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Lebanese Parliamentary Coming Elections: A Gigantic Political Rivalry

Sondoss Al Asaad

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The Lebanese constitution stipulates that the parliamentary electoral process take place every four years; however, the political unrest during the recent years has delayed this election, rankling voters and galvanizing a campaign to change electoral laws. Per Lebanon’s constitution, it is committed that the president is a Maronite Christian; the prime minister is a Sunni Muslim and the speaker of the parliament a Shiite Muslim.In May 2018, Lebanon will hold its first parliamentary elections after postponing it several times since 2009.

The new electoral dynamic could significantly change the political calculus. This law has eventually granted the Lebanese immigrants their right to vote; has reduced the number of electoral districts in the country from 26 to 15 and has replaced the current plurality system with a system of proportional representation; increasing the sectarian diversity of MPs within each district.

Each of the eighteen religious sects, which the Lebanese constitution recognizes, the designations by which political seats are allocated, court foreign support. In response to Lebanon’s failure to condemn attacks on Saudi diplomatic missions in Iran following the kingdom’s execution of a Shi’ite cleric, the Saudis cancelled a three billion dollar aid package for the Lebanese army. Additionally, they increase the level of their aggressive threatening rhetoric anti Lebanon.

The expected election will take place after the consecutive political debates and since the former president; Michel Suleiman finished his term in 2014 without an agreement on who would succeed him. After two years of the presidential vacant, the Lebanese Politicians overcame the political deadlock in October 2016, electing General Michel Aoun as president.

In a televised speech, Hezbollah Secretary General, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah urged the Lebanese to effectively take part in order to get the largest electoral outcome. He asserted that the relative law allows people to take their natural size in contrast to the law of majority, stressing, “The great harvest that we have achieved in Lebanon has cost us dear blood and it is our responsibility to keep our country strong.”

Lebanon is considerably polarised because of the continuous political unrest, Zionist attacks, security drastic events and the impact of the Syrian civil war. With this situation, President Aoun would play an effective role in terms of implementing changes and reforms. Undoubtedly, he stores experience of having an ability to weave understandings, build national bridges, address diverse forces and demonstrate strong leadership to rebuild the state.

Analysts consider that Aoun’s impending election would be an immense victory for Hezbollah, in terms of its political allies as well as its position in Lebanon and a painful climb down for the Saudis after their disengagement with Lebanon since February 2018. This co-operation dates back to 2006 when President Aoun signed a formal agreement of alliance between his Free Patriotic Movement and Hezbollah. President Michel Aoun has consistently backed Hezbollah ever since.

The Lebanese electoral system has followed sectarian allocations, entitled ‘consociational democracy’, since the independence from French Mandate in 1943. Seats in both the parliament and the government are reserved for the 18 different religious sects’ representatives. This sectarian designation divides sects and prevents political mobilisation around specific issues. As a result, the interests of outside powers take precedence over the interests of Lebanese voters.

Addressing his followers,Sayyed Nasrallah further highlighted, “Your votes in favour of the Resistance’s candidates would preserve the blood of the martyrs who have fallen in the Resistance’s path especially amid the current direct US interference in the region.”

After the 2005 assassination of Prime Minister Rafik Al-Hariri, the Lebanese public was divided, either supporting the March 8 Alliance i.e. Resistance axis, or the March 14 Alliance i.e. anti-Resistance axis. Disagreements between these two groups at the very beginning intensified, and then subsided correspondingly with political developments.

Since the adoption of the new law, which is based on the proportional representation system, electoral experts confirmed that the distribution of seats among the political forces was almost conclusive. They emphasised that the “Shi’ite duo” Hezbollah and Amal Movement agreed that the sect’s parliamentary seats would be shared consensually. Such a deal means that Hezbollah and Amal would maintain additional parliamentary seats; particularly in the two districts: Baalbek/Hermel and Nabatieh/Bint Jbeil/Zahrani.

Amid the consecutive Zionist-American-Saudi failures in the region, analysts expect that the coming election, which many Lebanese are awaiting enthusiastically, might interrupt almost the nine years of stability.In the announcement of the electoral program for Hezbollah’s MPs and the Loyalty to the Resistance Bloc, the Secretary-general of Hezbollah Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah said, “Be careful there are American-“Israeli” exercises. There are developments in the region and the world.”

Mostly all Lebanese understand that the stagnant political status quo can undermine security in the long run due to the foreign blatant interference in the Lebanese internal issues. A robust debate and concerns remain heavily centred on security and the status quo. It is obvious that the Zionist Saudi American powers aligned with some Lebanese actors would react undesirably to any significant shifts in the Lebanese political scene.

Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah addressed his followers, “To the Lebanese, the upcoming parliamentary elections represent a serious opportunity for the Lebanese people to re-produce their national authority, benefiting from the state of stability and safety provided by the protection umbrella thanks to the equation of the army, the people and the resistance. The security presence in Lebanon is due to this equation. There is a dispute in the evaluation, but this is our opinion. There is a new electoral law based on proportionality in which we contributed greatly to its adoption. It will allow the Lebanese to better express their choices better and correct the parliamentary representation as much as possible.”

Analysts, further, assume that the Saudis could leverage the power and launch an economic boycott over Lebanon as they have done with Qatar. Sayyed Nasrallah expressed, “Everyone has come to realize that the country’s situation on the financial level has become dangerous. Thus, discussions were held that if we continue like this, will Lebanon become like Greece or not?” He added, “It is necessary for everyone to deal with the issue of fighting waste and corruption in all departments and institutions of the state that is linked to public money.” “The issue of fighting [corruption and waste] is an absolute national priority. We will commit ourselves and work on the basis of this priority in the coming stage,” Sayyed Nasrallah read.

Sondoss Al Asaad is a Lebanese freelance journalist, political analyst and translator; based in Beirut, Lebanon. Al Asaad writes on issues of the Arabs and Muslims world, with special focus on the Bahraini uprising.

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The Turkish Gambit

Dr. Arshad M. Khan

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The only certainty in war is its intrinsic uncertainty, something Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan could soon chance upon.  One only has to look back on America’s topsy-turvy fortunes in Iraq, Afghanistan and even Syria for confirmation.

The Turkish invasion of northeastern Syria has as its defined objective a buffer zone between the Kurds in Turkey and in Syria.  Mr. Erdogan hopes, to populate it with some of the 3 million plus Syrian refugees in Turkey, many of these in limbo in border camps.  The refugees are Arab; the Kurds are not.

Kurds speak a language different from Arabic but akin to Persian.  After the First World War, when the victors parceled up the Arab areas of the Ottoman Empire, Syria came to be controlled by the French, Iraq by the British, and the Kurdish area was divided into parts in Turkey, Syria and Iraq, not forgetting the borderlands in Iran — a brutal division by a colonial scalpel severing communities, friends and families.  About the latter, I have some experience, having lived through the bloody partition of India into two, and now three countries that cost a million lives.   

How Mr. Erdogan will persuade the Arab Syrian refugees to live in an enclave, surrounded by hostile Kurds, some ethnically cleansed from the very same place, remains an open question.  Will the Turkish army occupy this zone permanently?  For, we can imagine what the Kurds will do if the Turkish forces leave.

There is another aspect of modern conflict that has made conquest no longer such a desirable proposition — the guerrilla fighter.  Lightly armed and a master of asymmetric warfare, he destabilizes. 

Modern weapons provide small bands of men the capacity and capability to down helicopters, cripple tanks, lay IEDs, place car bombs in cities and generally disrupt any orderly functioning of a state, tying down large forces at huge expense with little chance of long term stability.  If the US has failed repeatedly in its efforts to bend countries to its will, one has to wonder if Erdogan has thought this one through.

The Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 is another case in point.  Forever synonymous with the infamous butchery at Sabra and Shatila by the Phalange militia facilitated by Israeli forces, it is easy to forget a major and important Israeli goal:  access to the waters of the Litani River which implied a zone of occupation for the area south of it up to the Israeli border.

Southern Lebanon is predominantly Shia and at the time of the Israeli invasion they were a placid group who were dominated by Christians and Sunni, even Palestinians ejected from Israel but now armed and finding refuge in Lebanon.  It was when the Israelis looked like they were going to stay that the Shia awoke.  It took a while but soon their guerrillas were harassing Israeli troops and drawing blood.  The game was no longer worth the candle and Israel, licking its wounds, began to withdraw ending up eventually behind their own border.

A colossal footnote is the resurgent Shia confidence, the buildup into Hezbollah and new political power.  The Hezbollah prepared well for another Israeli invasion to settle old scores and teach them a lesson.  So they were ready, and shocked the Israelis in 2006.  Now they are feared by Israeli troops.   

To return to the present, it is not entirely clear as to what transpired in the telephone call between Erdogan and Trump.  Various sources confirm Trump has bluffed Erdogan in the past.  It is not unlikely then for Trump to have said this time, “We’re leaving.  If you go in, you will have to police the area.  Don’t ask us to help you.”  Is that subject to misinterpretation?  It certainly is a reminder of the inadvertent green light to Saddam Hussein for the invasion of Kuwait when Bush Senior was in office. 

For the time being Erdogan is holding fast and Trump has signed an executive order imposing sanctions on Turkish officials and institutions.  Three Turkish ministers and the Defense and Energy ministries are included.  Trump has also demanded an immediate ceasefire.  On the economic front, he has raised tariffs on steel back to 50 percent as it used to be before last May.  Trade negotiations on a $100 billion trade deal with Turkey have also been halted forthwith.  The order also includes the holding of property of those sanctioned, as well as barring entry to the U.S.

Meanwhile, the misery begins all over again as thousands flee the invasion area carrying what they can.  Where are they headed?  Anywhere where artillery shells do not rain down and the sound of airplanes does not mean bombs.

Such are the exigencies of war and often its surprising consequences. 

Author’s Note:  This piece appeared originally on Counterpunch.org

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Could Turkish aggression boost peace in Syria?

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On October 7, 2019, the U.S. President Donald Trump announced the withdrawal of American troops from northeast Syria, where the contingent alongside Kurdish militias controlled the vast territories. Trump clarified that the decision is connected with the intention of Turkey to attack the Kurdish units, posing a threat to Ankara.

It’s incredible that the Turkish military operation against Kurds – indeed the territorial integrity of Syria has resulted in the escape of the U.S., Great Britain, and France. These states essentially are key destabilizing components of the Syrian crisis.

Could this factor favourably influence the situation in the country? For instance, after the end of the Iraqi war in 2011 when the bulk of the American troops left the country, the positive developments took place in the lives of all Iraqis. According to World Economics organization, after the end of the conflict, Iraq’s GDP grew by 14% in 2012, while during the U.S. hostilities the average GDP growth was about 5,8%.

Syria’s GDP growth should also be predicted. Not right away the withdrawal of U.S., French, British, and other forces, but a little bit later after the end of the Turkish operation that is not a phenomenon. The Turkish-Kurdish conflict has been going on since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire when Kurds started to promote the ideas of self-identity and independence. Apart from numerous human losses, the Turks accomplished nothing. It is unlikely that Ankara would achieve much in Peace Spring operation. The Kurds realize the gravity of the situation and choose to form an alliance with the Syrian government that has undermined the ongoing Turkish offensive.

Under these circumstances, Erdogan could only hope for the creation of a narrow buffer zone on the Syrian-Turkish border. The withdrawal of the Turkish forces from the region is just a matter of time. However, we can safely say that the Turkish expansion unwittingly accelerated the peace settlement of the Syrian crisis, as the vital destabilizing forces left the country. Besides, the transfer of the oil-rich north-eastern regions under the control of Bashar Assad will also contribute to the early resolution of the conflict.

It remains a matter of conjecture what the leaders of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Russia agreed on during the high-level talks. Let’s hope that not only the Syrians, but also key Gulf states are tired of instability and tension in the region, and it’s a high time to strive for a political solution to the Syrian problem.

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Turkey and the Kurds: What goes around comes around

Dr. James M. Dorsey

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Turkey, like much of the Middle East, is discovering that what goes around comes around.

Not only because President Recep Tayyip Erdogan appears to have miscalculated the fallout of what may prove to be a foolhardy intervention in Syria and neglected alternative options that could have strengthened Turkey’s position without sparking the ire of much of the international community.

But also because what could prove to be a strategic error is rooted in a policy of decades of denial of Kurdish identity and suppression of Kurdish cultural and political rights that was more likely than not to fuel conflict rather than encourage societal cohesion.

The policy midwifed the birth in the 1970s to militant groups like the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK), which only dropped its demand for Kurdish independence in recent years.

The group that has waged a low intensity insurgency that has cost tens of thousands of lives has been declared a terrorist organization by Turkey, the United States and the European Union.

Turkish refusal to acknowledge the rights of the Kurds, who are believed to account for up to 20 percent of the country’s population traces its roots to the carving of modern Turkey out of the ruins of the Ottoman empire by its visionary founder, Mustafa Kemal, widely known as Ataturk, Father of the Turks.

It is entrenched in Mr. Kemal’s declaration in a speech in 1923 to celebrate Turkish independence of “how happy is the one who calls himself a Turk,” an effort to forge a national identity for country that was an ethnic mosaic.

The phrase was incorporated half a century later in Turkey’s student oath and ultimately removed from it in 2013 at a time of peace talks between Turkey and the PKK by then prime minister, now president Erdogan.

It took the influx of hundreds of thousands of Iraqi Kurds in the late 1980s and early 1990s as well as the 1991 declaration by the United States, Britain and France of a no-fly zone in northern Iraq that enabled the emergence of an autonomous Iraqi Kurdish region to spark debate in Turkey about the Kurdish question and prompt the government to refer to Kurds as Kurds rather than mountain Turks.

Ironically, Turkey’s enduring refusal to acknowledge Kurdish rights and its long neglect of development of the pre-dominantly Kurdish southeast of the country fuelled demands for greater rights rather than majority support for Kurdish secession largely despite the emergence of the PKK

Most Turkish Kurds, who could rise to the highest offices in the land s long as they identified as Turks rather than Kurds, resembled Palestinians with Israeli citizenship, whose options were more limited even if they endorsed the notion of a Jewish state.

Nonetheless, both minorities favoured an independent state for their brethren on the other side of the border but did not want to surrender the opportunities that either Turkey or Israel offered them.

The existence for close to three decades of a Kurdish regional government in northern Iraq and a 2017 referendum in which an overwhelming majority voted for Iraqi Kurdish independence, bitterly rejected and ultimately nullified by Iraqi, Turkish and Iranian opposition, did little to fundamentally change Turkish Kurdish attitudes.

If the referendum briefly soured Turkish-Iraqi Kurdish relations, it failed to undermine the basic understanding underlying a relationship that could have guided Turkey’s approach towards the Kurds in Syria even if dealing with Iraqi Kurds may have been easier because, unlike Turkish Kurds, they had not engaged in political violence against Turkey.

The notion that there was no alternative to the Turkish intervention in Syria is further countered by the fact that Turkish PKK negotiations that started in 2012 led a year later to a ceasefire and a boosting of efforts to secure a peaceful resolution.

The talks prompted imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan to publish a letter endorsing the ceasefire, the disarmament and withdrawal from Turkey of PKK fighters, and a call for an end to the insurgency. Mr. Ocalan predicted that 2013 would be the year in which the Turkish Kurdish issues would be resolved peacefully.

The PKK’s military leader, Cemil Bayik, told the BBC three years later that “we don’t want to separate from Turkey and set up a state. We want to live within the borders of Turkey on our own land freely.”

The talks broke down in 2015 against the backdrop of the Syrian war and the rise as a US ally of the United States in the fight against the Islamic State of the PKK’s Syrian affiliate, the People’s Protection Units (YPG).

Bitterly opposed to the US-YPG alliance, Turkey demanded that the PKK halt its resumption of attacks on Turkish targets and disarm prior to further negotiations.

Turkey responded to the breakdown and resumption of violence with a brutal crackdown in the southeast of the country and on the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP).

Nonetheless, in a statement issued from prison earlier this year that envisioned an understanding between Turkey and Syrian Kurdish forces believed to be aligned with the PKK, Mr. Ocalan declared that “we believe, with regard to the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), the problems in Syria should be resolved within the framework of the unity of Syria, based on constitutional guarantees and local democratic perspectives. In this regard, it should be sensitive to Turkey’s concerns.”

Turkey’s emergence as one of Iraqi Kurdistan’s foremost investors and trading partners in exchange for Iraqi Kurdish acquiescence in Turkish countering the PKK’s presence in the region could have provided inspiration for a US-sponsored safe zone in northern Syria that Washington and Ankara had contemplated.

The Turkish-Iraqi Kurdish understanding enabled Turkey  to allow an armed Iraqi Kurdish force to transit Turkish territory in 2014 to help prevent the Islamic State from conquering the Syrian city of Kobani.

A safe zone would have helped “realign the relationship between Turkey’s Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and its Syrian offshoot… The safe-zone arrangements… envision(ed) drawing down the YPG presence along the border—a good starting point for reining in the PKK, improving U.S. ties with Ankara, and avoiding a potentially destructive Turkish intervention in Syria,” Turkey scholar Sonar Cagaptay suggested in August.

The opportunity that could have created the beginnings of a sustainable solution that would have benefitted Turkey as well as the Kurds fell by the wayside with Mr. Trump’s decision to withdraw US troops from northern Syria.

In many ways, Mr. Erdogan’s decision to opt for a military solution fits the mould of a critical mass of world leaders who look at the world through a civilizational prism and often view national borders in relative terms.

Russian leader Vladimir Putin pointed the way with his 2008 intervention in Georgia and the annexation in 2014 of Crimea as well as Russia’s stirring of pro-Russian insurgencies in two regions of Ukraine.

Mr. Erdogan appears to believe that if Mr. Putin can pull it off, so can he.

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