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International Law

Liberum Veto and the Monkey and the Pea

Dr. Andrey KORTUNOV

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To paraphrase the beginning of Tolstoy’s Anna Karenina: all effective structures are alike; each ineffective structure is ineffective in its own way. The problems with the effectiveness of the UN Security Council are in many ways unique, as unique as the body itself. In recent years, only the laziest have failed to reproach the Security Council for dragging its feet, acting irresponsibly, getting bogged down in political infighting and pointless rhetoric, and being unwilling or unable to agree on the most pressing crisis situations, from Syria and Ukraine to Palestine and Myanmar.

For all its diversity, criticism of the Security Council has two main points. The first point is related to the composition of the Council itself, and the second is connected to the procedures of its operation. The current choices for the Security Council’s permanent members, or Big Five, are questionable to say the least. China is represented, but India is absent. France and the United Kingdom are present, but Germany or the European Union as a whole are not. Neither Africa nor the Middle East nor Latin America are represented. As for procedures, the primary bone of contention is the veto enjoyed by the five permanent members, which allows any of the Big Five to block any and all decisions that fail to please them.

It is clear that the first of the two problems looks more interesting, though the second one is of more importance. The prospect of expanding the Security Council promises a great deal of diplomatic scheming, behind-the-scenes negotiations and cunning subterfuge. However, as long as the right of veto remains, and as long as the obvious differences in the viewpoints of the permanent members regarding fundamental international problems persist, extending membership of the Security Council – regardless of which countries are let in – will make very little difference. On the contrary, “democratization” under the same old procedures will only serve to further complicate the possibility of ever reaching any agreement.

It is worth remembering that the constant abuse of a similar, albeit much more democratic principle of liberum veto (free veto) in the Sejm of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth eventually led to the irreversible decline and subsequent partition of one of the most powerful states in medieval Europe. Unfortunately, in recent years, the right of veto has been used more and more actively by some members of the Security Council. And it is Moscow that has set the tone. In the past two years alone, the Russian Federation has used its veto power nine times in connection with the Security Council’s examining the situation in the Middle East.

The struggle against the veto power of the permanent members of the Security Council has been going on for a very long time, without much chance of success. More than anything, it is a question of status, especially for those members whose position in world politics and whose economies are on the decline. To deprive them of their special status would be to inflict a crushing blow to national pride, to reduce them to the level of “ordinary” countries, and to forget their role in the creation of the United Nations. To be fair, let us recall that the permanent members of the Security Council are still the UN’s primary donors, accounting for more than 42 per cent of the organization’s total budget.

Besides status, however, the right of veto is also a question of practical national interests. For all their differences, each of the members of the Big Five values their sovereignty and would not like anyone, including the United Nations, to interfere in it. The Big Three of Russia, China and the United States are particularly critical of this issue. And the veto provides almost absolute guarantee of sovereignty to the select few.

So what should be done? Actually, the international community has little choice. You can do things the nice way, or you can do things the hard way. Doing things the hard way would mean commencing the procedure for a radical revision of the UN Charter so that a significant part of the Security Council’s authority would be transferred to the General Assembly. At the same time, you could get rid of the veto. In theory, such a procedure is provided for by the Charter itself: Article 109 allows for a United Nations General Conference to be held for this purpose with the support of two thirds of the members of the General Assembly and any nine members of the Security Council.

This is a rare case when the veto right of the permanent members of the Security Council is not valid. This procedure for the revision of the UN Charter has thus far never been implemented. And this is no coincidence, as it contains serious risks for the United Nations as a whole. Everyone understands that while it might be possible to take apart the complicated machine that is the UN, putting it back together again would be another thing entirely.

Doing things the nice way would mean convincing the permanent members of the Security Council of the need to take “voluntary” restrictions upon themselves in the use of the veto. There has been an active Code of Conduct campaign behind the scenes at the General Assembly for several years now that is designed to exert moral pressure on the permanent members of the UN Security Council to at least not to block those resolutions related to crimes against humanity and genocide. Strangely enough, the campaign was initiated by France, which is itself a permanent member of the Security Council. Presently, more than half of the UN’s members have joined the campaign. However, Russia, the United States and China, in a rare display of solidarity, refuse even to discuss such a possibility. The logic of the Big Three is understandable: start with voluntary restrictions and you can end up with an actual withdrawal of the veto power as a whole.

A multitude of other options exist to reduce the dependence of the practical work of the UN on the veto power of the permanent members of the Security Council. Some suggest extending the powers of the UN Secretary General. Others talk of resurrecting the now dormant Military Staff Committee. And still others believe that the solution to the problem lies in the transition to “subsidiary” peace-making by having the United Nations transfer a number of important functions in this area to “authorized” regional organizations. In any case, in order for these or other similar proposals to be implemented, a consensus is needed among the Big Five, something that is sorely lacking at present.

However, try as you might, the end will always come. The current situation in the UN Security Council should not be considered normal. It is difficult to believe that this abnormal situation can last indefinitely. In failing to resolve critical regional and global crises, the Security Council suffers serious damage to its reputation, damage that extends to the United Nations as a whole. This is not even the point; more importantly, the chronic paralysis of the Security Council reinforces and justifies the temptation to bypass the UN Security Council and sometimes circumvent the modern system of international law in general. For now, actions bypassing the Security Council are still perceived as the exception, but they could soon become the rule. For now, they are frowned upon, but soon they could become the norm.

Historical – and even everyday – experience suggests that those not willing to sacrifice a part risk losing the whole. Unfortunately, the United Nations is not at all immune to the fate of its predecessor, the League of Nations, which left the political scene quietly in the late 1930s, at the precise moment that international efforts to prevent a new world war were needed most.

To return once again to Leo Tolstoy, this time to one of his children’s fables: “A monkey was carrying two handfuls of peas. One little pea fell out. He tried to pick it up and spilled twenty. He tried to pick up the twenty and spilled them all. Then he lost his temper, scattered the peas in all directions and ran away.” The permanent members of the UN Security Council are still in the second stage – twenty peas have already been spilled. Will it reach the third stage?

First published in our partner RIAC

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International Law

Will Israel Be Expelled from U.N.?

Eric Zuesse

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The conditions of membership in the U.N. are specified in the U.N. Charter. Specifically, “Articles 5 and 6 of the Charter of the United Nations deal respectively with suspension of rights and privileges of membership, and with expulsion from the United Nations.” But the operative part is Article 6, which reads:

“A Member of the United Nations which has persistently violated the Principles contained in the present Charter may be expelled from the Organization by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.”

Israel certainly qualifies, but the United States Government, which is controlled by the anti-Shia and anti-Iran alliance between Israel’s Government providing the anti-Iran lobbyists and propagandists, and the Saudi Government providing the anti-Iran bribe-money, won’t allow that. Consequently, no matter how violative of the U.N. Charter Israel is, it cannot be expelled.

The United States Government likewise is routinely violating the U.N. Charter and cannot be expelled, because this very Government is on the U.N.’s own Security Council as one of the five permanent members: it would veto its own expulsion.

Consequently, a fatal flaw in the current U.N. Charter is that no vote by the U.N. General Assembly can expel a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council. Nor can they expel any member of the General Assembly that’s backed by one or more members of the permanent Security Council. Until this situation is changed and a stated percentage of the votes from the General Assembly can expel a member from the U.N. General Assembly, there can be no international accountability applied against a member of the U.N. Security Council permanent five nations; and the U.S. Government, being a member of that, will continue to be allowed to do whatever its Saudi and Israeli masters want it to do — thereby protecting both Israel and Saudi Arabia themselves, and giving each of those two masters virtually as much freedom-of-action as the U.S. has; the U.S. Government’s masters buy impunity, indirectly, from their protector.

This is not a world of international law; it is a world of international force — basically a world of conquest and submission (and subversion can be part of that), which mocks democracy internationally (and maybe even domestically), and therefore effectively corrupts and prevents democracy within all nations that the controlling masters in Saudi Arabia and in Israel demand.

The most fatal failure of the U.N. Charter is thus its prohibiting any amendment that one of the five permanent Security Council members opposes.

The issue of what the conditions would be for amending the U.N. Charter was debated while the U.N. Charter was being drawn up in 1945, but nothing effective was agreed to, and so the U.N’s PR on the matter states only that “the question of future amendments to the Charter received much attention and finally resulted in an agreed solution.” They don’t say what that “solution” was, but there have been no controversial amendments made to the Charter, during its 73 years, so whatever it might have been was almost totally ineffective. A web-search for “U.N. Charter” plus “proposed amendment” produces no major “proposed amendment” but does, near the top, show what that (obviously failed) “agreed solution” (which the U.N. tries to hide) was; and it is:

“This concession took the form of Articles 108 and 109 concerning Charter review procedures. While Article 108 describes the required steps for making specific amendments, Article 109 introduces the option of a review conference outside of the usual General Assembly (GA) meetings with the purpose of a comprehensive “review” of the Charter. Both these avenues for making changes to the UN Charter include the criteria of two-thirds of the UN member states voting for and ratifying a proposed amendment. However, in addition, “all the permanent members of the Security Council” must also ratify before the amendment goes into force. This unanimous concurrence of the P5

[the five permanent members] is the biggest challenge to adopting any amendment to the UN Charter.”

In other words: The U.N. Charter’s colossal (and thus-far fatal) failure was in its including the 5-member permanent Security Council’s veto-provision to apply even to any proposed amendment to the Charter. Only an amendment which all five permanent members support can pass. Here is such an amendment. No matter how much of the rest of the world want a particular change to be made, it can’t be done unless all five of the permanent members of the Security Council will accept it. This is the harmful dictatorial power that the five permanents were granted, but it can be eliminated without eliminating the Security Council itself (as will be discussed later here).

Consequently: In order to boot Israel or any other international rogue-nation out of the U.N., an amendment would first be needed, which would apply a degree of accountability to each member of the U.N. permanent Security Council, by stripping the provision that inappropriately applies their veto-power even over the consideration of any proposed amendment. Obviously: amending the Charter should be a matter for consideration only by the General Assembly — without any veto-power being held by any one nation. Amendment isn’t regular U.N. action: it concerns the Charter itself.

The biggest difference between a religious Scripture and a democratic constitution (such as the U.N. Charter was intended to be for the entire world) is that whereas the former (Scripture) includes no provision for its being amended, the latter (a democratic constitution) does — or else it instead is actually a religious Scripture, something to be taken only on faith, no democracy at all, nothing suitable for the Age of Science, and thus for a future of democracy. This faith-basis being the actual epistemological status of the U.N. Charter — unless and until its amendment-section becomes itself amended to what it needs to be — that Charter is a religious Scripture, and the U.N. is more a religion than a democracy of any kind, so long as there exists any nation that can veto any proposed change to the founding document. Though intended to be the emerging democratic constitution for the future world, the existing U.N. Charter is instead just a type of religion, and this is its Scripture. (Though, as noted, uncontroversial amendments may be considered in it; so, the U.N. isn’t fully a religious institution.)

Consequently, to address these problems, I propose that the members of the U.N. Security Council that wish to establish through the U.N. a democracy and transform the U.N. so as to abandon its current status as being a religion, push, at the U.N., relentlessly, for a measure to unlock the U.N. Charter — to enable it finally to be significantly amended and allow a two-thirds vote of the General Assembly to pass into international law as an Amendment to the emerging global Constitution, the no longer religion, but instead henceforth the democracy, of an unlocked Charter of the United Nations — thereby causing the existing Scripture to be henceforth a Constitution.

Unless and until this (the introduction of the General Assembly’s exclusive ability to amend the Charter) is done, there can be no progress, only continued regress to international dictatorship and a World War III, and so in the direction of even more global dictatorship — this time likely ending in global extermination (precisely what the U.N. was intended to avoid).

Any member of the Security Council who would oppose removing that provision — the veto-power’s extending even to any proposed amendment to the Charter — would be clearly an international pariah-Government and enemy of democracy, which all the rest of the world could then boycott and penalize outside the U.N. until that pariah-nation becomes defeated economically and thus effectively becomes coerced by economic means to become a decent member-state in the international community.

This is an existential issue for the future of a livable planet. A basic condition for progress is the elimination, from the Charter, of the clause:

“including all the permanent members of the Security Council.”

That phrase must be removed both from Article 108 and from Article 109, Paragraph 2, both of which say:

“108. Amendments to the present Charter shall come into force for all Members of the United Nations when they have been adopted by a vote of two-thirds of the members of the General Assembly and ratified in accordance with their respective

[individual national] constitutional processes by two-thirds of the Members of the United Nations, including all the permanent members of the Security Council.”

“109:2. Any alteration of the present Charter recommended by a two-thirds vote of the conference shall take effect when ratified in accordance with their respective constitutional processes by two thirds of the Members of the United Nations including all the permanent members of the Security Council.”

The five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council are: China, France, Russia, UK, and U.S. U.S. would try to block removal of that phrase “including all the permanent members of the Security Council.” On 14 May 2018, Russia’s Sputnik News bannered “UK Has no Plans to Move Embassy to Jerusalem, Disagrees With US on Issue – May”, and this indicates that the U.S. well might be the only member that would fight to block democratization of the U.N. — to unlock the Charter for all U.N. members.

The precipitating event for this call for correcting the Charter would be the virtually unanimous repugnance of the entire world other than the U.S., regarding Israel’s string of brazen in-your-face violations of the Charter and of much of international law. Taking advantage of this intense global outrage — plus of the many outrageous actions by the U.S. Government itself — provides a rare opportunity to make the long-delayed but essential reform of the U.N., as follows:

America is the only member, of the five permanent members of the Security Council, that is so under the boot of Israel and of the Sauds. America is controlled by its own aristocracy, which are heavily interlocked with those of Israel and especially of Saudi Arabia and its other vassals, such as UAE but more broadly including the Gulf Cooperation Council of Arabic fundamentalist-Sunni royal families — and that includes a large portion of the world’s wealth. The American portion of that Imperial alliance includes control over many of the world’s largest consumer-brands, and is thus (unlike either of its masters) especially highly vulnerable to international public-image problems, such as any consumer boycotts.

There might be a way to save the world. This might be the way to a progressive future, reversing the worst of what has happened after the death of FDR (who, more than any other person, laid the groundwork for the U.N.).

Though the U.S. Government might succeed in winning the UK’s support to block democratization of the U.N., such boycotts might produce a democratic victory, if not immediately, then still within a reasonably short time, such as happened when apartheid was removed from South Africa. But this victory would be not only for the Palestinians — it would be for all peoples everywhere — a world moving in the direction of international democracy, no longer like now, in the direction of increased international dictatorship.

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International Law

Whatever Happened To Due Process In International Relations?

Rahul D. Manchanda, Esq.

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It seems that recent events across the globe have further revealed a glaring hole within the framework and structure of international relations, law, and diplomacy – the complete and total lack of Due Process.

In each and every country around the world, from the local level all the way to the federal, there exists in criminal and civil jurisprudence the concept of Due Process – a concept which has been defined as the legal requirement that the state must respect all legal rights that are owed to a person.

Due process balances the power of law of the land and protects the individual person from it.

When a government harms a person without following the exact course of the law, this constitutes a due process violation, which offends the rule of law.

Due process has also been frequently interpreted as limiting laws and legal proceedings so that judges, instead of legislators, may define and guarantee fundamental fairness, justice, and liberty.

Analogous to the concepts of natural justice, and procedural justice used in various other jurisdictions, the interpretation of due process is sometimes expressed as a command that the government must not be unfair to the people or abuse them physically.

Due process developed from clause 39 of Magna Carta in England.

Reference to due process first appeared in a statutory rendition of clause 39 in 1354 AD: “No man of what state or condition he be, shall be put out of his lands or tenements nor taken, nor disinherited, nor put to death, without he be brought to answer by due process of law.”

When English and American law gradually diverged, due process was not upheld in England but became incorporated in the U.S. Constitution.

While there is no definitive list of the “required procedures” that due process requires, Judge Henry Friendly (July 3, 1903 – March 11, 1986), a prominent judge in the United States, who sat on the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit from 1959 through 1974, generated a list that remains highly influential, as to both content and relative priority:

(1) An unbiased tribunal;

(2) Notice of the proposed action and the grounds asserted for it;

(3) Opportunity to present reasons why the proposed action should not be taken;

(4) The right to present evidence, including the right to call witnesses;

(5) The right to know opposing evidence;

(6) The right to cross-examine adverse witnesses;

(7) A decision based exclusively on the evidence presented;

(8) Opportunity to be represented by counsel;

(9) Requirement that the tribunal prepare a record of the evidence presented; and

(10) Requirement that the tribunal prepare written findings of fact and reasons for its decision.

The international news media, on behalf of various governmental agencies, intelligence organizations, private deep state oligarch run businesses, has been blasting from time to time, allegations and accusations leveled by one country or empire versus another, most notably by the Western NATO powers against the Eurasian ones, that of Russia, Syria, Iran, and North Korea, China and others, while the converse has not occurred at all.

This should tell us something.

Lately, the Skripal poisoning attempts, the multiple alleged Bashar Assad Syrian government chemical weapons attacks, and countless others have dominated the headlines.

Russia has been screaming from the rooftops that their greatest concern is that the USA or West will manufacture some type of false flag attack to blame it on them.

The only solution then is that both the United Nations and the International Criminal Court must be given the power, funding, and support by countries that are being victimized by false flag allegations to be empowered to put a stop to these irresponsible lobbings and accusations of criminal conduct by one set of nations versus the others.

When Due Process is absent from our nations’ courts, police departments, law enforcement agencies, then innocent people get thrown into jail in criminal cases or bankrupted in civil matters.

But when nations are not afforded Due Process in the course of international relations, terrorism breaks out, and so does the possibility of nuclear annihilation of all the worlds’ people.

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International Law

Assessing failures of “Humanitarian Intervention”: Finding a “non-traditional”approach

Anant Mishra

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Within the context of traditional theory of international relations humanitarian intervention is referred as “intervention-from-above”, highlighting the “tactics of intervention” by various states, international institutions, government sponsored think tanks and international aid organizations. At the global level, flow of international aid is unidirectional (traditionally flowing from North to South); although, intervention is not only limited to North, but may occur regionally in the South too. Historically, the world has witnessed tensions highlighting “certain drawbacks” in the global legal system particularly within the context of a donor country “crossing humanitarian boundaries, sovereignty, the principle of non-intervention, while purposefully meddling in the regional affairs of the host”, violating every nomenclature of humanitarian assistance and instigating dilemma among probable future host economies.

Today, host countries are forced to question the objectives of donor economies. Many states begin formulating an “after-effect strategy” in case the donor intends to violate, in the light of many least economic developed economies being host, fewer states respond. From the aforementioned arguments, the questions that challenge policy makers of today are: Does humanitarian intervention bring results? Does it truly assist the host economy? If it does, which is the best effective and efficient plan of action?

Policy makers must focus their attention on the “flaws in international law highlighted in the aforementioned arguments”. Furthermore, historically it has been seen that, nations ignore legal guidelines and international laws which does not benefit it while giving jurisprudence to politics than the international laws.

Today, the focus of the article will be on the three traditional pillars of humanitarian intervention, the donor’s “capability” to assist the host, the donors “interests” in providing assistance to the host, and the “after-effects” on the host; in an effort to “effectively” understand and identify factors responsible for recent “negative outcomes” from humanitarian interventions while identifying alternative non-traditional approaches of humanitarian intervention shifting the focus of political thinkers and strategic experts from military theories, while giving special emphasis on the role of non-government development agencies and civil society organizations. Keeping all relevant actors in play, it is literally impossible to predict the success of “traditional grass-root focused ”humanitarian intervention especially when the “much advanced top-down approach” continue to fail.

The quest to identify non-traditional theories of humanitarian intervention, also termed by strategic experts as “bottom to top approach”, will be the focus of this article. It will be safe to say that, such non-traditional approaches, will depend majorly, on intervention policies of humanitarian aid agencies and public works development focussed institutions of non-governmental organizations, development focussed civil society and volunteer groups from the masses, civil rights advocacy groups and organizations advocating for a specific society.

Decoding the myths

Political and Strategic experts have, classified, two types of traditional “humanitarian intervention” theories. The first theory relies on aggressive military intervention to fulfil strategic objectives of the host and is carried under the leadership of one or more host states, or by unanimously approaching the United Nations Security Council and other regional and international institutions.

The first theory comprises of intervention tactics, which could fulfil positive humanitarian objectives of great benefit for the host, however it remains secondary to the intervention objective implemented by the host. For example, repetitive acts of crimes against humanity, horrific abuses by successive regimes could come to an end through an intervention which is designed specifically by the host government. It is important to note that, such intervention is rare, especially considering the “humanitarian” view of this form of intervention, instead their long presence could result in oppression against the masses forcing the host to use all forms of excessive force.

Some historical examples include devastation of Germany during World War II, the Liberation of Bangladesh in 1971, and the invasion of Cambodia by Vietnam in 1968. Policy makers must understand that, interventions at such level involves specific military and political goals that starts with “intervention and occupation” for an indefinite time.

In this form of humanitarian intervention, genocide, crimes against humanity and violence induced on local masses are common. Such acts are destitute to walk among the strategic and military objectives of the host. However, in regions where the host intervened without any strategic objectives, for example intervention on Kurdish regions since World War I, and military confrontation against the indigenous tribes of Amazon, excessive violence induced against human life have been categorically side-lined or purposefully ignored.

In the second theory of humanitarian intervention, human rights abuses instigate an “aggressive response”, although without any strategic advantage. If the intervention does takes place, it will be implemented without a “clear sight, objective or commitment” on the host intervening state, the commitment would be largely to challenge the political structure or the authority responsible for carrying such horrific crimes. Strategic and political experts refer this scenario, which remains active in the Middle East today, “the CNN factor”, an aggressive wide scale visual representation of horrors and distress particularly depicting crimes against humanity, stressing the masses of West to force their governments to response, particularly “Americanised” nations.

If the agendas established by policy makers are restricted, and the actors tasked to “bull-work” the humanitarian intervention agendas follow strict discipline and designated guidelines, simultaneously earning the trust of the masses, humanitarian intervention in this platform could bring relief to the socio-economic havoc wretched life of the masses. This initiative has been implemented for the Kurds living in northern Iraq post-Gulf War, in the early years of relief and rehabilitation initiatives in Somalia (before invasion),and deployment of UNPROFOR aid and relief units for the then civil war-stricken masses of Croatia, the then Bosnia. In the aforementioned examples, however, the strategic objectives to eliminate the factors responsible for the crisis were absent, on larger extent, the crisis devastated the lives of millions.

If the state intervening in the crisis receives armed responses that could increase volatility in the region, then the state forces intervening could deploy evasive tactics and steer away from the confrontation. The participation of Washington has been vital with relevance to its extensive experience in humanitarian intervention. During Clinton administration, the US aggressively shifted its policy of “strategic objectives dipped humanitarian intervention” and an example to this “doctrine” was largely visible during the “initial deployment of medical and food aid workers” deployed in Somalia, eliminating the “strategic discourse” while establishing an example of “stringent and self-restraining” regime. The new established theory was a perfect example of “intended humanitarian intervention” of a state, having an edge over responses taken by globally established international institution.

The change in international relations dynamics followed by acute regional, religion/ sectoral “coloured” violent conflicts has resulted into numerous debates on “humanitarian intervention as a viable tool in global politics”. The debate however, failed to separate the two theories of humanitarian intervention aforementioned discussed. This has resulted in “fragmented policies which not only failed but also became a principle factor in fuelling regional conflicts, further deteriorating an already deteriorated situation” leading to discontent and apprehension towards humanitarian intervention, while fuelling rage among the local masses and apprehensive governments towards UN actions. Clearing the “thick air” is not the purpose of this article, but many progressive steps could be taken in an effort to identify alternative theories.

Establishing outcomes from intervention

To begin with, a political tool such as an “intervention”, if introduced as a traditional mechanism in foreign policy, is troublesome even without the presence of “strategic action”, witnessed from the example of US intervention in Vietnam, or Soviet Union intervention of Afghanistan.

Using military superiority and using it to achieve desired political objectives/agendas is increasingly becoming difficult inspite of the “rightist regimes in the West”. The traditional tools of foreign policy (aggressively used by Washington during post-World War II until the end of Cold War) such as “cloak and dagger diplomacy”, “gunboat diplomacy” which elevated Washington’s position as a hegemon, benefitted many US intelligence agencies in holding many economies hostage without any resistance. In the light of globalisation, tradecraft tactics evolved and advanced weaponry, began playing a much larger role.

In 1983 when a single truck exploded inside the barracks of US soldiers, Washington which was already on an edge, withdrew the remaining stationed US forces and shifted the US foreign policy which was focussed on rebuilding and restructuring city of Beirut during post-1982 war. An aggressive President Bush Jrdid not undertake restructuring and rehabilitation initiatives in Iraq, which could have forced Washington to deploy forces in Iraq which could have instigated terror factions in targeting US soldiers. Bush understood the “careful policies implemented by Clinton administration ”particularly the actions taken by Washington in Somalia an example of “self-limiting” the objective to strictly humanitarian intervention. His objectives were very clear, turning Iraq’s fate into Bosnia was all he feared.

Since 1989, the traditional concepts of international relations have evolved. The pragmatic but traditional theories that were applicable in IR are fairly limited. This has largely been a “misconception” among traditional international relations theorists, military and political experts making their expectations uncleared:

a) Even today, traditional theorists continue to believe, that cooperation and coordination among the nations could only be effective within the UN.

b) The aforementioned notion comes from the successful restoration of Kuwaiti sovereignty after the deployment of UN forces. The resultant of the conflict created a biased approach on a half-baked truth followed by rhetorical idea that combined security initiatives would be sufficient to mobilise large troops and financial assistance to implement resolutions passed by the United Nations Security Council. The traditional theorists failed to acknowledge the presence of Washington’s “hunt for oil” and Israeli’s “security dilemma”. They also failed to foresee the lust for Middle East economies to acquire nuclear weapons.

c) Numerous severe simultaneous humanitarian crisis erupted which resulted in dictatorial regimes and failed states. The continent of Africa witnessed subsequent collapse of imperial regimes while the Central Asia witnessed the collapse of Soviet Union and the then Yugoslavia, which paved the way for ethnic conflicts, civil war and nationalist dictatorial regimes.

d) It was by now evident that, cost-efficient intervention will not be effective and even an objective focussed intervention will not bear desired results fearing which no political leadership was willing to accept the high cost of collateral damage during uninsured even in the name of “vital national interests.” Reinforced by poor political leadership in intervened states and their failure to adhere or implement any concrete domestic policy along with subsequent challenges to domestic security, decision makers “waited and watched”.

e) In colonial dominated regions particularly Africa, Latin America and Caribbean and South Asia, the concept of“ humanitarian intervention” represented the interest of traditional colonial forces in the region, paving a way to regain dominate the lost territories, particularly those with significant Muslim population. This “delusion” idea was further fuelled by the West’s retention of oil in the Gulf but refraining from taking any action against “systematic killing, ethnic cleansing” of Muslims in Serbia. Furthermore, the use of technology in the urban setting especially in the regions of Mogadishu to hunt warlord Aidid, reinforced their idea.

Strategy or Politics?

Bringing the focus back on political leadership, Bosnia was “political fore-play” which backfired. Argued by ethics professors even today, the reluctance to interfere, even after witnessing the horrors in war, mass killings, rape, gender-based violence and genocide reminding the days of World War II gripped Europe, the world has been reminded of another holocaust. It is nothing less than a betrayal to the lives of people who took a pledge “Never Again”, the pledge was disrespected by the ugly truths of international political world. When thousands of leftists were brutally murdered in Singapore, the West particularly Washington compensated the loss of lives with the fear of communist controlled Singapore. When Indonesia invaded East Timor, dismantling all trumps (sovereignty, national and territorial integrity and right to existence) of international relations, instigating a policy on mass rape, murder, extensive killing and genocide which resulted in the deaths of over half of the then population, intervention in all forms remain absent.

Perhaps evidently, inspite of genocide carried by communist regime on large scale in Cambodia, forced the West not to intervene (presence and support of China)in the Vietnam invasion of Cambodia which resulted in the end of Khmer Rouge. Policy makers must understand that, the decisions under taken by the West form a pattern: strategic objectives outweigh even the harshest and deplorable humanitarian crisis.

The aforementioned statements points towards the fact that, there is an imminent need to re-evaluate and reassess humanitarian intervention policy. Today, the masses will not accept the decision to “fight someone else’s war” irrespective of deplorable circumstances. This could come as a relief for many rightist political leadership, but it practically “chokes” the nation’s policy for humanitarian intervention.

A failed political leadership to blame?

It is important to note that, the political leadership reluctance highlights the “inadequate importance” given to the segment of humanitarian intervention in international diplomacy coupled with the “saga of failure” of global powers and international established institutions failures in the past. Coupled with the failure of political will and leadership, identifying “strategic interests” and formulating a strategy resulted in some of the worst humanitarian crisis in Haiti, Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda. The larger responsible segment of this failure goes to liberal “appeasing” foreign policy coupled with strategic interests and domestic security preferences. Historically, Washington was pushed to take a leading role and pulled by its own masses particularly when the “stakes were too high” overseas. This “tendency” continues to thrive within power nations which is evident from the on-going Rohingya crisis in South Asia.

The fundamental issue with humanitarian intervention lies largely on “intervention” aspect rather than “humanitarian” support, the larger perception remains the same “internal violence being the only factor capable of changing the dynamics of the domestic policy of a state”. Policy makers must note that, if the nation undertakes the responsibility of providing“ clean water, food, medicine, temporary shelter for refugees and internal displaced conflict-ridden masses” limiting the action to strictly humanitarian, then nations should not consider it an “intervention” even if the host country has not acknowledged or given a formal consent. If the intervening state intents to meddle with the host state’s internal issues particularly in times of internal conflict or civil war, then the intervening state will fail even if its intentions are “humanity centred”.

It is imperative for policy makers to identify or formulate strategies of “humanitarian intervention” without instigating further violence, fuelling crimes against humanity, genocide, factors leading to further deterioration of the host state.

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