In February, an eye-opening new report was released by the Program on Extremism at The George Washington University. This 116-page report, The Travelers: American Jihadists in Iraq and Syria, is a powerful mix of the best of political science and sociology. It exposes the reader to both the definitions and statistics around American- and European-based jihadist travelers, while also providing context via meaningfully detailed backstories of a select few cases.
While this report makes excellent distinctions between the much larger community of European-based jihadists compared to the smaller and more isolated American-based one, there are several key aspects of radical recruitment that deserve further research and greater elaboration.
Addressing Isolation in Immigrant Communities
It is clear that the past three years in America have seen an increase in the same small-scale acts of terrorism that were recently only taking place in Europe.
While the report acknowledges that there is much fanfare about the Islamic State’s savvy use of social media and technology to do “abroad recruiting,” it finds that a personal touch still plays a big role in developing successful recruits who venture all the way over to Iraq and Syria.
In the United States, evidence points to a loosely connected network of radicalization that dates all the way back to the Balkans ethnic conflict in the early 1990s. This provides further evidence of the “social Balkanization” that has remained stubbornly prevalent in the United States when it comes to newer waves of emigrant populations.
The GW report acknowledges the feelings of isolation in many new recruits in America. However, it does not make a connection between the isolation of individuals and the clear failures of select communities to successfully integrate immigrants into American culture. The report does not address this problem, largely because it considers the alienation and isolation process in Europe to be more stark than in America. However, I am not entirely sure this presumption is true and it is certainly not provided for in the report in any evidentiary way.
It also seems clear that the perpetrators of those acts are remarkably similar in their feelings of isolation and alienation from the home culture, whether they are Belgian, French, English, or American. Understanding why some groups in the modern era are coming to the United States but not finding any great attraction to the political and social values of America could be a huge leap in helping law enforcement agencies ascertain where the most vulnerable communities are and which people are most susceptible to such pernicious recruitment.
As a whole, the American diplomatic, social assistance, and academic communities have not done an adequate job investigating the phenomenon best described as being “in the West” but never truly becoming “of the West.” It is this aspect of the recruitment process that is not yet examined in any report but deserves much greater attention.
The gap that supposedly exists between Europe and America in the GW report may in fact be closing and we need to come to terms with its consequences. The report suggests that the West’s success in destroying the political goal of the Islamic State in establishing a Caliphate across the greater Middle East could harbor an unintended negative consequence: Robbing ISIS of the opportunity to achieve their ultimate goal at home may spur recruitment to initiate “revenge” violence back in the West.
Why ISIS’s Recruitment Strategy is More Successful Than al-Qaeda
The report glosses over one of the more unfortunate “successes” of the Islamic State since its inception that makes this so-called “revenge” terrorism more likely: namely, its ability to overcome what I have in the past called al-Qaeda’s “9/11 Syndrome.”
In many regards, al-Qaeda fell victim to its own surprise success with 9/11. After hitting the Pentagon and seeing the total destruction of the Twin Towers, al-Qaeda succumbed to a unique version of self-imposed peer pressure: after such a devastating and history-changing attack, the group would be hard-pressed to consider itself successful if future initiatives only amounted to bus bombings, car attacks, or individual suicide-vest bombers. Such minor acts would only be seen as a regression of relevance and impact.
This has been one of the great conundrums of American counter-terrorist strategists: Was the success in preventing a second 9/11 because of how quickly we reacted and learned from our mistakes? Or was it because al-Qaeda became obsessed with only perpetrating a second version of 9/11, no longer satisfied with smaller-scale acts of terrorism?
We may never know the answer, but what seems clear as a point of distinction between the two terrorist groups is that the Islamic State took any act of terrorism to be a successful act as long as it caused injury, chaos, and death. This is why its social media recruitment is more powerful and more effective than al-Qaeda’s: If you can achieve the same heavenly rewards of martyrdom for an act you can easily commit yourself with little-to-no training and/or consultation (such as blowing up a bus or randomly shooting at people in a nightclub) and don’t need to travel very far from home, then why bother trying to pull off a much more complicated and less-likely-to-succeed fantasy act of high terrorism in a foreign land?
The Islamic State was not handcuffed by the success of 9/11 and its most dangerous weapon so far in terms of Westerner recruitment has been its ability to characterize smaller acts of terrorism as being valuable and important. The report touches on the edge of this reality but does not investigate it fully by encapsulating it within the possibility of “revenge” terrorism. This is where the true epicenter of home-grown Islamic State fanaticism in America is likely to grow and emerge and is therefore an area that needs to be investigated more seriously.
Impacts on Counterterrorism Strategies
The unfortunate truth, as highlighted in the report, is that the perpetrators of future acts of homegrown terror in the United States – motivated by Islamic State recruitment – might only be getting more isolated and more socially alienated, thus becoming harder to detect and preempt. As the Islamic State leans ever-more heavily on social media, demanding less personal contact and perhaps no requirement for foreign travel and training, the prevalence of “lone wolf” acts are likely to become more dominant.
Unfortunately, our methods of counter-terrorism may also be growing antiquated. If this is so, then important reports like “The Travelers” will depressingly become out-of-date much faster than we would like and the emergence of “Jihadi Janes and Johns” will not be marked by travel overseas or by direct personal contacts with known radicalized communities.
Up to now, we have hoped and relied upon that patchwork of loose radicalized elements, centered around well-known communities within major American cities, to produce the most highly motivated recruits, thereby giving us ample evidence of where to focus our law enforcement efforts.
Which leaves one disturbing counter-terrorist Faustian bargain hanging in the air: which do you find more terrifying? Terrorist acts that are large-scale and highly planned, resulting in greater casualties but are quite rare? Or terrorist acts that are smaller-scale and random, resulting in fewer casualties, but are far more common?
Deepening our understanding of evolving recruitment strategies can help us prevent both types of attacks.
Effective measures to control Afghan border
It is essential to point out before dwelling upon this issue that international terrorism in its current shape remains one of the most challenging global threats. The area of responsibility of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) is no exception.
Even though the Islamic State, Al-Qaeda (which are banned in the Russian Federation), and the armed terrorist groups linked to them have sustained severe losses both in Syria and Iraq, we are nevertheless concerned about a serious threat coming from these international terrorist organizations.
The fact is that it would be a mistake to underestimate the ability of present-day terrorists to, figuratively speaking, mimicry, quickly adapt to the changing environment. So, as soon as it became clear that the above mentioned terrorist structures were facing a defeat in the Middle East, their leaders began to reorganize the system of command and control of their groups and units. While they were doing so, they focused on training militants to popularize extremist ideology and recruit new members, to raise financial support, and to mount units responsible for the preparation and execution of terrorist attacks.
In a word, terrorist leaders devised a fairly effective strategy which envisaged regrouping forces and resources according to the network principle. According to experts, in practice this means a well-coordinated approach in place of a chaotic movement of interconnected and autonomous Islamic State groups from the Middle East to countries of Europe, Central and Southeast Asia. Incidentally, foreign terrorists do not have any particular difficulty in entering countries of their further stay, since they use mainly legal channels of labor and humanitarian migration.
Naturally, CSTO experts are keeping an eye on this so-called “rotation”. The stake is on foreign terrorists returning to countries of origin or settling on the territory of other states. Before that, they, as a rule, are trained in Islamist camps, acquire the skills of subversive and sabotage activity, and, finally, set up underground cells. Thereby, as they say, they automatically increase the combat potential of existing terrorist groups and structures.
As for the CSTO area of responsibility, what triggers particular concern is the situation in Afghanistan. The fact is that international terrorist organizations in Afghanistan are reinforced by terrorists from Syria whose major purpose is to create the so-called “Islamic Caliphate Khorasan” with its further spread to the neighboring states of Central Asia. Unfortunately, the situation is aggravated by the fact that there are quite a few citizens of the CSTO member states in these terrorist organizations. Accordingly, we are aware only too well that under the circumstances the threat of terrorist acts on the territory of our states increases significantly.
What should we do given the situation, and what has already been done?
First of all, proceeding from the analysis of the situation on the border between the CSTO and Afghanistan, the CSTO heads of state, during the Council’s meeting in October 2016, took a “decision to introduce additional measures to counter international terrorism and extremism, which provide for a number of organizational steps to boost political and military cooperation and strengthen the CSTO’s antiterrorist potential. ”
As a result of this, the Organization has significantly increased the effectiveness of its annual regional operations. Among these is Operation “Channel” to combat drug-related crime, operations to curb illegal migration, codenamed “Illegal”, and “PROXY” – an operation to counter crimes committed with the use of information technology.
Thanks to the above measures, in 2018 alone, the law enforcement agencies confiscated over 16 tons of drugs, psychotropic and strong-impact substances, 407 units of rifled firearms, detained 443 people from the international wanted list, started 30 criminal cases on crimes related to terrorism and extremism, and exposed more than 10 thousand information resources that were disseminating information in the interests of terrorist and extremist organizations.
What other measures? An operation codenamed “Mercenary” was held in the spring of 2019 as part of the CSTO’s “Additional measures”. It was designed to block the recruitment channels, the entry and exit of citizens of the CSTO member states to participate in the activities of international terrorist organizations and neutralize their resource base in the CSTO area of responsibility.
Besides, a special task force has been formed and is training intensively with a view to address counter-terrorism agenda within the CSTO Collective Rapid Reaction Forces.
It is quite obvious that military exercises “Border”, “Interaction”, “Indestructible Brotherhood” and a number of special drills and operations conducted in tandem with the Collective Forces have become a serious deterrent and a demonstration of the intentions of the CSTO to resort to force if necessary.
I would also like to say a few words about preventive measures which are being taken by the relevant CSTO structures. According to the analysis of the situation in the Afghan provinces bordering the southern borders of the CSTO, not only has there been reported an intensification of terrorist activities, but there has also been a significant increase in drug production. According to the UN Agency on Drugs and Crime, Afghanistan remains one of the world’s leaders in the production and export of opiates – today it accounts for more than 80% of the global drug market.
Here are some more facts and figures to this account. Reports say the gross annual income of international terrorist organizations in Afghanistan ranges from 300 to 400 million dollars. About 200 million dollars come from underground drug production. Operating in the provinces of Kunduz and Takhar, bordering Tajikistan, are 48 large drug groups that, in cooperation with international terrorist organizations, smuggle drugs out of the country in exchange for weapons and ammunition.
It is no wonder then that such terrorist structures have been making their presence felt and have been expanding the scope of their activities. As a result, clashes between law enforcement agencies of Afghanistan and the country’s irreconcilable armed opposition, as well as terrorist activities of the Taliban movement, of militants of the Afghan wing of ISIL (Vilayat Khorasan) and other similar organizations have long become habitual. Moreover, according to expert estimates, the intensity of hostilities in 2018 increased by almost 40% compared to the previous year. The beginning of 2019 saw a series of terrorist acts, including in Kabul, and an increasing activity of terrorists in the provinces of Kandahar, Faryab and Farah.
And one more important observation. According to analytical services of the CSTO, military operations in Afghanistan have shifted to the northern provinces — to the borders of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan. Clearly, by the end of 2018, most of the northern areas of Afghanistan had found themselves instability zones or areas under permanent control of militants of the armed opposition.
However, an increase in hostilities on the border with Tajikistan is a minor thing compared to other issues of concern. There is growing concern over the fact that another terrorist enclave controlled by ISIL (banned in the Russian Federation) is de facto being formed in the provinces of Jowzjan and Sari-Pul, which are located very close to the Turkmen border. According to the expert community, there exists a real threat of traditional one-man sabotage terrorist acts, and of a direct invasion of armed terrorist units with the establishment of control over transnational criminal networks related to drug smuggling and the creation of uninterrupted drug trafficking channels in the CIS countries.
Apparently, amid the present instability in the IRA, the Afghan issue is permanently on the agenda of the statutory bodies of the CSTO. Given the situation, it is very important that the Organization is developing and implementing projects of the CSTO Intergovernmental Program on the strengthening of the Tajik-Afghan border and is following the List of Additional Measures aimed at reducing tension on the Tajik-Afghan border.
In addition, a Working Group on Afghanistan was set up at the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the CSTO, which examines the situation in the country and drafts recommendations aimed at coordinating regional security efforts.
Notably, experts from the United Nations, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the OSCE Secretariat and regional anti-terrorist structures participate in meetings of the Working Group on a regular basis.
Undoubtedly, all the above measures pursued by CSTO funtion as a deterrent containing the activities of international terrorist organizations within our area of responsibility.
From our partner International Affairs
The Nuclear Dimension of Cyber Threats
The subject of the interrelation of threats in the fields of information and communication technologies and nuclear weapons is gradually becoming one of the dominant topics in current international security issues. In early summer 2019, a group of researchers working under the auspices of the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) presented the Russian version of the “Nuclear Weapons in the New Cyber Age” report prepared by the Cyber-Nuclear Weapons Study Group (hereinafter referred to as the NTI Report). Russian assessments of the proposals put forward by American experts may contribute to finding constructive solutions that may be ultimately transferred to international communication platforms.
Understanding the Threats
The NTI Report is structured very logically and succinctly. The authors give specific examples using formalized scenarios and demonstrate the practical dimension of specific threats and their consequences. This is followed by concrete proposals. On the whole, this approach is conducive to understanding the essence of certain phenomena and is useful both for experts in the area under consideration and for the general public. Moreover, one would like to think that decision-makers in various countries will be interested in the problems considered.
The authors considered four “illustrative scenarios”:
Scenario 1: Warning systems provide false indications of a nuclear attack during a crisis.
Scenario 2: A cyberattack disrupts communications between officials, operators and nuclear systems, and/or international counterparts in a potential crisis.
Scenario 3: An adversary introduces a flaw or malevolent code into nuclear weapons through the supply chain or otherwise in a way that could compromise the effectiveness of those weapons
Scenario 4: An adversary is able to achieve unauthorized control of a nuclear weapon through cyber-assisted theft and/or defeating of security devices.
These scenarios look quite realistic. We will not go into detailed descriptions (or, more precisely, retellings) of them. A brief summary is given in Figure 1.
At the same time, we will note that each scenario has an element of simplification, which is generally justified from the point of view of the research objectives. An important clarification should be made, at least for the first scenario. An early warning system comprises many elements, and it is highly improbable that the decision to deliver a retaliatory strike will be made on the basis of a single sub-system. The probability of the “entire set” malfunctioning or being hacked and providing the exact same information appears to be very low. At the same time, when nuclear powers are in a crisis that has an obvious military aspect to it, the threat of a hastily made decision will also increase.
A Search for Solutions
The authors of the NTI Report propose the following three guiding principles that should be taken into account when developing approaches to minimizing the risk of cyber threats against nuclear weapons:
- The United States will continue to require a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear deterrent as long as nuclear weapons remain a central element of its security strategy.
- Technical measures alone are unable to completely eliminate the cyber threat to nuclear weapons.
- The cyber challenge is global, and a unilateral approach is not sufficient.
These principles appear to be quite sound and constructive. Item 1 is certainly reasonable for Russia and for other nuclear powers.
Maybe such statements should be also reflected in bilateral (or even multilateral) declarations on international security issues and strategic stability. Naturally, conditions should emerge first for such declarations.
The experts make several very specific proposals, which are grouped as follows:
reducing the risk of launch as a result of miscalculation;
reducing risks to the nuclear deterrent;
reducing the risk of unauthorized use;
taking a global approach to the cyber threat to nuclear weapons systems.
On the whole, this approach seems logical, but the feasibility of these proposals is questionable.
Certainly, the key task shared by all nuclear powers is to guarantee the impossibility of accidentally interfering with nuclear weapons and related infrastructure through information and communication technologies. What is problematic is the attitude of various states to interference that is deliberate, i.e. intentionally carried out by government services against probable adversaries. This contradiction sharply limits the room for joint action to minimize threats.
In particular, the recommendation contained in the NTI Report on bilateral and multilateral steps towards developing certain new rules of behaviour in cyberspace are unlikely to be fully implemented. This is primarily due to one of the key features of cyber weapons: the impossibility of reliably ascertaining the adversary’s target, even if the malware itself has been detected. Identical cyber weapons can be used to collect information and interfere with the systems into which the malware has been introduced.
Unilateral and Multilateral Approaches
At the same time, much can be done in the context of unilateral measures to minimize cyber threats.
It would seem that the most important task in this area is the training of qualified military personnel for the nuclear forces. Excellent knowledge of relevant weapons and military equipment, as well as the rules of operation in any situation and basic “digital hygiene” will evidently contribute to the overall reduction of threats.
Comprehensive rules and regulations for protecting equipment from external interference already exist. However, given that individual components are purchased from foreign manufacturers (this problem is relevant for both Russia and the United States), there is still danger of hardware implants. Let us hope that personnel of the relevant departments in the military and the special services have the necessary qualifications to detect such threats.
At the same time, certain national measures for enhancing the cyber protection of the nuclear weapons infrastructure should be compiled into some sort of “best practices” collection. Perhaps P5 countries (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) could prepare some handbooks to be distributed, for instance, as part of a Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference. This would to some extent demonstrate the responsible approach of recognized nuclear powers to current issues related to nuclear weapons.
As we have mentioned before, developing a relevant section in the Glossary of the Key Nuclear Terms could be a useful step, as fine-tuning the Glossary is supposedly still on the agenda. A dialogue based on a uniform conceptual and categorial framework leads to negotiations being more effective. At the same time, forming a uniform terminology should not be viewed as a trivial task. The solution of this task requires both political will and a deep understanding of the subject of negotiations. And still, even if such procedures do not have a positive outcome, such communications promote an improved understanding of assessments, approaches and paradigms among partners.
We should remember the Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China on strengthening global strategic stability today, which envisages, among other things, a joint “analysis of the regulation of new strategic security dimensions” related to the “possible impact of achievements in science and technology.” Moreover, Russia and China consider it appropriate to conduct a multilateral study of the relevant problems and their legal regulation on the basis of the United Nations.
Expanding the Context
As we have already mentioned, the crucial feature of cyber weapons (that kind of links it with “kinetic” weapons, primarily strategic weapons) is that the delivery vehicle and the payload are two different things: the same product can be used to introduce malware intended for monitoring and spying, as well as for control hacking and disabling.
Maybe classifying cyber weapons by hostile impact type can create conditions for searching for points of contact between various countries and international organizations. In general, the task of formalizing and coordinating definitions is one of the most complicated stages of any negotiation process, and a key stage that determines the success of the negotiations and the prospects for adapting the agreements to the rapidly changing reality against the backdrop of the scientific and technological progress.
As for deliberate cyberattacks that may be of interest to states that have the requisite capabilities, we should take note of the opinion of the UK-based Chatham House, which draws attention to the complex dynamics of military-political relations in the event of a further escalation in rhetoric concerning cyberattacks preventing combat missile launches as part of the so-called “left of launch” concept, which the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation calls “pre-start intercept.” The problem is that the hypothetical “Party A,” fearing an attack of such kindby “Party B,” may decide to use weapons at the early stages of a conflict. And if “Party B” is bluffing, then calling its bluff may result in the “failure” of the deterrent tactic. If “Party B” is confident in its supreme cyber capabilities, then its actions can easily become overconfident and result in a “hot” conflict.
Strictly speaking, the problem of the “rules of the game” in cyberspace is important in and of itself, without being tied to nuclear weapons. For instance, attempts can be made to train “cyber soldiers” to follow the rules of international humanitarian law, as, for instance, Professor Götz Neuneck from the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg (IFSH) suggests. And the specific content of such concepts as “proportionality” and “military necessity” when applied to cyberspace requires additional research. Joint international exercises, including those related to nuclear systems, ideally with the participation of “probable adversaries,” could be a useful event in this area. Thus, states could gain some experience of acting in a simulated combat situation and gain experience of interaction through emergency communication channels, which is of crucial importance.
Safe Communication Lines
For decades, information and communication technologies have been developing at breakneck speed, and the militarization of cyberspace accompanies these processes. In general, any technological changes result in new threats, and “Neo-Luddism” will hardly be a suitable cure for such threats. “Nuclear abolitionists” are unlikely to achieve their goals in the foreseeable future either: we are seeing a return to the international rivalry of great powers, and nuclear weapons are one of the principal elements confining death and destruction in the course of this rivalry within relatively moderate bounds.
The only way to preserve strategic stability and prevent catastrophic consequences from the incorrect use of nuclear weapons is to perform an in-depth analysis of the impact that new technologies have on the relevant systems. This analysis should be as open as possible and involve an element of international dialogue at both the state and expert levels. At the same time, it is necessary to “increase literacy” in information and communication technologies and nuclear weapons (and their control systems) both among military personnel and among civilian specialists and decision-makers. The NTI Report and the subsequent communication activities of its authors are a step in the right direction, especially since representatives of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation attended the presentation of the report at the Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences.
From our partner RIAC
Omani national security and the kind of political and military cooperation with the United States
Historical documentary evidence suggests that the United States has always had a strategic partner in the region. Oman is undoubtedly the closest Iranian southern neighbor to the Persian Gulf, with its common cultural and religious roots with the land of Iran. But it should be noted that the effects of convergence between the United States and Oman have an impact on Iran’s national security. Also, after the US Secretary of State Visits Oman and his visit to Sultan Qaboos and the Pompeo positions in Amman, the question is: How much is Oman to do with US sanctions against Iran?
Oman has a geographical isolation in the Arabian Peninsula. The country has only a frontier from its western region, and the three UAE, Saudi Arabia and Yemen are neighbors. On the other hand, the majority of the Abbasid religion of this country has led to its religious isolation in the Islamic world, and Wahhabism has entered into conflict with the followers of this religion several times since its inception, and still considers the abbots from the divergent difference of the Islamic world, And excuses.
Oman is relatively weak in the economic field, dependent on oil and the outside world. However, the Omani dealings with the United States are not high, and most of it is in the military arms sector. The demographic structure of this country, in particular the population of about 5% Shiite, who has a lot of strength and wealth, with the Baluchis, who have traveled to Oman many years before Iran, actually created a situation and the Omani government will not be in a relationship with Iran. If this issue is analyzed along with the influence of Wahhabism on the Omani population, it will be more important if it is to be analyzed.
It should be borne in mind that the Sunnis in Amman claim that they are the majority of the citizens of this country. Oman considers the Gulf Cooperation Council to be important in the framework of this cooperation, in addition to external problems, to prevent Arab aggression, the Omani are well aware of the history of Saudi Arabia’s deployment to its neighboring countries, and therefore the balance Power will not be pleasing to Saudi Arabia. Oman, which seeks to reduce dependence on oil and economic diversification in its 2020 and 2040 prospects, avoids any kind of conflict and conflict in the region, because the arrival of capital, tourists and goods, and services and manpower require security in this country. And stability in the region. They are working to strengthen Qatar in the Gulf Cooperation Council and are working with the United States to provide their own resources in the region, and because strengthening Qatar and removing Saudi and Qatari hostilities are in the interest of the country and necessary to curb Saudi Arabia. Greetings from the United States.
But the question is whether Oman can adopt an independent policy at the level of engagement with global powers such as the United States?
In August 2010, Oman and Iran signed a security agreement; of course, it cannot be said that the relations between Tehran and Muscat are generally without problems and is a full-fledged relationship; for example, the Oman navy does not participate in Iranian military maneuvers while Which is in the military maneuvers of the Gulf states, the United States, India and Pakistan. Oman has given America’s military partner its ports and bases. It has shown its willingness to participate in the US missile defense shield, which is aimed at creating security against Iran’s threat to the countries of the region.
From the point of view of Oman, the military conflict between the United States and Iran has a huge geopolitical and economic risk. To reduce this danger, the Omani government has acted as a bridge between Tehran and the West; that is why the Oman kingdom, unlike Saudi Arabia and some countries of the Cooperation Council, Which wants Iran to lose its position in the region, does not want Iran to be attacked by the military and tries to increase the capacity of Iran in the region by means of a synergy.
The geographic proximity of Iran and Oman in the Strait of Hormuz, Oman’s geographical remoteness from the Arab world, and the geopolitical and geopolitical importance of the Strait of Hormuz, Iran and Oman, have required good relations. Accordingly, and despite the fact that Oman has always had close ties with the United States, this has not had any effect on Iran’s friendly relations with the country. In fact, the different Muscat approach to the Tehran Cooperation Council has had a dramatic impact and has effectively reduced the influence of Riyadh on the smaller member states of the Council for the purpose of convergence, and undermined West’s efforts to isolate Tehran.
It should now be seen that in spite of important approaching variables such as geographic continuity, geopolitical situation in the region, oil, the need for stability in the region, and … the main causes of the security scene in the region.
In the past, in the context of security-related security with national power, there was a belief that with increasing military power security would increase, and with the number of military forces and equipment representing the power and security of each country, but now beliefs have changed and should be noted. National security is not a unilateral process that can only be increased by increasing its military power, but has a broad and comprehensive concept.
It is possible to maintain the national security of each political unit by increasing national power and balancing its constituent elements, and increasing one of these factors, if not accompanied by an increase in other factors, could threaten national security. In this regard, today, national security has taken a cross-border dimension; in other words, it is not just inside the border. Of course, security is not military power, so sometimes increased military strength reduces security and insecurity.
The Omanian kingdom has a different look at the position of the Gulf Cooperation Council on the issue of convergence; on the one hand, it contributes to economic issues within the framework of the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council, but on the other hand, in foreign policy and disputes between the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council Persian countries has not entered and has been trying to play a role in the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council by assuming the role of the Hammer of Equilibrium. However, now it seems that, despite the differences between Saudi Arabia and Qatar, it is not very willing to remain in the Gulf Cooperation Council. This approach may lead to a gap in the Gulf Cooperation Council, and will split countries into two different blocks. In this regard, Muscat tries to maintain its impartiality in the internal conflicts of this council as well as the differences between Iran and Arab countries, while playing a positive role.
Now the kingdom of Oman is not willing to pay for the rest of the world; therefore, in view of Muscat, Egypt’s entry into the Gulf Cooperation Union is very dangerous. On the other hand, the Omani kingdom does not differ much with other countries, but it is not pleasing to Saudi policies (which are trying to dictate their policies to other Gulf States). The country has repeatedly objected to Saudi apparent interference in foreign policy of the Gulf Cooperation Council, and if the situation continues, it is foreseeable that the Gulf Cooperation Council will collapse in the future, and even Qatar, along with the Oman kingdom, will cooperate with the Co-operation Council Gulf exits and form an alliance with Lebanon, Iraq and Syria. In contrast, Bahrain, UAE, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait are on the other.
In the future, Muscat tries to maintain its impartiality and, in its relations with the United States, the European Union, Saudi Arabia, and …, continues its policies and tries to play a positive role in resolving regional crises, as The meetings of Iran and the Western countries over the past years with Oman’s administration show that the king wants to mediate Iran’s relations with the West.
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