Which country has already suffered the greatest losses through the new U.S. strategy announced a year-and-a-half ago by President Donald Trump?
Clearly not Russia, whose relations with Washington were far from perfect even under the previous U.S. administration. Nor is it Mexico or Canada: even Trump is unable to turn the tables on the United States’ relations with its closest neighbours so rapidly and radically. With the exception of Iran, Syria, Cuba and the other habitual targets of U.S. attacks, Germany and China have the most reason to be unhappy with the current U.S. policy.
Trump has been applying particularly strong pressure on Berlin and Beijing; the two countries’ current and, more importantly, potential losses from America’s protectionist stance far exceed the losses of all the other US trading partners combined. In addition, Washington has a serious political axe to grind with Germany and China. Berlin is being chided for its “insufficient contribution” to the NATO budget and its unswerving commitment to the Nord Stream II gas pipeline, whereas Beijing is suspected of “hegemonic aspirations” in the Asia-Pacific and of its attempted “expansion” into the Indian Ocean.
If talking common sense, Chancellor Merkel and President Xi would be better off keeping closer to each other: they stand a better chance of weathering the pressure from the United States as a united front than on their own. Given the two countries’ impressive combined potential, the transcontinental Berlin–Beijing axis could become a worthy strategic response to the unprecedentedly strong and brutal U.S. pressure, even more so if this alliance secures the support of several other major countries between the Brandenburg Gate and Tiananmen Square. Including Moscow, which has its own agenda.
How likely is such a new alliance to emerge in the foreseeable future? What are the potential opportunities and limitations of a rapprochement between Germany and China? What consequences would increased cooperation between the two countries have for Russia? The answers to these questions are critical not only to the future of the Eurasian space, but also to the fate of the new world order as a whole.
The Chinese Groom and the German Bride
The Berlin–Beijing axis first manifested itself as a possibility immediately after the new president took office in the United States. Trump’s electoral victory raised serious concerns in China, and came as a true shock to the German political establishment. Symptomatically, on the eve of the G20 summit in Hamburg in July 2017, Trump paid a demonstrative visit to Warsaw at the precise moment that Germany–Poland relations were experiencing yet another dip. Coincidentally or not, Merkel was rolling out the red carpet for Xi Jinping in Berlin. Six months prior to that, China had been announced as Germany’s largest trading partner for 2016 for the first time in history.
Beijing’s interest in Berlin is not confined to China’s desire to further expand bilateral trade, boost investment and secure access to the latest German technology. With the new U.S. administration in power, the Chinese government is looking for ways to demonstrate its increased concern for the global problems Germany worries about, from climate change and WTO reforms to assistance to African countries. The Chinese leadership’s traditional statements as to the importance of free trade, the dangers of protectionism, the advantages of multilateral approaches and the need to adhere to the common rules of the game (Xi Jinping’s keynote address in Davos, Switzerland in January 2017 is one example) are primarily intended for Berlin’s ears.
It is hardly surprising that in the emerging romance between China and Germany, Beijing plays the role of the decisive and persistent young man, whereas Berlin is the wary and calculating girl eager to gain the most from the potential relationship. To begin with, China is much stronger than Germany in terms of its economic and demographic potential, geopolitical position and military might. China is a permanent member of the UN Security Council, and also possesses nuclear arms. In other words, China is a full-blown major power, whereas Germany right now is not. Therefore, any relationship between the two countries will inevitably be asymmetric, with the balance tipped in China’s favour, and this asymmetry will need to be compensated for in one way or another.
Second, China has greater room for manoeuvre in the international political arena than Germany. Currently, the country is not a party to any rigid politico-military or economic blocs; BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, these amorphous and barely binding associations, are beside the point here. Germany, for its part, has numerous fairly tangible obligations within NATO and the European Union. Berlin may be the driver of the European Union, but within NATO it often finds itself playing supporting roles. To continue with the romantic parallels, China the young man is single and free, whereas the girl is bound by close ties with numerous and often quite demanding European relatives, and is unwilling to sacrifice these ties under any circumstances. Whether the existence of “relatives” gives Germany extra bargaining chips in its contacts with China or actually weakens its position is a moot question, but the significance of this factor should not be underestimated.
Third, potential rapprochement is being hindered by the fundamental differences in values. It is difficult to build a strong relationship of trust if one of the partners has a conservative religious background and the other is an inveterate atheist. Germany today is perhaps the leading vector of traditional liberal values, not just in Europe but in the whole world. China’s political model of authoritarian modernization, for its part, is the exact opposite of Western liberalism. Predictions to the effect that the emergence of a middle class in China would inevitably result in the country drifting towards Western-style pluralistic democracy have so far been proven wrong. If anything, China appears to be drifting in the opposite direction.
Fourth, the Berlin Fräulein already has a young man, one that has for decades remained her key partner, protector and, to a great extent, an indisputable authority and guru. That young man lives in Washington. Germany and the United States have had their share of misunderstandings and even quarrels over the years; suffice it to recall Berlin’s resolute opposition to the U.S. intervention in Iraq back in 2003. Yet, until very recently, very few in Germany could picture their country’s future outside the close military, political and economic alliance with the United States. Remove that support, and the entire structure of Germany’s foreign policy would collapse in no time.
This last argument needs to be addressed in greater detail. It would be fair to say that in all of its long and sometimes dramatic post-World War II history, Berlin has never been exposed to attacks, threats, blatant pressure and even blackmail on the part of Washington on a scale similar to what has been going on in the past 18 months. Never before have the views of the leaders of the two countries been so far apart and the level of mutual trust so low.
One could, of course, argue that Trump will eventually go and the American people will remain. However, it was these same American people that elected Trump as their president in the first place in November 2016, albeit not unanimously. In fact, Trump’s popularity in America appears to be growing rather than declining. Whatever the case, it is obvious that Berlin will continue to suffer from the political and psychological consequences of the current transatlantic relations crisis long after the current president leaves the White House. The bilateral relations are not going to return to what they were during the times of the Obama administration any time soon, despite the hopes of German politicians and intellectuals with their orthodox Atlantic world view.
Five Lessons in Seduction
As we can see, China is to play the leading role in the emerging rapprochement. How can Beijing possibly dispel Berlin’s doubts as to the purity of its intentions? What price would the Chinese leadership have to pay for this? Let us take a closer look at Berlin’s main fears.
First, Berlin is extremely uncomfortable with Chinese investors methodically buying German businesses that specialize in the most promising sectors of technological development. Germany suspects that China is driven by more than just commercial interests; that it is, in fact, pursuing a national strategy aimed at gaining a technological advantage over the West in general and Germany in particular by the end of next decade. China invested nearly $14 billion in Germany in 2017, or almost two-thirds of its total investments in Europe.
Germany became aware of the potential threat. In 2018, Berlin partially nationalized one of the country’s largest power grid operators in order to prevent Chinese investors from buying into it. Preventive measures were also taken with regard to a major German hi-tech machine-tool specialist company that resulted in a potential Chinese buyer being forced to abandon its plans. These steps evidently contradict the general principles of Germany’ foreign trade policy, and would have been impossible just a few years ago (Russia’s Sberbank did fail to buy Opel at some point in the past, but then the deal fell through due to the position of General Motors, the U.S. owner of the German car maker).
What could China do in this respect? The most logical solution would be to provide for maximum possible reciprocity by granting German investors unhindered access to the hi-tech sector of the Chinese economy. This remains a problematic topic: China’s hi-tech sector is still largely impenetrable to foreigners. Greater transparency of business practices and a consistent fight against corruption would also raise Germany’s trust in Chinese investors. Beijing is sure to find these steps to be quite difficult and even risky, but a serious relationship with Berlin is bound to come at a price.
Second, Germany is concerned about the possibility of the balance of its trade with China changing dramatically in the coming years. Unlike the United States, Germany currently enjoys a significant surplus in trade with Beijing: exports stood at $96 billion in 2017, and imports amounted to $71 billion. Some fear, however, that the recently unleashed trade war between the United States and China may prompt Beijing to switch a significant portion of its exports to Europe, including Germany, which has the most capacious market in Europe. As a result, Germany could not just lose its current surplus, but would eventually find itself in a situation similar to that in which the United States currently finds itself.
These fears are justified: sooner or later, Beijing will ask Berlin to balance out bilateral trade. It would of course be a grave mistake to do so in the style of Trump, i.e., by twisting Germany’s arm. Quite on the contrary, the Chinese leadership has a great opportunity to demonstrate how different its balancing-out methods are from those used by the United States.
Furthermore, if the full-scale U.S.–China trade war eventually breaks out, Beijing could invite Germany to replace the United States as an exporter to the Chinese market. Germany already exports about twice as many cars to China as the United States, but U.S. exports are still significant at about 10 per cent of the market. China could discuss this opportunity with its German partners.
Third, Germany is rightly irritated by Beijing’s activity in Berlin’s “backyard” – that is, in Central and Eastern Europe and the Balkans. One particular irritant for Berlin is the 16+1 cooperation mechanism created by China for these countries, which involves regular meetings at the highest level. This format is perceived in Germany as China attempting to undermine European unity and gain backdoor access to the European Union. First, because the format involves 11 EU member states alongside five non-aligned countries of the Western Balkans. Second, because the 16+1 mechanism gets to discuss, among other things, issues pertaining to the EU remit (infrastructure development, e-commerce, etc.). An additional vexing point for Berlin was the fact that the latest 16+1 summit took place just several days before the July 2018 EU–China summit.
One could, of course, dismiss Germany’s suspicions and fears as being unreasonable and even hypocritical. After all, Germany consistently opposes any “privileged interests” in Europe and promotes all countries’ sovereign right to choose their partners and cooperation formats. Should Beijing resort to such rhetoric, it would doubtlessly earn a standing applause from Moscow. It is, however, hardly in China’s best strategic interest to ignore Germany’s fears, no matter how unfounded: Berlin is more important to Beijing as a potential strategic partner than all of Central Europe and the Balkans. So, if the road to Berlin lies through Brussels, then Beijing will take it.
Beijing has already made token concessions to the European Union: in future, 16+1 summits will be held once every two years and not annually as before. The Chinese leadership has been consistent in stating unequivocally that Beijing is interested in a unified European Union. Beijing has been careful not to support Eurosceptics, populists, right-wing radicals and other marginal forces within the European Union. Yet China could do even better, such as offering Berlin a joint China–Europe development programme for the Western Balkans in order to refute any suspicions about a possible hidden agenda on the part of China that is aimed at “infiltrating” this very important European region.
Fourth, in assessing the advantages and disadvantages of closer cooperation with Beijing, Berlin naturally wonders how this rapprochement would affect its relations with other Asian partners: Japan, India, the ASEAN countries, Australia, New Zealand, etc. It would certainly be extremely short-sighted of Germany to sacrifice these relations or even give its historic Asian friends a reason to doubt its strategic political priorities.
It is, therefore, in Beijing’s best interests to promote the potential Sino-German axis not as a stand-alone bilateral geo-economic project, let alone a geopolitical one, but rather as an important component of a broader multilateral plan aimed at creating a single Eurasian economic space. The implementation of this plan should prompt individual Asian countries to gradually forget about their bilateral disagreements in the face of the common long-term development targets. It would be too foolhardy of Beijing to seek Berlin’s direct support for its stance on the territorial disputes in the South China Sea, or to prompt Germany to side with China in its conflict with India.
Fifth, the most difficult obstacle to closer cooperation between China and Germany is the current gulf between Germany’s liberal political system and China’s authoritarian one. No sane politician in Berlin can possibly overlook the human rights violations in China, neglect the fate of Chinese dissidents, turn a blind eye to the discrimination against ethnic and religious minorities, ignore the existing restrictions on the dissemination of information and many other manifestations of Chinese authoritarianism. These values have always been and will continue to be a bone of contention in bilateral relations.
However, just because a fundamental solution of the values problem cannot be reached does not mean no progress is possible in this respect. China’s symbolic concessions with regard to individual dissidents are absolutely important (in the latest such development, Liu Xia, the widow of Nobel laureate Liu Xiaobo, was permitted to travel to Germany). It appears to be of even greater import, however, for the two countries to develop contacts along the lines of civil society, education, culture, youth and women’s organizations. For this to happen, China needs to turn Germany into a “fashion,” so as to change the Chinese public’s perception of the West as being primarily associated with the United States.
Why is Trump Not Afraid?
Even the remote and purely hypothetical possibility of a China–Germany alliance should be the cause of great concern for any serious politician in Washington. There is hardly any other geo-economic combination on the planet capable of posing such a threat to the United States, this key economic, financial, scientific and technological centre of the modern world. History teaches us that a war against two strong adversaries at once can rarely be won. A China–Germany alliance, even a short-lived one, should appear particularly threatening to the current U.S. administration, which is in the habit of assessing international challenges primarily from the standpoint of America’s short-term economic interests.
Is Trump afraid of a trade and economic war on two fronts? He appears not to be. If he were afraid, he would be behaving somewhat differently. At the very least, he would be more tactful and understanding with regard to one of his oldest and most reliable European allies. So far, however, quite the opposite is true. It seems at times that the President of the United States is actually pushing the German bride into the embraces of the Chinese groom. Such shocking behaviour needs some rational explaining.
Some of Trump’s political opponents tend to explain the President’s behaviour as manifestations of his personality quirks. In their opinion, he is simply unable to keep a comprehensive picture of the world in his mind, nor does he want to think strategically. Therefore, the reasoning goes, Trump views the United States’ relations with Germany and China as separate and unrelated prongs of America’s foreign policy. He does not give a though to the possible consequences for the Germany–China relations of America’s growing pressure on Beijing and Berlin.
Another explanation of the Trump administration’s policy can be described as “the presumption to power of the United States”: the White House is closely monitoring the progress of the attempted Germany–China rapprochement, but does not believe that it will succeed. The United States’ relations with both Germany and China remain asymmetric: the latter two are more dependent on the United States than the other way around. The White House may be under the impression that even if Berlin and Beijing unite efforts, they will still be unable to create a global financial, economic and technological centre that would be independent from Washington. Furthermore, neither China nor Germany has dared so far to resort to symmetric measures in response to the latest bouts of U.S. economic pressure. Therefore, the White House has no cause for concern, at least not in the foreseeable future.
The third and, in our opinion, most convincing explanation is that the Trump administration is simply incapable of imagining that German politicians are prepared to revise their views on the world, and of Germany’s desirable place in that world. U.S. political circles have long grown used to the periodic outbursts of anti-American sentiment in Germany; these outbursts are not perceived as posing any serious threat to the U.S.–Germany alliance for as long as they do not affect the German political establishment. This was the case during the German anti-war movement in the late 1970s and the early 1980s and during George W. Bush’s presidency. History may yet repeat itself under Trump, too.
One thing is obvious, however: Trump is applying much greater pressure on Germany than his Republican predecessors. The United States is making a show of demeaning not just the current German leadership, but the German political class as a whole, precisely when marginal German nationalism is beginning to awaken from its protracted slumber (as evidenced by the success of the Alternative for Germany party in the latest election). The combination of the imminent systemic crisis in Germany’s domestic politics and the loss of reliable international support in the form of the transatlantic partnership could create the prerequisites for an “ideal storm” in German politics with most unpredictable consequences.
The cockiness with which the current American leadership is treating Germany may eventually result in something similar to what Moscow got in exchange for its arrogance towards Berlin. Such a comparison might be farfetched, but we believe that it merits attention.
Russia had long believed that its “special relationship” with Germany would remain no matter what. Moscow was banking on the Germans’ “historical guilt” over the country’s role in World War II, and expected Berlin to never forget the role Russia had played in Germany’s unification. There were hopes for the rapid development of bilateral trade and economic cooperation, including with Germany’s leading major businesses.
Busy with all these calculations and hopes, Moscow overlooked the moment when it lost its erstwhile status as Berlin’s “privileged partner”; Germany stopped being an unconditional lobbyist for Russia’s interests in the Euro-Atlantic community. Moscow equally overlooked the moment of the generational change in German politics, with a new generation of leaders emerging in the political arena for whom the World War II and even the unification of Germany were nothing more than mere episodes in the country’s centuries of dramatic history.
It would of course be oversimplifying things to draw direct parallels between Germany’s Ostpolitik, which has long disappeared, and its modern, still fairly viable Atlanticism. Fidelity to Atlantic unity has always run much deeper in German society than its adherence to “Eastern politics” and Berlin’s willingness to maintain the “special relationship” with Moscow. Still, the Trump administration could benefit from looking at Russia’s experience, which is something that it is obviously not doing. Therefore, even without China factored in, it is obvious that the risks for the transatlantic partnership continue to grow.
An Axis or a Triangle?
Unfortunately, Russia does not appear to be in a position to play a leading part in the new game that is beginning to unravel in Eurasia. Its economic potential is too limited, and its positions in the emerging Eurasian interdependence system are too weak. On the other hand, Russia cannot afford to stay on the outside, since its future will largely depend on the outcome of the emerging confrontation of the Unites States with Germany and China.
The successful development of cooperation between Germany and China would be beneficial to Moscow, if only because it would deprive Washington of its current monopoly to determining the fundamental rules of the game in the global economy. There is very little hope that relations between Washington and Moscow will improve any time soon; for as long as the United States gets to dictate the rules, Russia will be consistently ousted to the periphery of the world economy. There is also the constant threat of extraterritorial U.S. sanctions, as illustrated by Iran.
In the meantime, China and Germany are Moscow’s main trade partners and are likely to retain this status for a long time. In fact, economic ties with Beijing and Berlin remain complementary for Russia: the countries are Moscow’s main points of entry into the global economy. It would, therefore, be entirely logical for Russia to feel enthusiastic about the possibility of taking part in the creation of the Berlin–Beijing axis and attempting to turn it into an equilateral triangle.
It should be noted that Russia has no interest whatsoever in the destruction of the present liberal world economic order, whose protection is to serve as the foundation of the China–Germany rapprochement. This, despite the fact that the term “liberalism” has recently acquired strong negative connotations within Russia. Just like any other participant in the international economic system, Moscow may have its problems with some aspects of this world order. However, excessive protectionism, the abandonment of multilateralism, the decline of universal international economic organizations and the world splitting into opposing trade blocs would do nothing to help Russia integrate into the global economy; nor will they facilitate the country’s economic modernization.
The opportunity to integrate into the China–Germany cooperation processes would provide Moscow with additional room for manoeuvre, enabling it to offset the “turn to the East” by a re-activation of contacts with the West. In the long run, the China–Germany axis could turn into one of the pillars of the “Greater Eurasia” concept, which has been actively discussed in Moscow of late.
However, a rapprochement between Germany and China per se would not automatically generate new opportunities for Russia. Beijing may well stick to its long-standing practice of pursuing parallel political courses in its relations with Moscow and Berlin. Germany in the current situation would certainly prefer to develop cooperation with China without involving Russia, which has only been creating problems for Berlin – at the very least until the Ukrainian crisis has been truly resolved. It is, therefore, extremely important for Moscow to not become the odd man out in the China–Germany alliance, and to contribute its unique advantages to the axis.
These advantages should certainly go beyond Russia’s geographical situation: there are plenty of transit options between China and Germany, not all of them passing through Russian territory. Moscow should, therefore, look for different kinds of opportunities, such as tripartite development projects for the Balkans, Central Asia and Afghanistan. Other opportunities could include initiatives that would marry security to development, such as migration management, the prevention of political radicalism and addressing the challenges associated with new technologies. In any eventuality, Russia’s value for both Germany and China will be largely defined by its ability to shift from the current inertial economic model to an innovative one.
In addition, as was already mentioned, no separate Russian or Chinese policy with regard to Germany can exist out of the broader EU context. Neither the United States, nor China, nor Russia will replace the European Union at the centre of Germany’s universe. Therefore, Moscow cannot expect to be on good terms with Germany while simultaneously being on bad terms with the European Union. Just like with China, the road to Berlin for Russia inevitably runs through Brussels. So, this road needs to be taken, no matter how long, winding and difficult it may turn out to be.
There may be different opinions about the chances the potential China–Germany alliance has to succeed. It is possible that an alternative geo-economic structure will emerge instead, such as a Berlin–Tokyo axis or a close partnership between the European Union and India. It appears indisputable, however, that the major actors in the global political arena are now required to make major, non-orthodox and perhaps even paradoxical decisions.
So far, most of these actors have been biding their time, hedging emerging political risks, carefully calculating the balances of group interests, maintaining the status quo and hoping that the situation would somehow rectify itself, solely on the strength of their having chosen “the right side of the barricades.” This is perhaps how Roman aristocrats behaved towards the end of the Empire.
Trump is not one of them. He is often rightly accused of being unprofessional, impulsive, lacking in strategic vision and of many other sins. That said, he is actually trying to solve the United States’ global problems rather than postponing them until the next term in office or not passing them on to the next generations. In other words, Trump is a man of action, a trait rarely to be found in the contemporary world. For this reason, until other leaders in Europe and Asia begin to demonstrate a similar capacity, Trump will always have, at the very least, an important tactical advantage over his opponents.
First published in our partner RIAC
Marine Le Pen’s Nationalist Ideology and the Rise of Right-Wing Parties in Europe
“When you decide to stand against injustice, expect that you will be cursed and then betrayed and then atoned, but do not keep quiet about injustice in order to be told that you are a man of peace.” Marine Le Pen stood in the face of injustice and said the word of truth without hesitation. As the truth hurts, Le Pen has faced much criticism, insults, and opposition campaigns. Marine Le Pen, the candidate for the 2017 French presidential election, lost to Emmanuel Macron, a moderate centrist young man who believed in economic and political openness to Europe, and her loss was an expression of democracy and freedom.
What will change in France and Europe after Macron takes office? Had Le Pen come to power, what would have happened? Why was this powerful campaign against Le Pen?
Marine Le Pen is the president of the National Front and the daughter of Jean-Marie Le Pen, the extreme right-wing political party in France. Since French society is a mixture of different civilizations, cultures and religions, Le Pen has not won many votes and was not accepted by the society because her project was France first, not Europe first, and the fight against terrorism was one of its priorities, without the support of anyone or the consent of religious and political groups to carry out this process. Le Pen’s experience is not new. When her father ran in the past, he called for the reinstatement of the French franc, the restoration of French identity instead of the European one and the implementation of a French national policy without referring to the European Union.
Many political analysts believe that if Le Pen was able to reach the presidency, Europe would enter a phase of wide change, since Germany and France are the two pillars of the European Union, the departure of France will lead to an imbalance in the European Union and to a weakness in its structure. Le Pen’s proposed program did not impress many advocates of freedom because it negatively affects the rights of refugees and works on a harsh policy with foreigners coming to France. As an Arab citizen and human rights defender, I will not accept Le Pen’s proposals at the beginning, but I meet with her on many things and concerns. The European continent has become a place for the export of large numbers of people who are doing terrorism in the world and the great margin of freedom in Europe has made it a tool for making evil and to strengthen the role of ideologically unclean groups, all due to the issue of human rights and the right of opinion and expression.
The European continent is witnessing a widespread campaign against the EU, the BREXIT in Britain was no accident, as well as the rise of right-wing parties to take power in Denmark and the Netherlands and demand a firmer policy, and it is noticeable that the right-wing European parties are growing in France, Italy, Spain, Hungary and Austria. The project demanded by Le Pen has become necessary on the European continent, especially with the financial crises in the European Union and the many terrorist acts that threaten European security.
From the Treaty of Westphalia to the founding of the European Union to the present Europe, the situation has changed a lot. The idea of a civilian state was necessary to end the 30-year war and the founding of the European Union came to unite the European continent after it was divided during the Cold War. Today, in the era of globalization, openness and freedoms, the economic crises that hit the world in general and Europe in particular, and the incidence of terrorist acts are increasing rapidly, and I am afraid that Europe will become a place of terrorist acts and a center for terrorist group. Therefore, the world today needs leaders such as Le Pen to control human insanity and restore stability to the international community.
The success of the experience of democracy in a certain part of the world does not mean that it is the ideal system and that it can easily be applied to the rest of the world. Many peoples of the world are not suited to democratic regimes, and the failure to implement a democratic system does not mean that the regime that will govern this country is oppressive and unfair, but one that suits the form of the state and the needs of the people. Henry Kissinger acknowledged that the idea of the European Union could not last forever because European countries since ancient times were not based on the doctrine of unity and participation.
I still dream of the beautiful Europe of the 1980s, when it was the center of international economy and trade and when the international political decision was linked to Europe. Europe today is a mass of endless economic crises and a center of attraction for terrorist acts that threaten European and international security, without forgetting the US decision, which often affects European sovereignty. Le Pen’s project is to reject American hegemony, return to French roots and adhere to French identity. The idea of a closed door policy and a strict policy with foreign expatriates is an internal French affair.
The situation in France will not be better after the arrival of Macron and terrorism will not stop, Emmanuel Macron is trying to give more economic, social and cultural freedoms and more integration with the European community. Of course, economic and political cooperation will have a positive impact on France and Europe. But in return for this cooperation, what special benefit will France gain, knowing that Macron has put forward the idea of establishing an EU military force, which means that the EU’s role will be not only economic and political but also joint military action.
The series of terrorist operations has not ceased after Macron’s arrival, and is increasing day by day. From France to Britain, Belgium and Germany, the target is Europe, which is the victim of terrorism. Terrorism wants Europe to become unstable and panic and make it a “New Land of Jihad”. Of course, Macron’s European policy plays an important role in strengthening the position of terrorist groups and creating fertile ground for them. Terrorism needs freedom and open borders to turn the impossible into reality.
When Le Pen raised the voice and said that we are French and wanted to rearrange the French house, she knew that France was the target and if it was not immunized, Great France would become just an idea in the “Museum of History”. Le Pen, an ultra-nationalist, does not scare me as an Arab Lebanese. Why would I be afraid of someone who wants to fight terrorism and oppressive ideology? We all love unity and freedom, but on the other hand there are some emergency circumstances that push the political system in a country to take an unusual path. Today, right-wing approach can make a difference, which some describe as extremism and lack of respect for human freedom.
The world today needs leaders like Marine Le Pen in every corner of the globe. The world today is ruled by force, and is afraid of those who say the word “no” to every stranger and outlaw. Le Pen has lost and the French will regret this option sooner or later because the European future does not bode well!
France: Chaos or a New Social Compact?
At the end of the parade, a few dozen people release yellow balloons into the sky and distribute leaflets saying “The yellow vests are not dead.” The police disperse them, quickly and firmly. Moments later, hundreds of “Antifa” anarchists arrive, throw security barriers on the roadway to erect barricades, start fires and smash the storefronts of several shops. The police have a rough time mastering the situation, but early in the evening, after a few hours, they restore the calm.
A few hours later, thousands of young Arabs from the suburbs gather near the Arc de Triomphe. They have apparently come to “celebrate” in their own way the victory of an Algerian soccer team. More storefronts are smashed, more shops looted. Algerian flags are everywhere. Slogans are belted out: “Long live Algeria”, “France is ours”, “Death to France”. Signs bearing street names are replaced by signs bearing the name of Abd el Kader, the religious and military leader who fought against the French army at the time of the colonization of Algeria. The police limit themselves to stemming the violence in the hope that it will not spread.
Around midnight, three leaders of the “yellow vest” movement come out of a police station and tell a TV reporter that they were arrested early that morning and imprisoned for the rest of the day. Their lawyer states that they did nothing wrong and were just “preventively” arrested. He emphasizes that a law passed in February 2019 allows the French police to arrest any person suspected of going to a demonstration; no authorization from a judge is necessary and no appeal possible.
On Friday, July 19, the Algerian soccer team wins again. More young Arabs gather near Arc de Triomphe to “celebrate” again. The damage is even greater than eight days before. More police show up; they do almost nothing.
On July 12, two days before Bastille Day, several hundred self-declared African illegal migrants enter the Pantheon, the monument that houses the graves of heroes who played major roles in the history of France. There, the migrants announce the birth of the “Black Vest movement”. They demand the “regularization” of all illegal immigrants on French territory and free housing for each of them. The police show up but decline to intervene. Most of the demonstrators leave peacefully. A few who insult the police are arrested.
France today is a country adrift. Unrest and lawlessness continue to gain ground. Disorder has become part of daily life. Polls show that a large majority reject President Macron. They seem to hate his arrogance and be inclined not to forgive him. They seem to resent his contempt for the poor; the way he crushed the “yellow vest” movement, and for his not having paid even the slightest attention to the protesters’ smallest demands, such as the right to hold a citizen’s referendum like those in Switzerland. Macron can no longer go anywhere in public without risking displays of anger.
The “yellow vests” seem finally to have stopped demonstrating and given up: too many were maimed or hurt. Their discontent, however, is still there. It seems waiting to explode again.
The French police appear ferocious when dealing with peaceful protesters, but barely able to prevent groups such as ‘Antifa’ from causing violence. Therefore, now at the end of each demonstration, “Antifa” show up. The French police seem particularly cautious when having to deal with young Arabs and illegal migrants. The police have been given orders. They know that young Arabs and illegal migrants could create large-scale riots. Three months ago, in Grenoble, the police were pursuing some young Arabs on a stolen motorcycle, who were accused of theft. While fleeing, they had an accident. Five days of mayhem began.
President Macron looks like an authoritarian leader when he faces the disgruntled poor. He never says he is sorry for those who have lost an eye or a hand or suffered irreversible brain damage from extreme police brutality. Instead, he asked the French parliament to pass a law that almost completely abolishes the right to protest, the presumption of innocence and that allows the arrest of anyone, anywhere, even without cause. The law was passed.
In June, the French parliament passed another law, severely punishing anyone who says or writes something that might contain “hate speech”. The law is so vague that an American legal scholar, Jonathan Turley, felt compelled to react. “France has now become one of the biggest international threats to freedom of speech”, he wrote.
Macron does not appear authoritarian, however, with violent anarchists. When facing young Arabs and illegal migrants, he looks positively weak. He knows what the former interior minister, Gérard Collomb, said in November 2018, while resigning from government:
“Communities in France are engaging in conflict with one another more and more and it is becoming very violent… today we live side by side, I fear that tomorrow it will be face to face”.
Macron also knows what former President François Hollande said after serving his term as president: “France is on the verge of partition”.
Macron knows that the partition of France already exists. Most Arabs and Africans live in no-go-zones, apart from the rest of the population, where they accept the presence of non-Arabs and non-Africans less and less. They do not define themselves as French, except when they say that France will belong to them. Reports show that most seem filled with a deep rejection of France and Western civilization. An increasing number seem to place their religion above their citizenship; many seem radicalised and ready to fight.
Macron seems not to want to fight. Instead, he has chosen to appease them. He is single-mindedly pursuing his plans to institutionalise Islam in France. Three months ago, the Muslim Association for Islam of France (AMIF) was created. One branch will handle the cultural expansion of Islam and take charge of “the fight against anti-Muslim racism”. Another branch will be responsible for programs that train imams and build mosques. This autumn, a “Council of Imams of France” will be established. The main leaders of the AMIF are (or were until recently) members of the Muslim Brotherhood, a movement designated as a terrorist organisation in Egypt, Bahrain, Syria, Russia, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates — but not in France.
French President is aware of the demographic data. They show that the Muslim population in France will grow significantly in the coming years. (The economist Charles Gave wrote recently that by 2057, France will have a Muslim majority). Macron can see that it will soon be impossible for anyone to be elected President without relying on the Muslim vote, so he acts accordingly.
Macron apparently sees that the discontent that gave birth to the “yellow vest” movement still is there. He appears to think that repression will be enough to prevent any further uprising, and so does nothing to remedy the causes of the discontent.
The “yellow vest” movement was born of a revolt against exorbitantly high taxes on fuel, and harsh government measures against cars and motorists. These measures included reduced speed limits – 90 km/h on most highways — and more speed-detection cameras; a sharp rise in the penalties on tickets, as well as complex and expensive annual motor vehicle controls. French taxes on fuels recently rose again and are now the highest in Europe (70% of the price paid at the pump). Other measures against the use of automobiles and motorists still in force are especially painful for the poor. They were already chased from the suburbs by intolerant newcomers, and now have to live — and drive — even farther from where they work.
President has made no decision to remedy the disastrous economic situation in France. When he was elected, taxes, duties and social charges represented almost 50% of GDP. Government spending represented 57% of GDP (the highest among developed countries). The ratio of national debt to GDP was almost 100%.
Taxes, duties, social charges and government spending remain at the same level now as when Macron came in. The debt-to-GDP ratio is 100% and growing. The French economy is not creating jobs. Poverty remains extremely high: 14% of the population earn less than 855 euros ($950) a month.
“How else to explain that the post-WWII come-and-help-our-recovery slogan Gastarbeiter willkommen became an Auslander Raus roar in a matter of only two decades. Suddenly, our national purifiers extensively shout ‘stop über fremdung of EU, we need de-ciganization’ of our societies, as if it historically does not always end up in one and only possible way– self-barbarization. In response, the socially marginalized and ghettoized ‘foreigners’ are calling for the creation of gastarbeiter partie. Indeed, the first political parties of foreigners are already created in Austria, with similar calls in Germany, France and the Netherlands. Their natural coalition partner would never be any of the main political parties. We should know by now, how the diverting of the mounting socio-economic discontent and generational disfranchising through ethno engineering will end up, don’t we?” – warned prof. Anis H. Bajrektarevic years ago in his brave and farsighted essay ‘Denazification urgently needed in Europe’.
Consequently, our top executives pay no attention to the growing cultural disaster also seizing the country. The educational system is crumbling. An increasing percentage of students graduate from high school without knowing how to write a sentence free of errors that make incomprehensible anything they write. Christianity is disappearing. Most non-Muslim French no longer define themselves as Christians. The fire that ravaged the Cathedral of Notre Dame de Paris was officially an ‘accident’, but it was only one of the many Christian religious buildings in the country that were recently destroyed. Every week, churches are vandalised — to the general indifference of the public. In just the first half of 2019, 22 churches burned down.
The main concern of Macron and the French government seems not to be the risk of riots, the public’s discontent, the disappearance of Christianity, the disastrous economic situation, or Islamization and its consequences. Instead, it is climate change. Although the amount of France’s carbon dioxide emissions is infinitesimal (less than 1% of the global total), combatting “human-induced climate change” appears Macron’s absolute priority.
A Swedish girl, Greta Thunberg, age 16, — nevertheless the guru of the “fight for the climate” in Europe — was recently invited to the French National Assembly by members of parliament who support Macron. She delivered a speech, promising that the “irreversible destruction” of the planet will begin very soon. A Baby-revolutionary added that political leaders “are not mature enough” and need lessons from children. MPs who support Macron applauded warmly. She received a Prize of Freedom, just created, which will be given each year to people “fighting for the values of those who landed in Normandy in 1944 to liberate Europe”. It is probably reasonable to assume that not one of those who landed in Normandy in 1944 thought he was fighting to save the climate. Such minor details, however, seem beyond Macron and the parliamentarians who support him.
Macron and the French government also seem unconcerned that Jews — driven by the rise of anti-Semitism, and understandably worried about court decisions infused with the spirit of submission to violent Islam –continue to flee from France.
Kobili Traore, the man who murdered Sarah Halimi in 2017 while chanting suras from the Qur’an and shouting that the Jews are Sheitan (Arabic for “Satan”) was found not guilty. Traore had apparently smoked cannabis before the murder, so the judges decided that he was not responsible for his acts. Traore will soon be released from prison; what happens if he smokes cannabis again?
A few weeks after the murder of Halimi, three members of a Jewish family were assaulted, tortured and held hostage in their home by a group of five men who said that “Jews have money” and “Jews must pay”. The men were arrested; all were Muslim. The judge who indicated them announced that their actions were “not anti-Semitic”.
On July 25, 2019 when the Israeli soccer team Maccabi Haifa was competing in Strasbourg, the French government limited the number of Israeli supporters in the stadium to 600, not one more. A thousand had bought plane tickets to come to France to attend the match. The French government also banned the waving of Israeli flags at the game or anywhere in the city. Nonetheless, in the name of “free speech”, the French Department of the Interior permitted anti-Israeli demonstrations in front of the stadium, and Palestinian flags and banners saying “Death to Israel” were there. The day before the match, at a restaurant near the stadium, some Israelis were violently attacked. “The demonstrations against Israel are approved in the name of freedom of expression, but the authorities forbid supporters of Maccabi Haifa to raise the Israeli flag, it is unacceptable,” said Aliza Ben Nun, Israel’s ambassador to France.
The other day, a plane full of French Jews leaving France arrived in Israel. More French Jews will soon go. The departure of Jews to Israel entails sacrifices: some French real estate agents take advantage of the wish of many Jewish families to leave, so they buy and sell properties owned by Jews at a price far lower than their market value.
Fighting the ghost
Macron will remain as president until May 2022. Several leaders of the parties of the center-left (such as the Socialist Party) and center-right (The Republicans) joined The Republic on the Move, the party he created two years ago. After that, the Socialist Party and The Republicans electorally collapsed. Macron’s main opponent in 2022 is likely to be the same as in 2017: Marine Le Pen, the leader of the populist National Rally.
Although Macron is widely unpopular and widely hated, he will probably use the same slogans as in 2017: that he is the last bastion of hope against “chaos” and “fascism.” He has a strong chance of being elected again. Anyone who reads the political program of the National Rally can see that Le Pen is not a fascist. Also, anyone who looks at the situation in France may wonder if France has not already begun to sink into chaos.
The sad situation that reigns in France is not all that different from that in many other European countries. A few weeks ago, an African cardinal, Robert Sarah, published a book, Le soir approche et déjà le jour baisse (“The evening comes, and already the light darkens”). “At the root of the collapse of the West”, he writes, “there is a cultural and identity crisis. The West no longer knows what it is, because it does not know and does not want to know what shaped it, what constituted it, what it was and what it is. (…) This self-asphyxiation leads naturally to a decadence that opens the way to new barbaric civilizations.”
That is exactly what is happening in France — and Europe.
Earlier version published by the Geterstone Institute under the title France Slowly Sinking into Chaos
Serbs disappointed with EU
A top-level meeting scheduled to take place in Paris in September with the participation of President of Serbia, Aleksandar Vučić, the head of Kosovo, Hashim Thaci, President of France Emmanuel Macron and German Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel may well be disrupted, which could lead to a new wave of tension in the Balkans. As the summit draws nearer, the differences between the parties involved show no signs of diminishing, while the Serbian leadership is demonstrating ever more opposition to any agreements with Pristina.
A few days ago Chairman of the Serbian People’s Party and Minister of Innovation and Technological Development of Serbia Nenad Popovic called for walking out of talks with Kosovo leaders under the patronage of the European Union. He said that the 2013 Brussels agreements on normalization of relations between Belgrade and Pristina was “not working”. According to the minister, Serbia ought to “challenge the pseudo-state of Kosovo” at any costs and under any conditions.
“After all the events that took place last week with the participation of Western countries: the simulated summoning of the Prime Minister of Kosovo, Ramush Haradinaj, to the Hague-based Special Court for interrogation in connection with the crimes of the Kosovo Liberation Army, new accusations against Serbia for committing genocide against Kosovo Albanians, arrests of Serbs – all this adds to the fact that we have nothing to gain from European integration, and that the Brussels agreement is dead,” – Nenad Popovic emphasized. In his words, the political course of Serbia should follow a balance: “What I mean is that Serbia should develop step by step and strengthen political, economic and military cooperation only with countries that build equal relations with it, revering its sovereignty and territorial integrity in relation to Kosovo”.
Nenad Popovic is one of the key figures on the Serbian political landscape in the context of relations between Kosovo and the Albanians. In diferent years, he was responsible for building economic relations with the region, and for Belgrade’s policy in the three southern Serb communities of Bujanovac, Medveda and Presevo, adjacent to the Kosovo border. It is these areas that Hashim Thaci proposes to annex to Kosovo in exchange for passing to Belgrade the control over the northern Serb-populated areas as part of a “package agreement” on the exchange of territories. Nenad Popovic used to be one of the closest associates of the former President of Serbia Vojislav Kostunica, who called for more intensive cooperation with Russia, including within the framework of energy and infrastructure projects. It was during his term Russia and Serbia concluded a range of bilateral agreements, which enabled Serbia to become a key partner of Russia in the purchase and processing of energy resources.
The visit to the Hague by the Prime Minister of Kosovo, Ramush Haradinaj, which triggered so much criticism from Nenad Popovic, does look strange. However, according to reports, all this could involve a more complicated political scenario. On learningthat he was summoned to the Hague court, Ramush Haradinaj immediately announced his resignation from the post of head of the Kosovo government. The former chief of staff of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) explained that he had no intention of jeopardizing the honor of the self-proclaimed state and its institutions. He remarked that his government’s ministers would continue to fulfill their duties and called on the president of the republic to announce early parliamentary elections.
“I was summoned for questioning to the Special Court in the Hague as a suspect. The honor of the prime minister and the state must be preserved,” – he said on his Facebook page.
According to Haradinaj, since he does not want to tarnish the reputation of Kosovo in any way, he will appear before the Hague Court, which was set up to investigate the activitgies of the KLA during the war, as a private person. Simultaneously, he expressed confidence that a new inquiry would not shake his innocence, confirmed by two acquittals of the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia in The Hague. His case was run by Chief Prosecutor Carla del Ponte in person. However, in spite of all her efforts, in 2008 the Tribunal acquitted Ramush Haradinaj of charges of committing crimes against the Serbian population of the region. In 2010, the ruling was cancelled, but in 2012 a new acquittal came into effect.
The unexpected summoning of Ramush Haradinaj to the Hague anew is in fact not connected with a sudden desire of the Western powers to finally punish the Kosovo prime minister for bygone anti-Serb crimes. For Brussels and Washington, his fierce opposition to agreements between Belgrade and Pristina is much more relevant. Over the past few months, this politician has been lashing out at Hashim Thaci for his “compromising” stance and for his intention to concede part of Kosovo’s territory to Serbia. To this end, he regularly organizes mass protests in Pristina. And given the popularity of the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo, of which he is the leader, there is a real possibility of Ramush Haradinaj assuming the post of Kosovo president, which is de facto could block any mediation efforts on the part of the European Union and which, of course, does not suit the EU leadership.
Such a development is fraught with unpredictable consequences, such as a crisis of European integration plans in Serbia and a reorientation of Belgrade’s policy from Brussels to Moscow and Beijing.
The American Wall Street Journal quotes Dan Coats, the outgoing Director of National Intelligence of the USA, as saying that Russia and China, “these two super-giants of Eurasia, are as close to each other as they were in the 1950s. Both Moscow and Beijing have been seeking to undermine the interests of the West, from Venezuela and Syria to Serbia. In addition, they have been stepping up cooperation in Africa south of the Sahara and have already found ways to lessen their rivalry in Central Asia. ”
Meanwhile, support from top Western powers continues to be a major factor determining Kosovo’s sustainability – both political and economic. Recently, there has appeared a trend towards a gradual rejection of the self-proclaimed independence of Kosovo by states that previously recognized it. According to the Serbian side, a few days ago the Central African Republic (CAR) recalled its recognition of Kosovo, thus becoming the 14th country that has done so. Foreign Minister Ivica Dacic said in a program broadcast by the radio and television of Serbia that the CAR “cannot assume a position that is at odds with international law” and that it “supports the sovereignty of Serbia and the rule of law”.
Ivica Dacic also said that unlike in 2015, when 92 states voted in favor of Kosovo joining UNESCO, in 2018 the number of such countries dropped to 73. “Undoubtedly, they cannot become members of any international organization, in which they would vote like they do in the UN”, – the head of the Serbian Foreign Ministry pointed out.
Given the situation, a further widening of the gap between Belgrade and Brussels amid the West’s inability to make Kosovo authorities more cooperative will naturally lead to the erosion of the pro-European direction of Serbia’s foreign policy and will strengthen the positions of forces that advocate more ties with Russia and other “centers of power” outside the Euro-Atlantic space.
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