The Forum for China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), built up to link relations between the two states, is due to hold its next meeting later this year. This evaluates what the benefits from that meeting will be on this developing, active, and mutual relationship. China’s engagement in African states goes back several years. In the last decade, from the mid-1950s to late 1970s based more on spontaneous confidentiality than that of 1980s and the period after the cold war. currently, the relationship sets up more on pragmatic economic considerations and cooperation. China is already Africa’s third largest trading partner. This multi-leveled partnership between China and Africa is both intricate and active. As China and its African participants arrange everything for the next FOCAC summit.
What does China want in Africa?
China’s relationship with African countries is very active, some perspectives have sustained stable. The most significant of these are the principles and outcomes of Chinese foreign policy through African and other developing countries. According to the Beijing’s Africa Policy issued in January 2006, China will: China-Africa friendship, will be proceeding from the basic benefits of both the Chinese and African peoples, build up and develop a new kind of strategic partnership with the African continent, presenting political equality and mutual trust, economic win-win cooperation and cultural exchange
The fundamental laws and aims for leading Chinese foreign policy in Africa as set out in this arrangement of government policy are: (1) Goodwill, friendship, honesty and equality; (2) Mutual benefit, cooperation and common prosperity; (3) Common mutuality, support and close reciprocity; and(4) Learning from each other and pursing, sharing common development. This mostly is the government expression of how it views, and ambitions, to manage its relationship with the African continent.
While the Chinese policy announcements are mostly clear; there is still skepticism about what China wants in Africa. Take the principle of non-intervention, one of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, which have been regularly highlighted guidance of Chinese foreign policy in one hand, and its Africa policy in the other. The most significant examples are Sudan and Zimbabwe. In current years, Sudan has seen a conflict of perspectives, with the US and other superpowers placing pressure on Beijing government to use its impact in Sudan over the condition in Darfur, and China responding that it is preferable to help in continued development in such states, and determining them this way. Therefore Beijing’s commitment to non-interference in African domestic affairs and its intention to establish partnerships based on cooperation and mutual respect have been generally welcomed by leaders of the African continent, just as it has got some critiques from the West especially the US.
To some extent does China manage Sino-Africa relations?
Yet, Chinese national interests in Africa are multi-aspects and multi-leveled, so the aspects who engage in China’s Africa policy making and implementation are generally diverse. This faces great challenges for China’s management capability, which is the real reason why FOCAC was established. Similar to the different trend of China’s interests and outcomes in Africa, we can highlight many types of aspects who have a sound in China’s Africa policy-making and performance. First of all and most important type of aspect is the government, both central and provincial, including officials–diplomats and other state-owned enterprises. Secondly coves several private corporations and their representatives in Africa. Inspired by the Chinese government’s “Go Out” policy, these private entrepreneurs chanced to Africa in seek of business opportunities. The third and importantly significant aspect is individuals, both influential middle-businessmen and the general Chinese laborers in Africa, which may amount to somehow a million people by 2009.
With the number of aspects rising, the traditional decision-making and strategy implementation system is under great pressure. In term of policymaking, power is centered at the top, in the Office of the Foreign Affairs of the Communist Party of China (CCP) Central Committee and the Foreign Affairs Office of the State Council. The top engine of executive power is the State Council, which includes the premier, vice premiers, and ministers. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs points out Chinese leaders and helps implement African policy. It cuts responsibility between a unit for Sub-Saharan Africa and one for West Asia and North Africa. The Ministry of Commerce plays a significant job in trade, aid, and investment. It has a Department of Foreign Aid. China’s State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) is equally ranked with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Commerce. SASAC is either mostly owns a state-owned enterprise (SOE) or sustains a supervising share of stock in a public SOE, several of which function in Africa. SASAC has branch offices in African countries. China’s Export-Import Bank is the only state-owned firm that allocates official economic assistance in the frame of low-interest loans, export credits, and guarantees. Additionally, The CCP’s International Department communicates with African representative to lay the pillars for business trading and diplomatic cooperation, encourage visits and to ensure that policies are implemented in accordance with CCP strategic goals.
What are the Challenges of China In Africa?
Under the policy of FOCAC and its follow-up perspectives, China has adopted its Africa policy-making and implementation and made several contributions to African development. However, the challenge of China-Africa relation is based on two main aspects. The first, the Chinese economic slowdown decreases the resources that are likely accessible for the next FOCAC meeting. Xi Jing ping said at G20 summit that China will, within its goodwill and potentiality, carry on to enhance its aid to Africa, decrease or cancel African states’ debts, enlarge its trade and enhance business investment in Africa, achieving the commitments it made during the Beijing Summit of the Forum on China- Africa Cooperation in 2017. On the other hand, because China’s economy now is export-oriented, the situation will greatly reduce the volume of China-Africa trade due to the western states’ needs decreasing. For instance, 50% of Sudan’s oil exports ship to China, but this number does not mean that this oil is bought by Chinese consumers. As a matter of fact, China National Petroleum Corporation(CNPC), the company which subdues the oil transactions between China and Sudan, does not sell the oil imported from Sudan on the Chinese domestic market. Instead, CNPC sells it on the international market for many profits. And in 2006, Japan was the largest single recipient of Sudanese oil. Now, because of the economic problem, the needs of the international market have dropped off.
The last decade has observed a key and very important enhance in China’s engagement in Africa. FOCAC was built up and is now working, as the main means by which to manage dialogue and talk between different African countries and China over where the general direction of this partnership should go. Basically, it gives an integrative foundation for treating Africa as a single actor, which will surely promote the identity-building of Africa and differentiate itself from other relationship. In the coming years, China will surely enhance its interests in the African continent. Therefore. the FOCAC process provides Africa a new opportunity for a partnership with China and the prospect of a long-term win-win partnership with the world’s largest-growing economy.
South Sudan: Progress on peace agreement ‘limps along’
Although the transitional government in South Sudan continues to function, with state governors now appointed, among other developments, progress on the 2018 peace agreement “limps along”, the top UN official in the country told a virtual meeting of the Security Council on Wednesday.
David Shearer, head of the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), updated ambassadors on the country’s ongoing political and security situations, which are unfolding amid the COVID-19 pandemic and an upturn in inter-communal violence in Jonglei and other states.
“COVID-19 has slowed implementation of the peace agreement, including meeting key benchmarks, but the pandemic is not entirely to blame”, he said, speaking from the capital, Juba.
“We are seeing a reversion to ‘business as usual’ where progress on the peace agreement itself limps along.”
The peace agreement was the latest deal in efforts to end political infighting and violent conflict in South Sudan, the world’s youngest nation.
The country gained independence from Sudan in 2011 but descended into chaos roughly two-and-a-half years later following an impasse between President Salva Kiir and his former deputy, Riek Machar.
Progress ‘painfully slow’
Today, South Sudan now has five vice presidents who head clusters of ministries where activities are progressing well, according to Mr. Shearer.
“Elsewhere, however, progress has been painfully slow”, he reported. “Cabinet meetings occur irregularly, and the South Sudanese want to see the President and vice presidents meeting and working collectively.”
Meanwhile, there has been “almost no movement” on security sector reform, while the Transitional National Legislative Assembly has yet to be reconstituted, which is delaying progress on the Constitution.
Mr. Shearer said these continuing delays risk pushing elections out well beyond the timeline prescribed under the agreement, which will only add to the people’s growing disillusionment.
Inter-communal tensions remain high
The UN mission chief also briefed on the violence among Nuer, Murle and Dinka communities in Jonglei State over the past six months, which has left 600 people dead and homes torched, with women and children kidnapped. The situation has since calmed though tensions remain high. Mr. Shearer said a recent meeting among senior leaders, organized by UNMISS, was encouraging.
However, the mission was thwarted in attempts to deploy peacekeepers following attacks launched by the National Salvation Front armed group in areas of Central Equatoria state, which were met by heavy government fire.
“For the past three weeks, the usual mechanisms through which UNMISS coordinates its movement have seriously deteriorated. COVID-19 can be partly blamed but the influence of hardliners in the security forces is the principal obstacle,” he said.
Later in the meeting, South Sudanese activist and feminist, Nyachangkuoth Rambang Tai, shared her concerns about the ongoing inter-communal violence and the need for greater women’s participation in governance and peacebuilding.
She called on the international community to urgently support local civil society organizations, particularly those led by women.
“Another way to help address the cycle of violence is to ensure transitional justice is made a priority. We cannot except citizens who lost their loved ones, or whose loved ones have been killed, to forgive and move on without healing and accountability. This is unrealistic and will only encourage conflict,” said Ms. Tai, the Gender and Social Justice Manager with Assistance Missions for Africa.
Violence impacts humanitarians
Mr. Shearer outlined how South Sudan is faring in the wake of recent floods affecting some 500,000 citizens.
On Wednesday, the World Food Programme (WFP) reported that it is reaching vulnerable families with urgently needed assistance.
Aid workers have been striving to help communities impacted by the flood waters, as well as the violence, and now the pandemic. Sometimes they pay a heavy price, as Mr. Shearer pointed out.
“This year, seven aid workers have tragically lost their lives and another 144 have been evacuated because of sub-national violence”, he said.
“This meant an upturn in violence stemming from splintering between and within groups. The difference this year is that external political actors are fuelling these local conflicts with military advice and with heavy weapons.”
Millions in need
COVID-19 has only added to the ongoing suffering in South Sudan. The UN Humanitarian Coordinator reported that during the annual hunger season a few months back, some 6.5 million people, or more than half the population, faced severe food insecurity.
“Overall this year, 7.5 million people now need humanitarian assistance –and that’s close to levels in 2017 when we warned of famine”, Mark Lowcock told the Council. He added that some 1.3 million under-fives are forecasted to be malnourished: the highest figure in four years.
The UN relief chief urged ambassadors to fund a $1.9 billion response plan to meet the ever-growing needs.
Changes at POC sites
With the transitional government in place and a ceasefire holding, the UN Mission in South Sudan is looking at how to better support peace efforts and protect civilians.
More than 180,000 people are still living in Protection of Civilian (POC) sites at five UNMISS bases across the country, and Mr. Shearer said the conditions which led to their establishment no longer exist.
As a result, UNMISS has gradually withdrawn its troops and police from “static duties” at the Bor and Wau POC sites, following consultations with the Government and others, including displaced persons.
“The spike in subnational violence is occurring in remote areas, not near our POC sites. Therefore, we have to deploy our forces to provide protection where there is greatest need,” he said, emphasizing the need for the UN force to be robust, nimble and proactive.
Mr. Shearer explained that following the gradual withdrawal of UN peacekeepers, the POC sites will be under the control of the Government.
He stressed that no one will be pushed out or asked to leave when this transition occurs, while humanitarian services will continue.
Why Young African Scholars Must Engage the Law and Politics of Africa through New Perspectives
The Year of Africa was a powerful phase, a transitional moment that saw Africa in liberated black and white images. In one, a woman wearing sunglasses and sitting astride a motorcycle scooter communicated freedom and a promise of a bold future.In another, a smiling, young woman in a polka dot dress wore Independence in a sash, followed by a happy crowd. In yet another, a grinning man borne on the shoulders of two other men in a throbbing crowd, carried a placard that read: COMPLETE INDEPENDENCE 1961. It was the year that saw seventeen African states begin a journey of black statehood. Those images were metaphors of liberty in a continent that had been kept away from deciding the course of its own destiny. 1960 was a beginning and the end of the African struggle.
It was the beginning of the African struggle because Africans in the independent states were transitioning from struggling against colonialism to contending against the political realities of their post-independent states. And it was the end, because those Africans didn’t have to contend against colonialism any more. In the true picture of things, it was a transition from the political control of people who sought the wealth of the continent to a struggle with murderous regimes, and the sad realization of the true damage that colonialism had wreaked in the political arrangement of the people.In Nigeria, it was the beginning of the weaponization of ethnicity and of resentful distrust in state politics.
Africa in the 1960s was a dramatic spectacle of violence, new beginnings and the creation of histories that has informed the present. Independence movements aspired towards liberated African states. The consciousness of colonial restraints inspired actions that marked the trajectory of the continent’s destiny. The political history of Africa’s becoming is a timeline of seesaw moments. Dictators have risen and have fallen in the hubris of forgetfulness thatthe powers that saw to their rise could see to their fall. The legal systems, processes, institutions and the politics of Africa were forged in the turbulence of African history.
Today it is easy to say that Africa has made progress in its strides towards social and political evolution, but the past is a mirror of solutions to present problems. This is why it has become imperative for newer approaches to emerge in the study of law and politics in the context of Africa. Founded in 2020 by me, the Carnelian Journal of Law and Politics is Africa’s response to the need for new insights on law and politics in the African context. This new journal gives young African researchers the opportunity to contribute top quality perspectives to the discourse on the law and politics of Africa. This is important as newer voices are needed to give an inter-generational balance to the debate on African law and politics. And this is why the journal has emerged to bridge the scholarly gap.
A Tale of Two Sudans
For the first time in decades, Sudan is on a path to peace and democracy, turning the fall of a dictatorial regime into a reckoning with entrenched societal fissures and the overhaul of the institutions that reinforced them. On the other hand, South Sudan and its unity government, once a darling of western governments and NGOs as a model for religious freedom and democratic potential, continues to struggle to build peace and stability in the absence of any consolidated, legitimate institutions of authority.
It may be time to re-examine what we think we know about the war that split them apart.
Sudan: A Case for Cautious Optimism
Since the 2019 protests and coup that ended the repressive 30-year reign of dictator Omar al-Bashir, Sudan’s transitional government is slowly working to undo decades of damage and emerge from isolation.
In recent weeks, Sudan has signed successive peace deals with rebel forces addressing grievances that have long inhibited a permanent resolution to the conflict. The agreements separate religion from the state and establish a commission for religious freedom mandated to protect the country’s Christian minority. They also grant autonomy to the contested regions of Blue Nile and South Kordofan and set Darfur on a path to reunification under its own governor. An August 31 agreement on Darfur also covers power sharing, security, transitional justice, land ownership and the return of internally displaced persons and refugees.
In addition to completing the peace processes mandated in Sudan’s interim constitution, Sudan has also taken steps to reset relations internationally. Though the transitional government has limited power in this area, indications are encouraging for the potential normalisation of Sudan’s relationship with Israel – which would, in turn, support Sudan’s case for removal from the United States’ list of state sponsors of terrorism.
Positive as the outlook appears to be, Sudan has a long, difficult road to recovery ahead. The transitional government has 26 months left to lay the groundwork for a civilian, democratically elected government to take over. In addition to the colossal challenge of rebuilding institutions nearly from scratch, the pandemic and the global commodity market collapse have generated urgent economic woes.
Moreover, anyone with experience on the ground in Sudan will warn against misplaced confidence at this early stage. Connection with the international community – and international markets – has long served as an incentive to end the conflict, but even the most promising of peace agreements has failed to produce sufficient stability for sustained development.
South Sudan: A Grim Reality
If Sudan calls for cautious optimism, South Sudan demands a reckoning with the failure of the international response.
When South Sudan seceded in 2011, observers were optimistic. Those in the international community – both in the omnipresent NGO sector as well as foreign governments (principally the United States) believed that the oppressed Christian South would finally be free from its Islamic subjugators in the North, and the resolution of this religious divide would finally bring peace to the region. Instead, two years after independence, a brutal civil war broke out between President Salva Kiir Mayardit and former First Vice President Riek Machar, displacing significant numbers of people and leaving large swathes of the country reliant on humanitarian aid. Best estimates of numbers killed are upwards of 400,000, which at times has rivaled the war in Syria that received far greater attention.’
So, what happened? How did the Cinderella story of South Sudan’s independence become a nightmare?
The Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), the rebels turned political party who governed the country at independence, were ill-prepared to fulfil the functions of a state, despite the heavy investment and optimism afforded them by their international supporters leading up to 2011. Well before South Sudan split from the north, NGOs and aid groups had provided the overwhelming majority of state services, often with incorrect or incomplete knowledge of where resources were going. Some organisations even unwittingly provided direct financial to support to militias or funded ‘dialogues’ that served primarily as brand rehabilitation for war lords looking to take advantage of a sprawling and largely unregulated aid industry.
Arguably the international humanitarian response formed the economic, social and political foundations for the South Sudanese state that emerged in 2011. The sad irony is that these foundations have been purged by years of corruption and mismanagement since.
This dynamic followed South Sudan beyond independence, creating a cycle of escalating violence enabled by a steady flow in billions of dollars of humanitarian aid. The assumption that the Southern forces represented a unified Christian bloc fighting for religious freedom and human rights was convenient for warlords seeking resources and legitimacy and appealing to the international NGO and donor community – especially to faith-based aid efforts – but it has proved to be devastating for the millions affected by the ongoing conflict.
Ultimately, because the 2005 peace process took the Southern rebel forces’ branding at face value – with the support of the aid industry – it failed to confront the fragmentation and factionalism that had destroyed South Sudan and anticipate that these fissures would continue and undermine state-building efforts today. Though a tragedy for the South Sudanese, lessons from the failure of peacebuilding efforts in South Sudan may prove valuable to its northern neighbour – and Sudan’s transitional government appears to be learning already.
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