Connect with us

International Law

Liberum Veto and the Monkey and the Pea

Dr. Andrey KORTUNOV

Published

on

To paraphrase the beginning of Tolstoy’s Anna Karenina: all effective structures are alike; each ineffective structure is ineffective in its own way. The problems with the effectiveness of the UN Security Council are in many ways unique, as unique as the body itself. In recent years, only the laziest have failed to reproach the Security Council for dragging its feet, acting irresponsibly, getting bogged down in political infighting and pointless rhetoric, and being unwilling or unable to agree on the most pressing crisis situations, from Syria and Ukraine to Palestine and Myanmar.

For all its diversity, criticism of the Security Council has two main points. The first point is related to the composition of the Council itself, and the second is connected to the procedures of its operation. The current choices for the Security Council’s permanent members, or Big Five, are questionable to say the least. China is represented, but India is absent. France and the United Kingdom are present, but Germany or the European Union as a whole are not. Neither Africa nor the Middle East nor Latin America are represented. As for procedures, the primary bone of contention is the veto enjoyed by the five permanent members, which allows any of the Big Five to block any and all decisions that fail to please them.

It is clear that the first of the two problems looks more interesting, though the second one is of more importance. The prospect of expanding the Security Council promises a great deal of diplomatic scheming, behind-the-scenes negotiations and cunning subterfuge. However, as long as the right of veto remains, and as long as the obvious differences in the viewpoints of the permanent members regarding fundamental international problems persist, extending membership of the Security Council – regardless of which countries are let in – will make very little difference. On the contrary, “democratization” under the same old procedures will only serve to further complicate the possibility of ever reaching any agreement.

It is worth remembering that the constant abuse of a similar, albeit much more democratic principle of liberum veto (free veto) in the Sejm of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth eventually led to the irreversible decline and subsequent partition of one of the most powerful states in medieval Europe. Unfortunately, in recent years, the right of veto has been used more and more actively by some members of the Security Council. And it is Moscow that has set the tone. In the past two years alone, the Russian Federation has used its veto power nine times in connection with the Security Council’s examining the situation in the Middle East.

The struggle against the veto power of the permanent members of the Security Council has been going on for a very long time, without much chance of success. More than anything, it is a question of status, especially for those members whose position in world politics and whose economies are on the decline. To deprive them of their special status would be to inflict a crushing blow to national pride, to reduce them to the level of “ordinary” countries, and to forget their role in the creation of the United Nations. To be fair, let us recall that the permanent members of the Security Council are still the UN’s primary donors, accounting for more than 42 per cent of the organization’s total budget.

Besides status, however, the right of veto is also a question of practical national interests. For all their differences, each of the members of the Big Five values their sovereignty and would not like anyone, including the United Nations, to interfere in it. The Big Three of Russia, China and the United States are particularly critical of this issue. And the veto provides almost absolute guarantee of sovereignty to the select few.

So what should be done? Actually, the international community has little choice. You can do things the nice way, or you can do things the hard way. Doing things the hard way would mean commencing the procedure for a radical revision of the UN Charter so that a significant part of the Security Council’s authority would be transferred to the General Assembly. At the same time, you could get rid of the veto. In theory, such a procedure is provided for by the Charter itself: Article 109 allows for a United Nations General Conference to be held for this purpose with the support of two thirds of the members of the General Assembly and any nine members of the Security Council.

This is a rare case when the veto right of the permanent members of the Security Council is not valid. This procedure for the revision of the UN Charter has thus far never been implemented. And this is no coincidence, as it contains serious risks for the United Nations as a whole. Everyone understands that while it might be possible to take apart the complicated machine that is the UN, putting it back together again would be another thing entirely.

Doing things the nice way would mean convincing the permanent members of the Security Council of the need to take “voluntary” restrictions upon themselves in the use of the veto. There has been an active Code of Conduct campaign behind the scenes at the General Assembly for several years now that is designed to exert moral pressure on the permanent members of the UN Security Council to at least not to block those resolutions related to crimes against humanity and genocide. Strangely enough, the campaign was initiated by France, which is itself a permanent member of the Security Council. Presently, more than half of the UN’s members have joined the campaign. However, Russia, the United States and China, in a rare display of solidarity, refuse even to discuss such a possibility. The logic of the Big Three is understandable: start with voluntary restrictions and you can end up with an actual withdrawal of the veto power as a whole.

A multitude of other options exist to reduce the dependence of the practical work of the UN on the veto power of the permanent members of the Security Council. Some suggest extending the powers of the UN Secretary General. Others talk of resurrecting the now dormant Military Staff Committee. And still others believe that the solution to the problem lies in the transition to “subsidiary” peace-making by having the United Nations transfer a number of important functions in this area to “authorized” regional organizations. In any case, in order for these or other similar proposals to be implemented, a consensus is needed among the Big Five, something that is sorely lacking at present.

However, try as you might, the end will always come. The current situation in the UN Security Council should not be considered normal. It is difficult to believe that this abnormal situation can last indefinitely. In failing to resolve critical regional and global crises, the Security Council suffers serious damage to its reputation, damage that extends to the United Nations as a whole. This is not even the point; more importantly, the chronic paralysis of the Security Council reinforces and justifies the temptation to bypass the UN Security Council and sometimes circumvent the modern system of international law in general. For now, actions bypassing the Security Council are still perceived as the exception, but they could soon become the rule. For now, they are frowned upon, but soon they could become the norm.

Historical – and even everyday – experience suggests that those not willing to sacrifice a part risk losing the whole. Unfortunately, the United Nations is not at all immune to the fate of its predecessor, the League of Nations, which left the political scene quietly in the late 1930s, at the precise moment that international efforts to prevent a new world war were needed most.

To return once again to Leo Tolstoy, this time to one of his children’s fables: “A monkey was carrying two handfuls of peas. One little pea fell out. He tried to pick it up and spilled twenty. He tried to pick up the twenty and spilled them all. Then he lost his temper, scattered the peas in all directions and ran away.” The permanent members of the UN Security Council are still in the second stage – twenty peas have already been spilled. Will it reach the third stage?

First published in our partner RIAC

Continue Reading
Comments

International Law

Why legal principles on war and environment matter

MD Staff

Published

on

Oh, the army tried some fancy stuff to bring them to their knees.
Like Agent Orange defoliants, to kill the brush and trees.
We’d hike all day on jungle trails through clouds of poison spray.
And they never told me then, that it would hurt my health today.
(Agent Orange Song—Country Joe McDonald)

Many of us remember shocking images of environmental destruction from conflicts across the globe; from the spraying of the poisonous chemical Agent Orange over the forests in Viet Nam in the 1970s, to the burning oil wells in Kuwait in the 1990s.

Sadly, Viet Nam and Kuwait were not isolated cases. Armed conflicts around the world, and their aftermath, continue to impact the health and well-being of people and the environment through pollution, infrastructure damage and the collapse of governance. The use of chemical weapons in the Syrian conflict as well as the burning of oil fields by the Dae’sh terrorist group are poignant recent examples.

Since 1999, the United Nations Environment Programme has conducted over twenty post-conflict assessments, using state-of-the-art science to determine the environmental impacts of war. From Afghanistan to Kosovo to the Gaza Strip and Sudan—armed conflict causes significant harm to the environment and the communities that depend on natural resources.

In 2009, UN Environment and the Environmental Law Institute co-authored a seminal report, Protecting the Environment During Armed Conflict : An Inventory and Analysis of International Law, which identified gaps and weaknesses in international laws that protect the environment during war and armed conflict.  

Among the report’s recommendations was for the United Nations International Law Commission to “examine the existing international law for protecting the environment during armed conflict and recommend how it can be clarified, codified and expanded”.

Partly as a result of UN Environment’s request to address the topic, the Commission decided to include the protection of the environment in relation to armed conflicts in its programme of work and appointed Marie G. Jacobsson as its Special Rapporteur in 2013. In 2017, following three reports by Jacobsson on the protection of the environment before, during and after armed conflicts, Marja Lehto was appointed as Special Rapporteur for environmental protection.

“One of the defining features of the International Law Commission’s work on protection of the environment in relation to armed conflicts is that the topic is not limited to situations of armed conflict but covers the whole conflict cycle, clarifying the international law applicable to the protection of the environment before, during and after armed conflicts. This broad frame has allowed the Commission to take a fresh look at the different environmental concerns and challenges that arise in relation to armed conflicts addressing, for instance, sharing and granting access to environmental information and environmental effects of human displacement. The Commission’s work has greatly benefitted from the increased understanding of the environmental impact of armed conflicts, based, inter alia, on the post-conflict environmental assessments conducted since the 1990s by the UN Environment Programme, the World Bank and others,” says Special Rapporteur Marja Lehto.

UN Environment, the Environmental Law Institute and others have supported the Commission throughout its work, and particularly the Special Rapporteurs, by providing publications, legal analyses, and case studies. They also organized a series of workshops and reached out to colleagues in governments, academia, civil society, and other international organizations to expand the information and analysis available to the Special Rapporteur. 

A resolution on the protection of the environment in areas affected by armed conflicts agreed by consensus by all Member States at the United Nations Environment Assembly (UNEA-2) in May 2016 encouraged UN Environment to continue supporting the work of the International Law Commission on the protection of the environment in relation to armed conflicts, and was an important signal of the commitment of Member States to tackle the issue.

Then Special Rapporteur Marie Jacobsson noted that this resolution was not only “a positive signal in itself, but it will also establish synergies for the future between the ongoing work of UN Environment, the International Law Commission, as well as the important work undertaken by the International Committee of the Red Cross on this topic”.

On 8 July 2019 the International Law Commission adopted 28 draft legal principles on first reading to enhance protection of the environment before, during and after armed conflicts.

“The draft principles are the biggest step forward in legal protection for the environment in conflicts since the 1970s and are long overdue. But they will only be effective in reducing harm to people and ecosystems if they are properly implemented. Governments, international organizations, experts and civil society will all have a role to play in making that happen,” says Doug Weir, Director at the Conflict and Environment Observatory.

The principles touch on various aspect of the conflict lifecycle and, among other things, address the designation of significant environmental and cultural areas as protected zones, the protection of the environment of indigenous people and prevention and mitigation of environmental degradation in areas where persons displaced by armed conflict are located.

“The principles cover both damage to the environment and natural resources. This is important, as initial discussions and framing focused largely on environmental damage and did not adequately address natural resources misuse, including the use of conflict resources to finance armed conflict, which tends to be more widespread. Another important aspect of the principles is that they address both international and non-international conflicts,” says Carl Bruch, Director, International Programs, Environmental Law Institute.

While the principles provide a critical overarching framework and represent a major milestone in ensuring environmental protection in relation to armed conflicts, they constitute the first step. There is still work to be done, for example to address the targeting of water infrastructure such as waterpipes and hydroelectric dams or to integrate environmental considerations in military manuals—a critical means for states to operationalize their obligations. The International Committee of the Red Cross and Red Crescent guidelines for military manuals and instructions on the protection of the environment in times of armed conflict, which are currently being revised, offer an important complementary vehicle in the process to support military manuals.

“Protecting the environment before, during and after armed conflict must rise to the same level of political importance as protecting human rights. A healthy environment is the foundation upon which ​peace and many human rights are realized,” says David Jensen, UN Environment’s Head of Environmental Cooperation for Peacebuilding.

The challenge ahead is ensuring that the principles are implemented and operationalized. This will require substantial work and partnerships among all stakeholders, including through incorporating the draft principles into military training manuals and supporting outreach to international and domestic courts to support enforcement efforts.

UN Environment

Continue Reading

International Law

Geneva Conventions mark 70 years of ‘limiting brutality’ during war

Newsroom

Published

on

Seventeen UN Member States met in November 1947 to sign protocols to amend the Geneva Conventions of 1921, 1923, and 1933. UN Photo

In commemorating the 70th anniversary of the landmark Geneva Conventions, the president of the United Nations Security Council hailed the “significant body of law”, describing it as playing “a vital role in limiting brutality of armed conflicts”.

In the aftermath of the Second World War, the treaty, comprised of four Conventions and three Additional Protocols, established the modern, international legal standards for humanitarian treatment during times of war. They were agreed on 12 August 1949, and with some exceptions, ratified by 196 countries around the world.

“As they are ratified and acceded by almost every State of the world, the principles and legal norms enshrined in these Conventions are also recognized as customary international humanitarian law [IHL] and are universally applicable”, said Poland’s Foreign Minister Jacek Czaputowicz, speaking for his nation which holds the Presidency of the Council for August. “This is a rare quality for any multilateral treaty”.

Among other things, the Conventions established protections for vulnerable groups in armed conflict, namely the wounded and sick; prisoners of war; and civilians, including civilians living under occupation. 

Because Poland has been “painfully affected by consequences of other States’ failures to comply with international agreements” and in conjunction with its “sense of responsibility” to maintain international peace and security, Mr. Czaputowicz said that strengthening international law has always been important to his country.

“The greatest challenge to protecting human life in modem conflict is observance of and respect for the existing rules by the armed forces and non-State armed groups”, he asserted. “If existing rules were followed, much of the human suffering in contemporary armed conflicts would not occur”.

Poland’s top diplomat also pointed to new threats that demand practices and policy consistent with international humanitarian law.

“Artificial intelligence and autonomous weapon systems, such as military robots and cyber-weapons, reduce the role and control of human factors during wartime”, he continued. Moreover, the general rules of IHL prohibiting indiscriminate and inhumane weapons, “are being violated”.

Two IHL principles under the Geneva Conventions that deserve particular attention, according to Mr. Czaputowicz, are “the obligation to protect civilians, prisoners of war, the wounded and shipwrecked” as well as “limitations to the rights of parties to an armed conflict on how they conduct operations and on their choice of weapons”.

The increasing role of non-State actors and IHL legal loopholes are “the new reality of modem conflict”, he spelled out, bemoaning that they hinder international humanitarian law “in many ways”.

“International humanitarian principles are under pressure” and “the complexity of new challenges impedes the process of classification of conflict situations and makes it difficult to determine the exact rules that may be applied”, he elaborated.

‘Historic moment for humanity’

According to UN Legal Counsel Miguel de Serpa Soares, the four Conventions are “at the core” of IHL.

Noting that the first three conventions “were by no means completely novel at the time”, he singled out the Fourth Convention as being “the first treaty that was specifically dedicated to the protection of civilian persons in time of war”.

Mr. Soares also drew attention to Article 3, the provision on basic rules governing the humane treatment of people not involved in hostilities, including soldiers who have laid down their arms, those wounded or in detention, as well as civilians.

Calling the inclusion of Article 3 “a historic moment for humanity”, he said it was the first instance in which non-international armed conflicts were regulated by a multilateral treaty. The significance is augmented by the fact that the Geneva Conventions are now universally adhered to.

Conventions show ‘what is possible’

For his part, Peter Maurer, President of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), maintained that the Geneva Conventions represent “one of the greatest achievements of inter-State cooperation” and “symbolize our enduring and common humanity”.

“The Conventions show us what is possible when States take collective and individual action to uphold the law and humanitarian principles”, he said.

Noting that “every single day” international humanitarian law is at work saving lives and protecting women, men and children in conflicts, he highlighted that while “we rightly hear about the violations because the consequences are tragic and visible”, we must also “recognize the protective power and positive impacts when IHL is respected”.

The ICRC chief painted a picture of IHL in action, when the wounded and sick are evacuated to safety; the detained are treated with dignity; the fate of missing people is clarified; and humanitarian assistance is delivered across lines.

“The impacts of IHL are also shown through acts of restraint, when horrors are not inflicted – civilian areas are spared from direct shelling, medical workers are able to freely operate without threat or targeting”, he added.

Continued violations do not mean the law is inadequate, but rather that efforts to ensure respect are inadequate, he flagged, urging “we can – and must – do more”.

The world must not forget that “the Geneva Conventions represent a line of our common humanity, and they shield us from our own barbarity”, underscored Mr. Maurer.

Continue Reading

International Law

Kerfuffle about Kashmir’s `special status’

Amjed Jaaved

Published

on

It is eerie that Pakistan’s foreign office, media and politicians have shallow understanding of the Kashmir dispute. Let us not forget dimensions to the Kashmir dispute. Pakistan is committed to United Resolutions. These resolutions do not recognise `accession’ of disputed Kashmir under a resolution of the puppet Constituent Kashmir assembly or under Maharajah’s `instrument of accession’.

India never presented the accession `resolution’ or the `maharajah’s instrument’ before the UN. Yet, it claimed that the occupied Kashmir’s constituent assembly had voted for accession to India. As such, it is no longer necessary for her to let the promised plebiscite be held in Kashmir. Now, it has abrogated `special status’, hitherto quid pro quo.  Has disputed Kashmir reverted to 1947 status in India’s own parlance?

In parliament, Amit Shah banked on the `instrument’ which is void.  The Independence Act required intention of accession to be absolute and crystal-clear. But, a stray glance at the ‘Instrument’ would make it clear that it is equivocal. The ‘Instrument’ expresses ‘intention to set up an interim government and to ask Sheikh Abdullah to carry the responsibilities’ with maharajah’s prime minister. The last sentence in the ‘Instrument’ is ‘In haste and with kind regards’. Handwritten corrections on the text of the ‘Instrument’ speak volubly about the wavering state of the maharajah’s mind. Any `instrument’, extracted under coercion and duress, is invalid under law.

Subsequent accession resolution, passed by the occupied Kashmir’s ‘constituent assembly’, also, is void. This resolution violates the Security Council’s resolutions forbidding India from going ahead with the accession farce. Aware of India’s intention to get the ‘Instrument of Accession’ rubber-stamped by the puppet assembly, the Security Council passed two resolutions to forestall the `foreseeable accession’ by the puppet assembly. Security Council’s Resolution No 9 of March 30, 1951 and confirmatory Resolution No 122 of March 24, 1957 outlaws accession or any other action to change status of the Jammu and Kashmir state.

`Accession instrument’ is a myth, unregistered with the UN. Alastair Lamb, in his book Incomplete Partition (Chapter VI: The accession Crisis, pp.149-151) points out that Mountbatten wanted India not to intervene militarily without first getting `instrument of accession’ from maharajah Hari Singh.  Not doing so would amount to `intervening in the internal affairs of what was to all intents and purposes an independent State in the throes of civil conflict’.  But, India did not heed his advice. It marched its troops into Kashmir without maharajah’s permission _ an act of aggression. Lamb says `timing of the alleged Instrument of Accession undoubtedly affected its legitimacy'(p.172, ibid). He adds `If in fact took place after the Indian intervention, then it could well be argued that it was either done under Indian duress or to regularise an Indian fait accompli’.

Lamb concludes (p. 191, ibid):`According to Wolpert, V. P. Menon returned to Delhi from Srinagar on the morning of 26 October with no signed Instrument of Accession.  Only after the Indian troops had started landing at Srinagar airfield on the morning of 27 October did V. P.   Menon and M. C. Mahajan set out from Delhi from Jammu. The Instrument of Accession, according to Wolpert, was only signed by Maharajah Sir Hari Singh after Indian troops had assumed control of the Jammu and Kashmir State’s summer capital, Srinagar.

Lamb also regards the Instrument of Accession, ‘signed’ by the maharajah of Kashmir on October 26, 1947, as fraudulent (Kashmir – A disputed legacy 1846-1990). He argues that the maharajah was travelling by road to Jammu (a distance of over 350 km). How could he sign the instrument while being on the run for safety of his life? There is no evidence of any contact between him and the Indian emissaries on October 26, 1947.

It is eerie to note that India has never shown the original Instrument’ in any international forum. India took the Kashmir issue to the UN in 1948 under article 35 of Chapter VI which outlines the means for a peaceful settlement of disputes.

Pakistan’s foreign office faux pas

Pakistan should not accept `special status’ as a fait accompli. Instead, it should focus on human-rights violations, and right of self-determination under UN conventions. While agitating these issues, Pakistan should avoid the legal wizard, a self-styled `international-law expert’, founder of a research society of international law, who selected Reqo Diq-fiasco incompetent legal team.

In his weekly press briefing, Pakistan foreign-office director general (South Asia and SAARC) Dr. Mohammad Faisal said (April 6, 2019), “Pakistan will never accept the repeal of Article 370 of the Indian Constitution… Besides violating the rights of Kashmiris, it will also contravene relevant UNSC (UN Security Council) Resolutions”. He added that Article 370 was incorporated in India’s Constitution in October 1949. And, it exempts Jammu and Kashmir from the country’s Constitution while allowing the state to draft its own [constitution]. Not so. Article 370 violates UN resolutions. Article 370 is rooted in accession-to-India resolution of so-called `constituent assembly’ of the disputed Kashmir. The `assembly’ itself banks on Maharajah Hari Singh’s mythical `Instrument of Accession’, not registered with the UNO. By accepting Article 370 and occupied Kashmir’s constitution, Pakistan binds itself to accepting Azad Kashmir as part of India. The IHK’s constitution provides seats for Azad Kashmir. Will Pakistan hold elections in Azad Kashmir under Indian or IHK’s constitution?

If our foreign office revisits Kashmir-case files, it will come to know that: (a) India never registered Instrument of Accession with the United Nations.  In the summer of 1995, the Indian authorities reported the original document as lost or stolen? (b) Aware of India’s intention to get the ‘Instrument of Accession’ rubber-stamped by the puppet assembly, the Security Council passed two resolutions _ Security Council’s Resolution No 9 of March 30, 1951 and confirmatory Resolution No 122 of March 24, 1957 _ to forestall the `foreseeable accession’ by the puppet assembly.. These resolutions outlaw accession or any other action to change status of the disputed state. (c) Pakistan stresses international-law jus cogen `pacta sunt servanda’ treaties are to be abided by, being binding on signatories. Non-compliance reduces a state to status of a rogue state. (d) India through a series of steps whittled down Kashmir’s special status under Article 370 and 35-A of India’s Constitution. Governor replaced sadr-e-riast who could conveniently dismiss wazir-e-riast (now chief minister). (e) Kashmiri leaders are begging for `election’ which is ultra vires of UN resolutions. Kashmiris’ fate of total integration hangs in hands of petition pending with India’s Supreme Court.

Pakistan’s information minister’s statement

In a prelude to Foreign Office spokesman’s statement (April 6, 2019), Pakistan’s information minister had dared India hold elections in Indian-held Kashmir (March 11, 2019). Taking the two statements juxtaposed, the inference is that Pakistan implicitly admits that: (a) Jammu and Kashmir is not a disputed territory. It is an `integral part of India’. IHK had acceded to India as per the maharajah’s Instrument of Accession not registered with UNO or invoked on UN forums. (b) `Pakistan administered Kashmir’ (Azad Kashmir) is under illegal occupation by Pakistan. Heretofore I quote from IHK’s `Constitution’.

`Preamble to the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir

“WE, THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR,having solemnly resolved, in pursuance of the accession of this State to India which took place on the twenty sixth day of October, 1947, to further define the existing relationship of the State with the Union of India as a part thereof…’.

`Relations with Government of India

Article 3 in part 2 of the Jammu and Kashmir constitution reads as,

“Relationship of the State with the Union of India:-The State of Jammu and Kashmir is and shall be an integral part of the Union of India.

Relations with Pakistan administered Kashmir

Article 48 of Part VI of Jammu and Kashmir constitution defines Pakistan administered Kashmir as “Pakistan Occupied Territory”.

There are currently 87 seats in Jammu and Kashmir State assembly, but article 48 of Jammu and Kashmir constitution also recognizes 24 seats from Pakistan administered Kashmir and mentions that these 24 seats will remain vacant till Pakistan ceases the “occupation” of Kashmir and the said area shall be excluded in delimiting the territorial constituencies till that time.

To India’s pleasure, Pakistan’s chagrin

What information minister or foreign-office said should please India? For, India says clasula rebus sic stantibus, a fundamental change of circumstances (literally `things as they stand’), making plebiscite demand an anachronism.

Look at Janus-faced Pundit Jawaharlal Kaul/Nehru. Nehru had earlier declared in a radio broadcast (Nov 2, 1947) that the government of India was “prepared, when peace and order have been established in Kashmir, to have a referendum held under international auspices like the United Nations.” I am quoting from Chaudhri Mohammad Ali’s The Emergence of Pakistan.

Nehru be-fooled Sheikh Abdullah to stab Pakistan in the back. Barkha Dutt recalls (This Unquiet Land, p. 154) `In a 1948 speech to the United Nations, Sheikh Abdullah … made a blistering defence of the accession to India. Sher-e-Kashmir (Lion of Kashmir) roared, :I had thought all along that the world had got rid of  Hitlers…but what is happening in my poor country I am convinced that they have transmigrated their souls into Pakistan…I refuse to accept Pakistan as a party in the affairs of Jammu and Kashmir’

Dutt says, “Sheikh Abdullah [later] began to talk about possibility of independent Kashmir…Soon after he changed his stance he was jailed and dismissed from office and was not able to lead the state for another twenty years’. Stanley Wolpert and Alastair Lamb (Kashmir – A disputed legacy 1846-1990, Birth of a Tragedy) also doubt existence of Instrument of Accession (October 26, 1947).

Pakistan’s foreign office has yet to produce a luminary of the caliber of Indian foreign secretaries Shiv Shankar Menon, Krishnan Srinivasan, JN Dixit and Jagat S. Mehta. These gentlemen knew that Kashmir was not an atoot ang (unbreakable part), but a disputed state. India and Parvez Musharraf partly implemented Mehta’s proposals. His proposals are contained in his article “Resolving Kashmir in the International Context of the 1990s” Some points of his quasi-solution are: (a) Pacification of the valley until a political solution is reached. (b) Conversion of the LoC into “a soft border permitting free movement and facilitating free exchanges…” (c) Immediate demilitarization of the LoC to a depth of five to ten miles with agreed methods of verifying compliance. (d) Final settlement of the dispute between India and Pakistan can be suspended (kept in a “cold freeze”) for an agreed period. Voracious readers may refer for detail to Robert G Wirsing, India, Pakistan and the Kashmir Dispute (1994, St Martin’s Press, New York pp. 225-228). Mehta’s thinking is in line with JN Dixit’s. Dixit says ‘it is no use splitting legal hair. “Everybody who has a sense of history knows that legality only has relevance up to the threshold of transcending political realities. And especially in inter-state relations… so to quibble about points of law and hope that by proving a legal point you can reverse the process of history is living in a somewhat contrived utopia. It won’t work.”(Victoria Schofield’s book Kashmir in the Crossfire). 

Conclusion

Does Pakistan’s Foreign Office abide by IHK and India’s constitutions? When shall Pakistan cease its `occupation of Azad Kashmir’ to hold elections on 24 seats reserved for Pakistan-administered Kashmir’? Certainly, the afore-quoted statements do not reflect Pakistan’s position on Kashmir dispute, based on UN resolutions. India has no mandate to change the status of the disputed state through sham elections, or sham `special status’. It is time Pakistan gagged its loose-cannon information minister, unbridled foreign-office, or politicians.  It’s time for Pakistan about militarisation of Kashmir, human right violations and need for self-determination, recognised under UN conventions and resolutions. 

Continue Reading

Latest

Trending

Copyright © 2019 Modern Diplomacy