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Is Nuclear Arms Control Still Alive?

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For almost eight years we have been witnessing a decline (or even absence) of Russian and U.S. efforts in the sphere of nuclear arms control, which can be seen at both the official and expert levels. The last achievement in this field was the Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New Start Treaty) which was signed by Russia and the United States in 2010 and entered into force in February 2011. Since then, issues pertaining to further steps in nuclear disarmament have disappeared from the agenda of Russian-American relations.

In the past, such pauses were filled with active consultations and were used to rethink one’s own policy in this area and comprehensively assess the other party’s position. Preparatory work continued even in the period between the fall of 1983 (when the Soviet Union withdrew from all nuclear arms negotiations with the United States) and the spring of 1985 (when the negotiations were resumed), while informal contacts between the parties (primarily through scientific communities) became much stronger.

Over a period of fifty years, the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia achieved significant progress in curbing the nuclear arms race and gradually and steadily lowering the level of nuclear confrontation between the two major nuclear powers. In the Soviet Union/Russia, the greatest achievements in nuclear arms control were made during the rule of Leonid Brezhnev and Mikhail Gorbachev. Vladimir Putin played an important role in the ratification of the START II Treaty (2000) during his first term as president, as he convinced legislators of its effectiveness and usefulness for Russia’s security interests, and in the conclusion of the Russian-American Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (2002). Dmitry Medvedev earned a place for himself in the history of nuclear disarmament by signing the aforementioned 2010 Treaty. It was only during the brief rule of Yuri Andropov (from November 1982 to February 1984) and Konstantin Chernenko (from February 1984 to March 1985) that there was no tangible progress in nuclear arms control.

In the United States, all the eight presidents that preceded Donald Trump—from Richard Nixon to Barack Obama—had achievements in this field. It is still an open question whether Trump will want to break with this tradition. In any case, there are several arguments both in favor of and against such a possibility. It should be emphasized that not everything depends on the desire or unwillingness of the U.S. administration to conclude new agreements in this area. Russia’s position has an equal role to play, and this position does not inspire much optimism at the present time.

Politicians and experts name many reasons for the breach of Russia-U.S. relations in the field of nuclear arms control. One of them is believed to be the deterioration of Russia-West relations over the Ukraine crisis. But facts show that the problem arose much earlier. In March 2013 (that is, one year before the events in Ukraine), former chief of the presidential administration of Russia Sergei Ivanov openly said that Russia was not interested in further reductions in armaments and named the reason for that: the completion of the modernization of Russia’s strategic nuclear forces and its unwillingness to eliminate new strategic weapons that had only recently entered service.

Another argument, named by President Putin in February 2012, is the need to involve third nuclear powers in the nuclear disarmament process after the 2010 treaty. Further explanations provided by some other officials, including Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, claimed that deeper reductions (outside the treaty’s framework) would make the strategic offensive weapons of Russia and the U.S. “comparable” with those of third nuclear powers.

Moscow puts the main blame for the failure to achieve new nuclear arms control agreements with the U.S. on the missile defense problem. This problem arose now and then in Soviet times and came to a head in 1983 when President Reagan proposed the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). The SDI slowed down START I negotiations and nearly blocked the conclusion of this and other nuclear disarmament agreements. The United States’ withdrawal from the open-ended ABM Treaty in 2002 and its subsequent efforts to create and deploy missile defense in its own territory and territories of its allies, coupled with unsuccessful attempts to reach agreement with Russia on joint missile defense programs, exacerbated the situation still further.

Moscow also explains the lack of progress in strategic nuclear arms reductions by the possession of nuclear weapons by Washington’s NATO allies. Anatoly Antonov, who at that time was Russian deputy defense minister, said this factor “cannot be ignored.” Other factors that Moscow says should be “taken into account” include the “Global Strike” concept, the deployment of strategic precision-guided conventional weapons, plans to deploy weapons in outer space, the presence of U.S. non-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe, and some other disproportions, many of which are mentioned in Russia’s present National Security Strategy, approved by Putin in late 2015.

Russia’s position on further steps towards nuclear disarmament resembles that of the Soviet Union in the late 1960s. It is based on the principle of “equal security,” which means that all factors determining the balance of power between the opposing sides should be taken into account. This explains why in negotiations with Washington on strategic nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union considered it justified to demand compensation for imbalances in other categories of arms.

Naturally, fifty years ago, the categories of weapons subject to “compensation” were different from those of today. They did not include conventional weapons of any kind. Moscow was concerned about nuclear weapons possessed by the U.S.’s NATO allies, and U.S. forward-deployed nuclear weapons in Europe. Now Russia has taken a broader approach, focusing more on non-nuclear armaments, which creates additional difficulties in the search for mutual understanding with the United States and which calls into question the possibility of concluding new agreements.

If we recognize that Russia’s concern over the effect of missile defense and precision-guided and other conventional weapons on the strategic balance is of a fundamental nature, a natural question arises: How to accommodate this concern if a political decision is made to continue the nuclear disarmament process? And should Russia agree to deeper reductions in nuclear weapons if its concern is ignored?

Needless to say, no agreement on strategic offensive arms can set unequal ceilings on the number of warheads and their strategic delivery vehicles remaining after reductions. That would be at variance with the very meaning of an international treaty, which should be based on the principle of equality of the parties and which should conform to its subject matter. Nevertheless, there are other ways to accommodate the aforementioned concerns. For example, in the second half of the 1980s, the Soviet Union was very concerned about the SDI program and American nuclear weapons deployed in Europe. This is why a package solution was proposed—simultaneous negotiations on three issues: medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe, strategic offensive arms, and defense and outer space. Moscow put forward a condition that the three planned agreements should be signed simultaneously. Washington did not object. However, the Soviet Union did not adhere to this position for long. At first, the term ‘nuclear delivery vehicles’ was used to designate only land-based ballistic and cruise missiles, while aviation was excluded from the negotiations. Later, Moscow removed this category of weapons from the initial package, after which, in December 1987, the parties signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty), which is of unlimited duration.

For a much longer time, almost until all provisions of the START I Treaty were agreed, the Soviet Union insisted on a linkage between strategic offensive and defensive weapons, which was reflected in official statements and the structure of the Soviet delegation to the talks. Moscow sent one delegation to the talks on these two types of weapons. Negotiations on defense and outer space were conducted by a separate group within the delegation. The United States was represented by two separate delegations. One worked on START I, and the other held consultations on defense and outer space. When it became clear that the defense and space negotiations would fail and that the START I Treaty was almost ready, the Soviet Union signed the treaty but made a unilateral statement on the need to observe the ABM Treaty as a condition for implementing START I.

This experience proves that one real way to accommodate concerns is to conclude separate agreements on the most pressing security problems, including missile defense, precision-guided long-range weapons, and space weapons. The authors of World 2035. Global Forecast, published by the Primakov Institute of World Economy and International Relations in 2017, admit of this possibility but consider it the least likely of the proposed four scenarios for the development of the military-political situation in the world in the period until 2035.

Speaking of concrete ways to accommodate concerns, one should assess, at least approximately, the effect of missile defense, precision-guided weapons and space weapons on the Russian-U.S. strategic balance. First of all, let us note an interesting circumstance. When it comes to the effect of various factors on the strategic balance, Russian officials insisting that this effect should be taken into account somehow fail to mention air defense. If we follow this logic, then any weapons capable of combating strategic offensive weapons should be included in the overall balance of power, especially if they are intended to combat retaliatory systems. These weapons definitely include the aviation component of the strategic triad. Without going into further discussion, let us note that this omission of air defense issues seems to be due to some other considerations than a desire to strengthen strategic stability.

Of the remaining three categories of weapons, which, in the opinion of the Russian leadership, have an effect on the strategic balance, space weapons are the most interesting from the point of view of concluding a possible agreement. The fact is, there are no such weapons yet, as far as we know. Therefore, they have no effect on the strategic balance. It is worth recalling the Soviet Union’s struggle against the SDI program in the second half of the 1980s. Many experts said then that “space strike weapons” would be created in the foreseeable future. The most skeptical participants in discussions said that such systems would appear in 20 to 25 years at the earliest. 30 years have passed since then, but this type of weapons (space-based lasers, railguns and other exotic weapons) has not come into existence so far. There are no serious reasons, either, to suggest that space weapons will be in the strategic arsenal of the United States or other countries within the next two to three decades, even if new technologies make this possible. In this case, the following factors will come into play: cost, combat effectiveness of weapon systems, their vulnerability, and possible reaction from the domestic opposition, individual countries and the international community as a whole. These factors may not only slow down but prevent the militarization of space.

In addition, there are no commonly agreed definitions for such terms as ‘weapons’, which can be the subject of an agreement on space issues. Unfortunately, such an agreement can hardly be based on the draft international Treaty on Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects, submitted by China and Russia to the Conference on Disarmament in 2008 (and its updated version, submitted in 2014). The draft only proposed preventing the deployment of weapons in outer space and made no mention of prohibiting their development or testing in space. Nor did it mention weapons deployed on Earth but capable of destroying outer space objects.

Criticisms of this document can be continued, but the main problem is whether it is possible to reach a verifiable agreement on limiting or banning space weapons, whatever this term might mean, even if all parties show real interest in it. There are more doubts than optimism regarding this possibility. Answering this question requires more than just efforts by diplomats, the military and developers of space weapons. More experts should be involved in these efforts, including scientists from countries that may be parties to future agreements.

Another interesting question concerns long-range precision-guided conventional weapons and their effect on the strategic balance. According to the majority of specialists, this type of weapons includes cruise missiles, non-nuclear ICBMs, and some weapon systems (for example, hypersonic gliders). As a rule, the degree of effect such weapons may have on the strategic balance is not assessed. Nevertheless, it is asserted that they can not only weaken but also undermine strategic stability. This is a doubtful statement.

If we view these systems from the point of view of strengthening the offensive capability, they are absolutely incommensurable with nuclear weapons in terms of power. Precision-guided weapons are absolutely unsuitable for preemptive strikes for many reasons. Speaking of non-nuclear ICBMs, their accuracy should by far exceed that of nuclear ICBMs. Otherwise, they won’t be able to destroy hard targets (such as missile silos or command centers). According to open source data, modern ICBMs have accuracy (circular error probable – CEP) of several dozen meters, at best. Destroying a hard target with a conventional warhead requires this accuracy of not more than several meters, which is impossible to achieve at the present technological level of these systems.

But this is not the main concern. If an aggressor decides to use precision-guided weapons (conventional ICBMs) in a surprise attack to destroy a significant part of the opponent’s nuclear arsenal, it will have to plan a massive attack. Such an attack cannot go unnoticed due to a missile warning system. There is no guarantee that the attacked party will not use nuclear warning systems when it receives information confirming the attack. So, it does not really matter to the victim of such aggression whether the approaching ICBMs carry nuclear or conventional warheads. The response will almost certainly be nuclear, with all the ensuing consequences.

Finally, one more important argument is that if Russia or the United States decides to deploy a great number of non-nuclear ICBMs, they will most likely have to do this at the expense of their own strategic nuclear weapons. If the 2010 treaty remains in effect (until 2021) and if it is extended (until 2026), all ICBMs will be counted under the treaty’s limits for strategic delivery vehicles (700 deployed delivery vehicles for each party). In order for non-nuclear ICBMs not to be counted under the treaty, one needs to create a new strategic delivery vehicle and prove that this weapon system is not covered by this treaty. This will be very hard to do, given the strained Russian-American relations. Unilateral actions will most likely lead to the collapse of this international agreement.

As regards cruise missiles as an element of precision-guided weapons, one important issue should be clarified above all. Under the New START Treaty of 2010, long-range (over 600 km) nuclear cruise missiles are not counted as strategic offensive arms. In other words, in the opinion of Russia and the United States, they are not strategic weapons. Each heavy bomber carrying nuclear-tipped air-launched cruise missiles is counted as one delivery vehicle and one warhead, no matter how many missiles it may carry. Sea-launched cruise missiles are not covered by this treaty at all. It does not even mention the term ‘long-range nuclear cruise missile.’ Simply put, the parties do not think that these nuclear weapons can undermine the strategic balance; therefore, they see no reason to limit them in the START Treaty. In this case, however, it is completely unclear why long-range nuclear cruise missiles do not affect the strategic balance between the parties, as Moscow and Washington stated in the above-mentioned agreement, whereas similar conventional weapons should undermine strategic stability, especially since some studies show that conventional cruise missiles are not capable of destroying highly protected strategic offensive weapons.

It is believed in Russia that the most serious threat to strategic stability comes from missile defense. However, there is much more ambiguity in this issue than evidence confirmed by practice. First of all, many experts and politicians follow a strange logic when talking about missile defense issues, and their logic differs significantly from the normal perception of the security problem. For example, it is claimed that the U.S. missile defense system “threatens” Russia’s strategic potential. But such a threat can be translated into action only after Russia strikes with ballistic missiles. For as long as these missiles are not used, missile defense does not threaten them. Saying that missile defense poses a threat to someone’s nuclear potential is the same as saying that a hard hat worn by a construction worker is a threat to a brick that may fall on his head.

Opponents of missile defense argue that it will be used after the enemy delivers a first strike against its opponent’s strategic forces, thus greatly weakening the latter’s retaliatory strike. It is this retaliatory strike that will have to be intercepted by missile defense. This abstract and senseless reasoning underlies the logic of missile defense opponents who denounce any programs for creating and deploying missile defense. They view such efforts as an attempt to achieve military superiority and create conditions for victory in a nuclear war. In fact, the entire concept of strategic stability is based on the assessment of the consequences of a first strike and the aggressor’s ability to repulse a retaliatory strike.

Debates over the effect of missile defense on strategic stability have been going on for sixty years, so there is no need to cite here all arguments for and against, set forth in numerous publications. Let us only note that these debates were largely held in the U.S. In the Soviet Union and Russia, an overwhelming majority of experts shared the view that the development of missile defense systems undermines strategic stability, increasing the probability of a first strike in crisis situations and spurring a race in strategic arms in all areas. As a rule, the debates focused on the assessment of effectiveness of missile defense systems and time required for the deployment of new weapon systems.

Now let’s see how the United States can repulse Russia’s “retaliatory strike” after its own “large-scale nuclear attack,” if such plans really exist. First of all, let’s take a look at the geography of U.S. missile defense systems. If the main task of the U.S. were to defend against a Russian retaliatory strike, it would deploy its missile defense system primarily along its borders and deep in its heartland. A thin defense of the country would require at least 10 to 12 deployment areas with several dozen interceptor missiles in each. As far as is known, nothing like this is happening. Such a program does not exist, and such proposals have never been submitted. By the end of 2017, 44 Ground-Based Interceptors (GBI) are to be deployed in U.S. territory (40 in Alaska and 4 in California). By 2025, the number of GBIs is planned to be increased to 56.

It should be recalled here that the most important provision of the 1972 ABM Treaty (from which the U.S. withdrew in 2002) was the limitation of interceptor missiles capable of shooting down incoming ICBM warheads. Each party was permitted to have up to 200 ABM systems in two ABM deployment areas. The Protocol of 1974 to the Treaty limited the number of ABM systems to 100 at each ABM site. In other words, the U.S. has not yet exceeded the limit set by the ABM Treaty and will not do so in the foreseeable future, which means that strategic stability, as understood by missile defense opponents, is not undermined.

Russia is greatly concerned over the proposed missile defense system for Europe and keeps an eye on programs for deploying similar systems in the Middle East and some Asian countries. But all these systems are not strategic in terms of location and performance. Of course, some modifications of the U.S. Standard interceptor missiles, THAAD and some other systems have a certain potential to combat strategic ballistic missiles. But they are not intended to perform such tasks and can shoot down ICBM warheads only accidentally. It is also important that the above BMD systems have never been tested against strategic missiles (warheads); so they cannot be relied on for intercepting retaliatory strikes with strategic ballistic missiles.

In addition, these systems pose no threat to Russia’s strategic potential due to the geography of their deployment. This will be clear if we move from a two-dimensional to a three-dimensional vision of this geography. Simply put, we should be looking not at the flat map of the world, but at the globe. Then many things will look differently. For example, we will see that the shortest way from Russia to America is not via Amsterdam or Paris, but across the North Pole.

To my view, there are no serious military-strategic obstacles to further dialogue between Russia and the United States on more reductions in strategic offensive arms. The effect of precision-guided and space weapons on the strategic balance between the parties is clearly exaggerated. In the foreseeable future, their effect will continue to be minimal, if at all.

U.S. missile defense programs are limited in terms of their impact on Russia’s ability to deliver a crushing retaliatory strike, even if weakened by a U.S. first strategic strike. The latter, too, is a very dubious strategic concept, which, nevertheless, underlies many discussions about ways to strengthen security and so-called strategic stability. No sane leader of a country would rely on an unreliable missile defense system, which has failed many tests and which can be bypassed by changing the direction of attack.

As for political obstacles to new negotiations, they have piled up both in Russian-American and Russia-West relations. They are difficult to overcome, and this will most certainly take much time and effort. There is a view that negotiations on deeper reductions in strategic offensive arms are possible only after relations between the two countries more or less improve or, at least, show a clear tendency towards improvement.

But this problem can be approached from a different perspective by setting the goal of concluding a new agreement on deeper reductions in strategic offensive arms and limiting the number of strategic warheads to 1,000 for each party. If concluded, the new agreement could serve as a positive example of cooperation and give a chance to reach mutual understanding in other areas. This will be facilitated by the beginning of broad consultations on the whole range of security problems, including those that evoke Russia’s concern.

In July 2018 in Helsinki Putin and Trump agreed to pay special attention to the problem of extension of a New START Treaty for the following 5 years (until the year of 2016), as well as to preserving the INF Treaty which became a subject of serious criticism during the last 3-4 years. It is obviously a positive step into a right direction. But it is not enough. Both states have quite a big potential for further reductions of their nuclear arsenals – strategic and tactical as well even without the participation of the third nuclear states in this process. This possible participation needs serious investigation and special attention of all the interested parties.

Chief Research Fellow at the Primakov Institute of World Economy and International Relations (Moscow, Russia). In 1989-1991 was a member of Soviet negotiating team at START-1 negotiations (Defense and Space Talks).

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Comprehension of the S-400 Crisis

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Turkey’s air defence has had a severe weakness for decades. Hence, Turkey was in a position to base its air defence on fighter aircrafts. It proves the fact that Turkey has a lack of medium-altitude and high-altitude air defence systems. This is a critical vulnerability for a country like Turkey. The countries surrounding Turkey are considered to have ballistic missile capabilities. They also control the missile defence systems. Naturally, it demonstrates that Turkey is in a problematic geography for security. Therefore, Turkey must have an air defence system. For this reason, Turkey has requested from NATO, historical partners of Turkey since 1952, to reinforce its air defence system against the ballistic missile threat. Ergo, between 2013-2015, the U.S., German and Dutch’s Patriots took up military duty in various cities in Turkey.

Hereupon, because of the off-duty of these deployed Patriots systems, since 2015 and 2016, Spanish Patriots and the Italian SAMP-T‘s have been carrying out military duty at the southern part of Turkey under the umbrella of NATO.These solutions are evaluated to be temporal in order to meet Turkey’s air defence system needs; additionally, the strategic necessity of these systems are too vital to be left to another country’s control.

Ipso facto, Turkey initiated a tender and negotiated with several countries. As a result of this tender, in 2013, the Chinese company had won the tender, but due to some pressure of the USA and NATO countries, Turkey had to cancel the agreement. The displayed reason was that the Chinese company has previously penalized by Washington. At the meantime, the purchase of the Patriot missile defence system from the United States also negotiated in 2013, but due to the U.S. refusal to share the technical specifications of the Patriots with Turkey and the high cost of the system, Turkey desisted from the MIM-104 Patriot. Therefore, decision makers started to work with different countries in order to purchase the air defence system to fulfil its need. After several meetings, Turkey’s expectations in terms of price, delivery, co-production and technology transfer allowed Turkish bureaucrats to approach S-400 purchasing positively with Russia.

After the signing of the agreement between Turkey and Russia in September, 2017, Turkey acquired two S-400 systems with a total of four; two will be produced in Turkey and batteries from Russia for $2.5 billion. In line with statements made by Turkish officials, the first delivery of the S-400 took place in recent months, as of 2019.Some days after the parts of the S-400 system began to get transported to Ankara, the U.S. Department of Defence officially announced at a press conference by the Pentagon that Turkey would be removed from the F-35 Joint Air Strike Fighter program. The U.S. and other F-35 partners are aligned in this decision to suspend Turkey from the program and initiate the process to remove Turkey from the program formally. The decision was taken jointly with the founding partner countries of the F-35 program (Australia, Canada, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway and the United Kingdom). The only discernible difference here is that the move was taken against Turkey’s decision to purchase Russian-made S-400 air defence systems.The U.S.’ argument is that the use of the S-400, some sensitive information of F-35 technology and important electronic intelligence, might change hands. However, the same dangerousness also present for Russia because the S-400 system is at the centre of Russia’s air defence. Russia is also opening up the performance of its system to NATO member states and therefore to NATO.

Moreover, Russian weapons are still in active use in many countries. Eastern European countries have the most Russian weapons. Aircraft, tanks, even missile systems and helicopters are still on duty. Many of these countries are under the umbrella of NATO today. Moreover, Greece, Bulgaria and Slovakia, which are also NATO members, use Russian-made S-300s which is considered still among one of the most potent medium-range air defence systems in the world, while Turkey has been criticised for acquiring the S-400 air defence system from Russia. Further, Greece acquired the S-300 systems from the Greek Cypriot Administration while they were in NATO. Another NATO member, Bulgaria, is known to have S-300 systems. Slovakia has S-300 missile battery inherited from Czechoslovakia. Slovakia had asked for its air defence system to be modernised by Russia in 2015. Astonishingly, Greece system participated in the joint military drill conducted by the Greek and Israeli Air Forces. The fact that Slovakia’s Air Force, which participated in a joint exercise in France and Germany , also brought in S-300 missiles was welcomed as contributing to NATO countries’ experience with these missiles. Bulgaria also tested its S-300 missiles at 2015 in another military exercise with Slovakia. Obstreperously, the U.S. has not made a definitive comment on the activation of the S-300 missile system mentioned above when used by NATO countries. Notwithstanding, Turkey has been signalled by the U.S. to be devastated with additional sanctions while calling the missile purchase an “unacceptable” move. Herein, the application of double standards on Turkey is plain to see.

Turkey has played essential roles within critical operations under NATO. Turkey’s role within the organisation is remarkable. Turkey is a durable and robust country of NATO and has been a reliable ally of the USA, even though Turkey’s capacity to take responsibility for NATO is beyond dispute. It is Turkey’s own decision to buy the S-400. Every NATO member country can buy any weaponry in accordance with the decision of their state interests.

It is some kind of attempt to isolate the Republic of Turkey, even with its allies, by removing it from a programme it is a partner in and applying another standard to Turkey compared with some other NATO members. This is a significant point to highlight. While Turkey has fulfilled all its responsibilities to NATO, it is incredibly wrong that its acquisition of the S-400 should not be associated with the F-35. This is a negative image that contributes to Turkey’s disengagement from NATO. The political and economic pressures applied or that would be applied and would interfere with Turkey’s sovereignty rights do not coincide with NATO’s spirit of alliance. Turkey must decide its future and what type of weapons to buy without any political pressure from any country.

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From Trade War to Strait War: China Warn U.S. Stop Stretching its Muscles in the Contested Waters

Asad Ullah

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Up till now, no one distinguishes the actual explanations behind the hostile faces. If a trade war isn’t the exact cause, the rise of China, the Hong Kong and the South China Sea questions added further fuel to the fire.  

War of words or trade war no one knows as the dust has not settled yet. When the dust settles, the practical ins and outs for the aggressive faces will appear. Peter Navarro, the US Director of Trade and Industrial policy, said Chinese wish to get Trump to the so the called bargaining table and let them keep having their will with the US. Whereas Wang Yi (王毅), China’s foreign minister, said, the US never desires to negotiate, and we still don’t know if they wish to transact over many issues or not?

More convincingly, the leading cause of the degraded relation isn’t just the trade war, America is trying to keep its universal notion fixed, for which the US considered China is a direct threat. To undermine Chinese strength, the US deliberately interfering in Chinese domestic affairs, recently in Hong Kong, and the South China Sea. China considers such actions a direct threat to China’s sovereignty and taking all possible measures to counterweight such moves. Such US actions are not just undermining Chinese strength but also pose a significant danger to regional stability and harmony. In the international arena, if power is essential for self-survival under the so-called anarchistic system, in the same vein undermining someone’s strength can be detrimental for both states, as China and the US are now not only economically abundant but also possess more sophisticated weapons then ever before.

As trade war favour China up to some scope, Trump Administration is looking for alternatives to overwhelm China of fortifying their universalism notion. The recent intervention in Hong Kong, the Human Rights and Democracy act by supporting the pro-democracy movement there, and more freedom of Navigation in the South China sea,  Trump still losing all his strategies against China. To some degree, the dyadic relationship trapped in the cross-fire, the US aggressive actions against China, and the lenient Chinese response against the US dazed the rest of the world.

In the international arena, the US, instead of a trade war, now moving its muscles in the contested water in the South China Sea. The issue became more exposed when the US Defense Secretary Mark Esper concluded his Asian tour aimed to build a coalition against China in the South China Sea. Esper tour came amid annoying stiffnesses in the South China Sea, with China deploying its new aircraft carrier while warning the US against “moving its muscles” in the disputed waters. Recently both the states have increased their navy and used evermore armada, weapons and military assets in regional contested water.

As the US navy increased its freedom of navigation operations in the disputed water lately, the tension between the two power intensified. A few months ago, China, for the first time deployed domestically, builds aircraft called Type 001A to the disputed water through Taiwan strait. Responding to China’s action, the US deployed the USS Gabrielle Giffords littoral combat ship stationed in Singapore’s Changi naval base. Such action-reaction spiral is the leading cause of their fragile relationship. Chinese officials claimed that the deployment of new aircraft means to allows the crew to become familiar with water, where it will often sail in the future. In the same vein, the US officials claimed that deploying any combat ship to the South China Sea is not that we are opposing China. We all believe and stand for international rules and laws and want China should abide by them as well.

The possibility of a hot war between China and the US is inevitable, as argued by the legendary diplomat Kissinger. Pointing towards China and the US, he said that the two most powerful economies could spill over into a military conflict.  He argued that the trade war is not the leading cause of hostility. The chief objective he mentioned is Honk Kong recently and the South China Sea. The devasted world war 1st was broke out because of the minor issue. Today, US-China hostile relation is because of a small issue but now the weapons are more potent than ever before he described.

The dyadic relationship between the US and China is getting shoddier day-by-day. The Chinese side has extended hands for peaceful resolution of the issues; being a dominant state, the US is always looking at the world more radically. Recently the US passed two bills into laws, supporting the pro-democracy movements in Hong Kong, and imposed sanctions on Chinese and Hong Kong officials alleged responsible for the human rights violation.

In response, the Chinese government suspended the US military and ships from visiting  Hong Kong and spanked sanctions on some  US-based non-governmental organisations believed for alleged spaying and encouraging Hong-Kong anti-government protest. Beijing also warns Washington to correct their mistakes and stop interfering in Chinese domestic affairs. Beijing correspondingly said, they would take all measures against any actors, who are allegedly interfering in China’s internal affairs.

The competition between the two significant power poses a great threat to regional stability. Since 2017 the US interference in the South China Sea increased than ever before. Till now, the US dispatched almost two or three destroyers to the contested water and enhanced their routine based freedom of navigation. Beijing warns such actions repeatedly and called the US to stop such illegal activities in the contested water; although the US never responded to Beijing. Probably such actions reactions would spill over into a hot war. For a reason, we know that, as long as there are potent nations with devastating weapons, conflict is inevitable. 

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Why Sri Lanka needs a “National Securitism” oriented National Security Policy?

Kasuni Ranasinghe

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“National Security” was one of the main discussion points in the propaganda campaigns of all major contenders of the Presidential election. War-time Defence Secretary, Gotabaya Rajapakshe, was elected as the 7th president of the country, stressing the security gap. The Easter Sunday attack brought attention to the security of the country that appeared as religious fundamentalism and extremism again after a decade of the end of the 30 years brutal war. Many have pointed this as a failure of the government and accused of dismantling the military intelligence service. Even the report of the select committee of parliament on the Easter Sunday attack (21st April 2019) has accused the President, former Secretary Defence as the Director of SIS and IGP as failed in fulfilling duties. “……. the PSC observes that the President failed on numerous occasions to give leadership and also actively undermined government and system including having ad-hoc NSC meetings and leaving key individuals from meetings…….”.

And regarding Defense Secretary and others, PSC noted as “that whilst the greatest responsibility remains with the Director SIS, others too failed in their duties. Within the security and intelligence apparatus, the Secretary MOD, IGP, CNI and DMI failed in their responsibilities. All were informed of the intelligence information before the Easter Sunday attacks but failed to take necessary steps to mitigate or prevent it…” However, now former Defence Secretary Hemasiri Fernando and IGP Pujith Jayasundara were arrested for further investigations. The victims are not pleased with the solutions tabled by the government, which created a trust deficit between the government and citizens.

Meanwhile, the country is in an alarming debt trap with China and a drastic economic downturn. India’s interest over strategic infrastructures such as Mattala Airport, newly open Jaffna International airport and Trincomalee harbor is becoming a challenge to the sovereignty and peace of the country. Also, other threats (apart from interest over infrastructure) coming from India is crucial, and that has historically proven. South India seems to be the key customer of Jaffna International Airport, and at the same time, the Southern Province of India is one of the primary breeding grounds for ISIS as well as for the LTTE. Thus the potential of the airport to be a floodgate for Islamic extremists and LTTE is high if the immigration is not carefully monitored.

Meanwhile, proposals coming from USA such as Status of Forces Agreement-SOFA, Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement – ACSA and now with the Millennium Challenge Cooperation- MCC. None of these agreements is completely evil, and the theory of conspiracy is not directly applicable for any of them. All pros and cons are visible if terms and conditions are prudently appraised. Practically, implementations of SOFA and ACSA are challenging to Sri Lanka as the power of negotiation with the USA is limited. The MCC is an important initiative addressing two of the crucial issues of the country; transport development and digitalizing land titles. Both are identified as key parameters of poverty reduction and human development initiatives of the government. However, the security concern is with the proposing GIS and CCTV monitoring systems which has the potential of accessing personal information of individuals. The closure or termination is also problematic to the country. Sri Lanka has no potentials to terminate the agreement, if a case, the grant will be converted to a loan and has to repay the grant, interest, earnings as well as assets. In case of a breach, the country will be financially trapped with USA and consequences will be similar or worse than the cancellation of the Colombo Port City project of China. Sri Lanka will be another significant case study digitalising to Djibouti of how massive investments go wrong for the hosting country and becoming a regional facilitator for Military bases. The results would be terrible if the SOFA has signed with no reviews.

Cyber is another source of threat which has capabilities of disabling vital websites and networks for the stability of the nation. Further, it has the potential to paralyze the economy by stealing and destroying classified information via hacking relevant data-banks. Illicit drugs and small arms are other two challenges which identified by Hon Maithreepala Sirisena His Excellency, the President of Sri Lanka as critical threats to peace and security. Climate change, modern slavery, corruptions, poverty, piracy, lack of identity, IUU fishing issue, racism, separatism, ethnic unrest, misinformation and unregulated social media networks are some of the other critical challenges to the present national security.

In this context, national security should be the prime duty of the President and also the government. Overall, it is proven that the lapses of the current policies are the foundation of the discussed coercions. Unclearness of national purpose, values and interests are also foremost roots. The National Security Policy, which defines the national purpose, values, interests, threats and challenges would be a pathway.

What is the National Security Policy?

The “National Security Policy” is considered as the “Grand Policy” where skills of soldiers, civilians and politicians merge to ensure the stability of the territory. In other terms, NSP can be characterized as the integration of military, foreign and domestic policies to coordinate its economic, political, social and military capabilities in preventing actual and potential external and internal adversaries. Thus, the NSP should be aligned with all ministerial portfolios to achieve the ultimate national purpose, values and interests of the island. The ministries related to defence, foreign affairs, economic and finance, socio-cultural, environmental and technologies and information should respectively convey their policies and strategies to reach the ultimate goal of NSP.

However, what type of Security Policy does Sri Lanka need is questionable? Defence and security theorists are coming up with the number of them and amongst them “National Securitism” oriented policy would be appropriate for Sri Lanka.

National Securitism” oriented Security Policy for Sri Lanka?

“National Securitism” is for the states which practice democracy and continually using the law of emergency to resort conflicts. The characteristics of a democratic regime appear to exist and practically the civilian leader (political) of the country, the President controls over the tri forces and police. The rule of law is supreme, and the political leader directs military and civilians with the instructions of the constitution.

As the national purpose and interest of the island appreciate democratic “National Security State”, the National Security Policy should in line with the same. Thus, the NSP of Sri Lanka should not just a state of emergency to meet threats to the democratic process. It is a permanent policy with timely amendments, which combine civil and military establishments to safeguard the national security of the county in general. Further, the policy consists of the tools to stricter the control Political, Economic, Social, Technologies, Ecology and Military arms (PESTEM) during the exceptional state of emergency. Roles of civilian, military and police forces should blend to bring democratic approaches (human rights) to the mandatory military exercises in political conflicts. The NSP mandate to fill the gap between investment requirement for national developments and threats arising (internally and externally) due to the same. The military involvement in economic and social development projects also all other social welfare activities necessary to appreciate. Aligning with other policies in a democratic and political process such as defence, foreign, economic and finance, technology and information is necessary to ensure the democratic values of the nation. Line policies and strategies as mentioned above, should be interconnected and NSP should derive all of them. More importantly, defence, foreign and economic policies should interconnect as well as the strategies to ensure the success of the NSP. For example, National Defence Policy which is already compiled by the Ministry of Defence, should connect to the foreign policy of the country. If two policies interconnected, Sri Lanka capable of exercising foreign policy for the use of military, in the form of technical assistance, training, arms supply, sharing intelligence and also the military industry activities. Intelligence sharing through proper channels would be a more exceptional solution to mitigate threats coming from other territories which fires the home. Such as Islamic fundamentalism which exported from Saudi Arabia and fuelled by the fundamentalists living in South India and Sri Lankan.

Further, national securitism would bring up the approach of human rights to the national security of the country, which may ensure the practice of ordinary jurisdiction. In the context, NSP would be an excellent initiative for Sri Lanka to answer the Geneva Human Rights Council. However, NSP of Sri Lanka if it is under the ideology of securitism, will function the military and civilian establishments as moral censors to the government warring potential activities destabilizing the peaceful political arena of the country.

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