What kind of Europe Russia needs? Strong or weak? Divided or united? I think that Russia needs an independent Europe, and the latter implies strength as well as solidarity. Unfortunately, recent events indicate the opposite. If Oswald Spengler wrote his work on Europe today, then it should have had the title “The Paralysis of Europe”.
After the USA introduced import duties for steel and aluminum, after threats to apply sanctions against European companies investing in Iran – there were too many harsh statements addressed to Washington from Europe. Many, finally, recognized the birth of a new reality within the NATO, which at the very least existed since the Second World War. However, even the statements that Europe can no longer rely on the US recklessly do not reflect the essence of this new reality. At present, it’s not about trust that is falling apart, but about the fact that one should beware of this partner. Recognized European leader Angela Merkel calls to be relentless in response to US actions. There is no shortage of similar calls from Brussels. But how can the EU really retaliate against the new American challenge?
The European Commission’s appeal to companies that may suffer from overseas sanctions, not to succumb to pressure and use their right to work within the framework of national and European legislation did not have much effect. A number of the largest European companies have already stated that they are winding down their projects in Iran. Some of them are connected with the US financial assets and loans, others have estimated the damage from the possible loss of the US market, some have done both. As one of the high-ranking employees of the Elysee Palace said: “If your economic interests cover the United States, where payments are in dollars, then your choice is poor. In fact, there is simply no choice.”
A reasonable question arises: how can the EU compensate for the potential losses of European companies if sanctions are ignored? In the current situation, almost nothing can be done, especially if guarantees for large businesses are in question. Truly, Brussels has decided to set up a stabilization fund for amortization of possible crisis situations, allocating for this purpose 30 billion euros. However, the crises of national economies in Europe have become so common that it is unlikely that this financial pillow will at the same time serve as a lifeline for the companies in distress. In this case, the EU member states, whose interests will not suffer from possible sanctions, will not agree to cede part of the pie to large European companies. In turn, the European voter facing the reduction of social benefits and income, will not approve such decisions. And the energy of protest will be higher in those countries that are facing or will face crises at home. Obviously, the opposition, or the so-called “populist” parties that gained strength in Europe, and are very sceptical about Brussels and Berlin, will not fail to bring their criticism on their heads.
It should be noted that European companies themselves do not really believe in the ability of their governments and EU officials to protect their interests. So the intention announced by the EU leadership to simplify the order of financial guarantees for European investments in Iran made neither proper impression on Total, nor MAERSK, or Engie, or Siemens … In fact, Berlin and Brussels are catastrophically late with their countermeasures. That is why it is difficult to agree with the opinion of P. Bayer, the coordinator for the EU transatlantic cooperation, who believes that “Europe has now realized that the transatlantic relations have radically changed and is aware of the whole gravity of the situation.” It does not seem though that Europe realized it. Not yet.
Liberal ideology played an evil historical joke on the European elite breaking it out of habit to think globally and strategically, making it helpless in the face of serious crises. The idea of the world self-regulation under the globalization with the inevitable weakening of the role of the state and national policy has taught the elites to follow a set of patterns that do not work in the face of rapidly growing challenges and contradictions. Governments see their role not in strategic planning and foresight, but solely in the role of intermediary and broker between different forces and interests. All their efforts and thoughts are concentrated on political manoeuvring, but these skills are clearly not enough to solve large-scale tasks.
The Trump Phenomenon consists precisely in the fact that he pursues a hardline national policy, rejecting all the conventional cliches and stereotypes. He revises existing commitments solely from the angle of US interests and ignores the established rules of the game, which causes Europeans impotent indignation.
The Trump Phenomenon consists precisely in the fact that he pursues a hardline national policy, rejecting all the conventional cliches and stereotypes.
As it turned out Europe in principle is not ready for geopolitical challenges, and loud statements, not backed up by solidarity actions, are giving out its confusion and weakness. All this is particularly evident from Merkel’s behaviour, which calls on Europe to “take its fate into its own hands.” However, as Thorsten Benner, the co-founder and director of the Global Public Policy Institute in Berlin, points out, Mrs.Merkel does everything possible to avoid the debates about what Trump’s actions are fraught with for Germany. “She needs to be leading the discussion, but she seems to shy away from it. It is as if she does not want to expend any political capital on the issue.”
Fears of Mrs. Merkel can be understood – neither Germany nor the EU has serious levers of pressure on the USA
Fears of Mrs. Merkel can be understood – neither Germany nor the EU has serious levers of pressure on the USA. And Trump’s threat to set tariffs for German-made cars gives Berlin almost a shock. There is no unity in the European ranks either. “But maintaining unity is difficult when many European countries, especially in the east, are not convinced that they must line up with their own continental partners in geopolitical affairs,” writes the Economist magazine. At the same time, the magazine recalls that at once three countries vetoed the EU resolution condemning the transfer of the US embassy to Jerusalem.
Only from Jean-Claude Junker, the head of the European Commission, one could get something that can be called glimpses of geopolitical thinking. He did this in an unusual way, comparing the territory of the European Union with the territory of Russia, and urging not to forget about the need to build relations with one’s neighbour. In fact, strategically, Russia for the EU is almost the single serious reserve of survival in global competition, which, by all accounts, will be only growing. In addition, Russia is part of Europe and by ignoring it, the EU only weakens itself, receiving neither political nor economic advantages from the sanctions policy. Unlike the United States.
In the long run, whether Europe wants it or not, in order to maintain its global role, it will have to build an independent policy, relying on its own resources, extricating itself from the bondage of a bankrupt ideology. One does not need to be particularly keen to understand the obvious – Russia is Europe’s closest and natural partner in global survival. But for such an inference one should be free from a narrow-minded, broker mentality and regain the ability for geopolitical thinking. Some glimpses of such thinking are evident. Several German experts consider it necessary to work closely with such countries as Canada, Japan, India, Brazil, Mexico, etc. Sceptics, however, believe that “the United States remains the anchor and guarantor of postwar world order, and Germany will not be able to compensate this by negotiations with Canadians and Japanese “.
However, sceptics do not take into account the obvious – the present postwar world order, thanks to the energetic actions of Trump, turns into America’s world order, in which Europe and other countries are given a subordinate role, and whose interests are not taken into account. Even the postwar status of the Allies does not give them in the eyes of Washington a guaranteed priority. And the very word “order” in the context of today’s events in the world sounds no more than an irony or an anachronism.
Among the whole chorus of voices sobering Europe from the world of real politics, we hear, though much less, some spells from the yesterday’s world. Ulrich Speck, a senior visiting fellow at the German Marshall Fund, calls:“If Germany could create.a critical mass in favor of the international liberal order, it can make a difference”. Sounds like the ancient Greek drama: “Oh, if only Germany could!”. But this is not about Germany at all, but about the fact that this order is irretrievably becoming the thing of the past and an increasing number of Europeans understand that following the ideological mainstream of the last two decades is a way to nowhere.
First published in our partner International Affairs
Iceland’s Historic(al) Elections
The morning of September, 26 was a good one for Lenya Run Karim of the Pirate Party. Once the preliminary results were announced, things were clear: the 21-year-old law student of the University of Iceland, originating from a Kurdish immigrant family, had become the youngest MP in the country’s history.
In historical significance, however, this event was second to another. Iceland, the world champion in terms of gender equality, became the first country in Europe to have more women MPs than men, 33 versus 30. The news immediately made world headlines: only five countries in the world have achieved such impressive results. Remarkably, all are non-European: Rwanda, Nicaragua and Cuba have a majority of women in parliament, while Mexico and the UAE have an equal number of male and female MPs.
Nine hours later, news agencies around the world had to edit their headlines. The recount in the Northwest constituency affected the outcome across the country to delay the ‘triumph for women’ for another four years.
Small numbers, big changes
The Icelandic electoral system is designed so that 54 out of the 63 seats in the Althingi, the national parliament, are primary or constituency seats, while another nine are equalization seats. Only parties passing the 5 per cent threshold are allowed to distribute equalisation seats that go to the candidates who failed to win constituency mandates and received the most votes in their constituency. However, the number of equalisation mandates in each of the 6 constituencies is legislated. In theory, this could lead to a situation in which the leading party candidate in one constituency may simply lack an equalisation mandate, so the leading candidate of the same party—but in another constituency—receives it.
This is what happened this year. Because of a difference of only ten votes between the Reform Party and the Pirate Party, both vying for the only equalisation mandate in the Northwest, the constituency’s electoral commission announced a recount on its own initiative. There were also questions concerning the counting procedure as such: the ballots were not sealed but simply locked in a Borgarnes hotel room. The updated results hardly affected the distribution of seats between the parties, bringing in five new MPs, none of whom were women, with the 21-year-old Lenya Run Karim replaced by her 52-year-old party colleague.
In the afternoon of September, 27, at the request of the Left-Green Movement, supported by the Independence Party, the Pirates and the Reform Party, the commission in the South announced a recount of their own—the difference between the Left-Greens and the Centrists was only seven votes. There was no ‘domino effect’, as in the case of the Northwest, as the five-hour recount showed the same result. Recounts in other districts are unlikely, nor is it likely that Althingi—vested with the power to declare the elections valid—would invalidate the results in the Northwest. Nevertheless, the ‘replaced’ candidates have already announced their intention to appeal against the results, citing violations of ballot storage procedures. Under the Icelandic law, this is quite enough to invalidate the results and call a re-election in the Northwest, as the Supreme Court of Iceland invalidated the Constitutional Council elections due to a breach of procedure 10 years ago. Be that as it may, the current score remains 33:30, in favor of men.
Progressives’ progress and threshold for socialists
On the whole, there were no surprises: the provisional allocation of mandates resembles, if with minor changes, the opinion polls on the eve of the election.
The ruling three-party coalition has rejuvenated its position, winning 37 out of the 63 Althingi seats. The centrist Progressive Party saw a real electoral triumph, improving its 2017 result by five seats. Prime-minister Katrín Jakobsdóttir’s Left-Green Movement, albeit with a slight loss, won eight seats, surpassing all pre-election expectations. Although the centre-right Independence Party outperformed everyone again to win almost a quarter of all votes, 16 seats are one of the worst results of the Icelandic ‘Grand Old Party’ ever.
The results of the Social-Democrats, almost 10% versus 12.1% in 2017, and of the Pirates, 8.6% versus 9.2%, have deteriorated. Support for the Centre Party of Sigmundur Gunnlaugsson, former prime-minister and victim of the Panama Papers, has halved from 10.9% to 5.4%. The centrists have seen a steady decline in recent years, largely due to a sexist scandal involving party MPs. The populist People’s Party and the pro-European Reform Party have seen gains of 8.8% and 8.3%, as compared to 6.9% and 6.7% in the previous elections.
Of the leading Icelandic parties, only the Socialist Party failed to pass the 5 per cent threshold: despite a rating above 7% in August, the Socialists received only 4.1% of the vote.
Coronavirus, climate & economy
Healthcare and the fight against COVID-19 was, expectedly, on top of the agenda of the elections: 72% of voters ranked it as the defining issue, according to a Fréttablaðið poll. Thanks to swift and stringent measures, the Icelandic government brought the coronavirus under control from day one, and the country has enjoyed one of the lowest infection rates in the world for most of the time. At the same time, the pandemic exposed a number of problems in the national healthcare system: staff shortages, low salaries and long waiting lists for emergency surgery.
Climate change, which Icelanders are already experiencing, was an equally important topic. This summer, the temperature has not dropped below 20°C for 59 days, an anomaly for a North-Atlantic island. However, Icelanders’ concerns never converted into increased support for the four left-leaning parties advocating greater reductions in CO2 emission than the country has committed to under the Paris Agreement: their combined result fell by 0.5%.
The economy and employment were also among the main issues in this election. The pandemic has severely damaged the island nation’s economy, which is heavily tourism-reliant—perhaps, unsurprisingly, many Icelanders are in favor of reviving the tourism sector as well as diversifying the economy further.
The EU membership, by far a ‘traditional’ issue in Icelandic politics, is unlikely to be featured on the agenda of the newly-elected parliament as the combined result of the Eurosceptics, despite a loss of 4%, still exceeds half of the overall votes. The new Althingi will probably face the issue of constitutional reform once again, which is only becoming more topical in the light of the pandemic and the equalization mandates story.
New (old) government?
The parties are to negotiate coalition formation. The most likely scenario now is that the ruling coalition of the Independence Party, the Left-Greens and the Progressives continues. It has been the most ideologically diverse and the first three-party coalition in Iceland’s history to last a full term. A successful fight against the pandemic has only strengthened its positions and helped it secure additional votes. Independence Party leader and finance minister Bjarni Benediktsson has earlier said he would be prepared to keep the ruling coalition if it holds the majority. President Guðni Jóhannesson announced immediately after the elections that he would confirm the mandate of the ruling coalition to form a new government if the three parties could strike a deal.
Other developments are possible but unlikely. Should the Left-Greens decide to leave the coalition, they could be replaced by the Reform Party or the People’s Party, while any coalition without the Independence Party can only be a four-party or larger coalition.
Who will become the new prime-minister still remains to be seen—but if the ruling coalition remains in place, the current prime-minister and leader of the Left-Greens, Katrín Jakobsdóttir, stands a good chance of keeping her post: she is still the most popular politician in Iceland with a 40 per cent approval rate.
The 2021 Althingi election, with one of the lowest turnouts in history at 80.1%, has not produced a clear winner. The election results reflect a Europe-wide trend in which traditional “major” parties are losing support. The electorate is fragmenting and their votes are pulled by smaller new parties. The coronavirus pandemic has only reinforced this trend.
The 2021 campaign did not foreshadow a sensation. Although Iceland has not become the first European country with a women’s majority in parliament, these elections will certainly go down in history as a test of Icelanders’ trust to their own democracy.
From our partner RIAC
EU-Balkan Summit: No Set Timeframe for Western Balkans Accession
On October 6, Slovenia hosted a summit between the EU and the Western Balkans states. The EU-27 met with their counterparts (Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Kosovo) in the sumptuous Renaissance setting of Brdo Castle, 30 kilometers north of the capital, Ljubljana. Despite calls from a minority of heads of state and government, there were no sign of a breakthrough on the sensitive issue of enlargement. The accession of these countries to the European Union is still not unanimous among the 27 EU member states.
During her final tour of the Balkans three weeks ago, German Chancellor Angela Merkel stated that the peninsula’s integration was of “geostrategic” importance. On the eve of the summit, Austrian Chancellor Sebastian Kurz backed Slovenia’s goal of integrating this zone’s countries into the EU by 2030.
However, the unanimity required to begin the hard negotiations is still a long way off, even for the most advanced countries in the accession process, Albania and North Macedonia. Bulgaria, which is already a member of the EU, is opposing North Macedonia’s admission due to linguistic and cultural differences. Since Yugoslavia’s demise, Sofia has rejected the concept of Macedonian language, insisting that it is a Bulgarian dialect, and has condemned the artificial construction of a distinct national identity.
Other countries’ reluctance to join quickly is of a different nature. France and the Netherlands believe that previous enlargements (Bulgaria and Romania in 2007) have resulted in changes that must first be digested before the next round of enlargement. The EU-27 also demand that all necessary prior guarantees be provided regarding the independence of the judiciary and the fight against corruption in these countries. Despite the fact that press freedom is a requirement for membership, the NGO Reporters Without Borders (RSF) urged the EU to make “support for investigative and professional journalism” a key issue at the summit.”
While the EU-27 have not met since June, the topic of Western Balkans integration is competing with other top priorities in the run-up to France’s presidency of the EU in the first half of 2022. On the eve of the summit, a working dinner will be held, the President of the European Council, Charles Michel, called for “a strategic discussion on the role of the Union on the international scene” in his letter of invitation to the EU-Balkans Summit, citing “recent developments in Afghanistan,” the announcement of the AUKUS pact between the United States, Australia, and the United Kingdom, which has enraged Paris.
The Western Balkans remain the focal point of an international game of influence in which the Europeans seek to maintain their dominance. As a result, the importance of reaffirming a “European perspective” at the summit was not an overstatement. Faced with the more frequent incursion of China, Russia, and Turkey in that European region, the EU has pledged a 30 billion euro Economic and Investment Plan for 2021-2027, as well as increased cooperation, particularly to deal with the aftermath of the Covid-19 pandemic.
Opening the borders, however, is out of the question. In the absence of progress on this issue, Albania, North Macedonia, and Serbia have decided to establish their own zone of free movement (The Balkans are Open”) beginning January 1, 2023. “We are starting today to do in the region what we will do tomorrow in the EU,” said Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama when the agreement was signed last July.
This initiative, launched in 2019 under the name “Mini-Schengen” and based on a 1990s idea, does not have the support of the entire peninsular region, which remains deeply divided over this project. While Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro are not refusing to be a part of it and are open to discussions, the Prime Minister of Kosovo, Albin Kurti, who took office in 2020, for his part accuses Serbia of relying on this project to recreate “a fourth Yugoslavia”
Tensions between Balkan countries continue to be an impediment to European integration. The issue of movement between Kosovo and Serbia has been a source of concern since the end of September. Two weeks of escalation followed Kosovo’s decision to prohibit cars with Serbian license plates from entering its territory, in response to Serbia’s long-standing prohibition on allowing vehicles to pass in the opposite direction.
In response to the mobilization of Kosovar police to block the road, Serbs in Kosovo blocked roads to their towns and villages, and Serbia deployed tanks and the air force near the border. On Sunday, October 3, the conflict seemed to be over, and the roads were reopened. However, the tone had been set three days before the EU-Balkans summit.
German Election: Ramifications for the US Foreign Policy
In the recent German election, foreign policy was scarcely an issue. But Germany is an important element in the US foreign policy. There is a number of cases where Germany and the US can cooperate, but all of these dynamics are going to change very soon.
The Germans’ strategic culture makes it hard to be aligned perfectly with the US and disagreements can easily damage the relations. After the tension between the two countries over the Iraq war, in 2003, Henry Kissinger said that he could not imagine the relations between Germany and the US could be aggravated so quickly, so easily, which might end up being the “permanent temptation of German politics”. For a long time, the US used to provide security for Germany during the Cold War and beyond, so, several generations are used to take peace for granted. But recently, there is a growing demand on them to carry more burden, not just for their own security, but for international peace and stability. This demand was not well-received in Berlin.
Then, the environment around Germany changed and new threats loomed up in front of them. The great powers’ competition became the main theme in international relations. Still, Germany was not and is not ready for shouldering more responsibility. Politicians know this very well. Ursula von der Leyen, who was German defense minister, asked terms like “nuclear weapons” and “deterrence” be removed from her speeches.
Although on paper, all major parties appreciate the importance of Germany’s relations with the US, the Greens and SPD ask for a reset in the relations. The Greens insist on the European way in transatlantic relations and SPD seeks more multilateralism. Therefore, alignment may be harder to maintain in the future. However, If the tensions between the US and China heat up to melting degrees, then external pressure can overrule the internal pressure and Germany may accede to its transatlantic partners, just like when Helmut Schmid let NATO install medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe after the Soviet Union attacked Afghanistan and the Cold War heated up.
According to the election results, now three coalitions are possible: grand coalition with CDU/CSU and SPD, traffic lights coalition with SPD, FDP, and Greens, Jamaica coalition with CDU/CSU, FDP, and Greens. Jamaica coalition will more likely form the most favorable government for the US because it has both CDU and FDP, and traffic lights will be the least favorite as it has SPD. The grand coalition can maintain the status quo at best, because contrary to the current government, SPD will dominate CDU.
To understand nuances, we need to go over security issues to see how these coalitions will react to them. As far as Russia is concerned, none of them will recognize the annexation of Crimea and they all support related sanctions. However, if tensions heat up, any coalition government with SPD will be less likely assertive. On the other hand, as the Greens stress the importance of European values like democracy and human rights, they tend to be more assertive if the US formulates its foreign policy by these common values and describe US-China rivalry as a clash between democracy and authoritarianism. Moreover, the Greens disapprove of the Nordstream project, of course not for its geopolitics. FDP has also sided against it for a different reason. So, the US must follow closely the negotiations which have already started between anti-Russian smaller parties versus major parties.
For relations with China, pro-business FDP is less assertive. They are seeking for developing EU-China relations and deepening economic ties and civil society relations. While CDU/CSU and Greens see China as a competitor, partner, and systemic rival, SPD and FDP have still hopes that they can bring change through the exchange. Thus, the US might have bigger problems with the traffic lights coalition than the Jamaica coalition in this regard.
As for NATO and its 2 percent of GDP, the division is wider. CDU/CSU and FDP are the only parties who support it. So, in the next government, it might be harder to persuade them to pay more. Finally, for nuclear participation, the situation is the same. CDU/CSU is the only party that argues for it. This makes it an alarming situation because the next government has to decide on replacing Germany’s tornados until 2024, otherwise Germany will drop out of the NATO nuclear participation.
The below table gives a brief review of these three coalitions. 1 indicates the lowest level of favoritism and 3 indicates the highest level of favoritism. As it shows, the most anti-Russia coalition is Jamaica, while the most anti-China coalition is Trafic light. Meanwhile, Grand Coalition is the most pro-NATO coalition. If the US adopts a more normative foreign policy against China and Russia, then the Greens and FDP will be more assertive in their anti-Russian and anti-Chinese policies and Germany will align more firmly with the US if traffic light or Jamaica coalition rise to power.
|Issues Coalitions||Trafic Light||Grand Coalition||Jamaica|
1 indicates the lowest level of favoritism. 3 indicates the highest level of favoritism.
In conclusion, this election should not make Americans any happier. The US has already been frustrated with the current government led by Angela Merkel who gave Germany’s trade with China the first priority, and now that the left-wing will have more say in any imaginable coalition in the future, the Americans should become less pleased. But, still, there are hopes that Germany can be a partner for the US in great power competition if the US could articulate its foreign policy with common values, like democracy and human rights. More normative foreign policy can make a reliable partner out of Germany. Foreign policy rarely became a topic in this election, but observers should expect many ramifications for it.
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