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Strategic Stabilization: A Window of Opportunities for Russia and the U.S.

Dmitry Stefanovich

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Despite the belligerent nuclear statements by Russia and the U.S. in the first quarter of 2018, the configuration of a possible future for the international arms control regimes can be seen beyond the veil of rhetoric.

Therapeutic address

The address to the Federal Assembly by President Vladimir Putin, who has since been re-elected, was striking and unprecedented in terms of its nuclear-missile revelations. However, it generated a fair share of criticism, and rightly so for the most part. In particular, the visualization of the new nuclear delivery systems included a number of previously demonstrated animations, including the understandably criticized “footage” of MIRVs arriving at Florida, which was borrowed from a video related to the future Sarmat ICBM that had been included in a TV film devoted to the Voyevoda ICBM. One aspect that wasn’t entirely understandable was the clearly doctored footage of a target being allegedly being hit by a Kinzhal, a system that is currently very close to deployment. It is, however, worth noting that all the systems featured in the presentation – the heavy Sarmat ICBM, the Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle, the Burevestnik nuclear-powered cruise missile of unlimited range, the Poseidon nuclear-powered unmanned underwater vehicle, the Kinzhal airborne rocket system, and the Peresvet combat laser system – were all, to one extent or another, started as Soviet projects aimed at counteracting the deployment of U.S. ABM as part of President Ronald Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative.

This, however, is beside the point. The key part of Putin’s address was the message to the effect that Russia is prepared to overcome the problems posed by any existing or future U.S. ABM system. Shortly after the president’s address, Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu expressed his bewilderment at why the U.S. would need a “leaky” ABM umbrella. Putin himself clarified his position in an interview with NBC, effectively declaring that Russia was ready for further reductions in strategic offensive weapons, the ABM threat notwithstanding. An external symptom of this readiness is the absence of ABM on the agenda of the next iteration of the international security conference in Moscow, which originally emerged as a platform for discussions on U.S. ABM-related issues. Thus, we can assume that the demonstration of nuclear delivery systems that are invulnerable a priori to any existing or future anti-missile systems had a therapeutic effect and significantly lowered the tone of hysterical talk concerning the development of the U.S. ABM system.

The most recent evidence of the possibility of a new agreement came in the form of a telephone conversation between Putin and Trump on March 20, after which the two presidents declared their interest in a meaningful discussion on strategic stability aimed at preventing a new arms race [1]. The first step towards a positive agenda should be a joint statement on strategic stability by the two countries’ presidents. Apart from the traditional talking point about the impossibility of winning a nuclear war, the statement would benefit from the inclusion of assurances stating that the new defensive and offensive weapons do not aim to undermine the deterring potential of each country’s nuclear forces, and that neither of the two are striving to create nuclear weapons that would be applicable in local conflicts.

In this context, despite the negative backdrop of the current Russian-U.S. relations, the need to discuss the parameters of the future nuclear deal has once again become a hot topic, even though Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova asserts that the time for such talks has not yet arrived.

Problems with prolongation

The simplest and most obvious option would be to prolong the current New START for another five years until 2026. There are, however, a number of obstacles to this.

Trump is extremely opposed to all the achievements of the Obama administration, including in the nuclear field. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on Iran’s nuclear program is falling apart and, according to unofficial reports, the New START came under criticism during Trump’s first phone conversation with Putin.

Russia continues to be critical of the U.S. approach to reducing the number of nuclear delivery platforms and launchers. This criticism does not appear to be extremely significant, but it does illustrate the shortcomings of the current New START in terms of the mere possibility of such a problem emerging once the combined permitted levels of strategic offensive weapons under the New START have been reached.

The INF Treaty is a burning topic: the two sides have officially accused each other of breaching the document, while denying the accusations leveled against themselves. It should be noted that the U.S. has already codified its accusations, including as part of sanctions against enterprises involved in the production of 9M729 cruise missiles for the Iskander-M theater missile system (Novator Design Bureau and Titan-Barrikady).

Both the U.S., under its new Nuclear Posture Review, and Russia, under its new government armament program through 2027, are slated to phase in nuclear delivery systems which fall outside the scope of the New START.

Hypersonic glide vehicles are already being discussed by experts as future systems that would be capable of radically rearranging the global strategic landscape even if they are not tipped with nuclear warheads;

The “exotic” Burevestnik and Poseidon nuclear-powered nuclear delivery platforms, which have not yet been added to Russia’s arsenal, represent projects of assured destruction with nuclear retaliation. They are believed to be in a fairly high state of completion, but tests continue. It is impossible to predict the planned deployment timeline, locations, and numbers as of now: the exact parameters will depend on the situation with Russian-U.S. and global arms control regimes.

Nuclear-tipped sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM) present a serious problem. Such missiles are nothing new, but for now there is no control regime that would apply to them. START I imposed an unverifiable limit of 880 SLCMs for both parties; in fact, these weapons have not been officially sent on combat duty to sea since the early 1990s as part of unilateral initiatives. In 2011, the U.S. finally decided to retire the nuclear-tipped variant of the TLAM-N Tomahawk cruise missile; the country has by now destroyed all the associated W-80-0 warheads [2]. Russia historically (and most likely deliberately) maintains a certain degree of ambiguity when it comes to the types of its SLCMs that are potentially and actually capable of being tipped with specialized warheads (the same is true of other Russian missile types). The U.S. periodically describes its nuclear-tipped SLCMs as a response to Russia’s breaches of the INF Treaty, allegedly through the continued deployment of a ground-based type of cruise missiles with a range of around 2,000 km, and states that it is prepared to suspend its project should the matter be resolved. Washington keeps different deployment options on the table for its SLCMs, from the fairly obvious Virginia-class nuclear-powered submarines to such exotic variants as Zumwalt-class stealth destroyers. Overall, it appears that in this particular context, Russia is merely a pretext, whereas the true reason that the U.S. re-admitted this class of nuclear weapons to its arsenal is China, with its rapidly developing naval force, which is being supported and reinforced by ground-based (and maybe even sea-based) ballistic anti-ship missile projects.

The air-launched aero-ballistic missile as part of the Kinzhal system is, in fact, an elegant solution to the INF Treaty problem, while not being formally covered by the New START.

As previously mentioned, Russia conducted an ABM “therapy” session for both the external audience and, perhaps more to the point, for internal consumption. However, given the previous history of the issue, primarily Moscow’s reiterated demands for legal guarantees that the U.S. ABM system will not be aimed against Russia and its other demands (including those voiced jointly with China), this topic should make its way into the future treaty in some form or another.

Should the two countries reach a compromise, a certain mechanism needs to be devised for both parties to save face, which is of particular importance given that Trump is facing stern opposition in Congress.

There is hope that one of the irritating arms control factors in Russian-U.S. relations will soon disappear: there are reports that the project to develop the Rubezh light mobile ICBM has been put on ice in favor of the Avangard missile [3]. U.S. experts had previously voiced their concerns that the Rubezh project was primarily intended as a smokescreen for the deployment of intermediate-range ballistic missiles that are banned under the INF Treaty. Furthermore, the U.S. National Defense Authorization Act calls for preparing a report on the Rubezh.

Ways to resolve differences

Given the above, Russia and the U.S. could and should shift to a positive agenda by each making two concessions:

the U.S. would suspend its nuclear-tipped SLCM project and provide a symbolic gesture of giving up an ABM component as well as making it possible for Russian specialists to inspect European Aegis Ashore installations (including periodically);

Russia would suspend its Burevestnik and Poseidon projects and make a symbolic statement to the effect that it would not be deploying, say, 9M729 missiles, and would replace them in the constantly growing Iskander-M missile inventory with a certain future article, one which Russian developers are most likely already working on. To further ease pressure, Russia would invite inspectors to visit one of its separate missile brigades, possibly including a demonstration of the 9M729 that would unequivocally prove that the missile is not in breach of the INF Treaty;

Under the best-case scenario, the sides might consider the possibility of Russian experts visiting various components of the U.S. ABM system with frequent inspections and being present during tests of certain interceptor missiles, with U.S. experts similarly visiting Russia’s separate military brigades and observing test launches of theater missiles. However, given the current harsh confrontation between the two countries, such a scenario would appear to be utopian.

It is evident that both countries’ goodwill would be key to implementing this plan, but it is precisely this ingredient that has been lacking so far. In addition, possible outcries at home should not be discounted, either. In this light, Moscow and Washington would do well to work in advance to agree on the optimal wording that would highlight their achievements and the potential for the most efficient use of the previously allocated budgets for the projects that are to be suspended, and also for these projects to be promptly re-activated if need be. Such actions are capable of resolving the two countries’ differences on the INF Treaty and on the ABM program.

Parameters of the new treaty

After the mutually irritating issues have been put to rest, however formally, the dialogue could proceed to a new comprehensive treaty. The following key criteria might be discussed:

A further reduction in the overall number of nuclear warheads. It appears important to agree to such a level at which the next phase of the process could accommodate, least painfully, the other nuclear powers, including the unofficial ones;

A clarification of the rules for counting heavy bombers and associated nuclear munitions: not in the context of either party’s advantages (which only exist in the eyes of the EU and Russian bomber patriots), but taking into account future military aviation and missilery developments, primarily for the Russian Kh-BD and US LRSO cruise missiles;

A clarification of the volume and nature of telemetry to be surrendered in the course of test launches of new ICBMs. The U.S. has been unofficially voicing its concerns about the New START procedure because Russia has tested and supplemented its arsenal with new systems since the treaty came into effect. Now the tables have been turned: Washington has launched work to develop the GBSD ICBM, and the new lower-yield warhead for the Trident II SLBM may also prove a peculiar weapon, despite the statements that it will be, in effect, a single-stage W76 with the index 2. In fact, the Trident missile itself will be replaced sooner or later.

The search for ways to classify and inventory new nuclear delivery systems, primarily as regards hypersonic glide vehicles;

Given Russia’s criticisms of the way the U.S. is denuclearizing its B-52H bombers, and in light of Washington’s ongoing (albeit somewhat vague) plans with regard to the Prompt Global Strike effort, the possibility of hypersonic glide vehicles being armed with non-nuclear warheads, and the Russian Defense Ministry’s conventional deterrence concept, which is directly linked to the development of such weapons, the topic of strategic conventional weapons could form a separate and important section of the future document.

The influence of intelligence, military, and criminal activities in cyberspace on strategic stability, including as regards the vulnerability of nuclear weapons. This topic has been highlighted, even if indirectly, in connection with the consistent disruptions of Russian-U.S. talks on information security and strategic stability in early March 2018.

Of particular importance is the possibility of partially involving representatives of other nuclear powers in the discussion of at least the fourth, fifth, and sixth bullet points listed above. Furthermore, should arms reduction processes continue even on a bilateral basis, all five nuclear powers could be involved in an information exchange and efforts to improve the transparency of strategic nuclear forces. At the same time, tactical nuclear weapons will remain beyond the scope of these efforts due to differences in regional dynamics, even though in theory nuclear charges might be inventoried collectively and not by individual country.

Stabilizing communications

Russia and the U.S. retain the potential for mutually assured destruction. Both Putin’s statement to the effect that the world is hardly viable without Russia and the reminder by U.S. Strategic Commander Gen John Hyten that his country may deliver a devastating strike on Russia in any situation should cool hot heads around the world. For better or for worse, nuclear weapons remain the only guarantee against a major hot war in the current situation of massive international confrontation. A meaningful discussion as to the existence of and application scenarios for nuclear arms, any quantitative limitations, possible nuclear doctrines, and other measures of trust and transparency would help retain and strengthen communications between the two notional enemies, which is crucial to the future of the entire planet. This can only be possible if both parties approach the problem in a constructive way and demonstrate their willingness to compromise.

Resolving individual differences and finding points of mutual contact per se will not be able to form the foundation for a full-fledged Detente 2.0, but these efforts might help articulate the partners’ goals and objectives in negotiations. The mutual misunderstanding of each other’s true intentions is precisely what resulted in the continuing escalation of problems. This is why the two countries must learn how to listen to and understand each other anew.

[1]. It should be noted, however, that both presidents previously expressed their readiness for such an arms race and that it had actually commenced.

[2]. In the meantime, W-80-1 warheads remain in service with air-delivered cruise missiles; the future LRSO cruise missile will be tipped with the W-80-4 warhead of the same series.

[3]. Previously, different sources would often mention Rubezh and Avangard in the same context, in different combinations. There is, however, no reason to believe that a lighter ICBM could propel a hypersonic glide vehicle over an intercontinental distance. On the other hand, China is planning to soon deploy its own vehicle precisely as an intermediate-range missile system; however, this subclass of missile weapons is outside the scope of our article.

First published in our partner RIAC

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Capabilities of Indian Armed Forces Exposed

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India’s Armed Forces Capabilities exposed during the Sino-India recent clashes in Ladakh. Indian Army was established on the fools day, 1 April 1895; 125 years ago by the East India Company, the British ruler of Sub-Continent. The aim and objectives of establishing the Indian Army were to protect the Companies economic interests, conquering the neighboring states, countering the insurgencies, suppressing the locals, maintaining the rit of British rulers, looking after the British empire, etc.

After getting independence from British rule in 1947, the Indian Army became the current day Indian Army, with its same ideology, aims, and objectives. The same training was continued, and the same traditions were inherited. Furthermore, to date, the current Indian Armed Forces are playing almost the same role. The conquered Goa, Sikkim, Hyderabad, Juna Ghar, and many other independent states. They are still fighting against the insurgencies like Assam, Maoist, Naga Land, Kashmir, Sikh, and,  etc. They are still suppressing their own local people like in Punjab, Haryana, Assam, Bihar, Kashmir, and minorities like Muslims, Christians, Sikhs, Dulats, and low caste Hindus, etc.

In fact, further deterioration started when they kept Muslims away and were not inducting Muslims in the armed forces. However, they inducted few on the ceremonial basis but were not given command or power or high ranks or important position since the 1965 War between India and Pakistan. The similar actions were initiated in the 1980s, after the Golden Temple (Sikh’s Holiest shrine) attack against the Sikhs. The Sikhs in the Armed Forces are no longer trusted and are not given important positions or commands. Recently, Indian Army Chiefs remarks about Ghurkas have an adverse impact of a strong regiment of Ghurkas. Ghurkas are originally Nepalis, but the British inducted then in the Indian Army and noticed as one of the best fighting soldiers. Then they deputed Ghurkas all over India and also used them in overseas operations during World War I & II. Even in today’s Indian Army, they constitute a considerable population and known for their bravery. Nevertheless, humiliating remarks by the Indian Army Chief has hurt them, and they are disgruntled. What will be the Indian Government policies, and future course of actions regarding Ghurkas, is still unpredictable.

The reputation of the Indian Army in suppressing its own people is notorious, and the violations of human rights have exceeded all records. According to Human Rights Independent Organizations, India has surpassed all records of human rights violations in the history of human beings. Especially, their role in Kashmir, Punjab, Assam, Bihar, Naga Land are the worst demonstrations.

Even, personals of Armed Forces deputed in such states are getting mental sickness, and some of them commit suicides. Most of the Indian Military personnel are not willing to be posted in the troubled area.

Some of the countries in the Western World have refused issuance of Visas for Military personnel involved in War-Crimes in Kashmir and other states. In fact, the movement for trail against those involved in war-crimes is gaining momentum. I am sure, sooner or later, all those who so ever are involved in war crimes will face severe punishments depending on the degree of their involvement and intensity of war- crimes.

The disparity of salaries, perks, and privileges between the high ranked officers and low ranked soldiers is huge, creating disgruntles. The uniform, shoes, food provided to low ranked soldiers are pathetic. Weapons and amminition is rather out dated. War-Machines are dysfunctional. Disgruntled Armed forces, with dysfunctional war-machines, could not face well-equipped, well-trained, well-looked-after, Chinese forces.

Talks between the two forces (India and China) at the Major General Levels have failed, and the next round of talks at a higher level of Lt. Generals is under schedule. The PM Modi is hiding and refraining from the public appearance or commenting on the situation between India and China conflict in the Ladakh region. India’s Media is passive and low-profile on the subject, while the Foreign Ministry is also a bit conservative and careful in giving any strong statement.

Indian Media’s aggressiveness against Pakistan and Armed Force’s aggressiveness has vanished in case of China. Indian armed forces’ capabilities are exposed already.

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Preparing For The Next Round Of Belligerent Nationalism

Prof. Louis René Beres

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“It must not be forgotten that it is perhaps more dangerous for a nation to allow itself to be conquered intellectually than by arms.” Guillaume Apollinaire, “The New Spirit and the Poets” (1917)

 More than anything else, a nation-state survives along with the corresponding society’s intellectual and moral underpinnings.[1] In the case of US President Donald Trump’s patently childish “Space Force,” neither precondition is evidenced. And at the same time that Trump has been abandoning essential treaties with Russia and economic arrangements with China, this president acts as if extending belligerent nationalism into space is somehow a rational plan.

Quite plainly, Donald Trump, who prides himself on “attitude, not preparation,” is sorely mistaken.[2]  Prima facie, any such extension of geopolitical competition would be anything but gainful. Among many other things, Space Force expresses the reductio ad absurdum of a dissembling president’s wholesale indifference to wisdom and ethics. It will only heighten the probability that America could be “conquered intellectually,” not “by arms.”

There is more. Space Force  represents an ironic reaffirmation of past Trump policy failures. Where it is correctly understood as a logically derivative posture from this president’s “America First,” the operational role of his “Force” will be to extend Realpolitik[3] or power politics to places where it has never existed before, still-pristine and “vertical” places. Significantly, as Realpolitik has never worked here on earth,[4]  any intelligent observer should feel compelled to ask: Why should belligerent geopolitics now work on a “galactic” level?

There are multiple ironies to be considered. As is the case of Donald Trump’s foreign and domestic policies in general, Space Force will be founded upon myriad failures of the past. In  essence, these failures are all aspects of the “balance of power world system originally bequeathed at the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. This conflict-oriented state system, an “everyone for himself”[5] pattern of interminable international warfare, was born at Westphalia, immediately following the Thirty Years’ War.[6] Though certain “Westphalian” zero-sum interactions might still have been more-or-less tolerable before the appearance of nuclear weapons, they are unsustainable  in our bitterly acrimonious and proliferating nuclear world. Unassailably, they are even more dramatically unsustainable at this fearful time of worldwide disease pandemic.

It’s not complicated. What America  needs today is not just another gratuitous or destined-to-fail weapon system[7] (how could it possibly “succeed” if it doesn’t calculably contribute to this country’s “assured destruction capability”?), but rather a more conspicuous, well-intentioned presidential commitment to global interdependence/worldwide cooperation.[8] Although true that – at least for the foreseeable future – the United States must take appropriate steps to ensure the overall credibility of American nuclear deterrence, it is not true that such credibility requires retaliatory “coverage” in all prospective theatres of large-scale military engagement.[9]

Even if the Russians should “succeed” in militarizing space first – and even if this militarization were to involve nuclear elements – a fully suitable U.S, countervailing strategy could still remain entirely on this planet. In these calculations, the prospective aggressor (here Russia) would be unconcerned with the geographic origins of any American retaliatory destruction. After all, those origins would have no material consequence as  long a US retaliatory strike  were judged sufficiently probable and “assuredly destructive.”

This is an absolutely key reason why the United States has no identifiable need for maintaining any specific supremacy in space. Expressed differently, this means that an American president can readily maintain an indispensable US “assured destruction” capability vis-à-vis Russian and/or China without adjusting principal target sets according to ever-changing venues of enemy missile deployments. As far as what president Trump has called his newly proposed space force “super-dooper missile” – not exactly the terminology of a scientist or military professional – it represents only a caricatural reference, one more appropriate for 1950s-era children’s’ television programming than for any seriously complex US strategic reality.[10] 

Nuclear strategy is certainly a “game” that an American president should always be prepared to “play,” perhaps even for the indefinite future, but not without some conspicuous prior understandings of history, science and very elementary formal logic.

Going forward, US President Trump must remain systematically aware of all conceivable circumstances that could place us in extremis atomicum,[11] but this focus will need to be broadly conceptual, and not childishly centered on American “super” missiles or reassuringly “big” bombs.

 Instead of “America First” (Trump’s overall term for a system that willfully punishes the Many for the presumed benefit of a contrived Few),  a rational American president should reject all derivatives and corollaries of “Westphalian” dynamics.[12] Accordingly, any foreign policy that naively seeks to maximize America’s own well-being at the zero-sum expense of other states and peoples would be acting against certain binding norms of international law[13] and contra its own national security interests at the same time.

Sadly, nothing could possibly be more apparent to anyone who bothers to think logically and historically about such literally existential matters.[14]

The world is a system. Everything, therefore, is interrelated.  Among other things, no American foreign policy success can be achieved at the willfully sacrificial expense of other countries and peoples. No such presumptive success is sustainable if the rest of the planet must thereby expect a more violent and explosive future. In this connection, it would be difficult to argue that Donald Trump’s Space Force could in any way lead us toward a less violent or less explosive global future.

Very difficult.

A manifestly corrosive American national tribalism is being “protected” by U.S. Space Force. Nothing more. When all cumulative policy impacts are taken into careful analytic account, this “soulless”[15] derivative of “America First” and belligerent nationalism will emerge as anything but patriotic. What else should we reasonably conclude about a planned U.S. military posture that would injure this country and various other countries abjectly, unambiguously and at the same time?[16]

 Among other basic issues here, it is effectively impossible to calculate the vast number of associated interactive effects of these significant injuries, especially where they would expectedly be “force-multiplying” or synergistic. By definition, wherever a synergistic injury would obtain, the “whole” of any inflicted harm would be greater than the tangible sum of its “parts.”

Today, at a time when America’s fight against worldwide disease pandemic should represent this nation’s very highest-priority security challenge, US Space Force offers a strategic posture that is wholly misconceived and prospectively lethal. Left in place, it will further exacerbate a deliberate presidential choice of gratuitous belligerence as the favored style of American military interaction. Ironically, what is required, instead, is the readily decipherable opposite of Space Force.

This means, in essence, a broadened US leadership awareness of human and societal interconnectedness.[17]

 History is duly instructive. From the 1648 Peace of Westphalia to the present fragmenting moment, world politics have been shaped by a continuously shifting balance of power and , correspondingly, by variously relentless correlates of war, terror and genocide. Ideally, of course, and against all calculable odds, hope should continue to exist. But now, even under the most imaginably optimistic circumstances, it should surely sing more softly, unobtrusively, even in a prudent undertone.

 For Americans now increasingly endangered by Trump’s visceral or seat-of-the-pants foreign policies, more will be required than superficial or sotto voce modulations. Soon, merely to survive on this imperiled planet, all of us, together, will have to rediscover an individual human life, one consciously detached from narrowly ritualistic patterns of conformance, mindless entertainments, shallow optimism or any other disingenuously contrived expressions of some utterly imagined tribal happiness. At a minimum, such survival will demand a prompt and full-scale retreat from what Donald Trump has termed “America First” and from all of its rapidly dissembling correlates. In this regard, Trump’s Space Force is the foreseeable result of a much deeper societal pathology, a know-nothing American populism that drives out intellect and reason in favor of incessantly deliberate mystifications and collective self-delusion.

Thomas Jefferson and America’s other Founding Fathers had already understood something very basic: There is always a necessary and respectable place for serious erudition. By learning from history, Americans may yet glean something from “America First” that is necessary to opposing any actual iterations of Space Force. They may learn, even during this national declension Time of Trump, that a ubiquitous mortality is more consequential than any glittering administration promises of “supremacy,” “advantage” or “victory.”[18] Our current time on earth is more meaningfully a time of agony than of algorithm.

In The Decline of the West, first published during World War I, Oswald Spengler asked importantly: “Can a desperate faith in knowledge free us from the nightmare of the grand questions?” This remains a vital query, but one that will never be adequately raised in our universities, on Wall Street or absolutely anywhere in the Trump White House. Still, we may learn something productive about these “grand questions” by studying American roles and responsibilities in a radically changing world politics.

This task must be about intellectual struggles, not weapons per se.

At that point we might finally come to understand what has thus far eluded us. The most suffocating insecurities of life on earth can never be undone by militarizing space and by abrogating pertinent international treaties. To argue otherwise is to further mar a wholesale unfamiliarity with world and national history with inexcusable derelictions of both logic and science.[19]

In the end, even in Trump-era American foreign policy decision-making, truth is exculpatory. In what amounts to a uniquely promising paradox, Space Force could help illuminate a blatant lie that may still let us see the underlying truth. This truth is peremptory and not really mysterious or unfathomable. Americans require, after all, a substantially wider consciousness of unity and relatedness between individual human beings and (correspondingly) between adversarial nation-states.

There is no more urgent requirement.

None.

Though seemingly oriented toward greater American power and security, building an American Space Force would merely propel this country’s disordered military strategy from one untenable posture of belligerent nationalism to another. What the proponents of Space Force ignore, inter alia, is that all national security options should always be examined from the standpoint of their cumulative impact. If the credible effect of this new America First policy initiative will be to spawn various reciprocal postures of belligerent nationalism among principal foes (i.e.., Russia and potentially China) the net effect will prove sorely destabilizing and comprehensively negative.[20]

At this exceedingly precarious moment in world and national history, the president of the United States must do everything possible to heed the poet Apollinaire’s warning of “intellectual conquest.” Though “force of arms” will assuredly remain a derivative source of military power and threat, America’s principal emphasis must now  be placed on variously promising concepts and ideas, not on expanding the “hardware” or tactics of willful human destructiveness. Instead of withholding funds from the World Health Organization,[21] Donald Trump must finally acknowledge the interminable futility of belligerent nationalism, and – correspondingly – take certain tangible steps toward expanded worldwide cooperation.

Could this actually happen?[22] To be sure, the probable likelihood of any success here is bound to be very small, but the time-dishonored alternatives are all uniformly misconceived and inherently catastrophic.[23] If America’s president should retain even a tiny remnant of leadership commitment to rational decision-making, he will quickly understand that U.S. Space Force is the reductio ad absurdum of a long-dying belligerent nationalism or Realpolitik.[24]

It is hardly a medical or biological secret that the factors common to all human beings greatly outnumber those that differentiate one from another. Accordingly, unless leaders of all great states can finally understand that the survival of any one state will inevitably be contingent upon the survival of all, true national security will continue to elude every nation on earth, even the most “powerful.”

The bottom line? The immediate security task must remain a proper conceptualization and refinement of national nuclear strategy. Simultaneously, however, President Trump must somehow learn to understand – together with all other far-sighted national leaders – that Planet Earth is an organic whole, a fragile unity that exhibits rapidly disappearing opportunities for avoiding successive war and dismemberment. To seize these residual opportunities,  Washington  must learn to build solidly upon the foundational insights of Francis Bacon, Galileo and Isaac Newton, and upon the much more recent summarizing observation of Lewis Mumford: “Civilization is the never ending process of creating one world and one humanity.”[25]

Obviously, the United States has no inherently special obligations in this regard, nor can it afford to build its own most immediate security policies upon narrowly distant hopes. Still, if expressed as an ultimate vision for more durable and just patterns of world politics, Donald Trump might recognize the indissoluble link between America’s own physical survival and that of the wider international system. In the final analysis, merely to keep itself “alive,” America will have to do whatever it can to preserve the global system as a whole. For the moment, this is an idea insurmountably far from the consciousness of America’s current president.

To instruct still further from Pierre Teilhard de Chardin’s The Phenomenon of Man, “The egocentric ideal of a future reserved for those who have managed to attain egoistically the extremity of `everyone for himself’ is false and against nature. No element could move and grow except with and by all the others with itself.”


[1] The seventeenth-century French philosopher Blaise Pascal remarks prophetically in Pensées: “All our dignity consists in thought….It is upon this that we must depend…Let us labor then to think well: this is the foundation of morality.” Similar reasoning characterizes the writings of Baruch Spinoza, Pascal’s 17th-century contemporary. In Book II of his Ethics Spinoza considers the human mind, or the intellectual attributes, and – drawing further from Descartes – strives to define an essential theory of learning and knowledge. Much of this effort was founded upon familiar ( to Spinoza) certain  Jewish sources.

[2] “Who is to decide which is the grimmer sight,” asks Honore de Balzac, “withered hearts, or empty skulls?”

[3] See, by this author, Louis René Beres, Reason and Realpolitik: US Foreign Policy and World Order, Lexington Books, 1984; and Louis René Beres, Mimicking Sisyphus: America’s Countervailing Nuclear Strategy, Lexington Books, 1983. Regarding philosophical foundations of Realpoliitk: “Right is the interest of the stronger,” says Thrasymachus in Bk. I, Sec. 338 of Plato, THE REPUBLIC (B. Jowett tr., 1875).  “Justice is a contract neither to do nor to suffer wrong,” says Glaucon, id., Bk. II, Sec. 359.  See also, Philus in Bk III, Sec. 5 of Cicero, DE REPUBLICA.

[4] Power politics or a “balance-of-power” has never been more than a facile metaphor. Despite its name, it has never had anything to do with ensuring or ascertaining equilibrium. As such, balance has always been subjective, a matter of assorted individual perceptions. Adversarial states in this “Westphalian” dynamic can never be sufficiently confident that strategic circumstances are suitably “balanced” in their particular favor. In consequence, each side to any contest or competition must perpetually fear that it will somehow be left behind, this creating ever wider and even cascading patterns of national insecurity and collective disequilibrium.

[5] Says French Jesuit philosopher Pierre Teilhard de Chardin in The Phenomenon of Man: “The egocentric ideal of a future reserved for those who have managed to attain egoistically the  extremity of `everyone for himself’ is false and against nature.”

[6] International law remains a “vigilante” or “Westphalian” system. See: Treaty of Peace of Munster, Oct. 1648, 1 Consol. T.S. 271; and Treaty of Peace of Osnabruck, Oct. 1648, 1., Consol. T.S. 119, Together, these two treaties comprise the Peace of Westphalia.

[7] The Devil in George Bernard Shaw’s Man and Superman observes correctly that “Man’s heart is in his weapons….in the arts of death he outdoes Nature herself….when he goes out to slay, he carries a marvel of mechanisms that lets loose at the touch of his finger all the hidden molecular energies….”

[8] We may think here of the applicable Talmudic metaphor: “The earth from which the first man was made was gathered in all the four corners of the world.”

[9] Understood  at purely conceptual levels, US strategic thinkers must inquire accordingly whether accepting a visible posture of limited nuclear war would merely exacerbate enemy nuclear intentions, or whether it would actually enhance this country’s overall nuclear deterrence. Such questions have been raised by this author for many years, but usually in explicit reference to more broadly theoretical or generic nuclear threats. See, for example, Louis René Beres, The Management of World Power: A Theoretical Analysis (1972); Louis René Beres, Terrorism and Global Security: The Nuclear Threat (1979; second edition, 1987); Louis René Beres, Apocalypse: Nuclear Catastrophe in World Politics (1980); Louis René Beres, Mimicking Sisyphus: America’s Countervailing Nuclear Strategy (1983); Louis René Beres, Reason and Realpolitik: US Foreign Policy and World Order (1984); Louis René Beres, Security or Armageddon: Israel’s Nuclear Strategy (1986); and Louis René Beres, Surviving Amid Chaos: Israel’s Nuclear Strategy (2016).

[10] As a child growing up in New York City in the 1950s, I am reminded of “Captain Video” and “Tom Corbett Space Cadet.” Plainly, such earlier children’s programs are not a proper model for US strategic forces, anywhere.

[11] See, by Louis René Beres at Harvard Law School: https://harvardnsj.org/2020/03/complex-determinations-deciphering-enemy-nuclear-intentions/ See also, by this author, at US Army War College,  https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/articles/nuclear-decision-making/ and at Modern War Institute, West Point (Pentagon)  https://mwi.usma.edu/theres-no-historical-guide-assessing-risks-us-north-korea-nuclear-war/

[12] For the most part, these dynamics describe a more-or-less variable condition of “chaos.” Though composed in the seventeenth century, Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan may still offer us a vision of this condition in modern world politics. During chaos, which is a “time of War,” says the English philosopher in Chapter XIII  (“Of the Natural Condition of Mankind, as concerning their Felicity, and Misery.”):  “… every man is Enemy to every man… and where the life of man is solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.” Still, at the actual time of writing Leviathan, Hobbes believed that the condition of “nature” in world politics was less chaotic than that same condition extant among individual human beings. This was because of what he had called the “dreadful equality” of individual men in nature concerning the ability to kill others. Significantly, however, this once-relevant differentiation has effectively disappeared with the continuing manufacture and spread of nuclear weapons, a spread soon apt to be exacerbated by an already-nuclear North Korea and by a not-yet-nuclear Iran.

[13] According to Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: “…a peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of states as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.” See: Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Done at Vienna, May 23, 1969. Entered into force, Jan. 27, 1980. U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27 at 289 (1969), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, reprinted in 8 I.L.M.  679 (1969).

[14] One may be usefully reminded here of Bertrand Russell’s trenchant observation in Principles of Social Reconstruction (1916): “Men fear thought more than they fear anything else on earth – more than ruin, more even than death.”

[15]  Sigmund Freud and Carl Jung both thought of “soul” (in German, Seele) as the intangible essence of a human being. Neither Freud nor Jung ever provided any precise definition of the term, but it was not intended by either in some ordinary or familiar religious sense. For both psychologists, it represented a recognizable and critical seat of mind and passions in this life. Interesting, too, in the present analytic context, is that Freud explained his predicted decline of America by making various express references to “soul.” Freud was plainly disgusted by any civilization so apparently unmoved by considerations of true “consciousness” (e.g., awareness of intellect, literature and history); he even thought that the crude American commitment to perpetually shallow optimism and material accomplishment at any cost would occasion sweeping psychological or emotional misery.

[16] From the standpoint of classical political and legal philosophy, such a national policy would be the diametric opposite of the statement by Emmerich de Vattel in The Law of Nations (1758): “The first general law which is to be found in the very end of the society of Nations is that each Nation should contribute as far as it can to the happiness and advancement of other Nations.”

[17] On this indispensable awareness, we may learn from the ancient Greek Stoic philosopher, Epictetus, “You are a citizen of the universe.” A broader idea of “oneness” followed the death of Alexander in 322 BCE, and with it came a coinciding doctrine of “universality” or interconnectedness. By the Middle Ages, this political and social doctrine had fused with the notion of a respublica Christiana, a worldwide Christian commonwealth, and Thomas, John of Salisbury and Dante were looking upon Europe as a single and unified Christian community. Below the level of God and his heavenly host, all the realm of humanity was to be considered as one. This is because all the world had been created for the same single and incontestable purpose; that is, to provide  background for the necessary drama of human salvation. Only in its relationship to the universe itself was the world correctly considered as a part rather than a whole. Said Dante in De Monarchia: “The whole human race is a whole with reference to certain parts, and, with reference to another whole, it is a part. For it is a whole with reference to particular kingdoms and nations, as we have shown; and it is a part with reference to the whole universe, which is evident without argument.” Today, of course, the idea of human oneness can and should be fully justified/explained in more purely secular terms of understanding.

[18] See by this author, at Oxford University Press:  https://blog.oup.com/2016/04/war-political-victories/

[19] Says Jose Ortega y’Gassett about science (Man and Crisis, 1958): “Science, by which I mean the entire body of knowledge about things, whether corporeal or spiritual, is as much a work of imagination as it is of observation….The latter is not possible without the former.”

[20] Included in this assessment must be the expanding risks of US Presidential nuclear decision-making. By this writer, see Louis René Beres, The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists  https://thebulletin.onuclear rg/2016/08/what-if-you-dont-trust-the-judgment-of-the-president-whose-finger-is-over-the-nuclear-button/

[21] In stark contrast to President Trump, Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, the Director General of WHO, spoke modestly, intelligently and purposefully: “COVID-19 does not discriminate between rich nations and poor, large nations and small. It does not discriminate between nationalities, ethnicities, or ideologies. Neither do we,” he said. “This is a time for all of us to be united in our common struggle against a common threat, a dangerous enemy. When we’re divided, the virus exploits the cracks between us.”

[22] In partial reply, we may consider Karl Jaspers in Man in the Modern Age (1951): “Everyone knows that the world situation  in which we live is not a final one.”

[23] Federico Fellini, the Italian film director, once commented wisely: “The visionary is the only realist.”

[24] Louis René Beres’ earlier book, Reason and Realpolitik: US Foreign Policy and World Order (1984) was already organized around this same core assumption.

[25] There have been prophets of global integration in the modern era, especially Condorcet, Immanuel Kant, Auguste Comte and H.G. Wells. For the very best treatment of these prophets and their still-indispensable ideas, see W. Warren Wagar’s The City of Man (1963) and Building the City of Man: Outlines of a World Civilization (1971). Professor Wagar was a great visionary himself, one with whom I earlier had the honor to work at Princeton (World Order Models Project) in the late 1960s.

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Defense

Gulf Sands Shift as Anchors of Regional Security Loosen

Dr. James M. Dorsey

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China and the Gulf states are in the same boat as they grapple with uncertainty about regional security against the backdrop of doubts about the United States’ commitment to the region.

Like the Gulf states, China has long relied on the US defense umbrella to ensure the security of the flow of energy and other goods through waters surrounding the Gulf in what the United States has termed free-riding.

In anticipation of the day when China can no longer depend on security provided by the United States free of charge, China has gradually adjusted its defense strategy and built its first foreign military facility in Djibouti facing the Gulf from the Horn of Africa.

With the People’s Liberation Army Navy tasked with protecting China’s sea lines of communication and safeguarding its overseas interests, strategic planners have signaled that Djibouti is a first step in the likely establishment of further bases that would allow it to project long-range capability and shorten the time needed to resupply.

But Chinese strategic planners and their Gulf counterparts may part ways when it comes to what would be acceptable geopolitical parameters for a rejuvenated regional security architecture.

A rejiggered architecture would likely embed rather than exclude the US defense umbrella primarily designed to protect conservative energy-rich monarchies against Iran and counter militancy.

In contrast to China and Russia, Gulf states, as a matter of principle, favor identifying Iran as the enemy and have cold shouldered proposals for a non-aggression agreement. But for that they need the United States to be a reliable partner that would unconditionally come to their defense at whatever cost.

For its part, China goes to great lengths to avoid being sucked into the Middle East’s myriad conflicts. Adopting a different approach, Russia has put forward a plan for a multilateral security structure based on a non-aggression understanding that would include Iran.

No doubt, China, unlike Russia, wants to postpone the moment in which it has no choice but to become involved in Gulf security. However, China could find itself under pressure sooner rather than later depending on how Gulf perceptions of risk in the continued reliance on the United States evolve.

One factor that could propel things would be a change of guard in the White House as a result of the US election in November.

Democratic presumptive candidate Joe Biden, as president, may strike a more internationalist tone than Donald J. Trump, though a Biden administration’s relations with Saudi Arabia could prove to be more strained. Similarly, Mr. Biden’s focus, like that of Mr. Trump, is likely to be China rather than the Middle East.

By the same token, China’s appraisal of its ability to rely on the US in the Gulf could change depending on how mounting tensions with the US and potential decoupling of the world’s two largest economies unfolds.

China’s increased security engagement in Central Asia may well be an indication of how it hopes to proceed in the Gulf and the broader Middle East. China has stepped up joint military exercises with various Central Asian nations while its share of the Central Asian arms market has increased from 1.5 percent in 2014 to 18 percent today.

Founded in 2001 as a Central Asian security grouping, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) has expanded its relationships in South Asia and the Caucasus, and admitted Iran as an observer.

Referring to China’s infrastructure, telecommunications, and energy-driven Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) that seeks to link the Eurasian landmass to the People’s Republic, China and Central Asia scholar Raffaello Pantucci explained that: “China is expanding its security role in Central Asia to protect its interests in the region and is increasingly unwilling to abrogate security entirely to either local security forces or Russia.”

“By doing so, Beijing is demonstrating an approach that could be read as a blueprint for how China might advance its security relations in other BRI countries,”  Mr. Pantucci wrote.

Central Asia may find it easier than the Gulf to accommodate the Chinese approach.

The problem for most of the Gulf states is that taking Chinese and Russian concerns into account in any new security arrangement would have to entail paradigm shifts in their attitudes toward Iran.

Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates – which has recently made overtures to Iran, insist that any real détente has to involve a halt to Iranian support for proxies in various Middle Eastern countries as well as a return to a renegotiated agreement that would curb not only the Islamic Republic’s nuclear program but also its development of ballistic missiles.

Caught between the rock of perceived US unreliability and the hard place of Chinese and Russian geopolitical imperatives, smaller Gulf states, including the UAE, in contrast to Saudi Arabia, are hedging their bets by cautiously reaching out to Iran in different ways.

They hope that the overtures will take them out of the firing line should either Iran or the United States, by accident or deliberately, heighten tensions and/or spark a wider military confrontation.

To be sure, various Gulf states have different calculations. Saudi Arabia and Bahrain have adopted the most hardline position toward Iran. Oman and Qatar have long maintained normal relations, while the UAE and Kuwait have made limited overtures.

In the short run, Gulf states’ realization of China and Russia’s parameters could persuade them to maintain their levels of expenditure on weapons acquisitions. And, in the case of Saudi Arabia and the UAE, to pursue the development of a domestic defense industry, despite the economic fallout of the pandemic, the drop of oil and gas prices, and the shrinking of energy markets.

Probably, so will recent Iranian military advances. Iran last week publicly displayed what is believed to be an unmanned underwater vehicle that would allow the Revolutionary Guards’ navy to project greater power – because of its long-range, better integrated weapons systems – and more efficiently lay underwater mines.

The vehicle put Iran in an even more elite club than the one it joined in April when it successfully launched a military satellite, a capability only a dozen countries have. When it comes to unmanned underwater vehicles, Iran rubs shoulder with only three countries: the United States, Britain, and China.

Iran’s advances serve two purposes: they highlight the failure of the United States’ two-year-old sanctions-driven maximum pressure campaign to force Iran’s economy on its knees, and, together with massive US arms sales to Gulf countries, they fuel a regional arms race.

To be sure, Russia and China benefit from the race to a limited degree too.

In the ultimate analysis, however, the race could contribute to heightened tensions that risk putting one more nail in the coffin of a US-dominated regional architecture. That in turn could force external powers like China to engage whether they want to or not.

“China is quickly learning that you can’t trade and invest in an unstable place like the Middle East if you don’t have the means to protect your interests,” said Israeli journalist David Rosenberg. “Where business executives come, warships and commando units follow, and they will follow big.”

Author’s note: This story was first published in Inside Arabia

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