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A Roadmap for Russia–U.S. Relations

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Today, both Moscow and Washington at official and unofficial levels recognize that relations between the United States and Russia have hit perhaps their lowest point. This is possibly one of the very few issues the Russians and the Americans actually agree on. Indeed, even at the height of the Cold War, the political dialogue between the Kremlin and the White House was never interrupted for such an extended period as it has been recently.

Another point both parties agree on is that the current crisis in Russia–U.S. relations is fraught with serious risks. Not just for the two countries concerned, but also for international security as a whole. I happened to visit Washington recently, and these concerns were voiced in almost every single conversation I had with prominent U.S. politicians and public figures.

As is often the case in life, it turned out to be far easier to create the crisis in bilateral relations than to find a way out of it. There is no shortage of so-called “hardliners” on both sides (and this will always be the case), who call for a rejection of the very notion of compromise and insist on the unconditional surrender of the other side. Yet we have all seen that, despite all the sanctions, Washington has been unable to impose its will on Moscow. And it would be equally absurd for Moscow to try to do the same with regard to the United States.

And if it is so, then we have only one option: to agree on the basis for taking the legitimate interests of both sides into account. All the more so because there are no insoluble problems between the two countries, and the problems that do exist can be resolved through negotiations.

Diplomatic experience teaches us that we need to study both the current international situation and historical precedents if we are to develop the most fitting solution to the problem. Let us take an example from the recent past, coincidentally a series of events in which I was directly involved. In early 2001, the newly elected President of the Unites States George W. Bush released a long list of Russian diplomats considered personae non grata in that country. The Russian government responded with a list of its own. A serious crisis in bilateral relations thus began — at the very start of a new political cycle in the United States.

In order to prevent the situation from spinning out of control, the Russian leadership made a critical decision: it would not succumb to the temptation to get pulled into the spiral of confrontation, and instead organized a personal meeting between the presidents of the two countries without delay. The meeting took place in Ljubljana on June 16, 2001.

The meeting did not concern any pressing international issues, it was not followed by high-profile statements, and neither side viewed it as a means to immediately solve all the problems that had accumulated between Moscow and Washington in the preceding years. The main goal was simply for the two presidents to “look one another in the eye” and demonstrate that, despite all their differences, the countries were open to political dialogue and the search for solutions to the existing problems.

Ljubljana meeting thus reached the goal: the presidents started to meet on a regular basis. And, despite the profound differences between the two countries (suffice it to recall the withdrawal of the United States from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the war in Iraq), the sides managed to maintain an intensive political dialogue and successfully work together on the international stage, whenever doing so was in the interests of both Moscow and Washington.

Projecting this experience onto the current situation, we can draw the conclusion that the only thing capable of breaking the vicious cycle in Russia–U.S. relations and launching them towards a state that is acceptable for both sides is a personal meeting between President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin and President of the United States Donald Trump. Of course, the current state of Russia–U.S relations is more complicated than it was 17 years ago, and Donald Trump’s position in Washington is not as solid as that of George Bush in 2001. However, it is very unlikely that we will be able to reverse the negative trends in the bilateral relations if a summit meeting is not held.

In all honesty, such a meeting should have taken place a year ago, or even earlier — right after Trump came to power. Unfortunately, circumstances conspired to prevent an “early summit” between Russia and the United States. However, it would be a serious mistake to postpone the meeting any further. Where exactly this meeting will take place is a technical matter, because the most important thing is for the presidents to have the opportunity to exchange opinions freely on a wide range of issues. Obviously, a full-fledged bilateral summit is required for this — yet another meeting “on the side-lines” of a multilateral event is simply not enough.

After such talks, the presidents could instruct the relevant ministries and government agencies to resume meaningful negotiations on the most pressing issues on the bilateral and international agenda and agree on a roadmap for developing relations at least until Trump’s term in office is up. The long history of bilateral relations between Russia and the United States would suggest that a direct mandate of this kind is absolutely essential to launching such a negotiating mechanism. At the same time, the presidents could agree upon a schedule for further meetings and exchange visits.

It is extremely important that this road map outlines several areas for future work, assuming the presidents of the two countries give the go-ahead. First, the sides need to work out and agree on the scope of the most pressing issues that need to be addressed — issues which, if left unattended, could lead to serious incidents between the two countries in the air, at sea and on land. We need to restore tried and tested channels of communication or develop new ones — primarily between military departments — in order to prevent possible incidents and unintentional escalation.

Second, serious negotiations are required in order to resolve the problems that have built up in the bilateral and multilateral aspects of security. We are talking here about the entire complex of issues related to strategic stability, strategic arms control and the regional conflicts in which the two countries are involved in one way or another. So-called “non-traditional” security threats such as cybercrime are acquiring greater significance. And we cannot expect to find an adequate response to them after a single round of negotiations. What we need is a systemic approach, long-term and persistent efforts on both sides.

Third, there is a range of issues that, for a number of reasons, would appear to be unresolvable at the present time. We are talking here primarily about issues of the internal development of the two countries, about the “values” and fundamental principles on which the new world order should be built. But dialogue is necessary on these points as well, so that we can better understand each other’s stance and avoid pointlessly rocking the boat.

Fourth, a meeting between the presidents would go some way to removing the barriers that have been erected in recent times to communication between the people of the two countries. Even today, amidst a vicious propaganda war, Russians and Americans are still extremely interested in one another. The fact that more U.S. tourists have come to Russia to attend the FIFA World Cup than from any other country is particularly telling.

The development of full-fledged cooperation between Russia and the United States through civil society and the professional community demands that we address, in the shortest possible time, the clearly absurd situation with regard to the issuing of visas and remove the obstacles that are preventing scientific, cultural and educational contacts between the two countries from achieving their full potential.

We need to be prepared to exert great efforts consistently and over a long period — efforts that will not bring immediate results. The inertia of confrontation will continue to influence public opinion in the United States and Russia for a long time. This inertia will inevitably colour the positions of the expert community in both countries — and not in a positive way — and will be reflected in the leading media, influencing politicians and public figures. But the scope and complexity of the tasks facing us are no excuse for not making any efforts to resolve the problem whatsoever.

Talking to journalists at a press conference in Qingdao, China, on June 10 about the possibility of holding a Russia–U.S. summit, President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin said, “As soon as we can set one up, I’m there. As soon as the American side is ready, we’ll set up a meeting.” Now the ball is in their court.

First published in our partner RIAC

President of the Russian International Affairs Council. Professor of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO) of the Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs (RF MFA). Russian Academy of Sciences Corresponding Member. Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Russian Federation.

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Russia Facing China: Little Red Riding Hood or Cinderella?

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Whenever I read another Western report on the prospects of Russian-Chinese relations, the old children’s fairy tale Little Red Riding Hood involuntary springs to my mind. In this well-known story, a little girl walks through a dense forest to bring cakes to her sick grandmother, unexpectedly stumbling upon an angry hungry Wolf. The light-hearted girl talks to the cunning Wolf, only to expose the purpose of her walk in the dark forest. Needless to say, this dangerous adventure cannot end well for Little Red Riding Hood: the insidious Gray Wolf eventually eats both the old sick grandmother and the tale’s main character.

With a little stretch of imagination, we can draw an analogy between the plot of this horror tale for kids and the West’s interpretations of the current relations between Russia and China. It is clear that Moscow has to play Little Red Riding Hood, stupid and naive, while Beijing is a fierce and ruthless gray villain. The emerging friendship between the two inevitably entails most tragic consequences for the girl. This is to say, Russia’s economic, technological, military and otherwise dependence on China will over time grow to an extent that Beijing will be able to take advantage of this growing dependence by turning Moscow into its obedient and compliant vassal.

While the fairy tale ends with the hapless Little Red Riding Hood set free from the wolf’s belly by the hunters who had arrived just in time, the real-life Russia cannot rely on a miraculous rescue. Moscow will have to accept the unpleasant status of an “outlying ulus” of the Middle Kingdom, with all the ensuing consequences for the Kremlin’s international ambitions. As President Vladimir Putin said on a slightly different occasion, “like it or don’t like it—it’s your duty, my beauty.” Unless prompt hunters (perhaps, the noble Americans and their faithful NATO allies?) eventually restore justice, bringing this story to a happy ending.

Still, when I come across the many Russian publications on the same interesting topic of bilateral relations with China, I can’t help but think of another well-known product of folk fantasy, the fairy tale Cinderella. It also tells the story of a young girl who is systematically mistreated and in every way abused by her ugly stepmother and heartless stepsisters. Fortunately, poor Cinderella is saved by her fairy godmother, who appears at just the right moment, generously dressing Cinderella for the upcoming royal ball. With one wave of her magic wand, the good fairy turns a pumpkin into a golden carriage, mice into horses, a rat into a coachman, and lizards into footmen. Cinderella’s filthy rags are miraculously transformed into a beautiful dress studded with jewels. For an additional gift, Cinderella receives glass slippers, which make the girl absolutely irresistible in the eyes of the local prince, who happens to be on the look-out for a suitable bride.

A large number of Russian analysts, politicians and journalists seemingly perceive China as the modern incarnation of the fairy godmother, ready with her magic wand to solve all the numerous problems of modern Russia, quickly and painlessly. They expect Beijing to vigorously oppose U.S. and EU anti-Russian sanctions, increasing purchases of Russian hydrocarbons and food at prices favorable to Moscow, providing Russia with critical technologies, and consistently supporting the Kremlin in all international organizations and multilateral forums. Multifaceted cooperation with China should allow Russia to avoid international isolation as much as enhance its status and influence in international affairs. Thus, despite all the machinations and intrigues of the envious and malicious relatives, Cinderella arrives at the royal ball in dazzling splendor and magnificence.

Moving on with this fairy tale analogy, we can argue about who the Prince Charming is in this case, and what fair punishment awaits Cinderella’s relatives in the end. The latter should obviously be understood as the notorious “Collective West.” In the end, all these details are not so important. What is important, though, is the understanding of China. Whereas it emerges as absolute pure evil in Little Red Riding Hood, Cinderella rather portrays China as the embodiment of an equally absolute pure good.

However, the world of fairy tales and the world of international politics have little in common. No matter what anyone says about Vladimir Putin, he appears neither the naive and frivolous Little Red Riding Hood, nor the battered and hardworking Cinderella. The Russian President remains one of the world’s most experienced state leaders. For more than two decades, he has consistently stressed the paramount importance of efforts to bolster Russia’s national sovereignty and independence. If national sovereignty were a religion, the Kremlin could rightfully claim to be the cathedral of that religion. It is hard to imagine a situation where Vladimir Putin, or even one of his likely successors, would willingly sacrifice the country’s sovereignty and independence, even for the sake of promoting cooperation with China.

Perhaps even more importantly, modern China is ill-suited to the role of the hungry evil Wolf or the generous fairy godmother. The characters of children’s fairy are inevitably one-dimensional, grotesque, and poster-like. In fact, they represent either absolute evil or equally absolute good, which is the intrinsic value of fairy tales passed down from generation to generation. They help children clearly distinguish good from evil, white from black, and justice from injustice. These fundamental differences, fixed in children’s minds, come to be one’s moral bearings, without which a person cannot do in adulthood.

In politics, however, this kind of one-dimensionality is a rare thing. The real China, in contrast to the imaginary one, is a vast and rather complex country, with its numerous and varied national interests, aspirations and priorities. Some happen to coincide with those of Russia, some overlap only partially, while others diverge altogether. Therefore, it would be hardly fair to define Beijing’s foreign policy as “pro-” or “anti-Russian,” since they have always been and will primarily be “pro-Chinese.”

There is no doubt that Russia and China currently converge in their approaches to a number of critical issues of international security and development. Such unity is historically justified as it reflects the current geopolitical landscape in the international system. A convergence of interests forms a solid foundation for long-term mutually beneficial cooperation between the two countries. It is to be hoped that the relations between the countries will remain dynamic, acquiring new and important dimensions over time.

Far from our two countries only, it is the international system at large that stands to benefit from a stable, predictable and sustainable Russian-Chinese partnership. The numerous prophets hoping for an imminent crisis in Moscow-Beijing relations and going on to predict a conflict between the two should think about the various grave consequences of such developments, not only for Russia and China, but also for the rest of the world. Tactically, many countries could probably take advantage of a Russian-Chinese rupture. Strategically, though, another tectonic split in the international system would not serve the interests of any of the responsible actors in world politics.

Nevertheless, Russian analysts and journalists should not flatter themselves, because no one will solve Russia’s own problems for it. No good wizard can turn a pumpkin into a carriage, mice into horses, and ash-soaked rags into a gorgeous ball gown. No generous fairy will shoe Russia in shimmering glass slippers, and no Prince Charming awaits Moscow at the magical royal ball.

Russia should fight corruption and mismanagement, the overreach of officials, and oppression of small businesses, all on its own. The country should invest in human capital, promoting its innovation sector, introducing full-fledged federalism and local governance, increasing the efficiency of the court system at all levels, and unleashing the creative potential of Russian society to its fullest. The faster and further Russia advances these goals, the more valuable a partner it will become—both for China and other foreign countries. This, in turn, means that the current crisis in the Russia-West relations should become another incentive to speed up the socio-economic modernization of the country, rather than slack or freeze it.

From our partner RIAC

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The Alliance of Downtrodden Empires

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Image source: kremlin.ru

There are many commonalities and differences, to the point of contradiction, in the Russian, Iranian, and Turkish political and economic positions, calculations, and priorities. Nevertheless, Moscow, Tehran, and Ankara maintain an alliance or, at least, close coordination that includes conflict files, that all or some of which are involved in different arenas.

To explicate this, it is possible to go back to the modern history of the three states, and to the fall of their empires. The empires that had their center in geography continued for long periods of time with space for their expansion and contraction and for their wars and the alteration of the territorial and water borders between them.

Russia witnessed the fall of two empires that ruled and sometimes fused their surroundings, and they played a central role in international relations for centuries. From the Russian Empire, which expanded in Europe and Central Asia and extended from the maritime borders in the east to with Japan to the Polish lands in the west which collapsed during World War I, to the Soviet Union, which ruled from Moscow an empire similar to the one that its leaders had brought down before its power increased after World War II to include Europe the entire East. The fall of the Union in the early nineties was a humiliation for the Russians and bitterness for an imperialist ambition that became unable to achieve its aspirations. In that humiliation and the bitterness that followed and the difficulty of being satisfied with the nation-state borders, Putinism was formed, and its rise attempted to marry Russian nationalism, Tsarist Orthodoxy, and Stalinism, based on violent suppression of the independence rebellion (Chechnya). Direct military intervention in the periphery (Georgia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan), leading to two comprehensive wars in Syria to declare a return by force to the international arena, and a denial of the legitimacy of the existence of an entity in Ukraine under the pretext of an American and Western threat to national security.

Iran, for its part, has not adapted to its national borders since it was drawn after the fall of Qajar rule and the rise of Reza Pahlavi to power after the First World War. The imperial intransigence of the new Shah and then of his son Muhammad, with historical arguments or a connection to a Persian bond, brought down Iranian relations with Afghanistan, Iraq and Bahrain ambiguities and tensions that remained until 1979. Then the Khomeinist “exporting revolution” ideology after the overthrow of the Shah, and the erupting Iran-Iraq war that followed in the eighties, transformed the Iranian ambition into a basis for forming alliances and loyalty in the Shiite communities in nearby states. Relying on previous attempts to influence the states were minorities of the Persian League and the historical Persian influence. Iran’s political and strategic expansion was enshrined after the fall of the Taliban in Afghanistan and Saddam Hussein regimes in Iraq. Tehran took advantage of the American occupation and the chaos it created to extend its influence to the west and complete a strategic arc that passes through Baghdad and Damascus, which is ruled by its ally Assad, and then reaches Beirut, where Hezbollah is founded and supported by Iran. Through it, it was able to engage directly with the Israelis, in order to raise a political-ideological position that provides popularity, and as a response to Tel Aviv’s threat to its nuclear program. Furthermore, Tehran provided finance and arms for Palestinian forces on one hand and Yemeni forces on the other, placing it at the heart of the conflict in Palestine and on the edge of the Red Sea overlooking vital navigation that affects the global economy.

As for Turkey, despite retreating from emerging ‘national’ borders and strict neutrality imposed by Atatürk through the establishment of the republic after the First World War and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Despite a subsequent political and cultural push towards Europe and the joining of the NATO after World War II, it remained the result of its nationalist discourse. As a result of the massacres that accompanied the fall of the Ottomans, its relations with its surroundings are tense. Of course, the matter applies to Soviet and then independent Armenia, to Greece and then Cyprus, where it intervened militarily in 1974, and it applies to Syria and Iraq, where the border problems and the depth of the Kurdish question, represent its most prominent concerns. Morevore, it relates to some regions of Central Asia where the geographical contact and historical frictions between empires, and where there are Turkish-speaking national minorities. To all of that in 2002 was added a very important element linked to the Islamic identity that Erdogan and his party had elevated. He returned Turkish priorities to an eastern and southern orientation and made Ankara invest in the remnants of the Ottoman League to build an Arab presence (in cooperation with Qatar), then it overtook that about years ago. Building an African economic presence and playing intermediary roles between countries and regional hubs to demonstrate influence beyond the borders of what was a sultanate for centuries.

Undoubtedly, the issue of warm waters, the control of straits, and sea lanes is a priority for the three parties, both in past and present, for economic and geopolitical reasons. In turn, this explains another aspect of the current alliance (and competition) between them.

The Black Sea and within it the ‘Sea of ​​Azov’ is Russia’s only water port that can be permanently relied upon economically and militarily, as it reaches through the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles to the Mediterranean ‘where Moscow’s only base is in Syria’. Obviously this is because of the impossibility of the Russians using their northern, eastern and northwestern seas due to the freezing of its waters for long months. This fact, of course, puts them in direct contact with Turkey, their partner in the maritime domain, and their obligatory waterway to the world. The latter, in turn, seeks to expand its exceptional water presence and establish areas of influence, whether in the Black Sea between Russia and Ukraine, in the Aegean Mediterranean Sea facing Greece, or in the Libyan West to reach the southern Mediterranean shore and energy fields.

When it comes to the Iranian case, the same water priority takes on another dimension, related to the control of the straits in addition to access to the Mediterranean. From the Strait of Hormuz, the oil artery separating the Indian Ocean from the Gulf, to Bab al-Mandab ‘the entrance to the Red Sea connects to the Suez Canal and the Mediterranean’ to Syria, Lebanon, and their Mediterranean ports. Tehran is seeking to impose its control and presence through its armed forces or the forces of its allies ‘the Houthis, the Syrian regime and the Lebanese Hezbollah’.

As a consequence, the maritime water issue, as the overlapping areas of geographical influence, and the recent past, which did not go beyond the complex and confusing present with its consequences during the transition from the empire to the nation-state, bring the Russians, Iranians and Turks together, despite the distinctions and different aspirations.

If we add to all the above, hostile discourses against Western hegemony in the capitals of the three states, an intertwining in their roles and occupations in Syria for years, their economic cooperation in the face of old American and European sanctions on Iran and the latest ones on Russia, examining the characteristics of Turkish mediation between Kyiv and Moscow, monitoring the Russian, Iranian and Turkish cooperation projects with China and India, we will see the depth of the mutual need for coordination between the heirs of the ‘Downtrodden Empires’. This common needs seem sufficient so far to curb the antagonism between Ankara on the one hand and Moscow and Tehran on the other hand in the Azerbaijani-Armenian conflict. It also gives the impression of satisfactory to overcome the difficulties between them in the Syrian arena, where they share the Astana path despite their contradictory positions and locations. Additionally, it puts to limit the repercussions of the clash between Russia ‘through ‘Wagner’ mercenaries; and Turkey ‘through drones and field experts’ in Libya. Finally, it seems sufficient to perpetuate Russia’s request to Turkey to mediate in the Ukrainian war, despite Ankara selling Kyiv the famous ‘Bayraktar’ drones with which the Ukrainians hunt Putin’s tanks crawling on the ruins of their cities.

The bottom line is, situations are not likely to change in the near future, even if the relationship of the three states or one of them changes with the West, given that diversification of options, taking advantage of the position, role, contradictions, and blackmailing the opposing parties have become a feature of international politics today. There are no signs that this needs to be changed.

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Russia responds to America’s plan to win WW III

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The U.S. Government no longer designs nuclear weapons to prevent WW III, but instead to win WW III.

Whereas both the Soviet Union and the United States used to design their strategy and weapons so as to prevent a Third World War so that neither side would win but both sides (and much of the world) would be destroyed as thousands of nuclear warheads would suddenly be exploding during a nuclear war which would be completed within around an hour or so, the U.S. Government has gradually shifted away from such a “M.A.D.” or “mutually assured destruction” meta-strategy, and been replacing it with the “Nuclear Primacy” U.S. meta-strategy, in which Russia will be totally destroyed but the U.S. will emerge afterward as being sufficiently strong so as to hold unchallengeable sway over the entire planet (which hegemony has been the actual goal of the U.S. Government ever since 25 July 1945).

On 3 May 2017, I headlined “America’s Top Scientists Confirm: U.S. Goal Now Is to Conquer Russia”, and linked to a report that had recently been issued by the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, about “revolutionary new technologies that will vastly increase the targeting capability of the US ballistic missile arsenal. This increase in capability is astonishing — boosting the overall killing power of existing US ballistic missile forces by a factor of roughly three — and it creates exactly what one would expect to see, if a nuclear-armed state were planning to have the capacity to fight and win a nuclear war by disarming enemies with a surprise first strike.” I pointed out there that this new technology, called the “super-fuse”, was exactly in accord with the replacement of M.A.D. by Nuclear Primacy. After all, though the proponents of “Nuclear Primacy” didn’t say that this phrase related ONLY to America’s “Primacy” in a U.S.-v.-Russia nuclear war, the context always was clear that this was the intention, and that the phrase meant the exact opposite of (and strongly opposed) any conceivable nuclear “primacy” for Russia. So, “Nuclear Primacy” — a phrase that was introduced in 2006 in the most prestigious scholarly journals, and subsequently adhered-to by all U.S. foreign policies though never explicitly stated (and never publicly advocated) by the U.S. Government — is, in actuality, the new U.S. meta-strategy, the one that now exists.

Other new U.S. military technologies also were discussed in that Bulletin of Atomic Scientists article: for example: “Because of improvements in the killing power of US submarine-launched ballistic missiles, those submarines now patrol with more than three times the number of warheads needed to destroy the entire fleet of Russian land-based missiles in their silos.” Of course, if this is true, then Russians were in a terrifying situation, at least as recently as 2017.

Russia’s response to this challenge had actually started even earlier, by no later than U.S. President Barack Obama’s having grabbed control over the Government of Ukraine in February 2014. (And in this video is shown that video’s full smoking gun of his coup, and here is the transcript and explanation of that crucial smoking gun.) Ukraine is the country that has the nearest foreign border to The Kremlin in Moscow — only 353 miles from Moscow, a mere five minutes of missile-flight-time, away, from the Ukrainian city of Sumy. Ukraine’s having the border with the closest proximity to Russia’s central command (The Kremlin) is the main reason why Obama grabbed it (in accord with his Nuclear-Primacy policies).

Compare that 353 miles to the 1,131 miles from Washington DC that Cuba is and that terrified JFK so much during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis as to have made him willing to launch nuclear war against the Soviet Union if Khrushchev wouldn’t remove the missile sites that the Soviet Union was attempting to build in Cuba. Cuba is over three times farther away from DC than Ukraine is from The Kremlin, and the missiles at that time were far slower than they are today, but when America’s NATO finally rejected, on 7 January 2022, Russia’s demand that Ukraine NEVER be allowed to join NATO, what alternative did Russia have left, other than to reverse Obama’s coup of Ukraine and to do it as soon as possible?

In preparation for Russia’s “Special Military Operation,” Russia has been introducing new weapons systems that are specifically designed to prevent “Nuclear Primacy.” Among the main ones is the Sarmat ICBM, which is vastly the world’s most terrifying weapon, because it will be virtually impossible to detect and track, carrying dozens of precision-targeted huge nuclear bombs, unstoppable by any existing technology, and having a range of 18,000 kilometers or over 11,000 miles, which would cover the entire U.S. empire. Just a few Sarmats could destroy the entire U.S. empire, all of the U.S. and its vassal-nations (self-described as being ‘democracies’ and ‘independent nations’ — neither of which is true).

A Princeton University group of scholars has produced their estimate of how a WW III would proceed, which they label as “Plan A”, and their video-summary of it was posted to youtube on 6 September 2019. As-of now, it has had nearly 4 million views, and five thousand viewer-comments. It assumes that the war would proceed in gradual steps of mutual escalation and ignores that the U.S. regime no longer is following the M.A.D. meta-strategy — that the U.S. regime has replaced M.A.D. by their Nuclear Primacy meta-strategy. Consequently, the Princeton estimates appear to be highly unrealistic, and not, at all, to be describing the type of unprecedentedly brief war that a WW III in our era would entail. A WW III in our time would be predicated upon being initiated in a blitz-nuclear attack by the United States, such as a war that is driven by the Nuclear Primacy meta-strategy would be done: Nuclear Primacy means a war to decapitate Russia’s central command in its first strike and within a mere 10 minutes or (if from Ukraine) even less from that blitz-launch. How would a decapitated Russia be able to retaliate, at all? Only by means of a “dead hand” system, which would automatically launch whatever would survive of its retaliatory capacities after that first, decapitating, nuclear-blitz, attack. The Sarmat would be a part of that, unless the U.S. regime starts WW III before the Sarmats become emplaced. In the meantime, Russia’s main concern will be to maintain a current dead-hand capability so as to make certain that at least the U.S. and its main vassal-nations will be eliminated in the event that the Nuclear Primacy meta-strategy becomes launched before Russia’s dead-hand system becomes completely implemented.

The way that a WW III would most likely start has been shaped by the U.S. regime’s objective of not being blamed for the war despite being the first side to nuclearize it; and this objective requires that Russia must have initiated the conventional phase of the war that will have led up to that nuclear phase. For example: if Russia fails to achieve its objective of capturing and holding enough of Ukraine so as to increase that 353 miles to, say, 1,000 miles (or whatever would be their required minimum), then the U.S. might send forces to Ukraine in order to prevent Russia from achieving that objective; and, if Russia then engages U.S. forces in direct combat, the U.S. might use that as their excuse to invade Russia, and, at some stage in that invasion, very suddenly, to blitz-nuclear attack The Kremlin, on the excuse (of course) that “the Russian regime doesn’t respond to anything but military force.” Then, the survivors of WW III will be able to be propagandized sufficiently to cast the blame for WW III onto Russia, and this will help to ease the U.S. regime’s successful take-over of the entire world (or what remains of it).

Already, it is a great propaganda-success on the part of America’s regime, that though they started the war in Ukraine by grabbing Ukraine in February 2014, Russia has gotten the blame for this war, when responding to that coup (which had started this war) eight years later, on 24 February 2022, with their “Special Military Operation.” In fact, most people now might think that Ukrainians always hated Russia’s Government and loved America’s Government, but even Western-sponsored polls of Ukrainians showed consistently that prior to Obama’s coup there, the vast majority of Ukrainians saw Russia as their friend; and America, NATO, and the EU, as their enemy; but that this reversed almost immediately, after the U.S. Government took over Ukraine, in 2014. In the propaganda-war, it’s almost as-if Russia hasn’t even entered the contest, at all.

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