Connect with us

Europe

EU and Armenia Seize Momentum to Enhance Partnership and Cooperation

Anzhela Amirjanyan

Published

on

On the sidelines of recent NATO summit, the leader of Armenian “Velvet revolution”, current Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan had separate talks with the European Commission president Jean-Claude Juncker and the president of the European Council Donald Tusk during which the leaders exchanged views on different issues over the further deepening of the Armenia-EU ties. The EU top officials affirmed their commitment to support Armenia’s comprehensive reform agenda. EC president Donald Tusk reaffirmed the EU’s willingness to assist in the future reforms in Armenia, promising a continued support to democracy-building efforts in the country.

“What happened in Armenia was extraordinary and, I must say,very European.The example you set was very promising, and you can expect the European Union’s support in the process of implementing reforms,” Tusk said.

Apparently, branding the “Velvet revolution” in Armenia as European-style movement wasn’t an empty statement rather than a gentle hint about the contribution that EU had in civil society development in Armenia and the investment in the youth through mobility projects in the field of education and training to encourage democratic engagement and civic participation. Undeniably, youth activists and civil society were at the core of the recent revolutionary struggle in Armenia. In this regard, the “Velvet revolution”in Armenia was unique and historic as it involved mainly youth, including schoolchildren and students, who moved to streets to challenge adult society.

After holding the talks with EU leaders, Armenian PM Nikol Pahinyan in his turn voiced sharp criticism of EU for not increasing its financial assistance to Armenia following mass protests that led to change in government which is now committed to zero tolerance approach towards corruption.

“I am surprised that certain officials in the EU haven’t noticed the ongoing changes in Armenia,” he stressed at news conference.

The EU most probably incurred Pashinyan’s reproach for providing financial aid to previous leadership, which haven’t made much progress towards democracy and economic growth, and which often vowed zero tolerance for corruption, but  its anti-corruption rhetoric was more likely an aspiration for the future rather than a practical political agenda.

Indeed, it would be unwise to dispute the veracity of the statements expressed by the EU leaders and Armenian PM, given the EU’s profound impact on Armenia’s democratization, rule of law and good governance, and Armenia’s need to diversify its foreign policy having channels open with the West,and the need for financial support to modernize itself.

To deepen understanding of the vital role EU plays in the transformation of Armenian society, we should delve into the EU’s financial support schemes Armenia benefits from.

Article 8 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) states that ‘‘the Union shall develop a special relationship with neighbouring countries, aiming to establish an area of prosperity and good neighbourliness, founded on the values of the Union and characterised by close and peaceful relations based on cooperation’’. The EU distributes its development assistance through its external financing instruments.These are the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (ISP), European Instrument for Democracy & Human Rights (EIDHR), the Partnership Instrument (PI) and the three relevant geographic instruments-the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance II (IPA), the European Neighborhood Instrument (ENI) and the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI).

As known, EU cooperates with Armenia in the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy and its eastern regional dimension, the Eastern Partnership. The European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) is the key financial instrument established in 2014 to fund the European Neighborhood Policy for the period 2014-2020. It replaces the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) of 2007-2013. The ENI is designed to promote integration by partner countries into the EU market; economic development; good relations and bilateral and multilateral collaboration; institution and capacity building; democracy, the rule of law and human rights; and orderly and legal movement of people across the EU’s external borders.

Support through the ENI is programmed and given in three different ways:

  1. Bilateral programmes covering Union support to one partner country;
  2. Multi-country programmes which address challenges common to all or a number of partner countries, and regional and sub-regional cooperation between two or more partner countries;
  3. Cross-Border Cooperation programmes between Member States and partner countries taking place along their shared part of the external border of the EU (including Russia).

Armenia participates also in regional programmes funded under the ENI (mainly in environment, energy, transport, culture and youth), in the Eastern Partnership Flagship Initiatives, and in initiatives open to all Neighbour countries: Erasmus+, TAIEX, SIGMA, and the Neighbourhood Investment Facility (NIF). The NIF in Armenia targets primarily investment projects in energy and transport infrastructure projects. It does so by pooling EU and Member State funds to leverage loans from European financial institutions and contributors in the ENP partner countries.

In addition to the ENI, Armenia is eligible for financial support under the EU thematic programmes: the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights, Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace, Civil Society Organisations and Local Authorities, Human Development and Migration & Asylum.

The priorities and indicative allocations for financial assistance to Armenia are set out in the Single Support Framework (SSF). For the programming period 2017-2020 the indicative allocation is EUR 144,000,000 to EUR 176,000,000.

Under the Support Framework the priority sectors selected for support are:

  • Economic development and market opportunities (indicatively 35% of total budget);
  • Strengthening institutions and good governance (indicatively 15% of total budget);
  • Connectivity, energy efficiency, environment and climate change (indicatively 15% of total budget);
  • Mobility and people-to-people contacts (indicatively 15% of total budget);

A key complementary support also will be provided through regional and multi-country programmes for

  • capacity development/institution building and strategic communication
  • ( indicatively 15% of total budget)
  • civil society development (indicatively 5% of total budget).

While analyzing the Programming of the European Neighbourhood Instrument’s Single Support Framework for EU support to Armenia-2017-2020, we see that the main risks to achieving progress vis-à-vis the above-mentioned priority sector objectives are mainly the lack of the promotion and coordination of the relevant policy measures, especially concerning business environment and fair play; government commitment to the reforms in public administration, but especially in the judicial sector, fighting corruption and promoting human rights; governance, in particular   the strategy and prioritization of investments; and political will.

The latter is believed to be sine qua non of any successful anti-corruption policy. Apparently, the new Armenian government has taken a route of intense fight against corruption by making a number of scandalous disclosures, involving high-ranking officials. Other above-mentioned risks can be mitigated through investor-friendly and development-oriented policies to be carried out by the new government. Hence, the future progress towards reform objectives will justify more EU support and investments. New agreement with Armenia, known as the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA) initiated by previous authorities, which promises financial assistance and trade opportunities, can become an impetus for further domestic reforms.

So, the new Armenian government should seize the momentum to strengthen the relations with EU to support the democratic aspirations of the Armenians. The EU, in its turn, should make correct use of conditionality and align its approach with Armenia’s strategic objectives.

Anzhela Amirjanyan, Graduate, International Relations, Yerevan Former stagiare at European Parliament's Directorate General for External Policies

Continue Reading
Comments

Europe

Dayton Peace Accord 23 Years On: Ensured Peace and Stability in Former Yugoslavia

Published

on

For the past twenty-three years life has been comparatively peaceful in the breakaway republics of the former Yugoslavia. The complicated civil war that began in Yugoslavia in 1991 had numerous causes and began to break up along the ethnic lines. The touching stories and the aftermath effects of the breakaway republics of Bosnia- Herzegovina, Croatia and in Kosovo are still unfolding. Though the numbers of deaths in the Bosnia- Herzegovina conflict in former Yugoslavia are not known precisely, most sources agree that the estimates of deaths vary between 150,000 to 200,000 and displaced more than two million people. During the conflict a Srebrenica a North-eastern enclave of Bosnia once declared as a United  Nations  (UN ) safe area” saw one of the worst atrocity since second world war.

It has been estimated that more than 8,000 Muslim Bosniaks were massacred in Srebrenica and it was one of the most brutal ethnic cleansing operations of its kind in modern warfare. The US brokered peace talks revived the a peace process between the three warring factions in Bosnia- Herzegovina. For Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina a United States (US ) -brokered peace deal reached in Dayton on 21st November 1995. In a historic reconciliation bid on 14 December 1995 , the Dayton Peace Accord was signed in Paris, France, between Franjo Tudjman president of the Republic of Croatia and Slobodan Milosevic president of the Federal Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

When conflict in Bosnia- Herzegovina, Croatia ended, the reconciliation began between ethnically divided region. The US played a crucial role in defining the direction of the Peace process. In 1996, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) -led 60,000 multinational peace enforcement force known as the Implementation Force (IFOR)) was deployed to help preserve the cease-fire and enforce the treaty provisions. Thereafter, the Court was established by Resolution 808 and later, Resolution 827 of the United Nations Security Council, which endorsed to proceed with setting up of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) to try crimes against humanity . International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was the first United Nations (UN) war crimes tribunal of its kind since the post-second world war Nuremberg tribunal.

In the late 1990’s, as the political crisis deepened a spiral of violence fuelled the Kosovo crisis between the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and the Yugoslav forces. Unlike the Bosnia- Herzegovina, Kosovo was a province of Serbia, of former Yugoslavia that dates back to 1946, when Kosovo gained autonomy as a province within Serbia. It is estimated that more than 800,000. Kosovos were forced out of Kosovo in search of refuge and as many as 500,000 more were displaced within Kosovo.

Subsequent t hostilities in Kosovo the eleven week air campaign led by NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) against Yugoslavia in 1999 the Yugoslavian forces pulled troops out of Kosovo NATO. After the war was over, the United Nations Security Council, under the resolution 1244 (1999) approved to establish an international civil presence in Kosovo, known as the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). Nevertheless UNMIK regulation No 1999/24 provided that the Law in Force in Kosovo prior to March 22, 1989 would serve as the applicable law for the duration of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK).

In this  context reconciliation is a key to national healing of wounds after ending a violent conflict. Healing the wounds of the past and redressing past wrongs is a process through which a society moves from a divided past to a shared future. Over the years in Serbia, Bosnia- Herzegovina, Croatia and in Kosovo the successful peace building processes had happened. The success of the peace building process was possible because of participation of those concerned, and since appropriate strategies to effectively approach was applied with all relevant actors. The strengthening of institutions for the benefit of all citizens has many important benefits for the peace and stability of former Yugoslavia. Hence, the future looks bright for the Balkan states of Serbia, Bosnia- Herzegovina, Croatia and Kosovo.

Continue Reading

Europe

Hungarian Interest, Ukraine and European Values

Published

on

Diplomatic conflicts that have recently arisen between Hungary and its neighboring countries and the European Union as a whole most clearly show the new trend in European politics. This trend is committing to national and  state values of a specific  European country, doubting  the priority of supranational  interests within the European Union. Political analyst Timofey Bordachev believes that “the era of stale politics and the same stale politicians, who make backstage decisions based on the“ lowest common denominator,” are finally coming to an end. Politicians with a new vision of the world order come to power, such as Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, Austrian Federal Chancellor Sebastian Kurtz, or the new head of the Italian Interior Ministry, leader of the right-wing League of the North Party, Matteo Salvini ”.

It is not the first year that Hungary is trying to protect the interests of its citizens and the state from external influence, to protect the Hungarians in the territory of neighbouring states  by establishing for this  a special position (Commissioner  for the development of the Transcarpathian region of Ukraine), to determine relations with other countries on the basis of their attitude to the rights of Hungarians. This is how conflicts with the European Union arose, after Hungary refused to let migrants into the country, in the same manner, a conflict  arose with Ukraine, which is trying to build a state ideology, based on nationalism, which a priori does not provide for the proper level of realization and protection of the rights of non-titular nations.

In relation to Hungary, Ukraine follows the same policy as in relation to Russia – to initiate various accusations, to call for punishment, to talk about the inconsistency with European values of the Hungarian policy under the leadership of  Orban. Doing so Kiev has its multifaceted interest: cooperation with NATO and the EU, support  for any decisions of Brussels, the anti-Russian course, domestic policy based on the nationalist  ideology. And in all these areas  Hungary poses  a problem for Ukraine. In the description of relations with Hungary  Kiev even  uses the word “annexation“.

Hungary is hardly planning to seize any Ukrainian territory, but on what  grounds Ukraine falsely accuses Hungary of its annexation intentions in relation to Transcarpathia?  The Ukrainian side highlights several positions:

Issuing Hungarian passports  to Ukrainian citizens (ethnic Hungerians)

This  is an old story, it has come to light again recently due to the growth of Ukrainian nationalism. Moreover,  there are concerns about the implementation by Hungary of the “Crimean scenario” in relation to Transcarpathia.

The Hungarian government has created the position of  “Commissioner  for the development of Ukraine’s Transcarpathian region and the program for the development of kindergartens in the Carpathian region”.

Ukraine demanded an explanation. A note of protest was delivered to the Hungarian Charge d’Affaires in Ukraine, and the Foreign ministers of Ukraine and Hungary had a telephone conversation on the problem. Hungary continues to ignore the requirements of Kiev.

Ukraine fears further disintegration processes

At the same time, in Kiev there is no understanding  of the fact that combining the ideology of nationalism with the country’s national diversity and European integration is hardly possible.

Ukrainian experts note the growth of separatism in the Transcarpathian region, as well as the “strange behavior” of the governor, who plays on the side of Hungary. They also complain that “pro-Ukrainian ideology”(?) is not being сonsolidated in Transcarpathia, and this region is not controlled and monitored by  the Ministry of information. In a word, the state is losing control over the territory, which it neither develops nor controls. Such behavior of the governor and the region’s residents may indicate that the state is not sufficiently present in the lives of residents of Transcarpathia, and this a financial and humanitarian drawback they compensate with the help of Hungary, – experts believe.

Apparently, Ukraine is unable to reach an agreement with Hungary as relations are tense. In response to the Ukrainian law on education, adopted in the fall of 2017, which infringes the rights of national minorities, Budapest blocked another, the third, Ukraine-NATO meeting. Ukraine witnessed this embarrassing  situation  in April 2018.  At the same time elections were held in Hungary, in  which Viktor Orban’s party won a majority in the parliament. Such a tough stance of Budapest in relation to the Ukrainian educational policy Kiev considered to be just a sign of electoral populism. However, this was a mistake.

Viktor Orban’s victory in spring 2018 was convincing, and a convincing victory means obvious support of his migration policies as well as his support  for compatriots abroad. The party of Orban – Fides – not only won a majority but a constitutional majority – 133 of the 199 seats  in the National Assembly of Hungary.

There is no doubt  that Hungary has become Ukraine’s another serious opponent in the process of its European integration. And it is unlikely that either  country  will take a step back: there will be presidential elections in Ukraine soon, and in Hungary, the victory won by Orban, apparently, confirms the  approval of his independent  foreign  policy  by  the citizens.  So the conflict is likely to develop.

First published in our partner International Affairs

Continue Reading

Europe

Belt and Road Alternatives: The European Strategy

Published

on

The European Union (EU) has put forward a plan for enhancing connectivity within Asia, which has been dubbed as the Asia Connectivity Strategy.

The EU does not want to give an impression, that the Asia Connectivity Strategy (ACS) is a counter to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Yet, senior officials of the EU, while commenting on the broad aims and objectives of the project, have categorically stated, that the primary goal of the Asia Connectivity Strategy, is enhancing connectivity (physical and digital) while also ensuring, that local communities benefit from such a project, and environmental and social norms are not flouted (this is a clear allusion to the shortcomings of the BRI). There are no clear details with regard to the budget, and other modalities of the project (EU member countries are likely to give a go ahead for this project, before the Asia-Europe Meeting in October 2018). EU has categorically stated, that it would like to ensure that the ACS is economically sustainable.

Other alternatives to BRI 

It is not just the EU, but even the US, along with Japan and Australia. which are trying to create an alternative vision to the BRI.

The US alternative to the BRI, is being funded by the recently created United States International Development Finance Corporation (USDFC) (an organization which will merge Overseas Private Investment Corporation and other Development Finance Programs) which came into being after the passing of the BUILD  (Better Utilization of Investments leading to Development) Act recently.

It would be pertinent to point out, that the US which has been accused of lacking a cohesive vision to counter China’s BRI has in recent months spoken, on more than one occasion, about greater the dire need for robust connectivity in the Indo-Pacific. In July 2018 US Secretary of State while speaking at the Indo-Pacific Business Forum committed an amount of $113 million for U.S. initiatives to support projects related to digital economy, energy, and infrastructure. The Secretary of State, while speaking about close links between US and Indo-Pacific, also spoke about the need for greater private sector involvement in projects in the Indo-Pacific. Pompeo off late, has also been reaching out pro-actively to a number of countries in South East Asia, and visited Malaysia, Indonesia in August 2018.

It would be pertinent to point out that OPIC  (now part of USFDC) has already signed with the overseas finance development arms of Japan and Australia, and is in talks with India to work jointly. Some of the areas being explored for joint investments are energy, infrastructure.

It is not just the US, even Japan has come with it’s own alternative, Partnership for Quality Infrastructure (PQI), to the BRI.

Potential Appeal of the Asia Connectivity Strategy

So the question then arises, why would countries seeking an alternative to China, not come on board the US’ connectivity initiative. The ‘Asia Connectivity Strategy’ may be especially acceptable to leaders, who do not want to be seen as blindly following US diktats, but who are also uncomfortable with Beijing’s economic policies, and want to avoid falling into what has been dubbed as Beijing’s ‘debt trap’ diplomacy. A perfect example being Malaysian Prime Minister, Mahathir Mohammad who scrapped projects worth 40 Billion USD, and also referred to the rise of a ‘new colonialism’ being promoted by China. The Malaysian PM has not shared a particularly cordial relationship with the US in the past. While addressing the United Nations General Assembly (unga), Mahathir made some interesting points, saying that Malaysians want a Malaysia, which seeks relations based on ‘mutual respect’ and a Malaysia, that is ‘neutral’ and ‘non aligned’

EU itself trying to strike a balance

EU Chief, Jean Claude Juncker, has been pitching for a more pro-active response to Trump’s insular policies, as well as China’s BRI. Given the fact, that EU has taken a divergent stand from US on the Iran issue, and has proposed a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) which will ensure that trade with Iran continues, even before the impending US sanctions to be imposed on Iran in November 2018. The SPV was announced, jointly with Russia and China, on the sidelines of the UNGA.

At the UNGA, French President, Emmanuel Macron disagreed with Trump’s views with regard to Iran, and supported the 2015 Vienna Accord. Said Macron: We know that Iran was on a nuclear military path but what stopped it? The 2015 Vienna accord.”

While it remains to be seen, if the SPV set up by EU works or not, but a number of countries which do not want to be part of the Chinese or American orbit would be attracted towards the EU, in spite of all the problems it is facing, due to it’s capacity to take an independent stand.

Asia Connectivity Strategy is not only about competition

It remains to be seen whether the Asia Connectivity Strategy can gain traction. In terms of connectivity, there may even be strong overlaps with the ‘Indo-Pacific vision’. France, which has strengthened strategic ties with Australia and India, is already seeking to play a pro-active role in the Indo-Pacific.

French President Emmanuel Macron had referred to the need for a strong Paris-Canberra-New Delhi axis, during his Australia visit, as a counter to China’s increasing assertiveness.

Interestingly, while there is a realization, that Asian Connectivity Strategy has a competitive element, and there are some clear differences between EU’s strategy and BRI, there are also some who believe, that there is space for collaboration between the Asia Connectivity Strategy and BRI. This point has been put forward by some policy makers and strategic commentators in EU, as well as sections of the Chinese media. Wang Wen Wen in an article for the Global Times, argues:

‘Asia needs Europe as much as it needs China. Since the EU and China are the two largest economic entities in Eurasia, it is vital that they steward the continent’s economic development agenda. Some programs in the BRI have carried out cooperation with the European side on technology and equipment procurement.’

In conclusion, the Asia Connectivity Strategy is an interesting idea. A lot will depend upon available resources and the response of potential stakeholders. But EU going ahead with such an initiative in spite of numerous problems within is truly laudable.

Continue Reading

Latest

Intelligence4 hours ago

US Conducting Biological Experiments Near Russia’s Borders

Two statements, almost simultaneously released by the Russia’s Foreign and Defense Ministries, once again raised the issue which, although rarely...

Americas6 hours ago

Trump: The Symbol of America’s Isolation in the World

The president of the United States, who came to power in 2016 with the slogan of “Reviving Washington’s Power”, has...

Russia8 hours ago

Putin Welcomes New Ambassadors in Moscow

Russian President Vladimir Putin has strongly reminded newly arrived foreign ambassadors of their important mission of promoting relations between their individual countries...

Intelligence9 hours ago

Why China will win the Artificial Intelligence Race

Two Artificial Intelligence-driven Internet paradigms may emerge in the near future. One will be based on logic, smart enterprises and...

Energy10 hours ago

Italy’s and EU’s natural gas imports from the United States

Currently natural gas is one of the most important US assets in its relations with the European Union. In fact,...

Newsdesk11 hours ago

Eurasian Research on Modern China-Eurasia Conference

October 26-27, 2018,National Academy of Sciences, Armenia. Address: Marshal Bagramyan 24, Yerevan, Armenia. Organizers:“China-Eurasia” Council for Political and Strategic Research,...

South Asia15 hours ago

The “Neo-Cold War” in the Indian Ocean Region

Addressing an event last week at London’s Oxford University, Sri Lankan Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe said some people are seeing...

Trending

Copyright © 2018 Modern Diplomacy