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Looking at Tiananmen Square through the Brandenburg Gate

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Which country has already suffered the greatest losses through the new U.S. strategy announced a year-and-a-half ago by President Donald Trump?

Clearly not Russia, whose relations with Washington were far from perfect even under the previous U.S. administration. Nor is it Mexico or Canada: even Trump is unable to turn the tables on the United States’ relations with its closest neighbours so rapidly and radically. With the exception of Iran, Syria, Cuba and the other habitual targets of U.S. attacks, Germany and China have the most reason to be unhappy with the current U.S. policy.

Trump has been applying particularly strong pressure on Berlin and Beijing; the two countries’ current and, more importantly, potential losses from America’s protectionist stance far exceed the losses of all the other US trading partners combined. In addition, Washington has a serious political axe to grind with Germany and China. Berlin is being chided for its “insufficient contribution” to the NATO budget and its unswerving commitment to the Nord Stream II gas pipeline, whereas Beijing is suspected of “hegemonic aspirations” in the Asia-Pacific and of its attempted “expansion” into the Indian Ocean.

If talking common sense, Chancellor Merkel and President Xi would be better off keeping closer to each other: they stand a better chance of weathering the pressure from the United States as a united front than on their own. Given the two countries’ impressive combined potential, the transcontinental Berlin–Beijing axis could become a worthy strategic response to the unprecedentedly strong and brutal U.S. pressure, even more so if this alliance secures the support of several other major countries between the Brandenburg Gate and Tiananmen Square. Including Moscow, which has its own agenda.

How likely is such a new alliance to emerge in the foreseeable future? What are the potential opportunities and limitations of a rapprochement between Germany and China? What consequences would increased cooperation between the two countries have for Russia? The answers to these questions are critical not only to the future of the Eurasian space, but also to the fate of the new world order as a whole.

The Chinese Groom and the German Bride

The Berlin–Beijing axis first manifested itself as a possibility immediately after the new president took office in the United States. Trump’s electoral victory raised serious concerns in China, and came as a true shock to the German political establishment. Symptomatically, on the eve of the G20 summit in Hamburg in July 2017, Trump paid a demonstrative visit to Warsaw at the precise moment that Germany–Poland relations were experiencing yet another dip. Coincidentally or not, Merkel was rolling out the red carpet for Xi Jinping in Berlin. Six months prior to that, China had been announced as Germany’s largest trading partner for 2016 for the first time in history.

Beijing’s interest in Berlin is not confined to China’s desire to further expand bilateral trade, boost investment and secure access to the latest German technology. With the new U.S. administration in power, the Chinese government is looking for ways to demonstrate its increased concern for the global problems Germany worries about, from climate change and WTO reforms to assistance to African countries. The Chinese leadership’s traditional statements as to the importance of free trade, the dangers of protectionism, the advantages of multilateral approaches and the need to adhere to the common rules of the game (Xi Jinping’s keynote address in Davos, Switzerland in January 2017 is one example) are primarily intended for Berlin’s ears.

It is hardly surprising that in the emerging romance between China and Germany, Beijing plays the role of the decisive and persistent young man, whereas Berlin is the wary and calculating girl eager to gain the most from the potential relationship. To begin with, China is much stronger than Germany in terms of its economic and demographic potential, geopolitical position and military might. China is a permanent member of the UN Security Council, and also possesses nuclear arms. In other words, China is a full-blown major power, whereas Germany right now is not. Therefore, any relationship between the two countries will inevitably be asymmetric, with the balance tipped in China’s favour, and this asymmetry will need to be compensated for in one way or another.

Second, China has greater room for manoeuvre in the international political arena than Germany. Currently, the country is not a party to any rigid politico-military or economic blocs; BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, these amorphous and barely binding associations, are beside the point here. Germany, for its part, has numerous fairly tangible obligations within NATO and the European Union. Berlin may be the driver of the European Union, but within NATO it often finds itself playing supporting roles. To continue with the romantic parallels, China the young man is single and free, whereas the girl is bound by close ties with numerous and often quite demanding European relatives, and is unwilling to sacrifice these ties under any circumstances. Whether the existence of “relatives” gives Germany extra bargaining chips in its contacts with China or actually weakens its position is a moot question, but the significance of this factor should not be underestimated.

Third, potential rapprochement is being hindered by the fundamental differences in values. It is difficult to build a strong relationship of trust if one of the partners has a conservative religious background and the other is an inveterate atheist. Germany today is perhaps the leading vector of traditional liberal values, not just in Europe but in the whole world. China’s political model of authoritarian modernization, for its part, is the exact opposite of Western liberalism. Predictions to the effect that the emergence of a middle class in China would inevitably result in the country drifting towards Western-style pluralistic democracy have so far been proven wrong. If anything, China appears to be drifting in the opposite direction.

Fourth, the Berlin Fräulein already has a young man, one that has for decades remained her key partner, protector and, to a great extent, an indisputable authority and guru. That young man lives in Washington. Germany and the United States have had their share of misunderstandings and even quarrels over the years; suffice it to recall Berlin’s resolute opposition to the U.S. intervention in Iraq back in 2003. Yet, until very recently, very few in Germany could picture their country’s future outside the close military, political and economic alliance with the United States. Remove that support, and the entire structure of Germany’s foreign policy would collapse in no time.

This last argument needs to be addressed in greater detail. It would be fair to say that in all of its long and sometimes dramatic post-World War II history, Berlin has never been exposed to attacks, threats, blatant pressure and even blackmail on the part of Washington on a scale similar to what has been going on in the past 18 months. Never before have the views of the leaders of the two countries been so far apart and the level of mutual trust so low.

One could, of course, argue that Trump will eventually go and the American people will remain. However, it was these same American people that elected Trump as their president in the first place in November 2016, albeit not unanimously. In fact, Trump’s popularity in America appears to be growing rather than declining. Whatever the case, it is obvious that Berlin will continue to suffer from the political and psychological consequences of the current transatlantic relations crisis long after the current president leaves the White House. The bilateral relations are not going to return to what they were during the times of the Obama administration any time soon, despite the hopes of German politicians and intellectuals with their orthodox Atlantic world view.

Five Lessons in Seduction

As we can see, China is to play the leading role in the emerging rapprochement. How can Beijing possibly dispel Berlin’s doubts as to the purity of its intentions? What price would the Chinese leadership have to pay for this? Let us take a closer look at Berlin’s main fears.

First, Berlin is extremely uncomfortable with Chinese investors methodically buying German businesses that specialize in the most promising sectors of technological development. Germany suspects that China is driven by more than just commercial interests; that it is, in fact, pursuing a national strategy aimed at gaining a technological advantage over the West in general and Germany in particular by the end of next decade. China invested nearly $14 billion in Germany in 2017, or almost two-thirds of its total investments in Europe.

Germany became aware of the potential threat. In 2018, Berlin partially nationalized one of the country’s largest power grid operators in order to prevent Chinese investors from buying into it. Preventive measures were also taken with regard to a major German hi-tech machine-tool specialist company that resulted in a potential Chinese buyer being forced to abandon its plans. These steps evidently contradict the general principles of Germany’ foreign trade policy, and would have been impossible just a few years ago (Russia’s Sberbank did fail to buy Opel at some point in the past, but then the deal fell through due to the position of General Motors, the U.S. owner of the German car maker).

What could China do in this respect? The most logical solution would be to provide for maximum possible reciprocity by granting German investors unhindered access to the hi-tech sector of the Chinese economy. This remains a problematic topic: China’s hi-tech sector is still largely impenetrable to foreigners. Greater transparency of business practices and a consistent fight against corruption would also raise Germany’s trust in Chinese investors. Beijing is sure to find these steps to be quite difficult and even risky, but a serious relationship with Berlin is bound to come at a price.

Second, Germany is concerned about the possibility of the balance of its trade with China changing dramatically in the coming years. Unlike the United States, Germany currently enjoys a significant surplus in trade with Beijing: exports stood at $96 billion in 2017, and imports amounted to $71 billion. Some fear, however, that the recently unleashed trade war between the United States and China may prompt Beijing to switch a significant portion of its exports to Europe, including Germany, which has the most capacious market in Europe. As a result, Germany could not just lose its current surplus, but would eventually find itself in a situation similar to that in which the United States currently finds itself.

These fears are justified: sooner or later, Beijing will ask Berlin to balance out bilateral trade. It would of course be a grave mistake to do so in the style of Trump, i.e., by twisting Germany’s arm. Quite on the contrary, the Chinese leadership has a great opportunity to demonstrate how different its balancing-out methods are from those used by the United States.

Furthermore, if the full-scale U.S.–China trade war eventually breaks out, Beijing could invite Germany to replace the United States as an exporter to the Chinese market. Germany already exports about twice as many cars to China as the United States, but U.S. exports are still significant at about 10 per cent of the market. China could discuss this opportunity with its German partners.

Third, Germany is rightly irritated by Beijing’s activity in Berlin’s “backyard” – that is, in Central and Eastern Europe and the Balkans. One particular irritant for Berlin is the 16+1 cooperation mechanism created by China for these countries, which involves regular meetings at the highest level. This format is perceived in Germany as China attempting to undermine European unity and gain backdoor access to the European Union. First, because the format involves 11 EU member states alongside five non-aligned countries of the Western Balkans. Second, because the 16+1 mechanism gets to discuss, among other things, issues pertaining to the EU remit (infrastructure development, e-commerce, etc.). An additional vexing point for Berlin was the fact that the latest 16+1 summit took place just several days before the July 2018 EU–China summit.

One could, of course, dismiss Germany’s suspicions and fears as being unreasonable and even hypocritical. After all, Germany consistently opposes any “privileged interests” in Europe and promotes all countries’ sovereign right to choose their partners and cooperation formats. Should Beijing resort to such rhetoric, it would doubtlessly earn a standing applause from Moscow. It is, however, hardly in China’s best strategic interest to ignore Germany’s fears, no matter how unfounded: Berlin is more important to Beijing as a potential strategic partner than all of Central Europe and the Balkans. So, if the road to Berlin lies through Brussels, then Beijing will take it.

Beijing has already made token concessions to the European Union: in future, 16+1 summits will be held once every two years and not annually as before. The Chinese leadership has been consistent in stating unequivocally that Beijing is interested in a unified European Union. Beijing has been careful not to support Eurosceptics, populists, right-wing radicals and other marginal forces within the European Union. Yet China could do even better, such as offering Berlin a joint China–Europe development programme for the Western Balkans in order to refute any suspicions about a possible hidden agenda on the part of China that is aimed at “infiltrating” this very important European region.

Fourth, in assessing the advantages and disadvantages of closer cooperation with Beijing, Berlin naturally wonders how this rapprochement would affect its relations with other Asian partners: Japan, India, the ASEAN countries, Australia, New Zealand, etc. It would certainly be extremely short-sighted of Germany to sacrifice these relations or even give its historic Asian friends a reason to doubt its strategic political priorities.

It is, therefore, in Beijing’s best interests to promote the potential Sino-German axis not as a stand-alone bilateral geo-economic project, let alone a geopolitical one, but rather as an important component of a broader multilateral plan aimed at creating a single Eurasian economic space. The implementation of this plan should prompt individual Asian countries to gradually forget about their bilateral disagreements in the face of the common long-term development targets. It would be too foolhardy of Beijing to seek Berlin’s direct support for its stance on the territorial disputes in the South China Sea, or to prompt Germany to side with China in its conflict with India.

Fifth, the most difficult obstacle to closer cooperation between China and Germany is the current gulf between Germany’s liberal political system and China’s authoritarian one. No sane politician in Berlin can possibly overlook the human rights violations in China, neglect the fate of Chinese dissidents, turn a blind eye to the discrimination against ethnic and religious minorities, ignore the existing restrictions on the dissemination of information and many other manifestations of Chinese authoritarianism. These values have always been and will continue to be a bone of contention in bilateral relations.

However, just because a fundamental solution of the values problem cannot be reached does not mean no progress is possible in this respect. China’s symbolic concessions with regard to individual dissidents are absolutely important (in the latest such development, Liu Xia, the widow of Nobel laureate Liu Xiaobo, was permitted to travel to Germany). It appears to be of even greater import, however, for the two countries to develop contacts along the lines of civil society, education, culture, youth and women’s organizations. For this to happen, China needs to turn Germany into a “fashion,” so as to change the Chinese public’s perception of the West as being primarily associated with the United States.

Why is Trump Not Afraid?

Even the remote and purely hypothetical possibility of a China–Germany alliance should be the cause of great concern for any serious politician in Washington. There is hardly any other geo-economic combination on the planet capable of posing such a threat to the United States, this key economic, financial, scientific and technological centre of the modern world. History teaches us that a war against two strong adversaries at once can rarely be won. A China–Germany alliance, even a short-lived one, should appear particularly threatening to the current U.S. administration, which is in the habit of assessing international challenges primarily from the standpoint of America’s short-term economic interests.

Is Trump afraid of a trade and economic war on two fronts? He appears not to be. If he were afraid, he would be behaving somewhat differently. At the very least, he would be more tactful and understanding with regard to one of his oldest and most reliable European allies. So far, however, quite the opposite is true. It seems at times that the President of the United States is actually pushing the German bride into the embraces of the Chinese groom. Such shocking behaviour needs some rational explaining.

Some of Trump’s political opponents tend to explain the President’s behaviour as manifestations of his personality quirks. In their opinion, he is simply unable to keep a comprehensive picture of the world in his mind, nor does he want to think strategically. Therefore, the reasoning goes, Trump views the United States’ relations with Germany and China as separate and unrelated prongs of America’s foreign policy. He does not give a though to the possible consequences for the Germany–China relations of America’s growing pressure on Beijing and Berlin.

Another explanation of the Trump administration’s policy can be described as “the presumption to power of the United States”: the White House is closely monitoring the progress of the attempted Germany–China rapprochement, but does not believe that it will succeed. The United States’ relations with both Germany and China remain asymmetric: the latter two are more dependent on the United States than the other way around. The White House may be under the impression that even if Berlin and Beijing unite efforts, they will still be unable to create a global financial, economic and technological centre that would be independent from Washington. Furthermore, neither China nor Germany has dared so far to resort to symmetric measures in response to the latest bouts of U.S. economic pressure. Therefore, the White House has no cause for concern, at least not in the foreseeable future.

The third and, in our opinion, most convincing explanation is that the Trump administration is simply incapable of imagining that German politicians are prepared to revise their views on the world, and of Germany’s desirable place in that world. U.S. political circles have long grown used to the periodic outbursts of anti-American sentiment in Germany; these outbursts are not perceived as posing any serious threat to the U.S.–Germany alliance for as long as they do not affect the German political establishment. This was the case during the German anti-war movement in the late 1970s and the early 1980s and during George W. Bush’s presidency. History may yet repeat itself under Trump, too.

One thing is obvious, however: Trump is applying much greater pressure on Germany than his Republican predecessors. The United States is making a show of demeaning not just the current German leadership, but the German political class as a whole, precisely when marginal German nationalism is beginning to awaken from its protracted slumber (as evidenced by the success of the Alternative for Germany party in the latest election). The combination of the imminent systemic crisis in Germany’s domestic politics and the loss of reliable international support in the form of the transatlantic partnership could create the prerequisites for an “ideal storm” in German politics with most unpredictable consequences.

The cockiness with which the current American leadership is treating Germany may eventually result in something similar to what Moscow got in exchange for its arrogance towards Berlin. Such a comparison might be farfetched, but we believe that it merits attention.

Russia had long believed that its “special relationship” with Germany would remain no matter what. Moscow was banking on the Germans’ “historical guilt” over the country’s role in World War II, and expected Berlin to never forget the role Russia had played in Germany’s unification. There were hopes for the rapid development of bilateral trade and economic cooperation, including with Germany’s leading major businesses.

Busy with all these calculations and hopes, Moscow overlooked the moment when it lost its erstwhile status as Berlin’s “privileged partner”; Germany stopped being an unconditional lobbyist for Russia’s interests in the Euro-Atlantic community. Moscow equally overlooked the moment of the generational change in German politics, with a new generation of leaders emerging in the political arena for whom the World War II and even the unification of Germany were nothing more than mere episodes in the country’s centuries of dramatic history.

It would of course be oversimplifying things to draw direct parallels between Germany’s Ostpolitik, which has long disappeared, and its modern, still fairly viable Atlanticism. Fidelity to Atlantic unity has always run much deeper in German society than its adherence to “Eastern politics” and Berlin’s willingness to maintain the “special relationship” with Moscow. Still, the Trump administration could benefit from looking at Russia’s experience, which is something that it is obviously not doing. Therefore, even without China factored in, it is obvious that the risks for the transatlantic partnership continue to grow.

An Axis or a Triangle?

Unfortunately, Russia does not appear to be in a position to play a leading part in the new game that is beginning to unravel in Eurasia. Its economic potential is too limited, and its positions in the emerging Eurasian interdependence system are too weak. On the other hand, Russia cannot afford to stay on the outside, since its future will largely depend on the outcome of the emerging confrontation of the Unites States with Germany and China.

The successful development of cooperation between Germany and China would be beneficial to Moscow, if only because it would deprive Washington of its current monopoly to determining the fundamental rules of the game in the global economy. There is very little hope that relations between Washington and Moscow will improve any time soon; for as long as the United States gets to dictate the rules, Russia will be consistently ousted to the periphery of the world economy. There is also the constant threat of extraterritorial U.S. sanctions, as illustrated by Iran.

In the meantime, China and Germany are Moscow’s main trade partners and are likely to retain this status for a long time. In fact, economic ties with Beijing and Berlin remain complementary for Russia: the countries are Moscow’s main points of entry into the global economy. It would, therefore, be entirely logical for Russia to feel enthusiastic about the possibility of taking part in the creation of the Berlin–Beijing axis and attempting to turn it into an equilateral triangle.

It should be noted that Russia has no interest whatsoever in the destruction of the present liberal world economic order, whose protection is to serve as the foundation of the China–Germany rapprochement. This, despite the fact that the term “liberalism” has recently acquired strong negative connotations within Russia. Just like any other participant in the international economic system, Moscow may have its problems with some aspects of this world order. However, excessive protectionism, the abandonment of multilateralism, the decline of universal international economic organizations and the world splitting into opposing trade blocs would do nothing to help Russia integrate into the global economy; nor will they facilitate the country’s economic modernization.

The opportunity to integrate into the China–Germany cooperation processes would provide Moscow with additional room for manoeuvre, enabling it to offset the “turn to the East” by a re-activation of contacts with the West. In the long run, the China–Germany axis could turn into one of the pillars of the “Greater Eurasia” concept, which has been actively discussed in Moscow of late.

However, a rapprochement between Germany and China per se would not automatically generate new opportunities for Russia. Beijing may well stick to its long-standing practice of pursuing parallel political courses in its relations with Moscow and Berlin. Germany in the current situation would certainly prefer to develop cooperation with China without involving Russia, which has only been creating problems for Berlin – at the very least until the Ukrainian crisis has been truly resolved. It is, therefore, extremely important for Moscow to not become the odd man out in the China–Germany alliance, and to contribute its unique advantages to the axis.

These advantages should certainly go beyond Russia’s geographical situation: there are plenty of transit options between China and Germany, not all of them passing through Russian territory. Moscow should, therefore, look for different kinds of opportunities, such as tripartite development projects for the Balkans, Central Asia and Afghanistan. Other opportunities could include initiatives that would marry security to development, such as migration management, the prevention of political radicalism and addressing the challenges associated with new technologies. In any eventuality, Russia’s value for both Germany and China will be largely defined by its ability to shift from the current inertial economic model to an innovative one.

In addition, as was already mentioned, no separate Russian or Chinese policy with regard to Germany can exist out of the broader EU context. Neither the United States, nor China, nor Russia will replace the European Union at the centre of Germany’s universe. Therefore, Moscow cannot expect to be on good terms with Germany while simultaneously being on bad terms with the European Union. Just like with China, the road to Berlin for Russia inevitably runs through Brussels. So, this road needs to be taken, no matter how long, winding and difficult it may turn out to be.

There may be different opinions about the chances the potential China–Germany alliance has to succeed. It is possible that an alternative geo-economic structure will emerge instead, such as a Berlin–Tokyo axis or a close partnership between the European Union and India. It appears indisputable, however, that the major actors in the global political arena are now required to make major, non-orthodox and perhaps even paradoxical decisions.

So far, most of these actors have been biding their time, hedging emerging political risks, carefully calculating the balances of group interests, maintaining the status quo and hoping that the situation would somehow rectify itself, solely on the strength of their having chosen “the right side of the barricades.” This is perhaps how Roman aristocrats behaved towards the end of the Empire.

Trump is not one of them. He is often rightly accused of being unprofessional, impulsive, lacking in strategic vision and of many other sins. That said, he is actually trying to solve the United States’ global problems rather than postponing them until the next term in office or not passing them on to the next generations. In other words, Trump is a man of action, a trait rarely to be found in the contemporary world. For this reason, until other leaders in Europe and Asia begin to demonstrate a similar capacity, Trump will always have, at the very least, an important tactical advantage over his opponents.

First published in our partner RIAC

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Europe

The Giedroyć-Mieroszewski Doctrine and Poland’s Response to Russia’s Assault on Ukraine

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image source: war.ukraine.ua photo: Albert Lores

Although they seem similar, there is a fundamental difference between the Brzezinski Doctrine and the Giedroyć -Mieroszewski Doctrine. Whereas the Brzezinski Doctrine was very pragmatic and cautious in outlining future plans for Ukraine in the transatlantic community, Giedroyć and Mieroszewski saw such a scenario as a tangible possibility because from their perspective, Ukraine’s accession to NATO and the EU would strengthen Central and Eastern Europe’s geostrategic position.  

There is no agreement in the literature on the subject as to who wrote that “without an independent Ukraine, there cannot be an independent Poland”, but it had to be either Józef Piłsudski, the father of Polish independence, or Jerzy Giedroyć, the editor-in-chief of the highly influential Paris-based periodical Kultura, the only influential East-Central European literary-political publication in the West during the cold war. Nonetheless, we know that thanks to the Giedroyc-Mieroszewski Doctrine, the elite of Polish post-1939 émigrés who sought political asylum in the Western countries after the Soviets installed Polish-speaking apparatchiks such as Bierut and Gomulka in Communist Poland almost unanimously agreed that it would be delusional for Poland to try to expand its Eastern territory to incorporate Vilnius, Novogrudok, Lutsk, Lviv, Ternopil, and Ivano-Frankivsk in the post-Yalta world order. Although they did not agree with the Communists on most of the fundamental matters related to the submissive nature of Communist Poland’s political system that was completely commandeered to indulge the Kremlin’s every whim, the freethinkers of the anti-Communist opposition such as Jerzy Giedroyć, Stanislaw Cat Mackiewicz, and Ryszard Kaczorowski (the last president of Poland in exile) slowly but surely came to come to terms with the practicality of Stalin’s decision as to the shape of Poland’s eastern border with the Soviet Union after 1944, for in the event of the Soviet Union’s dissolution, a free Poland that would free itself from the Russian sphere of influence would inadvertently benefit from a properly demarcated eastern border with Ukraine, Belarus, and Lithuania. Despite what today’s Kremlin propaganda claims, no one in Poland suggests that the former  “Kresy” (eastern borderlands) or “Inflanty Voivodeship” (Polish Livonia) should be annexed by Poland. On the contrary, thanks to the cosmopolitan nature of the Giedroyć-Mieroszewski Doctrine, the Polish elite was cured of any delusions of grandeur and smoothly transitioned from the neo-imperialist mindset of the Second Republic of Poland’s outlook towards the East (tending to reopen many wounds from the past) to the much more cosmopolitan Third Republic of Poland’s “Zero Problems with Neighbors” policy (at least until 2015) that had an uncanny resemblance to the Davutoğlu Doctrine and ultimately recognizes the independence and importance of all its neighbors. In essence, thanks to such visionaries as Giedroyć and Mieroszewski, who planted the seed, modern Poland was able to foster strong relations with all its neighbors (even with Russia until 2014). Those relations have been based on mutual respect, peace, and mutually extended security guarantees that built bridges of mutual understanding and not walls of false divisions with neighboring nations.

Nonetheless, Giedroyć and Mieroszewski were not delusional about Russia’s intentions, for they always, even after 1991, saw Russia as a latent threat to Central and Eastern Europe. They knew that in order to stop Russia’s expansionist policies after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Polish-Ukrainian alliance would have to be strongly reinforced, so both countries could achieve a more geostrategically beneficial situation in which they could embark on chasing their transatlantic dreams. Although Poland managed to join NATO in 1999 and the European Union in 2004, Ukraine did not escape twentieth-century geopolitics and fell victim to Putin’s revisionist and neo-imperial policies first in 2014 and then in 2022.

Unlike Poland, which has supported every Ukrainian action since February 2022 by offering its heavy defensive weapons and defensive ammunition and hosting millions of Ukrainian refugees, Putin’s Russia questions the very right of Ukraine’s existence. In Munich in 2007, Putin made it clear that he would try to reanimate the corpse of the Soviet Union. In 2008, he started the project by sending his troops to Georgia. In 2014, his “little green man” (the members of Russian Spetsnaz special forces units) were instrumental in annexing Crimea, and a year later, Putin sent his army to rescue a not-so-friendly dictator in Syria. There were no repercussions after these actions, and to his surprise, this changed in 2022, for the moment Russian tanks started rolling toward Ukraine’s borders as an ultimate test of Western unity, Poland and the other Central and Eastern European counties were first to react by advocating strong retaliation against Putin’s actions. Thanks to this effort, the majority of NATO and EU nations responded to Putin’s geostrategic delusions of grandeur with an unprecedented comprehensive sanctions regime.

Although Giedroyć and Mieroszewski were idealistic, and they were very often criticized for the naïve character of their ideas, they were proven right, for they managed to inadvertently shape the future of the region and encourage most of the countries that border Russia to be more proactive in doing their utmost to preventing a domino effect in Eastern Europe – for Russia clearly attempted to implement a Sudetenland-type scenario in Ukraine in 2022. However, thanks to their memory of how they suffered under the Kremlin’s domination, they were the first to demand a Western reaction; otherwise, Ukraine today would not be governed by President Zelensky but by Yanukovych or another loyal non-Ukrainian-speaking apparatchik, and the Ukrainian army together with the Russian and Belarusian armies would now be marching toward the West, whatever the cost. The leaders of these countries were under no illusions that in the event of the Russian whale swallowing Ukraine, Putin’s appetite would not be satisfied, for their Western allies would not promptly come to their rescue, and the Ukrainian scenario would be repeated elsewhere.

That is why despite Ukraine still being one of the most corrupt countries in Europe that cannot even stop its officials from stealing from their own soldiers, who risk their lives protecting their motherland, the majority of Eastern and Central European countries are still (at least for now) determined to offer Ukraine their unyielding support whatever the cost, for they know that without an independent Ukraine there simply cannot be the independent and peaceful Europe of their dreams, and they ultimately would face an even more hostile and unpredictable Russia that would be eager to impose some form of Putinization on them.

This speculation is reinforced by the observation of how the Russian army conducts its operations in Ukraine, for it somewhat resembles the brutal and genocidal Milosevic-era ethnic cleansing by the Serbian army of the Muslim populations in the western Balkans, particularly in Bosnia and Kosovo, in the 1990s. The names Bucha, Borodianka, Irpin, Hostomel, Mariupol, and many others will always symbolize some of the darkest days in European history, for the Russians were primarily motivated by the same desire to make the occupied territories of modern Ukraine an ethnically homogeneous Russian area.

As a result, the Eastern and Central European countries of today will unhesitatingly arm Ukraine with their military equipment, for they know that the Ukrainian army is fighting for their freedom today. They are particularly eager to contribute to making the Russian “special operation” Russia’s own Afghanistan, Vietnam, and Iraq combined to demonstrate to Putin and his successors that he has crossed one bridge too many.

Andreas Umland recently observed that it would be desirable if “the paradoxical repercussion of an act of aggression would be strengthening rather than weakening of the victim state’s geopolitical position.” He also expressed the desire that “Ukraine’s fate should teach both future possible aggressors and their potential victims three simple lessons: (a) might is never right; (b) rules will be upheld; and (c) that more powerful states will protect weaker ones.” I applaud this type of thinking, and I hope that it becomes prevalent.

Nevertheless, I wonder whether all NATO and EU countries will be eager to preserve this unity of purpose as long as it takes if Russia persists in waging its deadly Ukraine campaign in the years to come. Are they ready to subscribe to the Giedroyć-Mieroszewski way of thinking?

Please also see:

Umland, Andreas. 2023. “How the West Can Help Ukraine: Three Strategies for Achieving a Ukrainian Victory and Rebirth – SCEEUS.” Sceeus, January 11, 2023. https://sceeus.se/en/publications/how-the-west-can-help-ukraine-three-strategies-for-achieving-a-ukrainian-victory-and-rebirth/.

Pietrzak, Piotr. 2023. “The Brzezinski Doctrine and NATO’s Response To Russia’s Assault on Ukraine.” Modern Diplomacy, January 12, 2023. https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2023/01/12/the-brzezinski-doctrine-and-natos-response-to-russias-assault-on-ukraine/.

Pietrzak, Piotr. 2022. “The International Community’s Response to the PutiniZation of the Situation in Ukraine.” Modern Diplomacy, December 22, 2022. https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2022/12/22/the-international-communitys-response-to-the-putinization-of-the-situation-in-ukraine/.

Pietrzak, Piotr. 2023. “Michael Walzer’s work and the idea of humanitarian intervention in Syria (2011-): The International Response to the Situation in Syria During and After the Arab Spring in: Interdisciplinary Approaches to the Regulation of the Modern Global Migration and Economic Crisis. Edited by Alaverdov, Emilia, and Muhammad Waseem Bari. 2023, DOI: 10.4018/978-1-6684-6334-5.

Pietrzak, Piotr. 2022. Why has the term “balkanization” become so obsolete that it no longer holds water? | MCC Corvinák. “Why Has the Term ‘Balkanization’ Become so Obsolete That It No Longer Holds Water? | MCC Corvinák.” corvinak.hu, February 9, 2022. https://corvinak.hu/index.php/en/velemeny/2022/02/09/why-has-the-term-balkanization-become-so-obsolete-that-it-no-longer-holds-water.

Pietrzak, Piotr. 2022. “The International Community’s Response to the Ghouta Chemical Attack of 2013.” Acta Politica Polonica, 2 (54), 83–93. DOI: 10.18276/ap.2022.54-06.

Pietrzak, Piotr. 2022. “Introducing the idea of Ontology in statu nascendi to the broader International Relations Theory” International Conference Proceeding Series – International Conference on Economics and Social Sciences in Serik, Turkey on 21 – 23 Oct 2022. https://www.eclss.org/publicationsfordoi/abst11act8boo8kIE%26SS2022_antalya.pdf,

Pietrzak, Piotr. 2022. On the Idea of Humanitarian Intervention – A New Compartmentalization of IR Theories. [SL]: Ibidem-Verlag. ISBN: 9783838215921,

Pietrzak, Piotr. 2020. “On Human Rights in Syria: Deliberations on the universality of Human Rights and the International Community’s Reaction to the Syrian conflict (2011 – 2019)” in: Сборник “Универсалност и приложимост на човешките права”. Edited by Veselin Hristov Dafov, Ivan Kirkov, Tsena Zhelyazkova, Sofia 2020, ISBN: 978-954-07-4989-1,

Pietrzak, Piotr. 2014. “American Soft Power after George W. Bush’s Presidency,” in The United States and the World. From Imitation to Challenge. Edited by Andrzej Mania, Łukasz Wordliczek, Kraków: Jagiellonian University Press 2014,

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Baerbock has publicly declared ‘a war against Russia’

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image source: Wikimedia Commons

On January 25 Germany and the United States decided to provide Ukraine with Leopard 2 and Abrams tanks totaling 45 (respectively: 14 + 31). Some European countries also intend to join these supplies that could reach around 300 main battle and light tanks during this year. The Pentagon official confirmed that collected ‘the armor basket’ could include 300 tanks and ACV/APC during 2023. It will be 28th ‘basket’ of lethal military supplies of the transatlantic alliance to Ukraine that started on a massive scale in 2022.

– Unlike fascist Germany, current Germany openly declared a war against Russia on January 25. Arguing in favor of sending NATO tanks and ACV/APC to Ukraine, German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock said EU countries were fighting a war against Russia. US and EU officials have previously gone out of their way to claim ‘they were not a party to the conflict in Ukraine’.

This is a quotation from what Baerbock has stated at PACE. “And therefore, I’ve said already in the last days – yes, we have to do more to defend Ukraine. Yes, we have to do more also on tanks,” Baerbock said during a debate at the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) on January 25. “But the most important and the crucial part is that we do it together and that we do not do the blame game in Europe, because

so far from the German Government, it means that her statement is fully shared by the FRG Government we are fighting a war against Russia and not against each other.”

If she has not been sacked and the Parliament.

It also means that the FRG has radically changed its foreign policy and once again is unleashing the next World War – the Third one.

It means that German tanks again will appear in Ukraine and Russia like in 1941-1945.

It also means that pro-Nazi coalition supports ultra-nationalist regime in Kiev that began its own and unprovoked aggression – initially against Donbass in April 2014, and later against Russia in October 2022.

It means that since January 25, 2023 current joint Ukrainian-NATO actions in Ukraine can be politically and juridically labelled as “a declared direct combined Ukrainian-NATO aggression against the Russian Federation”.

Russia angrily reacted to such abnormal statement. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov told reporters that tank supplies to Ukraine by Western countries testify their direct and growing involvement in their armed conflict. He added that the flow of western weapons to Ukraine does not help potential negotiations between Moscow and Kiev.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov warned that any shipments containing weapons for Ukraine would become a lawful target for Russian forces,

The Russian Embassy in Germany for its part warned that “this extremely dangerous decision [by Berlin] shifts the Ukrainian conflict to a new level of standoff.”

All five parliamentary political parties at the Russian State Duma are demanding from the highest military and political structures in the country to destroy all Ukrainian-NATO heavy weapons – not only at the front lines, but additionally and primarily near Ukrainian-NATO border as soon as such weapons cross it on land, in the air and at sea.

Such destruction will save a lot of innocent lives amongst civilians and military men.

– Moscow has also cautioned NATO and non-NATO members against supplying Ukraine with depleted uranium munitions (DUM) and with long-range weaponry capable of striking at cities deep within Russian territory.

Supplying Ukraine with DUM for western military hardware would be regarded by Moscow as the use of “dirty bombs,” said Konstantin Gavrilov, head of the Russian delegation to the Vienna Negotiations on Military Security and Arms Control. Speaking at a plenary meeting of the OSCE Forum for Security Cooperation in the capital of Austria Vienna, Gavrilov cautioned “western sponsors of Kiev’s war machine” against encouraging “nuclear provocations and blackmail.”

“We know that Leopard 2 tanks, as well as Bradley and Marder armored fighting vehicles, can use depleted uranium shells, which can contaminate terrain, just like it happened in Yugoslavia and Iraq,” he said. “If Kiev were to be supplied with such munitions for the use in western heavy military hardware, we would regard it as the use of ‘dirty nuclear bombs’ against Russia, with all the consequences that entails.”

Gavrilov also warned that Moscow will retaliate if the West were to supply Kiev with long-range weaponry to carry out strikes against Russian cities. “If Washington and NATO countries provide Kiev with weapons for striking against the cities deep inside the Russian territory and for attempting to seize our constitutionally affirmed territories, it would force Moscow to undertake harsh retaliatory actions. Do not say that we did not warn you,” he remarked.

– Ex-President Donald Trump called on Joseph Biden to end ‘crazy’ Ukraine conflict before it leads to the use of nuclear weapons.

“First come the tanks, then come the nukes. Get this crazy war ended, now. So easy to do,” Trump outlined.

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Davos more of a show, no longer so important

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“Davos has become more of a show, it’s no longer so important”, concluded Liviu Muresan from Eurodefense Romania at the end of the webinar recently jointly organized by Eurodefense Romania and the Bucharest-based MEPEI think-tank. In the aftermath of the Davos World Economic Forum, 20 key-note speakers invited to examine this year’s edition did not hesitate to cast a critical eye upon the outcome and some of them were very straightforward in assessing this year’s  WEF.

Adrian Severin, former Romanian minister of foreign affairs, gave a remarkable definition to the Davos WEF:  “something between mythology and reality because politicians come to Davos to look for intellectual validation and economic support, corporatists come to look for intellectual respectability and political assets, civil activists seek kinship with the political power and financial sponsorship. They make a network of self-legitimized supra-national power that combines the characteristics of occult interest groups, influence groups that associate oligarchic cynicism with democratic hypocrisy. A group of self- proclaimed prophets, self-confirming their prophecies.”

Experienced in foreign policy, Severin could identify new approaches during the Forum, so he portrayed in detail “the Davos WEF that turned from an incubator of ideas into a platform for launching messages and trial balloons, from a doctrinal workshop into a ballroom…from a political designer into a moral whistle-blower ….from a producer of doctrines into a producer of dogmas…from the champion of missionary realism into athlete of utopias ….from a platform of dialogue into a platform of war propaganda…from a believer in globalization into a promoter of globalism…from a follower of inclusion into a promoter of exclusion….Davos is at risk of losing popularity and political failure, it no longer solves problems, it either deepens the existing crisis or generates new crises .”

Severin argued that “this year’s edition was significant through the absences rather than through the presences because only Olaf Scholtz was present this year out of the G7 leaders….Russia and China were absent….The president of the European Commission has become a US ventriloquist , no longer representative of the European Union that is neither  Union, and no longer European…The main representatives of the US were absent. Those present discussed everything but the risk of having the world fractured into two blocks with incompatible cultural identities, with the Euro-Atlantic block increasingly weaker than the Indo-Pacific block and the Euro-African-South-American block…the discussion about green energy and other similar topics  is nonsense as long as solutions are not presented.”

Severin believes that the main concern should be “to stop the war in Ukraine and to normalize the dialogue between the Euro-Atlantic and the Euro-Asian blocks”, especially because this year’s theme was “Cooperation in a fragmented world”.

The most inspirational speech was given by Antonio Gutierez, the head of United Nations Organization, who referred indeed to the fragmented world, but Severin pointed to the fact that Antonio Gutierez gave such a speech in Davos and not in the UN in New York or Geneva, a sign of the failure of the UN, which means that the UN and the OSCE must be revived.

General Corneliu Pivariu, former head of the Romanian Military Intelligence, stressed that the Davos meeting actually does not solve any problem of the world. It speaks every year about economic inequalities without solving that, doing every year nothing else than acknowledging the deepening of inequalities. For instance, according to Credit Suisse, between December 2019  and December 2021, the global wealth increased with 42 trillion USD but 26 trillion USD belonged to the 1% richest population, and 16% to the rest of 99% of the world’s population. Another topic is global warming, which is also never curbed, and an Oxfam report released in November 2022 revealed that a billionaire’s annual emissions of CO2 are one million times higher than a person in the 90% of the world’s population.

Carlos Branco, senior analyst with the National Defense Institute in Portugal, confirmed that Davos meeting did not find solutions to the world’s problems. He reminded that, in Davos, Ursula Von Der Leyen, Olaf Scholtz and other leaders spoke of the need to make Europe independent in terms of energy but they did not explain how exactly Europe will manage to provide itself commodities and raw materials, since Europe currently has 37 strategic dependencies out of which 2% from China and 3% from Russia, while the new technologies will still make Europe dependent on Asia. “The future of Europe will depend on how it will position itself in relation to the advanced technologies, Artificial Intelligence,  a.s.o., but for the moment, Europe is trapped.”

As an outstanding expert on Asia, Viorel Isticioaia Budura, former Managing Director for Asia and the Pacific at the European External Action Service and former Romanian ambassador in China and Japan, pointed to the absence of many G7 leaders in Davos as well as of Asian leaders, among which China, which is “the beauty and Miss Universe of the world’s interdependency”, and mentioned the presence of many Asian business people in Davos this year, while reminding of the importance of Asian countries and of the three high-level summits organized in Asia last year, G20, APEC and ASEAN, and of what Anthony Blinken, the US secretary of state, called “the rest of the world”, namely, Asian countries that do not follow the Euro-Atlantic order but have become a significant part of the global economy. Isticioaia Budura wondered if the “re-globalization of the supply chains would be possible” and declared China “the champion and the promoter of globalization.”

Michael Zinkanell director of the Austrian Institute for European and Security, Vienna, expressed his opinion that “we a living in a bipolar world dominated by the US and China while Russia has no ability to project global power, and some clear conclusions after the Davos meeting are that instability is increasing in the world, the world is becoming more and more interconnected and energy independence and decarbonisation are very important for the future”.  Zinkanell sees natural disasters and socio-economic risks as the main concerns for the future, but also the interactions with some authoritarian countries that are trying to lead in this new multipolar world that will allow multilateralism.

Germano Dottori, editor of the Italian Geopolitical magazine, also agreed that Davos meeting became too politicized and not too useful but he sees the prospects for the future of the world “not so bleak like a few months ago.”

Flavius Caba Maria, president of MEPEI, the Bucharest-based think-tank that co-organized the webinar, expert on the MENA region, mentioned a few aspects among which that fact that the representatives of oil and gas companies were welcomed at Davos, unlike Glasgow, which is a sign that renewables cannot entirely meet the energy needs of humanity.

On the other hand, Caba Maria pointed to the BRICS countries and his remarks could be seen as complementary to the idea mentioned by several speakers that the Western institutions seem to have lost their ability to solve the global problems and to ensure economic equality.

Caba Maria emphasized that “the global South is establishing its own system of alliances, turning them into a source to transform global economy, thus creating a development alternative trend, different from the one promoted by the West, with three regional alliances looming: the African Union, the Community of Latin American States and Shanghai Cooperation Organization in Eurasia. Among all these countries, China stands out and everything that’s going on in China is of utmost interest for the other countries, because it has become the world’s largest economy.”

Facts to keep in mind for the organizers of next Davos meetings.

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