollars in 2019.

A mass of paper that will revive short-term investment and markets’ “hit-and-run” transactions and operations.

Hence there are obvious effects prolonging the general crisis and the high absorption of capital by entities such as FED – capital that could instead be used for the economic recovery of the current peripheral areas of the world market.

What about the effects on the euro? There will be many effects, considering the presence of European economies in Turkey.

Hence a strong and stable pressure of the dollar on the euro cannot be ruled out, which will have geopolitical effects that are easy to predict.

The time needed to recover from the Turkish crisis will be measured as against the time needed for the Turkish domestic savings to recover and on the basis of the possible shift of the Turkish debt between the US currency and the currency of the EU, which is only partially a payer of last resort.

When Turkey has more money, there will be another inflationary squeeze caused by the leaders’ often inevitable political choices. And the carousel will start again.

A ride that is structurally ready, especially for the EU Southern economies.

Germany’s position on the Turkish crisis, which is fully strategic and obsessed with the migration issue, makes us lean towards this equation.

Germany will help Turkey, but with a view to opposing the USA (which will soon attack the German trade surplus with the “markets”) and, in any case, by severely restricting the Turkish exporting area, which shall anyway adapt to the German “value chains”.

Advisory Board Co-chair Honoris Causa Professor Giancarlo Elia Valori is an eminent Italian economist and businessman. He holds prestigious academic distinctions and national orders. Mr. Valori has lectured on international affairs and economics at the world’s leading universities such as Peking University, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Yeshiva University in New York. He currently chairs “International World Group”, he is also the honorary president of Huawei Italy, economic adviser to the Chinese giant HNA Group. In 1992 he was appointed Officier de la Légion d’Honneur de la République Francaise, with this motivation: “A man who can see across borders to understand the world” and in 2002 he received the title “Honorable” of the Académie des Sciences de l’Institut de France. “

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Economy

2022: Small Medium Business & Economic Development Errors

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Calling Michelangelo: would Michelangelo erect a skyscraper or can an architect liberate David from a rock of marble? When visibly damaged are the global economies, already drowning their citizenry, how can their economic development departments in hands of those who never ever created a single SME or ran a business, expect anything else from them other than lingering economic agonies?

The day pandemic ends; immediately, on the next day, the panic on the center stage would be the struggling economies across the world.  On the small medium business economic fronts, despite, already accepted globally, as the largest tax contributor to any nation. Visible worldwide, already abandoned and ignored without any specific solutions, there is something strategically wrong with upskilling exporters and reskilling manufacturers or the building growth of small medium business economies. The SME sectors in most nations are in serious trouble but are their economic development rightly balanced?   

Matching Mindsets: Across the world, hard working citizens across the world pursue their goals and some end up with a job seeker mindset and some job creator mindset; both are good. Here is a globally proven fact; job seekers help build enterprises but job creators are the ones who create that enterprise in the first place. Study in your neighborhoods anywhere across the world and discover the difference.

Visible on LinkedIn: Today, on the SME economic development fronts of the world, clearly visible on their LinkedIn profiles, the related Ministries, mandated government departments, trade-groups, chambers, trade associations and export promotion agencies are primarily led by job seeker mindsets and academic or bureaucratic mentality. Check all this on LinkedIn profiles of economic development teams anywhere across the world.

Will jumbo-pilots do heart transplant, after all, economic performance depends on matching right competency; Needed today, post pandemic economic recovery demands skilled warriors with mastery of national mobilization to decipher SME creation and scalability of diversified SME verticals on digital platforms of upskilling for global age exportability. This fact has hindered any serious progress on such fronts during the last decade. The absence of any significant progress on digitization, national mobilization of entrepreneurialism and upskilling of exportability are clear proofs of a tragically one-sided mindset.

Is it a cruise holiday, or what? Today, the estimated numbers of all frontline economic development team members across 200 nations are roughly enough to fill the world-largest-cruise-ship Symphony that holds 6200 guests. If 99.9% of them are job-seeker mindsets, how can the global economic development fraternity sleep tonight? As many billion people already rely on their performances, some two billion in a critical economic crisis, plus one billion starving and fighting deep poverty. If this is what is holding grassroots prosperity for the last decade, when will be the best time to push the red panic button? 

The Big Fallacy of “Access to Finance” Notion: The goals of banking and every major institution on over-fanaticized notions of intricate banking, taxation are of little or no value as SME of the world are not primarily looking for “Access to Capital” they are rather seeking answers and dialogue with entrepreneurial job creator mindsets. SME management and economic development is not about fancy PDF studies of recycled data and extra rubber stamps to convince that lip service is working. No, it is not working right across the world.

SME are also not looking for government loans. They do not require expensive programs offered on Tax relief, as they make no profit, they do not require free financial audits, as they already know what their financial problems are and they also do that require mechanical surveys created by bureaucracies asking the wrong questions. This is the state of SME recovery and economic development outputs and lingering of sufferings.

SME development teams across the world now require mandatory direct SME ownership experiences

The New Hypothesis 2022: The new hypothesis challenges any program on the small medium business development fronts unless in the right hands and right mindsets they are only damaging the national economy. Upon satisfactory research and study, create right equilibrium and bring job seeker and job creator mindsets to collaborate for desired results. As a start 50-50, balances are good targets, however, anything less than 10% active participation of the job creator mindset at any frontline mandated SME Ministry, department, agency or trade groups automatically raises red flags and is deemed ineffective and irrelevant. 

The accidental economists: The hypothesis, further challenges, around the world, economic institutes of sorts, already, focused on past, present and future of local and global economy. Although brilliant in their own rights and great job seekers, they too lack the entrepreneurial job creator mindsets and have no experience of creating enterprises at large. Brilliantly tabulating data creating colorful illustrative charts, but seriously void of specific solutions, justifiably as their profession rejects speculations, however, such bodies never ready to bring such disruptive issues in fear of creating conflicts amongst their own job seeker fraternities. The March of Displaced cometh, the cries of the replaced by automation get louder, the anger of talented misplaced by wrong mindsets becomes visible. Act accordingly

The trail of silence: Academia will neither, as they know well their own myopic job seeker mindset. In a world where facial recognition used to select desired groups, pronouns to right gatherings, social media to isolate voting, but on economic survival fronts where, either print currency or buy riot gears or both, a new norm; unforgiveable is the treatment of small medium business economies and mishmash support of growth. Last century, laborious and procedural skills were precious, this century surrounded by extreme automation; mindsets are now very precious.  

Global-age of national mobilization: Start with a constructive open-minded collaborative narrative, demonstrate open courage to allow entrepreneurial points of views heard and critically analyze ideas on mobilization of small mid size business economies. Applying the same new hypotheses across all high potential contributors to SME growth, like national trade groups, associations and chambers as their frontline economic developers must also balance with the job creator mindset otherwise they too become irrelevant. Such ideas are not just criticism rather survival strategies. Across the world, this is a new revolution to arm SME with the right skills to become masters of trade and exports, something abandoned by their economic policies. To further discuss or debate at Cabinet Level explore how Expothon is making footprints on new SME thinking and tabling new deployment strategies. Expothon is also planning a global series of virtual events to uplift SME economies in dozens of selected nations.

Two wheels of the same cart: Silence on such matters is not a good sign. Address candidly; allow both mindsets to debate on how and why as the future becomes workless and how and why small medium business sectors can become the driving engine of new economic progress. Job seekers and job creators are two wheels of the same cart; right assembly will take us far on this economic growth passage. Face the new global age with new confidence. Let the nation witness leadership on mobilization of entrepreneurialism and see a tide of SME growth rise. The rest is easy.

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Rebalancing Act: China’s 2022 Outlook

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Authors: Ibrahim Chowdhury, Ekaterine T. Vashakmadze and Li Yusha

After a strong rebound last year, the world economy is entering a challenging 2022. The advanced economies have recovered rapidly thanks to big stimulus packages and rapid progress with vaccination, but many developing countries continue to struggle.

The spread of new variants amid large inequalities in vaccination rates, elevated food and commodity prices, volatile asset markets, the prospect of policy tightening in the United States and other advanced economies, and continued geopolitical tensions provide a challenging backdrop for developing countries, as the World Bank’s Global Economic Prospects report published today highlights.

The global context will also weigh on China’s outlook in 2022, by dampening export performance, a key growth driver last year. Following a strong 8 percent cyclical rebound in 2021, the World Bank expects growth in China to slow to 5.1 percent in 2022, closer to its potential — the sustainable growth rate of output at full capacity.

Indeed, growth in the second half of 2021 was below this level, and so our forecast assumes a modest amount of policy loosening. Although we expect momentum to pick up, our outlook is subject to domestic in addition to global downside risks. Renewed domestic COVID-19 outbreaks, including the new Omicron variant and other highly transmittable variants, could require more broad-based and longer-lasting restrictions, leading to larger disruptions in economic activity. A severe and prolonged downturn in the real estate sector could have significant economy-wide reverberations.

In the face of these headwinds, China’s policymakers should nonetheless keep a steady hand. Our latest China Economic Update argues that the old playbook of boosting domestic demand through investment-led stimulus will merely exacerbate risks in the real estate sector and reap increasingly lower returns as China’s stock of public infrastructure approaches its saturation point.

Instead, to achieve sustained growth, China needs to stick to the challenging path of rebalancing its economy along three dimensions: first, the shift from external demand to domestic demand and from investment and industry-led growth to greater reliance on consumption and services; second, a greater role for markets and the private sector in driving innovation and the allocation of capital and talent; and third, the transition from a high to a low-carbon economy.

None of these rebalancing acts are easy. However, as the China Economic Update points out, structural reforms could help reduce the trade-offs involved in transitioning to a new path of high-quality growth.

First, fiscal reforms could aim to create a more progressive tax system while boosting social safety nets and spending on health and education. This would help lower precautionary household savings and thereby support the rebalancing toward domestic consumption, while also reducing income inequality among households.

Second, following tightening anti-monopoly provisions aimed at digital platforms, and a range of restrictions imposed on online consumer services, the authorities could consider shifting their attention to remaining barriers to market competition more broadly to spur innovation and productivity growth.

A further opening-up of the protected services sector, for example, could improve access to high-quality services and support the rebalancing toward high-value service jobs (a special focus of the World Bank report). Eliminating remaining restrictions on labor mobility by abolishing the hukou, China’s system of household registration, for all urban areas would equally support the growth of vibrant service economies in China’s largest cities.

Third, the wider use of carbon pricing, for example, through an expansion of the scope and tightening of the emissions trading system rules, as well power sector reforms to encourage the penetration and nationwide trade and dispatch of renewables, would not only generate environmental benefits but also contribute to China’s economic transformation to a more sustainable and innovation-based growth model.

In addition, a more robust corporate and bank resolution framework would contribute to mitigating moral hazards, thereby reducing the trade-offs between monetary policy easing and financial risk management. Addressing distortions in the access to credit — reflected in persistent spreads between private and State borrowers — could support the shift to more innovation-driven, private sector-led growth.

Productivity growth in China during the past four decades of reform and opening-up has been private-sector led. The scope for future productivity gains through the diffusion of modern technologies and practices among smaller private companies remains large. Realizing these gains will require a level playing field with State-owned enterprises.

While the latter have played an instrumental role during the pandemic to stabilize employment, deliver key services and, in some cases, close local government budget gaps, their ability to drive the next phase of growth is questionable given lower profits and productivity growth rates in the past.

In 2022, the authorities will face a significantly more challenging policy environment. They will need to remain vigilant and ready to recalibrate financial and monetary policies to ensure the difficulties in the real estate sector don’t spill over into broader economic distress. Recent policy loosening suggests the policymakers are well aware of these risks.

However, in aiming to keep growth on a steady path close to potential, they will need to be similarly alert to the risk of accumulating ever greater levels of corporate and local government debt. The transition to high-quality growth will require economic rebalancing toward consumption, services, and green investments. If the past is any guide to the future, the reliance on markets and private sector initiative is China’s best bet to achieve the required structural change swiftly and at minimum cost.

First published on China Daily, via World Bank

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The US Economic Uncertainty: Bitcoin Faces a Test of Resilience?

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Is inflation harmful? Is inflation here to stay? And are people really at a loss? These and countless other questions along the same lines dominated the first half of 2021. Many looked for alternative investments in the national bourse, while others adopted unorthodox streams. Yes, I’m talking about bitcoin. The crypto giant hit records after records since the pandemic made us question the fundamentals of our conventional economic policies. And while inflation was never far behind in registering its own mark in history, the volatility in the crypto stream was hard to deny: swiping billions of dollars in mere days in April 2021. The surge came again, however. And it will keep on coming; I have no doubt. But whether it is the end of the pandemic or the early hues of a new shade, the tumultuous relationship between traditional economic metrics and the championed cryptocurrency is about to get more interesting.

The job market is at the most confusing crossroads in recent times. The hiring rate in the US has slowed down in the past two months, with employers adding only 199,000 jobs in December. The numbers reveal that this is the second month of depressing job additions compared to an average of more than 500,000 jobs added each month throughout 2021. More concerning is that economists had predicted an estimated 400,000 jobs additions last month. Nonetheless, according to the US Bureau of Labour Statistics, the unemployment rate has ticked down to 3.9% – the first time since the pre-pandemic level of 3.5% reported in February 2020. Analytically speaking, US employment has returned to pre-pandemic levels, yet businesses are still looking for more employees. The leverage, therefore, lies with the labor: reportedly (on average) every two employees have three positions available.

The ‘Great Resignation,’ a coinage for the new phenomenon, underscores this unique leverage of job selection. Sectors with low-wage positions like retail and hospitality face a labor shortage as people are better-positioned to bargain for higher wages. Thus, while wages are rising, quitting rates are record high simultaneously. According to recent job reports, an estimated 4.5 million workers quit their jobs in November alone. Given that this data got collected before the surge of the Omicron variant, the picture is about to worsen.

While wages are rising, employment is no longer in the dumps. People are quitting but not to invest stimulus cheques. Instead, they are resigning to negotiate better-paying jobs: forcing the businesses to hike prices and fueling inflation. Thus, despite high earnings, the budget for consumption [represented by the Consumer Price Index (CPI)] is rising at a rate of 6.8% (reported in November 2021). Naturally, bitcoin investment is not likely to bloom at levels rivaling the last two years. However, a downfall is imminent if inflation persists.

The US Federal Reserve sweats caution about searing gains in prices and soaring wage figures. And it appears that the fed is weighing its options to wind up its asset purchase program and hike interest rates. In March 2020, the fed started buying $40 billion worth of Mortgage-backed securities and $80 billion worth of government bonds (T-bills). However, a 19% increase in average house prices and a four-decade-high level of inflation is more than they bargained. Thus, the fed officials have been rooting for an expedited normalization of the monetary policy: further bolstered by the job reports indicating falling unemployment and rising wages. In recent months, the fed purview has dramatically shifted from its dovish sentiments: expecting no rate hike till 2023 to taper talks alongside three rate hikes in 2022.

Bitcoin now faces a volatile passage in the forthcoming months. While the disappointing job data and Omicron concerns could nudge the ball in its favor, the chances are that a depressive phase is yet to ensue. According to crypto-analysts, the bitcoin is technically oversold i.e. mostly devoid of impulsive investors and dominated by long-term holders. Since November, the bitcoin has dropped from the record high of $69,000 by almost 40%: moving in the $40,000-$41,000 range. Analysts believe that since bitcoin acts as a proxy for liquidity, any liquidity shortage could push the market into a mass sellout. Mr. Alex Krüger, the founder of Aike Capital, a New York-based asset management firm, stated: “Crypto assets are at the furthest end of the risk curve.” He further added: “[Therefore] since they had benefited from the Fed’s “extraordinarily lax monetary policy,” it should suffice to say that they would [also] suffer as an “unexpectedly tighter” policy shifts money into safer asset classes.” In simpler terms, a loose monetary policy and a deluge of stimulus payments cushioned the meteoric rise in bitcoin valuation as a hedge against inflation. That mechanism would also plummet the market with a sudden hawkish shift.

The situation is dire for most industries. Job participation levels are still low as workers are on the sidelines either because of the Omicron concern or lack of child support. In case of a rate hike, businesses would be forced to push against the wages to accommodate affordability in consumer prices. For bitcoin, the investment would stay dormant. However, any inflationary surprises could bring about an early tightening of the policy: spelling doom for the crypto market. The market now expects the job data to worsen while inflation to rise at 7.1% through December in the US inflation data (to be reported on Wednesday). Any higher than the forecasted figure alongside uncertainty imbued by the new variant could spark a downward spiral in bitcoin – probably pushing the asset below the $25000 mark.

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