To paraphrase the beginning of Tolstoy’s Anna Karenina: all effective structures are alike; each ineffective structure is ineffective in its own way. The problems with the effectiveness of the UN Security Council are in many ways unique, as unique as the body itself. In recent years, only the laziest have failed to reproach the Security Council for dragging its feet, acting irresponsibly, getting bogged down in political infighting and pointless rhetoric, and being unwilling or unable to agree on the most pressing crisis situations, from Syria and Ukraine to Palestine and Myanmar.
For all its diversity, criticism of the Security Council has two main points. The first point is related to the composition of the Council itself, and the second is connected to the procedures of its operation. The current choices for the Security Council’s permanent members, or Big Five, are questionable to say the least. China is represented, but India is absent. France and the United Kingdom are present, but Germany or the European Union as a whole are not. Neither Africa nor the Middle East nor Latin America are represented. As for procedures, the primary bone of contention is the veto enjoyed by the five permanent members, which allows any of the Big Five to block any and all decisions that fail to please them.
It is clear that the first of the two problems looks more interesting, though the second one is of more importance. The prospect of expanding the Security Council promises a great deal of diplomatic scheming, behind-the-scenes negotiations and cunning subterfuge. However, as long as the right of veto remains, and as long as the obvious differences in the viewpoints of the permanent members regarding fundamental international problems persist, extending membership of the Security Council – regardless of which countries are let in – will make very little difference. On the contrary, “democratization” under the same old procedures will only serve to further complicate the possibility of ever reaching any agreement.
It is worth remembering that the constant abuse of a similar, albeit much more democratic principle of liberum veto (free veto) in the Sejm of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth eventually led to the irreversible decline and subsequent partition of one of the most powerful states in medieval Europe. Unfortunately, in recent years, the right of veto has been used more and more actively by some members of the Security Council. And it is Moscow that has set the tone. In the past two years alone, the Russian Federation has used its veto power nine times in connection with the Security Council’s examining the situation in the Middle East.
The struggle against the veto power of the permanent members of the Security Council has been going on for a very long time, without much chance of success. More than anything, it is a question of status, especially for those members whose position in world politics and whose economies are on the decline. To deprive them of their special status would be to inflict a crushing blow to national pride, to reduce them to the level of “ordinary” countries, and to forget their role in the creation of the United Nations. To be fair, let us recall that the permanent members of the Security Council are still the UN’s primary donors, accounting for more than 42 per cent of the organization’s total budget.
Besides status, however, the right of veto is also a question of practical national interests. For all their differences, each of the members of the Big Five values their sovereignty and would not like anyone, including the United Nations, to interfere in it. The Big Three of Russia, China and the United States are particularly critical of this issue. And the veto provides almost absolute guarantee of sovereignty to the select few.
So what should be done? Actually, the international community has little choice. You can do things the nice way, or you can do things the hard way. Doing things the hard way would mean commencing the procedure for a radical revision of the UN Charter so that a significant part of the Security Council’s authority would be transferred to the General Assembly. At the same time, you could get rid of the veto. In theory, such a procedure is provided for by the Charter itself: Article 109 allows for a United Nations General Conference to be held for this purpose with the support of two thirds of the members of the General Assembly and any nine members of the Security Council.
This is a rare case when the veto right of the permanent members of the Security Council is not valid. This procedure for the revision of the UN Charter has thus far never been implemented. And this is no coincidence, as it contains serious risks for the United Nations as a whole. Everyone understands that while it might be possible to take apart the complicated machine that is the UN, putting it back together again would be another thing entirely.
Doing things the nice way would mean convincing the permanent members of the Security Council of the need to take “voluntary” restrictions upon themselves in the use of the veto. There has been an active Code of Conduct campaign behind the scenes at the General Assembly for several years now that is designed to exert moral pressure on the permanent members of the UN Security Council to at least not to block those resolutions related to crimes against humanity and genocide. Strangely enough, the campaign was initiated by France, which is itself a permanent member of the Security Council. Presently, more than half of the UN’s members have joined the campaign. However, Russia, the United States and China, in a rare display of solidarity, refuse even to discuss such a possibility. The logic of the Big Three is understandable: start with voluntary restrictions and you can end up with an actual withdrawal of the veto power as a whole.
A multitude of other options exist to reduce the dependence of the practical work of the UN on the veto power of the permanent members of the Security Council. Some suggest extending the powers of the UN Secretary General. Others talk of resurrecting the now dormant Military Staff Committee. And still others believe that the solution to the problem lies in the transition to “subsidiary” peace-making by having the United Nations transfer a number of important functions in this area to “authorized” regional organizations. In any case, in order for these or other similar proposals to be implemented, a consensus is needed among the Big Five, something that is sorely lacking at present.
However, try as you might, the end will always come. The current situation in the UN Security Council should not be considered normal. It is difficult to believe that this abnormal situation can last indefinitely. In failing to resolve critical regional and global crises, the Security Council suffers serious damage to its reputation, damage that extends to the United Nations as a whole. This is not even the point; more importantly, the chronic paralysis of the Security Council reinforces and justifies the temptation to bypass the UN Security Council and sometimes circumvent the modern system of international law in general. For now, actions bypassing the Security Council are still perceived as the exception, but they could soon become the rule. For now, they are frowned upon, but soon they could become the norm.
Historical – and even everyday – experience suggests that those not willing to sacrifice a part risk losing the whole. Unfortunately, the United Nations is not at all immune to the fate of its predecessor, the League of Nations, which left the political scene quietly in the late 1930s, at the precise moment that international efforts to prevent a new world war were needed most.
To return once again to Leo Tolstoy, this time to one of his children’s fables: “A monkey was carrying two handfuls of peas. One little pea fell out. He tried to pick it up and spilled twenty. He tried to pick up the twenty and spilled them all. Then he lost his temper, scattered the peas in all directions and ran away.” The permanent members of the UN Security Council are still in the second stage – twenty peas have already been spilled. Will it reach the third stage?
First published in our partner RIAC
Nations and Capital:The Missing Link in Global Expansion
Most theorists of nationalism claim that nationalism is a modern phenomenon. However, they commonly fail to notice that the phenomenon to which they vaguely refer as Modernity is absolutely determined and defined by a very compact and precisely structured socio-economic system, that of capitalism. This is why capitalism as a whole – rather than its particular aspects, such as Gellner’s “industrialism”, Anderson’s “print-capitalism”, Nairn’s “uneven development”, Hechter’s “internal colonialism”, Tilly’s “mass-militarisation”, or Conversi’s “Westernisation” – inevitably arises as the most adequate framework for analysis of nationalism as a historical phenomenon, offering the reasons for nationalism’s emergence and continuing existence.
Whereas the principle of unequal exchange and accumulation of wealth in all previous systems was to provide socio-economic security and set social hierarchy, capitalism has built a mechanism which makes unequal exchange self-perpetuating, so as to make accumulation of wealth perpetual and limitless. Capitalism’s imperative for perpetual private profit, present in all its phases, both pre-industrial, industrial and post-industrial, generates particular social conditions that tend to undermine the very sustainability of the capitalist system: a perpetually widening gap between the exploiting elites on one side and the exploited masses on the other side leads to a perpetual rise of insurrectionary potentials of the latter, threatening the stability of the entire system. Bridging that gap without changing the structure of society becomes the paramount task for the capitalist system in its attempts to preserve the mechanism for incessant exploitation of labour and limitless accumulation of capital. Therefore, this system has introduced a social glue tailored to conceal, but also to cement, the actual polarisation of society. This glue has been designed as an ideal of absolute social unity, based on the assumption that both the exploiting and the exploited are born as equal, with equal rights, identical interests, and common identity, and that together they form an entirely new entity, the nation.
The nation is conceptualised as a simulated community whose homogeneity generates its power over the territory it inhabits and whose power over the territory it inhabits generates its homogeneity. In other words, the nation is designed as a community whose capacities for social homogeneity and political sovereignty stand in direct proportion: the might of homogeneity creates the right to sovereignty, the might of sovereignty creates an obligation to homogeneity. In historical, political, and social reality, the nation and nationalism always operate in accordance with this logic. The nation, by its very nature, consists of nationalism. To paraphrase Gellner, not only does nationalism invent nations where they do not exist, but nations themselves exist only in the form of nationalism: in social reality the nation operates as a fluctuating discourse rather than a fixed substantive and enduring entity. In this sense, nations function as nationalism: nations are generated and brought into being by their respective nationalisms; and nations continue to exist as long as the societies that have been politically framed as nations remain capable of perpetuating their respective nationalisms.
The nation-state arose as superior to the other forms of state characterising early capitalism – such as city-state and mercantilist empire – due to its ability to protect the domination of the capitalist class by systemically containing the potential discontent of other classes. For capitalist elites, the nation-state performs yet another important function: while populations fashioned as nations become increasingly isolated one from another by their respective nationalist ideologies, symbolic boundaries, and physical borders, and thus become increasingly powerless, capitalist elites further strengthen their position by operating across and above these ideologies, boundaries, and borders, as a powerful trans-national network. Eventually, supported by the ideology of nationalism, capitalism redesigns all states in the world as nation-states, by which they buy a must-take ticket for entrance into the global capitalist system. Reliance on nationalism, based on this must-take principle, has also been adopted by all left-wing and communist regimes, in their permanent striving for full-fledged membership in this system.
Nationalism successfully played the designated role within the capitalist system until the last decades of the twentieth century. However, the global neoliberal revolution, spread under the label of globalisation, has widened the gap between the rich and the poor to such an extent that classical nationalism, connected with liberal-democratic principles, has ceased to be able to conceal that gap, having made the capitalist system unstable, or even unsustainable. Therefore, capitalist elites have identified a possible solution in a resurgence of nationalism in a more robust, non-democratic, authoritarian form. This form of nationalism announces a new phase in capitalism’s development, the phase of hyper-capitalism, in which exploitation of labour and accumulation of wealth tend to become absolute, supported by overtly robust, authoritarian methods of rule.
This book demonstrates that capitalism needs and generates nationalism, both democratic and authoritarian, as its structural requirement that eventually becomes a conditio sine qua non of its very existence. In other words, not only is there no nationalism without capitalism; more importantly, there is no capitalism without nationalism.
First published 2022
4 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN
and by Routledge
605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158 2022
© Zlatko Hadžidedić
ISBN 978-1-032-15970-6 (hbk)
ISBN 978-1-032-15972-0 (pbk)
ISBN 978-1-003-24652-7 (ebk)
Will COPUOS five-year mission produce a new “international governance instrument” for outer space resources?
During its 2022 session, the Legal Subcommittee (LSC) of the United Nation’s Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) created a Working Group on the Legal Aspects of Space Resource Activity and gave it a five-year mandate to gather information, study the current legal framework, and “assess the benefits of further development of a framework for such activities, including by way of additional international governance instruments.” (emphasis added). A survey was sent to the LSC’s member states and official observers, with a response due by December 30.
Fifteen member states and five non-governmental official observers responded to the surveys. The responses were recently posted online by the United Nations Office on Outer Space Activities (UNOOSA), the parent body of COPUOS. This article will look at eight of them: three from states representing the range of international opinion, and all five of the observers, who represent part of “civil society”.
The Working Group Mandate: Address Unresolved Space Resource Issues
COPUOS-LSC gave its Working Group the following mandate (emphasis added):
The Working Group shall:
(a) Collect relevant information concerning activities in the exploration, exploitation and utilization of space resources, including with respect to scientific and technological developments and current practices, taking into account their innovative and evolving nature;
(b) Study the existing legal framework for such activities, in particular the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, and other applicable United Nations treaties, also taking into account other relevant instruments, as appropriate;
(c) Assess the benefits of further development of a framework for such activities, includingby way of additional international governance instruments;
(d) Develop a set of initial recommended principles for such activities, taking into account the need to ensure that they are carried out in accordance with international law and in a safe, sustainable, rational and peaceful manner, for the consideration of and consensus agreement by the Committee, followed by possible adoption by the General Assembly as a dedicated resolution or other action;
(e) Identify areas for further work of the Committee and recommend next steps, which may include the development of potential rules and/or norms, for activities in the exploration, exploitation and utilization of space resources, including with respect to related activities and benefit sharing.
The establishment of the Working Group and its mandate is significant. It represents a consensus acknowledgement that the Outer Space Treaty (OST) does not adequately address space resource activity and how the benefits of outer space are to be shared. It is also the first time since the 1970’s that member states of COPUOS have been willing to consider a new “international governance instrument” beyond non-binding principles and recommendations (e.g., the COPUOS long-term sustainability guidelines of 2019).
The Working Group has a five-year work plan. During initial setup in 2022, it was instructed to gather information from the members of the LSC to help establish the scope of its work. To that end, a survey was distributed to all member states and official observers, inviting a response to the following topics (emphasis added):
– The type of space resources that fall within the mandate and scope of the Working Group.
– The type of activities that fall within the mandate and scope of the Working Group.
– The type of information to be collected by the Working Group in accordance with its mandate.
– The views of States members regarding the existing legal framework for space resource activities.
– The current practices and challenges in the implementation of the existing legal framework for such activities.
– The benefits and challenges to the development of a framework for such activities.
– The relevant factors for the development of a set of initial recommended principles for such activities.
– The format, agenda, topics and other details of the dedicated conference (currently) scheduled for 2024.
– Any other background or information paper, or any other views, that States members may wish to share.
Responses of Representative States: Luxembourg, Russia, and Australia
Luxembourg is a member of the European Space Agency and one of the first signers of the Artemis Accords. It is the second country (after the United States) to pass a national law authorizing its own nationals (including corporations headquartered there) to remove and take ownership of outer space resources. A sample from its response:
Luxembourg considers that the Artemis Accords, as well as the Building Blocks of the Hague Working Group, constitute a valuable contribution to the discussions in international fora, especially the UN COPUOS.
According to the Luxembourg legislator, space resources are now commonly defined as abiotic resources that are in situ in outer space and can be extracted. This notion includes, for example, mineral resources and water, but not orbital positions or frequencies.
Luxembourg ratified the Outer Space Treaty, the Liability Convention and the Registration Convention and is in the process of accessing the Rescue Agreement. Luxembourg has not signed the Moon Agreement. The international space treaties have not yet been tested with regard to the rights over resources found in space. Most of carried missions have taken place for scientific purposes. However, for the sustainability of future deep space exploration, for commercial space projects and space mining to be viable, future explorers and investors will need certainty regarding their rights to the materials they find.
It seems essential that the Working Group, especially when formulating the set of initial recommended principles, is driven by adaptive governance principle and focuses on the most pressing issues. The highest priority is the recognition of individual rights over space resources, mechanisms for avoiding harmful interference and for the establishment of safety zones.
Russia is a fully “spacefaring” country, with the capacity to launch payloads and humans into outer space and send probes to the Moon and planets. It has not signed the Artemis Accords nor passed a national law authorizing private ownership of space resources. From their response:
Space resources include celestial bodies, spaces and territories of celestial bodies, mineral resources, liquids and gases located on them, various types of radiation, orbital-frequency resource, and other objects. . . . Due to the fact that the necessary legal framework for research and study of certain types of space resources, such as solar energy and the orbital frequency resource is available or not required, it is advisable to exclude these types of resources from the scope of the Working Group while referring to them in the classification system.
An important task of the Working Group is also to develop a monitoring mechanism for activities related to the exploration and utilization of space resources, which may include:
– issues of establishing responsibility when implementing the said activities;
– monitoring compliance with established international standards regulating the extraction of space resources, as well as control over the lawfulness of such operations;
– control over the organization of licensing of activities related to the exploration, exploitation and utilization of space resources;
– an algorithm for resolving conflicts and disputes between actors engaged in the extraction and utilization of space resources, an algorithm for international consultations between states;
– a mechanism for informing the international community (including the obligation to inform the UN Secretary-General) of the nature, progress, locations, and results of such activities;
– consideration of the feasibility of establishing a special international body responsible for securing the regime of the utilization of space resources (by analogy with the ITU, the International Seabed Authority).
A space resource, even after its extraction (removal), does not lose its unique natural extraterrestrial origin, unlike a resource mined on Earth. The transformation of space resources, in particular their extraction and, as a result, the acquisition of a natural-anthropogenic nature, does not give rise to ownership of these resources. However, the national legislative initiatives of certain States vest their non-governmental persons, citizens and entities with the right to mine, appropriate, own, transport and sell the mineral resources of celestial bodies, including asteroids. But the national law of any State cannot extend to territories outside its jurisdiction.
Thus, it is necessary for the Working Group to determine a mechanism for prioritizing missions and the number of admissible missions in the light of the physical characteristics of the celestial body and to consider the issues of the avoidance of the depletion of extraterrestrial resources and conservation of the space environment, among other issues.
Australia is unique among the world’s space powers: it has ratified the Moon Agreement and signed the Artemis Accords. Steven Freeland of Australia has been named vice-chair of the Working Group (Andrzej Misztal of Poland is the chair). Here is part of its response as it tries to straddle two worlds:
Australia considers that the type of space resources and activities that fall within the mandate and scope of the Working Group may include:
– Activities contemplated by the five United Nations (UN) treaties on outer space;
– Activities and definitions contemplated by the Hague International Space Resources Governance Working Group on the Building Blocks for the Development of an International Framework on Space Resource Activities, including definitions for the terms ‘space resource’ and ‘space resource activities’;
– Activities contemplated by national agencies, including the Artemis program;
– Activities contemplated through States Members’ policies, including NASA’s Lunar Landing and Operations Policy Analysis and the European Space Agency’s Space Resources Strategy.
Australia is party to the five UN treaties on outer space and is committed to meeting its international obligations. Australia is also committed to contributing to the development of norms that ensure the long-term safety, stability and sustainability of the outer space environment. The activities of States in outer space are also guided by a number of non-binding instruments. Despite not holding the status of law, Australia recognises that these non-binding instruments indicate the intentions of signatory States as to their conduct in outer space.
Australia does not consider that Article II of the Outer Space Treaty prohibits ownership of resources extracted or removed from the Moon or other celestial bodies. However, ensuring compliance with Articles I and II of the Outer Space Treaty requires some understanding of the elements of those obligations or ways of satisfying them in the context of space resource activities, and the Working Group may like to give consideration to this issue.
In Australia’s view, the establishment of an international regime governing exploitation of the Moon’s natural resources consistently with Article 11(5) [of the Moon Agreement] would permit and facilitate space resource exploitation in a rational, safe and equitable manner, providing a means by which the exploration and use of outer space can be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries.
Response from Observers (“Civil Society”)
Six Observers responded to the survey. One of those, the European Space Agency, is an inter-governmental organization. The other five are non-profits, part of “civil society” (“any non-profit, voluntary citizens’ group which is organized on a local, national or international level”) that gives voice to stakeholders. Here is a sample of their responses, in alphabetical order:
For All Moonkind is focused almost exclusively on the preservation of historic/cultural landing sites from the early years of lunar exploration. Their position is that any resource agreement must include protection of such sites:
Culture is who we are, where we have been and where we are going. It is what shapes our identity as humans. In short, development cannot be sustainable without culture. Moreover, cultural heritage protection is a mainstay of intergenerational equity. The protection and preservation of human heritage recognizes those who came before us, protects the gains of our civilization and allows future generations to learn from both their processes and results.
As the Working Group considers the legal aspects of space resource activities, it must address the impact those activities will have on cultural heritage and use the universality of heritage to achieve consensus.
Zones could be established to manage, and hopefully prevent, conflict, starting with proposed heritage protection zones. For All Moonkind also suggests that the first Coordination Zones can be implemented immediately, to recognize and protect human heritage on other celestial bodies. We believe that international community will be more willing to reach agreement regarding the protection of a site of universal value, as opposed to the operative site of a State or private company.
The Moon Village Association is an umbrella organization that facilitates the work of many groups and individuals. Its response* highlights sharing the benefits of outer space exploration and development. Although it stopped short of calling for mandatory benefit sharing, it did call for consideration of benefit sharing at every level of decision-making:
It is the sense of this Working Group that benefit sharing as a desirable feature in the context of international and space law, is in the process of maturing into a more consequential working theme, whose consideration should be deemed mandatory at relevant legal and operational levels, in the same vein as all relevant factors reviewed in this recommendation should be considered mandatory.
This said, it is also the sense of this Working Group that no benefit sharing first principles and specific mechanisms may manifest unless access issues have been resolved in close concertation with key operators and strongly invested stakeholders.
Specific mechanisms need to be considered simultaneously to legal and operational clarification, in the context of space resources utilisation, of non-exclusionary forms of priority and property rights intended to enable investment and operations to proceed.
While remaining aware of the fact that without economic sustainability there is neither sustainability nor access to and sharing of benefits, it is nonetheless the sense of this Working Group that, without a broad and inclusive debate on measures to mitigate future inequalities that may result from lack of sufficient consideration of access and benefit sharing issues, it would become considerably more difficult to assert international legitimacy in defining above specific legal and operational mechanisms.
The National Space Society was formed in 1987 by a merger of the National Space Institute with the L-5 Society. It generally supports the private sector and discourages regulation:
Notably, there are four factors most relevant to the development of a set of initial recommended principles: 1) the mitigation of harmful impacts and interference; 2) the need for economic incentives and clarity in benefit-sharing; 3) recognition of resource rights regardless of domestic or international implementation; and 4) the dissemination of data.
First, the mitigation of harmful impacts and interference speaks to the impacts of ISRU [In Situ (in place) Resource Utilization] activities and external interference upon ISRU activities. The protection of international cultural heritage sites in outer space should be paramount regarding ISRU impacts. . . . As humanity transcends into the solar system, the protection of how we progressed is important historically, culturally, and inspirationally.
Second, the current void of governance has contributed to a lack of investment in ISRU because of uncertainty within the legal field and the calls for monetary benefit-sharing. The recommended principles should incentivize investment by clarifying that benefit-sharing ought not to be compulsory monetary benefit-sharing but rather encouragement of enabling and promoting the development of technology, capabilities, and education; particularly in developing countries. Benefit-sharing could also take the form of an international fund to assist in the above-mentioned actions and bolstering the ever-necessary UN SDGs [sustainable development guidelines]. Clarity with the intentions of benefit-sharing is likely to incentivize economic activity to develop ISRU further.
This leads into the third and fourth factors of resource rights and data dissemination. In order for ISRU to further the human experience to outer space, the right to utilization is necessary. Thus, legitimate resource rights provided through legal processes should be recognized regardless of their domestic or international implementation. This would also incentivize economic investment. Lastly, the dissemination of data related to the type and amount of resources discovered and/or extracted should be considered. This is significant because as data becomes available regarding the amount of resources in varying places, it can create clearer methods of governance.
The Open Lunar Foundation is “committed to enabling peaceful, cooperative lunar settlement for the benefit of all life.”
The recovery, exchange and use of natural resources have always been foundational to the development and maintenance of any human society. Yet history also shows that uncoordinated access can create conflict and unfettered development can grow to the detriment of people, places and intentions. As humanity seeks to establish new roots in the vastness of space, the technical, economical and legal ability to make use of available natural resources will thereby play a crucial role in determining our failure or success.
In polycentricity, a shared set of goals and institutions empowers local management by semi-autonomous decision makers. Polycentricity leverages localized synergies and deep system knowledge for high social-ecological and governance congruence. Through subsidiarity and diversity, polycentric governance enables institutional experimentation and exchange in uncertain and complex environments. In a polycentric lunar governance system, the different lunar resource systems can be managed locally and individually while conforming to universal norms and principles such as transparency, sustainability, peace, cooperation, and justice.
Create a Catalog of Scarce Resources: Not all space resources are equally accessible or exist in large quantities. Specific resources or regions may be affected by inherent conditions of scarcity, such as the “peaks of eternal light” at the lunar poles or the “radio quiet zone” on the far side of the Moon. To ensure appropriate management regimes, we recommend developing and updating a living list of resources and regions involving conditions of scarcity. States, operators and other interested stakeholders should involve themselves in this definitional process and publicly commit to recognizing and respecting the list.
Scaffolding Towards Shared Frameworks: Wishing to ensure that emerging lunar regulations truly enable a plurality of societies, parties and activities, while not over-specifying institutional structures based on past approaches, a foundational document could be adopted which focuses on guiding principles and shared agreements rather than specific resource management and coordination approaches. Such a document could emphasize commitment to peace, cooperation and accessibility while protecting the ability for adaptive learning and evolution.
The Space Generation Advisory Council submitted itsE.A.G.L.E. report from May 2021 in lieu of a specific survey response. The particulars of “Effective and Adaptive Governance for a Lunar Ecosystem” are too long to summarize (see list below). In general, it calls for a new international “charter”:
The regulatory tools devised in UNCOPUOS seemingly follow a life span of roughly 20 years. Treaties, principles, and guidelines each characterised two decades of international space diplomacy by providing a reference narrative for the community. After long reflection, we realised that the narrative of the next two decades could be captured by charters. With this term we refer to a legal document enacted to define the essential features and boundaries of a legal framework through the solemn commitment of its signatories. Examples of famous charters used in this sense include the Magna Carta Libertatum, the Charter of the United Nations and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
Suggested Topics for a Lunar Governance Charter
– Fundamental Principles of Space Law
– Guiding Principles for a Lunar Governance Charter
– Human Life Protection
– Heritage Preservation
– Science / Business Balance
– The Use of Lunar Resources
– Safety Zones
– Liability & Registration
– Minimum Coordination
– Conflict Resolution
At the E.A.G.L.E. Team, we value the ability to unite and converge above everything else. When we set foot to initiate the development of this document, our main goal was to provide a contribution that could simultaneously increase the value of all others by providing them with meaningful opportunities to be expressed. We wanted to inspire global actors and catalyse international discussions on the exploration and use of the Moon. With this purpose in mind, we birthed the idea of a Lunar Governance Charter as a shared narrative that could frame the global debate on lunar governance within pragmatic but also idealistic terms. Structured in the way presented in Section 3, we believe that a Lunar Governance Charter could constitute a useful reference framework for the evolution of adaptive governance.
The responses from member states and observers show a wide spectrum of opinion concerning “additional international governance instruments”. Some do not want any additional rules unless they confirm private property rights and protect space resource activities. Others would require any space resource activity to be approved by an international authority, like the International Seabed Authority in the UN Convention on the Law of the Seas. In between are those who do not want a new authority but do want a new international agreement that will protect essential public policies while providing legal support for private activity. That agreement might be a stand-alone treaty, like the other UN space treaties, or it might be part of the Moon Agreement as an Article 11 resource agreement.
There is also a spectrum concerning what public policies should be protected. Most would agree on protecting heritage sites, but does that include every track mark by every rover? To what extent do we share information and technology? As for protecting activities, how can safety zones or priority rights be structured so that they are not prohibited exclusive claims? In general, how can we maximize sharing the benefits of outer space while still establishing mechanisms that promote economic sustainability?
The next five years may well produce a new international agreement that will guide the nations of Earth as we begin to leave the home world. Without one, we might repeat the mistakes of the Age of Imperialism, when powerful countries battled for control of distant resources, causing centuries of war, suffering, and neglect. Humanity has a chance to start over, and the new COPUOS working group might be the best vehicle for doing so. For this year’s meeting dates and other information about COPUOS and the Legal Subcommittee, click here.
* MVA’s response was primarily written by Suyan Christina Malhadas and the Space Law and Policy Research Group of the Catholic University of Santos, Brazil, with contributions from members of MVA’s Adaptive Governance Working Group, including this author.
Shaping a 21st-century world order amounts to a patchwork
What do Moroccan arms sales to Ukraine, a transnational Russian Iranian transit corridor, and US assistance in developing a Saudi national strategy have in common?
Together with this week’s Russian-Iranian financial messaging agreement and Chinese President Xi Jinping’s December visit to Saudi Arabia, they are smaller and bigger fragments of a 21st-century world order in the making that is likely to be bi-polar and populated by multiple middle powers with significant agency and enhanced hedging capabilities.
So is the competition between rival US and Chinese technologies for which the jury is still out.
For the two likely dominant powers, the United States and China, the building blocks are efforts to line up their ducks in a bipolar world.
For Russia, they involve hanging on to its pre-Ukraine war status, in part by deploying its Wagner Group mercenaries to the Sahel; devising ways to circumvent sanctions; and hoping that time will work in its favour in what was supposed to be a blitzkrieg but has turned into a drawn-out slugging match.
For middle powers, the name of the game is carving out their own space, leveraging their enhanced influence, and seeking advantage where they can.
The result is that weaving the 21st century’s tapestry amounts to a patchwork in which some fragments will have long-term effects while others may not even register as a blip on the radar.
Take, for example, Morocco’s decision to give Ukraine some 20 refurbished Russian-made T-72B battle tanks. The deal made Morocco the first African, if not the first Global South nation, to militarily aid Ukraine.
The move, almost a year into the Ukraine war, is likely to have been motivated by short-term considerations, including Russia’s close ties to Morocco’s arch-rival Algeria and US recognition of Morocco’s claim to the formerly Spanish Western Sahara, rather than long-term 21st-century world order considerations.
Even so, Morocco’s breaking ranks with much of the Global South serves the US goal of sustaining the current world order in which it is the top dog, even if its power diminishes.
It doesn’t fundamentally affect China’s goal of rebalancing power in the existing order to ensure that it is bi- rather than unipolar.
The loser in the deal is Russia, which, like Iran, wants to see a new world order in which the United States is cut down to size.
The tank deal may not be a significant loss for Russia, but it does suggest that horse trading is a critical element in weaving the fabric of a new order.
So is mutual interest.
Like the arms sale, the agreement between Russia and Iran to create a financial messaging system that would allow their banks to transfer funds between one another and evade sanctions that block their access to the global SWIFT system is unlikely to have a major impact on the structure of the new world order.
Russian and Iranian efforts to link Europe with the Indian Ocean, centred on 3,000 kilometres of rail and sea and river shipping, are potentially far more significant.
The transport corridor would help reshape trade and supply networks in a world that seems set to divvy up into rival blocs. Moreover, it could shield Russia and Iran from US and European sanctions as they forge closer economic ties with fast-growing economies in Asia.
Russia and Iran are not just looking at India, which sits at one extreme of the corridor.
They also expect to capitalise on their links to China. All three are members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), and China and Iran are close to becoming members of the Russia-dominated Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) free trade zone.
Of a similar potential impact on a future world order is US assistance in Saudi Arabia’s development of a first-time-ever long-term vision for the kingdom’s national security, an essential building block in Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s effort to modernize his military.
Saudi Arabia expects to disclose its strategy later this year. It would codify “the kingdom’s strategic vision for national security and regional security,” according to Gen. Michael “Erik” Kurilla, the top commander of US forces in the Middle East, who is advising his Saudi counterparts.
Shaping Saudi strategy as well as military modernization may be the United States’ best bet to imbue at least some of its values and complicate the establishment of similar defense ties with China or Russia. Moreover, it would enhance the kingdom’s ability to absorb and utilize US weapons systems.
“The Saudis, under MBS’s (Mohammed bin Salman’s) leadership, now recognize (their) deficiencies and seem, for the first time, determined to address them in partnership with the United States and to a degree with the United Kingdom,” said political-military analyst and former Pentagon official Bilal Y. Saab.
That will undoubtedly register on the geopolitical chessboard, even if small moves also count for something.
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