Russian President Vladimir Putin has assertively reminded 17 newly arrived foreign envoys to make efforts to facilitate the development of multifaceted relations with Russia in every possible way, strengthen political dialogue, boost trade and economic relations, deepen humanitarian and cultural ties.
“The role of diplomacy and diplomats are particularly important,” he explained and gave the assurance that Moscow was committed to constructive dialogue with its foreign partners and would unreservedly promote a positive agenda.
“For our part, we are ready to welcome your constructive initiatives, you can count on the support of Russian authorities, state institutions, business circles and the public,” Putin said, addressing the foreign ambassadors in a special ceremony held in the Alexander Hall of the Grand Kremlin Palace.
The 17 newly appointed ambassadors are from Austria, Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Cuba, Egypt, El Salvador, Ghana, Italy, Jordan, Nigeria, Montenegro, Republic of Congo, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, The Gambia, United Arab Emirates and Vietnam.
During the speech, Putin strongly reminded them about the growing challenges and threats confronting the global community and urged them to play a pivotal role in ensuring sustainable development, global peace and stability.
“As for Russia, it will continue to consistently be committed to strengthening global and regional security and stability and fully comply with its international obligations, build constructive cooperation with partners based on respect relying on international legal norms and the United Nations Charter,” the Russian leader said.
According to Putin, “diplomats are called upon to facilitate the joint search for answers to large-scale challenges and threats, such as terrorism, drug trafficking, organized crime, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and climate change.”
In addition to supporting greater security, stability and delivering promptly on its international obligations, Putin also emphasized the readiness of Russia to continue boosting overall ties both at bilateral level and on the world stage with African countries. According to the longstanding tradition, the Russian leader said a few words about the interaction with the individual countries in the welcome speech.
Of particular importance, Putin noted that Russia was interested in broadening ties with the Federal Republic of Nigeria.
“We very much appreciate our relations with Nigeria, an important partner for us on the African continent. We support the further expansion of mutually beneficial Russian-Nigerian ties, including cooperation on hydrocarbon extraction and aluminum production, as well as in the military-technical field,” he told the new Nigerian ambassador, Professor Steve Davies Ugba, who had arrived with an accumulated experience in corporate affairs and several years of academic teaching in the United States.
He went on to inform the gathering that the foundation for the cooperation between Russia and Ghana was laid over 60 years ago. “We have accumulated a great deal of experience in working together in both the trade and economic sphere and in politics. Currently, we are developing promising projects in the nuclear and oil industries, and we are discussing the prospects of supplying Ghana with Russian airplanes, helicopters and automobiles,” Putin said.
Oheneba Dr. Akyaa Opoku Ware, Ghana’s ambassador to the Russian Federation, was one of those who presented credentials to Putin. By profession, she is a qualified medical doctor from The Royal College of Surgeons in Dublin and was appointed as an ambassador to the Russian Federation and former Soviet republics by President Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo on September 13, 2017.
With regards to the Arab Republic of Egypt, Putin offered a bit more saying that the strategic partnership with Egypt is being strengthened. In August, Russia and Egypt will mark the 75th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations. Cooperation between Russia and Egypt is very active and includes the construction of the first nuclear power plant in Egypt, the establishment of a Russian industrial zone in the Port Said region, and the deepening of military and defense industry cooperation.
“I would also like to point out that regular flights between the capitals of the two countries have been resumed. We continue to work on resuming the rest of the flights,” he pointed out.
Last December, fruitful talks with President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi were held in Cairo, he noted, and added that they both maintained regular dialogue on a range of topics, including relevant international and regional issues because both countries have had close or similar positions. Quite recently, Putin heartily congratulated the President of Egypt on his resounding victory at the recent elections.
According to diplomatic sources, Mr. Ihab Talaat Nasr, the new Egyptian ambassador to Russia, has replaced Mr. Mohammed al-Badri who completed his mission late October 2017. Previously, Ihab Nasr was the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Egypt responsible for European affairs.
The Gambia was in the Kremlin for the first time in the country’s history with the official opening of an embassy in Moscow. Madam Jainaba Bah, a Senior Member of the United Democratic Party (UDP), became the first resident ambassador of The Gambia in the Russian Federation.
“Our ties with the Republic of The Gambia are traditionally constructive. The Russian side is interested in expanding economic cooperation, including by increasing the supply of machinery and agricultural products to the republic. We will continue to expand the practice of training Gambian specialists at Russian universities,” the Russian leader explained.
Significantly, Putin underscores the fact that friendly cooperation is maintained with the Republic of the Congo. Bilateral cooperation covers a number of major projects, including the construction of a 1,334 km oil pipeline. In February, Rosatom and the Science Ministry of the Congo signed a memorandum of understanding. Over 7,000 citizens of the Congo have received higher education at Soviet and Russian universities.
Talking about Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, he said that Russia’s relations with the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire would continue to develop in traditionally constructive spirit.
“We mainly interact with the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire in the trade and economic sphere. Russia supplies to this country chemical and food products and imports cocoa and its derivatives. As part of our humanitarian efforts, medicine and medical equipment from Russia are regularly sent to the Republic,” Putin told the new ambassador, Mr. Roger Gnanga, who had served in diplomatic post in Washington.
Currently, Côte d’Ivoire is a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council. Russia also stands ready to work with the Ivorian side at the UN.
Interestingly, Benin has frequently changed its ambassadors. Mr. Noukpo Clement Kiki, the newly appointed Ambassador of the Republic of Benin to the Russian Federation, is a professional teacher and administrator for over 20 years. Quite recently, he had a short diplomatic stint in Canada and now transferred to Moscow.
Relations with Benin are developing in a constructive spirit. Russia cooperates on energy and transport. Russia exports food and chemical products. Over 2,500 citizens of Benin have graduated from Russian universities, according to Putin.
Whatever the possible shortfalls, Putin optimistically expects that, with active participation of the 17 newly arrived ambassadors, these relations will develop dynamically for the mutual benefit of the peoples of their individual countries and Russia, and in the interests of international stability and security.
“I am confident that your time in Russia will allow you to better know our country and its rich history and culture, and will leave you with new unforgettable impressions,” Putin, elected for another six-year presidential term and to be inaugurated into office on May 7, told the gathering.
In conclusion, Putin congratulated the new foreign envoys with the official beginning of an important and honorable diplomatic mission, and with the hope that their activities in the Russian Federation will be productive and promote the development of relations between the countries they represent and the Russian Federation.
Russia marks 15 years of its membership in OIC
On June 30, 2020, the Russian Federation marked the 15th anniversary of its joining the Organization of the Islamic Conference (presently the Organization of Islamic Cooperation), as an observer.
Russian and foreign politicians, as well as the leadership of the OIC, took part in a videoconference organized on the occasion by the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the Organization of Islamic Cooperation.
The participants discussed a range of important issues, including the development of political dialogue and across-the-board cooperation between Russia and the countries of the Islamic world. They also underscored the significance of Russia’s joining the OIC in 2005 as an observer.
However, the extensive preparatory work, carried out over several years ensuring the success of the Russian bid to join the organization as an observer has been largely ignored.
One aspect of that preparatory work was the need to ease tensions and explain the real meaning of the events in the North Caucasus, where the Russian Federation had to deal with a large-scale conspiracy by international terrorist organizations and a maze of anti-Russian forces supporting those organizations.
The February 2004 visit to Saudi Arabia by the first president of the Chechen Republic, Akhmat Kadyrov, who led a delegation of public and religious figures representing Russia’s North Caucasus republics, was a significant part of that preparatory work.
The prospect of such a visit was discussed by President Vladimir Putin and the Crown Prince of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Abdullah on September 3, 2003.
However, the whole idea faced serious hurdles due, among other things, to the presence in Saudi Arabia of opponents of our rapprochement, who were influenced by anti-Russian forces and criticized Moscow’s policies in the North Caucasus.
The Saudi Foreign Minister, Faisal Al-Saud, told me, as Russia’s Ambassador to the Kingdom, that “the fate of the visit is in the hands of Crown Prince Abdullah,” who was then the de facto leader of the country (King Fahd was seriously ill and was virtually incapacitated).
After a tense, over two-hour-long discussion of the issue with the Crown Prince, he gave the visit the go-ahead, adding that all members of the delegation and accompanying persons would, without exception, be treated as “personal guests of the King of Saudi Arabia” and placed in the official government residence.
Upon his arrival in Saudi Arabia, Akhmat Kadyrov met with top members of the Saudi government, including the foreign minister and ministers of the economic bloc, the leadership of the OIC, the President of the Islamic Development Bank, Ahmed Mohamed Ali, and local public and religious leaders.
Akhmat Kadyrov’s excellent knowledge of the Arabic language and the intricacies of Islamic culture and his frankness eventually broke the ice of mistrust and contributed to the success of negotiations on Russia’s accession to the OIC.
Morocco’s ex-Foreign Minister Abdul Waheed Belkaziz, who served as the OIC Secretary General between 2000 and 2005, and Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal Al-Saud, who organized a meeting in Jeddah of representatives of OIC member countries to present weighty arguments in favor of the importance of Russia’s joining the alliance, played a major role in establishing a new climate of friendship between Russia and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation. During the meeting we agreed to amend the IOC Charter so that it would allow Russia to join the organization as an observer.
Today, our cooperation is many-sided and productive. It is really imperative for us to bear in mind our previous experience of friendly interaction and to give credit to our partners, including the Saudis, who played such an important role in opening up new opportunities for cooperation between Russia and the Arab, Islamic world.
From our partner International Affairs
Will Erdogan’s Adventures Hurt Russian Soft Power?
While the Russian Federation is actively pursuing the cultivation of its Soft Power, the results, in the present cynical and confusing international environment, appear to be mixed. For instance, in a 2019 paper, an Israeli analyst argued that “Russian soft power efforts in the Middle East are bearing fruit, as many young Arabs now view Moscow as an ally and the US as unreliable .” But the “SOFT POWER 30” Index, for 2019, places Russia 30th among 30 states, below Turkey’s 29th score. Admittedly, these are quite “Russophobic” times in the West, except for occasional positive gestures by some Western capitals and the explicit support for many Russian policies by Cyprus and Greece. Moscow, then, must struggle to undermine widespread anti-Russian propaganda. Hence it seems to Russophile Greeks of Cyprus and Greece that Russia should also contain its own “Turkey problem.” For during the current Russia-Turkey manifold embrace, President Erdogan’s behavior could damage Moscow’s own image and international prestige.
This article will revisit Erdogan’s characteristic foreign policy decisions, actions, and claims in the Mediterranean, the Middle East and the Aegean Sea, with particular emphasis on Ankara’s aggression against Cyprus and Greece through Erdogan’s military threats. The behavior against Moscow’s two traditional friends needs to be exposed in order to counter the spread of fake news and erroneous analyses. The Conclusion, therefore, will entail that Moscow should minimize the negative effects of Erdogan’s adventurism on Russia’s Soft Power.
Erdogan’s Goals and Means in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Middle East, and the Aegean Sea
President Erdogan has long been guiding Turkey’s belligerent regional adventures, driven by his professed ambition to establish the “New Turkey” and meet “the Borders of his Heart.” Echoing the neo-Ottoman syllogistic of his one-time mentor, Dr. Ahmet Davutoglu, he has repeatedly claimed inter alia that Turkey, as “victimized” by the Lausanne Treaty, “deserves” to regain its former (Ottoman) possessions. Thus, he has named as legitimate targets vast areas of present-day Syria, Iraq, Greece, its Aegean Islands, and Cyprus.
Erdogan’s self-declared ambitions help us call Turkey’s military interventions – in Northern Syria, Northern Iraq, Libya, and the Exclusive Economic Zone of the Republic of Cyprus – by their proper name: expansionism contrary to International Law. Nevertheless, Ankara presents itself and its policies as “in accordance with International Law.”
Similarly, in another formulation, Ankara’s officials and spokespersons make their territorial “claims” in terms of Turkey’s “rights and interests.” Therefore, they conflate these distinct concepts, aiming to extract “rights” even from subjectively and artificially conceived chauvinistic interests. “Rights,” of course, should be premised on solid legal grounds; subjectively-defined interests are, for International Law, “neither here nor there.” And yet, Erdogan and his foreign minister Mevlut Cavusoglu, his defense minister Hulusi Akar and the foreign ministry’s Hami Aksoi adopt the language of “rights and Interests,” as when they claim to pursue Turkish ambitions in what they have called “Blue Homeland.”
This neologism about a vast Eastern Mediterranean area covers half the Aegean Sea, “appropriating” all the Greek Islands of the Eastern Aegean. Moreover, by sheer Turkish Diktat, it includes the entire Exclusive Economic Zone of Cyprus and part of the EEZ of the Dodecanese Islands and Crete. So, what are Ankara’s alleged “grounds” for these claims? Turkey replies that “according to International Law,” Islands do not have either Continental Shelf or an Exclusive Economic Zone.
The claim appears inaccurate, for it contradicts the 1982 United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which states (Article 121):
- An Island is a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide.
- Except as provided in paragraph 3, the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf of an island are determined in accordance with the provisions of this Convention applicable to another land territory.
- Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.
Article 121.2 explains why Turkey refuses to sign UNCLOS, hoping it could substitute gunboat diplomacy for International Law. The UNCLOS, however, is part of International Customary Law, ratified by 167 states and by the European Union (EU), which Turkey hopes to join. Thus, the undisputed applicability of Article 121 has led to the massive condemnation of Ankara’s associated provocations.
Turkey’s “neo-surrealist” claim (as Greek FM Nikos Dendias once quipped) about Islands is currently extended to its two “MoUs” with Libya’s GNA government in Tripoli. The memorandum allegedly delineating a Turkey-Libya EEZ presupposes the elimination of the sovereign rights of numerous Greek islands, including Rhodes and Crete, by abolishing their Continental Shelf and EEZ. The EU has repeatedly deplored this memorandum as illegal. Athens and Nicosia have rejected both memoranda as “null and void.” Washington has variously expressed its condemnation calling them “provocative and counterproductive.”
Egypt’s own condemnation, submitted to the Security Council on December 19, 2019, was premised both on the technical fact that Libya’s “House of Representatives has not endorsed the two memorandums of understanding with Turkey” and the palpable geographic fact: “Egypt rejects Turkey-Libya sea rights, security agreements”:
The maritime deal would give Turkey access to an economic zone across the Mediterranean, over the objections of Greece, Cyprus, and Egypt, which lie between Tukey and Libya geographically.
A week earlier, Russian Ambassador to Athens, Andrey Maslov, commented on various issues during an annual press briefing: “Speaking on bilateral relations, Maslov said, Greece is a traditional and reliable partner for Russia in Europe, and the two countries can continue building their relations ‘even under the anti-Russian situation of sanctions’ by the EU.” He also expressed appreciation for “the established stance of the Greeks, that the architecture of security in Europe must include Russia as well.” And when asked about the recent Turkey-Libya memorandum on maritime zones, “the ambassador said he did not want to ‘enter into detailed commentary’ on the issue, which should be left to experts, but ‘the main issue is to observe the principles of international law, including the Lausanne Treaty of 1923 and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982‘.
To Moscow’s credit, and given the mounting Libya crisis, Ambassador Maslov returned to the accusation of Turkey, when he declared explicitly: Islands do have a continental shelf and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in face of Turkey’s insistence that they do not.
French President Emmanuel Macron, infuriated by Turkey’s manifold illegality in Libya, including its hostile actions against the French frigate, declared “the historical and criminal responsibility” of Turkey.
Finally, Greek FM Nikos Dendias visited the President of the Libyan House of Representatives, Aguila Saleh, on July 1, 2020. In his published Statement, Mr Dendias summarized his positive discussion with Mr Saleh, including a potentially historic prospect:
We also talked about the delimitation of maritime zones between Greece and Libya, not in the framework of illegality, as is the case with the so-called Sarraj-Turkey memorandum, but in the framework of International Law and follow-up to the relevant talks held between Greece and Libya in 2010.
Despite such powerful international outcry, Erdogan and his ministers keep insisting that their decisions and actions “accord with international law.” Moreover, whenever Nicosia and Athens’ governments confront Ankara’s behavior, the latter accuses them of “not knowing their place in the world.” Therefore, verbal provocations accompany Turkey’s aggression adding insult to injury. Furthermore, since these violations of International Law and International Ethics are being progressively accumulated and intensified, they entail further negative consequences: Erdogan’s self-imprisonment in his untenable claims; the anti-Hellenic brainwashing of the Turkish people and Turkey’s Media; and their endorsement by the Turkish Opposition who, in chauvinistic competition, frequently become more “Erdoganian” than Erdogan himself.
Recent Escalating Aggression Against Cyprus and Greece
Traditionally, Greece and Cyprus have insisted on dispute-resolution according to International Law and friendship and cooperation with Ankara and the Turkish people. More recently, Nicosia and Athens realized that Turkey’s appeasement had proved utterly counterproductive: Erdogan’s and his associates’ offensive rhetoric, explicit anti-Hellenic threats, and historical and legal distortions kept escalating as some examples suffice to demonstrate.
To begin with, Erdogan’s close adviser, Yigit Bulut, after asserting his “certainty” that Washington plans to make Greece attack Turkey, declared that, since Greece “is no match for Turkey’s might,” it would be “like a fly picking a fight with a giant.” Moreover, regarding the Greek Imia islets that Turkey has decided to “claim,” Bulut stated in January 2018: We will break the arms and legs of any officers, the Prime Minister, or of any minister, who dares to step onto Imia in the Aegean (ibid.)
Also, in 2018, when a few isolated fascists burned a Turkish flag in Athens, Mustafa Deztiji, Erdogan’s political ally, declared, “The Turkish flag one day will fly again in Athens.” In March 2018, Erdogan announced with macabre pomposity how he conceived the “New Turkey” materialization, “Certainly, we will build a great and dynamic future for Turkey, and for this, we will sacrifice our life and take the lives of others when needed.”
Such rhetoric was not improvised or temporary. Burak Bekdil, the distinguished Turkish columnist, offered memorable comments on the 2020 celebrations of Constantinople’s 1453 conquest. Since Erdogan commemorated the conquest personally with Islamic prayers at the Hagia Sophia, arguably Christianity’s holiest monument, Bekdil wrote among other things:
In Turkish jargon…it is “conquest” when we do it and “invasion” when others do it. In this year’s celebrations, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan raised the stakes when he spoke of the conquest prospectively, not just retrospectively. “I wish that God grant this nation many more happy conquests,” he said at a celebration where he recited from the Quran. .
In all this typically Turkish “conquest” fanfare, a serious question remains to be asked: When Erdogan wished God to grant Turkey many more happy conquests,” which non-Turkish lands is he hoping to “conquer”?
Besides such provocative verbal actions; Greece and Cyprus also experience Turkey’s unending hostility by non-verbal actions. They include the permanent violation of Greek airspace in the Aegean and the Athens Freedom of Information Region (FIR) by armed Turkish military jets, demonstrating Ankara’s expansionist dreams; the daily flights by Turkish military jets over Greek Aegean islands, often a few hundred meters above the terrified inhabitants; the constant issue of illegal NAVTEX within the Republic of Cyprus’ EEZ, long aiming to cancel or disrupt Nicosia’s hydrocarbon program; the “abortion” of gas drilling by SAPIEM 1200 in Bloc 3 of the Cypriot EEZ in March 2018 by the Turkish Navy, violating Cyprus’ contract with the Italian company ENI; the deliberate crash of a Turkish coast guard vessel into a Greek patrol boat off Imia in February 2018, literally threatening Greek sailors’ lives.
In 2019, Ankara intensified its “third invasion” within the Cypriot EEZ, by sending new drilling ships always accompanied by the Turkish Navy. The EU Institutions and individual Member-States flatly condemned these actions. Official Russian voices have consistently condemned Ankara’s relevant behavior since 2011, and Russian Ambassador Stanislav Osadchiy regularly declares that Moscow recognizes Cyprus’ sovereign rights in its EEZ. At the same time, Ambassador Tasos Tzonis received the same assurances when he met Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Grushko last October: “Full Russian support for the Republic of Cyprus’ sovereign rights in its sea zones during Tzionis’ discussions in Moscow.”  And yet, because all the statements condemning Turkey haven’t been accompanied by tangible sanctions, Erdogan remains unmoved, fixated on brutally contradicting the principles and norms of International Law.
The Evros Crisis as a Test-Case
In early 2020, the whole world witnessed in awe the incredible Evros River Crisis, at the northern Greece-Turkey border. During a late February Greek holiday, the “hybrid invasion” of Greece was attempted by thousands of people, misled by Ankara to believe that “Turkey’s borders with Europe are now open.” Erdogan had opened Turkey’s border to Greece while Athens had declared it closed, unable to host any more than the thousands it has been forced by Turkey to accept on the Aegean Islands and mainland Greece. Moreover, the overwhelming majority of these people were neither “refugees from Syria” nor even refugees, mainly economic migrants, primarily from Pakistan, Afghanistan, and North Africa. As it transpired, they included former prisoners in Turkish prisons and real jihadists from Syria.
What is happening here is a textbook case for destabilizing entire regions. The situation is similar to the pre-Balkan crisis in Kosovo. Erdogan’s movements follow the same patterns as the ones that preceded his intervention in Syria, when he used the populations expelled from there as weapons and an alibi .
In addition to “weaponizing” thousands of miserable people in order to destabilize Greece and “flood the EU” (Erdogan’s stereotypical threat) to extract pro-Turkey decisions – including more money and support for his Syria adventures – the crisis was aggravated by Ankara’s orchestrated campaign of fake news and vicious propaganda. Immature Western journalists, passionate Turkish propagandists, and some naïve Western academics were deceived by Turkey’s fabricated news and unethical misinformation, threatening Greece’s dignity and prestige.
But the EU’s top leadership set the record straight. It gave full support to Greece through the visit to Evros River by European Commission President Ursula von der Leiden, European Council President Charles Michel, European Parliament President David-Maria Sassoli, and Croatian Prime Minister Andrej Plenkovic. They were escorted by Greek PM Kyriakos Mitsotakis, who said that “Turkey has now become an ‘official migrant smuggler’.” The EU leaders added that “It is no longer a refugee-migration problem but an ‘asymmetric threat’ to Greece’s eastern border, which is also Europe’s border.”
Ankara’s psychological warfare included the Interior Minister’s unashamed lie that “117,677 refugees have crossed into Greece” (ibid.). EURAKTIV’s Balkan expert, Georgi Gotev, explained in detail (ibid): that “the total number of migrants gathered in the border areas is estimated at some 20,000”; that the Greek authorities said that fewer than 200 migrants have managed to cross the border; and that “Greece has already sentenced all of them to four years of jail for illegal crossing.”
Therefore, the tragedy turned into Erdogan and his regime’s downturn. Eventually, Greece took effective measures to protect its and Europe’s borders from such “hybrid warfare.” While It attracted the respect of political elites and honest foreign commentators, the notorious pro-Erdogan Daily Sabah continued its unending anti-Hellenic hate-speech, as evidenced from the following formulation:
Ankara recently announced that it would no longer try to stop asylum-seekers, refugees, and migrants from crossing into Europe. Thousands have since flocked to Turkey’s Edirne province, which borders Greece and Bulgaria to make their way into Europe.
Daily Sabah’s attack used dubious statements by a certain “refugee rights researcher” and “advocate at Human Rights Watch,” who insulted the Greek security forces for having “detained, assaulted, sexually assaulted, robbed, and stripped asylum-seekers and migrants.” This fabrication has been totally falsified by independent reporters and commentators; by the aforementioned top EU officials; and by the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (FRONTEX). Hence, Michael Rubin’s April 1, 2020, commentary, entitled, “Human Rights Watch reports are no longer credible.”
The Evros case illustrates Ankara’s ruses, narratives’ manipulation and other practices deployed in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Cypriot EEZ, the Aegean Sea, Syria, Iraq, and now Libya, in order to implement Erdogan’s megalomania  What deserves a separate treatment is why Hellenism is Erdogan’s fixed target, verbally abused daily and threatened militarily unless Cyprus and Greece yield to his blackmail.
For now, the following hypotheses seem irresistible: (1) Turkey’s anti-Hellenic geopolitical bulimia erupted in the 1970s when oil reserves were discovered in the northern Aegean and Ankara decided to claim half the Aegean Continental Shelf; (2) the “Blue Homeland” consists primarily of Greek territories and Greece’s threatened sovereign rights; (3) Turkey had always regarded Greece as far weaker than Turkey and weaker than what Greece really is; (4) Turkey cannot forgive Cyprus and Greece for their EEZs’ hydrocarbon deposits in contrast to missing its own; (5) Erdogan cannot “tolerate” that Hellenism has weaved substantial collaboration with neighboring Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and Lebanon; increasingly with France; and perhaps with (hovering) Italy; and (6) Turkish theologian, Cemil Kilic, asked about Erdogan’s passion for turning Aghia Sophia into a mosque, admitted inter alia Turkey’s “sense of inferiority vis-à-vis the West.” If so, for obvious historical and cultural reasons, one could deduce that Erdogan’s inferiority complex towards Hellenism may be far more robust and probably incurable.
Previous RIAC articles authored by me since 2017 have celebrated Russia’s very special links and bonds with Hellenism, premised on mutual interests, shared values, historical/cultural affinities, and respect for International Law. More recently, I recognized some reservations and joint complaints in Russia-Cyprus relations, emanating primarily from the Moscow-Ankara “multiple embrace.” However, progressively, Erdogan’s “sui generis personality and geopolitical megalomania have worsened Russia-Turkey relations since, besides concurrence, they also exhibit contradictory perceptions and interests, rights, and suspicions.
Moreover, Erdogan’s opportunism, adventurism, and overextension show today signs of despair, since certain decisions have traumatized Turkey’s economy while questionable actions have isolated the country. The EU’s alarming inaction toward Erdogan’s aggressiveness, especially against Cyprus and Greece, was primarily a matter of some member-states’ economic interests.
In summer 2020, however, after President Macron’s aforementioned eruption, Angela Merkel’s seeming exhaustion, the threat of an Egypt-Turkey military confrontation, the apparent failure of Josep Borrel’s peace-making trip to Ankara, Turkey’s exhibition of Realpolitik cum Machtpolitik, and, finally, after the bombing of Turkey-supported targets in Libya (al-Watiya), the EU seems to be changing its mind. After all, Erdogan’s Libya intervention has secured substantial international condemnation by numerous actors – France, Egypt, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Cyprus, Greece, and Russia – sufficient to miss the next “SOFT POWER 30.” Inevitably, Russian Soft Power is being victimized by the Erdogan association. Hence Moscow, uniquely capable of containing its trouble-making associate, is ideally placed to take appropriate initiatives: as a service to international stability, international dignity, and Russia’s international image and prestige.
1. Shay Attias, Russian Soft Power in the Middle East, BESA Center Perspectives Paper No.1,238, July 26, 2019
2. See Cyprus News Agency, October 15, 2019.
3. Any country would act like Greece, Cyprus Mail, March 5, 2020
4. For Erdogan’s array of deceptive rhetorical devices, see Costas Melakopides, Brief Remarks on President R.T. Erdogan and His Allies’ Methodical Use of Logical Fallacies, RUDN Journal of Political Science, Vol. 20, No.3, 2018, pp. 376-386.
From our partner RIAC
Understanding Russia-Algerian Strategic Partnership
For almost 20 years, Russia has pursued its economic cooperation and other geo-strategic interests using the Declaration on Strategic Partnership agreement signed in 2001 with the Arab Republic of Algeria in the Maghreb region. The Maghreb also known as Northwest Africa, the Arab Maghreb is a subregion of North Africa that is effectively a western part of the Arab world and is predominantly Muslim.
In geopolitical context, Russia has excellent relations with countries in this region compared to the rest of Africa. While that two-decade old Declaration on Strategic Partnership agreement has primarily allowed Russia to step up military-technical cooperation by supplying arms and military equipment, it also sets out principles for the consolidating long-term bilateral policy goals between the two countries.
During her weekly media briefing, Russian Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Maria Zakharova hinted about the official visit of Algerian Foreign Minister Sabri Boukadoum. “Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov will hold talks with the Algerian Foreign Minister in Moscow on July 22 in order to maintain dialogue on the current issues of bilateral relations and the issues on the regional agenda,” the diplomat said.
She reminded that Russia and Algeria had signed the Declaration on Strategic Partnership in 2001, which set out the long-term goals of joint work. “In nearly two decades, we have managed to expand the basis of our cooperation significantly. We are successfully developing mutually beneficial ties in the economic, military-technical, research and humanitarian spheres, and in 2019, the turnover between two states reached $3.4 billion. This is a significant figure,” Zakharova said.
Undoubtedly, Russia has tried to sustain its multifaceted bilateral relations with Algeria that plays an important role in maintaining regional stability in North Africa.
Sabri Boukadoum has served as Minister of Foreign Affairs since April 2019. In this short period though, he has expressed his country’s keenness on resolving the Libyan crisis through dialogue and maintaining the integrity of the country’s territory.
According to him, Algeria does not accept the presence of foreign forces in Libya, regardless of which country they represent. Currently there is an intense fight between the Government of National Accord (GNA) and Marshal Khalifa Haftar’s forces (the opposition from the Eastern region) to control the Libyan capital. There are external forces already supporting the two warring groups.
The inflow of arms for the conflicting sides in Libya is only aggravating the situation in the country. It adds to the involvement of foreign mercenaries and the presence of extremist and terrorist groups, whose activities reinvigorated jointly with the military escalation and is threatening the local, regional and global peace.
This development largely worries Algeria that wanted to assist Libyans in addressing “structural governance and security issues” and prevent a new Arab Spring from spilling over unto its territory.
From Russia’s perspective, besides Algeria’s role in ensuring regional stability in North Africa, this country makes a significant contribution to the fight against terrorism in the Sahara-Sahel zone, actively participates in international efforts to achieve national accord in Mali, and has a constructive mediating potential in the Libyan settlement.
On this basis, Russia wants to proceed from the premise that the upcoming talks help to strengthen multifaceted bilateral cooperation and to engage in the peaceful negotiation process in its neighboring Libya.
As a sign of cordial friendship, Russia prompt responded to Algeria’s request for humanitarian aid by delivering a cargo full of medical protective equipment to help tackle the novel coronavirus pandemic. That aid was purchased and delivered by Rosoboronexport, which is the sole State Arms Exporter, on instructions from the Russian government late April. Algeria has one of the biggest number of coronavirus-related deaths among the African nations, according to official statistics.
On July 8, while addressing the first political consultation meeting at the foreign minister level between Russia and three members of the African Union, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov stressed that the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Libya has been vacant for almost half a year ago. UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres has been unable to appoint a successor so far.
His first proposal to appoint Foreign Minister of Algeria, Ramtane Lamamra, was supported by most countries except the American colleagues. They refused to support his nomination. Then, another proposal put forward to appoint former Foreign Minister of Ghana, Hannah Tetteh, but for some reasons Mr Antonio Guterres has failed to have this nomination approved, according to Sergey Lavrov.
The political consultation meeting at the foreign minister level between Russia and three members of the African Union was established after the first Russia-Africa Summit held in Sochi last October. The three African Union countries are the Arab Republic of Egypt, the Republic of South Africa and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. They are the former, current and next presidents of the African Union.
Late January 2019, just before Russia’s presidential election and the first Russia-Africa summit, was the last time Lavrov paid a working visit to the Maghreb countries, including the People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria, the Kingdom of Morocco and the Republic of Tunisia.
Lavrov, however, hopes the upcoming bilateral talks with Sabri Boukadoum will lay a new roadmap to the diverse aspects of the bilateral relations and the possibility of strengthening bilateral cooperation in a number of spheres. Both are looking to have indepth discussion into adopting strategies toward resolving the crisis in Libya.
Both countries, of course, want the effective use of the Joint Russian-Algerian Intergovernmental Commission on Trade, Economic and Scientific and Technical Cooperation, as the instrument for full-fledged realization of the all the set policy goals including those outlined during the Sochi last year.
The leaders of both countries held their bilateral meeting on the sidelines of the Russia-Africa summit in Sochi. During the discussion, Putin said that Russia was ready to render the Algerian people assistance in strengthening their statehood and sovereignty.
He further indicated that Moscow attached great importance to developing inter-state strategic partnership with Algeria “which is based on the solid traditions of longstanding friendship and mutual respect.”
Algeria is among Russia’s major partners in Africa in the sphere of military and technical cooperation. The largest arms contract worth $7.5 billion was signed in 2006 as part of a deal, under which Russia agreed to write off Algeria’s debt owed to the Soviet Union.
Besides bilateral relationship, Russia relates with Algeria in the framework of the broad partnerships between Russia and the African Union, and Russia and the Arab League.
As part of the Maghreb, the People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria is bordered to the northeast by Tunisia, to the east by Libya, to the southeast by Niger, to southwest by Mali, to the west by Morocco and to the north by the Mediterranean Sea.
China Replacing Russia as the Boogeyman in the U.S. Presidential Campaign
During the 2016 U.S. Presidential bid, Russia was picked as a scapegoat to justify the loss endured by the Democratic...
Armed Bandits: The Novel Security Threat in Nigeria
The shrinking of Lake Chad which has led to competition between farmers and herders over scarce resources coupled with Boko...
AfDB presents findings of the Angola Green Mini-Grid Market Assessment
The African Development Bank hosted a webinar to present the findings and recommendations of the Angola Green Mini-Grid Market Assessment...
Ten Years to Midnight: Four urgent global crises and their strategic solutions
The world has 10 years to solve its urgent challenges or it will be too late. In his new book, TEN...
Refugees In The Outbreak Of The Pandemic
The COVID-19 today is having an adverse impact on our lives although it has brought exceptional changes in climate and...
Between Missiles and Flour: The Inside-Outside Game of Hezbollah in Lebanon
The Hezbollah is armed. Gunfire of Hezbollah and Amal supporters became audible on Beirut’s streets on early Sunday morning on...
Public Transport Can Bounce Back from COVID-19 with New and Green Technology
Public transport must adapt to a “new normal” in the wake of the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic and adopt technologies...
Eastern Europe3 days ago
The Treasure Map to the Forgotten Epoch of the Iravan Khanate
Intelligence2 days ago
ISIS and the Militant Jihad on Instagram
South Asia3 days ago
One year Siege of Kashmir
Southeast Asia2 days ago
What Indonesia Can Do to Prevent Nuclear Arms Race in Asia Pacific?
Economy3 days ago
Decoding European Union’s Economy
Eastern Europe1 day ago
The long-term threat of Armenian nationalism
Africa2 days ago
Somalia: An American Media Pundit, Exaggerates and Weaponizes International Aid
EU Politics2 days ago
EU-Vietnam trade agreement enters into force