Much has already been decided in the best way for peace on the Korean peninsula and, indirectly, in the South Pacific region and even for the US power projection onto Asia.
In fact, after almost five years since the proclamation of his byungjin policy in March 2013, Kim Jong Un has announced “a new strategic policy line”.
It is worth recalling that, in Kim Jong Un’s thought, byungjin is the parallel development of the economy and military and strategic research and supremacy.
I make no secret of the fact that – as stated by the North Korea’s leadership in a letter sent to me – much has been done by me, who has tried to analyze the issue of North Korean nuclear and missile systems with the help of my long-standing friendship for North Korea and of the trust I have gained there over many years – trust that also many US friends have ensured to me.
However, I owe much to the free and friendly discussions I had on all the most important political and strategic issues with Kim Yong-Nam, the President of the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly of North Korea – an extraordinary figure who was also North Korean Foreign Minister from 1983 to 1998, the year in which he was appointed to his current post.
Kim Yong Nam was, inter alia, the promoter of many North Korea’s openings to Africa – new strategic spaces that will be essential also in the upcoming talks between North Korea and the United States.
It is certainly not by mere coincidence that Kim Yong-Nam was present at the opening ceremony of the 2018 Winter Olympics. He is particularly trusted by the Supreme Leader, Kim Jong-Un, and national security – and hence North Korea’s positioning in the world – is currently the most important issue for the country.
If the byungjin policy “has been successful” – as Kim Jong-Un has recently stated – this is also due to the policy line that the North Korean leader has put in place since the beginning of his power, in 2012: reducing internal bureaucracy; renewing the country’s positioning in the world; making the most of the strategic threat of nuclear missiles to later achieve the eminently peaceful, political and economic goals of his policy “line”.
The core of the current “turning point” in North Korea’s policy line lies in Kim Jong-Un’s latest (and first) visit to China.
The Chinese President, Xi Jinping, wanted to know whether, pending a future meeting – already scheduled – between Kim Jong-Un and US President Trump, either of them could make improper moves that could create the conditions for a future war – something that China absolutely wants to avoid.
Therefore Kim Jong-Un reassured the Chinese President that North Korea wanted to negotiate in good faith, with a view to achieving a new equilibrium in the whole South Asian ocean region.
China also wanted to check whether Kim Jong-Un’s moves against the United States were only a way to play for time or rather a real willingness to negotiate.
If this had not happened, China would have moved its pawns directly in the United States.
In this regard, however, Kim Jong-Un provided every credible guarantee.
Moreover, China wants North Korea’s greater bilateral openness with it – a North Korea which, over the last few years, has slowly put an end to its traditional links with the Chinese Communism of the “Four Modernizations” and beyond.
Xi Jinping’s guarantee helped also the United States to understand that the negotiations were realistic and that there was no danger of imminent war on the Korean peninsula – a military confrontation that China would have avoided anyway, for better or worse.
On the other hand, Kim Jong-Un has always pointed out – also to President Xi Jinping in his first, but not last trip to China -that he believed President Trump’s threats were fully credible and that any US attack on North Korea would create tough reactions in China.
China does not want to have military borders with the United States and also believes that the presence of North American forces in South Korea is also aimed at the containment of Communist China.
This is the strategic usefulness of North Korea for China, but this also applies to Russia.
In both cases, Russia and China would be greatly damaged by any military operation entailing confrontation with the North Korean forces – a clash which would inevitably enlarge to the Russian and Chinese borders with South Korea.
Kim Jong-Un has used his strategic position with great intelligence.
Moreover, the United States cannot really wage war against North Korea: 85% of North Korean nuclear facilities are less than 100 kilometers from the border with China and the latter has already deployed at least 160,000 soldiers in its border area with North Korea, who can move quickly to the clash region.
Hence any war between China and the United States on the Korean peninsula depends on whether the United States really wants to knock China out – and this would be a suicidal move for the United States.
This is the reason why China has always thought that the two countries, namely North Korea and the United States, should have started dealing with each other long time ago.
Even with the bilateral mechanism alone.
This is also the reason why the news of bilateral talks between Kim Jong-Un and President Trump was the best thing that China could expect.
Hence, over and above full autonomy for both countries, China would alsolike to sit at the negotiating table to prevent either country from harming Chinese interest or making bilateral peace at China’s expense.
Whatever the outcome of the talks between President Trump and Kim Jong-Un will be, if it does not harm China’s direct interest in the region, it will be welcome for China which will anyway have time to make this US Presidency come to an end and clarify the future balance of power in the region – balance that no future US President will later be in a position to undermine.
We also imagine that China has already prepared military plans if President Trump or even Kim Jong-Un (albeit this is far less likely) did not fulfil their obligations, thus creating tension or even a “limited war” on the Korean peninsula.
It is easy to think that President Xi Jinping has already prepared plans to control the region on his own, without the support of either of the two countries, namely the United States and North Korea.
It is precisely the new linkage between Kim Jong-Un and Xi Jinping that has set the pace for the future peace talks.
“The issue of denuclearization can be resolved if South Korea and the United States respond to our efforts with goodwill and create an atmosphere of peace and stability while taking coordinated, progressive and synchronized measures to achieve peace”.
It is a statement made by Kim Jong-Un, as reported by the New China News Agency.
Currently North Korea wants to make it clear to the United States and to the rest of the West that it wants only one thing: the slackening of the joint US and South Korean pressure on the country, as well as the start of credible economic development or its full involvement in theregional globalization of Southeast Asia.
In fact, this was the dual purpose of North Korea’snuclear and missile systems: to pose such a vast threat as to make North Korea find itself more in the spotlight and no longer remain in the twilight zone of the old Cold War, thus enabling it to hold tough and definitive negotiations – almost on an equal footing – leading to strategic autonomy and economic internationalization.
With specific reference to Japan, it is both tempted by the new phase and suspicious of the future negotiations between President Trump and Kim Jong-Un.
On the one hand, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe wants President Trump not to neglect – in the negotiations with Kim Jong-Un – the issue of short- and intermediate-range missiles, which can easily hit Japan.
In fact, in spite of Japan, new Secretary of State Mike Pompeo had recently made it clear that the talks between North Korea and the United States would be focused only on intercontinental ballistic missiles.
Moreover, in the future bilateral talks, Shinzo Abe wants the United States to raise the long-disputed issue of the Japanese citizens allegedly “kidnapped” by North Korea.
It is an always fundamental issue for Japanese propaganda, but central to Shinzo Abe’s career.
Therefore, instead of asking for a place at the negotiating table, Japan delegates the United States.
We do not believe this is a forward-looking policy.
If peace with North Korea were finally achieved, this could also have positive results for Shinzo Abe.
President Trump has promised to Japan he will do everything for achieving North Korea’s full denuclearization and for eliminating all weapons of mass destruction still existing in the Pyongyang area, as well as for improving the “strategic triangle” between South Korea, Japan and the United States.
Kim Jong-Un, however, will always deal on a very broad basis of topics, ranging from missile engines to carriers, from nuclear devices to chemical and bacteriological weapons.
A wide range of issues that Kim Jong-Un will tackle with the United States for as long as it takes, considering that the missiles themselves attracted the attention of the United States and its regional allies to hold effective negotiations that would have never taken place without weapons of mass destruction and ballistic launches.
In that case North Korea would have been a sort of irrelevant maritime Tibet, without strategic clout, without autonomy and even without the ability to hold serious talks with “friendly” States, namely China, Iran and the Russian Federation.
Hence the political usefulness of North Korea’s nuclear and missile system has been very high.
In fact, it is the level of political and military autonomy that will allow futurenegotiations with President Trump – probably not on an equal footing, but at least with similar strategic potentials and with a fully credible US attack-reaction capacity.
It was exactly what Kim Jong-Un had been looking for years, so as to make the best use of his military system, with a view to getting out of his currently-closed economy and enable North Korea to experience positive economic globalization, not linked to the dollar and regional raw materials cycles.
It was the Russian Federation that officially informed the United States of Kim Jong-Un’ readiness to deal withit, although Russia is currently not so optimistic about the results of future talks between Kim Jong-Un and President Trump.
Firstly, the Russian Federation views the sanctions against North Korea – never approved by the UN Security Council – as serious obstacles to peace and as US illegal actions.
Moreover, Russia believes that North Korea’s nuclear and missile military system has a fully defensive nature and is mainly designed to avoid a regime change in North Korea itself, obviously sponsored by the United States and implemented starting from South Korea, which would also bear the most severe brunt.
Once again Russia is not fully convinced that the United States is credible, given its choice to continue military exercises with South Korea after a brief temporary stop during the Peyongchang Winter Olympics.
In fact, in an official statement made on March 3 last, the North Korean government announced it would respond militarily to new joint exercises between South Korea and the United States.
Furthermore, if the peace talks between President Trump and Kim Jong-Un failed, the Russian Federation would create a multilateral network that should improve North Korea’ security and encourage less brutal negotiations by the United States.
For Iran the issue of North Korea-US bilateral talks is even more complex. In fact, while Iran had no official reaction when, on March 8 last, the White House announced it had accepted Kim Jong-Un’s invitation to hold new bilateral talks, it is mainly interested in the new configuration – if any – of the JCPOA, i.e. the Treaty on nuclear weapons and their production in the Shi’ite Islamic Republic.
In fact, Iran fears that if the North Korean negotiationsgo well for Trump, the US President could have many incentives not to renew the JCPOA.
Moreover, if the American strategy keeps on defining the axis between Iran, North Korea and Iraq as the “axis of evil”, Iran fears that peace with North Korea will make the US hawks’ attention focus only on Iran.
Hence the skepticism of the Iranian leaders, who do not believe that a “revanchist” US President and America First can really reach a true agreement with North Korea.
Iran wants the maximum opening of negotiations for the reduction of North Korea’s military, nuclear and missile potential with China, the Russian Federation, Japan and the European Union.
Certainly multilateral negotiations would be such as to guarantee everyone from the beginning, but we believe that success in the relations between the United States alone and Kim Jong Un’s new policy line, will open up stable prospects for redesigning the whole Pacific region.
Moreover, we believe that never more than now Kim Jong-Un is both realistic and sincere in his willingness to negotiate with the United States.
South Korea should go with the United States
Now, previous success won’t guarantee same success in future in the age of the Fourth Industrial Revolution, We are expecting generation that ability to create new and missing things is more important than keeping existing assets.
The economic survival strategy also changes.
There is no longer continuous growth in this new era, even for a major growing corporation. For example, an automobile can be a mobile computer with value added on software and electronics. Every industry becomes IT related company, not only food and pharmaceuticals industry, but also construction and banking business as well. Now, a company own by person who counts the money in front of the vault and calculates the stock number can’t be survived. Although the South Korean economy has global competitiveness in mobile phone semiconductors and some industries, South Korea is facing huge challenges.
South Korean companies must challenge upcoming new business in order to servive. South Korea has strong engineering system. But even Germany which has world’s most powerful engineering system is having difficulties in developing new business areas. South Korea has no resources and can’t be self-sufficient. It is the fate of South Korea to look out for the world.
The US and China trade wars of two axis of the global economy are becoming reality.
As the United States imposed a $ 60 billion tariff in retaliation for China`s breach of intellectual property rights, the Chinese Department of Commerce immediately launched a counterattack by imposing a $3 billion tariff on 128 U.S. products.
Global stock markets plummeted dramatically and The WSJ reported that world was horrified by the terrible of uncontrolled commerce war. This trade war is a step in keeping the United States ” Economic security “on the rapid growth of China’s high-tech sector.
China, once called the “World Factory” by cheap labour put their hand to rebellion. To take an instance from smartphone, Huawei, Oppo, Vivo’s superiority in Apple designed by California and produced by China is striking. Oppo and Vivo are focused on advanced technologies, not only low-price.
China is moving from ‘Made in China’ to ‘Created in China’ through the ‘China Manufacturing 2025’ plan for the manufacturing powerhouse. By the manufacturing 2025 project has an ambition to boost China’s competitiveness to surpass the US, Germany, and Japan levels and to become the world’s No.1 in 2049.
According to Financial Times that the Trump government emphasized “economic security is the security of the country,” that is meaning the United States to take aim at the Chinese manufacturing 2025.
It is not so simple in terms of South Korea reality.
In South Korea, China and USA are first and second market highly dependent on exports of Korea that counts 25 percent of China and 12 percent of US market.
If the market shrinks due to the friction between the U.S. and China, South Korea could be caught in the middle of the market and not be able to choose either
But The true global leader in today is the United States and Unites States is really strong.
South Korea should go with the United States.
Power Projection of China
A coin has always two faces, an analyst is ought to analyze the both sides.
China is considered as flag holder of soft power with a global agenda of peaceful rise. At moment, the world is facing a new emerging global order by the rise of multiple actors in the international arena. Now there are two school of thoughts who are proposing contradictory views like one wing regarded it as optimistic Sino rise who believes that China’s rise is peaceful. Its foreign policy is viewed as one of the most harmonious policy ever structured. They believe in the mutual cooperation and peaceful coexistence. Rise of China is an optimistic opportunity which is justified by different aspects. As African states were facing a massive number of problems at all levels, many super powers came and ruled the world but they didn’t bothered the prosperity of third world countries.
China started invested in African region and assured the chances of prosperity over there. Due to this economic integration of China in Africa, a demise of Indian influence in that has been observed as well. Their economic cooperation is based on model of helping underdeveloped countries by initiating the projects like Belt and Road Initiative. They are extending the helping hand to developing countries by selling products at cheaper rates. They respect the ideologies of other countries, for example, China didn’t celebrated Pig year in Muslim countries. Regarding Pakistan, here the optimistic view is prevailed at higher context. Pakistan’s policy makers favor Chinese investment in Pakistan, as it will help Pakistan in economic prosperity. China helps Pakistan at almost all of the international forum. Friendship of china and Pakistan is the strongest one to be observed. Pakistan can learn a lot from them. The proper use of diplomacy, image building, projection of soft power and individualism in ideologies and beliefs. Long term planning strategies can be learned from them. China is all weather friend of Pakistan but self-skills are significant, as there is a famous Chinese saying, “to serve a guest by fish is a good way but to teach them how to catch fish is the best way to serve them.”
On the other hand, there are supporters of pessimistic Sino rise who believe that China’s rise is threat for globe. This pessimism is oftenly prevailed by western analysts. They think that rise of China can disturb the existing world order. For example, China is competing with American economy in the international market. Balance of power is coin of international politics, so other actors are emerging now. But the rise and demise of powers after a certain time period is one of the laws of nature. Specially America is feeling threatened by this emergence of China as a super power which can be seen through events like Huawei issue over 5G technology, its sensitization, trade war between china and America, claim of copyrights by America etc. increasing influence of China in majority of states is posing the seriousness of issue. Chinese model of Confucianism is spreading as it has started practices in South Korea as well which is predicted through their cultural stimulus. Pessimistic school of thought deny the authenticity of foreign policy of China, they consider that it is a mere framework which has nothing to do with reality.In reality China’s behavior is like relations having towards Taiwan, South China Sea etc. Interest of states are very important which may differ from each other. Lensing through these views, this unpredictable situation leaves a humans mind into a chaos, whether the rise of China is peaceful or just a myth?
The origin of the Four Modernizations and President Xi Jinping’s current choices
On September 13, 1971 Lin Biao tried to flee to the USSR with all his family, aboard a Trident plane of civil aviation, which had left with little fuel and no active radio contact.
The crash of the aircraft in Mongolia, where both Lin and his whole family died, was caused by the order given directly by Mao to shoot down the plane.
What had happened, obviously in political and not in personal terms?
The answer is simple: Lin Biao was very strongly opposed to the new agreement between China and the United States and hence had organized a military coup. For Lin Biao all the room for US geopolitics was to be found in what the Third International’s forces traditionally defined as “imperialism”.
For Mao Zedong, imperialism was vital for both the USSR and the USA- and considering that he was far from the continent that was the prize for which of the two won the Cold War, namely Europe-he refused to make too many differences between the two.
As a man of Tao and Zen, Mao treated an evil with another evil.
Mao Zedong, however, also knew that a new economic relationship with the United States was needed, after the long economic crisis and the factional instability within the Chinese regime. The Soviet Union could certainly not give it economic stability and hence the “Great Helmsman” turned to the distant enemy rather than to the near quasi-friend.
Nothing can be understood about China, including current China, if geopolitical choices are separated from economic, financial and industrial ones which, however, are subjected to the strategic “policy line” defined by the Party – a policy line that is cultural and always based on a very long term.
On September 29, 1972 the diplomatic relationship with Japan were resumed, along with those with the United States. An evident overlapping of different geopolitical lines which, however – in the minds of the Chinese decision-makers -were similar also from the symbolic viewpoint.
In 1973 Deng Xiaoping reappeared in public, upon direct order by Mao Zedong.
Those were also the years of the late definitive success of the “policy line” of Zhou Enlai, who had successfully gone through the Great Cultural and Proletarian Revolution, which had partly overwhelmed him, and led the 10thCPC Congress.
That was the compromise which held the Party together, after Lin Biao’s elimination. An unstable agreement between the reformist “Right” (Zhou had spoken of “four modernizations” many years before, exactly in 1965) and the Left, silenced by Mao, that had crossed the red line of the Cultural Revolution and the failed communization of rural areas.
In those years, also the Party’s Left lacked mass management of the people and the Party and had to agree with the other factions, while Mao mediated and also created “third wheels”.
Create something from nothing – one of the Thirty-Six Stratagems of the Chinese Art of War.
In 1973, just before the equilibrium between Zhou and the old CPC apparata broke again, Deng Xiaoping was fully rehabilitated and also became member of the Chinese regime’s deep axis, namely the Central Military Commission.
In 1975 Deng was elected vice-President of the Central Committee and member of the Politburo Standing Committee.
The connection between the reformists – if we can call them so – siding with Zhou Enlai, and the “centre” of the Party’s apparatus – that regained its roles and posts by ousting the Armed Forces -prevailed once again.
Again in 1975, the National People’s Congress praised the “Four Modernizations” already proposed by Zhou and, in its final statement, hoped “that China would be turned into a modern and powerful Socialist country in the approximately twenty years before the end of the century”.
Political transformation through the new economy, as well as preservation of the regime through political transformation itself.
We could call it “the Tao of geoeconomics”. Acceleration of industrialization and modernization, but without creating the disaster of rural masses, who were objectively unable of providing the start-up capital for implementing any of the Four Modernizations. This was the real difference with the USSR of the 1930s.
That capital had to be produced in innovative companies and be attracted from outside.
At the time, however, the CPC was not yet firmly in the hands of any factions. In September 1975, the national Agriculture Conference saw the harsh clash between Deng Xiaoping and the old “Shanghai group” of the Cultural and Proletarian Revolution that, however, no longer controlled most of the Party.
Zhou Enlai died in January 1976 and shortly afterwards, in Tiananmen Square, there were severe incidents, albeit with the constant presence of many wreaths reminding of Zhou.
Later there were also strikes and unrest, until the capture and trial of the “Gang of Four” in Shanghai. It had inspired the “Cultural Revolution” and was then directly accused by Hua Guofen – the man appointed by Mao to lead the transition- of having prepared a coup.
China’s transformation, however, began again from rural areas: at the second Agriculture Conference in Dazhai, in December 1976 – where various cases of corruption and “social polarization” were described and stigmatized- the discussion focused on the First Modernization, namely that of rural areas.
When you regulate too much, a parallel and illegal market is created. This always happens.
Obviously this also happens when total communization is applied to the economic cycle of rural areas.
Certainly those were residues of Sovietism in the CPC’s doctrine, but also of the a-dialectical implementation of Marxism-Leninism in historical and social contexts in which the analysis of the founder of “scientific Communism” had never focused.
In fact, when you read the works and correspondence that Marx dedicated to the Russian agricultural issue, you note that the author of “Capital” foresaw a direct Socialist social transformation stemming from the maintenance of the social and community networks in traditional villages. It may seem strange, but it is so.
This system operates only with a non-industrialized State that is scarcely widespread in the territory. Otherwise, the problem is that of capitalism in rural areas to generate the surplus of urban and industrial investments.
Even in the Second Volume of “Capital”, Marx’s model is essentially this one.
It is precisely on the agricultural issue that the stability and success of many Communist regimes isdefined and, not surprisingly, the first of Zhou’s and later Deng’s Four Modernizations was precisely that of agriculture.
The topic characterized all Party’s organizations, but it was in late December 1978 that the Third Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee decided to decentralize the economy – another factor strongly different from the Leninist tradition – and even to liberalize it, in addition to a process of ideological revision, namely Gaige Kaifang that roughly means “reform and opening”.
That was also related to the request for opening international trade based on the criterion of “mutual benefit” and equality between the various countries.
Hence, also from the ideological viewpoint, Deng became the Supreme Leader of the Party – as well as of the State apparatus – and announced the Open Door policy.
An extremely important fact was also the separation of the Bank of China from the People’s Bank of China, so as to serve as single State body for foreign exchanges.
That was the start of the “Long March” towards the Four Modernizations, with an unusually united Party, and currently towards “Socialism with Chinese characteristics” , as well as – at geopolitical level -President Xi Jinping’s New Silk Road.
In January 1980, the “four freedoms” – of work, people, goods and capital – were abolished.
The new planning needed to manage all aspects of productive forces.
That was explained by a covert war of the Chinese economy against the penetration of foreign capital and joint ventures, which in fact were immediately regulated by specific legislation enacted the previous year.
The great British operation of economic control over the South-Chinese coasts was resumed from Hong Kong, but the Chinese government eliminated the possibility of such an action by Great Britain (and by the USA, at least partly).
Hence the Party’s unity had to be reflected in a new context and, to some extents, in the whole society, so as to prevent the liberalized Chinese economy from taking the Party and Socialism away. A new rationale for the CPC’s Leninist unity.
The new Act on contract law was enacted in March 1981, and in 1982 also the new civil procedure law was enacted, which became effective on October 1, 1982.
In September 1983, at the 12th CPC Congress, there were three groups within the Party: the nostalgic Maoists, a small and narrow majority for Deng Xiaoping; the Orthodox group that still wanted a nationally planned economy, as in USSR -hence probably the heirs to Lin Biao; finally the real reformists.
Deng won with a clear, but not overwhelming majority.
Hence, everyone was waiting for the Four Modernizations to fail, so as to go back to the old routine of the Plan.
As also happened in the USSR, it was often fully imaginary compared to the actual reality of the things done and produced.
It was in 1983, however, that the Third Front strategy was implemented, i.e. Mao’s directive – drawn up as early as 1962 – according to which the national strategic industries had to be moved from the coasts – militarily and politically difficult to defend – to the internal areas. Without said Mao’s directive, the New Silk Road could not be understood even currently.
Hence 14 open coastal cities that were declared so in 1984, but with a new law on profits that served as mainstay of Modernizations: companies were asked to pay a certain share of profits to the government, but they could withhold some profits if they matched and exceeded the requirements of the contract with the State.
In 1985 a new regulation also involved government bonds. The seventh Five-Year Plan began, underlining a “scale” approach, in which the coastal areas – gradually freed from traditional strategic companies – were driving the economic development, which later spread like wildfire even in the internal areas.
It was the Hong Kong model that Deng Xiaoping’s executives copied and adapted.
For a short lapse of time, Chinese analysts and Party planners also looked to the Singapore model, with the (single) Party of Lee Kuan Yew.
It isby no mere coincidence that Shenzen was close to the former British colony, and often the Chinese attracted and favoured the companies of the British area towards the new Chinese coastal areas also characterized by free-market economy.
Advanced and high-tech services in coastal areas, and lower value-added, but still inevitable, productions in internal regions.
A new dualism, where rural overpopulation had to be gradually absorbed by inland strategic companies.
A double geopolitical status of inland areas which, in many cases, is repeated also in the current Belt and Road Initiative.
In 1986, the “open-ended” contracts for the manpower working in State-owned companies came to an end.
In October 1987,the 13th CPC Congress was held, in which – for the first time – there was talk about the “commodity economy”, i.e. a two-tier mechanism, in which the market is matched and also “corrected” by the old national planning.
A sort of re-edition, for internal use, of the formula “one country, two systems” implemented by China with the agreements for Macao and Hong Kong.
In 1988, however, the 7thNational People’s Congress officially legitimized the private initiative (not the mere ownership) and enabled private individuals to buy State-owned companies.
The term “People’s ownership” was also deleted, while individuals and groups, even non-Chinese ones, could buy land with a system similar to that of the British real estate leasing.
Profits, wherever made, had to be reinvested in the company that originated them, before requesting any financing from the People’s Bank.
The Special Economic Zones, modelled again on the Hong Kong system, became five.
Hence innovation on the coasts and strategic companies in the central regions – mainly public ones, which still remained almost completely public.
In April 1989, Jiang Zemin rose to power.
Student demonstrations also began in Tiananmen Square, where, year after year, the various anti-regime organizations gathered: Falun Gong, the networks of many illegal parties, unrecognized union organizations and many “spontaneous” groups.
And some old “Red Guards”.
Zhao Ziyang, the Party leader already defenestrated by Jiang Zemin, was in fact at the centre of “spontaneous” organizations.
The various Autonomous Federations of Workers -spread by location and not by industry – were legally created.
Gorbachev’s visit took place in May 1989.
That was the key moment of a long series of doctrinal, practical, cultural and historical differences that – from the very beginning – divided the two great Eastern heirs to the Marxist-Leninist Third International.
What really mattered to the Chinese leadership was that the Russian crisis did not overwhelm the Chinese Communists: that was the meaning of the declaration signed by Gorbachev, which regarded the “peaceful coexistence” of the two Communist regimes.
The leader of the Soviet Party was made fun of – not even so elegantly – not because he had reformed the Soviet economic system – in a way, however, that the Chinese deemed wrong – but for one reason only: he had relinquished the Party’s role in the reformist process, which the CPSU had to lead and guide for China, from the very beginning.
An “economicist” mistake, as the CPC’s ideologues said – yet another proof of the Marxist roughness of the “Northern enemy”, as Deng Xiaoping called Russia.
Sarcastic sniggers on the lips of Chinese leaders. Then Gorbachev explained again his perestrojka and glas’nost, but the Chinese leaders, whose power was based on Party’s bayonets, kept on not taking him seriously.
Days before the arrival of the Soviet leader, at least one million people had gathered in Tiananmen Square.
The problems that the Chinese leadership had to solve in a short lapse of time were radical: the “hard” wing that was previously a minority prevailed and managed to convince Jiang Zemin.
The Party and its authority – the basis of any transformation, even the most radical one – were re-established without much talk. It was impossible to think about a heir to the “Long March” that dissolved the Party within “society”.
On May 19, the CPC decided to follow the hard line and the military forces reached the areas near the Square, from the outskirts of Beijing.
Few hours later, the Square was completely cleared, but that was done the hard way.
Shortly afterwards, at the 4th CPC Plenum, Jiang Zemin – also following the experience of Tiananmen Square – returned to one of his old theories and developed the “Three Represents” model, i.e. the idea that the CPC’s power was based on its “vast representation” of the Chinese productive forces, of the cultural and technological avant-gardes and of the wide strata of population.
In other words, the Chinese society – and its economy, in particular – was reformed by bringing the elites together, part of whom were in Tiananmen Square, but also the large crowds still organized by the Party.
A Confucian middle way that was particularly successful.
Hence, Zhao Ziyang definitively lost the game within the Party that, however, was also inside the Tiananmen Square insurgency.
Once the crisis was over, Deng Xiaoping left also the last very strong power in Jiang’s hands: the leadership of the Central Military Commission.
Shortly afterwards – and there was nothing more symbolic than that event – the Stock Exchange of Shanghai reopened. A reopening that had been expected since the 1930s.
Later also the Shenzhen Securities Exchange opened. In both of them, any securities – including those issued by the State – were traded, but there was only one deep logic: to acquire productive capital to generate strong and self-sustained development of the coasts and of the high value-added industries that had to compete on the world free market, without granting protection and aid that would go to the detriment of the deep productive structures of the internal regions.
In 1992, Deng’s journey to Southern borders had a clear route, although the CPC’s leadership had always had some doubts about the “free economic zones”. The core of the issue was that the GDP had to be increased in the lapse of time between the 1990s and the beginning of the Third Millennium.
It had to be rapidly increased from 6% to 10%.
Without that “quantitative” assessment – just to use the old Communist jargon – there could be no “qualitative” transformation of Chinese society.
Everything had to be done soon – well, but soon. That was the characteristic of Deng Xiaoping’s years – extraordinary years, in some respects.
In a short lapse of time, the Party developed the concepts of “Socialism with Chinese characteristics” and of “market Socialism”, which are so important also in President Xi Jinping’s current policy line.
There were also other changes that, in a few years, led to the current Socialism with Chinese characteristics, as advocated by President Xi Jinping. However, everything could be done from a legal view point began in those years.
The transformation process of the Chinese economy is long, powerful and complex, but – unlike what is often said in the West – it is never a mere market mechanism or a naive adaptation of the Party or the State to the absolute Western rules of globalization.
As early as the 1990s, China has decided to govern market globalization and not just being a part of it. It wants to lead the process so as to be – now that the end of the century about which Deng thought has long been over – the axis of globalization and the centre of the new global hegemonies.
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