Latvia is actively preparing for one of the most important political event of the year. Parliamentary elections will take place in October 6, 2018. Submissions of the lists of candidates for the 13th Saeima elections will take place very soon – from July 18 to August 7, 2018. But the elections campaign as well as all political life in the country faces some problems which require additional attention from the authorities. And these problems spoil the image of Latvia as a democratic state which might respect the rights of its people.
This is a well-known fact, that the image of the state is composed of several components: it heavily depends on its foreign and domestic policy directions. The more so, internal events very often influence its foreign policy and vice versa.
Latvia considers itself a democratic state and tries to prove it by all possible means. But all attempts fail because of a serious unsolved problem – violation of human rights in Latvia.
It is not a secret that about one third of Latvians are ethnic Russians. Their right to speak and be educated in their native language is constantly violated. This problem is in the centre of attention of such international organizations as OSCE and EU. This fact makes Latvian authorities, which conducts anti Russia’s policy, extremely nervous.
Thus, the Latvian parliament recently passed in the final reading amendments to the Education Law and the Law on General Education under which schools of ethnic minorities will have to start gradual transition to Latvian-only secondary education in the 2019/2020 academic year. It is planned that, starting from 2021/2022 school year, all general education subjects in high school (grades 10-12) will be taught only in the Latvian language, while children of ethnic minorities will continue learning their native language, literature and subjects related to culture and history in the respective minority language. This caused
Hundreds joined a march in the centre of Riga in June to support Russian-language schools in Latvia. The event was held under the slogan: “For Russian schools, for the right to learn in native language,” as the government wants to switch the language of the education system to Latvian.
The European Parliament deputies called for support of Russian education in Latvia. 115 people have signed the joint declaration that will be forwarded to the Latvian Sejm and government. The declaration is signed by representatives of 28 EU countries, and almost all parliamentary factions. Every 7th deputy supported the necessity of the Russian school education in Latvia. The document authors marked that this is unprecedented expression of solidarity towards the national minorities, especially Russian residents of the EU. Authors of the letter sharply criticize the education reform that takes away from children of national minorities the right to study in their native language.
On the other hand the parliament contradicts itself by rejecting a bill allowing election campaigning only in Latvian.
The matter is in parliamentary election will take part not only Latvians, speaking Lantvian, but Latvians, who speak Russian. Their voices are of great importance either. The authorities had to recognize this and tempered justice with mercy.
After years of oppressing Russian speaking population and violating their rights Saeima committee this month rejected a bill allowing election campaigning only in Latvian.
It turned out that politicians need ethnic Russians to achieve their political goals. They suddenly remembered that Campaigning Law should not promote discrimination because publicly active people should not have problems using the state language.
“Wise” deputies understand that Russian speaking children are not going to participate in the elections while Russian speaking adults can seriously damage political plans. Only this can explain the controversy in the Parliament’s decisions.
In Russia Riga’s decision to transfer the schools of national minorities to the Latvian language of teaching considers as unacceptable and could cause introduction of special economic measures against Latvia as well as condemnation by the international community.
So, Latvia’s on-going war against its residents also could become a reason for deterioration in attitudes not only with Russia but with EU and OSCE that will have unpleasant economic and political and even security consequences for Latvia. It is absolutely clear that making unfriendly steps towards own citizens and neighboring states, Latvia can not expect a normal attitude in return.
The long-term threat of Armenian nationalism
According to the paradigm of realpolitik, states have no permanent friends or enemies- only interests can be permanent. This thought has been dominant in the foreign policy-making of the last centuries and, though subject to various mutations, has in general remained a dominant principle of international relations. However, there have been, and there still are, some exceptions. And one of the most persistent and seemingly counter-intuitive cases thereof remains the foreign policy of Armenia, a small landlocked post-Soviet republic in South Caucasus. The week of furious skirmishes along the border with Azerbaijan, that started on July 12, and subsequent tensions arising between Azerbaijani and Armenian communities in various countries of the world, have reminded the world about the destructive potential of this special case and at the same time invite us to think why this conflict has become so intractable and thoroughly outgrown its initial causes and interests.
To begin with, let’s remember the beginnings of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict which started to unfold in 1988, three years before the ultimate collapse of the Soviet Union. The demands of the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians (constituting around 75% of the population of this area, which had a status of an autonomous region- “oblast” within the Azerbaijani SSR) for “reunification” (or “miatsum” in Armenian) with the mother-Armenia, were the trigger. The movement defined itself through the discourse of a national awakening and revival, and posed as an inalienable part of the process of democratization which was then beginning in Armenia, along with Azerbaijan and some other Soviet republics. Let’s for now remember this point- it is really important.
The “Karabakh committee”, as the leaders of the secession movement called themselves, of course put forward standard accusations of the violations of Armenians’ cultural rights in Azerbaijan. However, these accusations were, mildly speaking, ill-grounded, as the recently released documentary “Parts of a circle” may attest: the worst oppression cited by the region’s Armenians were the occassional inaccessibility of the TV and radio broadcasts from the Armenian SSR. Other than that, Nagorno-Karabakh had its high school education predominantly in Armenian, hosted an Armenian pedagogical college and a theatre. Moreover, Armenians constituted a significant and influential share of the population of Azerbaijan outside Nagorno-Karabakh, particularly in the country’s biggest cities- Baku, Ganja and Sumgayit, and were widely represented in the republic’s social and cultural elite. Up until now, you cannot find any document-based, hard evidence of systematic violations of the cultural autonomy enjoyed by the Armenian majority of the Oblast’. So, we cannot understand the motives of the Karabakh movement unless we put it into the context of the much wider, global revival of extreme form of nationalism among Armenians of the world.
In 1973, Kurken Oghanian, an elderly Armenian living in California and a refugee from the 1915 events in the Ottoman Empire, assassinated two LA-based Turkish diplomats, declaring revenge for the alleged genocide as the motive of his crime. This murder inspired a group of Armenian nationalists who in 1975 founded a group called ASALA (Armenian Secret Army of the Liberation of Armenia), whose goal was defined as forcing Turkey to recognize the 1915 events as genocide and make Ankara not only pay generous compensations to the Armenian victims and their families, but also to cede territories (!) of the Eastern Turkey, which, according to the never-ratified colonial Sevres treaty were supposed to become the homeland of would-be Armenian state. To achieve these goals, ASALA unfolded a campaign of full-fledged terror against Turkish diplomats, killing 46 of them in the period until 1990. After the particularly vicious attack at the Orly Airport in France, the group was recognized as terrorist by most major countries of the world, including U.S.
At the same time, nationalistic attitudes were slowly brewing among the Soviet Armenians, back then very loosely connected with the Diaspora. Since 1965, when the 50-year anniversary of the “genocide” was for the first time openly commemorated in Yerevan, these events started to be held every year on April 24, and in 1967 a massive memorial was unveiled at the site of the Tsitsernakaberd Hill, quickly becoming the symbol of Armenians’ anti-Turkish sentiment. The Soviet government tolerated these expressions of nationalism, which were in general all but prohibited by the official ideology of “friendship of peoples” partly because Ankara was considered a dangerous geopolitical adversary of the Soviets and a puppet of “American imperialism”. However, this produced shocking repercussions, when on January 8, 1977 three explosions took place in Moscow (including one at the underground station), claiming the lives of 7 people. Later that year, three Armenian nationalists were found guilty of these terror acts, the first ever to happen in the USSR. The court concluded them to be an isolated group, though claims about their links with ASALA, which was in the process of creation back then, were subsequently made.
Hence, the 1980’s witnessed the rise in exclusive Armenian nationalism driven by ressentiment and a sense of pending revenge against the Turks. The Karabakh movement, though it succeeded in portraying itself as the vanguard of the Soviet-wide wave of democratization, was heavily imbued with this ideology, which equated Azerbaijanis, ethnically close to the Turkish people, to perilous “Turks” considered perennial enemies of Armenia. That’s why the initially peaceful protests gave way to an interethnic strife in a matter of months, and in 1988 most Azerbaijanis (around 170,000 people back then) were expelled from Armenia by force.
As the both republics became independent in 1991, Karabakh started to attract “fidains”- mercenaries who had their training at the ASALA camps in the Middle East, many of whom participated in the acts of terror and served prison terms for that. The most famous of them, Monte Melkonyan from California, who was among the organisers of the Orly attack, is now a much-revered national hero in Armenia. The arrival of these people with their fierce anti-Turkic stance, brought the primordial discourse of “much-oppressed ancient nation”, “Armenia from the Caspian to the Mediterranean”, to the fore. Presence of the “fidains” significantly increased the intensity of atrocities, the most vicious of which happened in the Azerbaijani town of Khojaly where on the night of 26 February 1992 613 unarmed people (including children and the elderly) were slaughtered. And although the negotiation process conducted by the Azerbaijani and Armenian governments, served to bring the conflict to the international level as a “classic” interstate one, it never lost, at least for the Armenian side, its zero-sum “either we or you” character. The words uttered by former Armenian President Kocharyan, who used to be the leader of Karabakh Armenians during the war, in an interview to the British researcher Tom de Waal, that “Armenians and Azerbaijanis are genetically incompatible”, sound as something from the racist playbook. Yet this black-and-white vision of the Armenian history and interests reflect the dominant, if not usually articulated, thinking which among others defines Armenian foreign policies as well.
The major feature of the Armenian strategy ever since its independence- the reluctant but inevitable affiliation with Russian interests- is one example. The Armenian democratic movement perceived Moscow as no friend as well. However, as the conflict intensified and Turkey in 1993 ultimately closed borders with Armenia, Yerevan had no other choice but to fully embrace Russia as security guarantor. Ultimately, the presence of the Russian military base in Gyumri as well as the frequent engagement of former Soviet army units in hostilities on the Armenian side, were among the major factors behind the ultimate Armenian victory. Later on, as the idea of preserving the “security” of the Nagorno-Karabakh (which proclaimed itself an independent republic, not yet recognized by any sovereign state), and the seven adjacent districts occupied by Armenian forces, got entrenched in both the national state of mind and political strategy, any attempts to re-orient Armenia towards Western integration would fail against the need to preserve Russia’s exclusive leverage in the country in exchange for its security guarantees. The failure of the “compliant Armenia” strategy preached by the first President Ter-Petrosyan, encapsulated this permanent deadlock of the Armenian foreign policy. This strategy envisaged gradual shift of Yerevan towards the Western-centered global institutions, including NATO and EU, and distancing from militant exclusive nationalism that characterized Armenia’s attitude towards Azerbaijan and Turkey. Ter-Petrosyan supported the maximally quick return of the 7 occupied regions (the “buffer zone” in the parlance of Karabakh separatists) to Baku and even reportedly contemplated an option of the “single state” for Nagorno-Karabakh within Azerbaijan. Such prospects were rejected by the majority of Armenians, and the President had to resign in 1998, being replaced by the war hero Kocharyan, who quickly turned to considerably more nationalist rhetoric.
Another exemplary U-turn happened in 2013, when the Sargsyan government, preparing the association agreement with the EU, refused from signing it in the most unexpected manner days before the planned agreement date and a few days later joined the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). The evidence indicates that this decision was obtained by Moscow through pressing hard on the Nagorno-Karabakh issue, pivotal for Armenian politics. The newest case is the current president Pashinyan, who swept to power with the agenda of a more transparent and reforming Armenia and prioritized improving ties with the West. In the first year of his presidency Pashinyan did a lot to relieve the tensions with Azerbaijan, making 2019 the calmest year on the frontline in at least a decade. However, domestic pressure exerted by nationalists, who manipulated public opinion into believing that the President prepares a “treason” on Karabakh, and growing bitterness with Moscow, triggered Pashinyan to gradually adopt the traditional intransigent mode, and the latest escalation has been the logical outcome of the mounting tensions. In the aftermath of the July hostilities, he made a number of unprecedentedly pro-Russian statements, reassuring Moscow that Yerevan will remain its firm ally. At the same time, the officials and expert community in Armenia are again pushing the idea that only Russian umbrella can save their country from the destruction by “enemy Turks”. However, violence against peaceful Azerbaijani protesters in Los Angeles, Brussels or London, as well as rioting in Moscow, came as a shock and was the first time the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict really spilled over the territory of third countries and involved thousands of people with no direct links to the armed forces or politics. Given that the Armenian leadership never bothered to denounce such behavior by their ethnic kin, it must be concluded that the conflict in the eyes of most Armenians, despite of their appellations to international law and the language of realpolitik, is clearly an ethnic one which justifies war by all means. Among the Armenians who came on the streets of Western cities to confront the Azerbaijani crowds, were scattered people bearing the insignia of “ASALA” on their t-shirts, which also indicates the merging of Azerbaijanis and Turks in the radical-nationalist perception.
However, the most dramatic consequence of the intransigent, zero-sum policy of Armenia are the numerous wasted opportunities for the dynamic development of the whole region. Even in the 1990’s, when all the three countries of South Caucasus experienced the economic collapse of more or less similar magnitude, Armenian President Ter-Petrosyan warned about long-term adverse outcomes of the uncompromised attitude to the Nagorno-Karabakh issue for the country’s economic development. Since then, Armenia found itself isolated from the major infrastructural projects of regional significance, such as the Baku-Tbilisi-Jeyhan oil pipeline, Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline, Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway, as well as many more international initiatives promoted by the Turkey-Georgia-Azerbaijan triangle. The absence of the border with Russia, together with economic problems Moscow is experiencing since 2014, mean that this partnership is not nearly as lucrative for Yerevan as the hypothetical collaboration with the direct neighbours could have been, and in fact the only serious boon from it is Yerevan’s ability to obtain Russian weapons for lower-than-market prices from time to time- which only strengthens “the party of war” and perpetuates the mentality of a besieged fortress. The resulting dependence on communications with Iran puts severe limits on Armenia’s attempts to deepen cooperation with the West. As a result, in the last 15 years Armenia’s GDP per capita consistently lagged behind Azerbaijan, for some years even falling to the half its level, and in the recent years has also been considerably lower than the respective figure for Georgia. Moreover, Armenian economy, compared to Azerbaijan and Georgian ones, is much more dependent on the inflow of investment from rather limited sources (particularly the Armenian diaspora), which makes it more vulnerable to various shocks and further constrains the range of available policy options, as diaspora money is usually linked with Armenia’s uncompromised and vigorous promotion of the issues of genocide recognition and Nagorno-Karabakh “independence”.The vicious circle of stagnant economy and bellicose rhetoric serves to reward the politicians most radical on Nagorno-Karabakh, since its “defense” from Azerbaijan becomes the only success that can justify the government’s performance.
At the same time, Armenian policies have put significant obstacles to the whole region as well. Amid the growing weariness from the enormous Russian influence, the continuing presence of Russia’s 302ndmilitary base in Gyumri can now be justified only by the guarantee of the status-quo it provides for Yerevan. Unsurprisingly, after initial irritation at the CSTO and Moscow who didn’t rush to interfere into the border skirmishes with Azerbaijan, President Pashinyan had to change his stance and recognize the strategic importance of security partnership with Russia- a victory for Moscow but another blow to the sustainable peace in South Caucasus. The lack of such peace and the constant, if often understated threat of a new escalation between Armenia and Azerbaijan causes skeptical assessment of the strategic importance and potential of the whole region in the West, which throughout his last decade has considerably diminished its presence here; since Obama’s presidency, South Caucasus has been downgraded in the list of U.S’s foreign policy priorities. The constant threat of war in South Caucasus was very clear to the whole world in the aftermath of the 2008 Russian-Georgian war, but the fact that Armenia is, unlike Russia, a small, economically backward state has blinded many analysts from fully recognizing its destructive role and put the Karabakh conflict to the back row, relative to the conflicts in Abkhazia and Ossetia. Yerevan’s rejection of compromises and desperate attachment to the Russian security umbrella made a long-term time bomb from Nagorno-Karabakh. The fact that many Armenians abroad perceive Azerbaijani embassies and peaceful rallies as a target, attests to the flawed thinking which perpetuates Armenia’s conflict with “Turks”. At the same time, it made as clear as never before that it would be in the best interest of the international community to return, after many years, to a pro-active role, and take a harsh stance against war-mongering and ethnic radicalism in South Caucasus. It must be finally made clear that Yerevan cannot pretend to be a flagship of democracy in the region and continue its occupation, preaching the ideas of militant primordial nationalism and disregard for international law.
The Treasure Map to the Forgotten Epoch of the Iravan Khanate
In an exclusive interview, the scholar of the “lost” Iravani Khanate, Amir Ali SardariIravani, reveals a rich history of a society marked by a peaceful coexistence between Christians and Muslims which has been all but erased from the understanding of the region by the subsequent and victorious governments.
According to the researcher, Iravan Khanat was an independent state in the South Caucasus, which emerged around 1748. The official end of this state was in 1828 after the defeat of Qajars against Russia. The period between its creation in 1748 and 1805 is called the real life of the independent Khanate of Iravan, whereas between 1805 and 1828 the Khanate was under the rule of the Qajar dynasty. It means that in this time the Khan of Iravan was appointed by the Qajar state.
The Qajar dynasty was a Persian royal dynasty of Turkic origin which ruled over Iran from 1789 through 1925 when it was displaced by the Pahlavis.
The development of the city Iravan as a center goes back to the Chukhur-Sa’adbeylerbeyli period in the beginning of the Safavid dynasty in 16th century, which followed by the independent Iravan Khanate in 18thcentury. As a result of the wars between the Ottoman and Safavid Empires, the city of Iravan passed 14 times from Safavids to Ottomans and vice versa. Each time the city exposed to certain destruction and was reconstructed again. After the collapse of the Safavids, the city wasoccupied by the Turks in 1723. In 1733 Nadir Shah conquered Iravan city from the Ottomans again. Nader Shah was an Iranian who belonged to the Turkmen Afshar tribe of Khorasan in northeastern Iran, which had supplied military power to the Safavid dynasty since the time of Shah Ismail Independent khanates were created after the deathof Nadir Shah Afshar in 1748. The city of Irevan became the capital of the Iravan khanate.
Iravan khanate covered the area between Mount Agri (Ararat) and MountAlagoz (Alayaz) and located on both banks of the Araz River. The Iravan khanate was bordered on the north by Pambak river and Ganja khanates, on the east by Karabakh and Nakhchivan khanates, on the south by Khoy and Maku and Bayazid khanates,; on the west by Kars and on the north west by Shorayel sultanates. The territory of Iravan khanate was about 24 thousand square kilometers.
The Irevan fortress locating in a strategic position between the Ottoman Empire, Georgia and Safavid and later Afsharid empire has great importance for all neighboring states. It was built in 1582 by the Ottomans. The causes of political and military interference of neighboring governments in the internal affairs of Khanate of Iravan had emerged due to the commercial and strategic characteristics of Iravan and its unique geopolitical situation in the commercial routes and crossways of south Caucasus region. Located at the cross section between Europe, Asia, Russia, and the Middle East, and is known for the gamut of climates, and landscapes, and in those days, an international trade hub, which brought about a great deal of intercultural exchange, and contributed to the cultural, religious, and linguistic diversity in the region, as described in Thomas de Waal’s ” A Brief Guide to Understanding the Countries of the South Caucasus.”.
After the death of Nadir shah Afshar Mir Mehdi khan was the first khan of independent khanate of Iravan in 1747 but short time after that Azad khan, Afghan who was a general of Nadir shah, conquered Iravan and appointed Khalil khan uzbak as his representative and Khan of Iravan. In his timeIravan was being often attacked by Lezgins of Daghistan and Khalil khanuzbak was unable to protect Iravan.
Lezgins are a Northeast Caucasian ethnic group native predominantly to southern Dagestan, Russia and what is now northeastern Azerbaijan. In the 4th century BC, the numerous tribes speaking Lezgic languages united in a union of 26 tribes, formed in the Eastern Caucasus state of Caucasian Albania (which has nothing to do with the Balkan state), which itself was incorporated in the Persian Achaemenid Empire in 513 BC. Descendants of these tribes are now part of the rich makeup of the region, and retain distinctive cultural traditions.
The Lak Kazi Kumukh Khanate controlled a part of the Lezgins for a time in the 18th century after the disintegration of the Safavid Empire. In the first half of the 18th century, Persia was able to restore its full authority throughout the entire Caucasus under Nader Shah. Some Lezgins were part of the Kuba Khanate in what is now Azerbaijan, while others fell under the jurisdiction of the Derbent Khanate.In 1755 Hasanali khan who was a native Iravani and gained support of people of Iravan, replaced Khalil khan Uzbak.From this time on Iravan was an independent state under the rule of native khans for approximately 50 years until 1805. Hasanali khan gave his position to his brother Husseinali khan 4 years later. Under the rule of Husseinali khan and his son Mahammad khan, Iravan khanate experienced its most prosperous time. Husseinali khan and his son Mahammad khan were real politicians. Thepolitical life of Iravan Khanate was always under the threat of neighboring powers.
This situation forced Husseinali Khan and later his son Mahammad khan towards the third power so that their political independence can be maintained. In fact, the formation of relations between Khanate of Iravan and neighboring powers was due to political considerations and mutual interests. However, relations of Khan of Iravan with neighboring governments were not always stable, since the only objective for the Khanate of Iravan was to preserve its domain and governance over a localized region through utilization of any measures or means.
In the reign of Husseinali khan he benefited from support of Ottomans and also sometimes of Karim khan Zand (from Iran) to encounter Irakli (Erekle II) of Georgia. He used the conflict between Russia and Ottoman Empire on black sea as a political opportunity.
Later his son Mohammad khan played the similar political role with Russia and Agha Mohammad khan Qajar to maintain Iravan khanate, essentially playing one off the other, and receiving a level of protection from each – without ever being fully (or really) subservient to either. Agha Mohammad khan Qajar defeated Zand dynasty in Iran and came to power
in 1796. The Zand dynasty was an Iranian dynasty, a branch of Lurs or Kurds, origin founded by Karim Khan Zand that initially ruled southern and central Iran in the 18th century. It later quickly came to expand to include much of the rest of contemporary Iran, as well as what is modern day Azerbaijan, Bahrain, and parts of Iraq and Armenia. Mohammed Khan Qajar expected from the Khanates of Caucasus to obey him. The Khanates were ruled by the khans of Turkic Oghuz descents. Especially the khanates of Iravan, Ganja and Karabakh were ruled by the khans of Qajartribe. The Khan of Iravan did not trust him as a newcomer. It was the reason for the invasion of Agha Mohammad khan Qajar of Caucasus. The khan of Iravan was arrested by Agha Mohammad khan Qajar and sent to Tehran. But shortly after that Agha Mohammad khan Qajar was killed in Karabakh and the Iravan khan was returned to his home. Mahammad khan of Iravan continued the policy of gaining the balance of power between Russia and the Qajar state to maintain the independent Iravan khanate. In 1805 Mahammad khan was finally arrested and sent to exile by Fathali shah Qajar, the successor of AghaMohammad khan Qajar. Mahammad khan Iravani was treated by Fathali shahwith respect in exile. There were many cross marriages between his children and Fathali shah’s children in order to strengthen the ties between their dynasties. This was a strategy of rulers in those times to stabilize their power and reduce the risks of invasion or intervention by their rivals. After the death of Fathali shah Mahammad khanIravani got the highest military rank under Mohammad shah Qajar, the successor of Fathali shah, and married the daughter of Fathali shah. Hisson, Mahammad hasan khan, also married the daughter of Abbas mirza, the crown prince. This daughter was the full sister of Mohammad shah Qajar. I myself am a descendant of this line, explained the scholar. The descendants of Mahammad khanIravani have had a very good career among Qajars. They were mostly very influential personalities who at times had ruled up to 75% of Iran as local governors. They were very closely related to the royal family.
Even under Pahlavis, the family members had reached very high official posts.In 1807 Husseinqulu khan from Qazvin was appointed by Fathali shah to khanof Iravan. He and his brother Hasan khan were not native from Iravan. Manyhistorians have mistaken written that their father with Mahammad khan unfortunately.The political reform of Husseinqulu khan, driven by Fathali shah Qajar,changed the situation in Iravan khanate and led finally to heavy losses and Gulistan and Turkamanchay treaties. Khanate of Iravan was annexed to Russia in 1827.
The Treaty of Gulistan was a peace treaty concluded between Imperial Russia and Persia (modern day Iran) on 24 October 1813 in the village of Gulistan (in modern-day Goranboy Rayon of Azerbaijan) as a result of the first full-scale Russo-Persian War, lasting from 1804 to 1813. The peace negotiations were precipitated by Lankaran’s fall to Gen. PyotrKotlyarevsky on 1 January 1813.The treaty confirmed the ceding and inclusion of what is today Daghestan, eastern Georgia, most of the Republic of Azerbaijan, and parts of northern Armenia from Iran into the Russian Empire. The text was prepared by the British diplomat Sir Gore Ouseley who served as the mediator and wielded great influence at the Persian court. It was signed by Nikolai Rtischev from the Russian side and Mirza Abolhassan Khan Ilchi from the Persian side.
The Treaty of Turkamanchay was an agreement between Persia(Iran) and the Russian Empire, which concluded the Russo-Persian War (1826–28). It was signed on 10 February 1828 in Torkamanchay, Iran. By the treaty, Persia ceded to Russia control of several areas in the South Caucasus: the Erivan Khanate, the Nakhchivan Khanate, and the remainder of the Talysh Khanate. The boundary between Russian and Persia was set at the Aras River. These territories comprise modern-day Armenia, the southern parts of the modern-day Republic of Azerbaijan, Nakhchivan, as well as Iğdır Province (now part of Turkey).
The treaty was signed for Persia by Crown Prince Abbas Mirza and Allah-Yar Khan Asaf al-Daula, chancellor to Shah Fath Ali (of the Qajar Dynasty), and for Russia by General Ivan Paskievich. Like the 1813 Treaty of Gulistan, this treaty was imposed by Russia, following military victory over Persia. Paskievich threatened to occupy Tehran in five days unless the treaty was signed.
Discussing the culture of the Iravan Khanate and the region, the researcher explained that at the beginning of 16th century and during the rise of Safavid empire, Iravan was an important strategic location for Safavids against Ottomans. It wasthe reason why Safavid rulers appointed their most capable and intelligent allies and generals to protect the fortifications in Iravan. In additionto the military importance, Iravan was a very strategic trade center. As a crossroad between east and west Iravan gained from economic and cultural interactions between different nations. This unique opportunity madeIravan into a cultural hub and a place for open minded people from different religions and backgrounds. Neighboring states were always very eager totake control over this area to gain from taxes and security advantages. These interests caused Iravan to be subjected to conflicts and extensive damages in Iravan from time to time.
The rulers of Iravan were close to Safavid dynasty. The first officialrepresentatives of the Safavid state, who were sent to Europe, were from Iravan. Safavid rulers finally declared Isfahan to be their capital, because it wasa safe location and far from borders but they were still very well connected with their high ranking officials and people from “Chokhur Sa’ad” (the name of Iravan state at that time). Safavi kings offered special conditions like tax relief for Armenians and tried to discourage them from treason. From time to time Christian rival states like Georgiaand Russia were inciting Armenians to conspire against Safavids.
In Safavi and Afshar periods Iravan was a battle field between Iran and Ottomans. The major powers looked to it as a potential proxy against one another and sought its allegiance, both through outreach and through force. After death of Nader shah Afshar, the Iravan Khanate era was the most peaceful period which lasted about 50 years. In this time the rulers of Iravan tried to secure their independent state through unique political position, maneuvering among the larger powers, but also utilizing the unique location to develop a business friendly climate favorable to merchants and to friendly diplomacy with neighboring states.
They could concentrate on their internal affairs and promote the quality of life and development inside their own society without interference or disturbance. Among cities with a large Christian minority, Iravan was much more tolerant than the very religious Muslim Isfahan. Many Western travelers who visited Iravan witnessed the religious freedom and tolerance in this country. It is obvious that some European travelers had sympathy for people who shared their faith and intended to reflect their complaints. It was In the 18th. century and even today we are struggling with the same conflict between ideologies, which at times portrayed conflicts as clashes between religions themselves, rather than between their practitioners. The period of Iravan khanate was the most prosperous time of this country. Trade was improved and the custom taxes were not paid to neighboring supporters but invested internally. Based on the very rare sources remaining from that period it wasthe golden age of Iravan. Mosques and churches, facilities for travelers like Bazars, Hamams and Caravansara is with eastern architecture were built or renovated. In the 18th. century, mosques were still the most important centers for education. A lesser known fact is that the first modern school and the new education system in Caucasus and Iran was initiated in Iravan some decades later, and the most appropriate conditions for this revolutionary initiative was prepared in Iravan khanate period. The tolerance for different perspectives and the openness due to the inherent diversity laid the foundation for this innovative approach.
Still, the peaceful period eventually came to an end. In 1796 and with the rise of the Qajar dynasty in Tehran, Agha Mohammad khan Qajar targeted Caucasus and the time of peace and prosperity was breached. Mahammad Khan Iravani was captured and forced to leave Iravan to Tehran. Although the Iravani khan was treated respectfully in Tehran, the conqueror Qajar state did not allow him to intervene in internal affairs of Iravan anymore. Instead, another loyal Qajar general was appointed to khan of Iravan “Hossein qulukhan”. From this time on, the history of the Khanate was written by the victors, by Qajar historians. The last Khan of Iravan started the so-called political reforms under control of Qajar state. In my opinion, continued the researcher, hedid not manage to accomplish anything of value, and only provoked Russia and the Armenian minority of Iravan. In his reign and in 1813 the entire Caucasus except Iravan andNakhchivan was annexed to Russia through the Gulistan treaty. Politicalmismanagement of Qajars led to huge territorial and other losses, and Iravan and Nakhchivan were entirely lost to Russia in 1827.
The last khan of Iravan in his reign was living in the Iravan Sardar palace,whose patron was the former khan “Mohammad khan Iravani”. Beside thepalace, Husseinqulu khan built a new mosque and named it the “Sardar mosque”.The contemporary German professor Markus Ritter, a specialist in the history of Islamic art, published a paper “thelost mosque in citadel of Yerevan” in 2009. He contacted me for some clarifications, added the scholar. Another German historian “Friedrich Sarre” had traveled to Iravanin 1897 and took some remaining tiles of this mosque to Berlin. Hedescribed in his book the very bad condition of the historical heritage of Khanate and those taken tiles are today displayed in the Berlin museum. Other European travelers who had visited Irevan at different times, described the Sardar’s Palace, its Mirror Hall, mosques, pools and baths in the castle and the city in their writings, as well as the underground marble stairedway passing down to the Zangi River.
There are eyewitness accounts of the marble Fountain once located in the middle of the hall of mirrors.As the result of the earthquake in 1853 the Iravan castle walls were damaged. Since 1868 Iravan City Police Office had been located in Khan Palace, Sardar Hall. The Caucasian viceroyalty allocated resources for there construction of Sardar hall (Mirror Hall) on the basis of petition of Iravan governor in 1867, 1871, 1874, 1880 years. From other recollections, we learn that an Armenian merchant by name of Nerse Tahiryan purchased a part of Iravan castle in 1865 and he built a winery (present cognac/brandy plant). Eventually Serdar Palace was completely demolished and the walls of the Iravan citadel were pulled down. The old districts are by also in ruins. In 1906-1911 years, B.Mehrabov, the engineer of Iravan city, mapped out the city plan and the existence of 8 mosques (Tepebashi, Zal khan, Sartib khan, Blue Mosque (Huseynali khan), Haji Novruzali bey, Gala mosque (Abbas Mirze mosque ), Demirbulag, Haji Jafar) were marked there. The Blue Mosque at Iravan was commissioned in 1765–1766 by Husseinali Khan, the Sardar of the IravanKhanate as the city’s main Friday mosque. It is today the only remaining monument from the Iravan Khanate. The reason why it survived is, the mosque was used as the city museum. There were a number of caravanserais in Iravan city as well: Afshar, Sardar, Sheykholislam, Taghli, Haji Ali, Komurchu, Gurju, Julfa, Haji Ilyas, etc. All these caravanserais had been obliterated. By the decision dated on May 29, 1918, Azerbaijan National Council (Milli Shura), as a result of a political compromise, ceded the city of Iravan to the Armenians as a capital city after three independent countries –Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia had been established in the Caucasus. The re-construction of the city Iravan after the first world war was started in 1924 but in fact, it was serving the agenda of erasing the historical heritage there. The Iravan City History Museum was located in Blue Mosque, Zal khan (the City) mosque turned to the art gallery, but all the other mosques except Demirbulag Mosque in the city had been razed to the ground. Demirbulag Mosque was set on fire in 1988.The history of the Iravan Khanate was written by the victors, first by Qajar conquerors and later by Russians, Armenians and finally by Pahlavis who removed Qajars from power. The Iravan Khanate was forgotten and its history was systematically erased.
Why was the history of the Iravan Khanate suppressed?
At the beginning of the Qajar dynasty there were only few trusted historians in Qajar court, explained Amir Ali SardariIravani . They described all events from the perspective of their master Agha Mohammad khan Qajar or Fathali shah Qajar. As said before, Iravan Khans tried to stabilize their country by switching from one neighboring supporter (Iran, Ottomans, Russia) to the other one based on their common interests. Agha Mohammad khan Qajar was actually an intelligent commander. He believed that all territories in Near and Middle East and Central Asia, even India, belong to Turkic tribes and must be ruled by them. I read a statement from him, added the scholar, that Turkic rulers of those countries should respect each other and should be peaceful to each other. But in case of Khanates he wanted to restore the Safavid territories under his flag. The Khanates could not trust him as a young newcomer.
So, despite of being from the same roots “Qajar”, the Iravan Khan refused to follow Agha Mohammad khan and Fathali Shah. It was the reason why the Qajar historians mentioned him as an unfaithful and incapable khan. After he was sent to exile and was replaced by loyal Husseinqulu Khan from Qazvin, the new Khan as a non-native governor needed a lot of publicity. He carried out some tax reforms. In the first Russian war Qajars lost a great part of Caucasus. Unfortunately Husseinqulu khan overestimated his military power. He provoked Russia and started the 2nd war, which ended in loss of Iravan. Qajar historians documented only one side of the story.
Fathali Shah Qajar and his successors respected Mahammad khan Iravani and his children. It was a respect combined with fear. The Iravani Khan was rich and influential. After death of Fathali Shah, the old Iravani Khan who was a middle ranked general made career again and got to the highest level in the army under Mohammad Shah Qajar. He married the daughter of Fathali Shah and his son married the sister of Mohammad Shah Qajar. Even the new chancellor of Iran „Mirza Aghasi“ was his old servant in Iravan. So it is obvious why the Qajar kings felt like being threatened by this family. Professor Abbas Amanat and some other historians mentioned the huge influence of Mohammad Hasan Khan Sardar Iravani (son of Mahammad khan Iravani) in Nasser-eddin Shah Qajar‘s era. The Pahlavis then systematically erased this history for political reasons.
The Implications for Further Research
This page of our history has been disregarded by censorship, continued the researcher. Through objective research the true history will be revealed. The history which goes beyond our current understanding of political borders remains in the archives for now. It will open us a horizon to find out the integrity of Christians and Muslims in a traditional society in 18th century, he underscored. It will teach us lessons about tolerance in a multi-cultural and multi-ethnic society and also how such civilized community could be abused for imperialistic purposes, posited the scholar.
Researchers in this area must understand several languages. The documents obtained from this period are partly in Persian, partly in Turkish, partly in Russian and partly in Armenian.
Several archives in Iravan, Nakhichevan, Russia, Iran, Georgia, Turkey and Azerbaijan contain many correspondents and documents from that time. Due to conflicts and political issues, such objective, comprehensive research does not currently seem to be possible unfortunately. I am pretty sure that such steps could uncover the mistreatments regarding the history of Iravan khanate.
According to Amir Ali SardariIravani, the most interested audience and supporters live in the Republic of Azerbaijan and Turkey. Most of them are refugees from Iravan or neighboring regions who have been displaced from their homeland. They try to keep their traditions and culture. Both governments support historical research, but extensive work requires an international network of researchers who can access archives anywhere without restrictions. Such a network could be orchestrated by a cultural organization in Europe, for example. Anur Ali SardariIravani proposed to start such an initiative in Germany but it’s on hold because of the COVID-19 pandemic.
This fascinating interview leaves the reader with at least as many questions as answers, to which the lodestar of research access has not yet waxed. But it also offers a treasure map with clues that can bring the scholars following the footsteps of Amir Ali SardariIravani, closer to unraveling the enigmas presented in this story, and to reaching the buried wealth of previously unknown history.
Azerbaijani- Turkish old-new agenda for Armenia
The armed forces of Turkey and Azerbaijan are set to conduct large-scale military exercises on Armenian border of Nakhijevan. As reported by the Turkish Defense Ministry, the military exercise will involve military personnel, armored vehicles, artillery, and mortars, as well as military aviation and air defense equipment. The exercises will be held from July 29th to August 10th, and will be hosted in various cities in Azerbaijan including-Baku, Ganja, Kurdamir, and Yevlakh.
Turkey and Azerbaijan have a tight military cooperation with one another, and often joint conduct military exercises. However, what is different with this particular exercise is that it was unplanned and follows a series of provocative border skirmishes Azerbaijan has had towards neighboring Armenia which have been escalating since mid-July. The choice of Nakhijevan to host these exercises is symbolic. Nakhijevan is an autonomous republic within Azerbaijan which was ceded to Soviet Azerbaijan according to a Soviet-Turkish Moscow Treaty from 1921. Nakhijevan is not connected by land to the rest of Azerbaijan, and has only a tiny border with Turkey.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Azerbaijan has been engaging in a systematic culture cleansing of the country’s historic Armenian heritage in Nakhijevan which is considered the worst cultural genocide of the 21st century.
To make matters worse, the border of Nakhijevan is only 40 km far from the Armenian capital Yerevan and is even less of a distance from Metsamor. Metsamor being a strategic city where Armenia’s only nuclear power plant is located. On July 17, Azerbaijani Defense Ministry spokesman Vagif Dargyakhly made a statement threatening that their weapons “are capable of hitting the Metsamor Atomic Energy Station with high accuracy, which will turn into a catastrophe for Armenia.”
Undoubtedly such a scenario will turn into nuclear catastrophe not only for Armenia but for the entire region including neighboring countries such as Georgia, Iran but ironically even Turkey and Azerbaijan themselves. Such statements were an open call to state terrorism and should be properly condemned by the international society.
Members of the European Parliament, 29 MEPs from 7 main political groups, sent a letter to the EU HR/VP of the European Commission, Josep Borrell. The MEPs called on the EU to use its leverage to put in place genuine and effective confidence-building measures mechanisms, and urge Azerbaijan to install the OSCE investigative mechanism for cease-fire violations.
“It is crucial that the EU uses its leverage to put in place genuine and effective confidence-building measures, notably the OSCE investigative mechanism for cease-fire violations which would prevent the sides from blaming each other for initiating deadly attacks. Armenia has agreed to discuss the details of the mechanism. Azerbaijan must do the same”, -mentioned in the letter.
Indeed, the investigative mechanism could be a solution. For over the past several decades each time hostilities erupt, each side ends up blaming one another for initiating hostilities. However, in the era of cutting-edge technology, it is now easier to reveal who is the culprit for initiating the violation of the ceasefire, and who is on the defense.
The main mediator of the conflict, the OSCE Minsk Group, has tried several times, calling on the Presidents of both Armenia and Azerbaijan to accept a mutually agreed upon OSCE mechanism to investigate ceasefire violations.
In a Press Statement by the Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group, they stated, “Without such a mechanism, the sides will continue to blame each other for initiating deadly attacks on the Line of Contact and Armenia-Azerbaijan border. Armenia has agreed to discuss the details of the mechanism, and we urged Azerbaijan to do the same.”
However, these calls from the OSCE Minsk Group continue to remain ignored from the Azerbaijani side which has refused all proposals for international mediators on producing confidence-building measures that are aimed at the consolidation of another ceasefire.
Armenia is also among 170 countries that endorsed UN ceasefire appeal during the COVID crisis. Azerbaijan refused to join this initiative. Moreover, right after these skirmishes began, protests erupted in Baku, where approximately 30.000 people came out into the streets demanding war with Armenia, and challenging the government to take a harder approach towards the conflict. From the other side, Turkey also fuels regional tensions to incite unrest.
Moreover, Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan made inflammatory comments threatening Armenia that it will finish the Armenian Genocide. He pledged arms and aid to Azerbaijan, sending a chilling warning to Armenia and the at-risk Armenian population still within the territory of present-day Turkey. And yet despite such comments, Turkey and Azerbaijan aspire to make Turkey one of the mediators of the conflict at the OSCE negotiations. Azerbaijan refuses the suggestions of the OSCE Minsk Group and has a destructive approach to undermine the efforts of international mediators. However, in the sake of global peace, and regional stability the international society should be supportive of the OSCE Minsk group as the only legal framework to resolve the conflict.
The conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan is over Nagorno Karabakh (Artsakh), a part of historical Armenia, and Armenian populated autonomous region (89% were Armenians during the Soviet time) which was forced to join the Azerbaijani Soviet Republic in 1920 by the will of Soviet leader Joseph Stalin. Since the Gorbachev reforms in 1988, the people of Artsakh raised their voices, using their constitutional rights, to secede from Azerbaijani SSR. As a result, Azerbaijani SSR imposed a war which ended in 1994 with the victory of the Armenian forces. Since 1992, Nagorno Karabakh has proclaimed its independence and is currently an unrecognized republic. The main mediator of the conflict is the OSCE Minsk group including co-chairs from France, Russia and the USA. The negotiations are still ongoing.
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