Turkey has been applying for the EU membership since 1987 when Turgut Ozal, the 8th President of Turkey submitted an application. But until today, they have failed to convince the EU as well as the EU member states that they are fit to be a part of the European community via the EU. They are many factors that might have contributed to the failure of Turkey’s application. One of the factors that has been heavily debated is on the historical perspectives based on the culture and identity. The European identity is one of the core importance in discussing about EU membership or enlargement process. The question that is being asked here is whether Turkey has that European identity within their country. In addition if we look at the history of Europe’s relation with the Ottoman Empire in the past would also be a deciding factor too as some Europeans would remember the shadows of conflict between both sides back in the day. The Ottoman Empire and its Muslim identity as well as the Christian Europe might have also shaped the minds of Europeans when Turkey applied for EU membership (Multuler &Taskin, 2007)
“While the cacophony of European contradictions works towards a self-elimination of the EU from the MENA/Euro-Med region, Turkey tries to reinsert itself. The so-called neo-Ottomanism of the current government is steering the country right into the centre of grand bargaining for both Russia and for the US. To this emerging triangular constellation, ambitious and bold PM Erdoğan wishes to beat his own drum. … Past the Arab Spring, Turkey wakes up to itself as the empiric proof that Islam and modernity work together. In fact, it is the last European nation that still has both demographic and economic growth. … Moreover, Ataturk’s Republic is by large and by far the world’s most successful Muslim state: It was never resting its development on oil or other primary-commodity exports, but on a vibrant socio-economic sector and solid democratic institutions. … The very outcome will be felt significantly beyond the Arab region and will reverberate all across the Sunni Muslim world. (Bajrektarevic, Anis, 2016)
Besides the factor of history, culture and identity there were also war and human rights issues that hindered Turkey’s application to the EU. Turkey got involved in a bloody Kurdish revolution in South-East Anatolia during the mid-1980s. Turkey was accused of abusing human rights as well as persecuting the minorities during the revolution. Turkey’s failure to improve human rights and the rights of minorities made it difficult for them to be accepted into the EU. In addition, the EU also raised doubts about Turkey’s ability in implementing the necessary social, political and economic adjustments needed to enter the EU. This was mentioned by the EU back in the 1990s but until today these issues still exist in Turkey. Government-led restrictions on media freedom and freedom of expression in 2015 went hand in- and with efforts to discredit the political opposition and prevent scrutiny of government policies in the run-up to the two general elections (Human Rights Watch, 2015). Recently, President Tayyip Erdogan has been arresting political activists, journalists and other critical of public officials since the attempted military coup happened in 15th July 2016. (Amnesty International, 2016). These are all the issues that has definitely contributed and effected Turkey’s EU membership application.
Another factor that has contributed to the failure of Turkey’s EU membership application is the fact that they currently occupy the northern part of Cyprus till this day. The issue of Cyprus and Turkey became significant when Turkey invaded Cyprus in 1974 in retaliation to Greece that had already occupied Cyprus since 1964 (Fitzgerald, 2009). At present, the Turkish troops occupy the northern part of Cyprus whereas the southern part of Cyprus is currently independent and has its own government. The connection between the Cyprus issue and the membership of Turkey into the EU became noticeable when Cyprus and Turkey both became candidates for EU membership and it was announced at the 1999 Helsinki Summit. Both countries were destined to join the European Union and at that time, it was confirmed that the situation in Cyprus was not involved in the decision making for the candidature. There were not precondition that was mentioned. But it was important for Turkey to play an active and important role in bringing about a settlement in Cyprus.
But on 1st May 2004, Cyprus was accepted as an EU member state and Turkey remained on the sidelines. The membership of Cyprus in the EU has made in even difficult for Turkey to become a member and it constitutes an important obstacle for EU accession of Turkey. This is because Turkey cannot become a member of the EU without recognizing the Republic of Cyprus. Since it joining the EU, Cyprus has used its veto to prevent the EU from passing the so-called direct trade regulation needed to lift tariffs on good from Northern Cyprus. (Barysch, 2010). In addition, Cyprus as a member of the EU has also used its veto to block Turkey’s negotiations on accession with the European Union (Kambas, 2015). Cyprus have also said that it will not end its veto for the time being. These shows that the Cyprus issue is definitely one of the stumbling blocks for Turkey to strike any sort of deal with the EU and this deal includes their EU membership application.
Is the Cyprus issue one of the crucial factors that is currently effecting Turkey’s membership application after it became an EU member state in 2004. The first part of the paper will discuss about the Cyprus issue before it became an EU member state whether there were also other factors that affected Turkey’s membership application. The first part will discuss a little about history and then move on to Cyprus issue from 1974 until 2004. The second part will discuss about the Cyprus issue after it became an EU member state in 2004 where it seems that the Cyprus issue was definitely a very crucial factor that is currently affecting Turkey’s membership application.
Greek and Turkish Intervention in 1974
Cyprus became an independent nation in 1960 after both the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots agreed to sign the London-Zurich Agreement (BBC News, 2016). The agreement guaranteed the right of the Turkish minorities that were around 18% of the population as well as the rights of the Greek majority which comprised around 80% of the population at that time. Prior to that, both the Greeks and Turkish Cypriots had demanded the British to give them independence. While Cyprus was already an independent country, their first President of Cyprus Archbishop Makarios said to have proposed constitutional changes called the Akritas Plan that would abolish power sharing in Cyprus and at the same suppress Turkish Cypriots. (Ellis, 2010). There were also sources that said Deputy President of Cyprus and also Turkish Cypriot Community Leader, Fazil Kutchuk wanted to break away from the state and set up a separate administration with the help of Turkey (Charalambous, 2014). These lead to communal violence and Turkey withdrawal from power sharing. There were already problems that were happening internally in Cyprus as both the leaders of Greek and Turkish Cypriots had a feud over the constitution and there was an ethnic divide.
The situation in the Republic of Cyprus became worst in July 1974 when there was an intervention by Greece when they overthrew ruling government of President Archbishop Makarios in Republic of Cyprus (Nugent, 1999). The military coup was led by Nikos Sampson who had had the support of the military regime in Greece as they wanted a union (enosis) to be achieved between
Cyprus and Greece (Smith, 2014). Supporters of President Makarios rejected the idea of union (enosis) as they wanted to be an independent nation. In the same month and year, Turkey also intervened in Republic of Cyprus with operation Atilla. Their reason for intervening is to protect the rights to the Turkish Cypriots (Hislop, 2014). Both coups resulted in a civil war that broke out between both the Greek and Turkish Cypriots with the help of both countries as well. The coup by Greece collapsed and the war had ended in August 1974 as the Turkish military were able to capture one-third of the island and it was in the northern part of Republic of Cyprus. They had occupied Famagusta and the Karpas Peninsula. The intervention in 1974 forced a partition as the island was separated along the Green Line that was already in place since 1963 as it was drawn up by the UN forces due to the ongoing domestic conflicts (Fitzgerald, 2009). Greek Cypriots living in the north were forced out to the south and vice versa for the Turkish Cypriots living in the south when they fled to the north. Republic of Cyprus was now divided into two states
The Divided Cyprus
Up till today, Republic of Cyprus is divided into two states. The UN Security Council has warned the Turkey to withdraw its troops but they have failed to do so. There are almost 35,000 Turkish troops stationed in the Northern Cyprus (Nugent, 1999). Immediately after the war, Turkish Cypriots established an independent administration. There was an effort for peace talks between both north and south Cyprus but it collapsed and as a result of that the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) was formed in 1983. The southern Cyprus was known as The Republic of Cyprus (ROC). The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) is only recognized by Turkey and it not recognized internationally by the UN whereas the Republic of Cyprus is recognized internationally by the UN and not by Turkey (Comfort, 2005). This means that the northern Cyprus depends wholly on Turkey for survival as it does not have ties internationally. Northern Cyprus has so far maintained its existence and rebuffed all attempts by the world body to submit to the current Cyprus government in the south. (Bhutta, 2016). They believed that they are an independent nation of their own. The Green Line which was supposed to be a temporary ceasefire has not become permanent. People from both sides are not allowed to communicate with each other although they have been effort to change this when the Turkish Cypriots opened the barricades along the Green Line for visitors on both sides of the divide. (Hislop, 2014).
A divided Cyprus has definitely made things more complicated between the two sections of the country as well as the relationship between Turkey and Republic of Cyprus (southern Cyprus). The Republic of Cyprus feels that stationed troops in northern Cyprus is definitely seen as a threat and an occupying force. (Comfort, 2005).
The Cyprus Effect on Turkey’s EU Membership Application until the Year 1990
Turkey started to eye the EU membership for many decades since it was named as the European Community (EC) back then. Turkey’s official membership application was in 1959 when it applied to become a member of the European Community (EC). The application was rewarded with the Ankara Agreement which was signed by both Turkey and the EU in 1963. (Gerhards & Hans, 2011). The Ankara Agreement was not an agreement that guaranteed full membership yet but it was the first step towards full membership in the future. The Ankara Agreement signed in 1963 was limited to only trade and financial matters. In 1970, there was another milestone in the application when both Turkey and the EU signed the 1970 Additional Protocol establishing a 22 year transnational period leading to customs union (EUEC, 2008). Although protocol was signed, Turkey strategy for economic development was not in line with EC and there was going to a re-negotiation on the deal was signed. At an early stage, Turkey EU membership application was more towards dealing between only the EU and Turkey. There was obvious third party that was involved in making sure that negotiations failed. Turkey’s initial membership application was not yet effected by the Cyprus issue.
The interventions in Cyprus by Greece and Turkey definitely impacted Turkey’s quest for the EC membership. After 1974, it could be said that the EC took a very careful approach in identifying Turkey as a possible candidate for the EC. The division of Cyprus definitely had an effect on Turkey’s membership application. Besides the Cyprus factor, there were also other strong factors that affected the relationship between the EC and Turkey. Both parties had a rough relationship because of the domestic politics in Turkey at that time. Unfavorable domestic political developments in Turkey and most importantly the military coup that happened on 12 September 1980 made Turkey’s possible EC membership totally irrelevant (Grigoriadis, 2003). During this period, Turkey isolated themselves from EU until the civilian government took power in 1983.
There was also another important factor that was effected Turkey’s EU membership application during this time. In 1981, while Turkey was in isolation due to its domestic problems, Greece became an official EU member. This basically meant that as an EU member Greece had veto powers to indirectly stop Turkey from becoming an EU member at that time. As an EU member, Greece was always able to affect EU policies on its benefits with respect to Turkey as well as the Cyprus issue (Basturk, 2013). In addition, Greece’s ascension as the EU member at that time had given Greece the ultimate opportunity to point the finger at Turkey of being an invader in relation to the Cyprus issue which was a breach of the idea of an ‘European’ identity which was based the values of peace and democracy. (Ulusoy, 2009). Despite of all these factors, Turkey applied for full EU membership in 1987 but as expected the EU felt that Turkey was not ready for the membership. In December 1989 the EU decided that it will not accept any members at that moment of time. In terms of Turkey application, the EU said to have had concerns about developmental gap between the EU and Turkey which meant that Turkey could not fulfil its obligations of developing from the EU economic and social policies (Grigoriadis, 2003). In addition to the mentioned reason, the EU also referred to Turkey’s ongoing disagreements with Greece as well as the Cyprus issue. Besides that, the EU was also referring to the fact that the human rights issue and treatment of the minorities in Turkey would still need improvement (Hale, 2000). Thus for this reasons Turkey’s EU membership application in 1987 was rejected by the EU.
It could be said that at this point of time the influence of Greece in the EU could be seen as even more vital factor than the Cyprus issue itself. This is because the issue related to Cyprus was initially being strongly voiced out by Greece rather than the EU. We could analyze that after Greece’s ascension into the EU in 1981, the voice on the Cyprus issue by Greece became more vocal thus it definitely affected Turkey’s EU membership application. The Greek policy towards Turkey’s membership was always portrayed as a crucial factor for the lack of progress in the EU Turkey relations. In the minds of many Turkish citizens, Greece was the only obstacle to the accession of their country into the EU although Turkey was not eligible yet for the membership during the 1980s and 1990s (Georgiades, 2000). But by looking at it on a different angle, it could also be said that Turkey’s domestic politics also played a major role in their membership application. The military regime in Turkey during their isolation between 1980-1983 gave the window of opportunity for Greece to become an EU member and influence the EU in some way.
The situation might have been a little different if Turkey did not isolate themselves. They might have influenced the EU too in making sure that Greece was not a member of the EU. Although it seems that the Cyprus issue played a major role in Turkey EU membership application, but it can be argued that it played an indirectly role altogether as the ascension of Greece into the EU and Turkey domestic politics played a more crucial role during this period of time until 1990 that ultimately affected Turkish EU membership application.
The Cyprus Effect a Non Crucial Factor between 1990 to 2004
Turkey EC membership application seemed to have hit a new blow when Republic of Cyprus applied to become the member of the EU as well in 1990. The application by EU definitely shocked the Turkey and northern Cyprus. Turkey feared that they would face another obstacle if Republic of Cyprus became an EU member. Turkey insisted that the application should not be allowed by the EU as it is against the International Law and the constitution of the Republic of Cyprus. Turkey received advice from international law expects. Article 8 of the Republic of Cyprus states that Republic of Cyprus cannot be a member of an international organization unless both Turkey and Greece are a member of it too (Mandelson, 1997). But this failed to convince the
EC as they taught that the issue of Cyprus’ accession is an eminently political debate and law can adapt itself to any political solution. But looking at it from another point of view, Turkey as also not abiding by the law as they were not following the European Court of Human Rights by not respecting the property rights of the Greek Cypriots in northern Cyprus (Suvarierol, 2003). It could be seen that Turkey one way or another was practicing double standard.
But looking at it clearly, the Cyprus issue was again not the crucial point here that was hindering Turkey’s EU membership application. The collapse of the communism in 1992 definitely had an impact on Turkey’s membership (EUEC, 2008). The communist bloc of the Soviet Union ended hence granting opportunity for the EU to establish a European bloc within the Central and Western European countries. In addition to that also, the countries that were finally released of communism were also performing poorly in terms of economy hence it needed all the help they could get from the European community via the EU. These countries were also given priorities because they were seemed to more culturally part of Europe than Turkey. This resulted in the prioritization of the Central and Western European countries as member states and Turkey fell down the picking order.
Besides the fall of the communist bloc, continuous pressure from Greece also contributed to Turkey’s EU membership application. The Copenhagen Criteria which was discussed in 1993 became Greece’s attack on Turkey. Greece used it as a tool to point fingers at Turkey. Greece criticized Turkey’s miserable human and minority rights record as well as their military influenced democracy.(Grigoriadis, 2003) Turkey who initially failed to meet the political criteria choose to then focus on the economic criteria. The EU gave priority to Turkey to complete the negotiations of the EU-Turkey customs union. But Greece again showed their influence when they used their veto policy to block the customs union agreement between Turkey and the EU (Grigoriadis. 2003). Greece seemed to be using the veto for its own national interest but they were not going to be convinced easily. Besides that, Greece were also very influential in making sure that Cyprus became one of the candidates that would join the EU. The deal was that Greece would lift its veto over Turkey’s customs union with the EU in return for the EU’s agreement to start accession talks with the Greek Cypriots on behalf of the whole island of Cyprus (Oguzlu, 2002).
Turkey’s customs union agreement came into force in January 1996 (EUEC, 2008) after Greece lifted its veto on the customs union in March 1995 (Suvarierol, 2003). Greece was influential once again when the 1999 Helsinki Summit finally granted candidateship to Turkey. This is because there was a precondition where Turkey would need to resolve their issue with Greece before starting EU membership negotiation(Oguzlu, 2002). In the same summit, Cyprus was also given candidateship without any pre-condition on their internal issue. The EU Accession Partnership Document for Turkey was publicized by the European Commission in November 2000. Once again Greece stood in the way of Turkey’s EU membership as they continued to pursue their agenda when they persuaded 14 fellow EU members to add another condition to the EU Accession Partnership Document by adding that Turkey should also resolve the Cyprus issue before negotiating EU membership (Franz, 2000). This generally shows that the Cyprus issue was again only an indirect factor to Turkey’s EU Membership because Greece were making all the important decisions directly. They did not only use the Cyprus issue as tool but also managed to influence other members states as well to make sure that Turkey was unsuccessful in their membership application.
It is not fair also to point fingers only at Greece because there were other EU member states too that did not want Turkey to become an EU member. German Foreign Minister at that time had an opinion that Turkey still have a long way but are already in line to be in EU but they were still lacking behind in terms of human rights referring to the Kurdish situation and also stressed about
Turkey’s relationship with Greece and Cyprus as well as some economic problems (Hurriyet Daily News, 1997). Besides that, during the Luxembourg Summit in 1997 Greece, Germany and Luxembourg opposed Turkey’s candidature for the EU (Muftuler, 2003). In addition there were also concerns among the EU member states regarding the distribution of votes in the Council of Minister as well as the number of seats in the European Parliament. This is because both criteria’s are based on size of population of the member states. The concern here was that Turkey might have the second highest population after Germany if it becomes an EU member state. It would mean that Turkey could influence the decision making in the European Union because they would have the second most number of votes in the European Parliament (Muftuler, 2003). The EU member states excluded Turkey as they wanted to make some changes to the population voting system if possible during the Nice Treaty. As a whole the Cyprus issue is once again not crucial as they were definitely other factors that hindered Turkey’s EU membership application. Concerns about Turkey’s population and the influence that they could have over the EU was definitely another dominant factor that made EU hesitant to grant EU membership to Turkey at that point of time.
Another important factor also during this time is when Turkey failed to live by the Copenhagen Criteria politically but they were brilliant economically as they achieved almost all the criteria. The EU Commission Progress Report in the year 2000 and 2001 demonstrated that the political aspect of the Copenhagen Criteria was one of the challenges faced by Turkey. There were still no improvements in terms of human rights although steps were taken to improve them. In addition, there was still problems related to the democratic structure of Turkey as civilian control over the government was yet to be addressed that time. As a whole, the period the between 1990 to 2004 could be concluded in a way that the Cyprus issue was crucial in Turkey’s EU membership application. The Cyprus issue was only an indirectly as they had no prior say in whatever that was happening in the EU. The crucial factor here was Greece as they played a major role in the decision making process as they used the veto power to their advantage to block EU-Turkey deals.
The Cyprus Effect after the Year 2004
The Republic Cyprus became an EU member on 1st May 2004. The Cyprus that became an EU member is the only the southern part of Cyprus. This is because the “Annan Plan” that was presented by the United Nations did work out as expected. The “Annan Plan” received mixed reactions from the southern and northern Cyprus. The initial reactions by Turkish Cypriots are that they were not in favor of the whole plan (Suvarierol, 2003). But the Turkish Cypriots began to grow into the plan and basically started to support “Annan Plan”. Civil societies in the Turkish part of Cyprus held demonstrations in support of a unified Cyprus. The Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktas who was against unification was voted out of office in the December 2003 election (Kyris, 2012). It was for the first time in history that a pro-unification party won the election. The election results definitely showed that the Turkish Cypriots were definitely routing for unification as well a future in the EU. In general, the Turkish Cypriots approved the Annan Plan and was ready to unify their country.
However at the other side of the island in Cyprus, the Greeks Cypriots initially supported the “Annan Plan” whole heartedly without any shadow of a doubt. But elections in the 2003 changes the whole scenario when Tassos Papadopoulos became the new leader of Republic of Cyprus. The new leader was pretty much against the whole “Annan Plan” and wanted to make sure that the Greek Cypriots voted against unification of the island. Papadopoulos started to create conditions to make sure the people reject the UN Resolution Plan with the help of many political and social elites created (Anastasiou, 2007). Besides that, a few days before the referendum Papadopoulos appeared to be emotionally telling his people through the television that the Greeks
Cypriots should reject the “Annan Plan” (Kyris, 2012). On 24th April 2004, On April 24, 2004, just a week from Cyprus’ entry into the EU, the results of the voting were out as 64.9% of the Turkish Cypriots voted in favor of the “Annan plan” and they definitely wanted unification while but in a turn of events the Greek Cypriots rejected the “Annan Plan” 75.8% of Greek Cypriots voted against the plan (Ulosoy, 2008). As a result of this, The Republic of Cyprus remained a divided island as only the Southern part of the island entered the European Union (Basturk, 2013). This was definitely a blow to Turkey as this was the make or break decision that might have given the green light for Turkey EU membership.
The accession of only southern Cyprus into the EU definitely hampered the Turkey’s membership application into the EU. The Cyprus issue became one the major and crucial factors that affect Turkey’s negotiation process in becoming an EU member. Cyprus as an EU member now has direct power in term of veto to block Turkey from becoming an EU member. In addition, Cyprus also has the power to block any sort of deals in between Turkey and EU. The discussion over Turkey’s EU membership application started in 2005 where there needs to be a screening process for 35 chapters. Between 2005 and 2014, Turkey has completed the screening process in 33 of the chapters required for its accession while the balance of the other two chapters does not require negotiation. One of the important elements that is slowing the progress and making it difficult for the Turkish EU accession is the fact that 17 of the chapters remain blocked either by the EU or member states individually (Dagdeverenis, 2014). In the case of Turkey, delays and slow progress in discussion are mainly due to the Cyprus issue. This is because the EU Council have blocked atleast 8 chapters in December 2006. This was done when Turkey refused to recognize Cyprus and to ratify the Additional Protocol of the Ankara Association Agreement by not allowing Cyprus vessels and aircrafts to use Turkey’s ports and airports (Barysch, 2010). This block by the EU Council was due to the Cyprus issue that definitely became a crucial factor for Turkey’s EU membership application after 2004 as Cyprus became a member of the EU.
In addition to the 8 chapters blocked by the EU Council, the Cyprus issue again appears as even Cyprus chose to veto at least 6 chapters that is required for Turkey’s accession into the EU (Chislett, 2015). These six chapter are related to six chapters: (1) freedom of movement for workers; (2) energy; (3) judiciary and fundamental rights; (4) justice, freedom and security; (5) education and culture; and (6) foreign, security and defense policy (Chislett, 2015). Hence this means that a total of 14 chapters are blocked due to the issue of Cyprus and this has again slowed down negotiation for the accession process for Turkey. This shows that the veto power that Cyprus received after entering EU in 2004 has now become an important tool to block and slow down Turkey’s EU membership application. In addition to that, the failure of Turkey in recognizing Cyprus as an EU member has also contributed to the slow process of Turkey’s membership into the EU which is definitely closely related to the Cyprus issue. This proves that after 2004, the Cyprus issue has definitely become an important and crucial factor that has impacted Turkey’s EU membership application.
Besides the blocking of chapters by the EU Council and Cyprus in relation to the Cyprus issue, since becoming an EU member Cyprus has definitely become aggressive towards Turkey.
In 2014, the Greek Cypriots said that it would file a complaint to the EU leaders to block Turkey’s attempts in joining the European Union (Middle East Eye, 2014). This was in response to Turkey’s gas exploration expedition done in the waters claimed by Cyprus. Turkey said to have send a warship into the Cypriot Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) to conduct seismic surveys which was definitely a threat to the safety of Cyprus. President Nicos Anastasiades said that formal complaints will also be lodged with the U.N. Division for Oceans and Law of the Sea, the International Maritime Organization and possibly with the U.N. Security Council (CNS News, 2014). This again shows that the Cyprus issue has definitely become a crucial factor because since becoming an EU member in 2004 Cyprus has been very brace and aggressive towards Turkey and are definitely making it hard for Turkey to become an EU members states.
In 2015, Cyprus showed their aggressiveness again when they pledged to block Turkey’s stalled accession negotiations to join the EU. This is because Turkey has not done enough to reunite the divided island of the Republic of Cyprus. In order to restart negotiation, there needs to be a consent from all EU members (Zalan, 2015). Cypriot Foreign Minister Ioannis Kasoulides mentioned that Cyprus is sticking to the veto for as long as Turkey doesn’t live up to its obligations.
The Greek Cypriot administration threatened to block Turkey’s bid until the Turkish “occupation” of northern Cyprus is ended (TRT World, 2015). This act by Cyprus again shows how far does the Cyprus issue is currently the crucial factor towards Turkey’s EU membership process. The accession of Cyprus into the EU has given it power to basically rule over Turkey in their bid for an EU membership. The 14 chapters that are currently blocked and vetoed definitely shows that the Cyprus issue is a crucial factor towards Turkey’s dream of being an EU member since 2004. In addition to that, Cyprus’s bravery and confidence after 2004 also shows that they are not afraid of Turkey as they hold a huge advantage over them. Although there are other factors that affect Turkey’s EU membership application after 2004, I would personally argue that the Cyprus issue is the most crucial factor that stands in the way of Turkey and its membership application to the EU.
Is Godot About to Come ?
In conclusion, the Cyprus issue was not significant or crucial in Turkey’s EU membership application before it became an EU member in 2004. This is because the Cyprus issue was only an indirect factor rather than a direct factor. During the initial phase of Turkey’s membership application there was more two way discussion without any external interference as it was not yet influenced by the Cyprus issue. Later on, it seemed that Greece was having a bigger say than Cyprus when talking about the EU membership application. This happened after Turkey isolated themselves for three year which paved the way for Greece to become an EU member. The Greece factor was even more crucial during this stage rather than the Cyprus factor as they were voicing out for Cyprus. Between 1990 and 2004, the Cyprus issue was once again not crucial. This is because it was the end of Cold War and countries from Central and Western Europe were being prioritized as possible candidates. The EU wanted to unify the former communist in one community. Turkey was on sidelines as other European countries were preferred. Besides that, there were continuous pressure from Greece in terms of pin pointing Turkey human rights record as well as their military democracy. There were also other EU members states that did not favor Turkish it would become a member. One of their concern was Turkey might be able to influence the European Parliament if it entered the EU because it will have more seats in parliament due to their population. The Cyprus issue is not much of a crucial factor here during this period.
Once Cyprus became an EU member in 2004, the troubles came along for Turkey. This is because the Cyprus issue became a crucial factor that affected Turkey’s EU membership directly this time. Cyprus used its veto to block 6 chapters that were important to make sure that Turkey’s EU membership negotiation could take place. But due to this veto, Cyprus has basically slowed down the negotiation process. In addition, since becoming a member Cyprus have been brave to stand up to Turkey. This is because they now have the power to veto Turkey-EU membership negotiation just like they did in 2015. This was because Turkey was not taking steps to end their occupation in Northern Cyprus. It is indeed proven that the Cyprus issue only became a crucial and dominat factor after 2004 once it became an EU member. The veto power that they currently have place an important in making sure that Turkey does not become an EU member and Cyprus definitely stands in the way of Turkey’s EU membership even in the future.
How Can Parity Be More Proportional?
International diplomats located in Bosnia-Herzegovina have recently launched an initiative requesting the Parliament of one of Bosnia-Herzegovina’s two entities, the Federation, to reconstitute its upper chamber, the House of Peoples, in line with „more proportional representation“. Yet, how can representation in the House of Peoples be more proportional, when already based on the principle of parity? Sounds absurd, doesn’t it? Representation can be based either on the principle of proportionality or on the principle of parity. When based on the principle of parity, it cannot possibly be more proportional. Moreover, such an initiative encroaches on the sovereign right of that very Parliament to constitute and reconstitute itself, without external interference.
Indeed, what does sovereignty mean in the present-day Bosnia-Herzegovina? In the rest of Europe it has been adopted, almost axiomatically, in the traditions of both Locke and Rousseau, that sovereignty is indivisible and inalienable. For, the will of the people, as the expression of sovereignty, can not be divided; otherwise, it ceases to be the will of the people and becomes a collection of individual wills and then the people can only be a collection of individuals. Also, sovereignty can not be alienated from its bearer: power may be transferred, but not will; it is impossible for any organ to exercise the sovereign will save the sovereign body itself. The state, as a state, can no more alienate its sovereignty than a man can alienate his will and remain a man. There is but one possible bearer of sovereignty, the people.
In Bosnia-Herzegovina, it has been accepted, no less axiomatically, in the tradition of its long-negotiated partition sponsored by international envoys, that this country’s sovereignty can easily be divided, alienated from its people as a whole and transferred to its constituent ethnic elements and then consumed by its three ethnic oligarchies in the form of unrestrained political power over the pieces of territory assigned to them in the process of partition. Actually, such a divided sovereignty is treated as transferred to these oligarchies and consumed in the form of their private property over the resources found on the given pieces of territory.
Thus, whereas sovereignty is elsewhere treated as generated by a contract signed by free individuals, who thereby constitute themselves as the people and sovereignty as their general free will, in Bosnia-Herzegovina sovereignty is treated as dissolved by a contract signed, under the auspices of international envoys, by its three major ethnic groups, renamed for that purpose as ‘constituent peoples’, who thereby construct only a provisional state structure with no declared or acting bearer of sovereignty. ‘Constituent peoples’ are perceived as the contractors who should presumably be represented on the basis of the principle of parity in the parliamentary institutions, on the levels of both state and its two ‘entities’ (Federation of BiH and Republika Srpska), and it is only their three wills that are taken into account, although even they are not treated as sovereign, either, but only as dependent on each other’s acquiescence.
Moreover, yet another part of the country’s divided sovereignty has been transferred to the so-called High Representative (a diplomat appointed by major international powers), whose will may reign supreme over particular wills of the oligarchies claiming to represent their respective ‘constituent peoples’. In this sense, as a part of the country’s Constitution, the High Representative comes closest to the notion of the sovereign, although in practice this person rarely exercises his will and imposes his decisions on the three oligarchies in question. Still, the position in the Constitution makes the High Representative irremovable from the country’s legal structure, in spite of the permanent efforts of the three ethnic oligarchies to eliminate this potential threat to their unrestrained power.
Yet, is such a multiple division and transfer of sovereignty truly a part of the Bosnian Constitution, or it is rather an arbitrary interpretation of the country’s constitutional structure by both foreign diplomats and local politicians? In the preamble of the country’s Constitution one can really find its sovereignty divided among several different categories, positioned as sovereignty’s bearers:
Bosniacs, Croats, and Serbs, as constituent peoples (along with Others), and citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina hereby determine that the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina is as follows.(The Dayton Peace Agreement, Annex 4, The Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina)
A similar formula can be found in the Washington Agreement (1994), which preceded the Dayton Peace Agreement (1995) and served as the basis for creation of the Federation of BiH, as one of Bosnia’s two entities:
Bosniacs and Croats, as constituent peoples (along with Others) and citizens of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the exercise of their sovereign rights, transform the internal structure of the territories with a majority of Bosniac and Croat population in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina into a Federation, which is composed of federal units with equal rights and responsibilities.
Here sovereignty is divided between Bosniacs, Croats and others – whatever their ethnic identity or a lack of identity – and they are all treated as possessing a double identity,first as constituent peoples and then as citizens of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. For, the form ‘constituent peoples (along with others)’ presupposes that ‘others’ – whatever their ethnic identity or a lack of identity – are also to be treated as ‘constituent peoples’, along with Bosniacs and Croats. By analogy, Bosniacs, Croats, and Serbs, along with Others, are to be treated as both ‘constituent peoples’ and ‘citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina’ in the Dayton Peace Agreement’s Annex 4.But who can actually be proclaimed the bearer of sovereignty on the basis of these two constitutional acts?
Following the modern theories of sovereignty mentioned above, if sovereignty is to be regarded as indivisible and if, accordingly, there can be only one bearer, then the bearer must be the citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina, acting as a whole. Then the ‘constituent peoples’ (Bosniacs, Croats, and Serbs, along with Others) are to be understood simply as the constituent elements of the whole, which cannot be treated as multiple bearers of sovereignty. And then the citizens may be represented in a unicameral parliament, founded on the principle of proportionality.
On the other hand, if we take sovereignty as divisible, the ‘constituent peoples’ maywell be regarded as its multiple bearers. Then, however, these ‘constituent peoples’ are not to be reduced only to Bosniacs, Croats and Serbs: the preambles used in both of these constitutional documents suggest that the category of Others is to be regarded as equal to the categories of Bosniacs, Croats and Serbs.
Constitution makers, obviously, had no clear answer to the question of sovereignty’s (in)divisibility in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina: instead of a formulation that would follow the principle of sovereignty’s indivisibility (for example, „Bosniacs, Croats, and Serbs (along with Others) as citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina“), they introduced the ‘constituent peoples’ as parallel to the citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina and thus proposed a form of shared sovereignty between the citizens and the ‘constituent peoples’. This shared sovereignty is reflected in the structure of the parliamentary institutions of Bosnia-Herzegovina and both of its entities: all the parliaments are bicameral, the lower chambers representing the citizens on the basis of election results in accordance with the principle of proportionality, and the upper chambers representing the ‘constituent peoples’ on the basis of the principle of parity.
Yet, even such relative consistency has ceased to exist in the practical implementation of these two principles. In the the upper chamber of the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the House of Peoples, the principle of parity is applied only to representatives of Bosniacs, Croats and Serbs (each represented with 5 seats), while Others are totally absent, as if they do not exist in the Constitution’s preamble among ‘constituent peoples’, along with Bosniacs, Croats and Serbs. In the upper chamber of the Parliament of the Federation of BiH, the House of Peoples, the principle of parity is again applied only to representatives of Bosniacs, Croats and Serbs (each represented with 17 seats), while the number of representatives of Others is arbitrarily reduced to only 7 seats, as if Others are not to be found among ‘constituent peoples’ in the Constitution’s preamble, along with Bosniacs, Croats and Serbs, and as if the principle of parity can be applied selectively or in some reduced manner. Similarly, in the upper chamber of the Parliament of Republika Srpska, the Council of Peoples, parity is applied again only to Serbs, Bosniacs and Croats (each represented with 8 seats), while Others are represented with only 4 seats, as if they have not been put into the category of ‘constituent peoples’, along with Serbs, Bosniacs and Croats. In other words, even if we theoretically accept the possibility that sovereignty may be divided between the ‘constituent peoples’ and the citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina, such shared sovereignty is in its constitutional implementation distorted to such an extent that only Bosniacs, Croats and Serbs are recognized as ‘constituent’, whereas Others are sometimes treated as partially constituent, with a reduced number of seats, and sometimes as non-constituent, that is, practically non-existent!
Obviously, when the principle of parity is applied in such a selective manner, it ceases to function as parity. Otherwise, Others would be represented in all these parliamentary institutions on the basis of parity, along with Bosniacs, Croats and Serbs. And then, it only means that Others have been permanently discriminated in the political reality of Bosnia-Herzegovina and that such a constitutional discrimination must be removed if the model of shared sovereignty is to be applied at all. If not, then full sovereignty must be given back to the citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina, regardless of whether they link their identity to any of its ethnic groups or not. And that has to be reflected in the structure of all its parliamentary institutions: the Houses of Peoples should be abolished and the parliaments should then become unicameral, so that only the citizens would be represented in the Houses of Representatives, based on the principle of proportionality and the principle one person/one vote. Of course, for that purpose the country should get a new constitution, adopted by its own Constitutional Assembly, instead of the one tailored in such an inconsistent (and theoretically problematic) manner by foreign diplomats as a part of the international peace treaty.
However, the international diplomats calling for „more proportional representation“ obviously do not distinguish between, and directly mix up, the principle of proportionality and the principle of parity. They assume that the House of Peoples in the Parliament of the Federation of BiH is based on the principle of proportionality, and ask for more proportionality, although it is clear that parity is its sole founding principle. For, political representation can either be proportional, reflecting the proportion of actual votes for actual political parties and candidates, or it can be based on parity, reflecting the parity between the constituent elements of the entire constituency (presumably, of the country’s population as a whole). As already noted above, it is the principle of parity in the House of Peoples that has been violated by under-representation of Others: while Croats, Bosniacs and Serbs are all represented with 17 seats in this House, Others are represented with only 7 seats. Yet, the diplomats do not pay any attention to this violation of the constitutional principle of parity. Instead, they suggest the Parliament to adopt even „more proportional representation“ in its upper chamber (which, in practice, can only be over-representation of one of the groups already represented in line with the principle of parity), so as to even further undermine its founding principle of parity, already violated by the existing under-representation of Others!
Such a legal absurdity is certainly unsustainable and can only lead to the total dissolution of the existing constitutional order in Bosnia-Herzegovina, already distorted by the abandonment of the principle of indivisibility of sovereignty and further undermined by the selective implementation of the principle of parity in the parliaments’ upper chambers. This brings us to a crucial point: either the parliamentary structures in Bosnia-Herzegovina will follow the logic of this request, abolish the existing provisional constitutional order and leave the country without any constitutional order whatsoever, or they will abolish this constitutional order and establish a non-provisional one, based on the principle of sovereignty’s indivisibility, reflected in a unicameral parliament, representing only the citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a whole, regardless of their ethnic identity or a lack of it.
It is up to the parliamentarians. They may follow the principle of sovereignty as applied in the rest of the European countries, or obey the diplomats’ request, whatever the price for the country’s constitutional order. As for the diplomats, whoever they are, one should finally ask whether they would ever apply in their own countries any of the models they advocate for Bosnia.
Do Angela Merkel and Germany have a joint future?
Many foreign media and even some German media people reported during the endless appearing process for finding a coalition 2017/2018 about a “governmental crisis”. This mostly due to the lack of knowledge these coalition talks being a defined process despite taking unusually long. Germany sure wasn’t able to take major decisions hurting especially Emmanuel Macron and his affair of the heart: the renovation of Europe. On the topics Europe and Foreign Policy, Germany steps on the brakes for many years now, therefore the result remains the same – little or nothing happens anyway.
The new German government is in operation since a few weeks now but there is trouble brewing afoot in Berlin. Unexpectedly, the right wing AfD is pretty quiet at the time.
The CSU remains the arsonist
Those who have hoped the CSU (the Bavarian sister party to the CDU of Angela Merkel) will concentrate on governing the country after the forming of the government are utterly wrong. With the elections ahead in Bavaria, Horst Seehofer wanted to gather his voters and attract those who have left CSU for the AfD with the powerful comment “The Islam does not belong to Germany”. He even doubled within this context by adding “People of Muslim Belief belong to our country”. Just like one could take his belief and values off before going out on the streets. It certainly appears Horst Seehofer is able to abandon his belief and Christian values scarifying them to preserve his own power.
If you look into the history of Europe and Germany – and therefore Bavaria – you soon will discover Horst Seehofer wants to make the pure opposite of history to become reality. Whether by ignorance or on purpose is hard to determine, however based on facts the Bavarian Blusterer simply is wrong – “fake news” might the right term. During the early Middle Age Arabs and the academic people from their countries brought an enormous amount of knowledge to the backwardly European countries. People actually have to thank the Muslims for the following flourishing or Europe. They benefitted from countless innovative products and a vast knowledge transfer from the Occident into the countless by monarchs oppressed, socially underdeveloped and by a faint educational system inhibited countries of Europe. A startling detail: the majority of the academics originate from Chorasan – an expanded Afghanistan – and Iran, namely from the former intellectual stronghold Bagdad.
Angela Merkel took a clear position, criticised and rectified Horst Seehofers statement – who received it thin-skinned but did no longer make such unqualified statements.
Settlements within CDU still not finished
Angela Merkel has many areas with the need for improvement within her own party, too. While the Chancellor tries to convey she has understood the vote and is working on improvements her Health Minister Jens Spahn is backstabbing her. It took him just three appearances – perceived by the people concerned as big-headed and ice-cold calculated arrogance – to destroy Angela Merkels recently planted crop of hope. “Hartz IV does not mean poverty” was his first statement causing backlashes from many sources but also support by those who do not like governmental interventions (Hartz IV is the German unemployed support and welfare system introduced by the SPD in earlier times and a constant annoyance since it does not cover the rapidly increasing cost of life). With his second appearance Jens Spahn talked against the liberalisation of the abortion law unveiling his lack of knowledge and tact. Just a few days later he wanted to comply with his promise to create 8000 new jobs in health care and wanted to speed up the homologation of education certificates of nurses and doctors from other European countries. Again, the Health Minister unveiled he is unprepared since today it already is impossible to convince more than 1000 nurses from EU countries per year to come to Germany – also due to the questionable working conditions and much too low salaries in Germany.The situation is critical since many German nurses and doctors leave for better jobs in other countries like Switzerland. Based on these facts counting on foreign nurses and doctors seems to be questionable on two levels: these people leave a vacancy in their home countries and the problem in Germany becomes the burden of the foreign workers – the question is how long this can be done. Even more problematic is the continuous decrease of the quality in nursing which gradually becomes life-threatening, particularly with cheap foreign workers. Voices rise Jens Spahn is pulling wool on people’s eyes.
Even CDU exponents oppose the young politician and reveal there’s much to learn for Jens Spahn. At least, with his thoughtless, unemotional and erroneous appearances Jens Spahn is keeping all these issues prominently on top of the agenda of the Grand Coalition.However, the local CDU parties and the local party members have not yet understood the troubles of the German society, thus their ignorance could become a bigger problem than expected. The CNT Alliance visited some Kreisveranstaltungen (party gatherings) of the CDU in first semester of 2018 and discovered the mostly elderly party members are interested only in issues securing their own wealth. Other issueswere just briefly touched by the politicians on stage.
All this is a bit more than a tendency towards right. Like the strategy paper presented the group “WerteUnion” (Union of Values) beginning of April with lots of criticism for Angela Merkel. With this paper the opponents request a re-positioning of the CDU from the middle towards the right and fiercely oppose Angela Merkels refugee policy. Within this conservative manifesto they request the “return to the core values” of the CDU. The main part of the manifesto focusses on the Islam and migration. Again, it seems much easy for the authors of this manifesto to leave their Christian values behind (refugees) and putting them back in the centre of attention (Family) by demand. It doesn’t come as a surprise Jens Spahn sending a greeting to the approximately 100 people of this manifesto.
Interest to enthuse new members and to focus on younger people or migrants does not exist – in the contrary: our questions regarding rejuvenating the CDU or to include new members originating from foreign countries were quietly, but definitely opposed even with some discomfort. It seems Angela Merkel does not recognize the “Small AfD” among their own people – or she tolerates them on purpose.
Little fuss from the SPD
The partner in the coalition, the SPD, did not stir issues up after they’ve started governing. During the coalition negotiations the SPD has secured the Ministries of Finance, Justice and the Foreign Ministry besides others, much to the displeasure of those people in CDU and CSU who were keen on these jobs as well. With these ministries the SPD owns quite some power and the ability to steer the government: an excellent success for the negotiators of SPD.
At the other hand the SPD remains in a fuzzy situation not just within its own quest for identity. Several representatives of SPD do not find common ground regarding the welfare programme Hartz IV. Some people around vice president Ralf Steger for instance want to replace Hartz IV knowing the programme was introduced by the SPD but also is the reason for the downfall of the party. At the other hand, the Finance Minister Olaf Scholz wants to keep Hartz IV – since it is some kind of his own child from the time he worked for Chancellor Schröder, the facilitator of Hartz IV. The designated president of the party Andrea Nahles rarely shy of some “Kick-Ass”comments is very quit despite the discussion about Hartz IV and the job market being the opportunity for SPD to position itself clearly. She commented Jens Spahn’s intentional slip geared towards media with surprisingly soft voice, but straight into the face. Horst Seehofe and Jens Spahn are after the personal representation but missing out on their duties, and adds: “The primary job of the Chancellor is to sort out the act of government”.
Angela Merkel is flagging
Over the past years Angela Merkel became the symbol for political stability and predictability. She is popular in Germany and abroad but scratches in the paint become visible. Her political style is increasingly perceived as boring and leaden even by her own people. Usually, watched from distance she acts successfully and well balanced even for extensive problems. Angela Merkel is the chancellor of compromises and subtle but also of half-hearted decisions and stalling in front of complex problems. This works fine at the moment since economy runs excellent and tax revenues are on a steady high – both causing additional problems which she isn’t regulating. This stability increasingly is perceived as stagnancy which it actually is e.g. if looked at the Digital Offensive launched by the government many years too late.
Along with a certain fatigue in society towards Angela Merkel – a phenomenon previous chancellor Kohl encountered too – and her style the many postponed “building lots” become visible. Media often simplify the situation and explain the fatigue towards Angela Merkel merely with her misjudgment in the situation with the refugees and her catastrophic and negligent management of this issue. This, however, is just a small part of the real reasons for the poor results of the elections and the steep head wind Angela Merkel is facing. It is the combination of various diverse issues such as the state of emergency in nursing, poverty among the elderly, housing shortage, low wages and this in combination with contemptuousness and ignoring several population groups, particularly those at the far right of the political spectrum. The situation with the refugees therefore is just one part of the picture – but one people easily can discharge their hate and anger. Also because of the right wing party AfD right wing ideas and right wing protesting became “En Vogue” – even the voters of CDU/CSU are going towards the right. In this climate the uprising hostility against the Jews in the German society and the anti-Semitic activities of the past month are not unexpected. The internal policy of Angela Merkel was meant to be visionary and creative but it looks more like uncertain, delayed, reactive, and unveils many large problem.
Rumble at the right
The “old” parties still underestimate the right wing AfD. The equally underestimate the potential of right wing populism and the count of German citizen having conservative/right wing thoughts – even within CDU and CSU. For example, much disregarded by politics the right wing union “Zentrum Automobil” gained six mandates during the last works committee elections in March 2018 at the Daimler (Mercedes) plant in Untertürkheim (Stuttgart) – with the result of 13.2% they achieved a similar result like the AfD during the election last year, the Bundestagswahlen. The “Forschungsgruppe Wahlen“ stated approximately 15% of the members of the politically social unions did voted for AfD instead for SPD during the last Bundestagswahlen. A result pretty much replicated during the works committee elections at Daimler.
The statements by some of the exponents of the works committee of the IG Metall union: right wing ideas today are little visible but are spread subliminal throughout the whole company and, therefore, it’s expected to see a further rise of the “Zentrum Automobil”. The confronted union IG Metall got us evasive responses only.It seems this issue is hushed up. Time will tell whether Angela Merkel tactics to sit such problem out are the successful tactics for the unions. Looking at the general tendency in the country towards the right we believe Angela Merkel and the unions both are playing with fire.
Some more foreign policy?
During the past Germany was known for a little consolidated, imprecise and often lacking foreign policy. Domestic policy always was more important and it still is. The country focuses on economic foreign policy driven by the industry and its lobbyists, and otherwise relies on symbolic policy geared towards the media.
This image could slightly change. One of the first official acts by Heiko Maas, the new foreign minister, was his visit to Israel. His predecessor Sigmar Gabriel several times acted awkwardly and Angela Merkel didn’t want to become involved but Heiko Maas clearly, pragmatically and quietly put down some counterpoints.On top of it he clearly took position against the lighting up anti-Semitism.
Despite his appearances sometimes being perceived as nicely stage-made he did not make his own life easier since expectations are high now. The quick and friendly meet up with the French foreign minister Jean-Yves Le Drian in Israel stirs up some hope Germany – after months of naval-gazing – finally will take over responsibility in Europe and the World. Moving from inactivity towards political creation with the friendly support by France.
The future of Angela Merkel
Foreign policy slowly picks up speed but Angela Merkel seems to have a hard time with her country. It no longer seems to be the Germany she knows. She seems to lose more ground contact the more she tries to understand the problems of society therefore losing more and more ground contact while facing fronts she has to fight. In the Bundestag CDU/CSU and SPD have to heavily deal with an number of parties, all of them having gained more than 5% of the votes. On top there is the AfD, the strongest party in the opposition owning an uncomfortable agenda – some of it even being attractive to her own party members.
With their vote for the Grand Coalition the SPD members have saved it and also saved the faces of SPD as well as the CDU/CSU. The SPD finds herself in a disruption and renovation process, even more so than the CDU. On top of it the parties of the opposition got stronger and this comes together with the incapability or the active reluctance of the governing parties to tackle the urging problems in the country in all consequence.
A forecast about the future of Angela Merkel and, therefore, of the German bipartisan system seems to be tricky. Though, the recent Grand Coalition steers towards the end of the factual bipartisan system in Germany. And people in Germany will be even more discontent for the next elections in 2021.The question how CDU/CSU and SPD will score is eligible. And whether the right wing AfD will establish itself as the third constant in the party landscape. The other question is whether the other parties will see the signs. Some media are singing the swan song for Angela Merkel forgetting she is not for nothing the most powerful woman in this world. It will be interesting to see how she will cope with the erosion on several fronts. It is not the end of Angela Merkel but she and her party are showing heavy signs of wear.
*Ajmal Sohail contributed to this article
Big mistake of EU against Washington
The EU is still confused! The U.S. government’s actions in the field of foreign affairs and economics have not been accompanied by strong and strong reaction from the European Union.
This has led the U.S. President Donald Trump to continue his efforts to isolate Europe in the international system more quickly. Since the beginning of the Tramp presence in the White House, the movements of nationalist and extremist groups and opposition to the European Union have intensified. That same issue has put the EU in jeopardy. It is widely believed that the President of the United States supports the collapse of the European Union and the euro- zone. However, it seems that some European officials still do not understand the deterioration of the situation in this region!
The fact is that if the European Union does not take a decisive decision against the United States and its policies in the international system, it will have to see its fall in the international system and the return to the twentieth century in the near future.
During the World Economic Summit in Davos, the Chancellor of Germany and the President of France both gave a significant warning about the return of nationalism and populism to Europe. This warning has been sent in a time when Far-Right movements in Europe have been able to gain unbelievable power and even seek to conquer a majority of parliaments and form governments.
In her speech, Angela Merkel emphasized that the twentieth century’s mistake shouldn’t be repeated. By this, the German Chancellor meant the tendency of European countries to nationalism. Although the German Chancellor warning was serious and necessary, the warning seems to be a little late. Perhaps it would have been better if the warning was forwarded after the European Parliamentary elections in 2014, and subsequently, more practical and deterrent measures were designed.However, Merkel and other European leaders ignored the representation of over a hundred right-wing extremist in the European Parliament in 2014 and merely saw it as a kind of social excitement.
This social excitement has now become a “political demand” in the West. The dissatisfaction of European citizens with their governments has caused them to explicitly demand the return to the twentieth century and the time before the formation of the United Europe.
But it seems that one of the issues that European leaders have not understood is the role of the United States in the process of destroying the European Union. This role is so high that few have the power to deny it: from the U.S. economic war with Europe to the direct support of the White House from nationalist groups in Europe. However, some European politicians still try to look at optimism about U.S. behaviors. Without doubt, this optimism will in the future lead to the destruction of the European Union.
Speaking at the Davos summit (2017), “Emanuel Macron” the French President warned of the victory of nationalists and extremists in Europe and said:
“In my country, if I do not make sense of this globalisation then in five, 10, 15 years time it will be the nationalists, the extremes which win — and this will be true of every country.”
The commonality of Merkel’s and Macron’s remarks is their concern about the return of European citizens to nationalism. As noted, this process has intensified in Europe. The extremist party of Freedom found way to the Austrian coalition government, and the increase in radical far-right votes in countries like France, Sweden and Germany, is a serious crisis in Europe. The recent warnings by the German Chancellor and the French President should therefore be seriously analyzed and evaluated.
But the main question is whether the French President and German Chancellor are aware of their great mistakes in the United States and the Trump government? Do they still ignore the White House’s role in strengthening extremist groups in the European Union? What is certain is that it is possible for Merkel and Macron to realize their deep mistakes over the Trump government that there is no longer a way to save the European Union.
First published in our partner Tehran Times
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