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China- Africa Framework: Strategic Cooperation

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The Forum for China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), built up to link relations between the two states, is due to hold its next meeting later this year. This evaluates what the benefits from that meeting will be on this developing, active, and mutual relationship. China’s engagement in African states goes back several years. In the last decade, from the mid-1950s to late 1970s based more on spontaneous confidentiality than that of 1980s and the period after the cold war. currently, the relationship sets up more on pragmatic economic considerations and cooperation. China is already Africa’s third largest trading partner. This multi-leveled partnership between China and Africa is both intricate and active. As China and its African participants arrange everything for the next FOCAC summit.

What does China want in Africa?

China’s relationship with African countries is very active, some perspectives have sustained stable. The most significant of these are the principles and outcomes of Chinese foreign policy through African and other developing countries. According to the Beijing’s Africa Policy issued in January 2006, China will: China-Africa friendship, will be proceeding from the basic benefits of both the Chinese and African peoples, build up and develop a new kind of strategic partnership with the African continent, presenting political equality and mutual trust, economic win-win cooperation and cultural exchange

The fundamental laws and aims for leading Chinese foreign policy in Africa as set out in this arrangement of government policy are: (1) Goodwill, friendship, honesty and equality; (2) Mutual benefit, cooperation and common prosperity; (3) Common mutuality, support and close reciprocity; and(4) Learning from each other and pursing, sharing common development. This mostly is the government expression of how it views, and ambitions, to manage its relationship with the African continent.

While the Chinese policy announcements are mostly clear; there is still skepticism about what China wants in Africa. Take the principle of non-intervention, one of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, which have been regularly highlighted guidance of Chinese foreign policy in one hand, and its Africa policy in the other. The most significant examples are Sudan and Zimbabwe. In current years, Sudan has seen a conflict of perspectives, with the US and other superpowers placing pressure on Beijing government to use its impact in Sudan over the condition in Darfur, and China responding that it is preferable to help in continued development in such states, and determining them this way. Therefore Beijing’s commitment to non-interference in African domestic affairs and its intention to establish partnerships based on cooperation and mutual respect have been generally welcomed by leaders of the African continent, just as it has got some critiques from the West especially the US.

To some extent does China manage Sino-Africa relations?

Yet, Chinese national interests in Africa are multi-aspects and multi-leveled, so the aspects who engage in China’s Africa policy making and implementation are generally diverse. This faces great challenges for China’s management capability, which is the real reason why FOCAC was established. Similar to the different trend of China’s interests and outcomes in Africa, we can highlight many types of aspects who have a sound in China’s Africa policy-making and performance. First of all and most important type of aspect is the government, both central and provincial, including officials–diplomats and other state-owned enterprises. Secondly coves several private corporations and their representatives in Africa. Inspired by the Chinese government’s “Go Out” policy, these private entrepreneurs chanced to Africa in seek of business opportunities. The third and importantly significant aspect is individuals, both influential middle-businessmen and the general Chinese laborers in Africa, which may amount to somehow a million people by 2009.

With the number of aspects rising, the traditional decision-making and strategy implementation system is under great pressure. In term of policymaking, power is centered at the top, in the Office of the Foreign Affairs of the Communist Party of China (CCP) Central Committee and the Foreign Affairs Office of the State Council. The top engine of executive power is the State Council, which includes the premier, vice premiers, and ministers. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs points out Chinese leaders and helps implement African policy. It cuts responsibility between a unit for Sub-Saharan Africa and one for West Asia and North Africa. The Ministry of Commerce plays a significant job in trade, aid, and investment. It has a Department of Foreign Aid. China’s State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) is equally ranked with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Commerce. SASAC is either mostly owns a state-owned enterprise (SOE) or sustains a supervising share of stock in a public SOE, several of which function in Africa. SASAC has branch offices in African countries. China’s Export-Import Bank is the only state-owned firm that allocates official economic assistance in the frame of low-interest loans, export credits, and guarantees. Additionally, The CCP’s International Department communicates with African representative to lay the pillars for business trading and diplomatic cooperation, encourage visits and to ensure that policies are implemented in accordance with CCP strategic goals.

What are the Challenges of China In Africa?

Under the policy of FOCAC and its follow-up perspectives, China has adopted its Africa policy-making and implementation and made several contributions to African development. However, the challenge of China-Africa relation is based on two main aspects. The first, the Chinese economic slowdown decreases the resources that are likely accessible for the next FOCAC meeting. Xi Jing ping said at G20 summit that China will, within its goodwill and potentiality, carry on to enhance its aid to Africa, decrease or cancel African states’ debts, enlarge its trade and enhance business investment in Africa, achieving the commitments it made during the Beijing Summit of the Forum on China- Africa Cooperation in 2017. On the other hand, because China’s economy now is export-oriented, the situation will greatly reduce the volume of China-Africa trade due to the western states’ needs decreasing. For instance, 50% of Sudan’s oil exports ship to China, but this number does not mean that this oil is bought by Chinese consumers. As a matter of fact, China National Petroleum Corporation(CNPC), the company which subdues the oil transactions between China and Sudan, does not sell the oil imported from Sudan on the Chinese domestic market. Instead, CNPC sells it on the international market for many profits. And in 2006, Japan was the largest single recipient of Sudanese oil. Now, because of the economic problem, the needs of the international market have dropped off.

Conclusion

The last decade has observed a key and very important enhance in China’s engagement in Africa. FOCAC was built up and is now working, as the main means by which to manage dialogue and talk between different African countries and China over where the general direction of this partnership should go. Basically, it gives an integrative foundation for treating Africa as a single actor, which will surely promote the identity-building of Africa and differentiate itself from other relationship. In the coming years, China will surely enhance its interests in the African continent. Therefore. the FOCAC process provides Africa a new opportunity for a partnership with China and the prospect of a long-term win-win partnership with the world’s largest-growing economy.

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SADC-Russia’s economic cooperation: Strategies, challenges and future perspectives

Kester Kenn Klomegah

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In 1991, the globally recognized anti-western Soviet propaganda machine collapsed and disappeared. Russia and SADC Member States have had long-standing and time-tested bilateral partnerships for nearly 30 years after the Soviet collapse. In this long-ranging interview, the Executive Secretary of the Southern African Development Community, Stergomena Lawrence Tax, discusses various aspects of SADC-Russia’s economic cooperation, some strategies, challenges and future perspectives with Kester Kenn Klomegah from Moscow.

Russia and Africa mark nearly 30 years of bilateral relations after the Soviet collapse. What does this mean from the African perspectives?

Russia has a long history of bilateral engagements with the Southern African countries, which constitute the Southern African Development Community, a Regional Economic Community (REC). Russia, as part of the then Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), supported the concerted efforts of the Frontline States and the Liberation Movements to fight against apartheid and the existential threats posed by it.

The USSR, in this regard, provided technical and military support to most of the countries that were a part of the Frontline States in order to achieve total liberation in the region. Even after the break-up of the USSR, Russia has continued to play an important role in technical assistance, economics and military support to African countries, including SADC Member States – our relationship with Russia is therefore not new, it is very valuable, and need to be sustained.

The most recent visit (2018) of the Russian Foreign Minister H.E. Sergey Lavrov, to the Republics of Angola, Ethiopia, Namibia and Zimbabwe, (as we understand it) was largely focused on signing of economic cooperation agreements to attract Russian investments in key areas such as mining, aviation and energy sectors, as well as fostering military technical cooperation.

Southern African leaders are looking for investment in infrastructure, industry and trade. How would you characterize Russia’s role in Southern Africa, comparing it among BRICS?

Investment in infrastructure, industry and trade is seen as a catalyst for regional integration, economic growth, and sustainable development. In this regard, SADC welcomes investors from all over the world.  It is worth noting that one of the BRICS countries, South Africa, is a SADC Member State. Any comparison will therefore be limited to the other BRICS countries – namely Brazil, India and China.

While Russia as part of the then Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) supported SADC Frontline States and the Liberation Movements, a few years ago, it has not been that visible in the region as compared to China, India or Brazil. It is encouraging that, of recent, Russia has positioned herself to be a major partner with Southern Africa and being part of the BRICS promotes her engagement with the region, particularly in investment in minerals, aviation, defense and energy sectors.

Russia has also launched an Africa business forum, aimed at improving direct trade with the continent/region beyond the traditional sectors like mining, seeking to invest in areas like agriculture, industrial production, high technology and transport. The upcoming Russia and SADC Investment Forum that is to take place on 23 October 2018 in Russia, also seeks to provide an opportunity for businesses and partnerships.

Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has reiterated during his last African tour that Russia’s preferred focus is on Russia-SADC in its diplomacy in Africa. Why is SADC region considered a strategic region for Russia?

We cannot obviously speak for Russia, but we could give you a general overview of why international partners and investors would consider SADC an attractive or strategic investment partner.

There are a number of inter-related factors for this, the first being peace and stability: The SADC region is peaceful and stable. A peaceful and stable environment is attractive to investors as it fosters confidence by assurance of longevity, property rights and fundamental freedoms, which underpin economic rights. Peace in SADC is sustained through cooperation between the 16 Member States of SADC as espoused in the SADC Treaty, and in particular, the Protocol on Politics, Defense and Security Cooperation whose general objective is to promote peace and security in the Region.

The Founding Fathers of SADC had long recognized that the region could remain stable by fostering common political values, building legitimate democratic institutions and mechanisms to sustain peace as a pre-requisite for regional integration and prosperity.

Secondly, is the integrated market resulting from a combined population of approximately 327 million people, and a collective GDP of US$ 600 billion (2016), which is supported by generally favorable weather conditions in most parts of the region.

Thirdly, the region has abundant natural resources ranging from vast energy resources, arable land and forestry; to precious minerals such as diamonds, gold, platinum, copper, cobalt, oil, and natural gas to mention but a few. These are vital for the global economy and strategic partnership.

Notwithstanding, the above mentioned comparative advantages, the region has relatively under-developed human capabilities and infrastructure, which are essential for bolstering the region’s efforts to exploit and maximize benefits from these natural resources. Hence, the need for the region to cooperate with external partners, such as Russia, which has advanced technologies and capacities that could be transferred to the region. A peaceful and stable environment surely presents a ‘strategic’ imperative as well.

Russian Federation’s priorities are also in line with SADC priorities as evidenced by the priorities of the Foreign Economic Strategy in the region as indicated below:

  • Prospecting, mining, oil, construction and mining, purchasing gas, oil, uranium, and bauxite assets (Angola, Namibia and South Africa);
  • Construction of power facilities—hydroelectric power plants on the River Congo (Angola, Namibia and Zambia,) and nuclear power plants (South Africa);
  • Creating a floating nuclear power plant, and South African participation in the international project to build a nuclear enrichment centre in Russia;
  • Railway Construction (Angola);
  • Creation of Russian trade houses for the promotion and maintenance of Russian engineering products (South Africa).
  • Participation of Russian companies in the privatization of industrial assets, including those created with technical assistance from the former Soviet Union (Angola).

In your estimation, what is the level of Russia’s engagement with SADC region?

Russia and SADC Member States have had long-standing bilateral partnership for development for decades, providing substantial results in the priority areas of cooperation. Through such significant historical ties, the peoples of SADC and of Russia have strengthened friendship and mutual understanding for developing comprehensive, equitable and fruitful cooperation.

The ten (10) SADC Member States represented in the Russian Federation, namely: Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe provide an extensive representation for engagement.

At the regional level, SADC and Russia are expected to sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Basic Principles of Relations and Cooperation on 23rd October 2018, in the following areas, among others, Technical Cooperation and Assistance; Capacity Building; Peace, Security, Conflict Prevention and Resolution; Preventive Diplomacy; Trade, Industry, Finance and Investment; Infrastructure Development, and Energy; Information Communication Technology (ICT); Transport, Communications and Meteorology; Water, Agriculture, Ocean Economy, Food Security; Minerals, Natural Resources and Protection of the Environment; Education and Science; Healthcare; Technology and Innovation; and Culture, Tourism and Information Exchange. In addition, a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in the area of Military – Technical Cooperation, with the aim of promoting cooperation between the Parties in regional and international peace and security was signed in July, 2018.

Outcomes of Russian Foreign Minister’s March 2018 visit to some SADC Member States

In March 2018, the Russian Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, visited the Southern Africa region where he held talks with the Presidents of Angola, Namibia, Mozambique and Zimbabwe. In his statement, the Minister noted that Russia together with Africa wanted to elevate trade, economic and investment relations to a level that would meet political and trust-based relations.

It is our considered view that the bilateral engagements served to strengthen the already existing ties, coming up with win–win bilateral cooperation between Russia and these Member States. This will be augmented by the two Memorandum of Understanding: MOU in the area of Military–Technical Cooperation, that is to promote cooperation between the Parties that was signed in July, 2018, and MoU on Basic Principles of Relations and Cooperation to be signed on 23rd October 2018.

What challenges and setbacks, in your view, still remain to get both parties (Russia and Southern Africa) towards result-oriented and effectively closer in their post-Soviet economic cooperation?

SADC works closely with the International Cooperating Partners (ICPs) in achieving its developmental results. As such, SADC’s cooperation with the ICPs is guided by the principles of partnership and commitments. Both SADC and Russia value their adherence to the aims and principles of the United Nations Charter, seeking to contribute to the establishment of a democratic and just world order and to strengthen regional and inter-regional ties to ensure peace, stability, socio-economic development, and mutual confidence.

In view of the above, the thrust for SADC-Russia Cooperation shall be aligned with global, continental, regional, and national policies. By so doing, both sides will be able to contribute and create favourable conditions for socio-economic development, cooperation, and mutual confidence.

Soft power and public diplomacy are largely or significantly not in Russia’s engagement with Southern Africa. What are your objective views on these issues?

If you follow the history of Russia’s engagement with Africa, and Southern Africa in particular, from the days of the USSR to the present, one is likely to find that Public Diplomacy by Russia has encompassed many forms. These have included, educational programs, cultural exchanges, scholarly visitor programs, and of course, the use of media to cover and project issues on Africa from a Russian perspective. These are all instruments and forms of public diplomacy, which would ordinarily have the effect of reaching audiences on our continent and beyond, and impacting positively on what Russia has to offer the world. In the same vein, this can be seen as a form of “soft power” as its aim is to appeal and attract partners rather than coerce them into a relationship of one form or the other.

Arguably, do you think intermediaries will be required, for example, the private equity and commodity trading communities to play a supportive role in forging business links between Russia and Southern Africa?

Like most of the developing countries, Southern African countries have, over the years, largely relied on multilateral and regional development financial institutions to fund their development projects. However, given the huge demand for resources, policy makers have realised that these cannot be met solely from these traditional sources, and therefore, the need to explore alternative and innovative sources of funding. Private equity and commodity trading exchanges can play a critical role in mobilising resources mostly from the private sector to fund projects in the Southern African countries.

For the region to realise its enormous potential, it needs the support of the next generation of financial instruments and intermediaries to capitalise on opportunities, navigate challenges, and build the businesses and economies, that will enable the continent to thrive. Private equity could become a major force for accelerating growth in African countries. While regional penetration is low, smaller markets and modest penetration create significant potential for high risk-adjusted returns. Major growth sectors are: natural resources, transportation, energy, real estate, fintech, healthcare and hospitality. Many private equity funds are nurturing the requisite skills and experience to invest, grow and add value to portfolio/innovative companies.

Similarly, the establishment of commodity trading exchanges can play a critical role in boosting the region’s economic development. Successful securities exchanges all over the world are key to the economic development, providing the most efficient channel for savers (domestic and foreign) to channel funds into long-term productive enterprises, creating growth and increased prosperity. Since the region has a comparative advantage in the vast natural resources sector, and in line with SADC objective of developing and adding value and beneficiation concept, the setting of the commodities trading exchanges present attractive growth opportunities.

In this context, SADC has already undertaken initiatives to develop the interconnectivity project whereby the aim is to link the SADC stock exchanges, and to encourage cross border trading of shares/stocks. Efforts are also being made to improve the operational, regulatory and technical requirement underpinnings and capabilities of the region’s exchanges to make the securities markets more attractive to both regional and international investors.

The region remains a top destination for investment as its attractiveness to investment has risen dramatically over the last several years, and this should continue to present attractive growth opportunities for private equity for the foreseeable future. Private equity represents a new source of capital, complementing traditional sources and project finance, with private equity investors offering more than just funds, but also the needed skills. All said, there are positive directions in the relationship, we look for a bright future.

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Global community must go beyond military cooperation to assist Africa

Kester Kenn Klomegah

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Russian Special Presidential Representative for the Middle East and Africa and Deputy Foreign Minister, Mikhail Bogdanov, has urged global community to go beyond military cooperation to assist African countries that are still facing a number of serious development problems particularly infrastructure, social inequality, healthcare and education.

According to Bogdanov, transnational problems, the issues of arms smuggling, drug trafficking, illegal migration and even slavery continue escalating on the African continent.

“Joint efforts of the whole global community are required for meeting those challenges, I am confident that the aid to African states should go beyond military components,” the Russian diplomat stressed.

“It is necessary to fortify public institutions, engage economic and humanitarian fields, construct infrastructure facilities, create new jobs,” Bogdanov said, adding “those are the ways of solving such problem as migration, for example, to Europe.”

Bogdanov was contributing to the panel discussions on the topic: “Engaging Africa in Dialogue: Towards a Harmonious Development of the Continent” at the Dialogue of Civilisations Forum that was held from October 5-6 in Rhodes, Greece.

This plenary discussion aimed at identifying specifically African countries’ priorities and issues holding back these countries and if competition between the West and Asia could benefit Africa, or is a more collaborative effort needed.

Bogdanov’s advice to the global community to go “beyond military cooperation” came at the crucial time when as part of the foreign policy, Russia has increasingly stepped up exports of military equipment through its “military-technical cooperation” abroad instead of assisting with needed investment in economic sectors in African countries.

Within the context of strengthening ties, Director for International Cooperation and Regional Policy Department of Rostec, Victor Kladov, said at the Business Forum of 2018 Army Games recently organised by the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation that “African countries are now returning to military-technical cooperation market as their national economies steadily develop.”

Rosoboronexport’s cooperation with traditional importers of Russian weapons from Africa include Algeria, Angola, Burkina Faso, Botswana, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Libya, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, Sudan, South Africa, Uganda and Zimbabwe. It has recently concluded agreements with a few more African countries.

In March, President Putin chaired this year’s first meeting of the Commission for Military Technical Cooperation with Foreign States and Kremlin’s website transcript pointed to the geographic reach of military technical cooperation as constantly expanding, with the number of partners already in more than 100 countries worldwide.

It’s an established fact that the major driver for Moscow’s push into Africa is military-technical cooperation more broadly. These often include officer training and the sale of military equipment, though the full details are rarely publicly available.

The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) reported in December 2017 that Russia accounted for nearly 20% of the volume of major arms supplied to sub-Saharan Africa.

The Soviets provided military assistance, a historically accepted view, but many experts have also acknowledged that now ideology is not a significant factor.

Dmitri Bondarenko, Deputy Director of the Institute for African Studies Institute (IAS) of the Russian Academy of Sciences, told me: “With African countries, the primary aim now for Russian business is to regain a competitive edge in the global arms trade, and what’s interesting is that the approach is not ideological but very pragmatic – you pay, we ship. It’s simply business and nothing more.”

“Russia has revived their contacts with their African comrades that used to be the traditional buyers of Soviet weaponry. It is a similar policy, in the sense, that they are using military diplomacy once again in order to gain stature and influence in certain countries,” Scott Firsing, a visiting Bradlow fellow at the South African Institute for International Affairs (SAIIA), wrote in an emailed discussion.

Arguably, Shaabani Nzori, a Moscow based Foreign Policy Expert, thinks that Russia’s military-technical cooperation with African countries is appropriate in Russia’s foreign policy but African leaders should also allocate enough money to spend on priority development projects in Africa.

“It shows clearly Russia’s weak business engagement with Africa. Until now, we can’t point to completed Russian infrastructure projects in Africa. There are many investment areas. What is important these days is Russia has to go beyond just selling arms to Africa! Still, Russia has the chance to transfer its technology to agriculture and industries in Africa,” Shaabani said in the interview discussion.

President Vladimir Putin said a major part of Russia’s weapons business includes new equipment supplies, upgrades and refurbishment of Soviet-era technology and hardware. “Russia places special emphasis on developing countries that gradually increase military procurement. We understand that competition in this sector of the international economy is very high and very serious,” he said.

According to Kremlin website, Russia targeted global export contracts worth $50 billion in 2018. Russia’s export priority is to expand its scope and strengthen its position on the market. Last year’s results indicated that Russia has been keeping its standards high, confirming its status as one of the leading suppliers on the global arms market. The portfolio for Russian arms and military equipment stands at $45 billion.

Russia plans “to enhance multifaceted interaction with African states on a bilateral and multilateral with a focus on promoting mutually beneficial trade and economic cooperation” – the full text of the new foreign policy concept was approved by President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin on February 12, 2013.

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France and China in Africa

Giancarlo Elia Valori

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A geoeconomic and strategic clash between China and France is currently emerging across Africa, with France supporting the United States in a new bilateral relationship, and China changing its economic penetration into the Dark Continent- in a new relationship with the Russian Federation.

Let us look at the main data and statistics: this year the African Development Bank has forecast a 1.9% growth in Southern Africa; a 2.2% growth in Central Africa and even 3.4% in Eastern and Northern Africa.

However, the trend is towards a slowdown in economic growth across the world – a slowdown that will be ushered in by the reaching and exceeding of the 100 US dollar threshold of the oil barrel price.

In fact, if we analyse the data and statistical series, the recent great economic and financial crises have been triggered by a significant increase in the oil price – that the West is facing with increasing difficulty.

Reverting to the focus of our analysis, in East Africa growth will be even 5.7%, the current highest rate in the world, apart from some Asian countries.

Africa’s development, however, has two sides – the side of the GDP growth and the equally important one of the increase in the external debt of many African countries.

An African indebtedness that mainly concerns China.

Here two very severe cases can be seen: in fact, in January 2017, Mozambique declared it could not to repay its foreign debt, due to a hidden debt incurred by its companies to the tune of 1.8 billion euros.

Furthermore, in August 2017, Congo had to revaluate its debt to 120% of its GDP (it was previously 77%) for similar reasons.

Hidden indebtedness is currently one of Africa’s plagues. It is currently worth 34% of the total African GDP. It is a debt mainly denominated in foreign currencies, often run up by unsavory and deceptive bankers, including members of Italy’s and other regions’ organized crime. This obviously favours China’s purchase of African companies that now cost a handful of rice.

In Nigeria, currently 60% of State revenue is used for servicing the public debt, with evident and foreseeable internal turmoil in the near future, considering that the Nigerian government has no reserves for productive public spending and for the necessary poverty mitigation policies.

In Ghana, the government led by Nana Akufo-Addo, who has been in power since January 2017, has taken on the debt piled up by its predecessors, which today accounts for 80% of GDP.

Also Angola, the second sub-Saharan oil power, is debt-ridden and is reducing extraction activities.

In Angola the debt is supposed to account for 90% of GDP and it is rising quickly.

As previously mentioned, China already holds much of the African debt.

It owns 70% of Cameroon’s public debt. This holds true also for Kenya.

Moreover, international banks inform us of the fact that between 2010 and 2014 the appetite for Chinese credit has increased by 54% throughout Africa.

A figure never reached by any developed country in banking and economic development relations with Africa.

Until 2017, however, the average of the African public debt was 45% of GDP.

Currently, however, according to the African Development Bank, at least 11 out of the 35 low-income African countries are considered to be at very high over-indebtedness risk.

For years the low cost of raw materials has been the trigger of the crisis, which will certainly become very severe in the phase of the “debt peak” which, in the case of Africa, is expected to materialize in 2021.

At the same time, however, some African States have begun to lend money to some emerging African countries, obviously at a rate higher than the rate granted to them. Countries that had no access to international credit.

And with raw materials that have been on the wane for long time, as well as a growing cost of manpower and the increase in internal political instability, caused by the crisis in public spending for a minimum level of Welfare State.

A debt spiral that has already enabled as many as 32 African countries to accept the unfair conditions of the private Funds for debt recycling, which acquire the securities at derisory prices and then resell them at a higher price to good European and American clients.

In 1996, however, the Ivory Coast, Ghana, Cameroon, Gabon, Rwanda and Kenya accepted the PPTE program of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund – the program for heavily indebted countries which imposed strict spending control on them so as to later enable them to return into the international credit mechanism.

The recipes are well-known: privatization, in the belief that the private sector is metaphysically better than the State one; heavy cuts in current spending, as well as reduction of spending on security and investments, including the productive ones.

As can be easily imagined, this has created a very profound crisis in the income of the poorest walks of society and has really annihilated the prospects for the young generations who, in fact, flee unreasonably towards the EU – or swell the ranks of the very strong exchange of manpower between the various African countries.

Currently the most indebted countries in Africa are South Africa, Sudan, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Ivory Coast, Nigeria and Kenya. Hence a continent already destroyed before being made sufficiently productive.

Ironically, many of these countries are also on the list of the richest nations in Africa: Egypt, South Africa and Nigeria–again in descending order.

France, however, has lost its traditional role as top investor in Africa.

Between 2015 and 2016, for example, China invested as many as 38.4 billion US dollars in the Dark Continent, while the second largest investor in Africa, namely the United Arab Emirates, reached 15 billion US dollars over the same period.

Italy, however, is the top investor among European countries, especially through ENI.

France ranks only sixth with 7.7 billion US dollars invested.

Meanwhile the Russian Federation is strengthening its traditional ties with Algeria and it is arranging a free trade area in the Maghreb region, with the Alawite Kingdom of Morocco at the core. It is also building nuclear power plants in Egypt and Southern Africa, with further exports of Russian grain to the poorest African countries.

Russia is also organizing peer cooperation projects in Equatorial Guinea, Burundi, Zambia, Uganda and Zimbabwe.

Areas that are less relevant to China or where there may be cooperation between China and Russia, with the latter interested in agriculture and oil and the former building infrastructure and operating on the market of the other raw materials.

China already owns 98% of the world’s coltan -i.e. the columbite-tantalite used for all commercial electronic devices – which can be found in the Central African Republic.

France’s exports to Africa, however, have almost halved in 2018 compared to 2000, falling from 11% to 5.5%.

In Senegal, French exports fell by 25% in 2017 – a loss that locally favoured Turkey, Spain and, above all, China.

Certainly the French-speaking Africa – linked to the CFA Franc – is a huge source of raw materials, with 14% of the world’s energy reserves and 22% of the world’s habitable areas.

Through the Africa using the CFA Franc, the French-speaking regions, which alone account for 4% of the world population, still account for 16% of world GDP and 20% of global trade in goods. France led by President Macron (but also France led by his more colourless predecessor Hollande) wants to create an autonomous common market – to be used also against an adverse EU – between the economy of the French Hexagon and the economies of the African French-speaking countries.

And this is precisely the point of geopolitical contrast with China.

China, however, still has many strings to its bow.

Last June, for example, Burkina Faso announced it had broken its relations with Taiwan to recognize only the People’s Republic of China.

The first step that China asks all its partners to take.

China also doubled US bilateral trade with Africa as early as 2013.

The beginning of the new relationship between China and Africa – after the “Three Worlds” Maoist theory in which, however, the People’s Republic of China became the leader of the Third World, after the two American and Soviet “imperialisms”-materialized after the Tiananmen Square protests and crisis in 1989, with a view to escaping the isolation imposed by the West (and by Russia which, at the time, had many problems to solve).

It should also be noted that many current African leaders have been educated in China.

Think of Joseph Kabila, the leader of the Democratic Republic of Congo, who studied at the National University of Defence in Beijing.

Or to Mulatu Teshoma, the President of Ethiopia, who studied philosophy and political economy with a PhD in international law at the Peking University, before continuing his studies at the Tufts University in the United States.

Or again to Emmerson Mnangagwa, the President of Zimbabwe, former student of the “School of Marxism” at the Peking University, who later spent a period of time in Nanjing studying combat training.

The current leader of Tanzania studied military engineering in China and then returned to the country in 1964.

Hence how is France responding to this? In July 2018 President Macron went to Nigeria -after having paid an official visit to Ghana – but he has the clear intention of gaining broad consensus not only in the old African French-speaking countries, but also in the English-speaking part of the Dark Continent.

The French President believes that also Africa is now “globalized” and hence he must go well beyond the old traditional perimeter of the so called Françafrique.

The concept underling the strategy of President Macron is no longer the traditional one of Françafrique, but rather that of AfricaFrance.

The offer made to the President of Rwanda, Paul Kagame, to become President of the International Organization of the Francophonie must be seen in this context.

From the African autonomous culture – which, according to President Macron, must be revitalized – to the recovery of the French economy and companies in Africa: the French market in Africa fell from 11% in 2003 to 5% in 2017.

Meanwhile China rose from 3% in 2001 to the pan-African 18% in 2017.

Even Germany has currently overtaken France in foreign trade with Africa.

Certainly the French President also wants his country to remain the “policeman” of Africa – as during the Cold War –  but he plans to confine his fight “to terrorism”, or more precisely to the sword jihad, in the Sahel region, which is and will be the future core of the French military presence in Africa.

Furthermore, President Macron intends to deal with business, thus limiting the security role played by France in Africa France as much as possible.

This is also the meaning of the increasingly important role that will be given to the G5 Sahel,i.e. the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel including Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Chad.

In short, according to its best strategic analysts, France wants to prevent future geoeconomic battles by preserving its global strategic role. Hence it wants to protect its old African colonies from the predatory and harmful effects of globalization.

This means that France tends to produce a new African “common market” between its economy and the developing economies if its old Françafrique.

Hence the recent France-G5Sahel military operations must be seen in this context: Operation Barkhane, which began in 2014 with 3,000 French soldiers, in addition to those of the G5-Sahel, based in ‘Ndjamena, the capital of Chad, as well as the Operation Serval aimed at ousting Islamic militants from the North of Mali, and Operation Epervier, a French counter-terrorist action between Cameroon and Chad.

The other two French military operations, namely Sangaris and Licorne – the former in the Central African Republic, which ended in 2016, and the latter a peacekeeping action in the Ivory Coast, replaced in 2015 by the “French Forces in the Ivory Coast” -were a relative success, but with a progressive support from the US African Command.

However, what about the CFA Franc, which is now a controversial topic inside and outside Africa France?

For some African Heads of State and Government, who obviously do not want to give in to China or to other new players in Africa, the CFA Franc “is a sound currency” and “does good to the African people”, just to quote the explicit words of Ivorian President Alassane Ouattara.

President Macron stated that the CFA Franc is “a currency that works and needs to be modernized together”.

It should be recalled, however, that France intervened militarily in Africa as many as 42 times from 1968 to 2013.

France will never give up Africa, but it has not the liquidity to really do so. China, too, will certainly not give up Africa and will never intervene militarily, if not directly hit, while investing massively in the Dark Continent.

Hence how will the CFA Franc be reformed?

It is easy to predict: with an increase of its value as against the Euro and new internal regulations governing the relations between France and the other African partners.

The French game in Africa will work until the Chinese economy slows down and hence there will be less Chinese capital to invest in Africa.

China, however, is already a net importer of semi-finished goods, as well as clothes and basic products from countries such as Ethiopia, while many African countries keep on importing high-value-added goods and capital for basic industrialization from China.

In Africa, China tends to replicate the same development as its development of the early days of the “Four Modernizations” phase.

Therefore, the most likely solution in the near future will be a concentration of French power on the G5 Sahel, with a parallel reduced role of France in the Eastern region of the Dark Continent.

While China will keep on expanding its influence in Africa, from the South to sub-Saharan Central Africa, up to Egypt and the Northern Atlantic Coast of Africa.

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