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The European and American plan for the JCPOA

Mohammad Ghaderi



Evidences suggest that the United States is likely to withdraw from the nuclear deal with Iran. The appointment of John Bolton as the U.S. National Security Advisor and Mike Pompeo as Trump’s Secretary of State, have sent certain signals to those following the JCPOA news.

The two American officials share kid of intrinsic and fundamental opposition to the nuclear deal. Many of the news sources in the West mention that Trump intends to withdraw from the agreement by re-claiming the inefficiency of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).
For example, the Guardian has recently quoted a European diplomat and wrote that the EU has no hope for Trump’s government to remain in the nuclear deal with Iran. However, the main question is, what is the final plan of the United States and Europe for the JCPOA?
On the other hand, what kind of approach and strategy should be taken by our country against Washington’s possible withdrawal from the nuclear deal?

Trump’s Plan for JCPOA

Without a doubt, the U.S. President isn’t going to put away his negative attitude towards the nuclear deal. Trump is still calling the nuclear deal as the worst deal ever. That was why he replaced his former Secretary of State “Rex Tillerson” with Mike Pompeo. Some of the Western analysts believe that Trump is after “winning more advantages over the JCPOA” through imposing pressure.

The appointment of John Bolton and Pompeo should also be regarded in the same vein. On the other hand, Trump plans to make the least possible costs in case of his possible withdrawal from the nuclear accord. It should be noted that John Bolton, before being appointed as the U.S. National Security Advisor, insisted on Washington withdrawal from the JCPOA.

He also said that in this regard, it is necessary for the U.S. European partners to join Washington, and that there should be diplomatic consultations between the White House and the European Union in this regard.

This is while some news sources and analysis have a different opinion. They believe it is possible that Trump doesn’t announce the U.S. withdrawal from the nuclear deal, but keeps to impose sanctions on Iran! Undoubtedly, this unilateral and sophisticated game will mean nothing but the U.S. breach of the nuclear deal.
Of course the president of the United States seems incapable of playing this dual game. The fact is that in case of the United States withdrawal from the JCPOA, Washington can no longer manage this equation.

Europe is still confused

Despite the fact that the U.S. seems to have made its final decision on the nuclear deal with Iran, Europe is still confused about this. The Chancellor of Germany and the French President are scheduled to meet with President Donald Trump on two separate visits to the United States, and will consult with him over the JCPOA and maintaining the nuclear deal.

This is while many international affairs analysts have argued that John Bolton’s appointment as the U.S. national security adviser means a definitive decision by Trump to quit the nuclear accord. On the other hand, Trump continues to insist on issues such as the “inclusion of Iran’s missile power” in the nuclear deal, as well as the “inspection of Iranian military sites” and “putting permanent restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program”. The European Troika has recently told Trump that there is no possibility of changing the JCPOA based on the terms he has announced.

Macron and Merkel are separately going to visit Trump before the deadline set by the President of the United States. These visits take place while there are differences between European players on how to deal with the JCPOA. Recently and during the Brussels Summit, we witnessed major disputes among European leaders regarding the imposition of rocket and regional sanctions against the Islamic Republic of Iran.

The European troika insists on imposing new sanctions on Iran to prevent Trump from cancelling the nuclear deal! This is while some European countries such as Italy, Spain and Austria believe that this will only discredit the EU in the international system, since Trump has made his final decision on withdrawal from the JCPOA regardless of imposing such sanctions by the European Union.

The fact is that the European’s paradoxical game has cost the European Troika a lot during the last year. “Restraining the U.S.” has been the very duty that the European Troika has failed to fulfil.

Iran’s strategy in case of the cancellation of the JCPOA

It’s is clear that Trump’s main goal of his threats, and the pressure on the European Troika during the last year has been to win more benefits over the JCPOA, and this is what the U.S. president is still pursuing. Obviously, “the insistence on the red lines of our foreign policy,” “the emphasis on our country’s defense capabilities,” “the emphasis on American lack of commitment at the diplomatic level”, “the use of public diplomacy capacities in response to U.S. actions” and ” The intensive diplomatic consultation with other international players ” are among the most important steps that our country’s diplomacy and foreign policy should take to confront Trump’s administration.

On the other hand, the Islamic Republic of Iran should have a firm, determined and intelligent response to the possible withdrawal of the United States from the nuclear deal. In recent days, the Iranian authorities have clearly stated that Iran’s reaction to the cancellation of the nuclear deal will be regrettable for the United States. Obviously, Trump’s government will have to pay big technical, legal, political and international costs in case of walking away from the nuclear deal.

Furthermore, the U.S.’s opposition to Russia and China seems to be worsening over the coming weeks. On the other hand, the European Troika has no choice but to take more transparent positions on the nuclear deal with Iran. The main question is, “Are we going to see a more obvious alliance between the other members of P5+1 against Trump and the U.S. government in near future”? Or because of the continuation of the European troika’s dual game, this “alliance” is not going to be formed?

In any case, Beijing and Moscow, besides being members of P5+1, have an effective maneuverability in the international system. Under such circumstances, the dialogue between the five players, namely Beijing, Moscow, Berlin, Paris and London, will be prominent in the near future.

First published at our partner Tehran Times

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Middle East

Battling for the Future: Arab Protests 2.0

Dr. James M. Dorsey



Credit: Institute of Security Studies

Momentous developments across Arab North and East Africa suggest the long-drawn-out process of political transition in the region as well as the greater Middle East is still in its infancy.

So does popular discontent in Syria despite eight years of devastating civil war and Egypt notwithstanding a 2013 military coup that rolled back the advances of protests in 2011 that toppled Hosni Mubarak and brought one of the country’s most repressive regimes to power.

What developments across northern Africa and the Middle East demonstrate is that the drivers of the 2011 popular revolts that swept the region and forced the leaders of Egypt, Tunisia, Libya and Yemen to resign not only still exist but constitute black swans that can upset the apple cart at any moment.

The developments also suggest that the regional struggle between forces of change and ancien regimes and militaries backed by the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia is far from decided.

If anything, protesters in Algeria and Sudan have learnt at least one lesson from the failed 2011 results: don’t trust militaries even if they seemingly align themselves with demonstrators and don’t surrender the street until protesters’ demands have been fully met.

Distrust of the military has prompted an increasing number of Sudanese protesters to question whether chanting “the people and the army are one” is still appropriate. Slogans such as “freedom, freedom” and “revolution, revolution” alongside calls on the military to protect the protesters have become more frequent.

The protests in Algeria and Sudan have entered a critical phase in which protesters and militaries worried that they could be held accountable for decades of economic mismanagement, corruption and repression are tapping in the dark.

With protesters emboldened by their initial successes in forcing leaders to resign, both the demonstrators and the militaries, including officers with close ties to Saudi Arabia and the UAE, are internally divided about how to proceed.

Moreover, neither side has any real experience in managing the crossroads at which they find themselves while it is dawning on the militaries that their tired playbooks are not producing results.

In a telling sign, Sudan’s interim leader Abdel Fattah Abdelrahman Burhan praised his country’s “special relationship” with Saudi Arabia and the UAE as he met this week with a Saudi-Emirati delegation at the military compound in Khartoum, a focal point of the protests.

Saudi Arabia has expressed support for the protests in what many suspect is part of an effort to ensure that Sudan does not become a symbol of the power of popular sovereignty and its ability to defeat autocracy.

The ultimate outcome of the dramatic developments in Algeria and Sudan and how the parties manoeuvre is likely to have far-reaching consequences in a region pockmarked by powder kegs ready to explode.

Mounting anger as fuel shortages caused by Western sanctions against Syria and Iran bring life to a halt in major Syrian cities have sparked rare and widespread public criticism of president Bashar al-Assad’s government.

The anger is fuelled by reports that government officials cut in line at petrol stations to fill up their tanks and buy rationed cooking gas and take more than is allowed.

Syria is Here, an anonymous Facebook page that reports on economics in government-controlled areas took officials to task after state-run television showed oil minister Suleiman al-Abbas touring petrol stations that showed no signs of shortage.

Is it so difficult to be transparent and forward? Would that undermine anyone’s prestige? We are a country facing sanctions and boycotted. The public knows and is aware,” the Facebook page charged.

The manager of Hashtag Syria, another Facebook page, was arrested when the site demanded that the oil ministry respond to reports of anticipated price hikes with comments rather than threats. The site charged that the ministry was punishing the manager “instead of dealing with the real problem.”

Said Syrian journalist Danny Makki: “It (Syria) is a pressure cooker.”

Similarly, authorities in Egypt, despite blocking its website, have been unable to stop an online petition against proposed constitutional amendments that could extend the rule of President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi until 2034 from attracting more than 320,000 signatures as of this writing.

The petition, entitled Batel or Void, is, according to Netblocks, a group that maps web freedom, one of an estimated 34,000 websites blocked by Egyptian internet service providers in a bid to stymie opposition to the amendments.

Mr. El-Sisi is a reminder of how far Arab militaries and their Gulf backers are potentially willing to go in defense of their vested interests and willingness to oppose popular sovereignty.

Libyan renegade Field Marshall Khalifa Belqasim Haftar is another, Mr. Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) is attacking the capital Tripoli, the seat of the United Nations recognized Libyan government that he and his Emirati, Saudi, and Egyptian backers accuse of being dominated by Islamist terrorists.

The three Arab states’ military and financial support of Mr. Haftar is but the tip of the iceberg. Mr. Haftar has modelled his control of much of Libya on Mr. El-Sisi’s example of a military that not only dominates politics but also the economy.

As a result, the LNA is engaged in businesses ranging from waste management, metal scrap and waste export, and agricultural mega projects to the registration of migrant labour workers and control of ports, airports and other infrastructure. The LNA is also eyeing a role in the reconstruction of Benghazi and other war-devastated or underdeveloped regions.

What for now makes 2019 different from 2011 is that both sides of the divide realize that success depends on commitment to be in it for the long haul. Protesters, moreover, understand that trust in military assertions of support for the people can be self-defeating. They further grasp that they are up against a regional counterrevolution that has no scruples.

All of that gives today’s protesters a leg up on their 2011 counterparts. The jury is out on whether that will prove sufficient to succeed where protesters eight years ago failed.

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Middle East

As Marsha Lazareva languishes in jail, foreign businesses will “think twice” before investing in Kuwait



IF THERE IS one thing to glean from the case of Marsha Lazareva, it’s that foreign businesses must now think very carefully before investing in Kuwait.

For more than a year, Lazareva, who has a five-year-old son and is one of Russia’s most successful female investors in the Gulf, has been held in the Soulabaiya prison by Kuwaiti authorities. Those authorities claim she ‘stole’ half a billion dollars, a claim she strenuously denies.

Human rights groups and prominent officials, including the former FBI director, Louis Freeh, and Jim Nicholson, former Chairman of the Republican Party and former US Ambassador to the Vatican, have called for her release and expressed concerns about the apparent absence of due process in a country where Lazareva has worked for over 13 years. Both Freeh and Nicholson visited Kuwait in recent weeks with Neil Bush, son of the late President George H. W. Bush. Bush has said Lazareva’s incarceration ‘threatens to darken relations between the U.S. and Kuwait, two countries that have enjoyed a long and prosperous relationship.

Russian officials have been equally concerned. Vladimir Platonov, the President of the Moscow Chamber of Commerce and Industry, confirmed that a single witness gave testimony in Kuwaiti court, and only for the prosecution. ‘I myself worked in prosecution for more than eight years, and I cannot imagine any judge signing off on an indictment like this,’ he said. ‘One fact of particular note is that Maria was given 1,800 pages of untranslated documents in Arabic.’

Serious questions surrounding the safety and future viability of investing in Kuwait are now being raised. Through The Port Fund, a private investment company managed by KGL Investment, Lazareva has contributed hundreds of millions of dollars to local infrastructure and economic development projects during her time in the country. Until 2017, when a Dubai bank froze $496 million without cause, she had worked largely unobstructed.

But as things stand, more foreign investment is unlikely to be forthcoming. Jim Nicholson has said that the ‘imprisonment and harassment’ of Lazareva ‘threatens’ U.S. support. adding that the ‘willingness of the U.S. to do business with Kuwait’ is based on ‘its record as a nation that respects human rights and the rule of law’. Mark Williams, the investment director of The Port Fund and a colleague of Lazareva’s, has called on international investors to ‘think twice before doing business in this country’. 

These comments will surely concern the Kuwaiti government, who said last year that FDI was ‘very crucial’ to the success of its Kuwait Vision 2035 road map. In September 2018, the FTreported that the government planned to reverse its traditional position as an investor in order to diversify its economy, carrying out a series of reforms designed to facilitate foreign investment and assist investors.

But despite these changes, which have propelled Kuwait to 96th—higher than the Middle East average—in the World Bank’s ‘Ease of Doing Business’ report, investors may be unwilling to take the risk so long as Lazareva remains in jail. Lazareva’s lawyers have accused Kuwait of violating international law by breaching a long-standing bilateral investment treaty with Russia. Lord Carlile of Berriew, QC has brought the case to the attention of the British public and the EU, writing in The Times that ‘there is no evidential basis to justify any claim of dishonesty, corruption or any other criminal wrong’. He added: ’Anyone thinking of doing business in Kuwait should read on with mounting concern.’

What’s worth remembering is that Kuwait is an important, long-standing ally of the UK, and a country generally seen as stable and fair. It is equally a major non-NATO ally of the United States, where there are more than 5,000 international students of Kuwaiti origin in higher education. But these relationships, and the investment to which they have historically led, have been cast into doubt. And it now seems certain that relations will continue to sour so long as Marsha Lazareva languishes in Soulabaiya.

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Middle East

Economic reform in the Gulf: Who benefits, really?

Dr. James M. Dorsey



For Gulf leaders, long-overdue economic reforms were never going to be easy.

Leaders like the crown princes of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, Mohammed bin Salman and Mohammed bin Zayed, quickly discovered that copying China’s model of economic growth while tightening political control was easier said than done. They realised that rewriting social contracts funded by oil wealth was more difficult because Gulf Arabs had far more to lose than the average Chinese. The Gulf states’ social contracts had worked in ways China’s welfare programmes had not. The Gulf’s rentier state’s bargain—surrender of political and social rights for cradle-to-grave welfare—had produced a win-win situation for the longest time.

Moreover, Gulf leaders, struggling with mounting criticism of the Saudi-UAE-led war in Yemen and the fall-out of the killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi, also lacked the political and economic clout that allowed China to largely silence or marginalise critics of its crackdown on Turkic Muslims in the troubled northwestern province of Xinjiang.

The absence of a welfare-based social contract in China allowed the government to power economic growth, lift millions out of poverty, and provide public goods without forcing ordinary citizens to suffer pain. As a result, China was able to push through with economic reforms without having to worry that reduced welfare benefits would spark a public backlash and potentially threaten the regime.

Three years into Mohammed bin Salman’s Vision 2030 blueprint for diversification of the economy, Saudi businesses and consumers complain that they are feeling the pinch of utility price hikes and a recently introduced five per cent value-added tax with little confidence that the government will stay the course to ensure promised long-term benefit.

The government’s commitment to cutting costs has been further called into question by annual handouts worth billions of dollars since the announcement of the reforms and rewriting of the social contract to cushion the impact of rising costs and quash criticism.

In contrast to China, investment in the Gulf, whether it is domestic or foreign, comes from financial, technology and other services sector, the arms industry or governments. It is focused on services, infrastructure or enhancing the state’s capacities rather than on manufacturing, industrial development and the nurturing of private sector.

With the exception of national oil companies, some state-run airlines and petrochemical companies, the bulk of Gulf investment is portfolios managed by sovereign wealth funds, trophies or investment designed to enhance a country’s prestige and soft power.

By contrast, Asian economies such as China and India have used investment fight poverty, foster a substantial middle class, and create an industrial base. To be sure, with small populations, Gulf states are more likely to ensure sustainability in services and oil and gas derivatives rather than in manufacturing and industry.

China’s $1 trillion Belt and Road initiative may be the Asian exception that would come closest to some of the Gulf’s soft-power investments. Yet, the BRI, designed to alleviate domestic overcapacity by state-owned firms that are not beholden to shareholders’ short-term demands and/or geo-political gain, contributes to China’s domestic growth.

Asian nations have been able to manage investors’ expectations in an environment of relative political stability. By contrast, Saudi Arabia damaged confidence in its ability to diversify its oil-based economy when after repeated delays it suspended plans to list five per cent of its national oil company, Saudi Arabian Oil Company, or Aramco, in what would have been the world’s largest initial public offering.

To be sure, China is no less autocratic than the Gulf states, while Hindu nationalism in India fits a global trend towards civilisationalism, populism and illiberal democracy. What differentiates much of Asia from the Gulf and accounts for its economic success are policies that ensure a relatively stable environment. These policies are focused on social and economic enhancement rather than primarily on regime survival. That may be Asia’s lesson for Gulf rulers.

Author’s note: first published in Firstpost

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