As Leonardo da Vinci used to say: “If you are alone you belong entirely to yourself. If you are accompanied by even one companion you belong only half to yourself”.
Later, in the positivist era, Gustave Le Bon – in his Psychology of Crowds developed a concept whereby the crowd weakens all the individual’s rational abilities.
The crowd unleashes the Id, destroys the Ego and makes the unconscious prevail in history.
Also Freud – in his Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego” – shared that approach.
Benito Mussolini was said to have a copy of Le Bon’s book on the nightstand, while Eduard Bernays, Sigmund Freud’s nephew, created advertising and modern public relations in the United States. It was the same great country where,as the George Washington pulled him into New York Harbour, Freud supposedly remarked to Carl Jung, who accompanied him, “They do not realize that we are bringing them the plague”.
The assumption of Bernays and of the commercial and advertising public relations he created is still the positivist one: to create a feeling of pleasure (or self-esteem) and then connect an object, a role, a person or a symbol to that same perception of pleasure – in such a way that, as Pavlov taught us, the human brain can do without the real object and is activated anyway when a sign or a symbol is triggered off.
In fact, contemporary society is the one that has raised the symbol to the rank of primary object of the exchange, the Ersatz, the symbolic substitute, which is much more sold and valued than the real object.
This is the reason why politics has currently taken up the same methods as marketing and advertising. Indeed, it is currently pure commercial communication and distribution of substitutes.
In fact, Bernays used to say that for his professional practice in the US companies he had used both his uncle Sigmund’s theories and Le Bon’s psychology of crowds, as well as the “conditioned reflex” theory of Ivan Petrovic Pavlov, who had won the Nobel prize in Medicine in 1904.
Currently, however, the situation is very different: the political and commercial messages are too many to be perceived according to the typical advertising criteria, while the signals of the ruling class and politicians are all processed according to the same paradigm.
This further confuses the end user of the message, of the sign created by mass communication.
Being recognizable in the emotional marketing arena has become very difficult.
As De Saussure taught us, a sign is composed of an inseparable link between signifier and signified.
Currently political communication tends to change the signifier by artificially maintaining the original meaning.
As said by Neuliep, one of the most interesting experts of mass habits in our time, culture provides the aptitudes and general attitudes that prompt behaviours.
Hence all contemporary cultures are like icebergs: a small visible part, and a shadow area accounting for almost nine-tenths of “culture”, but obviously in the anthropological sense of the word.
Deep values are the hidden part, the data that unconsciously rationalizes behaviours.
Hence, using the terminology of “affective contagion”, “culture” is the collective programming of the mind.
Marketing, the psychology of Public Relations (PR), always comes from a cultural context and expands its limits, by confirming the socially good behaviours (i.e, those “within” the cultural group) and punishing those that push us outside the group.
This means that the “bad” behaviours are those which deviate from De Saussure’s artificial link between signifier and signified of a cultural value.
In the analysis of advertising and public relations experts, however, modern cultures are divided according to some standard models, which also apply to the individuals belonging to very different cultures at social and geographical levels.
There is the model of “distance from power” or that of the contrast between “individualism” and “collectivism”. There is also the clash between masculinity and femininity and finally the concept of “aversion to uncertainty”.
Furthermore there is the dimension between dynamism and long-term orientation.
Whoever can play this keyboard of original and culturalized feelings well together has the destiny of peoples in his/her hands – more or less like the Pied Piper of Hamelin who mastered the fate of the children who followed him attracted by the music he played.
Hence if the key to change behaviour is the pre-rational one – from Le Bon to contemporary marketing – emotional contagion is defined as the ability to influence the others’ feelings and behaviours directly or indirectly.
While commercial and political advertising and communication have always been characterized explicitly in relation to the context of each culture, emotional contagion tends to change the mass of the cognitive iceberg which is below sea level.
Emotional contagion eliminates the separation between marketing and politics, between politics and affective and private communication, between the symbols of the Ego and those of the group.
As also Charles Darwin maintained, at evolutionary level emotional contagion serves to synchronize our emotions with others’ and to express our primary needs, which are processed by the limbic system and by the hippocampus of our brain.
Furthermore, if we study some current mass political phenomena, in addition to the rallies and demonstrations already studied by Le Bon, we can better understand the issue.
The “Arab Springs”, in fact,were a political model in which feelings played a primary role, far beyond the classic and now outdated contrast between “reason” and “emotion”.
In that context, the Arab masses’ motivations were based precisely on the classic elements of the emotional system, namely fear, anger and pride.
Fear of repression, anger for the predictable reaction of the Authority, namely the wounded or symbolically dead Leader, pride for being the only ones who know the Truth.
A model that applies to all revolutions, regardless of their being political, violent or symbolic and all played on communication.
These are the three categories that differentiate a new “culture” from the old one, and which define the new group – in terms of values – compared to the original one of each single member of the “revolution”.
As the astronomical origin of the word suggests, revolution is a return and a new beginning. It is the end of time and Paradise Lost at the same time.
Hence each revolutionary culture presupposes its own reference group as a “paradise” – to use the current definition of the Egyptian young people in Tahrir Square during the insurgency against Mubarak.
Today, however, the emotional entrepreneur – as some scholars call him – tends to influence the emotions that shall be popular and to later set the moment in which they arise, as well as to finally control the way in which they are expressed.
The techniques for regulating emotions concern the management of duration, magnitude and efficacy of mass emotion.
There are three types of emotions, namely the subjective, the group and the collective emotions.
Every political actor – especially in the sphere of foreign policy – is an engineer of mass emotions.
How can we manipulate emotions?
It is not difficult: in a first phase the situations in which you can find masses are selected.
Stages, side events, serious or happy news about which everyone talks, and obviously television – what you choose to communicate in the first place.
The issue mainly lies in avoiding the meeting or comparison between a political proposal and the opposite one.
This must be done not through pseudo-reasoning, but through objective situations that avoid contact with the Other.
There is also the change of situation, namely the time, location and the aesthetic and symbolic aspects of the meeting.
Here the feel good factor comes into play, the “paradise” about which the young people of Tahrir Square talked.
The situation must be fully emotional, while the leader, the emotional operator, enhances the positive emotions and puts the fears or emotions generated by his/her opponents aside.
When the perfect emotional situation is reached, the emotional entrepreneur creates a new direction to which people’s attention must be directed.
Once done it, a “cognitive change” of the candidate or of the party needs to be developed, so that people perceive them as “different” and alternative, with a view to later changing the emotional impact of the leader chosen.
A good “emotional” politician modulates the response, by changing the perceptive situation of that moment to emphasize the characteristics that should be more interesting for voters and groups.
In fact, voters behave differently based on their different emotional states.
The study of many presidential election campaigns in the United States has led to currently identify some categories that prompt voters’ emotions – and we have already partially mentioned them.
They are anger, fear, enthusiasm, pride and compassion.
Anger and Fear rarely work well, especially on television; Enthusiasm always works well, while Pride and Compassion depend on the acting ability of the politician, who is the emotional entrepreneur par excellence.
As we may easily remember, this happened in the Balkan wars, with all the local parties on the field that managed only Fear and Anger together, by trying to divert them towards the Enemy.
Indeed, without an Enemy, there is no politics -in fact, politics is war by other means.
The “cognitive change”, which is used to select the useful feelings for the leader, is mainly a technique to weaken negative emotions.
The anxiety generated by the proposed changes, however, can be manipulated by the opponent, as well as exaggerated and changed in order to make the leader under attack less reliable and less “mythical”.
With a view to avoiding this situation, the emotional entrepreneur can deny the opponent’s claims or make them marginal.
The classic techniques are the following: to declare oneself to be the target of “injustice”; to create a new identity of the emotional group and to develop new symbols.
In the past, affective reactions were evolutionarily useful.
In fact, they served to attract the attention of every member of the species to a cataclysm or to a new existential threat (a political theme, even today).
Moreover, according to some economists, the immediate reaction catalysed by emotions served to immediately communicate to everyone the real size and relevance of the problem and hence established immediate collaboration among individuals.
This means that the emotional contagion is very similar to financial contagion: we take our investment away from company X, thus waiting for everyone to follow suit.
Fear drives us, but all the feelings and emotions we have at that moment never depend on the amount of real news we know.
If politics is manipulated feelings and sentiment, there is no objective data that can change a behaviour.
In this respect, if we look at the Italian and European immigration policies, we can confirm our model: fear, fear of the Other; other EU Member States’ behaviours; identity building based on pride and finally creation of a new collective imagination, be it immigrationist or contrary to the “invasion” from the South.
Or we may also accept the perceptions – disguised as thoughts – of some market actors who have already conquered a role, prestige and power.
It happens in financial crises and also in the political arena, which now imitates the dialectic between economic forces on the “market”, regardless of its being financial or political.
Hence we can sum up by saying that the emotional contagion stems from the Leader’s figure and symbolic ability, as well as from the narrative he/she proposes, which builds an imaginary world, just like a novel, and finally from the amount of support for his/her project.
A Leader is such only with a group, and the other way round.
The size of the group, however, always determines the Leader’s power.
Another aspect not to be overlooked is that – both in the case of old-fashioned politics and of current propaganda through social media – the symbolic relevance and the evocative power of a fact are essential, at electoral level, for using that fact as propaganda.
Nevertheless the evocative and symbolic power is built ex post and it is not present in the fact itself.
Currently, however, the Leader is – in himself/herself – a critical and endangered factor.
The slogan “One is one” is the current dogma of all contemporary politics, not of a single movement.
If it is only a matter of prompting emotions and symbols, there is no need for the rational development of political discourse- hence all elites die and every “citizen” is the place of all powers.
Not even Rousseau would have gone that far.
Therefore, nowadays,we need propaganda politics that follows the old criteria, but eclipses the Leader, by making him/her polymorphic and devoid of apparent identity.
Today the Leader is like Shakespeare’s Macbeth, a man full of ambitions but dominated by very strong dark and evil powers, who fulfils his destiny while the infernal prophecy of the three witches comes true:
“And oftentimes, to win us to our harm,
The instruments of darkness tell us truths,
Win us with honest trifles, to betray’s
In deepest consequence”.
This was stated by Banquo in Macbeth, but any skilful political analyst could say so.
A new approach to information management
The American people, both directly and through their representatives, are more focused on organizing and conducting the work of intelligence agencies than ever before. Because of intelligence operations play an important role in life and security. From the September 11, 2001 incident, terrorism and weapons of mass destruction are debates that are constantly being raised in American families.
Not surprisingly, there are suggestions for the transformation of organizations and the US intelligence system beyond the public awareness. Foreign countries are demanding this, and many people inside the country also need to understand such a change. Many of the organizational methods and structures that have proven successful over the years have failed in some cases, especially in the September 11 incident, and have provided enough information to the United States in dealing with Saddam Hussein’s weapons designs in Iraq. They did not set up the country.
Information managers and many other people who are involved do not agree with such changes. They often prefer to deal with marginal issues because information is every day and it is time consuming to make such changes. In 1986, Casey, former head of the CIA, created a counterterrorism center. He believed that the center created the necessary coordination in design and operation, and analysts were working in the immediate vicinity of the operators, but many of the old members of the CIA and intelligence operations threatened their place and those under their control. They knew even years after the establishment of the anti-terrorist center, there has been tension between the function of the center and other elements of the organization.
The CIA, after receiving adequate guidance from the military, should provide an official mechanism for post-operative investigations. A review of human gathering about Iraq should include the history of that program, the selection of personnel for it, the targeting of Iraq and the recruitment of people and benchmarking it for deployment and operation.
Such a “post-operation” review should not undermine the level of shielding, accusing, defining or denigrating anyone. It should also be ensured that managers and leaders discuss important goals such as Iran and North Korea, systems for designing breakthroughs, tools for deploying a framework for spy operations based on accurate surveys and information to adjust the plan to maximize the quality and ensure optimal operations. Other human resources managers should have a summary of the methods that have been effective in reducing the failure rate. Really important operational information should not be compromised in this way.
Managers and information leaders should work on re-use of “post-operation” formal surveys, planning, recruiting, training, recruitment, assessment and promotion of their staff. In many cases, the development of such systems is not required by law. The system needs to be explicit, honest and accurate, and also requires a co-operative work force. This system examines the need for a foreign country in order to increase the success of a successful business person, not a business, policy or training consultant in a team. Such a foreign country has a new perspective and can ask questions that do not come to the minds of others.
A commitment to using the best results in these reviews is essential. The US government and politics are eager to face a crisis and failure to design new policies or seek quick solutions and examine the issue. In any organization, it’s difficult to transfer funds from steady plans to creative and new ones. Especially in the US government, the fundamentals of the country’s budget are old and weird. Every year the congress and executive branch decide on budgeting for personnel, logistics, operational programs and infrastructure – they decide to continue the same or increase it with a slight change. When the management of the organization, the budget and congress organization agrees with the operational plans, then they will be licensed and funded. It is difficult to compete for the new budget, but basically the competition between the initiatives takes place, not between the new plans and the fixed plans.
One of the hallmarks of CIA operations is the development of creativity. Creative leaders and officers will identify problems and provide solutions, But spending too much on new creativity, regardless of cutting or cutting out budgets. The “stirring up” of something in the database is hard and frustrating. But when all US intelligence facilities are under investigation and new threats, they must be shuffled.
Spying, human gathering and other programs will never be fully realized. Because of this is the nature of the world of information. The only thing they guarantee is that their performance in the context of informing policymakers and military and operational commanders emphasizes the quality, accuracy, accuracy and utilization of the best available technical and human-coordinated programs.
Trends in the Spread of Radical Islam in Africa: The Case of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
Authors: Galina Sidorova and Natalia Zerlitsina*
Islamic radicalism and extremism are perceived around the world as a major threat to international security. The Islamists started developing terrorism and took it to a global level. Today, perhaps, there is no continent where this problem would not be acute. This is the standpoint of scientist D. V. Trenin who presents his reasoning in the article Traditional and New Security Challenges in International Relations [Trenin 2015: 138]. Indeed, one could easily agree with him.
In recent times, intrusion and spread of radical Islam has become evident in African countries, where, as it is, the problems of national and continental security have not been solved due to the never-ending armed conflicts. The most prevalent Islamic groups in sub-Saharan Africa are the Wahhabis and the Muslim Brotherhood. Other widespread groups are the Sheikh Balala sect in Kenya with an active subdivision in Zimbabwe, the Sunni Muslim Association in Cote d’Ivoire, the People against Gangsterism and Drugs, and the Islamic Jihad in the Republic of South Africa (the RSA). In Nigeria, the greatest danger is posed by the Boko Haram extremist organization imposing the Shariah laws and extirpation of the Western lifestyle; in Senegal — the Al-Falah Movement for Salafi Islamic culture; in Burkina Faso, there is Jama’at Ahl al-Sunnah al-Muhammad; in Somalia — Al-Shabaab and Jihad al-Islamiyya, the radical wing of the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (headed by Oumar Ould Hamaha); Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, that seized control over the northern territories of Mali and, in October 2012, was holding 9 European citizens as hostages, 6 of whom were French [Kemal 2015: 156].
The revivalists’ backbone is not only Islam coming from Arab countries of the East and the Maghreb. The African reality has seen some examples of religious extremism conceiving in the depths of the African society itself. These are various sects and groups primarily calling attention of disadvantaged population of the country, striving for a better life. They all differ in terms of dogmatic principles. Although the majority of them are constituted by Sunni Muslims, in a number of countries there is also the Shia minority (notable for bravery in combat, no fear of death, belief in afterlife), which is also influential due to the financial, organizational and moral support of Iran. The influence of Shia revivalists is apparent in Nigeria, Senegal, Kenya, Cote d’Ivoire, Mali, and the RSA.
It should be noted that the term “Islamic revivalists,” which is most often associated with terrorism did not always bear this negative connotation. If we look back in history, we will see that it entered the political lexicon in the late 1970’s/early 1980’s, after rise of the anti-Shah regime in Iran. Russian diplomat and orientalist A. I. Vavilov asserts that “it is not always justifiable that Islamic revivalism is applied to fairly broad, vague and, in many respects, motley religious-political movement standing for return to the “original, radical values of Islam” (not incidentally, the Arabic word for “revivalists” means “radicalists”) [Vavilov 2009: 229]. Another scientist, Africanist A. D. Savateyev, maintains the position that Islamic revivalism is far from the national spirit, although it “incorporates a range of diverse outlooks from the spiritual and religious point of view, and reflects the interests of various social strata and sentiments of many categories of Muslims” [Savateyev 2006: 201]. He mentions the following classification of Islamists. The first category is focused on the intrinsic values of eternal order — justice, equality, and fair work in accordance with Koranic precepts. The second category does not follow the rules and regulations of the “true” Islam and appeals to the brothers of the religion with proposals to follow the prophetic directives. The third one goes beyond the “brothers” circle and seeks to impose its standards of behavior upon adherents of other confessions. The fourth category of the Muslims includes representatives of secular intellectuals, merchants; it stands for connecting Islam to the government, and, in fact, for the re-establishment of a theocratic state. Although, the views of the adherents are far from being identical in this case. The fifth category of the revivalists is the armed jihad, manifested as achieving the goal (creation of a unified Islamic religious and political entity) by any means including the fight against “expansion” of Christians and reprisal against infidels. The basic features of the moral portrait of the revivalists’ extremist wing are cynicism and resentment aimed at breach of native African values. According to the ideology of Islamic extremism, a Muslim is merely obliged to fight the non-Muslims, that is, to conduct armed jihad. [Savateyev 2006: 230].
Study of penetration of Islam and its implications to one of the Central African countries — the DROC — provides a visual representation of the topic addressed. In the DROC, Islam has been recognized relatively recently, though islamization of the country, advancing from the east of the DROC, had been known as early as before the arrival of the Portuguese to the continent (1482). In March 1972, the President of Zaire Mobutu Sese Seko issued Decree 72/194 on the foundation of the Islamic Community of the Republic of Zaire (COMIZA), which later transformed into the Islamic Community of the DROC (COMICO) [Cheik Ali Mwinyi…La Référence plus. Kinshasa 2014: P. 2]. This organization is officially recognized and unites only a part of the Muslim community in the DROC. Besides COMICO, there are other Islamic organizations acting “on a private basis”. In March 2014, from among 12 contenders for the post of the Head of the Islamic community Mufti Sheikh Ali Mwini Mkuu was elected to a 5-year term — a politically literate, well-educated person maintaining an active position in the subregional, continental and international organizations [Les musulmans de la RDC…L’Observateur. Kinshasa 2014: P.11]. Wide connections and communications with regional and international colleagues enable the Mufti to collect information, “keep his finger on the pulse”, and control the situation in the country.
In 2012, the Islamic Community of the DROC launched the programme “Peaceful Settlement of Conflicts, Administration and Efficient Governance,” with the view to train representatives in the provinces of the country. The initiative involved 48 regional committees and 288 Islamic centres, which employ about three thousand activists. According to the Deputy Chairman of the Islamic Community of the DROC M. Seto-Bagoni, who is in charge of legal issues, trained specialists will provide indispensable support to the DROC Government in establishing peace and supremacy of the statute law across the country. In the provinces, Congolese people are also provided with the necessary legal, expert, and advisory assistance to settle the internal political situation in the Republic. With the assistance of local, regional and international sponsors, about USD 130,000 were allocated for the implementation of the Islamic Community’s project.
It should be kept in mind that the role of religious denominations in the social and political life of the DROC, taking into account the deep piety inherent in the Africans, is extremely high. The dominant position is held by Catholicism, which is practiced here by more than 50% of the 80 million population, and by Protestantism as its branch — 20%. This data identifies the DROC as the largest Catholic country in Africa and draw special attention to Kinshasa from the Vatican. The National Episcopal Conference, declaring its position on key issues of domestic and foreign policy on a regular basis, demonstrates significant interest in this region. Catholic structures, traditionally involved in political processes, occupy senior positions in the government. For example, Abbot Apollinaire Malumalu has been elected as the Chairman of the Independent National Electoral Commission twice — in 2006 and in 2013. Religious leaders mediate the processes of settlement of the Eastern crisis, coordinate the provision of humanitarian assistance, and offer a wide network of higher and secondary educational institutions.
Afro-Christian syncretic sects (especially Kimbanguism) also have numerous congregations in a number of provinces, and, according to their postulates (chosenness of the Africans and etc.), are characterized by considerable political engagement, often of separatist or anti-European orientation (about 10%). There are many various religious sects. As a rule, they are fee-paying, but due to the preachers’ rhetoric skills and their ability to attract attention, the sects are very popular among the local population. Orthodox Christianity is represented thinly (five parishes). It is professed by about 3% of the population. According to 2015 estimates, 10% of the Congolese are Muslims.
The largest number of adherents of Islam is concentrated in the east of the country, in the Provinces of Orientale, Maniema, and in the north of Katanga. In the DROC, along with Christian buildings for public worship, there are 70 mosques belonging to different Muslim communities: Pakistani, Iranian, Lebanese, Indian and others.
Year by year, the percentage of the Congolese people professing Islam is growing. This is partly promoted by the presence of Muslim peacemakers in the country, who serve with the UN Stabilization Mission in the DROC, and by numerous Pakistani military units that provide financial support for the Islamic communities, in particular in construction of mosques. The severe internal political, economic and social situation in the country fosters the spread of the radical wing of Islam.
In one of the author’s conversations that took place in Kinshasa in 2013, Sheikh Abdalah Mangal told that the Islamic Community in the DROC has nothing to do with so-called radical, aggressive Islamists. The Community is thoroughly monitoring manifestations of proselytism with the purpose of nipping it in the bud; it aims at reconciling hostile ethnic groups, at settlement of conflict situations including those in the east of the country, and stands for consolidation of the peoples of various religious confessions. Muslims try to spread and introduce their culture, open schools and provide humanitarian assistance to the poverty-ridden Congolese population. However, according to the Mufti, in spite of the attractiveness of Islam, the Congolese authorities inhibit the spread of this religion in the “Catholic country”. He gave the following example. On April 18, 2013, the Minister of Justice and Human Rights of the DROC signed a decree on suspension of the activities of the Islamic Community for three months (the reasons are not disclosed). The decree was abolished after the Mufti had argued against it and appealed to the Congolese authorities.
As Congolese analysts assert, although within the period of 2011–2014 no radical Islamists’ organizations were detected in the country, still there are certain fears about penetration of jihadist ideas. According to the experts, the Muslim influence is, albeit slowly, but moving to the DROC. In the west the “Muslim wave” is coming from Mali and Nigeria; in the east — from Kenya through Uganda and Rwanda; in the south — from Tanzania and Zambia; and in the north — from the Central African Republic (the CAR), subsequent to the coup in March 2013.
It is Mali — the “citadel” of Islamism in Africa — which is often named by the experts an “epicenter of the spread” of radical Islam. They do not exclude that the conflict between Salafists, who differ dogmatically, ideologically, politically and culturally, can be brought to the Republic Congo, similar to the conflict between Tutsis and Hutus in Rwanda in 1994, which was brought to the DROC from outside. In this regard, a large Malian community in the DROC, living by its own laws and having its own mosque, raises certain concerns. Another threat originates in Nigeria, where ethnic antagonisms between the “Christian south” and the “Muslim north” pose a real danger, up to division of the country into two states. Consequences of the conflict may well have an effect on the central region of Africa where the refugees of different faiths will rush into. As a result, “foreign” problems will affect the already existing ethnic and religious contradictions. A serious danger is also posed by crossing the “unconsolidated” border by militants-illegal aliens from South Sudan, who partially “settled down” in the DROC. This makes the Congolese society extremely vulnerable in the face of the permanent terrorist threat.
Another source of threat of the spread of Islam in the DROC is the neighboring Central African Republic (CAR) where, as already noted, a coup took place. According to MONUSCO Russian military observers, on December 5, 2013, near the residential community of Zongo in the Province of Équateur (the DROC), bordering the residential community of Bangun (the CAR), armed clashes broke out between the Muslim Seleka and the Christian Antibalaka organization. By the experts’ assumption, the ethnic conflict escalated as a result of mass activity of French troops, which deployed the “Sangaris” (which means “red butterfly” in Swahili) operation in the CAR. It was also reported that about 10 militaries of the Seleka movement oppositional to the CAR government entered the DROC territory. Streams of refugees from the CAR were crossing the border and “dissolving” in the forests of the DROC since they did not want to stay in the refugee camps because of the unstable situation in the region. The Congolese people, who lived in the areas bordering the CAR, also responded to the situation and fled from the country. Generally, the situation complicated because the civilian population of the DROC was extremely irritated by the aliens from the neighboring country who provoked conflicts and worsened the already disastrous conditions in the state. The incomers were not only “pressing” the local population in the Province of Équateur, but were also bringing with them Islamic culture alien to the Congolese Christians and to those, who adhere to the local faiths. According to the UNHCR, in May 2014 in the DROC, there were about 70 thousand refugees from the CAR and six thousand Congolese returnees. In addition to the arriving refugees, another problem arose in the country. The CAR militants started seizing the DROC territory. The risks of migration processes and the destabilization associated with them are addressed in details in analytical notes by Russian researchers K. Borishpolets and A. Babadzhanov [Borishpolets K., Babadzhanov A. 2007: 3-7].
The threat of radical Islam in the DROC and other African countries comes not only from the East and the Maghreb. After the investigations of the terrorist attack that was carried out in Nairobi on September 21, 2013 (67 people died), the non-governmental organization Red Cross came to the conclusion that the militants had also been recruited in Europe. Germans, Scandinavians, Americans were among them. According to the European Union Counter-Terrorism Coordinator Gilles de Kerchove, “it is necessary to find out how people get there”. In Belgium, for example, there exists an organization for recruiting mercenaries, the so-called Sharia4Belgium Organization (L’Organisation de la Chariat pour la Belgique). European mercenaries were seen in Syria and Kenya [Les Shebabs…L’Observateur 2013: P. 11].
The eastern regions of the DROC are the most vulnerable and susceptible to jihadist influence. Considerable length and “unconsolidated” nature of borders with 9 neighbour countries, geological and climatic characteristics (mountainous terrain, multilayer equatorial forest, rainfall seasons) along with the absence of roads and traffic infrastructure precondition the inefficiency of the border safety system and create a “back door” not only for cross-border criminality, but also Islamic revivalists.
The growth of terrorism spread by armed groups on the African continent as a whole is the additional risk factor for the destabilization of situation. For more than a decade illegal armed groups, the members of which profess Islam, have been acting in the eastern part of the DROC (North Kivu and South Kivu provinces, Orientale and the northern part of Katanga) uncontrolled by central authorities. These were primarily the Uganda Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) groups. Consequently, flashpoints of conflict emerge and create opportunities for terrorist attacks. As a rule, the criminal activity of illegal armed groups is connected with illegal exploitation of valuable natural resources, being smuggled abroad, and with uncontrolled cash flow. Leaders of illegal armed groups quite often control the process of valuable minerals and metals extraction and selling on the black market, using locals as free labour in the mines. In remote areas civilians often become victims of robbery, lawlessness and violence inflicted by various military forces. Local population is tortured and humiliated, often killed, robbed of cattle; their houses are burned and their crops are destroyed. There are numerous cases of people being kidnapped into slavery. Some of them are used for service support of gunmen in the rear, others are forced to participate in combat operations. Recruiting of child soldiers deprived of education and prone to psychological traumas remains a painful problem. Gunmen use underage children as labour force under the threat of bodily harm. It provokes mass exodus of population into the frontier zones where new centres of tension emerge.
Authorities of the Republic are gravely concerned by such actions of militants as ransom kidnappings, including those of foreigners. Thus, in April 2010, in the province of Équateur the illegal armed group of Enyele rebels took a number of foreign citizens hostage to draw attention of the international community to their activity. At the same time they occupied the airport and municipal buildings of the provincial capital of Mbandaka.
The situation is aggravated by the catastrophic condition of social sphere, extreme poverty of population, non-payment of monetary allowances to the members of national army. Destitute population, largely comprised of young people, is the most susceptible to Islamist influence, which promises to improve their living conditions. They are the people who join armed groups and unwillingly become carriers of the ideas of Islam.
Virtually all the neighbouring counties are involved in extraction and sales of valuable raw materials on foreign markets. According to experts, over 80% of the DROC economy remains shadow, and so far nobody sees the way out of this dramatic situation. Experts state that there are mafia formations in this field having direct access to offshore centres. Customs Administration of the Democratic Republic of the Congo intends to fight money laundering, illicit trade and cross-border criminality at large. On November 21, 2013, they signed the Memorandum of Understanding with the Judicial Police of the Public Prosecution Office. This document proposes a programme for enforcement of customs officers’ authority, which is aimed at criminal investigations. Article 2 of the Memorandum states that “the Judicial Police of Public Prosecution Office is obliged to provide education for customs officers within the prescribed time limits and create, with assistance of Interpol, the database of the Customs Administration aimed at combating theft”[ Lutte contre la criminalité transfrontalière…Le Potentiel. Kinshasa 2013: P. 10]. In their reports, based on facts and investigations, human rights nongovernmental organizations like Human Rights Watch draw special attention to correlation between income from sales of contraband goods on world market and illegal arms traffic in the eastern regions of the DROC. Considerable amounts of arms and uncontrolled cash flow enter combat operation zones. In the context of armed groups activity there arises a problem of illicit trade in small arms acquired in exchange for the so called “conflict diamonds” (compact and convenient form of mutual payments). Strengthening of control over illicit trade in small arms, which is detrimental to relations between the DROC, Rwanda and Uganda, is still one of the sensitive issues for the whole region.
Militants from illegal armed groups commit terrorist acts not only overland. From time to time, the mass media reports on piracy on Lake Tanganyika. According to witnesses, it is highly unadvisable for cargo vessels to appear on the lake after 6 PM (i. e. at nightfall). Thus, on the night of July 1, 2014, Mai-Mai Yakutumba rebels attacked a merchant vessel near the City of Uvira (South Kivu Province). Pirates forced the captain to give them two thousand dollars, defueled the vessel and stole the board instrument. According to the report, militants were well armed and trained [Des miliciens Maï-Maï arraisonnent…Le Potentiel 2014: P. 9]. A similar incident took place in 2011, when armed combatants hijacked “Maman Wundja” vessel (about 100 passengers and 40 tonnes of cargo were on board) sailing across Lake Tanganyika from Uvira (South Kivu Province) to Moba (Katanga Province), and made the captain change the course, virtually taking him hostage [Les Maï-Maï Yakutumba prennent…APA. Kinshasa 2011: P. 8].
National separatists fuel terrorism in the DROC. According to estimates by authorities, over the last decade the most active was the religious and political movement Bundu dia Kongo. During the transition period (from 2003 to 2005), this organization controlled the largest part of the Lower Congo Province, advocating its complete independence as historical successor of the Great Kingdom of Kongo. Although after conflicts between the followers of movement and law enforcement forces in spring of 2008 the activity of Bundu dia Kongo was officially banned, it has not lost its “audience” and continues to influence its followers. Formally, the slogans of Bundu dia Kongo seem quite democratic. For example, in the proclamation of October 8, 2012, representatives of this organization call for protection of the Bakongo people [Document de l’organisation réligieuse de la RD Congo «Bundu dia Kongo»…Kinshasa 2012: P. 3].
Bursts of separatist sentiment fostering national differences are constantly observed in the Katanga Province. In the middle of 2014, Kata Katanga illegal armed group militants announced that on June 11, on the anniversary of proclamation of the Republic of Katanga, which existed from 1960 to 1963 but was not recognized by the world community, they intended to seize its provincial capital, the City of Lubumbashi. The purpose of seizing the second most important city after the capital was to proclaim independence of Katanga once again and plant their flag at the strategic sites of the city. They considered the monument to Moise Tshombe, “the President” of the Republic of Katanga, as one of such sites. Although the announcement of Kata Katanga was not implemented and only frightened the civilians with gunfire, security agencies including military and police forces were prepared to meet the attack with a massive array of military equipment [Tensions à Lubumbashi…Agence Presse Associée. Kinshasa 2014: P. 1].
One of the ways for Islam to penetrate the DROC is trading with neighbouring countries. “Trust relations in business”, a Congolese diplomat said in a conversation, “create a fertile ground for discussing, among all, religious topics”. Besides, long distance drivers, for example, from Tanzania and Zambia, as bearers of Islamic culture are considered here to be spreading Islam in the eastern and western parts of Congo. As the diplomat emphasized, the National Committee for the Coordination of Anti-International Terrorism cooperates with regional and international organizations in this field, and “uses analytical potential of the CIA”. According to him, this organization traced the activity of Somalian radical Salafi Ash-Shabaab movement, which was founded in the DROC. It was created in 2000 (translated from Arabic as “youth”) and is the part of Al-Qaeda, which seeks to establish strong relations within the DROC. In 2011 Ash-Shabaab emissaries tried to contact Islamic organizations in the eastern regions of the country, primarily in South Kivu Province, where Pakistani subunits of MONUSCO were quartered. The Islamic group Ash-Shabaab claimed responsibility for a terrorist attack in the capital of neighbouring Uganda, the City of Kampala, on July 11, 2010. The Ugandan authorities stated that terrorists supposedly entered the country from the territory of the DROC. Military command of Uganda put forward a public assumption of Ash-Shabaab connection with Uganda rebel anti-government ADF group, based in the western regions of the DROC.
Ash-Shabaab counts 7 to 9 thousand militants from various illegal armed groups [Kongo 2013: P. 12]. The prospect of its penetrating the DROC poses an additional grave threat to both national security of the country and improvement of conditions in the central region of Africa as a whole. In the interview to the Potentiel magazine Congolese researcher of the problems of Islam Valentina Soria mentioned that Ash-Shabaab aims to adapt to the local African cultures, thus capturing political and economic space and establishing stable relations [Cinq questions…Le Potentiel. 10.10.2013: P. 4].
One of the documents, which was ostensibly left in the car of Fazul Abdullah Mohammed from Ash-Shabaab and later got into the Canadian newspaper The Toronto Star, contains information about special operation performed in Bombay in 2008, in Nairobi in 2013, and in The Ritz Hotel in London. In the same document it is also said that such countries as Uganda, Ethiopia and Burundi are considered to be “the enemies of Islam” and are to be fought against by all means. Arming of the adherents of Islam is also mentioned. They consider Kalashnikov rifle to be “a bulky weapon” and prefer to arm themselves with guns and hunting knives! [Cinq questions…Le Potentiel. 10.10.2013: P. 4].
Radical Islam and terrorism are constantly in the focus of Congolese authorities’ attention. Article 52 of the Constitution serves as a ground for banning terrorist activities. It states: “No individual or group of individuals may use part of the national territory as a basis for subversive or terrorist activities against the Congolese State or any other state” [La Constitution de la Republique Démocratique du Congo 2006: P. 23]. The issues of antiterrorist and anti-criminal activities as well as of spreading revivalism are among priorities in the work of the DROC security agencies, as in the eastern regions of the country there constantly emerge flash points of military conflict, which are fertile ground for serious terrorist attacks. The National Committee for the Coordination of Anti-International Terrorism investigates these issues. This body was established by the Presidential Decree No. 070/2001 as of 26 December 2001. This regulatory act is, in fact, the only internal document regulating interdepartmental cooperation in this field.
The activity of the Committee is controlled directly by the Head of State, while the Special Adviser to the Head of State on Security is responsible for coordination. In accordance with the Decree, the tasks of the Committee include executive decision-making on all the issues in the field of fighting terrorism, coordination of application of the field-specific international conventions, development and conduct of national activities, provision of corresponding cooperation with foreign countries and international organizations. Among the members of the Committee there are Ministers of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation (the post is currently divided in two), Minister of National Security (the post was abolished), Minister of Defence, Minister of the Interior, Minister of Justice, military, political and diplomatic advisers to the Head of State, and Special Adviser to the Head of State on security. The latter acts as the permanent Secretary of the Committee and controls the work of its technical secretariat.
Kinshasa is the member of several international and regional conventions in the field of antiterrorist protection, including the African Union. It supports similar initiatives in the network of subregional organizations. In May 2008, under the auspices of the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism the decision was made about cooperation in the field within the Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS), brought back to life by efforts of the DROC.
As the present study has shown, the prospect of radical Islam spreading in the DROC poses a certain threat to both national security and improvement of conditions on the African continent as a whole. As of now, Congo still has not reached the so-called “red mark,” signifying the reign of terrorists. However, it may happen that tomorrow terrorists’ hegemonic ambitions will spread to this central African country as well [Des terrorists menacent…Le Phare.Kinshasa 2012. P.2]. “Vacuum” of governmental authorities in the provinces of the country creates favourable conditions for spread of terrorist attacks. Being weak, security agencies currently cannot ensure safety in these regions. Congolese politicians state that if the territory of the country is not controlled by the authorities, army and the republican police (taking into account geostrategic situation of the DROC on the African continent), nothing can constrain the surge of terrorists, who have already set foot in Libya, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Chad, Somalia, Kenya, Sudan and South Sudan. It may happen that the ideas of revivalists from the “Islamic State” (ISIL) group, formed in 2014, will also be promoted in the African countries. It will cause new flash points of religion-based conflicts, which, combined with the “traditional” conflicts, such as, for example, ethnic ones, will further complicate political and military situation in some African countries and will lead to armed conflicts.
Taking into consideration the important role of religious denominations in political life and shaping of public opinion in African countries, spread of Orthodoxy and its cultural values can act as a counter-force to aggressive Islam in Africa, as well as religious extremism at large. Greek communities, which, in addition to religious worship use religious institutes and local congregation to address their own political and economic issues, should play an important role in developing and supporting Orthodox culture.
*Natalia Zerlitsina, Institute of International Relations and Social and Political Sciences, Moscow State Linguistic University
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Cybercrime attacks and identification of actors
Given the nature of the cyber space, although the allocation of a set of malicious acts to a particular actor appears to be quite complex, there are many elements that allow cybercriminals to run.
Geo-strategic texture and technical texture can facilitate the assignment of hostile acts to responsible actors: for example, in a cybercrime attack on Estonia, although the official Russian services did not directly operate to neutralize the servers of the country, but consider It appears that Russia has played a significant role in the attack. Of course, it can not be said that this is the only decisive factor in identifying an actor, since in some cases many actors may be suspected of carrying out an attack, or that even actors may be attacked and try to act as a third party actor. Accused It may even be possible for a government to take responsibility for cyberattacks against its rival to increase its containment position.
In some circumstances, a state that has used the infrastructure and equipment used to commit malicious acts is also responsible for and charged. Thus, in countries where there are no judicial authorities to identify prosecution of cybercrime or cybercriminals, some actions cause them to be identified as responsible or collaborators of a cyber invasion. In this way, governments, as well as groups providing hacker refuge services or facilitating their operations in an attack, can be held responsible.
Also, governments refusing to cooperate in carrying out criminal investigations on their territory are also partly responsible for the attack. In fact, in some cyber attacks, we find that some malicious acts do not occur without participation, support, tacit consent, or even lack of corrective / preventive measures by governments.
In some cases, even if there are many indications regarding the participation of actors in an attack, it is difficult to provide documentary evidence to accuse them; and this uncertainty makes the adoption of preventive countermeasures extremely sensitive.
But by expanding the concept of “multinational response”, this problem can be addressed. This concept is:
– Increase the capabilities of the analysis and investigation of the attack, through the synergy between state-owned technical equipment and the expansion of judicial and military cooperation.
– Achieving a common right to condemn a hostile act and its possible writer – governments and non-governmental groups – through the creation of a unified vote, which is based on unprocessed joint evidence.
Governments and member organizations of this multinational system can rely on this solution to a certain level of cyber-deterrence. In addition, if the participants in this system define the necessity of imposing compulsory or punitive measures, its deterrence will increase sharply.
Joseph Snee in his book, Cyber Power, cited this special dimension of cybercrime: “Since false flags are not complete, rumors of the source of cyber attacks seem to be valid.” (Although it is not measurable in a court of law), the damage done to the soft power of a cyber attacker can contribute to deterring attacks. ”
The actor’s reputation in cyberspace is particularly valuable in comparison to other environments. Many online actors are known by their internet users because of their reputation (honesty, competence, access to reliable information, independence, etc.) and have many followers. The opinions expressed, the analyses provided and the information provided by these actors, are relatively reliable given their positive or negative reputation.
In fact, the reputation of governments, real people and legal people on the Internet creates a real cyber identity, which is achieved through the familiarity of classical interactions. Cyberspace cybercrime is more cumbersome and more volatile than virtual space.
Companies, for example, are placed against actors who are often not well-known, who can publish them on the Internet using simple materials related to their products, products or partners.
In fact, it is a serious challenge to be charged with casting cybercrime. In the same vein, blow to credit can be a means of deterring them from participating in a malicious act.
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