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The current financial regulation in China

Giancarlo Elia Valori

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The power of a newly established Chinese public organization, namely the Financial Stability and Development Committee, is growing. Said organization was created precisely on November 8, 2017.

It is an important organization under the State Council’s direct control. Indeed, it is an office of the Council itself which will deal mainly with China’s financial stability and with all matters concerning economic development and monetary and capital stability.

More specifically, the Committee will be tasked with deliberating major national programs for regulating the financial system, for organizing monetary policy with the Central Bank and for defining tax policies and the related fiscal and industrial actions.

This Committee will also be responsible for analysing  international and domestic financial situations, identifying the greatest global financial systemic risks, as well as studying the related conditions and finally defining the ways for reaching  financial stability.

The important choice made in relation to this Committee is that it will be chaired by the Chinese Vice Premier, Ma Kai.

The idea of ​​creating this organization had been suggested directly by President Xi Jinping during the National Financial Work Conference held on July 14-15, 2017.

The Committee will also strengthen the macro-systemic policies of China’s Central Bank. In fact, it is a matter of regulating and stabilizing the Chinese financial market, which is worth 40trillion US dollars and is one of the largest in the world.

The Chairman of the Committee and Vice Premier, Ma Kai,was born in Jinshan, a district of Shanghai, in 1946.

In the mid-1990s he was elected Vice-President of the National Planning Commission.

He was Deputy-Head of the State Council from 1998 to 2003 and also Minister for National Development from 2003 to 2008. He was appointed President of the National School of Administration and later Head of the Office for the development of small and medium-sized enterprises.

In fact, the Committee will also be tasked with coordinating tax and financial policies and tuning them with the long time schedules of the industrial system, while the collaboration between the Committee and the People’s Bank of China will allow the regulation of the 15 trillions currently invested in financial products throughout China.

With the creation of this Committee, high-risk investment or massive bank loans to buy securities will no longer be allowed, while it will be mandatory to set 10% of managers’ profits aside.

China is currently turning its old role as “world factory” into that of a modern consumer-driven economy.

Hence the need to regulate corporate and retail finance.

There are three issues underlying the new Chinese financial regulation: a) booming loans, the majority of which are requested by businesses and local governments; b) complexity, considering that risky creditors have moved away from banks, due to the complexity of rules, towards less structured products, while Chinese banks currently offer mainly financial products for the long-term management of household and business savings.

The third issue is c) guarantees. With a view to preserving their reputation, Chinese banks often offer even compensation to their clients who have lost money as a result of certain investment,  which leads them to miscalculate their risk share.

Hence an extremely fragmented banking system which is hard to control.

The Chinese systemic risk must be kept well under control:  financial assets have grown four foldover the last decade, from 310% up to 510% of the GDP, which, however, has grown by 2.5 times over the same period.

The expansion of credit has been led by the public sector and by its very poor regulation, with the expansion of shadow banks, non-orthodox credit and particularly risky – but attractive – financial products for private investors.

Credit growth has already declined, while corporate access to capital has also decreased considerably.

For the Party, however, the fragility of the financial system arises from the excess of leverage and debt investment and from the excessive debt in many sectors of the real economy, while credit has expanded too rapidly in the financial sector.

In late 2016 the average national leverage amounted to 247%,   while companies’ leverage was 165% in the same period.

Definitely too much debt for companies and individuals, far beyond the international standard.

As President Xi Jinping has pointed out, the control of aggregate money supply has been severely lacking.

President Xi Jinping has also noted that the financial institutions’ general control has been missing and the State has focused only on the individual links of the chain of financial audits.

President Xi Jinping has also maintained that the State has been unable to control major financial companies.

Moreover, the Chinese government’s interest in financial matters has never been negligible.

The National Financial Work Conference had been created as early as 1997.

Later, based on the analysis of that select group, the first Chinese sovereign fund, namely China Investment Corporation, was created in 2007.

A structure that can currently boast to have capital to the tune of 813.5 billion US dollars.

The fifth National Financial Work Conference was held in July 2017, simultaneously with the creation of the Committee.

As the CPC noted, all this was designed to reach “national financial security”, mainly with a view to backing the aims of the  13th Five-Year Plan.

President Xi Jinping also thinks that the new Committee shall a) deal with the real economy and b) combine and harmonize social development with economic development.

According to President Xi Jinping, finance is never disconnected from the social context in which it operates; c) financial regulation is always aimed at eliminating the systemic risk and d) reaching national financial stability.

Stability first and then development – this is President Xi Jinping’s belief.

Furthermore, local governments shall follow the central government’s rules. Any failure to report the financial risk will be regarded as an administrative irregularity.

This will be very useful, considering the ongoing trade war between the United States and China.

In fact, China has resorted to the WTO dispute settlement mechanism against the duties levied by President Trump.

It is worth recalling that the United States has levied duties equal to 25% on imported Chinese goods, for a total value of 50 billion US dollars.

So far these duties have been levied only in the aluminium and steel sectors.

China has responded immediately by levying equal duties on US products such as soy, pork and vegetables.

The immediate US countermove has been the doubling of duties on aluminium and steel up to 100 billion dollars.

One of the reasons for the current clash is certainly the forthcoming mid-term elections for which President Trump wants to keep on winning the support of the Rust Belt protectionist voters who enabled him to rise to the White House.

Moreover, according to the universal supply chain system, many of the Chinese products taxed by the United States come from South Korea, Taiwan and even from the European Union.

Hence the Chinese pressure could harm US farmers and the whole US middle class, as well as some of US best allies.

Therefore, while China’s recourse to the WTO has not slowed  down the aggressive posture of the Chinese economy towards the United States and the European Union, the aim of the current duties is to force China to revalue its currency, so as to rebalance the deficit between China and the United States, with the latter already recording a trade deficit with China to the tune of over 375 billion dollars.

Reading between the lines, President Trump wants a decrease of Chinese duties on US cars, so that there is an increase in China’s purchase of US semiconductors and, in any case, a greater share of the huge Chinese market for US companies.

Furthermore, China undermines intellectual property in the advanced sectors of computer science and Artificial Intelligence.

Finally, for the United States, the issue lies in hitting Chinese innovation and the “Made in China 2025” project, which is supposed to ensure China’s global strategic superiority in cutting-edge products, robotics and advanced infrastructure.

If everything goes well, at the end of this trade war, China will impose on the United States a network of joint ventures and selective openings for US products on the Chinese market.

That is what the new Chinese financial authority is for: to raise capital for the State’s primary projects and to protect China’s finance from the turmoil that could be caused by the monetary and economic imbalances resulting from the entry of foreign liquidity into the Chinese market.

Advisory Board Co-chair Honoris Causa Professor Giancarlo Elia Valori is an eminent Italian economist and businessman. He holds prestigious academic distinctions and national orders. Mr. Valori has lectured on international affairs and economics at the world’s leading universities such as Peking University, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Yeshiva University in New York. He currently chairs “International World Group”, he is also the honorary president of Huawei Italy, economic adviser to the Chinese giant HNA Group. In 1992 he was appointed Officier de la Légion d’Honneur de la République Francaise, with this motivation: “A man who can see across borders to understand the world” and in 2002 he received the title “Honorable” of the Académie des Sciences de l’Institut de France. “

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East Asia

Power Projection of China

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A coin has always two faces, an analyst is ought to analyze the both sides.

China is considered as flag holder of soft power with a global agenda of peaceful rise. At moment, the world is facing a new emerging global order by the rise of multiple actors in the international arena. Now there are two school of thoughts who are proposing contradictory views like one wing regarded it as optimistic Sino rise who believes that China’s rise is peaceful. Its foreign policy is viewed as one of the most harmonious policy ever structured. They believe in the mutual cooperation and peaceful coexistence. Rise of China is an optimistic opportunity which is justified by different aspects. As African states were facing a massive number of problems at all levels, many super powers came and ruled the world but they didn’t bothered the prosperity of third world countries.

China started invested in African region and assured the chances of prosperity over there. Due to this economic integration of China in Africa, a demise of Indian influence in that has been observed as well. Their economic cooperation is based on model of helping underdeveloped countries by initiating the projects like Belt and Road Initiative. They are extending the helping hand to developing countries by selling products at cheaper rates. They respect the ideologies of other countries, for example, China didn’t celebrated Pig year in Muslim countries. Regarding Pakistan, here the optimistic view is prevailed at higher context. Pakistan’s policy makers favor Chinese investment in Pakistan, as it will help Pakistan in economic prosperity. China helps Pakistan at almost all of the international forum. Friendship of china and Pakistan is the strongest one to be observed. Pakistan can learn a lot from them. The proper use of diplomacy, image building, projection of soft power and individualism in ideologies and beliefs. Long term planning strategies can be learned from them. China is all weather friend of Pakistan but self-skills are significant, as there is a famous Chinese saying, “to serve a guest by fish is a good way but to teach them how to catch fish is the best way to serve them.”

On the other hand, there are supporters of pessimistic Sino rise who believe that China’s rise is threat for globe. This pessimism is oftenly prevailed by western analysts. They think that rise of China can disturb the existing world order. For example, China is competing with American economy in the international market. Balance of power is coin of international politics, so other actors are emerging now. But the rise and demise of powers after a certain time period is one of the laws of nature. Specially America is feeling threatened by this emergence of China as a super power which can be seen through events like Huawei issue over 5G technology, its sensitization, trade war between china and America, claim of copyrights by America etc. increasing influence of China in majority of states is posing the seriousness of issue. Chinese model of Confucianism is spreading as it has started practices in South Korea as well which is predicted through their cultural stimulus.  Pessimistic school of thought deny the authenticity of foreign policy of China, they consider that it is a mere framework which has nothing to do with reality.In reality China’s behavior is like relations having towards Taiwan, South China Sea etc. Interest of states are very important which may differ from each other. Lensing through these views, this unpredictable situation leaves a humans mind into a chaos, whether the rise of China is peaceful or just a myth?

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East Asia

The origin of the Four Modernizations and President Xi Jinping’s current choices

Giancarlo Elia Valori

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On September 13, 1971 Lin Biao tried to flee to the USSR with all his family, aboard a Trident plane of civil aviation, which had left with little fuel and no active radio contact.

The crash of the aircraft in Mongolia, where both Lin and his whole family died, was caused by the order given directly by Mao to shoot down the plane.

 What had happened, obviously in political and not in personal terms?

 The answer is simple: Lin Biao was very strongly opposed to the new agreement between China and the United States and hence had organized a military coup. For Lin Biao all the room for US geopolitics was to be found in what the Third International’s forces traditionally defined as “imperialism”.

 For Mao Zedong, imperialism was vital for both the USSR and the USA- and considering that he was far from the continent that was the prize for which of the two won the Cold War, namely Europe-he refused to make too many differences between the two.

 As a man of Tao and Zen, Mao treated an evil with another evil.

  Mao Zedong, however, also knew that a new economic relationship with the United States was needed, after the long economic crisis and the factional instability within the Chinese regime. The Soviet Union could certainly not give it economic stability and hence the “Great Helmsman” turned to the distant enemy rather than to the near quasi-friend.

 Nothing can be understood about China, including current China, if geopolitical choices are separated from economic, financial and industrial ones which, however, are subjected to the strategic “policy line” defined by the Party – a policy  line that is cultural and always based on a very long term.

 On September 29, 1972 the diplomatic relationship with Japan were resumed, along with those with the United States. An evident overlapping of different geopolitical lines which, however – in the minds of the Chinese decision-makers -were similar also from the symbolic viewpoint.

 In 1973 Deng Xiaoping reappeared in public, upon direct order by Mao Zedong.

 Those were also the years of the late definitive success of the “policy line” of Zhou Enlai, who had successfully gone through the Great Cultural and Proletarian Revolution, which had partly overwhelmed him, and led the 10thCPC Congress.

 That was the compromise which held the Party together, after Lin Biao’s elimination. An unstable agreement between the reformist “Right” (Zhou had spoken of “four modernizations” many years before, exactly in 1965) and the Left, silenced by Mao, that had crossed the red line of the Cultural Revolution and the failed communization of rural areas.

 In those years, also the Party’s Left lacked mass management of the people and the Party and had to agree with the other factions, while Mao mediated and also created “third wheels”.

  Create something from nothing – one of the Thirty-Six Stratagems of the Chinese Art of War.

 In 1973, just before the equilibrium between Zhou and the old CPC apparata broke again, Deng Xiaoping was fully rehabilitated and also became member of the Chinese regime’s deep axis, namely the Central Military Commission.

 In 1975 Deng was elected vice-President of the Central Committee and member of the Politburo Standing Committee.

 The connection between the reformists – if we can call them so – siding with Zhou Enlai, and the “centre” of the Party’s apparatus – that regained its roles and posts by ousting the Armed Forces -prevailed once again.

 Again in 1975, the National People’s Congress praised the “Four Modernizations” already proposed by Zhou and, in its final statement, hoped “that China would be turned into a modern and powerful Socialist country in the approximately twenty years before the end of the century”.

 Political transformation through the new economy, as well as preservation of the regime through political transformation itself.

 We could call it “the Tao of geoeconomics”. Acceleration of industrialization and modernization, but without creating the disaster of rural masses, who were objectively unable of providing the start-up capital for implementing any of the Four Modernizations. This was the real difference with the USSR of the 1930s.

 That capital had to be produced in innovative companies and be attracted from outside.

 At the time, however, the CPC was not yet firmly in the hands of any factions. In September 1975, the national Agriculture Conference saw the harsh clash between Deng Xiaoping and the old “Shanghai group” of the Cultural and Proletarian Revolution that, however, no longer controlled most of the Party.

 Zhou Enlai died in January 1976 and shortly afterwards, in Tiananmen Square, there were severe incidents, albeit with the constant presence of many wreaths reminding of Zhou.

 Later there were also strikes and unrest, until the capture and trial of the “Gang of Four” in Shanghai. It had inspired the “Cultural Revolution” and was then directly accused by Hua Guofen – the man appointed by Mao to lead the transition- of having prepared a coup.

 China’s transformation, however, began again from rural areas: at the second Agriculture Conference in Dazhai, in December 1976 – where various cases of corruption and “social polarization” were described and stigmatized- the discussion focused on the First Modernization, namely that of rural areas.

 When you regulate too much, a parallel and illegal market is created. This always happens.

 Obviously this also happens when total communization is applied to the economic cycle of rural areas.

 Certainly those were residues of Sovietism in the CPC’s  doctrine, but also of the a-dialectical implementation of Marxism-Leninism in historical and social contexts in which the analysis of the founder of “scientific Communism” had never focused.

 In fact, when you read the works and correspondence that Marx dedicated to the Russian agricultural issue, you note that the author of “Capital” foresaw a direct Socialist social transformation stemming from the maintenance of the social and community networks in traditional villages. It may seem strange, but it is so.

 This system operates only with a non-industrialized State that is scarcely widespread in the territory. Otherwise, the problem is that of capitalism in rural areas to generate the surplus of urban and industrial investments.

 Even in the Second Volume of “Capital”, Marx’s model is essentially this one.

 It is precisely on the agricultural issue that the stability and success of many Communist regimes isdefined and, not surprisingly, the first of Zhou’s and later Deng’s Four Modernizations was precisely that of agriculture.

 The topic characterized all Party’s organizations, but it was in late December 1978 that the Third Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee decided to decentralize the economy – another factor strongly different from the Leninist tradition – and even to liberalize it, in addition to a process of ideological revision, namely Gaige Kaifang that roughly means “reform and opening”.

 That was also related to the request for opening international trade based on the criterion of “mutual benefit” and equality between the various countries.

 Hence, also from the ideological viewpoint, Deng became the Supreme Leader of the Party – as well as of the State apparatus – and announced the Open Door policy.

 An extremely important fact was also the separation of the Bank of China from the People’s Bank of China, so as to serve as single State body for foreign exchanges.

 That was the start of the “Long March” towards the Four Modernizations, with an unusually united Party, and currently towards “Socialism with Chinese characteristics” , as well as – at geopolitical level -President Xi Jinping’s New Silk Road.

 In January 1980, the “four freedoms” – of work, people, goods and capital – were abolished.

 The new planning needed to manage all aspects of productive forces.

  That was explained by a covert war of the Chinese economy against the penetration of foreign capital and joint ventures, which in fact were immediately regulated by specific legislation enacted the previous year.

 The great British operation of economic control over the South-Chinese coasts was resumed from Hong Kong, but the Chinese government eliminated the possibility of such an action by Great Britain (and by the USA, at least partly).

 Hence the Party’s unity had to be reflected in a new context and, to some extents, in the whole society, so as to prevent the liberalized Chinese economy from taking the Party and Socialism away. A new rationale for the CPC’s Leninist unity.

 The new Act on contract law was enacted in March 1981, and in 1982 also the new civil procedure law was enacted, which became effective on October 1, 1982.

 In September 1983, at the 12th CPC Congress, there were three groups within the Party: the nostalgic Maoists, a small and narrow majority for Deng Xiaoping; the Orthodox group that still wanted a nationally planned economy, as in USSR -hence probably the heirs to Lin Biao; finally the real reformists.

 Deng won with a clear, but not overwhelming majority.

 Hence, everyone was waiting for the Four Modernizations to fail, so as to go back to the old routine of the Plan.

 As also happened in the USSR, it was often fully imaginary compared to the actual reality of the things done and produced.

 It was in 1983, however, that the Third Front strategy was implemented, i.e. Mao’s directive – drawn up as early as 1962 – according to which the national strategic industries had to be moved from the coasts – militarily and politically difficult to defend – to the internal areas. Without said Mao’s directive, the New Silk Road could not be understood even currently.

Hence 14 open coastal cities that were declared so in 1984, but with a new law on profits that served as mainstay of Modernizations: companies were asked to pay a certain share of profits to the government, but they could withhold some profits if they matched and exceeded the requirements of the contract with the State.

 In 1985 a new regulation also involved government bonds. The seventh Five-Year Plan began, underlining a “scale” approach, in which the coastal areas – gradually freed from traditional strategic companies – were driving the economic development, which later spread like wildfire even in the internal areas.

 It was the Hong Kong model that Deng Xiaoping’s executives copied and adapted.

 For a short lapse of time, Chinese analysts and Party planners also looked to the Singapore model, with the (single) Party of Lee Kuan Yew.

 It isby no mere coincidence that Shenzen was close to the former British colony, and often the Chinese attracted and favoured the companies of the British area towards the new Chinese coastal areas also characterized by free-market economy.

 Advanced and high-tech services in coastal areas, and lower value-added, but still inevitable, productions in internal regions.

 A new dualism, where rural overpopulation had to be gradually absorbed by inland strategic companies.

 A double geopolitical status of inland areas which, in many cases, is repeated also in the current Belt and Road Initiative.

 In 1986, the “open-ended” contracts for the manpower working in State-owned companies came to an end.

 In October 1987,the 13th CPC Congress was held, in which – for the first time – there was talk about the “commodity economy”, i.e. a two-tier mechanism, in which the market is matched and also “corrected” by the old national planning.

 A sort of re-edition, for internal use, of the formula “one country, two systems” implemented by China with the agreements for Macao and Hong Kong.

 In 1988, however, the 7thNational People’s Congress officially legitimized the private initiative (not the mere ownership) and enabled private individuals to buy State-owned companies.

 The term “People’s ownership” was also deleted, while individuals and groups, even non-Chinese ones, could buy land with a system similar to that of the British real estate leasing.

 Profits, wherever made, had to be reinvested in the company that originated them, before requesting any financing from the People’s Bank.

 The Special Economic Zones, modelled again on the Hong Kong system, became five.

 Hence innovation on the coasts and strategic companies in the central regions – mainly public ones, which still remained almost completely public.

 In April 1989, Jiang Zemin rose to power.

 Student demonstrations also began in Tiananmen Square, where, year after year, the various anti-regime organizations gathered: Falun Gong, the networks of many illegal parties, unrecognized union organizations and many “spontaneous” groups.

 And some old “Red Guards”.

 Zhao Ziyang, the Party leader already defenestrated by Jiang Zemin, was in fact at the centre of “spontaneous” organizations.

 The various Autonomous Federations of Workers -spread by location and not by industry – were legally created.

 Gorbachev’s visit took place in May 1989.

  That was the key moment of a long series of doctrinal, practical, cultural and historical differences that – from the very beginning – divided the two great Eastern heirs to the Marxist-Leninist Third International.

 What really mattered to the Chinese leadership was that the Russian crisis did not overwhelm the Chinese Communists: that was the meaning of the declaration signed by Gorbachev, which regarded the “peaceful coexistence” of the two Communist regimes.

 The leader of the Soviet Party was made fun of – not even so elegantly – not because he had reformed the Soviet economic system – in a way, however, that the Chinese deemed wrong – but for one reason only: he had relinquished the Party’s role in the reformist process, which the CPSU had to lead and guide for China, from the very beginning.

An “economicist” mistake, as the CPC’s ideologues said – yet another proof of the Marxist roughness of the “Northern enemy”, as Deng Xiaoping called Russia.

 Sarcastic sniggers on the lips of Chinese leaders. Then Gorbachev explained again his perestrojka and glas’nost, but the Chinese leaders, whose power was based on Party’s bayonets, kept on not taking him seriously.

 Days before the arrival of the Soviet leader, at least one million people had gathered in Tiananmen Square.

 The problems that the Chinese leadership had to solve in a short lapse of time were radical: the “hard” wing that was previously a minority prevailed and managed to convince Jiang Zemin.

 The Party and its authority – the basis of any transformation, even the most radical one – were re-established without much talk. It was impossible to think about a heir to the “Long March” that dissolved the Party within “society”.

 On May 19, the CPC decided to follow the hard line and the military forces reached the areas near the Square, from the outskirts of Beijing.

 Few hours later, the Square was completely cleared, but that was done the hard way.

 Shortly afterwards, at the 4th CPC Plenum, Jiang Zemin –  also following the experience of Tiananmen Square – returned to one of his old theories and developed the “Three Represents” model, i.e. the idea that the CPC’s power was based on its “vast representation” of the Chinese productive forces, of the cultural and technological avant-gardes and of the wide strata of population.

 In other words, the Chinese society – and its economy, in particular – was reformed by bringing the elites together, part of whom were in Tiananmen Square, but also the large crowds still organized by the Party.

 A Confucian middle way that was particularly successful.

 Hence, Zhao Ziyang definitively lost the game within the Party that, however, was also inside the Tiananmen Square insurgency.

 Once the crisis was over, Deng Xiaoping left also the last very strong power in Jiang’s hands: the leadership of the Central Military Commission.

 Shortly afterwards – and there was nothing more symbolic than that event – the Stock Exchange of Shanghai reopened. A reopening that had been expected since the 1930s.

 Later also the Shenzhen Securities Exchange opened. In both of them, any securities – including those issued by the State – were traded, but there was only one deep logic: to acquire productive capital to generate strong and self-sustained development of the coasts and of the high value-added industries that had to compete on the world free market, without granting protection and aid that would go to the detriment of the deep productive structures of the internal regions.

 In 1992, Deng’s journey to Southern borders had a clear route, although the CPC’s leadership had always had some doubts about the “free economic zones”. The core of the issue was that the GDP had to be increased in the lapse of time between the 1990s and the beginning of the Third Millennium.

  It had to be rapidly increased from 6% to 10%.

 Without that “quantitative” assessment – just to use the old Communist jargon – there could be no “qualitative” transformation of Chinese society.

 Everything had to be done soon – well, but soon. That was the characteristic of Deng Xiaoping’s years – extraordinary years, in some respects.

 In a short lapse of time, the Party developed the concepts of “Socialism with Chinese characteristics” and of “market Socialism”, which are so important also in President Xi Jinping’s current policy line.

 There were also other changes that, in a few years, led to the current Socialism with Chinese characteristics, as advocated by President Xi Jinping. However, everything could be done from a legal view point began in those years.

 The transformation process of the Chinese economy is long, powerful and complex, but – unlike what is often said in the West – it is never a mere market mechanism or a naive adaptation of the Party or the State to the absolute Western rules of globalization.

 As early as the 1990s, China has decided to govern market globalization and not just being a part of it. It wants to lead the process so as to be – now that the end of the century about which Deng thought has long been over – the axis of globalization and the centre of the new global hegemonies.

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East Asia

US-China Global Rivalry and BRI

Irfan Khan

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Starting in 2001 from the low-cost industry, China has established most advanced technology today. To a first approximation, China is struggling at its best, to emerge as global power or super power, or in other words you might like to say about. However, in some respect, it still faces challenges, in domestic politics, military’s capability and most importantly what its equivocal vision of whether unipolar or multipolar world.

It sounds well that, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), as of its first kind and biggest developmental project in the history, will open its trade, economy and influence, across the world.BRI is transcontinental and transitional, cooperation and connectivity-based long-term mega project to China and its allies but countries like US, Turkey and India have perceived it as geopolitical, economic colonialization. For the similar reasons, Turkey and India had not attended “Second Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation”, held in Beijing, China last month. BRI spreads across Asia, Africa and Europe, subsuming 68 countries. BRI countries, sharing 30% of global GDP, 62% of world population will find it advantageous and economic driver of change. In reality, BRI will decide of what shape the world would be in 21 century and the next super power. However, BRI’s perennial progress until its completions, is the real test of leaderships of Chinese and also of world. 

US as global leader, is being hamstrung by US-Russia rivalry, US-China fickle economic relationships, China’s openness to international market, Russia growing hegemony and categorially the “Globalization”. US’s influence as major economy, and supplier has been fading away each passing day. The quip, what I had struggled then, have lost now, is not an exaggeration about US.

China’s military capability is not so high compared to US. What if, China has to engage in a conflict for a long time same the US has been in Middle East. This is of much significance, to ponder.

Globally diplomatic and strategic campaign by US and its allies and security situation are main Challenges to BRI. For instance, Pakistan, a flagship partner of BRI, has been enduring insurgency, backed by multi-fold foreign agencies. Last year November attack on China’s consulate Karachi, bomb blast in Quetta, Baluchistan in April and recent Gwadar attacks mirror the security challenges to BRI. Stability in Afghanistan, Pakistan’s relationships with Afghanistan, India and Iran, would affect the progress of BRI.

China’s military capability is not so high and sophisticated compared to US. What if, China has to engage in a conflict for a long time same the US has been in Middle East. This is of much significance, to ponder. To circumvent proxies, if may any, China and its allies, must share a sophisticated intelligence—the most advance than ones the individual has today.  

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