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Strategic Stabilization: A Window of Opportunities for Russia and the U.S.

Dmitry Stefanovich

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Despite the belligerent nuclear statements by Russia and the U.S. in the first quarter of 2018, the configuration of a possible future for the international arms control regimes can be seen beyond the veil of rhetoric.

Therapeutic address

The address to the Federal Assembly by President Vladimir Putin, who has since been re-elected, was striking and unprecedented in terms of its nuclear-missile revelations. However, it generated a fair share of criticism, and rightly so for the most part. In particular, the visualization of the new nuclear delivery systems included a number of previously demonstrated animations, including the understandably criticized “footage” of MIRVs arriving at Florida, which was borrowed from a video related to the future Sarmat ICBM that had been included in a TV film devoted to the Voyevoda ICBM. One aspect that wasn’t entirely understandable was the clearly doctored footage of a target being allegedly being hit by a Kinzhal, a system that is currently very close to deployment. It is, however, worth noting that all the systems featured in the presentation – the heavy Sarmat ICBM, the Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle, the Burevestnik nuclear-powered cruise missile of unlimited range, the Poseidon nuclear-powered unmanned underwater vehicle, the Kinzhal airborne rocket system, and the Peresvet combat laser system – were all, to one extent or another, started as Soviet projects aimed at counteracting the deployment of U.S. ABM as part of President Ronald Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative.

This, however, is beside the point. The key part of Putin’s address was the message to the effect that Russia is prepared to overcome the problems posed by any existing or future U.S. ABM system. Shortly after the president’s address, Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu expressed his bewilderment at why the U.S. would need a “leaky” ABM umbrella. Putin himself clarified his position in an interview with NBC, effectively declaring that Russia was ready for further reductions in strategic offensive weapons, the ABM threat notwithstanding. An external symptom of this readiness is the absence of ABM on the agenda of the next iteration of the international security conference in Moscow, which originally emerged as a platform for discussions on U.S. ABM-related issues. Thus, we can assume that the demonstration of nuclear delivery systems that are invulnerable a priori to any existing or future anti-missile systems had a therapeutic effect and significantly lowered the tone of hysterical talk concerning the development of the U.S. ABM system.

The most recent evidence of the possibility of a new agreement came in the form of a telephone conversation between Putin and Trump on March 20, after which the two presidents declared their interest in a meaningful discussion on strategic stability aimed at preventing a new arms race [1]. The first step towards a positive agenda should be a joint statement on strategic stability by the two countries’ presidents. Apart from the traditional talking point about the impossibility of winning a nuclear war, the statement would benefit from the inclusion of assurances stating that the new defensive and offensive weapons do not aim to undermine the deterring potential of each country’s nuclear forces, and that neither of the two are striving to create nuclear weapons that would be applicable in local conflicts.

In this context, despite the negative backdrop of the current Russian-U.S. relations, the need to discuss the parameters of the future nuclear deal has once again become a hot topic, even though Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova asserts that the time for such talks has not yet arrived.

Problems with prolongation

The simplest and most obvious option would be to prolong the current New START for another five years until 2026. There are, however, a number of obstacles to this.

Trump is extremely opposed to all the achievements of the Obama administration, including in the nuclear field. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on Iran’s nuclear program is falling apart and, according to unofficial reports, the New START came under criticism during Trump’s first phone conversation with Putin.

Russia continues to be critical of the U.S. approach to reducing the number of nuclear delivery platforms and launchers. This criticism does not appear to be extremely significant, but it does illustrate the shortcomings of the current New START in terms of the mere possibility of such a problem emerging once the combined permitted levels of strategic offensive weapons under the New START have been reached.

The INF Treaty is a burning topic: the two sides have officially accused each other of breaching the document, while denying the accusations leveled against themselves. It should be noted that the U.S. has already codified its accusations, including as part of sanctions against enterprises involved in the production of 9M729 cruise missiles for the Iskander-M theater missile system (Novator Design Bureau and Titan-Barrikady).

Both the U.S., under its new Nuclear Posture Review, and Russia, under its new government armament program through 2027, are slated to phase in nuclear delivery systems which fall outside the scope of the New START.

Hypersonic glide vehicles are already being discussed by experts as future systems that would be capable of radically rearranging the global strategic landscape even if they are not tipped with nuclear warheads;

The “exotic” Burevestnik and Poseidon nuclear-powered nuclear delivery platforms, which have not yet been added to Russia’s arsenal, represent projects of assured destruction with nuclear retaliation. They are believed to be in a fairly high state of completion, but tests continue. It is impossible to predict the planned deployment timeline, locations, and numbers as of now: the exact parameters will depend on the situation with Russian-U.S. and global arms control regimes.

Nuclear-tipped sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM) present a serious problem. Such missiles are nothing new, but for now there is no control regime that would apply to them. START I imposed an unverifiable limit of 880 SLCMs for both parties; in fact, these weapons have not been officially sent on combat duty to sea since the early 1990s as part of unilateral initiatives. In 2011, the U.S. finally decided to retire the nuclear-tipped variant of the TLAM-N Tomahawk cruise missile; the country has by now destroyed all the associated W-80-0 warheads [2]. Russia historically (and most likely deliberately) maintains a certain degree of ambiguity when it comes to the types of its SLCMs that are potentially and actually capable of being tipped with specialized warheads (the same is true of other Russian missile types). The U.S. periodically describes its nuclear-tipped SLCMs as a response to Russia’s breaches of the INF Treaty, allegedly through the continued deployment of a ground-based type of cruise missiles with a range of around 2,000 km, and states that it is prepared to suspend its project should the matter be resolved. Washington keeps different deployment options on the table for its SLCMs, from the fairly obvious Virginia-class nuclear-powered submarines to such exotic variants as Zumwalt-class stealth destroyers. Overall, it appears that in this particular context, Russia is merely a pretext, whereas the true reason that the U.S. re-admitted this class of nuclear weapons to its arsenal is China, with its rapidly developing naval force, which is being supported and reinforced by ground-based (and maybe even sea-based) ballistic anti-ship missile projects.

The air-launched aero-ballistic missile as part of the Kinzhal system is, in fact, an elegant solution to the INF Treaty problem, while not being formally covered by the New START.

As previously mentioned, Russia conducted an ABM “therapy” session for both the external audience and, perhaps more to the point, for internal consumption. However, given the previous history of the issue, primarily Moscow’s reiterated demands for legal guarantees that the U.S. ABM system will not be aimed against Russia and its other demands (including those voiced jointly with China), this topic should make its way into the future treaty in some form or another.

Should the two countries reach a compromise, a certain mechanism needs to be devised for both parties to save face, which is of particular importance given that Trump is facing stern opposition in Congress.

There is hope that one of the irritating arms control factors in Russian-U.S. relations will soon disappear: there are reports that the project to develop the Rubezh light mobile ICBM has been put on ice in favor of the Avangard missile [3]. U.S. experts had previously voiced their concerns that the Rubezh project was primarily intended as a smokescreen for the deployment of intermediate-range ballistic missiles that are banned under the INF Treaty. Furthermore, the U.S. National Defense Authorization Act calls for preparing a report on the Rubezh.

Ways to resolve differences

Given the above, Russia and the U.S. could and should shift to a positive agenda by each making two concessions:

the U.S. would suspend its nuclear-tipped SLCM project and provide a symbolic gesture of giving up an ABM component as well as making it possible for Russian specialists to inspect European Aegis Ashore installations (including periodically);

Russia would suspend its Burevestnik and Poseidon projects and make a symbolic statement to the effect that it would not be deploying, say, 9M729 missiles, and would replace them in the constantly growing Iskander-M missile inventory with a certain future article, one which Russian developers are most likely already working on. To further ease pressure, Russia would invite inspectors to visit one of its separate missile brigades, possibly including a demonstration of the 9M729 that would unequivocally prove that the missile is not in breach of the INF Treaty;

Under the best-case scenario, the sides might consider the possibility of Russian experts visiting various components of the U.S. ABM system with frequent inspections and being present during tests of certain interceptor missiles, with U.S. experts similarly visiting Russia’s separate military brigades and observing test launches of theater missiles. However, given the current harsh confrontation between the two countries, such a scenario would appear to be utopian.

It is evident that both countries’ goodwill would be key to implementing this plan, but it is precisely this ingredient that has been lacking so far. In addition, possible outcries at home should not be discounted, either. In this light, Moscow and Washington would do well to work in advance to agree on the optimal wording that would highlight their achievements and the potential for the most efficient use of the previously allocated budgets for the projects that are to be suspended, and also for these projects to be promptly re-activated if need be. Such actions are capable of resolving the two countries’ differences on the INF Treaty and on the ABM program.

Parameters of the new treaty

After the mutually irritating issues have been put to rest, however formally, the dialogue could proceed to a new comprehensive treaty. The following key criteria might be discussed:

A further reduction in the overall number of nuclear warheads. It appears important to agree to such a level at which the next phase of the process could accommodate, least painfully, the other nuclear powers, including the unofficial ones;

A clarification of the rules for counting heavy bombers and associated nuclear munitions: not in the context of either party’s advantages (which only exist in the eyes of the EU and Russian bomber patriots), but taking into account future military aviation and missilery developments, primarily for the Russian Kh-BD and US LRSO cruise missiles;

A clarification of the volume and nature of telemetry to be surrendered in the course of test launches of new ICBMs. The U.S. has been unofficially voicing its concerns about the New START procedure because Russia has tested and supplemented its arsenal with new systems since the treaty came into effect. Now the tables have been turned: Washington has launched work to develop the GBSD ICBM, and the new lower-yield warhead for the Trident II SLBM may also prove a peculiar weapon, despite the statements that it will be, in effect, a single-stage W76 with the index 2. In fact, the Trident missile itself will be replaced sooner or later.

The search for ways to classify and inventory new nuclear delivery systems, primarily as regards hypersonic glide vehicles;

Given Russia’s criticisms of the way the U.S. is denuclearizing its B-52H bombers, and in light of Washington’s ongoing (albeit somewhat vague) plans with regard to the Prompt Global Strike effort, the possibility of hypersonic glide vehicles being armed with non-nuclear warheads, and the Russian Defense Ministry’s conventional deterrence concept, which is directly linked to the development of such weapons, the topic of strategic conventional weapons could form a separate and important section of the future document.

The influence of intelligence, military, and criminal activities in cyberspace on strategic stability, including as regards the vulnerability of nuclear weapons. This topic has been highlighted, even if indirectly, in connection with the consistent disruptions of Russian-U.S. talks on information security and strategic stability in early March 2018.

Of particular importance is the possibility of partially involving representatives of other nuclear powers in the discussion of at least the fourth, fifth, and sixth bullet points listed above. Furthermore, should arms reduction processes continue even on a bilateral basis, all five nuclear powers could be involved in an information exchange and efforts to improve the transparency of strategic nuclear forces. At the same time, tactical nuclear weapons will remain beyond the scope of these efforts due to differences in regional dynamics, even though in theory nuclear charges might be inventoried collectively and not by individual country.

Stabilizing communications

Russia and the U.S. retain the potential for mutually assured destruction. Both Putin’s statement to the effect that the world is hardly viable without Russia and the reminder by U.S. Strategic Commander Gen John Hyten that his country may deliver a devastating strike on Russia in any situation should cool hot heads around the world. For better or for worse, nuclear weapons remain the only guarantee against a major hot war in the current situation of massive international confrontation. A meaningful discussion as to the existence of and application scenarios for nuclear arms, any quantitative limitations, possible nuclear doctrines, and other measures of trust and transparency would help retain and strengthen communications between the two notional enemies, which is crucial to the future of the entire planet. This can only be possible if both parties approach the problem in a constructive way and demonstrate their willingness to compromise.

Resolving individual differences and finding points of mutual contact per se will not be able to form the foundation for a full-fledged Detente 2.0, but these efforts might help articulate the partners’ goals and objectives in negotiations. The mutual misunderstanding of each other’s true intentions is precisely what resulted in the continuing escalation of problems. This is why the two countries must learn how to listen to and understand each other anew.

[1]. It should be noted, however, that both presidents previously expressed their readiness for such an arms race and that it had actually commenced.

[2]. In the meantime, W-80-1 warheads remain in service with air-delivered cruise missiles; the future LRSO cruise missile will be tipped with the W-80-4 warhead of the same series.

[3]. Previously, different sources would often mention Rubezh and Avangard in the same context, in different combinations. There is, however, no reason to believe that a lighter ICBM could propel a hypersonic glide vehicle over an intercontinental distance. On the other hand, China is planning to soon deploy its own vehicle precisely as an intermediate-range missile system; however, this subclass of missile weapons is outside the scope of our article.

First published in our partner RIAC

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U.S. divorces Europe

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Europe is in the anticipation of NATO summit which will take place on June, 11-12 in Brussels. Before this meeting the Pentagon thoroughly analyzed all allies’ expenses on collective defence. It turned out that NATO members’ defence budgets don’t reflect real needs of the Alliance. Among the twenty-nine members, only the United States is really serious about its obligations, spending approximately $700 billion or 3.5 percent of its GDP on defense. No other NATO member comes close to this proportion, and the vast majority fail even to meet the self-imposed requirement to devote at least 2 percent of GDP to defense.

Donald Trump repeatedly warned the member states that America is not going to carry the main burden any more. It is time for Europe to pay for itself. “I’ll tell NATO, you got to start paying your bills,” Trump told a wildly cheering crowd in Montana on July, 5. And he is ready to begin with Germany. The president pondered aloud about the value for the US in paying for the collective defence of Germany. Now the US is analyzing the cost and impact of a large-scale withdrawal or transfer of American troops stationed in Germany. No doubt, the Baltic States are the next.

It is clear that Trump begins the process of limiting America’s role in NATO. For a long time NATO members have been promising, but did nothing to increase defense spending. Weak attempts of some countries to meet requirements did not save the situation.

If NATO reduces its huge financial injections in Alliance’s budget, the whole system of European defence, and the Baltic States’ defence in particular, will become illusive and unattainable. The Baltic States’ worst nightmares become true. It is not a secret that keeping a large army abroad is already draining the nation’s treasury, stationing many soldiers in numerous strategic foreign nations costs huge sum of money. While the Baltic States and Poland ask for more and more US and NATO troops and bases, the US is not about to satisfy their every whim. It is enough, patience is over, and pragmatism defeated compassion.

Being highly dependent on US financial support, NATO turns to be on the verge of collapse.
It became quite obvious that Trump behaves more as a businessman than a politician. He has received success in his business and transfers his behavior model to politics. The more so, Donald Trump keeps his word and the major theme of his administration “America first” at least really works. The US does not want any more to throw out money, doesn’t want to believe in Europe’s “sincere will” to be on equal footing in NATO. Trump-businessman prevails over Trump-politician. We are on the eve of global political change. Like “it’s every man for himself in business”, America will not pay for weak partners. Trump: “Dear Baltics, nothing personal, it’s just business.”

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The Islamic Republic of Iran and Security Discourse

Sajad Abedi

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The fact of security discourse has entered a new era in the next Cold War has a general consensus. Accordingly, security studies, in order to continue to maintain their position, have been compelled to avoid the traditional focus on threats, use and management of the military, by experiencing some fundamental changes, with new dimensions and considerations. Define security. At the same time, we are witnessing security issues and the emergence of new issues such as acid rain, AIDS, ozone depletion, drug trafficking, destruction of natural resources, warmth of the earth, population explosion, pollution of the air and so on.

Although the security image presented seems fresh, it is believed that there is no fundamental change beyond the scope of the topic, and the essence of security remains the same. Nevertheless, there have been positive and significant developments in this period. ; Such as the release of the “militaristic” one-dimensional approach, and the turning of attention to the sinister category of “conflict” and “conflict,” and ultimately to the fact that security has a multidimensional face and cannot be restricted to the next military unit. The rule of this new insight is that it produces a significant amount of texts related to national security studies, in which economics, the environment, cultural and intellectual, political, geographic and etc. issues are considered as new dimensions of national security.

The national security considerations of the Islamic Republic of Iran have undergone many changes during the years after the Islamic Revolution. The country’s security considerations are divided into three “axis expansion”, “axis retention” and “growth-driven” discourses. In each discourse, four basic variables, namely, the goals and principles of national security, national strength, threats and vulnerabilities of national security, and ultimately national security policies, have been considered.

The expansionist discourse; in the national security considerations of the country, the “expansion-oriented discourse” in the early years had a new military discourse. In these years, despite the fact that the religious revolutionaries did not have all the formal political structures, they gradually managed to dominate all the declared and effective policies of the system, and in fact their ideas were the main guide to domestic and foreign policy. In the eyes of the revolutionists, the concept of national security did not enjoy intrinsic credibility, even in the face of any national burden, such as national identity, national interests, and national security, a kind of hatred and pessimism. Accordingly, the concept of security in the form of a macro was worthy of value and instead of national security, such as the security of the system, the security of the Islamic Ummah was considered. Such a definition of security also meant that it would spur the nature of the expansion of the revolution. Accordingly, revolutionaries, in addition to focusing on the improvement of the individual and social life of the nation, felt the expansion of Islamic values beyond national boundaries as part of their primary duties. On the one hand, they wanted Iran for Islam, and on the other hand, they considered the role of Islamic Iran as a pole and axis for the Islamic world.

From the results of the national security considerations in the expansionist discourse, one can mention the following: “the boundaries and frontiers of nationalism were abandoned”, “followed by a revolutionary pattern”, “national security considerations did not follow the pattern of civilization,” “various dimensions in considerations The security of the country, including its goals and principles, national achievements, threats and vulnerabilities and national security policies, began at a zero point “,” the security objectives were subject to revolutionary macro policies, following the ideals and principles of human and Islamic, which reflected the nature of the software of national security ” “Revolution and the system were vulnerable to threats,” “Raid.” Political militancy was the priority of other dimensions, such as social, cultural, economic and security. ”

Conservative Discourse; the occurrence of war was a turning point in national security considerations. In a situation where many of the concepts of the revolution were still being defined, and yet the pivot of the revolution was unfolding, the imposed war began. In fact, existing political forces had not yet reached a consensus in many areas, and political transformations could be expanded. That is why, even in the first year of the war, the revolutionary community was involved with issues that were not so in tune with the conflicting communities. Only after the decline of political inflammation after the dismissal of Bani-Sadr and the summer of 1981 and the achievement of a political unity between revolutionary officials, the war was at the forefront of national security. From the beginning of the second year of the war to the end, it was dominated by national security considerations. Obviously, the fundamental distinction of this period with the previous period was the limitation of the circle of fundamental security problems of the system in a fundamental factor, namely war and its affairs. Therefore, preserving the territorial integrity of the country and securing the system against the Iraqi objective threat is at the core of the system’s attention. Nevertheless, the new era is in line with the ideological aspects of the past period. The evolution of war and the type of resistance created by the armed forces even increased the ideological impact at some time on the security considerations of the country. However, the realities of warfare were decisive in controlling many ideological and ideological goals of the past.

According to the results of this study, the results of the national security considerations in the persistent discourse include: “national security considerations were centered around national boundaries”, “greater use was made of elements of spiritual power”, “the continuation of the revolution through war Was insured “,” the ability of the Iranian community to mobilize and integrate to face the crisis of extermination was proven “,” the necessity of military empowerment “,” the economic backwardness of the country was reduced as the main negative changes “,” to prevent unrealistic considerations in foreign policy “,” Aspects of pragmatism in outside politics ” was imposed. ”

Growth-focused discourse; The war focused on security considerations at the edge of the national borders, but the end of it and the beginning of widespread developments in the country, above all else, centered on these considerations into national borders. The end of the war was accompanied by other changes at the national, regional and international levels. At the internal level, by reforming the constitution and centralizing power in the presidency, the areas of possible controversy in the executive branch of the country were resolved but this did not mean the end to political rivalries in the great collection of politicians in the country. During this time, one can see three important points in relation to the supreme elite of the country regarding national security. First, a view based on economic growth. Second, an ideological perspective and third, a view based on political cultural development.

In addition to these internal changes, regional and international changes have also been effective in shaping new national security considerations. The decline of the role of ideology in the international system after the collapse of communism and the establishment of a new order in this system that led to the growth of the monopolistic behaviors of the powers, and especially the United States, have had a decisive impact on the national security of the country. In addition to these developments, trends such as the escalation of internationalization and the evolution of the globalization process have also been effective factors. At the regional level, the effects of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of new states in the northern region, as well as the continuation and progression of the regional Middle East crises, created many engagements for the statesmen.

In the context of the country’s national security considerations, the following results can be reached in the growth-driven discourse: “Inflammation of the past two periods and relative introversion in the security considerations” was reduced, “there is still a vacancy in a systematic and all-rounder vision in the country’s security considerations,” ” National welfare is becoming more and more emphasis on national security “,” The creation of a strong and prestigious Iran instead of the physical exodus of the revolution “,” Elements of national power have been given a more objective quality “,” The threats have become more widespread “,” Necessity Multilateral vision is felt in politics “,” a tangible change in the amount of attention to the public L environment has been found. ”

On this basis, in general, it can be said that “security policy” has a different meaning from whatever has been, including two fundamental principles. On the one hand, political planners, diplomats, such as jurists and intellectuals, have to come up with a collective agenda in order to find a place for small and ultra-national actors in politics and the administration of society. On the other hand, the global arena represents new areas where governments alone are not “non-governmental”. So, while identifying the realm of government influence, a particular kind of problem arises that the government does not necessarily find the right solution for them. The understanding and accepting this separation is an important consideration in the security equations. Accordingly, a new study program is being developed, the nature of which is not only the elimination of threats, but also the creation of opportunities and the realization of requirements that are in keeping with the capabilities of a political system. In this framework, new thinkers in the field of security studies are divided into two state-oriented and non-government-oriented approaches, thus defining and identifying new actors in the national security equations, which were not so important for analysts before. At the same time as developing national security studies, the category of “threats” has also evolved, and we are witnessing the emergence of new threats that are largely nongovernmental and, in contrast to the Cold War, are in the two “national” and “supreme” spaces of the national government.

In addition, Iran’s national security considerations have been varied in various ways; in summary, the evolution of “outsourcing to introspection” from the “ideological approach and pure commitment to more realism”, from “universality to Iran”, from “simplicity to complexity”, and from the “Threat of Thought as an Intentional Threat in the International System.” In these developments, we are paying more attention to the need for a balance between the limits and limits of national security considerations.

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India’s Shifting Nuclear Doctrine: Impact on Strategic Stability

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Strategic Stability is considered crucial for preventing war and conflict between nuclear adversaries. It is comprised of two essential factors: deterrence equilibrium and crisis stability. India and Pakistan’s military buildup and technological advancements are considered satisfactory to maintain the Balance of Power (BOP) and nuclear deterrence equilibrium. While on the military side, nuclear capability has played a vital role to ensure the strategic balance as no major war has taken place between India and Pakistan in post 1998 era. Therefore, it is pertinent to establish that the nuclear capability has restored strategic balance and maintained crisis stability in the region. Deterrence equilibrium is arduously maintained in the region but has played a vital role in maintaining peace between two nuclear neighbors. Nonetheless, according to nuclear analysts the strategic stability in South Asia is fragile as just the nuclear deterrence alone is not sufficient to maintain durable peace and stability in the region.  Challenges to strategic stability between India and Pakistan include domestic politics, cross border tension, risk of terrorism, induction of sophisticated technologies, India’s evolving nuclear doctrine and India-US strategic partnership. These challenges have enhanced the fragility of strategic stability and complexity of nuclear deterrence in South Asia.

Growing challenges in the South Asian landscape has forced the security strategists to analyze the potential threats of India’s ‘shifting strategic logics’. A recent debate on strategic landscape of South Asia revolves around India’s shifting nuclear policy and doctrine which can be studied under the twin pillars of ‘strategic ambiguity’ and ‘pre-emptive nuclear strike’. Nuclear doctrine of India is based on the principle of “Credible Minimum Deterrence” and Nuclear First Use. Statements by Indian scholars, former military officials and extensive military buildup of its forces are expression of emerging trends in India’s nuclear doctrine. On the bases of recent developments, it is anticipated that India is shifting its nuclear posture to Nuclear First Use (NFU). Secondly, it is moving from “Counter Value targets” to “Counterforce targets”. Another recent development is that India is deviating from Credible Minimum Deterrence and opting for credible deterrence. However, Indian disguise was revealed internationally when Vipin Narang at Carnegie International Conference in March 2017 hinted towards potential change in India’s nuclear doctrine.  For reference Vipin Narang used excerpts from the book of former Indian National Security Advisor Shivshankar Menon. One might wonder if the shift in India’s No First Use policy or other nuclear policy developments should come as a surprise for Pakistan. The answer would be that these discoveries by International Community didn’t come out as a surprise to Pakistan for India’s stance on use of nuclear capability against the biological and chemical nuclear weapon has already questioned the status of “Nuclear First Use” posture.

It is also important to note that India’s history is full of contradictory remarks.  Such as the fact that initially India denied the existence of Cold Start Doctrine (CSD) but in 2017 Indian Chief of Army Staff Bipin Rawat accepted that India is working to operationalize its CSD.  More importantly, in article 2.3 of India’s Draft Nuclear Doctrine (DND) adherence to the principle of Credible Minimum Deterrence is claimed but Indian military build-up and technological developments e.g. Missile development and Proliferation (Prithvi, Agni, Brahmos, Nirbhay),  Ballistic Missile Defense System  (BMD), Space capabilities ( its Cartosat-2 Series for Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance) , Fleets of SSBN and SSN (Arihant class and Akula Class respectively) clearly negate the article 2.3 of its DND. India’s shifting logics and technological advancements demonstrate that India is constantly trying to achieve escalation-dominance in the region.

The above mentioned scenario demands to explore the impact of India’s shifting nuclear doctrine on the strategic stability of region. If India is to opt for counter force strategy instead of counter value strategy then it will have to achieve considerable quantitative and qualitative arms superiority over Pakistan. This would increase the defense production gap between nuclear rivals and instigate the arms race in the region. Secondly, nuclear CBMs and proposal of establishing Strategic Restraint Regime will face a serious blow if any such move of shifting nuclear strategy by India is to be made.  Lastly, if India is to go for a nuclear shift then it will have serious implications for the strategic stability within the South Asian region as it would lead the region towards crisis instability.

However, the ambiguous nuclear posture and claims from the Indian side regarding the shift in the nuclear doctrine need to be clarified to avoid the risk of miscalculation. Given the circumstances it is inevitable for Pakistan to take following security measures to ensure its security: First,  developing and maintaining a second strike capability; second, acquiring Ballistic Missile System; third, development of offensive as well as defensive cyber- warfare capabilities. Most importantly, South Asia demands a practical approach to prevent conflict escalation through initiating dialogue process and establishing Arms Control Regime. To conclude, it is vital that nuclear doctrines should not be based on ambiguous principles in order to avoid the risk of miscalculations. Thus, the pragmatic approach in South Asian strategic landscape would be the establishment of nuclear risk reduction measures.

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