On the 12th of February2018, a Turkish coast guard patrol rammed into a Greek patrol boat near the Imia islands (Kardak in Turkish). The pair of uninhabited islands has been a source of dispute between Greece and Turkey since a military crisis in 1996, which almost resulted in war. The collision has been the climax of a number of Turkish violations on Greek territorial waters and airspace, which have damaged Greek-Turkish relations and escalated the tensions between the two countries. In this article I argue that Turkey’s geopolitical advantages over the US and the EU embolden it to pursue an ambitious foreign policy in the Aegean Sea, while its toxic domestic politics necessitates that it must do so. This combination creates a ticking time bomb for crisis in the Aegean Sea.It is time for the EU to act.
Turkey’s control of refugee flows has EU hands tied
The Syrian crisis has increased Turkish power over European nations that receive the greatest part of refugee flows. Currently, over 2.5 million Syrian refugees reside in Turkey. Turkish officials have threatened to force an influx of Syrian refugees into Europe, a situation that would destabilize already complex tensions within European states and further the far-right political crisis of Europe. The potentiality of this development provides Turkey with a favorable bargaining position over many Western European governments, which are interested in actively averting extremist actions against immigrant populations in order to prevent sectarian divide.
In addition, the waning desire of the Turkish administration to join the EU has removed any leverage the EU had over Turkey. In the past, Turkey has been willing to engage in bilateral talks with Greece over territorial disputes, mainly in an effort to withdraw Greece’s veto over its potential membership in the EU. However, Brexit and the emergence of anti-European movements in founding members like France and Italy, has caused Turkish officials to have second thoughts about the prospect of joining a union on the verge of collapse, according to reports. This development has reduced the bargaining advantage Greece previously enjoyed.
The US is unlikely to react in the event of a crisis
Since the time of the Cold War, American policymakers have viewed Turkey as a key ally against the Soviet Union and now Russia. The proximity of Turkey to Southern Russian cities favors the deployment of strategic nuclear weapons, while, most significantly, the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits create a double chokepoint that checks Russian maritime activity from the warm ports of the Black Sea. This means that in the case of conflict, if Turkey cooperates, Russia’s supply lines from the south could be shut down.
The location of Turkey, north of the Levant, gives Turkish leaders influence in Middle East matters as well and the ability to affect the political situation in both Syria and Iraq. The proximity of Turkey to the Syrian conflict allows it to intervene militarily as it did through Operation Olive Branch in Afrin in January. Turkey also holds a large portion of the Tigris and Euphrates river basins, which hydrate the majority of agricultural land in Syria and Iraq. In the past, Turkey has used its control over these river flows as a bargaining tool to curb Kurdish militant activity along its borders with the two countries.These geopolitical facts give Turkey a unique advantage in influencing politics in the Middle East, both directly through military operations and indirectly through river flows.
Turkey’s capacity to contain the Russian navy in a time of a crisis, its ability to directly get involved in the Syrian war, and its influence on the prosperity of Iraq, gives influence over key American strategic objectives: namely, keeping Russia under control, maintaining peace in the Middle East, and ensuring the stability of oil outflows. Despite the status of both Greece and Turkey as members of NATO, the US is unlikely to risk bringing Turkey and Russia closer diplomatically and tempting Turkey to intervene more often in the Middle East.
How are Turkish domestic politics exacerbating the conflict?
Turkey’s militarism is informed by the institutional friction between Turkish politicians and the Turkish army. Since the death of Ataturk, the Turkish army has assigned itself the role of the protector of Ataturk’s ideals. Frequent army intervention in Turkish politics through coups has made politicians apprehensive of the army and ready to externalize the army’s domestic pressure into international operations. After the coup attempt of 2016, President Erdogan has become increasingly determined to preoccupy the army with military operations and maintain stability domestically, as he concentrates power through institutional change and purges political and intellectual dissidents. Turkey’s leaders have also been empowered by public support. The Turkish public has a deep historical understanding of the Turkish identity, the memory of the Greek invasion of 1919, and the unfairness of the Treaty of Lausanne. President Erdogan’s popularity after the failed coup attempt of 2016 has enabled him to empower these conservative opinions and silence opposing Euro-friendly voices in Turkey.
Greek leadership has also done its part to worsen the tensions. The Greek Minister of Defense, Panos Kammenos, leader of the nationalist minority party in Greece’s coalition government, has been vocal on Greece’s expansion of territorial waters, mainly as a feat to maintain his party’s share of the vote. Historical tensions between the two countries, as well as President Erdogan’s public and institutional empowerment and Greece’s current diplomatically inept administration have fueled Turkish nationalist sentiment against Greece, counterbalancing against public support for European integration, and emboldening Turkey’s aggressions in the Aegean.
What are the objectives of Turkey?
Turkish perceptions and expectations of European and American passivity embolden Turkey to act in calculated aggression according to its favorable estimation of the balance of power. Turkey’s primary goals are to increase its claim on maritime territory that may contain potential oil reserves in the Aegean Sea and to hinder Greek efforts to expand territorial waters according to proposed international law . These objectives constitute a reversal of the Treaty of Lausanne, which gave Greece control of the entire Aegean archipelago, and essentially landlocked the Turkish western coast. In a highly complex domestic climate, if Turkish policymakers judge that tensions have risen enough to even minimally justify translation of rhetoric into action, then Turkey is likely to annex the Imia-Kardak islands in a symbolic statement of intent, or even to potentially claim control over Kastelorizo, which would extend Turkey’s continental shelf into the southeast Mediterranean Sea.
Why should the EU care? What can be done?
In an environment of European reluctance and American rejection of involvement, the clock is ticking before the Turkish administration could make bolder moves. The crucial coming election could be the catalyst in materializing Turkish threats over the annexation of disputed territory. In the ever-increasing tense domestic politics of Turkey, political rivals try to outdo each other on anti-Greek rhetoric, resulting in heightened public expectations of conflict. Under the current circumstances, if Turkey escalates the conflict, then the EU stands to lose in all possible scenarios. If the EU intervenes, then Turkey may retaliate with the release of Syrian refugees into the continent, which will increase the influence of the far-right and break the EU from within. If the EU fails to act, then trust in its institutional power will wane, discouraging potential members from joining and increasing the separatist sentiments inside member countries.
The Aegean Dispute sheds light into the most important institutional anomaly of the EU: the absence of political unification to support economic integration.The European experiment has been successful in integrating economic activity within the continent. However, it now teeters with an unstable equilibrium, between further integration and outright demise. The Aegean dispute offers both a challenge and an opportunity for Europe: EU policymakers must look into ways of integrating security strategy, through cooperation agreements, security guarantees and investment into border control, while also moving towards an integrated and centrally-organized immigration plan for Europe. Tighter border security in the Balkan Peninsula will stop Turkey’s use of refugee flows as a bargaining chip and also appease nationalist sentiment in European countries, while security agreements will halt Turkish aspirations in the Aegean Sea and improve public trust in the EU’s institutional power. If the EU wants to remain relevant far into the future across the greater European continent, then it must start behaving as boldly and strategically as Turkey has over the past several years. If it doesn’t it will simply be outmaneuvered and, potentially, replaced as a major political voice in the global community.
 Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg Der Ägäis-Konflikt: Die Abgrenzung des Festlandsockels zwischen Griechenland und der Türkei und das Problem der Inseln im Seevölkerrecht. (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1989)
The neoliberal project strikes back: Upcoming regime-change in post-pandemic Bulgaria?
In the last few years, Eastern European politics has hit the headlines around the world rather often. However, commentaries on the topic have been everything but flattering — and not without reason. Usually, journalists and politicians lament the ‘democratic backsliding’ affecting the region and the lack of Western-minded leaders. But the fluid political situation in Bulgaria seems to offer a first chance for neo-liberal elites to strike back. Will it really happen?
The laments of the (neo)liberal media — Introduction
Since the 2010s, several commentators in the US and Europe have suddenly become experts on Eastern Europe writing bitter pieces. Usually, the region hits the headlines only due to the surreptitious regime change still undergoing in Poland and Hungary. Namely, commentators posit the likes of Orban and Kaczyński as dictators forgetting that most voters supports them (Figure 1). Meanwhile, few remind that the European Union is also to blame for the region’s growing unacceptance of the ‘liberal’ values. For instance, the region’s underrepresentation in EU institutions does “severely undermine support for the EU‘s institutions, values and policies”. But most of these ‘experts’ prefer to focus on how “populist” leaderships are making Budapest and Warsaw “worse” than Brexit. Rarely do they emphasise the many “fragile spots that require further discussion on multiple levels” in Eastern Europe’s post-socialist democracies.
Actually, the simple truth is that these attacks stem from a clear ideological agenda — which some reproduce unwittingly. In the end, those who demonise Eastern European leaders for their “machoistic” attitude are simply sorrow losers. In fact, they echo local neoliberal elites’ lamentations for their inability to harness consensus (Chart 1).
Neoliberals’ comeback — Is Hungary an exception?
However, despite non-trivial differences amongst anti-government formations, a united ‘opposition’ bloc in taking shape in some illiberal Eastern European democracies. Interestingly, this strategy may yield the first concrete, positive results where illiberalism is at its apogee: Hungary. As to “put an end” to Orban’s rule, social-democrats, centrists and other neoliberals have agree to put their “differences aside”. So much so, that this rainbow coalition including six Hungarian parties is celebrating its primary at the time of writing. As of now, they are likely to select Budapest’s liberal-green mayor as their joint candidate to the prime ministership. Few people would make a starker contrast to the Orban and his strong appeal to rural constituencies. But Hungary is an almost unique case. Besides rigging the economic game in favour of its allies, Orban has rewritten the constitution making it much more ‘illiberal’.
Hence, the wind of history seems to be changing direction, at least in Hungary. But illiberal leaders in the rest of Eastern Europe have had a less spectacular and more recent success than Orban. Especially in those countries that are members of the EU such as Poland, Slovenia, Czechia, and Bulgaria. For instance, many criticise the Slovenian Prime Minister for having “repeatedly and publicly attacked the country’s” main public media outlets.” Whilst Poland’s Constitutional Tribunal face strenuous condemnations for considering EU law’ subordination to the constitution and its politicisation. Whereas, the exact same things have happened in Hungary without anyone complaining about it. Thus, expectations of a weaker and slower rejoinder are only natural.
The second piece of the puzzle: Bulgaria
Against this background, the transformations of the Bulgarian centre-right acquire a completely new meaning and a much more far-reaching significance. In fact, neo-liberal elites seem intent to exploit the pandemic-induced crisis to hold on power beyond Hungary as well. Apparently, the first stepping stone in this process of ‘reconquest’ of the region will be Bulgaria. After all, the protracted institutional crisis the country is facing grants immense potentiality for emerging new leaders advocating for radical changes. For a while now, neoliberal forces are on the verge of allying with left-leaning parties in the upcoming election. Perhaps, this almost-cohesive coalition will manage to form a stable government after three consecutive snap elections in early 2022.
Therefore, it is worth giving more attention to what exactly is happening in Bulgarian power politics. Namely, to identify which leaders are on the rise, what agenda do the advance and what their vested interests are.
The shrinking left opposition
Since the auto-golpe of the Communist Party in the 1990s, fair and competitive elections have taken place regularly in Bulgaria. At the first few democratic election of their life, voters lent the victory to the former-communist Bulgarian Social Party (BSP). Notably, unlike the German SPD and other Western-European socialists and social-democrats, the BSP’s agenda combines social conservatism and economic interventionism. Actually, since the devasting hyperinflation of winter 1996–1997, the BSP has managed to win only one lection, in 2005. Nevertheless, the party remains the main political force of the traditional left floating between 15% and 25% of the votes. Thus, the BSP and its leftmost fractions have represented the only real opposition to Prime Minister Boyko Borisov since 2009.
Or they did until April 2021, when the party ranked third in the general elections for the second time ever. Then, the party barely avoided slipping to the fourth place at the snap elections in July 2021, a colossal debacle. However, the BSP’s lost votes have not migrated compactly to another leftist party. In fact, the only likeminded list on the left, ISNI, gathered just around 5% of all votes in July. Hence, the Bulgarian left of the centre has shrunk to no more than 18% of the electorate. In order to find out where did these votes go one needs to look what is happening on the right. In fact, the socially and economically liberal right of the centre seems to have been thriving during the pandemic.
The centre-right between feckless populism …
The Bulgarian centre-right has been quite effervescent ever since the end of real socialism. Not least because the anti-systemic bloc exploded in a myriad of smaller fraction earlier than elsewhere in Eastern Europe. To be exact, the anti-communist coalition called Union of Democratic Forces (UDF) lost its hegemony as early as 2001. Subsequently, the UDF won slightly less than 9% of the vote in 2005 before disappearing from the electoral maps. In less than a decade, the Bulgarian centre of the right moved beyond the UDF and its irrelevant successor parties. So Boyko Borisov, the populist mayor of Sofia, took the helm of this political segment with his personal party, GERB. From 2009 and until 2021, the party has won commanding majorities of the popular vote (Figure 3). Thus, GERB has long dominated the Bulgarian centre-right as a whole forcing smaller parties to accept its overreaching patronage.
This equilibrium tuned unstable in 2020, when Democratic Bulgaria (DB), a coalition of neoliberal parties, gained massive prominence. Thank to a mostly favourable coverage on many opposition media, DB rallied many of those Borisov’s long tenure had disillusioned. Namely, at the latest election it gathered about 12% of the preferences, ranking close fourth behind the BSP. Clearly, in doing so DB became GERB’s number one adversary ‘officially’. But last month, DB has proved its decisivenss for the formation of any government; making it a kingmaker of sorts.
… and neoliberal elitism
But the story does not end of the story for Bulgaria’s neoliberal elites. In fact, this camp has a new rising leader: Kiril Petkov, former caretaker finance minister between May and August 2021. Actually, Petkov was a complete novice in politicking before his presidential appointment to a cabinet-ranking post a few months ago. However, he has learnt rather quickly how to hide his secrets behind a thick smoke courtain or counter-allegations and dissimulation. Most recently, he has proved these new skills during the ‘affaire’ concerning his alleged – then ascertained – double citizenship. In fact, Bulgarian ministers cannot hold any other citizenship by law; but Petkov was a Canadian national until April 21. Still, he did not disclose the renounciation to his Canadian citizenship until some parlamentarians raised the issue publicly. Eventually, Pertkov managed to get out of the woods by steering the attention on a different topic: his new party.
In fact, Perkov and fellow caretaker economy minister Asen Vasilev, announced the plarform ‘Let’s Continue the Change’ (Prodolzhavame promyanata, PP). By now, there can be little doubt that PP is a neoliberal party addressing mostly well-educated workers and liberal-minded youngsters. First of all, Petkov distanced himself and his project from the popular, but quite conservative President Rumen Radev immediately. Second, Bulgaria was amongst the signatories of the OECD’s proposal to raise the minimum corporate-tax rate to 12.5%. Yet, PP will not support any tax increase despite the fact that Bulgaria adopting a 10% flat-rate corporate tax. Moreover, the focus of PP’s programme is on the businesses environment and foreign investments rather than redistribution and social rights. Coherently, the first formations to support Petkov and Vasilev’s project are ‘Volt’ and ‘Middle European Class’ — both pro-EU and neoliberal.
Neoliberals raising their heads in Eastern Europe — Conclusion
All things considered Petkov and Vasilev launched PP officially just in time to participate in the next elections in November. And PP may win at least 9% of the votes, even though the list of candidates is not available yet. Together with DB’s expected 15–16%, PP may tip the parliamentarian balance in favour of the neoliberal right. Meanwhile, both the traditional and the populist left are likely to buckle visibly. Even if the BSP manages not to slip below DB, ISNI is still lingering over the 4% electoral threshold. Thus, economically progressive forces could hold no more than 48 – and probably 40 – on the 240 available seats. Meanwhile, the neoliberal centre-right could gather as many as 60 seats and no less than 50, making it decisive for any realistic majority.
In conclusion. Boyko Borisov could become the first illiberal, but democratically elected, Prime Minister of an EU country to be ousted by such an electoral bloc the EU- and US-financed opposition defeated Vladimir Mečiar in the 1999 Slovak presidential election. Eventually, Bulgarian illiberalism could be the first victim of neoliberalism’s revanche in post-pandemic Eastern Europe.
Europe tells Biden “no way” to Cold War with China
Amidst the first big transatlantic tensions for the Biden Administration, a new poll shows that the majority of Europeans see a new Cold War happening between the United States and China, but they don’t see themselves as a part of it.
Overwhelmingly, 62% of Europeans believe that the US is engaged in a new Cold War against China, a new poll just released by the European Council on Foreign Relations found. Just yesterday US President Joe Biden claimed before the UN General Assembly that there is no such thing and the US is not engaging in a new Cold War. So, Europeans see Biden’s bluff and call him on it.
The study was released on Wednesday by Mark Leonard and Ivan Krastev at the European Council on Foreign Relations and found that Europeans don’t see themselves as direct participants in the US-China Cold War. This viewpoint is most pronounced in Bulgaria, Hungary, Austria, Portugal and Italy, according to the study. The prevailing view, in each of the 12 surveyed EU member states, is one of irrelevance – with respondents in Hungary (91%), Bulgaria (80%), Portugal (79%), and Austria (78%) saying that their country is not in a conflict with Beijing.
Only 15% of Europeans believe that the EU is engaged in a Cold War against China. The percentage is so low that one wonders if there should even be such a question. It is not only not a priority, it is not even a question on the agenda for Europeans. Even at the highest point of EU “hawkishness”, only 33% of Swedes hold the view that their country is currently in a Cold War with China. Leonard and Krastev warn that if Washington and Brussels are preparing for an all-in generational struggle against China, this runs against the grain of opinion in Europe, and leaders in Washington and Brussels will quickly discover that they “do not have a societal consensus behind them”.
“The European public thinks there is a new cold war – but they don’t want to have anything to do with it. Our polling reveals that a “cold war” framing risks alienating European voters”, Mark Leonard said.
The EU doesn’t have the backing of its citizens to follow the US in its new Cold War pursuit. But unlike the views of the authors of the study, my view is that this is not a transatlantic rift that we actually have to be trying to fix. Biden’s China policy won’t be Europe’s China policy, and that’s that, despite US efforts to persuade Europe to follow, as I’ve argued months ago for the Brussels Report and in Modern Diplomacy.
In March this year, Gallup released a poll that showed that 45% of Americans see China as the greatest US enemy. The poll did not frame the question as Cold War but it can be argued that Joe Biden has some mandate derived from the opinion of American people. That is not the case for Europe at all, to the extent that most of us don’t see “China as an enemy” even as a relevant question.
The US’s China pursuit is already giving horrible for the US results in Europe, as French President Macron withdrew the French Ambassador to the US. The US made a deal already in June, as a part of the trilateral partnership with the UK and Australia, and stabbed France in the back months ago to Macron’s last-minute surprise last week. Max Boot at the Council on Foreign Relations argues that it is Macron that is actually arrogant to expect that commitments and deals should mean something: “Back in February, Macron rejected the idea of a U.S.-E.U. common front against China. Now he complains when America pursues its own strategy against China. What’s French for chutzpah?” What Boot does get right is that indeed, there won’t be a joint US-EU front on China, and European citizens also don’t want this, as the recent poll has made clear.
The US saying Europe should follow the US into a Cold War with China over human rights is the same thing as China saying that Europe should start a Cold War with the US over the bad US human rights record. It’s not going to happen. You have to understand that this is how ridiculous the proposition sounds to us, Europeans. Leonard and Krastev urge the EU leadership to “make the case for more assertive policies” towards China around European and national interests rather than a Cold War logic, so that they can sell a strong, united, and compelling case for the future of the Atlantic alliance to European citizens.
I am not sure that I agree, as “more assertive policies” and “cold war” is probably the same thing in the mind of most Europeans and I don’t think that the nuance helps here or matters at all. Leaders like Biden argue anyway that the US is not really pursuing a Cold War. The authors caution EU leaders against adopting a “cold war” framing. You say “framing”, I say “spin”. Should we be in engaging in spins at all to sell unnecessary conflict to EU citizens only to please the US?
“Unlike during the first cold war, [Europeans] do not see an immediate, existential threat”, Leonard clarified. European politicians can no longer rely on tensions with China to convince the electorate of the value of transatlantic relations. “Instead, they need to make the case from European interests, showing how a rebalanced alliance can empower and restore sovereignty to European citizens in a dangerous world”, Mark Leonard added. The study shows that there is a growing “disconnect” between the policy ambitions of those in Brussels and how Europeans think. EU citizens should stick to their sentiments and not be convinced to look for conflict where it doesn’t exist, or change what they see and hear with their own eyes and ears in favor of elusive things like the transatlantic partnership, which the US itself doesn’t believe in anyways. And the last thing that should be done is to scare Europeans by convincing them they live in a “dangerous world” and China is the biggest threat or concern.
What the study makes clear is that a Cold War framing against China is likely to repel more EU voters than it attracts, and if there is one thing that politicians know it is that you have to listen to the polls in what your people are telling you instead of engaging in spins. Those that don’t listen in advance get the signs eventually. At the end of the day it’s not important what Biden wants.
Germany and its Neo-imperial quest
In January 2021, eight months ago, when rumours about the possibility of appointment of Christian Schmidt as the High Representative in Bosnia occurred for the first time, I published the text under the title ‘Has Germany Lost Its NATO Compass?’. In this text I announced that Schmidt was appointed to help Dragan Čović, the leader of the Croatian HDZ party, to disrupt the constitutional structure of Bosnia-Herzegovina and create precoditions for secession of the Serb- and Croatian-held territories in Bosnia and the country’s final dissolution. I can hardly add anything new to it, except for the fact that Schmidt’s recent statements at the conference of Deutsche Atlantische Gesellschaft have fully confirmed my claims that his role in Bosnia is to act as Čović’s ally in the latter’s attempts to carve up the Bosnian Constitution.
Schmidt is a person with a heavy burden, the burden of a man who has continuously been promoting Croatian interests, for which the Croatian state decorated him with the medal of “Ante Starčević”, which, in his own words, he “proudly wears” and shares with several Croatian convicted war criminals who participated in the 1992-1995 aggression on Bosnia, whom Schmidt obviously perceives as his ideological brethren. The question is, then, why Germany appointed him as the High Representative in Bosnia?
Germany’s policy towards Bosnia, exercised mostly through the institutions of the European Union, has continuously been based on the concept of Bosnia’s ethnic partition. The phrases that we can occassionaly hear from the EU, on inviolability of state boundaries in the Balkans, is just a rhetoric adapted to the demands by the United States to keep these boundaries intact. So far, these boundaries have remained intact mainly due to the US efforts to preserve them. However, from the notorious Lisbon Conference in February 1992 to the present day, the European Union has always officially stood behind the idea that Bosnia-Herzegovina should be partitioned along ethnic lines. At the Lisbon Conference, Lord Carrington and Jose Cutileiro, the official representatives of the then European Community, which has in the meantime been rebranded as the European Union, drew the maps with lines of ethnic partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina, along which the ethnic cleansing was committed, with 100.000 killed and 1,000.000 expelled, so as to make its territory compatible with their maps. Neither Germany nor the European Union have ever distanced themselves from the idea they promoted and imposed at the Lisbon Conference as ‘the only possible solution’ for Bosnia, despite the grave consequences that followed. Nor has this idea ever stopped being a must within their foreign policy circles, as it has recently been demonstrated by the so-called Janša Non-Paper, launched a couple of months ago, which also advocates the final partition and dissolution of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Such a plan is probably a product of the powerful right-wing circles in the European institutions, such as Schmidt’s CSU, rather than a homework of Janez Janša, the current Prime Minister of Slovenia, whose party is a part of these circles, albeit a minor one. To be sure, Germany is not the original author of the idea of Bosnia’s partition, this author is Great Britain, which launched it directly through Lord Carrington at the Lisbon Conference. Yet, Germany has never shown a will to distance itself from this idea, nor has it done the European Union. Moreover, the appointment of Schmidt, as a member of those political circles which promote ethnic partition as the only solution for multiethnic countries, testifies to the fact that Germany has decided to fully apply this idea and act as its chief promoter.
In this process, the neighbouring countries, Serbia and Croatia, with their extreme nationalist policies, can only act as the EU’s proxies, in charge for the physical implemenation of Bosnia’s pre-meditated disappearance. All the crimes that Serbia and Croatia committed on the Bosnian soil – from the military aggression, over war crimes, ethnic cleansing and genocide, up to the 30 year-long efforts to undermine Bosnia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity – have always had a direct approval and absolute support of the leading EU countries. During the war and in its aftermath, Great Britain and France were the leaders of the initiatives to impose ethnic partition on the citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and now Germany has taken up their role. In such a context, the increasing aggressiveness of Serbia and Croatia can only be interpreted as a consequence of the EU’s intention to finish with Bosnia for good, and Schmidt has arrived to Bosnia to facilitate that process. Therefore, it is high time for the citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina to abandon any ilussions about the true intentions of the European Union and reject its Trojan Horse in the form of the current High Representative.
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