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The issue of peace in North Korea and Asia

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Much has already been decided in the best way for peace on the Korean peninsula and, indirectly, in the South Pacific region and even for the US power projection onto Asia.

In fact, after almost five years since the proclamation of his byungjin policy in March 2013, Kim Jong Un has announced “a new strategic policy line”.

It is worth recalling that, in Kim Jong Un’s thought, byungjin is the parallel development of the economy and military and strategic research and supremacy.

I make no secret of the fact that – as stated by the North Korea’s leadership in a letter sent to me – much has been done by me, who has tried to analyze the issue of North Korean nuclear and missile systems with the help of my long-standing friendship for North Korea and of the trust I have gained there over many years – trust that also many US friends have ensured to me.

However, I owe much to the free and friendly discussions I had on all the most important political and strategic issues with Kim Yong-Nam, the President of the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly of North Korea – an extraordinary figure who was also North Korean Foreign Minister from 1983 to 1998, the year in which he was appointed to his current post.

Kim Yong Nam was, inter alia, the promoter of many North Korea’s openings to Africa – new strategic spaces that will be essential also in the upcoming talks between North Korea and the United States.

It is certainly not by mere coincidence that Kim Yong-Nam was present at the opening ceremony of the 2018 Winter Olympics. He is particularly trusted by the Supreme Leader, Kim Jong-Un, and national security – and hence North Korea’s positioning in the world – is currently the most important issue for the country.

If the byungjin policy “has been successful” – as Kim Jong-Un has recently stated – this is also due to the policy line that the North Korean leader has put in place since the beginning of his power, in 2012: reducing internal bureaucracy; renewing the country’s positioning in the world; making the most of the strategic threat of nuclear missiles to later achieve the eminently peaceful, political and economic goals of his policy “line”.

The core of the current “turning point” in North Korea’s policy line lies in Kim Jong-Un’s latest (and first) visit to China.

The Chinese President, Xi Jinping, wanted to know whether, pending a future meeting – already scheduled – between Kim Jong-Un and US President Trump, either of them could make improper moves that could create the conditions for a future war – something that China absolutely wants to avoid.

Therefore Kim Jong-Un reassured the Chinese President that North Korea wanted to negotiate in good faith, with a view to achieving a new equilibrium in the whole  South Asian ocean region.

China also wanted to check whether Kim Jong-Un’s moves against the United States were only a way to play for time or rather a real willingness to negotiate.

If this had not happened, China would have moved its pawns directly in the United States.

In this regard, however, Kim Jong-Un provided every credible guarantee.

Moreover, China wants North Korea’s greater bilateral openness with it – a North Korea which, over the last few years, has slowly put an end to its traditional links with the Chinese Communism of the “Four Modernizations” and beyond.

Xi Jinping’s guarantee helped also the United States to understand that the negotiations were realistic and that there was no danger of imminent war on the Korean peninsula – a military confrontation that China would have avoided anyway, for better or worse.

On the other hand, Kim Jong-Un has always pointed out – also to President Xi Jinping in his first, but not last trip to China -that he believed President Trump’s threats were fully credible and that any US attack on North Korea would create tough reactions in China.

China does not want to have military borders with the United States and also believes that the presence of North American forces in South Korea is also aimed at the containment of Communist China.

This is the strategic usefulness of North Korea for China, but this also applies to Russia.

In both cases, Russia and China would be greatly damaged by any military operation entailing confrontation with the North Korean forces – a clash which would inevitably enlarge to the Russian and Chinese borders with South Korea.

Kim Jong-Un has used his strategic position with great intelligence.

Moreover, the United States cannot really wage war against North Korea: 85% of North Korean nuclear facilities are less than 100 kilometers from the border with China and the latter has already deployed at least 160,000 soldiers in its border area with North Korea, who can move quickly to the clash region.

Hence any war between China and the United States on the Korean peninsula depends on whether the United States really wants to knock China out – and this would be a suicidal move for the United States.

This is the reason why China has always thought that the two countries, namely North Korea and the United States, should have started dealing with each other long time ago.

Even with the bilateral mechanism alone.

This is also the reason why the news of bilateral talks between Kim Jong-Un and President Trump was the best thing that China could expect.

Hence, over and above full autonomy for both countries, China would alsolike to sit at the negotiating table to prevent either country from harming Chinese interest or making bilateral peace at China’s expense.

Whatever the outcome of the talks between President Trump and Kim Jong-Un will be, if it does not harm China’s direct interest in the region, it will be welcome for China which will anyway have time to make this US Presidency come to an end and clarify the future balance of power in the region – balance that no future US President will later be in a position to undermine.

We also imagine that China has already prepared military plans if President Trump or even Kim Jong-Un (albeit this is far less likely) did not fulfil their obligations, thus creating tension or even a “limited war” on the Korean peninsula.

It is easy to think that President Xi Jinping has already prepared plans to control the region on his own, without the support of either of the two countries, namely the United States and North Korea.

It is precisely the new linkage between Kim Jong-Un and Xi Jinping that has set the pace for the future peace talks.

“The issue of denuclearization can be resolved if South Korea and the United States respond to our efforts with goodwill and create an atmosphere of peace and stability while taking coordinated, progressive and synchronized measures to achieve peace”.

It is a statement made by Kim Jong-Un, as reported by the New China News Agency.

Currently North Korea wants to make it clear to the United States and to the rest of the West that it wants only one thing: the slackening of the joint US and South Korean pressure on the country, as well as the start of credible economic development or its full involvement in theregional globalization of Southeast Asia.

In fact, this was the dual purpose of North Korea’snuclear and missile systems: to pose such a vast threat as to make North Korea find itself more in the spotlight and no longer remain in the twilight zone of the old Cold War, thus enabling it to hold tough and definitive negotiations – almost on an equal footing – leading to strategic autonomy and economic internationalization.

With specific reference to Japan, it is both tempted by the new phase and suspicious of the future negotiations between President Trump and Kim Jong-Un.

On the one hand, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe wants President Trump not to neglect – in the negotiations with Kim Jong-Un – the issue of short- and intermediate-range missiles, which can easily hit Japan.

In fact, in spite of Japan, new Secretary of State Mike Pompeo had recently made it clear that the talks between North Korea and the United States would be focused only on intercontinental ballistic missiles.

Moreover, in the future bilateral talks, Shinzo Abe wants the United States to raise the long-disputed issue of the Japanese citizens allegedly “kidnapped” by North Korea.

It is an always fundamental issue for Japanese propaganda, but central to Shinzo Abe’s career.

Therefore, instead of asking for a place at the negotiating table, Japan delegates the United States.

We do not believe this is a forward-looking policy.

If peace with North Korea were finally achieved, this could also have positive results for Shinzo Abe.

President Trump has promised to Japan he will do everything for achieving North Korea’s full denuclearization and for eliminating all weapons of mass destruction still existing in the Pyongyang area, as well as for improving the “strategic triangle” between South Korea, Japan and the United States.

Kim Jong-Un, however, will always deal on a very broad basis of topics, ranging from missile engines to carriers, from nuclear devices to chemical and bacteriological weapons.

A wide range of issues that Kim Jong-Un will tackle with the United States for as long as it takes, considering that the missiles themselves attracted the attention of the United States and its regional allies to hold effective negotiations that would have never taken place without weapons of mass destruction and ballistic launches.

In that case North Korea would have been a sort of irrelevant maritime Tibet, without strategic clout, without autonomy and even without the ability to hold serious talks with “friendly” States, namely China, Iran and the Russian Federation.

Hence the political usefulness of North Korea’s nuclear and missile system has been very high.

In fact, it is the level of political and military autonomy that will allow futurenegotiations with President Trump – probably not on an equal footing, but at least with similar strategic potentials and with a fully credible US attack-reaction capacity.

It was exactly what Kim Jong-Un had been looking for years, so as to make the best use of his military system, with a view to getting out of his currently-closed economy and enable North Korea to experience positive economic globalization, not linked to the dollar and regional raw materials cycles.

It was the Russian Federation that officially informed the United States of Kim Jong-Un’ readiness to deal withit, although Russia is currently not so optimistic about the results of future talks between Kim Jong-Un and President Trump.

Firstly, the Russian Federation views the sanctions against North Korea – never approved by the UN Security Council –  as serious obstacles to peace and as US illegal actions.

Moreover, Russia believes that North Korea’s nuclear and missile military system has a fully defensive nature and is mainly designed to avoid a regime change in North Korea itself, obviously sponsored by the United States and implemented starting from South Korea, which would also bear the most severe brunt.

Once again Russia is not fully convinced that the United States is credible, given its choice to continue military exercises with South Korea after a brief temporary stop  during the Peyongchang Winter Olympics.

In fact, in an official statement made on March 3 last, the North Korean government announced it would respond militarily to new joint exercises between South Korea and the United States.

Furthermore, if the peace talks between President Trump and Kim Jong-Un failed, the Russian Federation would create a multilateral network that should improve North Korea’ security and encourage less brutal negotiations by the United States.

For Iran the issue of North Korea-US bilateral talks is even more complex. In fact, while Iran had no official reaction when, on March 8 last, the White House announced it had accepted Kim Jong-Un’s invitation to hold new bilateral talks, it is mainly interested in the new configuration – if any – of the JCPOA, i.e. the Treaty on nuclear weapons and their production in the Shi’ite Islamic Republic.

In fact, Iran fears that if the North Korean negotiationsgo well for Trump, the US President could have many incentives not to renew the JCPOA.

Moreover, if the American strategy keeps on defining the axis between Iran, North Korea and Iraq as the “axis of evil”, Iran fears that peace with North Korea will make the US hawks’ attention focus only on Iran.

Hence the skepticism of the Iranian leaders, who do not believe that a “revanchist” US President and America First can really reach a true agreement with North Korea.

Iran wants the maximum opening of negotiations for the reduction of North Korea’s military, nuclear and missile potential with China, the Russian Federation, Japan and the European Union.

Certainly multilateral negotiations would be such as to guarantee everyone from the beginning, but we believe that success in the relations between the United States alone and  Kim Jong Un’s new policy line, will open up stable prospects for redesigning the whole Pacific region.

Moreover, we believe that never more than now Kim Jong-Un is both realistic and sincere in his willingness to negotiate with the United States.

Advisory Board Co-chair Honoris Causa Professor Giancarlo Elia Valori is an eminent Italian economist and businessman. He holds prestigious academic distinctions and national orders. Mr. Valori has lectured on international affairs and economics at the world’s leading universities such as Peking University, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Yeshiva University in New York. He currently chairs “International World Group”, he is also the honorary president of Huawei Italy, economic adviser to the Chinese giant HNA Group. In 1992 he was appointed Officier de la Légion d’Honneur de la République Francaise, with this motivation: “A man who can see across borders to understand the world” and in 2002 he received the title “Honorable” of the Académie des Sciences de l’Institut de France. “

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East Asia

The ‘Multiplier Effect’ of BRICS+

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The main hallmark of China’s chairmanship in the BRICS grouping in 2022 has been the unveiling of plans to institutionalize the BRICS+ format and to explore the possibilities of expanding the core of the BRICS bloc. The current debate regarding the future trajectories of the BRICS+ format centers on whether the expansion of the bloc is to proceed one by one by adding new countries to the BRICS core, or via the format of “integration of integrations”, namely the creation of a platform for the cooperation of regional arrangements in which BRICS countries are members. At this stage, it appears that both tracks are possible and have their pros and cons. But there is one factor in the regional “integration of integrations” model that has particular merit – it is the “BRICS+” multiplier that allows for a significant extension in the outreach undertaken by core BRICS economies with respect to the rest of the Global South.

In terms of scale, the effects of the two formats of BRICS expansion may be mathematically illustrated by the difference between the arithmetic and geometric progression. If the one-by-one expansion in the core of the BRICS grouping represents the minimalism of the arithmetic progression, the BRICS+ format of integration of integrations can be seen as a far more extensive and ambitious undertaking characterized by a geometric progression. With respect to the arithmetic progression, the waves of the expansion in the BRICS core may involve a sequential addition of one or several countries representing the most significant heavyweights (possibly members of G20 from the Global South). The alternative is the aggregation of the regional integration blocs of all of the five BRICS members – represented by the BEAMS platforms consisting of BIMSTEC, Eurasian Economic Union, the ASEAN-China FTA, Mercosur and the South African Customs Union – leading to the addition of up to 25 members (the 5 times 5 geometric progression – or the 5 BRICS taken to the power of 2) of the BRICS+ circle that are the regional neighbors/partners of BRICS economies.

This BRICS+ geometric progression can be taken further to the next level whereby a wider circle of countries is included into the enlarged platform that comprises the African Union in Africa, CELAC in Latin America and the Eurasian economies from the Global South. The Eurasian constellation of developing economies can be formed on the basis of the aggregation of the main regional integration blocs such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), ASEAN, SAARC, EAEU. Such an extended platform across all three continents of the Global South may be termed as TRIA (Trilateral Intercontinental Alliance) and it comprises nearly 125-130 developing economies (depending on the exact methodological approach of including the Eurasian economies). This second sequence of extending the BRICS+ platform results in a “5 times 5 times 5” geometric progression – or the 5 BRICS economies taken to the power of 3.

These stages of progression in the extension of the BRICS+ circle can be taken to an even higher level if one is to account for all of the bilateral/plurilateral trade deals, digital alliances and other accords that may be multilateralized on the basis of the BRICS+ platform. For example, the Israel-Mercosur FTA or the SACU-EFTA FTA could be extended to include more developing countries from the BRICS+ circle. At this stage the combinatorics of matching and aggregating the multitudes of alliances along the BRICS+ platform kicks in – each of the main regions and regional integration grouping from the Global South has its own cob-web of alliances that can be shared throughout this extended network of Global South.

Such additional multiplier effects will be all the more powerful, the greater the openness and inclusiveness of the aggregated BRICS+ platform and the more connectivity there is across the alliances concluded by developing economies with their partners from across the globe. In other words, in order for the multiplier effects to be increased the BRICS+ platform of integration of integrations needs to be predicated on alliances that are scalable and capable of connecting with other regional blocs (regional alliances that can be “globalized”). This in turn may be facilitated by particular emphasis placed on building platforms for regional development institutions (with standardized protocols for investment projects, including with respect to PPPs); greater scope for digital economic alliances that may be particularly amenable to scale and replication.

Potentially this sequential approach to building alliances across the Global South on the basis of the BRICS+ “integration of integrations” could become a basis for re-starting the globalization process in the world economy bottom-up (from the level of countries and regional blocs) rather than top-down (solely from the level of global organizations). In fact, this “integration of integrations” sequence may prove superior to the previous attempts at top-down wholesale liberalization via “Washington consensus” for the following reasons:

  • Greater gradualism and connectivity of country and regional integration roadmaps with the resulting global pattern of liberalization
  • Greater flexibility: there may be room for revision and corrections to the resulting global pattern at the local level
  • Greater accordance of the global pattern of alliances and integration with local/country-level and regional peculiarities and exigencies
  • Greater political sustainability and feasibility of the resulting global pattern of alliances that is predicated on the cooperative network of regional alliances

This greater sustainability and flexibility of the bottom-up globalization process as a network of alliances rather than a rigid framework that is to be implemented across the globe without due account of the regional and country-level peculiarities argues in favor of looking for ways to render such a model of globalization more feasible and effective.

Under this scenario of a network-type globalization what would be the role of global institutions such as the WTO, IMF, World Bank? In many ways it would remain crucial for the sustainability of the construct of the reshaped global economic architecture. The global institutions would receive the additional mandate of coordinating the regional networks and development institutions:

  • IMF: coordination of regional financing arrangements (RFAs)
  • World Bank: coordination of regional development banks
  • WTO: coordination of regional integration arrangements

There will also be a need for global institutions to focus more on resolving global issues, including global imbalances. This in turn would allow the global economic system to overcome the current problem of regional and global institutions/organizations operating frequently as substitutes rather than mutually reinforcing complements.

In sum, the BRICS+ track of country-by-country additions to the BRICS core if pursued solely on its own without building a broader network of alliances may result in minor alterations to the status-quo and a missed opportunity for the Global South and the broader global economy. At the same time, the possibilities offered by the “integration of integrations” track for BRICS+ are substantial, provided that such a platform is open, inclusive and ensures connectivity across regional integration arrangements – this will deliver the much needed “multiplier effect” in the process of economic cooperation and can set off a new process of globalization that connects regional arrangements in the developed and the developing world. Such a paradigm may be the real mission of BRICS after all – the value of BRICS is not in each of them taken separately, but rather in them being connected together to form a construct that supports the edifice of the global economic architecture.

From our partner RIAC

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Ukraine’s losses are China’s gains

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A woman walks past sandbags piled for defensive protection, in Odessa, Ukraine. © UNICEF/Siegfried Modola

The conflict in Ukraine will have major strategic consequences for Chinese foreign policy in the Indo-Pacific. It will promote the deepening of Russian–Chinese economic cooperation that will make both countries more resilient to Western economic pressure. Long-term instability in Europe will make it more difficult for the United States to boost its Pacific presence for years to come with significant US financial and military resources being drawn toward supporting Ukraine.

The conflict has demonstrated that the West is not able to impose sanctions on a major economy without damaging its own stability. The war has also shown the effectiveness of the Russian nuclear deterrent, making even a limited Western intervention unthinkable.

China will be the main beneficiary of the Ukraine crisis. But this is not reflected in China’s political rhetoric which has been carefully calculated to avoid any major fallout with the European Union and other developed countries, while also maintaining close cooperation with Russia.

The official Chinese position has remained consistent with the statement made by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in February 2022 at the outbreak of the war: China is concerned with the violence and wants it to stop. It maintains that the territorial integrity and security interests of all parties need to be respected. China also maintains that NATO enlargement is partially responsible for the crisis.

On the economic front, China has seized the major strategic opportunities provided by the war. During the first four months of 2022, trade between Russia and China increased by 25.9 per cent. Russian exports to China grew by 37.8 per cent, to US$30.85 billion. The physical volume of natural gas exports also jumped 15 per cent.

China is in line to supplant the European Union as Russia’s main economic partner. The Chinese Ambassador to Russia Zhang Hanhui has called upon Chinese businesspeople to ‘fill the void’ left in the Russian market by outgoing Western businesses. Cooperation with China has contributed to Russia’s federal budget surplus between January–April 2022 despite the war. Maintaining this financial and economic stability appears to be Russia’s strategy as it continues to press in Ukraine.

By 2023, most or all bilateral trade is expected to be conducted in renminbi. Chinese companies and brands will likely dominate large segments of the Russian consumer market and will become Russia’s key industrial and technological partners. There is also a growing trend towards a large part of Russian trade being conducted with third countries in renminbi.

With the expected expansion of the logistical infrastructure, China will obtain a major source of strategic commodities. China will be able to procure these commodities at significant discounts because Russia will be isolated from many other markets and China will be using its own currency. This will significantly reduce the West’s ability to leverage economic pressure points against China.

Some of China’s top-tier global companies are visibly reducing their presence in Russia because secondary sanctions could affect their operations in international markets. But cooperation in many areas will be overtaken by second-tier corporations with limited or no global exposure. Such companies will still be powerful enough to operate in the Russian market. Their operations will be serviced by specialised banks with no exposure in the West, like in Iran.

Strategically, this transition — coupled with deep internal changes in the Russian political economy — will make Russia largely immune to economic warfare. For the foreseeable future, the West will have no other means to deter Russia in Europe except for costly military options. In turn, this will provide major strategic opportunities for China in the Pacific.

The military lessons of the war for China are too early and too difficult to assess based on available data. One characteristic of the Ukrainian conflict is an unprecedented scale of propaganda and misinformation from all sides.

But two clear lessons have emerged from the war so far. First, US and NATO allies will always try to avoid a direct military confrontation with a major nuclear power. Even if a power is fighting a full-scale war at their doorstep. Second, economic war on Russia has caused significant problems for Western economies, including rising inflationary pressures and falling growth rates. Any comparable actions against China, an economy ten times bigger, will devastate much of the world economy. This makes any such action extremely unlikely.

From our partner RIAC

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Taiwan dispute, regional stability in East Asia and US policy towards it

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In the 1950s, armed confrontation erupted between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (ROC) over vital islands in the Taiwan Strait. ROC-controlled islands were bombarded by the PRC on two distinct occasions in the 1950s. The US retaliated by acting actively on favor of the ROC. Tensions in the Taiwan Strait were exacerbated by US policy toward East Asia during the early Cold War. In late 1949 and early 1950, American authorities were prepared to allow PRC forces to cross the Taiwan Strait and defeat Chiang, but when the Korean War broke out in June 1950, the US moved its Seventh Fleet into the Taiwan Strait to keep the conflict from expanding south. The advent of the Seventh Fleet enraged the Chinese Communists, who moved soldiers from Taiwan to the Korean front in preparation for an attack. This served to postpone military conflict in the Strait until after the Korean War, when the US withdrew its fleet.

Beijing claims there is only “One China,” of which Taiwan is a part. It considers the People’s Republic of China to be China’s only legitimate government, a position it refers to as the “One-China concept,” and desires Taiwan’s eventual “unification” with the mainland.

China, Mongolia, Taiwan, Tibet, and the South China Sea remain part of the ROC, according to Taiwan’s KMT-drafted constitution. The KMT opposes Taiwan’s independence and has repeatedly advocated for tighter ties with China. However, in light of recent election setbacks, KMT leaders have pondered whether the party’s position on the 1992 Consensus should be changed. The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), the KMT’s main adversary, has never supported the 1992 Consensus’s understanding. President Tsai, who is also the DPP’s leader, has refused to recognize the consensus in writing. Instead, she has endeavored to find a different formulation that Beijing will accept. Tsai declared she was “Elected President in accordance with the Constitution of the Republic of China,” which is a One-China document, and that she would “Safeguard the Sovereignty and Territory of the Republic of China” in her 2016 inaugural address. Tsai also promised to “Handle Cross-Strait Affairs in accordance with the Republic of China Constitution, the Act Governing Relations Between People of Taiwan Area and the People of the Mainland Area, and other applicable legislation.” Beijing, on the other hand, rejected this statement and severed ties with Taiwan.

UN Membership Status for Taiwan

China directly rejects the participation of Taiwan in other international organizations that only allow governments to join. Taiwan complains its absence on a regular basis, while the US advocates for Taiwan’s meaningful involvement in such groups. Taiwan, on the other hand, is a member of over forty organizations, the most of which are regional in nature, such as the Asian Development Bank and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum, as well as the World Trade Organization. On several additional bodies, it has observer or other status. Only fourteen countries have formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan. No government has ever maintained formal diplomatic relations with both China and Taiwan at the same time.

Economic Situation of Taiwan

Taiwan’s economy is still based on trade with China, the island’s most important commercial partner. However, their economic relationship has been strained in recent years, partially as a result of Beijing’s pressure on Taiwan and Taiwanese leaders’ rising concerns about the island’s overdependence on Chinese trade. President Ma, who served from 2008 to 2016, signed over twenty agreements with the PRC, notably the 2010 Cross-Straits Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement, in which the two countries agreed to remove trade barriers. Direct sea, air, and mail ties between China and Taiwan were reestablished after decades of prohibition. They also agreed that banks, insurers, and other financial service providers would be permitted to operate in both markets. Tsai’s main program, the New Southbound Policy, has had some success in increasing trade and investment with Southeast Asian and Indo-Pacific countries. Between 2016, when the project was announced, and 2021, trade between Taiwan and the eighteen nations increased by more than $50 billion. Nonetheless, Taiwan’s exports to China reached an all-time high in 2021. Beijing has exerted pressure on other countries to refrain from signing free trade deals with Taiwan. Only a few nations have signed free trade agreements with the island, with New Zealand and Singapore being the only industrialized economies to do so.

US-Taiwan Relations

The United States and the People’s Republic of China established formal diplomatic ties in 1979. At the same time, it cut diplomatic ties with the ROC and terminated their mutual defense treaty. However, the US maintains a strong unofficial relationship with the island, selling defense weapons to its military. Beijing has frequently pushed the US to stop sending weapons to Taiwan and to cut ties with the country. The United States’ strategy is guided by its One-China policy. It is based on a number of documents, including three US-China communiqués issued in 1972, 1978, and 1982; the Taiwan Relations Act, passed by the US Congress in 1979; and President Ronald Reagan’s recently disclosed “Six Assurances”, which he delivered to Taiwan in 1982. According to these documents, the United States:

“Acknowledges the Chinese stance that there is only one China and Taiwan is a part of China” and that the PRC is the “only lawful government of China”

Disposes the use of force to resolve the conflict; maintains cultural, commercial, and other ties with Taiwan through the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), commits to selling arms to Taiwan for self-defense and maintains the ability to come to Taiwan’s defense while not committing to do so, a policy known as Strategic Ambiguity was created.

The major purpose of the United States is to maintain peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and it has urged both Beijing and Taipei to do so. It declares that it opposes Taiwanese independence. For decades, the US has tried to strike a careful balance between backing Taiwan and avoiding a confrontation with China through its policy of strategic ambiguity.

Over Chinese protests, the US strengthened ties with Taiwan under President Donald Trump, selling over $18 billion in armaments to the military and erecting a $250 million facility for its de facto embassy in Taipei. Tsai and Trump spoke by phone before Trump’s inauguration, the greatest degree of engagement between the two since 1979. He also dispatched several top administration officials to Taipei, including a cabinet member, and the State Department lifted long-standing limitations on where and how US officials can meet with their Taiwanese counterparts during his final days in office.

Biden’s Administrative and Military Relations with Taiwan

The Biden administration has taken a similar approach, maintained arms shipments and endorsed Trump’s decision to allow US officials to meet with Taiwanese officials more freely. Biden was the first president of the United States to invite Taiwanese officials to the inauguration. The US regularly sails ships across the Taiwan Strait to demonstrate its military presence in the region, and it has encouraged Taiwan to raise its defense budget. The United States has been more supportive of Taiwan in recent years than it had been before China adopted a rejectionist stance toward the current Taiwanese government. On cross-strait problems, Tsai has been noticeably and consistently moderate. The fact that she would push the limit by declaring full formal independence is not a risk Beijing has to be concerned about. During Tsai’s presidency, Washington has increased its support for Taiwan, primarily in response to Beijing’s increasing pressure on the island. The Biden administration has a variety of grievances about Chinese behavior and its coercion of Taiwan has been towards the top of that list, as seen by congressional legislation and presidential and administration policy comments.

U-S Implications for Strategic Stability over Taiwan Issues

Strategic stability refers to a condition in which both the United States and China can pursue their key national interests without jeopardizing, if not increasing, regional and global stability. Such strategic stability may also help to establish a pattern of bilateral relations that decreases the likelihood of accidental conflict particularly military conflict while simultaneously enhancing the possibilities for future collaboration. However, the reality on all three sides make stability appear like a far-off dream. Beijing has made it obvious that it feels its national might is quickly expanding and that it will soon be enough to exercise diplomatic, economic, and military supremacy, at least in the western Pacific. Furthermore, the realities of Beijing’s expanding power have allowed it to engage in resentment diplomacy, accusing the US and other foreign powers of being responsible for China’s “Century of Humiliation” and demanding retribution. If strategic stability is to be achieved, it must begin here for the US to change its policies toward Taiwan and China, they must opt.

Conclusion

Both militaries have increased their capabilities in order to dissuade and defeat the other. The two countries have moved from rivalry to conflict, and both have made establishing Taiwan’s future the focal point of that clash on numerous occasions. Taiwan, whether you call it a pawn or not, is caught in the crossfire. As a result, lowering tensions over Taiwan might be the first step toward avoiding potentially devastating instability and, possibly, developing a cautious trust on both sides that other lingering problems can be resolved successfully. A reinforced US policy of dual deterrence, coupled with authoritative assurance, can be a first step toward restoring trust in enormous strategic stability between these two superpowers.

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