Connect with us

Defense

Strategic Stabilization: A Window of Opportunities for Russia and the U.S.

Dmitry Stefanovich

Published

on

Despite the belligerent nuclear statements by Russia and the U.S. in the first quarter of 2018, the configuration of a possible future for the international arms control regimes can be seen beyond the veil of rhetoric.

Therapeutic address

The address to the Federal Assembly by President Vladimir Putin, who has since been re-elected, was striking and unprecedented in terms of its nuclear-missile revelations. However, it generated a fair share of criticism, and rightly so for the most part. In particular, the visualization of the new nuclear delivery systems included a number of previously demonstrated animations, including the understandably criticized “footage” of MIRVs arriving at Florida, which was borrowed from a video related to the future Sarmat ICBM that had been included in a TV film devoted to the Voyevoda ICBM. One aspect that wasn’t entirely understandable was the clearly doctored footage of a target being allegedly being hit by a Kinzhal, a system that is currently very close to deployment. It is, however, worth noting that all the systems featured in the presentation – the heavy Sarmat ICBM, the Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle, the Burevestnik nuclear-powered cruise missile of unlimited range, the Poseidon nuclear-powered unmanned underwater vehicle, the Kinzhal airborne rocket system, and the Peresvet combat laser system – were all, to one extent or another, started as Soviet projects aimed at counteracting the deployment of U.S. ABM as part of President Ronald Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative.

This, however, is beside the point. The key part of Putin’s address was the message to the effect that Russia is prepared to overcome the problems posed by any existing or future U.S. ABM system. Shortly after the president’s address, Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu expressed his bewilderment at why the U.S. would need a “leaky” ABM umbrella. Putin himself clarified his position in an interview with NBC, effectively declaring that Russia was ready for further reductions in strategic offensive weapons, the ABM threat notwithstanding. An external symptom of this readiness is the absence of ABM on the agenda of the next iteration of the international security conference in Moscow, which originally emerged as a platform for discussions on U.S. ABM-related issues. Thus, we can assume that the demonstration of nuclear delivery systems that are invulnerable a priori to any existing or future anti-missile systems had a therapeutic effect and significantly lowered the tone of hysterical talk concerning the development of the U.S. ABM system.

The most recent evidence of the possibility of a new agreement came in the form of a telephone conversation between Putin and Trump on March 20, after which the two presidents declared their interest in a meaningful discussion on strategic stability aimed at preventing a new arms race [1]. The first step towards a positive agenda should be a joint statement on strategic stability by the two countries’ presidents. Apart from the traditional talking point about the impossibility of winning a nuclear war, the statement would benefit from the inclusion of assurances stating that the new defensive and offensive weapons do not aim to undermine the deterring potential of each country’s nuclear forces, and that neither of the two are striving to create nuclear weapons that would be applicable in local conflicts.

In this context, despite the negative backdrop of the current Russian-U.S. relations, the need to discuss the parameters of the future nuclear deal has once again become a hot topic, even though Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova asserts that the time for such talks has not yet arrived.

Problems with prolongation

The simplest and most obvious option would be to prolong the current New START for another five years until 2026. There are, however, a number of obstacles to this.

Trump is extremely opposed to all the achievements of the Obama administration, including in the nuclear field. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on Iran’s nuclear program is falling apart and, according to unofficial reports, the New START came under criticism during Trump’s first phone conversation with Putin.

Russia continues to be critical of the U.S. approach to reducing the number of nuclear delivery platforms and launchers. This criticism does not appear to be extremely significant, but it does illustrate the shortcomings of the current New START in terms of the mere possibility of such a problem emerging once the combined permitted levels of strategic offensive weapons under the New START have been reached.

The INF Treaty is a burning topic: the two sides have officially accused each other of breaching the document, while denying the accusations leveled against themselves. It should be noted that the U.S. has already codified its accusations, including as part of sanctions against enterprises involved in the production of 9M729 cruise missiles for the Iskander-M theater missile system (Novator Design Bureau and Titan-Barrikady).

Both the U.S., under its new Nuclear Posture Review, and Russia, under its new government armament program through 2027, are slated to phase in nuclear delivery systems which fall outside the scope of the New START.

Hypersonic glide vehicles are already being discussed by experts as future systems that would be capable of radically rearranging the global strategic landscape even if they are not tipped with nuclear warheads;

The “exotic” Burevestnik and Poseidon nuclear-powered nuclear delivery platforms, which have not yet been added to Russia’s arsenal, represent projects of assured destruction with nuclear retaliation. They are believed to be in a fairly high state of completion, but tests continue. It is impossible to predict the planned deployment timeline, locations, and numbers as of now: the exact parameters will depend on the situation with Russian-U.S. and global arms control regimes.

Nuclear-tipped sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM) present a serious problem. Such missiles are nothing new, but for now there is no control regime that would apply to them. START I imposed an unverifiable limit of 880 SLCMs for both parties; in fact, these weapons have not been officially sent on combat duty to sea since the early 1990s as part of unilateral initiatives. In 2011, the U.S. finally decided to retire the nuclear-tipped variant of the TLAM-N Tomahawk cruise missile; the country has by now destroyed all the associated W-80-0 warheads [2]. Russia historically (and most likely deliberately) maintains a certain degree of ambiguity when it comes to the types of its SLCMs that are potentially and actually capable of being tipped with specialized warheads (the same is true of other Russian missile types). The U.S. periodically describes its nuclear-tipped SLCMs as a response to Russia’s breaches of the INF Treaty, allegedly through the continued deployment of a ground-based type of cruise missiles with a range of around 2,000 km, and states that it is prepared to suspend its project should the matter be resolved. Washington keeps different deployment options on the table for its SLCMs, from the fairly obvious Virginia-class nuclear-powered submarines to such exotic variants as Zumwalt-class stealth destroyers. Overall, it appears that in this particular context, Russia is merely a pretext, whereas the true reason that the U.S. re-admitted this class of nuclear weapons to its arsenal is China, with its rapidly developing naval force, which is being supported and reinforced by ground-based (and maybe even sea-based) ballistic anti-ship missile projects.

The air-launched aero-ballistic missile as part of the Kinzhal system is, in fact, an elegant solution to the INF Treaty problem, while not being formally covered by the New START.

As previously mentioned, Russia conducted an ABM “therapy” session for both the external audience and, perhaps more to the point, for internal consumption. However, given the previous history of the issue, primarily Moscow’s reiterated demands for legal guarantees that the U.S. ABM system will not be aimed against Russia and its other demands (including those voiced jointly with China), this topic should make its way into the future treaty in some form or another.

Should the two countries reach a compromise, a certain mechanism needs to be devised for both parties to save face, which is of particular importance given that Trump is facing stern opposition in Congress.

There is hope that one of the irritating arms control factors in Russian-U.S. relations will soon disappear: there are reports that the project to develop the Rubezh light mobile ICBM has been put on ice in favor of the Avangard missile [3]. U.S. experts had previously voiced their concerns that the Rubezh project was primarily intended as a smokescreen for the deployment of intermediate-range ballistic missiles that are banned under the INF Treaty. Furthermore, the U.S. National Defense Authorization Act calls for preparing a report on the Rubezh.

Ways to resolve differences

Given the above, Russia and the U.S. could and should shift to a positive agenda by each making two concessions:

the U.S. would suspend its nuclear-tipped SLCM project and provide a symbolic gesture of giving up an ABM component as well as making it possible for Russian specialists to inspect European Aegis Ashore installations (including periodically);

Russia would suspend its Burevestnik and Poseidon projects and make a symbolic statement to the effect that it would not be deploying, say, 9M729 missiles, and would replace them in the constantly growing Iskander-M missile inventory with a certain future article, one which Russian developers are most likely already working on. To further ease pressure, Russia would invite inspectors to visit one of its separate missile brigades, possibly including a demonstration of the 9M729 that would unequivocally prove that the missile is not in breach of the INF Treaty;

Under the best-case scenario, the sides might consider the possibility of Russian experts visiting various components of the U.S. ABM system with frequent inspections and being present during tests of certain interceptor missiles, with U.S. experts similarly visiting Russia’s separate military brigades and observing test launches of theater missiles. However, given the current harsh confrontation between the two countries, such a scenario would appear to be utopian.

It is evident that both countries’ goodwill would be key to implementing this plan, but it is precisely this ingredient that has been lacking so far. In addition, possible outcries at home should not be discounted, either. In this light, Moscow and Washington would do well to work in advance to agree on the optimal wording that would highlight their achievements and the potential for the most efficient use of the previously allocated budgets for the projects that are to be suspended, and also for these projects to be promptly re-activated if need be. Such actions are capable of resolving the two countries’ differences on the INF Treaty and on the ABM program.

Parameters of the new treaty

After the mutually irritating issues have been put to rest, however formally, the dialogue could proceed to a new comprehensive treaty. The following key criteria might be discussed:

A further reduction in the overall number of nuclear warheads. It appears important to agree to such a level at which the next phase of the process could accommodate, least painfully, the other nuclear powers, including the unofficial ones;

A clarification of the rules for counting heavy bombers and associated nuclear munitions: not in the context of either party’s advantages (which only exist in the eyes of the EU and Russian bomber patriots), but taking into account future military aviation and missilery developments, primarily for the Russian Kh-BD and US LRSO cruise missiles;

A clarification of the volume and nature of telemetry to be surrendered in the course of test launches of new ICBMs. The U.S. has been unofficially voicing its concerns about the New START procedure because Russia has tested and supplemented its arsenal with new systems since the treaty came into effect. Now the tables have been turned: Washington has launched work to develop the GBSD ICBM, and the new lower-yield warhead for the Trident II SLBM may also prove a peculiar weapon, despite the statements that it will be, in effect, a single-stage W76 with the index 2. In fact, the Trident missile itself will be replaced sooner or later.

The search for ways to classify and inventory new nuclear delivery systems, primarily as regards hypersonic glide vehicles;

Given Russia’s criticisms of the way the U.S. is denuclearizing its B-52H bombers, and in light of Washington’s ongoing (albeit somewhat vague) plans with regard to the Prompt Global Strike effort, the possibility of hypersonic glide vehicles being armed with non-nuclear warheads, and the Russian Defense Ministry’s conventional deterrence concept, which is directly linked to the development of such weapons, the topic of strategic conventional weapons could form a separate and important section of the future document.

The influence of intelligence, military, and criminal activities in cyberspace on strategic stability, including as regards the vulnerability of nuclear weapons. This topic has been highlighted, even if indirectly, in connection with the consistent disruptions of Russian-U.S. talks on information security and strategic stability in early March 2018.

Of particular importance is the possibility of partially involving representatives of other nuclear powers in the discussion of at least the fourth, fifth, and sixth bullet points listed above. Furthermore, should arms reduction processes continue even on a bilateral basis, all five nuclear powers could be involved in an information exchange and efforts to improve the transparency of strategic nuclear forces. At the same time, tactical nuclear weapons will remain beyond the scope of these efforts due to differences in regional dynamics, even though in theory nuclear charges might be inventoried collectively and not by individual country.

Stabilizing communications

Russia and the U.S. retain the potential for mutually assured destruction. Both Putin’s statement to the effect that the world is hardly viable without Russia and the reminder by U.S. Strategic Commander Gen John Hyten that his country may deliver a devastating strike on Russia in any situation should cool hot heads around the world. For better or for worse, nuclear weapons remain the only guarantee against a major hot war in the current situation of massive international confrontation. A meaningful discussion as to the existence of and application scenarios for nuclear arms, any quantitative limitations, possible nuclear doctrines, and other measures of trust and transparency would help retain and strengthen communications between the two notional enemies, which is crucial to the future of the entire planet. This can only be possible if both parties approach the problem in a constructive way and demonstrate their willingness to compromise.

Resolving individual differences and finding points of mutual contact per se will not be able to form the foundation for a full-fledged Detente 2.0, but these efforts might help articulate the partners’ goals and objectives in negotiations. The mutual misunderstanding of each other’s true intentions is precisely what resulted in the continuing escalation of problems. This is why the two countries must learn how to listen to and understand each other anew.

[1]. It should be noted, however, that both presidents previously expressed their readiness for such an arms race and that it had actually commenced.

[2]. In the meantime, W-80-1 warheads remain in service with air-delivered cruise missiles; the future LRSO cruise missile will be tipped with the W-80-4 warhead of the same series.

[3]. Previously, different sources would often mention Rubezh and Avangard in the same context, in different combinations. There is, however, no reason to believe that a lighter ICBM could propel a hypersonic glide vehicle over an intercontinental distance. On the other hand, China is planning to soon deploy its own vehicle precisely as an intermediate-range missile system; however, this subclass of missile weapons is outside the scope of our article.

First published in our partner RIAC

Continue Reading
Comments

Defense

Rafale: A national tragedy or just plain stupidity?

Published

on

In other countries, it would have been a badge of shame for the Government, Bureaucracy, Defense Industry and the citizenry as a whole. In India, it has become an ugly no-holds-barred slugfest like none other. Endless discussions, numerous debates and multitudes of expert opinions have pervaded the national discourse on just one topic these days. Apparently, the topic on which everyone in India and apparently a few abroad, have become an expert is Dassault Rafale. Every moment, new facts, truths, half-truths, and blunt lies are being tossed about in the Print, Television & Social Media and apparently, some so-called experts have started a smear campaign to malign the name of the Prime Minister, labeling him as a chor (thief) and much more. What is the whole issue about? Pick any hundred shouting at the very top of their voices and ask them about the issue. Not one would be able to go beyond the generality and much-used catchphrases like Scam, Ambani-Adani, Modi, France. Most, if not all, detractors of the defense deal have a half-baked understanding of the fighter aircraft in general and would be unable to differentiate between an interceptor and an air-superiority fighter in any literature. Conversely, the supporters of the deal, in their standard fashion, have built walls of ignorance so high that it puts even Mount Everest to shame. While most (though not all) of the questions of the detractors are logical and valid, tagging every detractor as an Urban Naxal while ignoring his line of questioning won’t work. It’s time for the supporters and detractors of the deal to gain a meaningful insight into the entire deal and then form an opinion on the issue.

The entire fiasco has its roots way back in 2001 when the Indian Air force had projected a requirement for 126 (seven squadrons of 18 aircrafts each) aircraft. The strength of the IAF was starting to fall. It has last acquired an aircraft (Mirage-2000) in the 1980s and the acquisition of the Sukhois (-30MKI) was starting to gain steam. The initial requirements were for a 20-ton class fighter aircraft with medium role capability which would fill the multi-role niche between the heavy-hitter Sukhoi Su-30MKI (an air superiority fighter) and the MiG-21/Tejas (a smaller multi-role interdictor). Apparently impressed by the Mirage 2000s bomb lugging capability at high altitudes during the Kargil War, the IAF was keen to acquire the Mirages and had quietly made up its mind to acquire the same until the French Aerospace industry and Rafale, in particular, threw a spanner in their works. However, the French aerospace industry was winding down Mirage 2000 production due to lack of orders and preparing for the manufacture of the Rafale aircraft. Apparently, the French Air Force needed it Rafales faster (point to be noted- the Rafale is the next iteration of the Mirage-2000 fighter and the current mainstay fighter of the French Air Force). The Mirage production line was shutting down and the French could only keep it open if India gave a firm order. But we are Indians, have we ever committed to anything without first bargaining and comparing the hell out of it?

Hence, Requests for Information (RFI) were issued in 2004. In the formative years of the tendering, aircraft in the running were: Mirage 2000-5 Mk.2 (Dassault, France), F-16C/D (Lockheed Martin, USA), MiG-29OVT (Mikoyan, Russia), and JAS 39 Gripen (Saab, Sweden). Preliminary estimates pegged the costs in the neighborhood of INR 55,000 crore (US$8.6 billion), making it India’s single largest defense deal. However, the 20-ton MTOW (maximum take-off weight) limit requirement was later removed and this limit was revised to 24-tons. Given the protracted nature of the tendering and the past governmental acquisition timelines, Dassault replaced the Mirage 2000-5 with the Rafale and the MiG Company placed MiG-35 in instead of the prototype MiG-29OVT. The Eurofighter consortium entered the Typhoon into the competition. Not wanting to be outdone, the Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornet also joined the tendering. Given the vagueness of the clauses, all aircraft, single engine or double and both light and heavy became a part of the fray.

As per one defense analyst, this deal meant that The Indian Air force was comparing every four-wheel vehicle from a Maruti 800 and a tractor when it just needed a jeep.

The Indian government had initially planned to buy the first 18 aircraft directly from the manufacturer. The remaining fighters will be built under license with a transfer of technology (ToT) by HAL. After an intensive and detailed technical evaluation by the IAF, in 2011, the competition has reduced the bidders to two fighters — Eurofighter Typhoon and Dassault Rafale. On 31 January 2012, it was announced that Dassault Rafale won the competition due to its lower life-cycle cost. The deal has been reported to cost US$28–30 billion in 2014. However, the French refused to provide any guarantees for the 108 aircraft that would be manufactured by HAL. The deal went back to the chopping block and the fleet strength of the IAF continued to deplete at alarming rates. A report commissioned under the erstwhile UPA slammed the HAL’s practices and there were some serious differences between HAL and Dassault on the various fronts.

In light of this, on April 10, 2015, Prime Minister Modi declared: ‘Keeping in mind the critical operational necessity of fighter aircraft in India, I have discussed with the president (of France) the purchase of 36 Rafale fighters in ‘fly-away condition’ at the earliest through an inter-governmental agreement.’ However, the Congress party alleges that the Modi government, in buying 36 Rafales for €7.8 billion ($9.2 billion or Rs 58,000 crore/Rs 50 billion), paid more than what Dassault had quoted in the MMRCA tender but a full breakdown of figures is essential as the total cost of a fighter contract includes — besides the cost of the aircraft — costs related to technology transfer, spare parts, weapons and missiles, added-on equipment and maintenance costs. Moreover, the same aircraft Rafale has also be bought by the Governments of Egypt and Qatar.

A closer look at the costs shows that the contracted price averages out to €91.7 million (Rs 686 crore/Rs 6.86 billion) per Rafale which includes the purchase of 28 single-seat fighters, for €91.07 million (Rs 681 crore/Rs 6.81 billion) each; and eight twin-seat fighters, each priced at €94 million (Rs 703 crore/Rs 7.03 billion). That puts the cost of each of the 36 fighters at €91.7 million (Rs 686 crore) — totaling up to €3.3 billion.

Besides this, the IAF will pay €1.7 billion for ‘India-specific enhancements’, €700 million for weaponry such as Meteor and SCALP missiles, €1.8 billion for spare parts and engines, and €350 million for ‘performance-based logistics’, to ensure that at least 75 percent of the Rafale fleet remains operationally available (our Sukhoi serviceability is an abysmal 50%). We are paying extra for the India specific enhancements that were earlier not the part of the generic aircraft selected via the MMRCA process. Also, while such a direct comparison is not right, prima facie the IAF is paying more or less the same as the EAF and the QAF. The Egyptian air force has paid €5.2 billion for 24 fighters and is reportedly considering buying 12 more, a ‘fully loaded cost’ of €217 million per Rafale. Similarly, the Qatar air force has paid out €6.3 billion for a similar number of aircraft, with a ‘fully loaded cost’ of €262 million per fighter.

The opposition Congress is arguing that by reducing the buy from 126 aircraft for which a sum of (520-700 crores per aircraft, varying in every speech) to just 36 aircraft (700-1600 crores), the present dispensation is causing a scam of epic propositions. There are also serious concerns about the offer being made to Reliance instead of HAL to partner with the deal. While concerns about the apparent lack of Reliance’s experience in making aircraft is genuine, this is no excuse to mock and needlessly criticize a perfectly valid deal. One Congress legislator had even claimed that he would make a better plane than Reliance and mockingly flew a paper plane in the august presence of elected public representatives. Wish making fighter jets was only that simple. However, they seem to forget that Reliance is not going to manufacture any aircraft. It is just a part of an Indian Consortium which will be benefitted by offsets as part of the deal. Why Reliance? Yes, this is a question that needs to be asked and should be answered. The choice was primarily dictated by Dassault’s need to gain a foothold in Indian Markets and tap the rich moolah in the pockets of Indian Industrialists. Given the tie-up between Tata ASL and Lockheed Martin & Pilatus, Honeywell and HAL, Adani and Elbit Systems of Israel and Mahindra taking a heavy plunge in the aviation industry with its acquisition of Gipps Aerospace, Dassault was wary of being caught napping and needed a partner that would be accommodative for them and assertive for others. Reliance Group fit the bill perfectly and while many have been accusing the govt. for crony capitalism, the Dassault-Reliance tie-up is one of survival.

Many have also lamented that private industries are being promoted at the cost of public institutions. Well, only HAL can be blamed for this mess. Not only has HAL chronically underperformed over the years and hamstrung the IAF’s expansion plans (read Sukhoi SU-30MKI) by its ineptitude, it is also overcharging the Indian Tax-payer for basic jets like the domestic Tejas. Recent estimates show that the much-hyped Tejas (named by our former PM Atal Bihari Vajpayee during his regime) is still facing teething troubles even after 2 decades in testing & production and the costs have ballooned exponentially over the years. It is being reported that each Tejas will cost between 460-480 crores per platform which is significantly higher than other fighters for its niche (read JF-17, FC-1) and certainly not making sense in any way. It’s an irony that people accusing the present dispensation of allowing private players to siphon taxpayers’ money are either unaware or simply don’t care that the public sector undertaking is just as expensive (if not more) with the added downside of inefficiency and lethargy. It must also be pointed out that HAL Dhruvs (a light helicopter) manufactured by the PSU have had serious doubts raised about their capability and a South American nation has mothballed all its Dhruvs after a significant no. of them crashed within a short span of time. It is only logical that any foreign manufacturer would be hesitant to partner with HAL. If there is indeed something wrong in this deal, it is the sorry state of affairs at HAL and the government must take immediate steps to resolve it.

On an ending note, defense procurements in India and around the globe have always been shrouded in mist and with good reason. Given the stringent security clauses, unique modifications and country-specific costing, it is near impossible to compare figures across the board, unlike the Big Mac Index. While everyone has the right to an opinion, it should be exercised with caution and should never be misused. The fleet strength of the IAF is rapidly depleting and the Rafales are needed. The opposition is being hypocritical by painting its inability to close a deal in a decade (remember, Saint Antony of the “You can’t be accused of corruption if you do nothing” fame) as a done deal and conveniently forgetting the facts and reports, it had itself prepared. The Government, on the other hand, is doing a poor job by its high on rhetoric and low on facts media reporting. The deal is tough and not easily understandable for all because it is meant to be that way. Having a simple analogy to substitute for this deal is hilarious and plainly, uncalled for. Something must be left to the experts and not brought down to the floor. We are, after all, buying a Mach 2 capable fighter plane, not the bhaziya-tamatar of everyday use. While common sense should prevail on this issue of national importance and the cacophony should subside, it is highly unlikely in the coming days and the slugfest will continue. Meanwhile, the only casualty in this conflict will be the Indian Air Force and its brave pilots, who continue to fly old and unsafe planes for the foreseeable future to come.

Continue Reading

Defense

Indo-US 2+2 Strategic Dialogue: Threat for Regional Stability

Adeela Ahmed

Published

on

The Strategic Status of the Asia-Pacific Region is rising due to its significant role in the global economy. It has the third-largest body of water in the world and comprising of dynamic sea lanes. The sea lanes in the Indian Ocean are considered among the most strategically important in the world. According to the Journal of the Indian Ocean Region, more than 80 percent of the world’s seaborne trade in oil transits through the Indian Ocean choke points, with 40 percent passing through the Strait of Hormuz, 35 percent through the Strait of Malacca and 8 percent through the Bab el-Mandab Strait.

US Interests in South Asia, especially tilted towards India for a decade is to secure its supremacy in the utmost Geo-Strategic and Geo-Economic region. The US wants to contain China and Russia who are spreading influence across Asia, notably in Pakistan, Southeast Asia, and the Indian Ocean. Consequently, the US has recognized India as Major Defense Partner with changing dynamics of security in regional and global great game.

On 6 September 2018, India and the United States of America have documented a new two plus two (2+2) Ministerial dialogue to enhance strategic coordination between them to expand their supremacy in the Indo-Pacific region. U.S. strategy in the Indo-Asia–Pacific is to advocate the US and India to work more closely together on maritime infrastructure in the Indian Ocean to balance China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).  It is in the national interests of US to assist India in building up its capacity in the increasingly important Indian Ocean Maritime Sphere and to sale American weapons and the transfer of sophisticated technologies to India.

The recent 2+2 dialogue joint statement is focused on ‘strengthen Defense ties and promote Security cooperation’ while Commercial Dialogue is now separated from that. External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj, Defense Minister Nirmala Sitharaman, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and US Defense Secretary James Mattis revitalized the deliberate engagement on cross-border terrorism, India’s bid for membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

Both democratic states shared interest to work more closely in Afghanistan, for the developments in the Asia Pacific, Indian Ocean and also in the Middle East (West Asia). Along with India, the US is enhancing its ties with Japan and Australia. The Quadrilateral Dialogue between India, US, Japan, and Australia significantly boosted security and defense cooperation, as evidenced by enhanced bilateral ties, regular trilateral dialogues, and expanded military exercises. The Quad is to boost basic incentives, levels of engagement, and as an instrument to balance against a strengthening Chinese role in the Indo-Pacific region vary for each of the grouping’s members.

The USA has used India to revive its Pacific Command. To strengthen their mutual relations, US Foreign and Defense Ministers offered India for tri-Services joint exercise with the United States off the eastern coast of India in 2019.  The US will train Indian Air, Land and Naval Forces. They will assist India to boost their various sectors and grow the bilateral trade to $500-600 billion from the current $125 billion with a good strategy under a specified time. US Department of Defense will help them to address the procedural complexities and facilitate Indian companies to join the manufacturing supply chains of US defense companies.

Subsequently, in the 2+2 meeting, the two countries successfully maintained a mechanism. They agreed to set up a direct hotline between the foreign and defense ministers which includes the signing of Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA) and Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA).  The COMCASA will facilitate India to obtain critical defense technologies from the US, and access critical communication network to ensure interoperability between the US and the Indian armed forces. Indo-US also laid the foundation of agreement for mutual logistics support, the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA), which will be fully operationalized over the past few months. US recognized India STA-1 status which will make it easy for Indian and US companies to trade in Military hardware, while many technological items will not require licenses either. They agreed to work together regarding the entry of India in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). Superpower has made an exception for India.

But on the other hand, both countries are compelling Pakistan to ‘do more’ to eradicate terrorism and diminish the safe heavens of terrorist’s organizations. US and India must overlook that the real terror in region is emanating from US and India Strategies as India is introducing dangerous weaponry in the region. The Indian military modernization and indigenization is emanating threats for peace and stability of the region. India rigid stance on Kashmir, violating LoC and modernization of dangerous weapons is making conflict-prone South Asia more vulnerable to uncertainty.

Pakistan has defensive policies, and to counter threats originate from India is overcome by Strategic Partnership with China and Russia. Pakistan decision makers gave a proposal of Strategic Restraint Regime to India for maintaining the deterrence stability in South Asia. Pakistan as a responsible nuclear state is more concentrating on China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and Belt and Road Initiative for the economic prosperity of the region.

Unfortunately, the India-US convergence of interest to contain China and their Regional Hegemonic designs have instigated arms race in the region. For the sake of their dangerous national interest, regional peace and stability cannot be compromised. Such discriminatory Alliances and Partnerships instigates instability and undermine global Non-Proliferation Regime.

Instead of such perilous partnerships, new Economic Alliance and Partnerships should be introduced which can rehabilitate economic prosperity and resolute the deep-rooted conflicts. Superpowers should play their constructive role for Economic incentives of all developing South Asian state.

Continue Reading

Defense

Pakistan’s Defense Day: Why nuclear weapon capability was inevitable?

Published

on

Six September is known as Defense Day (Youm-e-Difa) of Pakistan. It is celebrated every year with full devotion to give tribute to the martyrs who sacrificed their lives for the defense of Pakistan during second war between India and Pakistan in 1965. Though on 6 September 1965, Pakistan’s forces played a vital role in nation’s defense but at the same time, the war has fundamentally changed the strategic thinking and security landscape of region. To understand the emerging strategic landscape of South Asia, it is necessary to study bilateral relations of India and Pakistan.

Relations between these two major powers of South Asia have remained hostile since independence. Historical disputes, contested boundaries, and disturbed balance of power forced India and Pakistan to search for counterweights through improved relations with other major powers of the world. Consequently, India’s more offensive policies and its objective to acquire “status of hegemonic power” in South Asia has consistently undermined Pakistan’s efforts to maintain “Balance of Power” and “peace” in the region. The enduring rivalry between India and Pakistan has developed a “classic insecurity trap” in the military preparations of both states.  India’s initiation of nuclear weapon program in 1960 and its expanding capabilities as potential proliferator added nuclear dimension to Pakistan’s security calculations in early 1960. The turning point came in the mid-1960s after India acquired a research reactor (1960) and built a reprocessing plant in 1964.Same year, in response to China’s nuclear test, an intensive debate initiated in Indian Parliament and public circle for “nuclear bomb”.

Paradoxically, the 1965 war triggered the new demand in India for Nuclear bomb. Homi Babha’s statement was carefully noted by officials in Pakistan in which he claimed that “India could build a nuclear weapon within twelve and eighteen months”. India’s quest of nuclear capability and war of 1965played vital role in making Pakistan realize that the state has to diversify its security measures and relying only on conventional capability is not sufficient to maintain state’s security. Therefore, Pakistan’s security concerns acquired nuclear dimension.  The war of 1971 appears to have additional stimulus for Pakistan’s decision makers to favor the pursuit of a nuclear weapon capability option for Pakistan. In the wake of 1971 war, Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto gave a decisive flip to country’s nuclear program. In 1972, PM Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto stated that, “We(Pakistan) will eat grass, even go hungry, but we will get one of our own (Atom bomb)…. We have no other choice”. Furthermore, Pakistan’s need for nuclear weapon capability was impelled by multiple factors including wars of 1965 and1971 between India and Pakistan; inadequate conventional capabilities to counter India’s threats and India’s first nuclear weapon test in 1974.  Hence, Pakistan detonated its nuclear weapon on 28 May 1998 in response to India’s second series of nuclear weapon test on 11 and 13 May, 1998.

These factors show that Pakistan did not initiate the nuclearization of South Asia; actually India’s adversarial nature, offensive mindset of its policymakers and its inability to accept the existence of Pakistan as independent state continue to be the major hurdles in the way of establishing peaceful cooperative relations on the basis of equality. Pakistan’s nuclear weapon capability has played central role in countering any kind of external aggression through operational preparedness of the strategic forces. Though nuclear weapon capability has prevented the war between India and Pakistan by maintaining deterrence equilibrium but on this defense day it is inevitable to understand that ‘Defense’ is not limited to direct military clashes or borders security. Now defense of the state has much more meaning, obligations and complexities. Therefore, Pakistan should formulate a pragmatic policy that can counter ‘cruel and protracted tactics’ employed by the country’s adversaries to undermine its security from within. One effective tool could be the art of fourth or fifth generation warfare, more commonly known as 5GW which is more decentralized, fluid and is strategically calculated to engage the enemy on all fronts. As Sun Tzu stated, “supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy’s resistance without fighting”.

Continue Reading

Latest

Newsdesk36 mins ago

Financing the 2030 Agenda: What is it and why is it important?

António Guterres launches his strategy to finance the 2030 Agenda to put the world on a more sustainable path, this 24 September,...

Religion11 hours ago

Erdogan, Andrew Brunson and Ukrainian Church autocephaly

On Monday, a Turkish news website Dik Gazete published an article Erdogan’s Washington – Brunson – Ukraine game written by...

Tech12 hours ago

Digitisation and autonomous driving to halve costs by 2030

The digitization and automation of processes and delivery vehicles will reduce logistics costs for standardized transport by 47% by 2030,...

South Asia14 hours ago

Democratic transitions in South Asia: Solih led Opposition brings hope to Maldives

Authors:  Srimal Fernando and Mizly Nizar* The 2018 Maldivian Presidential Election and the run up to it was closely watched...

Middle East16 hours ago

Battling it out at the UN: Potholes overshadow US-Iran confrontation

It’s easy to dismiss Iranian denunciations of the United States and its Middle Eastern allies as part of the Islamic...

Defense17 hours ago

Rafale: A national tragedy or just plain stupidity?

In other countries, it would have been a badge of shame for the Government, Bureaucracy, Defense Industry and the citizenry...

South Asia18 hours ago

Pakistan should ‘Speak Softly and Carry a Big Stick’ in response to India

With the 73rd United Nations General Assembly currently underway, tensions in South Asia once again seem to be building up...

Trending

Copyright © 2018 Modern Diplomacy