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South Africa’s Economic Hegemonic Imperatives in SADC

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South Africa is the current chair of SADC, and as such its leadership is of paramount interest. South Africa is also the gateway to foreign direct investment to the developing world. The country also holds the key for the success of SADC both at economic and political level. However, since 1994 Pretoria has only intermittently, and reluctantly so, demonstrated leadership in SADC. More than 24 years later, a majority of key institutions for regional integration are largely inefficient and the prospects for human development index are painfully blur. A number of factors were earmarked to comprehend the lethargic state of regional integration and development in SADC. These include the lack of political will amongst member states to integrate for development purposes, various levels of economic development and systems.

Retrospectively, since the achievement of a democratic state, South Africa earmarked Southern Africa as its foremost foreign relations priority. This relationship with the region is a delicate one for Pretoria as it has to fulfill its roles as regional, continental and global player. South Africa assumed the region’s responsibility as to address such issues as closer collaboration and economic integration and utilised the SADC as a vehicle to steer the developmental agenda of the region. Arguably, this has benefited the region since South Africa’s spotlight on the global arena helps intensify the regions potential in many aspects. Notwithstanding the fact that this has not always brought the desired results for the region and beyond. Subsequently, South Africa has, overtime, continued to isolate itself from the region and likewise the region may have also chose to isolate South Africa in its own dealings.  South Africa acceded to the SADC Treaty on 29 August 1994 at the Heads of States Summit in Gaborone, Botswana. This accession was approved by the Senate and National Assembly in September 1994.After joining SADC South Africa was given a sector responsibility for finance, investment and health. This was a decision that was formed by South Africa’s comparative advantage in this area. It is undeniable that South Africa is the most developed and advanced economy in SADC and on the continent of Africa. This position cannot be ignored if the possibility of regional integration is prioritized on the region and the continent itself. For this reason, it is perhaps essential to earmark the owing to its economic strength South Africa also holds the capacity to make or break regional integration within the SADC and the continent. Moreover South Africa can be described as the economic hub of the region.

Consequently, South Africa is often confronted with a crisis of trying to balance its domestic, regional and global interests especially with the rise of transnational cooperation’s including membership into the BRICS group of countries. Evidently, in the process the probability of conflict of interest is inevitable. On the other hand, the success of the SADC unequivocally rely on South Africa’s will to support and develop it as envisaged. SADC established the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan as a thorough guide to intensify integration. According to the 15 year plan, the key milestone are to reach a Free Trade area in 2008, Customs Union in 2010, Common Market in 2015, Monetary Union in 2016 and regional currency in 2018. The Regional Indicative Strategic Developmental Plan (RISDP) remains the strongest indicator of SADC’s desire for deeper integration with an objective of achieving a level of intra-regional unrestricted flow of goods, services and investment. The RISDP cannot be implemented without the support of the biggest economy of the region. SADC needs South Africa but the fear is that the same cannot be said of South Africa needing SADC.

According to Alde and Pere, South Africa’s biggest export market is SADC. This is often overlooked when surveying South Africa’s trade figures, the reason being that a great portion of South Africa’s exports to other countries are concealed within SACU. Evidently, the relevance of the SADC market to South Africa should not be underestimated. Since 1994 the South African government has regarded the Southern African region as the foremost priority of its foreign relations. To exemplify the prominence attached to this region, the first foreign policy document adopted by its democratic government was in fact a “Framework for Co-operation in Southern Africa” endorsed by Cabinet in August 1996. In terms of this “Framework”, the vision for the Southern African region is one of the highest possible degree of economic cooperation, mutual assistance where necessary and joint planning of regional development initiative, leading to integration consistent with socio-economic, environmental and political realities.

South Africa has taken a leading role in the region to address such issues as robust cooperation and economic integration. These include the establishment of a free trade area within the region, the development of basic infrastructure, the development of human resources and the creation of the necessary capacity to drive this complicated process forward, as well as the urgent need for peace, democracy and good governance to be established throughout the region. Nevertheless, history has proven that South Africa bullies its fellow member states within the region. South Africa opts to wield its economic power when negotiating with partners in both SACU and SADC. This oversight plays itself out in how some South African government officials view their regional partners. For example in response to questions about the consequences of the negative impact that an EU/SA Free Trade Agreement would have on its SACU member states. Former Director of Regional Economic Organisations within the South African Ministry of Foreign Affairs Willem Bosman maintained that, there is a need for a shock treatment that is necessary to fellow SACU member states. Bosman further maintained that SACU members are on their own, as South Africa would no longer provide for the 50% of their budget….”now you will have to tax your own people; you also have to work according to the structures of a free independent country”. The irony of this statement is that even if the new SACU agreement replaced the old agreement in 2002, SACU largely remains an apartheid-created relic, designed to ensure that South Africa would have a captive market for its agricultural and non-international competitive manufactured products. This economic dependency of the SACU states on South Africa was “part of a strategy to ensure that South Africa’s economic hegemony in Africa. If SACU states experienced economic deterioration as a result of the EU/SA Free Trade Agreement, who will buy South Africa’s non-international competitive manufactured products? By placing integration at the global level a priority, South Africa has always risked national and regional economic destabilization.

South African’s global integration agenda

In the interest, for many, South Africa has an urgent need to further integrate its economy into the world economy. This could also be at the expense of its SADC counterparts. Nevertheless, for South Africa to attract good foreign direct investment, therefore there’s an urgent need for South Africa be seen as an environment of peace and tranquility not just in South Africa but the region. Many global players who take interest in investing in Africa perceive South Africa as the gate way.  Nonetheless unfamiliar circumstances arise from the role played by external partners in the region, especially the EU and the USA. In respect of the EU, the outcomes of the Economic Partnership Agreements negotiations will fundamentally alter the peace and nature of regional integration in Africa. Other global players refuse to be side-lined. This was illustrated by the recent introduction of the China-Africa office in South Africa in March 2008. South Africa has to assume leadership in ensuring that the Zimbabwean problems are resolved since regional peace is important for the national economy of South Africa. Nonetheless, many have questioned South African former President Thabo Mbeki’s impartiality in the process. What this means is that there has to be a balance of interest between national, regional and global integration aspirations for South Africa.

Moreover, there are ways in which South Africa has attempted to integrate its economy in the world economy at the expense of its regional counterparts. It is also noteworthy to point out that this was inevitable in light of long term planning. The EU/SA TDCA agreement stabling a free trade areas demonstrate this phenomenon. South Africa become a signatory to this trade agreement with full knowledge that it would bare devastating impact on both the members of SACU and SADC. In light of the SACU, the agreement was endorsed without consultation without consultation with the other BLNS SACU member states. This was a precise disregard of the SACU Treaty that stipulates that such agreements must be approved by all SACU members. By acting unilateral, it is clear that South Africa is trying to monopolise/maximize these economic benefits for itself at the expense of the other members.

In light of SADC, the fear of EU goods flooding the regional market has been duly noted. This is because when EU goods have entered South Africa, it becomes relatively easy to have them anywhere else within the SADC region and Africa at large.  Evidently, this has undermined the agricultural and industrial sectors. A number of SADC states launched a complained that South Africa only became serious about completing the negotiations for the SADC FTA when it had completed negotiations with the EU. However, a few South African trade officials felt that the EU/SA FTA allowed them to become more integrated into the world economy, notwithstanding the fact that the consequences could also be severe for South Africa’s own economy.

A look at the TDCA agreement will show that South Africa has divided attention, with more emphasis place on the EU and not the SADC region. This agreement follows several aspects; strengthening dialogue between the parties, supporting South Africa in its economic and social transition processes, promoting regional cooperation and the country’s economic integration in Southern Africa and in the world economy, and expanding and liberalizing trade in goods, services and capital between the parties. The amount of loss of revenue is very high since SACU and SADC states will not be able to levy duties on the EU products. “Based on respect for democratic principles, human rights and the rule of law, the Agreement establishes a regular political dialogue on subjects of common interest, both at bilateral and regional level (within the framework of the EU’s dialogue with the countries of Southern Africa and with the group of the African Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries. The duration of the agreement is unspecified, but provision is made for its revision every five years of the date of its entry into force in order to consider possible amendments. The agreement covers a number of areas and includes a future developments clause making it possible to widen the field of cooperation”.

Concluding remarks

South Africa’s dominance in southern Africa, most prolific in the economic sphere, remains uncontested. South Africa accounts for about 60% of SADC’s total trade and about 70% of the regions GDP. The country is also within the region, the most diversified economy and thus critical to SADC’s drive towards developmental regionalism. Nevertheless, it is also true that a relationship of interdependence binds South Africa to the region. Moreover, in varying degrees, the economies of other SADC member states also benefit from employment opportunities, skills transfer, tax revenues and global linkages as a result of the business activities of South Africa firms.

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Africa

Global community must go beyond military cooperation to assist Africa

Kester Kenn Klomegah

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Russian Special Presidential Representative for the Middle East and Africa and Deputy Foreign Minister, Mikhail Bogdanov, has urged global community to go beyond military cooperation to assist African countries that are still facing a number of serious development problems particularly infrastructure, social inequality, healthcare and education.

According to Bogdanov, transnational problems, the issues of arms smuggling, drug trafficking, illegal migration and even slavery continue escalating on the African continent.

“Joint efforts of the whole global community are required for meeting those challenges, I am confident that the aid to African states should go beyond military components,” the Russian diplomat stressed.

“It is necessary to fortify public institutions, engage economic and humanitarian fields, construct infrastructure facilities, create new jobs,” Bogdanov said, adding “those are the ways of solving such problem as migration, for example, to Europe.”

Bogdanov was contributing to the panel discussions on the topic: “Engaging Africa in Dialogue: Towards a Harmonious Development of the Continent” at the Dialogue of Civilisations Forum that was held from October 5-6 in Rhodes, Greece.

This plenary discussion aimed at identifying specifically African countries’ priorities and issues holding back these countries and if competition between the West and Asia could benefit Africa, or is a more collaborative effort needed.

Bogdanov’s advice to the global community to go “beyond military cooperation” came at the crucial time when as part of the foreign policy, Russia has increasingly stepped up exports of military equipment through its “military-technical cooperation” abroad instead of assisting with needed investment in economic sectors in African countries.

Within the context of strengthening ties, Director for International Cooperation and Regional Policy Department of Rostec, Victor Kladov, said at the Business Forum of 2018 Army Games recently organised by the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation that “African countries are now returning to military-technical cooperation market as their national economies steadily develop.”

Rosoboronexport’s cooperation with traditional importers of Russian weapons from Africa include Algeria, Angola, Burkina Faso, Botswana, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Libya, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, Sudan, South Africa, Uganda and Zimbabwe. It has recently concluded agreements with a few more African countries.

In March, President Putin chaired this year’s first meeting of the Commission for Military Technical Cooperation with Foreign States and Kremlin’s website transcript pointed to the geographic reach of military technical cooperation as constantly expanding, with the number of partners already in more than 100 countries worldwide.

It’s an established fact that the major driver for Moscow’s push into Africa is military-technical cooperation more broadly. These often include officer training and the sale of military equipment, though the full details are rarely publicly available.

The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) reported in December 2017 that Russia accounted for nearly 20% of the volume of major arms supplied to sub-Saharan Africa.

The Soviets provided military assistance, a historically accepted view, but many experts have also acknowledged that now ideology is not a significant factor.

Dmitri Bondarenko, Deputy Director of the Institute for African Studies Institute (IAS) of the Russian Academy of Sciences, told me: “With African countries, the primary aim now for Russian business is to regain a competitive edge in the global arms trade, and what’s interesting is that the approach is not ideological but very pragmatic – you pay, we ship. It’s simply business and nothing more.”

“Russia has revived their contacts with their African comrades that used to be the traditional buyers of Soviet weaponry. It is a similar policy, in the sense, that they are using military diplomacy once again in order to gain stature and influence in certain countries,” Scott Firsing, a visiting Bradlow fellow at the South African Institute for International Affairs (SAIIA), wrote in an emailed discussion.

Arguably, Shaabani Nzori, a Moscow based Foreign Policy Expert, thinks that Russia’s military-technical cooperation with African countries is appropriate in Russia’s foreign policy but African leaders should also allocate enough money to spend on priority development projects in Africa.

“It shows clearly Russia’s weak business engagement with Africa. Until now, we can’t point to completed Russian infrastructure projects in Africa. There are many investment areas. What is important these days is Russia has to go beyond just selling arms to Africa! Still, Russia has the chance to transfer its technology to agriculture and industries in Africa,” Shaabani said in the interview discussion.

President Vladimir Putin said a major part of Russia’s weapons business includes new equipment supplies, upgrades and refurbishment of Soviet-era technology and hardware. “Russia places special emphasis on developing countries that gradually increase military procurement. We understand that competition in this sector of the international economy is very high and very serious,” he said.

According to Kremlin website, Russia targeted global export contracts worth $50 billion in 2018. Russia’s export priority is to expand its scope and strengthen its position on the market. Last year’s results indicated that Russia has been keeping its standards high, confirming its status as one of the leading suppliers on the global arms market. The portfolio for Russian arms and military equipment stands at $45 billion.

Russia plans “to enhance multifaceted interaction with African states on a bilateral and multilateral with a focus on promoting mutually beneficial trade and economic cooperation” – the full text of the new foreign policy concept was approved by President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin on February 12, 2013.

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France and China in Africa

Giancarlo Elia Valori

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A geoeconomic and strategic clash between China and France is currently emerging across Africa, with France supporting the United States in a new bilateral relationship, and China changing its economic penetration into the Dark Continent- in a new relationship with the Russian Federation.

Let us look at the main data and statistics: this year the African Development Bank has forecast a 1.9% growth in Southern Africa; a 2.2% growth in Central Africa and even 3.4% in Eastern and Northern Africa.

However, the trend is towards a slowdown in economic growth across the world – a slowdown that will be ushered in by the reaching and exceeding of the 100 US dollar threshold of the oil barrel price.

In fact, if we analyse the data and statistical series, the recent great economic and financial crises have been triggered by a significant increase in the oil price – that the West is facing with increasing difficulty.

Reverting to the focus of our analysis, in East Africa growth will be even 5.7%, the current highest rate in the world, apart from some Asian countries.

Africa’s development, however, has two sides – the side of the GDP growth and the equally important one of the increase in the external debt of many African countries.

An African indebtedness that mainly concerns China.

Here two very severe cases can be seen: in fact, in January 2017, Mozambique declared it could not to repay its foreign debt, due to a hidden debt incurred by its companies to the tune of 1.8 billion euros.

Furthermore, in August 2017, Congo had to revaluate its debt to 120% of its GDP (it was previously 77%) for similar reasons.

Hidden indebtedness is currently one of Africa’s plagues. It is currently worth 34% of the total African GDP. It is a debt mainly denominated in foreign currencies, often run up by unsavory and deceptive bankers, including members of Italy’s and other regions’ organized crime. This obviously favours China’s purchase of African companies that now cost a handful of rice.

In Nigeria, currently 60% of State revenue is used for servicing the public debt, with evident and foreseeable internal turmoil in the near future, considering that the Nigerian government has no reserves for productive public spending and for the necessary poverty mitigation policies.

In Ghana, the government led by Nana Akufo-Addo, who has been in power since January 2017, has taken on the debt piled up by its predecessors, which today accounts for 80% of GDP.

Also Angola, the second sub-Saharan oil power, is debt-ridden and is reducing extraction activities.

In Angola the debt is supposed to account for 90% of GDP and it is rising quickly.

As previously mentioned, China already holds much of the African debt.

It owns 70% of Cameroon’s public debt. This holds true also for Kenya.

Moreover, international banks inform us of the fact that between 2010 and 2014 the appetite for Chinese credit has increased by 54% throughout Africa.

A figure never reached by any developed country in banking and economic development relations with Africa.

Until 2017, however, the average of the African public debt was 45% of GDP.

Currently, however, according to the African Development Bank, at least 11 out of the 35 low-income African countries are considered to be at very high over-indebtedness risk.

For years the low cost of raw materials has been the trigger of the crisis, which will certainly become very severe in the phase of the “debt peak” which, in the case of Africa, is expected to materialize in 2021.

At the same time, however, some African States have begun to lend money to some emerging African countries, obviously at a rate higher than the rate granted to them. Countries that had no access to international credit.

And with raw materials that have been on the wane for long time, as well as a growing cost of manpower and the increase in internal political instability, caused by the crisis in public spending for a minimum level of Welfare State.

A debt spiral that has already enabled as many as 32 African countries to accept the unfair conditions of the private Funds for debt recycling, which acquire the securities at derisory prices and then resell them at a higher price to good European and American clients.

In 1996, however, the Ivory Coast, Ghana, Cameroon, Gabon, Rwanda and Kenya accepted the PPTE program of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund – the program for heavily indebted countries which imposed strict spending control on them so as to later enable them to return into the international credit mechanism.

The recipes are well-known: privatization, in the belief that the private sector is metaphysically better than the State one; heavy cuts in current spending, as well as reduction of spending on security and investments, including the productive ones.

As can be easily imagined, this has created a very profound crisis in the income of the poorest walks of society and has really annihilated the prospects for the young generations who, in fact, flee unreasonably towards the EU – or swell the ranks of the very strong exchange of manpower between the various African countries.

Currently the most indebted countries in Africa are South Africa, Sudan, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Ivory Coast, Nigeria and Kenya. Hence a continent already destroyed before being made sufficiently productive.

Ironically, many of these countries are also on the list of the richest nations in Africa: Egypt, South Africa and Nigeria–again in descending order.

France, however, has lost its traditional role as top investor in Africa.

Between 2015 and 2016, for example, China invested as many as 38.4 billion US dollars in the Dark Continent, while the second largest investor in Africa, namely the United Arab Emirates, reached 15 billion US dollars over the same period.

Italy, however, is the top investor among European countries, especially through ENI.

France ranks only sixth with 7.7 billion US dollars invested.

Meanwhile the Russian Federation is strengthening its traditional ties with Algeria and it is arranging a free trade area in the Maghreb region, with the Alawite Kingdom of Morocco at the core. It is also building nuclear power plants in Egypt and Southern Africa, with further exports of Russian grain to the poorest African countries.

Russia is also organizing peer cooperation projects in Equatorial Guinea, Burundi, Zambia, Uganda and Zimbabwe.

Areas that are less relevant to China or where there may be cooperation between China and Russia, with the latter interested in agriculture and oil and the former building infrastructure and operating on the market of the other raw materials.

China already owns 98% of the world’s coltan -i.e. the columbite-tantalite used for all commercial electronic devices – which can be found in the Central African Republic.

France’s exports to Africa, however, have almost halved in 2018 compared to 2000, falling from 11% to 5.5%.

In Senegal, French exports fell by 25% in 2017 – a loss that locally favoured Turkey, Spain and, above all, China.

Certainly the French-speaking Africa – linked to the CFA Franc – is a huge source of raw materials, with 14% of the world’s energy reserves and 22% of the world’s habitable areas.

Through the Africa using the CFA Franc, the French-speaking regions, which alone account for 4% of the world population, still account for 16% of world GDP and 20% of global trade in goods. France led by President Macron (but also France led by his more colourless predecessor Hollande) wants to create an autonomous common market – to be used also against an adverse EU – between the economy of the French Hexagon and the economies of the African French-speaking countries.

And this is precisely the point of geopolitical contrast with China.

China, however, still has many strings to its bow.

Last June, for example, Burkina Faso announced it had broken its relations with Taiwan to recognize only the People’s Republic of China.

The first step that China asks all its partners to take.

China also doubled US bilateral trade with Africa as early as 2013.

The beginning of the new relationship between China and Africa – after the “Three Worlds” Maoist theory in which, however, the People’s Republic of China became the leader of the Third World, after the two American and Soviet “imperialisms”-materialized after the Tiananmen Square protests and crisis in 1989, with a view to escaping the isolation imposed by the West (and by Russia which, at the time, had many problems to solve).

It should also be noted that many current African leaders have been educated in China.

Think of Joseph Kabila, the leader of the Democratic Republic of Congo, who studied at the National University of Defence in Beijing.

Or to Mulatu Teshoma, the President of Ethiopia, who studied philosophy and political economy with a PhD in international law at the Peking University, before continuing his studies at the Tufts University in the United States.

Or again to Emmerson Mnangagwa, the President of Zimbabwe, former student of the “School of Marxism” at the Peking University, who later spent a period of time in Nanjing studying combat training.

The current leader of Tanzania studied military engineering in China and then returned to the country in 1964.

Hence how is France responding to this? In July 2018 President Macron went to Nigeria -after having paid an official visit to Ghana – but he has the clear intention of gaining broad consensus not only in the old African French-speaking countries, but also in the English-speaking part of the Dark Continent.

The French President believes that also Africa is now “globalized” and hence he must go well beyond the old traditional perimeter of the so called Françafrique.

The concept underling the strategy of President Macron is no longer the traditional one of Françafrique, but rather that of AfricaFrance.

The offer made to the President of Rwanda, Paul Kagame, to become President of the International Organization of the Francophonie must be seen in this context.

From the African autonomous culture – which, according to President Macron, must be revitalized – to the recovery of the French economy and companies in Africa: the French market in Africa fell from 11% in 2003 to 5% in 2017.

Meanwhile China rose from 3% in 2001 to the pan-African 18% in 2017.

Even Germany has currently overtaken France in foreign trade with Africa.

Certainly the French President also wants his country to remain the “policeman” of Africa – as during the Cold War –  but he plans to confine his fight “to terrorism”, or more precisely to the sword jihad, in the Sahel region, which is and will be the future core of the French military presence in Africa.

Furthermore, President Macron intends to deal with business, thus limiting the security role played by France in Africa France as much as possible.

This is also the meaning of the increasingly important role that will be given to the G5 Sahel,i.e. the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel including Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Chad.

In short, according to its best strategic analysts, France wants to prevent future geoeconomic battles by preserving its global strategic role. Hence it wants to protect its old African colonies from the predatory and harmful effects of globalization.

This means that France tends to produce a new African “common market” between its economy and the developing economies if its old Françafrique.

Hence the recent France-G5Sahel military operations must be seen in this context: Operation Barkhane, which began in 2014 with 3,000 French soldiers, in addition to those of the G5-Sahel, based in ‘Ndjamena, the capital of Chad, as well as the Operation Serval aimed at ousting Islamic militants from the North of Mali, and Operation Epervier, a French counter-terrorist action between Cameroon and Chad.

The other two French military operations, namely Sangaris and Licorne – the former in the Central African Republic, which ended in 2016, and the latter a peacekeeping action in the Ivory Coast, replaced in 2015 by the “French Forces in the Ivory Coast” -were a relative success, but with a progressive support from the US African Command.

However, what about the CFA Franc, which is now a controversial topic inside and outside Africa France?

For some African Heads of State and Government, who obviously do not want to give in to China or to other new players in Africa, the CFA Franc “is a sound currency” and “does good to the African people”, just to quote the explicit words of Ivorian President Alassane Ouattara.

President Macron stated that the CFA Franc is “a currency that works and needs to be modernized together”.

It should be recalled, however, that France intervened militarily in Africa as many as 42 times from 1968 to 2013.

France will never give up Africa, but it has not the liquidity to really do so. China, too, will certainly not give up Africa and will never intervene militarily, if not directly hit, while investing massively in the Dark Continent.

Hence how will the CFA Franc be reformed?

It is easy to predict: with an increase of its value as against the Euro and new internal regulations governing the relations between France and the other African partners.

The French game in Africa will work until the Chinese economy slows down and hence there will be less Chinese capital to invest in Africa.

China, however, is already a net importer of semi-finished goods, as well as clothes and basic products from countries such as Ethiopia, while many African countries keep on importing high-value-added goods and capital for basic industrialization from China.

In Africa, China tends to replicate the same development as its development of the early days of the “Four Modernizations” phase.

Therefore, the most likely solution in the near future will be a concentration of French power on the G5 Sahel, with a parallel reduced role of France in the Eastern region of the Dark Continent.

While China will keep on expanding its influence in Africa, from the South to sub-Saharan Central Africa, up to Egypt and the Northern Atlantic Coast of Africa.

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Twenty Years of South Africa’s transition: An Economic and Foreign policy perspective

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Authors: Srimal Fernando and Siksha Singh*

South African has made a major transition from apartheid to democracy which is one of the most significant political occurrences of the past 20 years. The flag bearer of this movement was anti-apartheid crusader Nelson Mandela. Through his deep commitment to the cherished ideals of equality he introduced South Africa to the larger world. The nation’s vision on foreign affairs during this period was based on the tenet that human rights should be at the core of international relations. This period also witnessed the constitution of Truth and Reconciliation Commission to set in place the justice mechanism. South African constitution has also gone through many transformations post the political upheavals in the region since 1996.

Mandela‘s tenure from 1994 to 1999 was credited for its emphasis on economic growth through a framework of market economics and encouragement of foreign investment. The former President exercised active, determined leadership in the years following his consolidation of power. There had been sincere attempts to shift to democratic federalist system which had helped in improving the economic welfare of all communities. On the economic front the nation was transitioning from Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) Policy to Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GER) Policy. This policy accelerated the economic growth of the nation to 3.5%, led to creation of 400,000 Jobs and uplifted the Black Middle class.

Mandela was succeeded by Mebaki’s Presidency. His government was instrumental in establishing intra-continental trade with other African nations which resulted in national exports rising from ZAR 8.6 Billion in 1994 to ZAR 38.8 Billion in 2003 which was a 300% increase. Mebaki’s regime was known for quiet diplomacy; however South Africa’s leadership among African nations was making new strides. The leader’s key emphasis was on finding solutions to Africa’s problems such as reducing poverty levels and helping in establishing stability in African states. However his foreign policy was criticized for the refusal to express disapproval of Zimbabwe’s President Mugabe’s authoritative rule and gross neglect of human rights abuses. The pursuit of economic development at all cost had implications for the political complexation of the Mebaki presidency as well. Former leader therefore wished the country’s performance to be measured in terms of its acceleration of economic change.

Zacob Zuma succeeded Thabo Mebaki and his economic policy shifted from Mandela’s Growth, Employment and Redistribution to a new macro-economic policy which provided social assistance to 17 million South Africans and ZAR 120 Billion a year on infrastructure projects like Roads, Railways, Ports and electricity supply. During his presidency South Africa also got the distinction of the number one country in the world for extending maximum subsidy for housing. South Africa also became a part of BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa)in 2011 and helped in laying the foundation for BRICS Development Bank in Johannesburg. The country got the chair of IORA (Indian Ocean Rim Association) and BRICS since 2017.

The appointment of former Vice-President Cyril Ramaphosa as South Africa’s President can be seen as a period achieving stability and taking significant steps towards consolidating its economic and social status in the next four years. His policy formulation is vastly different from his predecessors. South Africa’s perception of foreign relations has remained fairly consistent since the time of late President Nelson Mandela and current President has been the most successful in combining creativity and collaboration with numerous regional groupings taking a lead on matters of foreign policy. The countries GDP per capita over the last twenty years has grown from 3,447$ in 1994 to 7,524$ (World Bank, 2017).The growth however has been inequitable due to the high rates of unemployment which was estimated to be around 26%.(Statistics office, 2017).The government recently set the vision for 2030 which is Quality basic education, decent employment through inclusive economic growth and Vibrant, equitable and sustainable rural communities contributing to food security for all. Changes in South Africa’s social structure during the past decades are insufficient to explain the policy changes that took place during Mandela’s period. Transforming the democratic leadership in South Africa was a process of what’s called dismantling of the old system in a way that simultaneously creates a new foundation for a political system that will lead South Africa to new heights. Nevertheless there are things that draw these leaders together as the political economy of South Africa has found a stable equilibrium with less than maximal redistributive taxation. The desire to preserve South Africa’s status as a global and a continental power will require small steps beyond the presidency.

*Siksha Singh, a scholar of Masters in Diplomacy, Law, International Business at Jindal School of International Affairs, India

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